83d Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 83-239

83d Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 83-509

84th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 84-235

Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954

Volume XV

Korea

(in two parts)
Part 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Editor in Chief
John P. Glennon

Editor
Edward C. Keefer

United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1984

H920-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9347
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other Government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

> *a.* To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
>
> *b.* To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> *c.* To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> *d.* To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
>
> *e.* To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Edward C. Keefer compiled this volume under the supervision of John P. Glennon. Louis J. Smith assisted in declassification, and David W. Mabon in final editing. Margaret Roman prepared the lists of names and abbreviations.

Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Fredrick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume.

Vicki L. Ettleman performed technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

CONTENTS

Page

Preface III

Introduction VII

List of Abbreviations, Symbols, and Code Names XI

List of Persons XV

List of Sources XXV

PART 1

I. January 1–April 30, 1952: Narrowing the issues:
Agreement on the greater sanctions statement; continuation of the military armistice negotiations at Panmunjom; postponement of discussion of Korea at the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly; decision on the policy of voluntary repatriation; South Korean economic problems; decision on the package proposal at Panmunjom; Operation Scatter; delivery of the package proposal 1

II. May 1–July 14, 1952: The South Korean political crisis and third party approaches to end the war:
POW incidents; the Meyer mission; Korean political crisis; Indian-Chinese discussions on a POW settlement and consideration of an approach to the USSR; executive sessions at Panmunjom 187

III. July 16–October 8, 1952: Deadlock acknowledged, recess at Panmunjom:
Consideration of return of repatriate POWs and relegation of issue of nonrepatriates to a postarmistice conference; Department of Defense and CINCUNC opposition; Truman's decision; UNC final offer; rejection and recess at Panmunjom 409

IV. October 17–December 29, 1952: The Korean debate at the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly:
First Committee consideration of draft resolutions; the Menon proposal and ensuing negotiations; Truman's approval of a final position on the Menon proposal; acceptance of the revised proposal by the General Assembly; rejection by the People's Republic of China and North Korea 558

V. January 2–April 26, 1953: New look at Korea under the Eisenhower administration:
Request by Clark for authority to try POWs and to counter increased military threat; settlement of the won currency advances question; possible courses of action in Korea, NSC 147; Operation Little Switch and the Chou En-lai proposal 721

Page

VI. April 26–June 8, 1953: Progress at Panmunjom and the offer to negotiate a mutual security pact with the Republic of Korea:
Communist and UNC proposals at Panmunjom; Rhee's desire for a mutual security pact and his opposition to an armistice; NSC consideration of NSC 147; Dulles–Nehru discussions on Korea; the final UNC proposal; consideration of Operation Plan EVERREADY; decision not to implement EVERREADY in favor of a mutual security pact; agreement on the POW question at Panmunjom 938

PART 2

VII. June 8–July 27, 1953: Armistice attained:
Rhee's unilateral release of North Korean nonrepatriate POWs; United States reaction; suspension of Panmunjom negotiations; formulation and consideration of policy toward Korea after the armistice, NSC 154, 156, and 157 series; additional UN forces for Korea and the problem of reimbursement; the Robertson mission; resumption of the Panmunjom negotiations; final details; armistice 1152

VIII. July 27, 1953–February 18, 1954: Postarmistice issues:
Korean reconstruction; the Dulles trip to Korea and the mutual defense treaty; preliminary negotiations for the Korean political conference—the Dean mission; the Nixon visit to Korea and Rhee's promise not to act unilaterally; formulation and consideration of NSC 167 and 170 series; failure of the Dean negotiations; South Korean-Indian friction and the release of the remaining nonrepatriate POWs; Berlin Conference and the shift from Panmunjom to Geneva 1446

IX. March 1–December 31, 1954: U.S.-Korean relations in the postarmistice period:
Redeployment of U.S. troops in Korea, expansion of the ROK armed forces, and the Van Fleet mission; the Rhee visit to Washington; concern over the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; economic and military aid and the signature of the U.S.–ROK Agreed Minute of Understanding; final issues and the signature of the mutual defense treaty; hwan currency advances controversy 1752

INDEX 1957

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF THE COVERAGE

This volume presents documents on United States policy toward Korea and on United States-Republic of Korea relations during the years 1952–1954. During the first year and a half of this period, the continuation of the Korean war provides the focus. Although the fighting in Korea was stalemated during the 19 months until the armistice, casualties continued while the United Nations Command and the Communist side met at Panmunjom to attempt to reach a military armistice. These negotiations were supposed to preclude political considerations, but by the nature of the issues at stake and the ideology of the cold war, they became pre-eminently political. The editors have chosen to emphasize the formulation by the Executive Branch of the basic policy decisions raised by these political issues. Thus, deliberations on the policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, on the role of the Soviet Union in any future postarmistice conference on Korea, and on the question of a political settlement on the Korean peninsula loom large in this volume. Conversely, the technical side of the armistice which was still unresolved at the beginning of 1952 is given less space.

Efforts to achieve peace in Korea were not limited to the truce tent at Panmunjom and the editors have included documentation on diplomatic approaches via the Indian Government to the People's Republic of China, an initiative to the Soviet Union, and a serious attempt in late 1952 by the United Nations General Assembly to produce a formula capable of ending the fighting. A corollary to both the Panmunjom negotiations and the diplomatic initiatives beyond the truce tent was the question of what the United States should do in the event it was unable to attain an acceptable peace in Korea. Contingency planning which had atomic war as an option was ultimately discussed and accepted by the National Security Council in 1953. This decision has been given the most complete treatment possible.

Armistice did come to Korea in July 1953. The basic story of this success, except for the question of the Republic of Korea's adherence, is generally known. This volume serves to fill out the details.

As for the bilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States, the editors have sought to illuminate the principal issues. In May and June 1952, when President Syngman Rhee was involved in a political and constitutional struggle with opponents in the National Assembly, the United States attempted with minimal success to dissuade the Korean President from using extralegal means to achieve his ends and even considered plans for United Nations Command intervention into South Korean affairs. This political crisis was resolved by Rhee's victory over his opponents in the legislative branch. The plan for intervention was shelved. When it became obvious in June 1953, after President Rhee released the nonrepatriate Korean prisoners of war, that the opposition of the Rhee government was the main obstacle to the armistice, the United States again considered intervention. This time it was rejected in favor of negotiations with Rhee to obtain his promise not to disrupt the armistice. The mission of Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, which accomplished this task and paved the way for signature of the armistice, and Secretary John Foster Dulles' trip to Seoul in August 1953, which completed Robertson's work, were both part of this campaign. The decision to negotiate with Rhee rather than to attempt to replace him with a more amenable South Korean leadership and the evolution of these negotiations are naturally given extensive coverage.

The Korean armistice brought to the fore the remaining bilateral issues between the United States and the Republic of Korea which were generally resolved during the next year and a half. These questions are treated in less detail than the issues of war and peace. They include the final details for a Mutual Defense Treaty, economic reconstruction, military aid, redeployment of United States forces from Korea and expansion of South Korean armed forces. Also part of this bilateral list was the nagging question of currency advances from the Republic of Korea to the United States forces there. This was an issue which plagued both countries virtually throughout the 3-year period covered in this volume. The editors attempted to document this problem only when it reached the highest level of consideration or brought on a crisis. They followed the same approach with a multilateral issue, the question of reimbursement of the United States for costs incurred by nations participating in the United Nations effort in Korea.

The successful conclusion of the armistice also revived the issue of a political settlement in the Korean peninsula. The editors attempted merely to highlight the preliminary political negotiations at Panmunjom, which ended unsuccessfully in December 1953. Material on the problem posed by President Rhee's threat of unilateral action against the North, in view of the failure of the United States and the Communist side to reach a political settlement for Korea, forms a crucial segment of the compilation. Vice President

Richard Nixon's visit to Seoul in November 1953 during which he received assurances from Rhee that he would not take unilateral military action without first consulting the Unites States is dealt with in as much detail as the records provide. Contingency planning similar to that considered in June and July 1953 was again discussed and approved by the National Security Council in the event that Rhee should attempt such action.

In early 1954 a shift of serious consideration of the Korean question from Panmunjom to international conferences in Europe requires that the reader use other *Foreign Relations* volumes in conjunction with this one. The records of the Berlin Conference of January and February 1954, in which the decision to call a conference of Korean belligerents in Geneva was agreed upon, may be found in volume VII. Documents on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, including United States efforts to persuade the Republic of Korea to attend, are contained in volume XVI, an essential companion to this volume.

In this volume the editors have attempted to account for major policy decisions on Korea during 1952–1954, to include as much political reporting as possible from United States Missions which they believe influenced these decisions, and finally to document as fully as they are able the interaction of United States policy with that of other nations with interests in Korea. Given the limitations of space, the task has required that the editors make value judgments as to the relative importance of issues as well as individual documents.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

Editor's Note—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AB, airborne
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
AE, ammunitions ship
afld, airfield
AKL, light cargo ship
AM, fleet minesweeper
AmEmb, American Embassy
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (the ANZUS Pact Nations)
AO, oiler (vessel)
AOB, air order of battle
AP, Associated Press
AR, repair ship
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARL, landing craft repair ship
ASAP, as soon as possible
bn, battalion
BW, bacteriological warfare
C, Counselor of the Department of State
CAFIC, Communist Air Force in China
CAMG (CA/MG), Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army
cav, cavalry
CCAF, Chinese Communist Air Force
CCF, Chinese Communist Forces
CFI, Custodial Forces of India
CEB, Combined Economic Board
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CGAFFE, Commanding General, American Forces in the Far East
CGArEight, Commanding General, Eighth Army
CGEUSAK, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea
CGKCOMZ, Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone
ChiComs, Chinese Communists
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CI & E, Counter Intelligence and Espionage
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUNC-Adv, the headquarters of the UNC negotiating team at Panmunjom, located at Munsan-ni near Panmunjom
CIs, civilian internees
CMC, Collective Measures Committee, United Nations
CNA, Chinese Nationalist Army
COFS, Chief of Staff
COMFEAF, Commander, Far East Air Forces
COMNAVFE, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East
COMSAC, Commander, U.S. Strategic Air Command
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CPV, Chinese People's Volunteers
CRIK, Civilian Relief in Korea
C/S, Chief of Staff
CSUSA, Chief of Staff, United States Army
CW, chemical warfare
DA, Department of the Army
DD, destroyer
DE, destroyer escort
Def, Department of Defense
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
DEPTAR, Department of the Army
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIP, military series indicator for diplomatic traffic

DNP, Democratic Nationalist Party (South Korea)
DMS, Director of Mutual Security
DOD, Department of Defense
DPs, displaced persons
DRF, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State
D/Z (DZ), Demilitarized Zone
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
EDC, European Defense Community
EE, Office of East European Affairs, Department of State
EM, enlisted man
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUSAK, Eighth United States Army in Korea
EVERREADY, plan covering eventualities of ROK domestic disturbances and non-cooperation with UNC
FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEC (FECOM), Far East Command
FINAL, UNC plan for signing armistice
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G-1, Army general staff section dealing with personnel at the division level or higher
G-2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the division level or higher
G-3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the division level or higher
G-4, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the division level or higher
GA, General Assembly, United Nations
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GHQ, general headquarters
GOI, Government at India
HICOG, High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM, High Commissioner
I, internal time
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IC, Indochina
ICJ, International Court of Justice, United Nations
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IN, incoming
INS, International News Service
ISA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
J-5, Office of Civil Operations, Far East Command of the UN Command
JA UNC, Judge Advocate, United Nations Command
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOEWP, joint operation emergency war plan
JSPC, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of JCS
KCAC, Korean Civil Assistance Command
KCOMZ, Korean Communications Zone
Kentel, series indicator and special channel for telegrams to or from Ambassador Kennan in Moscow
KMAG, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), Republic of China
KPA, Korean People's Army
L, Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/E, Legal Adviser to the Bureau of Economic Affairs
LITTLE SWITCH, operation for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war
LOC, line of communication
LSM, landing ship, medium
LST, tank landing ship
MAC, Military Armistice Commission
MB, medium bomber
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization
MDT, Mutual Defense Treaty
M/L, martial law
MP, military police
MLR, Main Line of Resistance
MSA, Mutual Security Agency; Mutual Security Act (of 1951); Mutual Security Assistance
MSP, Mutual Security Program
mytel, my telegram
NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NDC, National Defense Corps (ROK)
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NK, North Korea
NKA, North Korean Army
NKPA, North Korean People's Army
NNIT, Neutral Nations' Inspection Teams
NNRC, Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission
NNSC, Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission
NOTAL, not needed by all addressees
NSC, National Security Council
NSF, National Safety Forces (Japan)
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OCS, Office, Chief of Staff
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
OPI, Office of Public Information (ROK)
OSD, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
ourad, our radio (telegram)
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PC, Political Conference
PCEC, escort amphibious control vessel
PIO, Public Information Officer
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POWs, prisoners of war
PM, Prime Minister
PNG, persona non grata
Pres US, the President of the United States
PriMin, Prime Minister
PSB, Psychological Strategy Board
PSF, President's Secretary's File (Truman Papers, Truman Library)
PsyWar, psychological warfare
PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
PW, prisoner of war
RAAF, Royal Australian Air Force
rad, radio (telegram)
RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force
RCT, regimental combat team
reftel, reference telegram
reurad, re your radio (telegram)
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROKA, Republic of Korea Army
ROKG, Republic of Korea Government
ROKN, Republic of Korea Navy
S, Office of the Secretary of State
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCATTER, screening plan for repatriation of prisoners of war
SE, Special Estimate
SEA, South East Asia
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State
sitrep, situation report
SK, South Korea
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SM, Secretary's Meeting
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
STU, short ton of tungsten
Supr Com, supervisory commission
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
telecon, telecommunications conference
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
TO & E, Table of Organization and Equipment
Tofoa, series indicator for telegrams to Foreign Operations Administration
Topad, designation for telegraphic correspondence in either direction between the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan and the Department of State
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State
TopSec, Top Secret
TS, Top Secret
UC, Unified Command
UKHC, United Kingdom High Commissioner
UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNASYG, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
UNC, United Nations Command
UNCACK, United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea

UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

UNPW, United Nations prisoner of war

UNKRA, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

urad, your radio (telegram)

urtel, your telegram

USAF, United States Air Force

USIS, United States Information Service

USMC, United States Marine Corps

UST, *United States Treaties and Other Agreements*

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

WIROM, series indicator for certain Department of State administrative telegrams

YO, fuel oil barge

ZI, Zone of the Interior

LIST OF PERSONS

Editor's Note—Throughout this volume individuals generally are identified in context as their names appear. This list is designed to provide ready reference for identification of those persons mentioned most frequently. The identification of the persons on this list is generally limited to positions and circumstances under reference in the volume and is confined to the years 1952-1954. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume.

Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State to January 20, 1953.

Adams, Sherman, Assistant to President Eisenhower from January 20, 1953.

Alexander of Tunis, Harold R.L.G., Field Marshal and Earl; British Governor General of Canada to March 1, 1952; British Minister of Defense to October 18, 1954.

Allen, George V., Ambassador in Yugoslavia to March 11, 1953; Ambassador in India from May 4, 1953.

Allen, Stanley V., Canadian Commercial Secretary in the United States to January 1953; Commercial Counselor in the United States, February 1953-May 1954.

Allen, Ward P., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Allison, John M., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to January 31, 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, February 1, 1952-April 7, 1953; Ambassador in Japan from May 28, 1953.

Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Navy from February 4, 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense from May 3, 1954.

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence.

Austin, Warren R., Permanent Representative at the United Nations to January 1953.

Bacon, Ruth E., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

Bajpai, Sir Girja S., Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to May 1952.

Barbour, Walworth, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 26, 1954.

Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from June 26, 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs from October 13, 1952; Attaché in the Embassy in Denmark from January 30, 1953; First Secretary from July 26, 1954.

Bendetsen, Karl R., Assistant Secretary of the Army for General Management to 1952.

Bohlen, Charles E., Counselor of the Department of State to March 1953; thereafter, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Bolté, Lieutenant General Charles L., USA, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans to 1953.

Bonbright, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to April 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris.

Bond, Niles W., Counselor of the Embassy in Korea to 1954; Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, from August 12, 1954.

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board from May 18, 1953.

Bowles, Chester B., Ambassador in India to March 23, 1953.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to August 14, 1953.

Briggs, Ellis O., Ambassador in Czechoslovakia to August 27, 1952; Ambassador in Korea from August 25, 1952.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador in France to March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1, 1952–January 20, 1953; Consultant to the Secretary of State to February 18, 1953; thereafter, Observer at the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community at Paris and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

Byroade, Henry A., Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, to 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from April 14, 1952.

Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles P., USAF, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to January 1953; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 23, 1953.

Calhoun, John A., Second Secretary of the Embassy in Korea, December 1952–March 1954; thereafter, First Secretary.

Campbell, Peter, Second Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in the United States to March 1953; thereafter, First Secretary.

Carney, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1950–1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 1952–1953; Chief of Naval Operations from August 1953.

Carter, Brigadier General Marshall S., USA, Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense to 1953.

Casey, Richard G., Australian Minister for External Affairs.

Chang Han-fu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the People's Republic of China.

Chang Myon (Chang, John M.), Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, February 1951–April 1952.

Chang Taek-Sang, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, April–May 1952.

Chase, A. Sabin, Chief, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State, to 1954; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the Philippines from March 25, 1954; Counselor of Embassy from October 22, 1954.

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China.

Cho Chung Whan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Korea.

Choi Duk Shin, Brigadier General, Republic of Korean Army; Delegate of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation at Panmunjom, April–May 1953.

Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government Administration Council (after September 1954, State Council) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China;

in 1954, Head of the People's Republic of China Delegation at the Geneva Conference.

CHURCHILL, Winston S. (Sir Winston from April 24, 1953), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury.

CLARK, General Mark W., USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, May 1952–August 1953.

COLLINS, General J. Lawton, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, to August 14, 1953; U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Group, August 1953–October 1954; Special Representative of the President in Vietnam with the rank of Ambassador from November 3, 1954.

COLSON, Brigadier General Charles F., USA, Chief of Staff, United States I Corps; assumed command of Koje-do prison camp in May 1952; relieved of command shortly thereafter and demoted to Colonel.

CONNALLY, Senator Tom, Democrat of Texas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to January 1953.

CORDIER, Andrew W., Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

COULTER, Lieutenant General John B., USA (ret.), Agent General, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency from May 1953.

CUTLER, Robert, Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower, January 21–March 22, 1953; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

DEAN, Arthur H., Deputy to the Secretary of State for the Korean Political Conference from September 1953.

DENNISON, Rear Admiral Robert L., USN, Naval Aide to President Truman, 1952.

DE PALMA, Samuel, Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, March 1952–September 1953.

DILLON, C. Douglas, Ambassador in France from March 13, 1953.

DODD, Brigadier General Francis T., USA, Commandant of Koje-do prison camp, February–May 1952; thereupon relieved of command and demoted to Colonel.

DODGE, Joseph M., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 21, 1953–April 15, 1954.

DULLES, Allen W., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to February 26, 1953; thereafter, Director.

DULLES, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State to April 1952; Secretary of State from January 21, 1953.

EDDLEMAN, Major General Clyde D., USA, Assistant Chief of Army Staff, G–3, Operations, 1952–1953.

EDEN, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

EISENHOWER, Dwight D., General of the Army to July 1952; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to May 30, 1952; President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

EMMERSON, John K., Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, to 1952; Counselor of Embassy in Pakistan from July 28, 1952.

EMMONS, Arthur B., III, Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to February 1952; Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, February 1952–August 1953.

EVEREST, Lieutenant General Frank F., USAF; Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953–1954.

Fechteler, Admiral William N., USN, Chief of Naval Operations to August 17, 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

Ferguson, John Haven, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to August 12, 1953.

Finletter, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force to January 20, 1953.

Foster, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense to January 20, 1953.

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Gross, Ernest A., Deputy Representative at the United Nations and Deputy Representative on the Security Council to January 1953.

Hammarskjold, Dag H. A. C., Secretary-General of the United Nations from April 10, 1953.

Han Pyo Wook, Minister of the Republic of Korea in the United States.

Hanlon, Rear Admiral Byron H., USN, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, from May 1952.

Harrison, Major General William K., Jr. USA, Plenary Member, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, February 1952–July 1953; Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, May 23, 1952–July 1953.

Harvey, Mose L., Chief, Division of Research for USSR and Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.

Hemmindinger, Noel, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to 1954; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, from September 9, 1954.

Henkin, Louis, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Herren, Major General Thomas W., USA, Deputy Commanding General for Civilian Affairs, United States Eighth Army in Korea, to July 1952; thereafter, Commander of the Korean Communications Zone.

Hickenlooper, Bourke, Republican Senator from Iowa; member, Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Hickerson, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to July 27, 1953.

Hickey, Lieutenant General Doyle D., USA, Chief of Staff, United Nations Command, 1951–1953.

Hickman, Colonel George W., Jr., USA, Staff Officer, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation.

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State to November 1954.

Huang Hua, Delegate from the People's Republic of China to the preliminary discussions for a Korean Political Conference at Panmunjom, 1953–1954.

Hull, General John E., USA; Vice Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, United States Army, to October 1953; thereafter, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1953.

Jackson, C. D., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, February 16, 1953–March 31, 1954; Representative, United States Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations to 1954; British Ambassador in France from April 1954.

Jenner, William E., Republican Senator from Indiana.

Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large to January 2, 1953; Alternate Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Johnson, Earl D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Material, 1952–1954.

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to October 1953; Ambassador in Czechoslovakia from December 1953; United States Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, 1954.

Jones, William G., Chief, Northeast Asian Economic Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State, to 1953; Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, from November 1953.

Joy, Vice Admiral C. Turner, USN, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Armistice Delegation until May 22, 1952.

Judd, Walter H., Republican Representative from Minnesota; member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Kennan, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May 14–October 3, 1952.

Ki Sok Pok, North Korean Delegate to the preliminary discussions for a Korean Political Conference at Panmunjom, 1953–1954.

Kimball, Dan A., Secretary of the Navy to January 20, 1953.

Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

Kingsley, Donald, Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency to May 1953.

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Acting Chief, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from May 26, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from November 9, 1952; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, from January 23, 1953; Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, from October 10, 1954.

Kyes, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 2, 1953–May 1, 1954.

Lacey, Major General J. K., USAF, Senior United States Military Representative on the Military Armistice Commission from July 1953.

Lalor, Rear Admiral William C., USN, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 1953.

Lamb, Lionel Henry (Sir Lionel from January 1, 1953), British Chargé in the People's Republic of China, March 1951–December 1953.

Lanham, Henderson L., Democratic Representative from Georgia; member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

Lemnitzer, Major General Lyman L., USA; Director of Foreign Military Assistance, Department of Defense, to 1953; Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Plans and Research from 1953.

Libby, Rear Admiral Ruthven E., USN, Member of the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation to 1952; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, for Operations, from June 1952.

Lie, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations to April 10, 1953.

Lightner, Edwin A., Counselor of Embassy in Korea, March 1, 1951–February 18, 1953.

Limb, Ben C., Ambassador at Large of the Republic of Korea and ROK Observer at the United Nations.

Lloyd, John Selwyn, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to October 1954; thereafter, Minister of Supply; Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Acting Chairman at the Eighth Regular Session, 1953; Vice Chairman at the Ninth Regular Session, 1954.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., United States Representative at the United Nations from January 26, 1953.

Lovett, Robert A., Secretary of Defense to January 20, 1953.

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Counselor of Embassy in France to October 15, 1952; Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1953.

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to December 30, 1952; British Ambassador in the United States from January 7, 1953.

Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to March 1953; thereafter, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom; Member, Soviet Delegation at the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953; Vice Chairman of the Delegation at the Ninth Regular Session, 1954.

Manhard, Phillip W., Second Secretary of Embassy in Korea to February 1954; Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan from March 1954.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Central People's Government Council, People's Republic of China, to September 1954, thereafter, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Representative from Montana, 1952; Senator and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1953.

Martin, Paul, Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare; Member of the Canadian Delegation at the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State to October 11, 1953; Ambassador in the Netherlands after November 25, 1953.

Matthews, Lieutenant Colonel Jack B., USA, Member of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army.

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from January 30, 1953.

McClurkin, Robert J. G., Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to September 1954; thereafter, Acting Director.

McCormack, John, Democratic Representative from Massachusetts; Majority Floor Leader, House of Representatives, to January 1953; thereafter, House Minority Whip.

McFall, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to September 9, 1952; Minister in Finland, November 15, 1952–May 1, 1953; thereafter, Ambassador.

McNicol, David W., First Secretary of the Australian Embassy in the United States to March 1953.

McWilliams, William J., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State to August 19, 1953.

Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, to 1952; Second Secretary of Embassy in France, January–July 1953; Second Secretary of Embassy in Vietnam, October 1953–May 1954; thereafter, First Secretary.

Mendès-France, Pierre, French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 19, 1954.

Menon, V.K. Krishna, Member, Indian Delegation at the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953; Chairman, Indian Delegation, Ninth Regular Session, 1954; Indian Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

Merchant, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs to March 24, 1952; then Deputy Special Representative in Europe at Paris to March 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March 16, 1953.

Meyer, Clarence E., Personal Representative of President Truman and head of the Special Economic Mission to the Republic of Korea, March–May, 1952.

Millet, Pierre, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States to September 1954; thereafter, Minister.

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union from March 1953; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference, 1954.

Morton, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from January 30, 1953.

Muccio, John J., Ambassador in Korea to September 8, 1952.

Muñiz, João Carlos, Brazilian Ambassador in the United States from October 20, 1953; Permanent Representative of Brazil at the United Nations from 1952.

Murphy, Charles S., Special Counsel to President Truman to January 1953.

Murphy, Robert D., Ambassador in Belgium to March 19, 1952; Ambassador in Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Political Adviser to the United Nations Command on Korean armistice negotiations, April 28–July 11, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, July 28–November 30, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Nam Il, Lieutenant General, Korean People's Army; Chief Delegate, North Korean and Chinese Delegation to the armistice negotiations, July 1951–July 1953.

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to February 10, 1953; then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to February 28, 1954.

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

Nehru, R.K., Indian Secretary for United Nations Affairs from 1952; Indian Secretary for External Affairs from July 1953.

Nervo. *See* Padilla Nervo.

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff to April 1953.

Nixon, Richard M., Republican Senator from California to January 1953; thereafter, Vice President of the United States.

O'Connor, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 21, 1953; Special Assistant from February 21, 1954.

Oliver, Robert T., Chief of the Washington Office of the Korean Pacific Press, a Republic of Korea registered agency; Adviser to President Rhee.

Pace, Frank, Jr., Secretary of the Army to January 21, 1953.

Padilla Nervo, Luis, Mexican Secretary for Foreign Relations from March 1953; Permanent Representative of Mexico at the United Nations, 1952–1954.

Paek Sun Yup, Major General, Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Army.

Paik Tu Chin, Minister of Finance in the Republic of Korea to September 1953; Acting Prime Minister, October 1952–April 1953; Prime Minister, April 1953–June 1954.

Pandit, Srimati Vijaya Lakshmi (Madam Pandit), Chairman, Indian Delegation to the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and to the first meeting of the Ninth, 1952-1953-1954; President of the Eighth Regular Session, 1953.

Panikkar, K.M., Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China to July 1952.

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Chairman of the Canadian Delegation at the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952-1953-1954; President of the Seventh Regular Session, 1952.

Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to January 31, 1953.

Phillips, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1952-1954; Director, Office of Public Affairs in Bonn from June 30, 1954.

Pillai, Narayana Ragnavan, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from 1952.

Pleven, René, Prime Minister of France to January 1952; Minister of National Defense, March 1952–June 1954.

Plimsoll, James, Australian Representative on the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, March-December 1952.

Popper, David H., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, to October 1954; thereafter, Director.

Pyun Yung Tai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Prime Minister from June 1954.

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Fleet, to July 10, 1953; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1953.

Raghavan, Nedgan, Indian Ambassador in the People's Republic of China from September 1952.

Rhee, Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea.

Riddleberger, James W., Political Adviser to the Economic Cooperation Administration to May 14, 1952; Director of the Bureau of German Affairs to July 31, 1953.

Ridgway, General Matthew B., USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to May 1952; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952–May 1953; Chief of Staff, United States Army, from August 15, 1953.

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from April 8, 1953.

Ross, John C., Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Security Council, 1952-1954.

Ruffner, Major General Clark L., USA, Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, as of 1952; Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in 1953.

Salisbury, Lord (Cecil, Robert A.J.G.), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, March-December 1952; Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June-October 1953.

Sandifer, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to February 28, 1954.

Sargeant, Howland H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, February 21, 1952–January 30, 1953.

Schuman, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs to January 8, 1953.

Schumann, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to June 1954; Deputy Chairman of the French Delegation to the Geneva Conference.

Scott, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to March 21, 1954; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat.

Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1, 1952.

Shin Ik-Hi (P. H. Shinicky), Chairman of the National Assembly in the Republic of Korea to June 1954; Leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party.

Shin Tai-yong, Minister of National Defense in the Republic of Korea, March 1952–June 1953.

Short, Joseph, Secretary to President Truman to 1952.

Smith, Lawrence H., Republican Representative from Wisconsin; Member, Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence to February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954.

Snyder, John W., Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies to January 20, 1953.

Sohn Won Il, Admiral, Republic of Korea Navy; Minister of National Defense in the Republic of Korea, from June 1953.

Spender, Sir Percy C., Australian Ambassador in the United States.

Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich (Djugashvili), Generalissimo; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Stassen, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security from January 20, 1953; Director for Foreign Operations from August 1, 1953.

Stelle, Charles C., Member of the Policy Planning Staff from February 17, 1952.

Stevens, Robert T., Secretary of the Army from February 4, 1953.

Strom, Carl W., Counselor of Embassy in Korea from June 4, 1954.

Sullivan, Charles A., Chief, Northeast Asian Section, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense in 1953; Director of the Office's Policy Division, 1953–1954.

Talbott, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force from February 4, 1953.

Tasca, Henry J., Special Representative of the President for Korean Economic Affairs, April–June 1953.

Taylor, Lieutenant General Maxwell D., USA, Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Operations and Administration to 1953; Commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea from February 1953.

Thimayya, Lieutenant General K.S., Indian Army; Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, June 1953–January 1954.

Thorp, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to November 15, 1952.

Tomlinson, Frank S., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States.

Treumann, Walter, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, to June 1953.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States to January 20, 1953.

Tsai Cheng-wen, Major General, People's Liberation Army, People's Republic of China; PRC Staff Officer at the Military Armistice Negotiations to April 1953; PRC Plenary Member of the armistice delegation, April–May 1953.

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to June 30, 1953; thereafter, Chief of Staff.

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to June 29, 1953.

Van Fleet, Lieutenant General James A., USA, Commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea to February 11, 1953.

Van Ittersun, Baron G. E., Netherlands Representative to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, April–August, 1952.

Vorys, John M., Republican Representative from Ohio; Member of the United States Delegation at the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1951–1952.

Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to March 1953; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative at the United Nations, April 1953–November 1954.

Wadsworth, James J., Deputy Representative at the United Nations from 1953.

Wainhouse, David W., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs from February 28, 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from August 25, 1954.

Waugh, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 5, 1953.

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State to February 29, 1952.

Webb, Thomas Clifton, Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand to November 1954; Chairman of the New Zealand Delegation at the Seventh and Eighth Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953.

White, Lieutenant General Thomas D., USAF, Deputy Chief of Air Force Staff (Operations), to 1953; thereafter, Vice Chief of Staff.

Wilson, Charles Erwin, Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

Wisner, Frank G., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency.

Won Yong Duk, General, Republic of Korea Army; Provost Marshal of the Republic of Korea from June 1953.

Wood, C. Tyler, Associate Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency from January 1, 1952; Economic Coordinator for Korea at Seoul from September 30, 1953.

Wrong, Hume, Canadian Ambassador in the United States to August 3, 1953; thereafter, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Yi Pom-suk (Lee Bum Suk), Korean Home Minister, May–July, 1952.

You Chang Yang, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea in the United States.

Young, Kenneth T., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, from March 20, 1952; Acting Director, Office of Philippine and South Asian Affairs, from September 13, 1954.

Yount, Brigadier General Paul F., USA, Commander, 2d Logistical Command in Korea.

Yun-kyong, Chief of the National Police in the Republic of Korea from May 1952.

Zinchenko, Constantin E., Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; Permanent Representative at the United Nations, 1952–1953.

LIST OF SOURCES

The Korean war represented one of the major foreign policy crises of the 1950's. Policy toward Korea involved Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and their advisers as well as executive agencies beyond the Department of State. Consequently the editors have made extensive use of appropriate files outside the Department of State in order to make the record as complete as possible. The papers printed in this volume were drawn from the following files and collections of official and private papers.

PART A. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1952–1954 are indicated by a decimal file number in the headnote.

2. "*Lot Files.*" Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department of State, which are decentralized files of operating areas. A list of the lot files used in this volume follows:

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 128

Top secret files of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs concerning the Korean war and ceasefire for the years 1950–1952.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 388

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for 1953.

FE Files, Lot 55 D 480

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for 1954, including documentation on the Geneva Conference, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Black Book.

FE Files, Lot 60 D 330

Files on relations with Japan and Korea for the years 1950–1953, as maintained by the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Matthews Files, Lot 53 D 413

Collection of cables relating to the Korean armistice, 1951-1953, maintained in the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews.

INR-NIE Files

Files maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files

Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official UN documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the UN Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and *ad hoc* committees for the period from 1946 to date.

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the UN General Assembly for the years 1945-1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file for the years 1947-1953 of the Policy Planning Staff, comprising memoranda and related correspondence.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials during the years 1949-1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949-1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951-1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950-1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's daily staff meetings which were held twice a week during the years 1952-1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P-NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the period 1951–1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Note: Because of the heavy involvement of the Department of Defense and the military services in Korean policy and implementation of that policy, special mention must be made of the numerous Department of Defense telegrams and related documentation available in the files of the Department of State. For 1952, telegrams related to Korea are contained in binders in the central files under the basic Korean decimal number. Additional copies as well as new materials for 1952 are located in FE Files, Lot 55 D 128, the so-called "Korean Black Book" of documentation relating to the Panmunjom negotiations. The Matthews Files, Lot 53 D 413, represent the best source for military telegrams for 1953 and include also a backup for the previous year. The 1954 military cables on Korea in Department of State files are both fewer in number and less important than in the two previous years; they are located in FE Files, Lot 55 D 480. Lastly, Lot 55 D 588, while not a source of many military cables, does contain a few for 1953 which were considered most important and were therefore closely held at the time.

United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

USUN Files

Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

Archives-Museum, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina

Mark W. Clark Collection

Papers of General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East.

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Files

Documents specifically requested by the editors from the Department of Defense.

JCS Files

Documents specifically requested by the editors from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953-1959 (some 1952 material included).

James C. Hagerty Papers

Papers of the Press Secretary to the President for the years 1953-1961.

C. D. Jackson Records

Records of C. D. Jackson, 1953-1956. Jackson was the President's Special Assistant for International Affairs, 1953-1954; and speechwriter and consultant to the President, 1958.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, maintained by his personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

National Archives, Washington, D.C.

JCS Records

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Appointment Book

Daily log of Secretary of State Dulles' meetings and appointments for the years 1953-1959.

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

Acheson Papers

Papers of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State, 1949-1953.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files (PSF)

This collection contains the papers of Harry S. Truman as President of the United States. Records relating to Korea are included with the National Security material in the subject file, in a documentary collection compiled by the Departments of State and Defense and given to Truman just before he left Office, and in intelligence-related papers.

Truman Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File

Papers of Harry S. Truman as President of the United States contained in the classified portion of the White House Central Files.

PART B. PUBLISHED SOURCES

The following publications, including secondary accounts, were particularly useful in the preparation of this volume. No responsibility is taken by the Department of State for the truth or accuracy of events set forth in unofficial sources.

Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969).

Dean Acheson, *Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959).

Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1962* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1973).

Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954).

Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1963).

Allan E. Goodman, ed., *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

Gregory Henderson, *Korea, the Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1968).

Walter G. Hermes, *United States Army in the Korean War, Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966).

C. Turner Joy, *How the Communists Negotiate* (New York, MacMillan & Company, 1955).

John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., *Mike, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson,* vol. II (New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1973).

Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London, Collins, 1964).

David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York, St. Martins Press, 1964).

Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1967).

Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope,* vol. II (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1956).

United Nations, *Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, 1951–1954* (UN documents A/1881, A/2187, A/2441, A/2711).

United States Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents,* vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

United States Department of State, *Bulletin,* 1952–1954.

United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966).

United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960).

William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1958).

I. JANUARY 1–APRIL 30, 1952: NARROWING THE ISSUES

AGREEMENT ON THE GREATER SANCTIONS STATEMENT; CONTINUATION OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AT PANMUNJOM; POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF KOREA AT THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY; DECISION ON THE POLICY OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION; SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS; DECISION ON THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL AT PANMUNJOM; OPERATION SCATTER; DELIVERY OF THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL [1]

795.00/1–252

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1952.

It is suggested that at your meeting on January 3 with the President you leave with him the attached copy of the text of the proposed statement on Korea (Tab A) [2] to be issued by the sixteen countries participating in the hostilities there immediately following an armistice.

The President has been kept informed of the development of the thinking of State and Defense in this regard through the telegrams to General Ridgway which he has approved (the latest of which is JCS 90083 of December 19 (Tab B)) and, through his approval of NSC 118/2, has concurred in the general concept.[3]

You may wish to inform the President that the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey have approved the principle of issuing such a statement and have concurred in the attached text. It is anticipated that Belgium and Luxembourg will approve, although definitive replies have not yet been received. Discussions are still proceeding with France, which initially attempted to widen and weaken the statement so as to include Indochina, but has now agreed to the statement with the important exception of the last sentence concerning which you sent an urgent personal message to Schuman (or Pleven at Bruce's discretion) on January 2.[4] While expressing agreement with the principle embodied in the last sentence, the French have strongly urged a weaker wording in public statement, the U.S. with French support, making the substance of present draft clear to Peking and Moscow through diplomatic channels. No reply has yet been received from Thailand, for which the extension of hostilities against Communist China under the circumstances envisaged in the statement would present special significance and difficulties. Because of security considerations and their differing degrees of interest in the problem, approaches have not yet been made to the Philippines, Ethiopia and Colombia although such approaches will be required shortly. The President will, of course, appreciate the magnitude of the decision required by the statement from each of these countries and the fact that in each case approval has required Cabinet-level decisions.

---

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

[2] The proposed statement on Korea (Tab A), also known as "the Greater Sanctions Statement", was not filed with the source text. It was left with President Truman by Secretary Acheson on Jan. 3. Acheson's account of that meeting went as follows: "I left with the President the proposed statement on Korea which would be made in the event of an armistice. The President had been following very closely our telegrams with Bruce on this matter. He was strongly of the opinion that we should stick to our statement and get the French to concur." The above memorandum by Acheson, dated Jan. 3, 1952, is in file 795.00/1–352. A copy of the draft sanctions statement on Korea is in telegram 1988 to Manila, Jan. 4, 1952, not printed (795.00/1–452).

[3] For the text of JCS 90083 of Dec. 19, 1951, and NSC 118/2, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," Dec. 20, 1951, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1377 and 1382, respectively.

The President will also appreciate the vital necessity for complete security concerning all aspects of the proposed statement in order not to jeopardize the armistice negotiations at this critical phase or complicate the negotiations on the statement still required of the Department.

Decisions have not yet been made on the mechanics of issuing the statement.

While it will be desirable that the President consult with, or inform Congressional leaders of the statement prior to its issuance, it is not recommended that this be done except in connection with the armistice agreement as a whole, on which recommendations to the President for Congressional consultation will be submitted shortly.

---

[4] *Infra.*

795.00/1-252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, January 2, 1952—6:39 p. m.

3780. For Bruce from Secretary. Pls deliver soonest fol personal msg addressed either to Pleven or Schuman whichever you consider preferable:

I am happy to note we are in entire agreement on situation which wld be created in event of a renewal of the attack in Kor fol an armis and on steps which wld be necessary meet it. We also seem be agreed it is important that Commies clearly understand consequences if they return to the attack in Kor.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin, Popper, and Johnson; cleared by Matthews, Bonbright, and Hickerson (in draft); and signed by Secretary Acheson.

The only difference which appears remain between us relates to degree to which countries participating in Kor hostilities publicly make explicit their determination this regard.

On this question I am entirely convinced, and most of other countries have already agreed that statement shld make completely clear to Commies as well as to rest of world what the consequences of such a flagrant breach of armis wld be. Only by such a clear statement our intentions can we achieve maximum deterrent effect upon Commies and thereby safeguard our forces against treachery; only by such a clear statement can we make clear to peoples of world where the responsibility wld lie for serious consequences which wld fol upon a renewal of the attack. We do not think statement we have proposed wld provoke Commies or constitute an ultimatum any more than did our joint declaration on West Germany in Sept. 1950.[2] We do think that, so far as words can do it, such a statement of our determination wld give Commies pause before they embarked on new acts of aggression.

It is the considered judgment of the highest polit and mil authorities in my govt that only if we can count on a clear public statement to deter Commies from renewing the attack can we afford accept armis terms which in themselves wld not provide UN forces with that degree of protection we wld otherwise have to demand. It now seems clear from course of armis negots that Commies will not agree to the safeguards our mil authorities had considered essential. Therefore, without an unequivocal statement, we cannot see how it will be possible to conclude an armis. At this juncture highest interests of free world require that we seize this opportunity to end hostilities in Kor.

I therefore hope you will reconsider as matter of urgency ur objections to last sentence [3] our projected statement in order that when it is issued it will carry the great weight of unanimous approval by all countries participating in Kor hostilities.

You may inform FonMin approval of proposed statement has thus far been received from UK, Aust, NZ, SoAfr, Canad, Neth, Greece and Turkey. Formal reactions Belg and Lux not yet received but approval anticipated. Thai was approached only within last few days. Because of security reasons and differing degrees of interest, Phils, Colombia and Ethiopia have not yet been approached but no objections to statement anticipated.

You may also in ur discretion and in whatever manner you consider desirable indicate to FonMin that USGovt places greatest importance and value upon Fr agreement to issuance this statement.

FYI it is matter of greatest urgency that Fr agreement to statement be achieved soonest in order that Dept may inform JCS issuance of statement is assured and accordingly instructions to Ridgway amended in manner that shld permit expeditious conclusion armis. Also for ur own background only you shld bear in mind Fr action on this statement will inevitably influence attitude USGovt upon Fr problems in Indochina and elsewhere.

---

[2] For documentation on the joint declaration on West Germany of September 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1108 ff.

[3] For the French objections, see telegrams 3850 and 3910, Dec. 28 and 31, *ibid.*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1458 and 1471, respectively.

ACHESON

795.00/1-352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1952—12:40 p. m.

3790. For the Ambassador. Re your telephone conversation with Hickerson,[1] language proposed by Fr Govt can not be accepted. This statement must be restricted to Korea where action was clearly authorized by UN. The statement can not, by indirection, bring in threats of aggression elsewhere.[2] Such matters must be faced by UN if and when they happen. We know that a number of other countries who have already agreed to statement wld completely refuse to accept sentence proposed by Fr Govt, even if we cld accept it, which we can not.

Pls urge on Fr authorities in strongest terms that we agree to statement in its present form. France alone of principal countries with forces in Korea has not agreed and is holding up everything. Final sentence of statement can not now be changed in view of wide measure of agreement of other countries. Moreover, Jt Chiefs of Staff wld we know resist any watering down of this sentence to which they attach fundamental importance from standpoint of security of UN troops.

Armistice negots will probably remain on dead center until we get agreement on this statement and we feel it is indispensable that Fr agree at once.

ACHESON

---

[1] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[2] Specifically, to Indochina.

795.00/1-352

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1952.

Subject: Present Status of Armistice Negotiations.[1]

---

[1] The subject under discussion in the memorandum was the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations between the delegates of the United Nations Command and those of North Korea and the People's Republic of China, which resumed at Panmunjom on Oct. 25, 1951. For a statement of how these negotiations will be documented in this volume, see the editorial note, *infra*.

After adoption of the agenda, there remained four agenda items to be considered. Agreement was reached on item 2 on November 27. Items 3 and 4 are being discussed simultaneously in separate sub-committees. The last item, item 5, will be considered after agreement is reached on items 3 and 4.

Item 2: "Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea."

On November 27, the delegation for both sides ratified an agreement on agenda item 2 containing three principles:

a. The actual line of contact between both sides shall be the military demarcation line, with both sides to withdraw two kilometers from the line to establish a demilitarized zone.

b. If a military armistice is signed within 30 days, the demarcation line adopted on November 27, based on the line of contact as of that date, shall remain in effect regardless of any changes in the battle lines.

c. If the armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days, the demarcation line shall be revised immediately prior to the signing of the armistice in order to make it accord to the line of contact as of that date.

Since an armistice was not achieved within 30 days, provision c has come into effect. Immediately prior to the signing of an armistice, therefore, there will have to be a new determination of the actual line of contact at that time and the line of contact so determined will be the demarcation line.

Item 3: "Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice."

Discussions on this item still continue. Agreement has been reached in substance on the following:

1. Cessation of hostilities within 24 hours after the armistice agreement comes into effect.

2. Withdrawal of armed forces from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the agreement comes into effect. Thereafter, no armed forces shall enter the demilitarized zone, nor shall any acts of armed forces against the zone be taken by either side. Each side will administer its half of the zone.

3. Within 5 days after the agreement goes into effect, all armed forces of either side shall be withdrawn from the rear of the other side and from the territorial waters and coastal islands of the other side, i.e., those islands which were formerly controlled by the other side as well as any other islands specifically agreed to.

4. No reinforcement of military personnel, but rotation is permitted within limits to be agreed upon by both sides. No increase in the level of matériel.

5. Establishment of a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of representatives of both sides to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement. The Commission shall deal with any alleged violations within the demilitarized zone, and be responsible also for general supervision of the agreement.

6. An invitation to non-combatant nations to provide personnel for a supervisory organ. This organ will observe at ports of entry to be agreed upon, to assure that there is no violation of the limitations on reinforcement of personnel and equipment. At the request of either side, it will also investigate any alleged violations anywhere in Korea.

The remaining points of disagreement are:

1. The Communists insist on inserting language under item 3 which would constitute a commitment to hold a political conference by both sides after an armistice. We have requested more general language which, while referring to a political settlement on a higher level, would not commit us specifically to a conference involving governments on both sides. Also we think this question should be dealt with under item 5.

2. The Communists insist that there be no replenishment of matériel whatever. We desire the right to maintain the level of equipment existing at the time of the armistice though not to increase it. Under our proposal we could replace matériel worn out or damaged after the armistice, but not equipment consumed or damaged during hostilities.

3. The Communists object to any limitation on the rehabilitation of airfields. We have insisted that only a limited number of airfields may be rehabilitated for civil air operations, and that such rehabilitation should not include the extension of runways. No other airfields should be rehabilitated or constructed.

The Communists have indicated that the last point is the major obstacle to agreement on this item. On this point, we are prepared to concede after the "greater sanctions" statement is ready.

Item 4: "Arrangements relating to prisoners of war."

Discussions to date have largely concentrated on the exchange of lists, and alleged discrepancies in both lists. The Communists have from the beginning sought agreement on the release of all prisoners of war, i.e., an all-for-all exchange. On January 2, we made our first proposal which in effect would provide for the exchange of those prisoners of war who wish to be repatriated on a one-for-one basis against prisoners of war held by the enemy, interned foreign civilians, and South Koreans who are in North Korea, whether they have been impressed in the North Korean Armies or not. Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross would be present to assure that all repatriation is voluntary. Those who do not wish to be repatriated would be released and paroled on condition that they do not again bear arms in the Korean conflict.

General Ridgway's instructions authorize him to retreat from his first position and if necessary to agree to release all the prisoners of war we hold against all the prisoners of war which the enemy holds and UN civilians and certain listed South Korean civilians. He is not authorized to drop his insistence on these civilians, or to agree to any involuntary repatriation, without first consulting Washington.

Item 5: "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides."

This item has not yet been the subject of discussion. It is clear that the Communists will seek a commitment to hold a political conference in which the North Koreans and Chinese Communists will participate which shall deal, *inter alia,* with the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops. We have instructed General Ridgway to seek agreement on a general recommendation to governments and authorities concerned that early steps be taken at a political level to deal with questions concerning a political settlement including the unification of Korea and other questions not resolved by the armistice.

Editorial Note

Limitations of space preclude publication of documents relating to the Panmunjom talks on the scale of *Foreign Relations,* 1951, volume VII, Part 1. In the place of emphasis on the negotiations for a military armistice in Korea, the editors favored a full treatment of important documentation on United States relations with Korea, the problems of the United Nations Command, and the efforts beyond the truce site to end the war. While important developments relating to the armistice negotiations have been given the treatment they deserve, the reader will not find excerpts or extensive summaries of the sessions at Panmunjom in this volume.

For those interested in the day-to-day negotiations at Panmunjom, a set of transcripts of the talks is available at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California. The National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., has custody of a special collection of original transcripts, letters, and related documents pertaining to the armistice negotiations, which was originally maintained by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army. Minutes of the plenary meetings, subdelegate, liaison, and staff officers sessions are also found in these records.

Admiral C. Turner Joy, *How the Communists Negotiate,* and William H. Vatcher Jr., *Panmunjom,* are first-hand accounts of the armistice conference. Extensive coverage of the truce negotiations is included in Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* a volume in the series *United States Army in the Korean War.* A secondary source is David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War.*

795.00/1–452: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 4, 1952—2 p. m.

3976. Eyes only for the Secretary and Hickerson from Bruce. Deptel 3790, January 3. After numerous conversations and interviews, drafts, redrafts, and clearances and detailed consideration by top officials French Govt, we have now received from Schuman reply to Secretary's personal message contained Deptel 3780, Jan 2. Free translation of reply follows:

"I have studied your message of Jan 3 with the attention and interest I attach to all your communications.

I regret that you did not consider it possible to accept the revisions that I had proposed to you in the draft common statement, the final drafting of which was communicated to me on Dec 28.[1] Although my more recent suggestions had as their aim only to return, with the addition of one word, to the first version which had been presented to me by you, I understand the reasons for your insistence which Ambassador David Bruce has explained to me.

I am certain that for your part you appreciate the difficulties which the French Govt must face. Because especially of the threat which hangs over Indochina, the French Govt has the duty of neglecting no precaution in order to avoid having the armistice in Korea, whose conclusion it keenly desires, produce a further aggravation of the situation in the Far East.

It is in this spirit and in order to avoid the delay that you rightly fear, that I have decided to give my agreement to the text which has already received the agreement of the other interested counties.

You will understand that this agreement is, however, accompanied by the two following reservations:

> (1) The final part of the statement could not imply any change in the agreement according to which all measures susceptible of producing a territorial extension of the conflict should be made the subject of prior consultation,
>
> (2) If the situation in Indochina grew worse, especially as an indirect consequence of the cessation of hostilities on the Korean front, we count on the USA to see to it that the solidarity of the powers associated in resistance to aggression manifests itself with the same promptness and same effectiveness as in Korea.

I would attach the greatest importance to your being good enough to express to me your agreement on this point, whose essential importance for France I know you appreciate."

---

[1] See telegram 3850, Dec. 28, *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1458.

This reply is described to us by Margerie [2] as unconditional acceptance of our text of proposed statement to be issued on conclusion Korean armistice. Reservations expressed by French with reference to (*a*) extension of hostilities, and (*b*) possibility of aggression against Indochina are in no sense to be considered conditions of French acceptance of text of declaration, but are points which French desire to bring to our attention and on which they would appreciate our views. We are in no way therefore committed as to nature of reply which we make or as to timing of such reply. Issuance of Korean statement with French consent thereto is independent of such reply.

BRUCE

---

[2] Roland Jacquin de Margerie was Assistant Director-General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Editorial Note

From January 5 through January 19, 1952, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, at the head of a British Delegation, held a series of informal and formal talks with President Truman and other United States officials. Korea was a topic of these discussions. In preparation for these talks, the Department of State established an interagency Steering Group charged with responsibility for assigning drafting officers for preparation of position papers (sometimes called negotiating papers) for the use of President Truman and Secretary Acheson during the talks.

Arthur B. Emmons III of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, prepared the first draft of a paper on Korea. After four subsequent drafts with revisions, it was approved at the official level on January 5, 1952. For the texts of these papers, none of which is printed in this compilation, see CFM files, lot M-88, box 160, D-5 series.

During the Churchill-Truman talks, Korea was discussed on a number of occasions, but no substantive action decisions were made. All memoranda and minutes of these talks will be printed in volume VI. Records of the following discussions among the President, the Prime Minister, and their advisers are pertinent to subjects treated in this compilation:

1. Memorandum by Secretary Acheson of the talks held aboard the yacht *Williamsburg* on January 5. Among other things, this discussion dealt with the question of United States problems with Commonwealth nations over discussion of wider sanctions in Korea and raised the British tendency to inform the "Dominions" of these confidential talks without first informing the United States.

2. Memorandum by Secretary Acheson of the meeting of January 6 in which Eden, Churchill, Acheson, Bradley, Lovett, and others dis-

cussed, among other things, the possibility of bombing or blockading Communist China in the event there was no armistice or if an armistice was entered into and later broken.

3. United States minutes of the Third Formal Meeting of January 8, held at the White House. This was the longest of the discussions on Korea and the one in which all the principals were involved. The major topics discussed were the situation in Korea as it related to the Far East as a whole and the consequences of either a breach of the armistice or failure to reach an armistice at all.

4. Memorandum by George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, of a meeting held at the Department of State on January 11 in which the British made clear their desire to participate in a planned United Nations committee to negotiate a Korean political settlement.

5. United States minutes of the meeting held at the White House on January 18 in which, among other topics, the participants noted their fears that the Chinese Communists did not really desire a truce at that time.

795.00/1-3152: Telegram [1]

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army [2]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, January 7, 1952—11:58 p. m.[3]

C 60961. Refs:

A. Para 1, part 4, HNC 588, 18 Dec 51, under "Agenda item 3".

B. Para 1, part 5, HNC 588, 18 Dec 51, under "Agenda item 3".

C. Para 4, part 1, JCS 90083, 20 [*19*] Dec 51.[4]

1. I am apprehensive that the potential consequences of the action proposed in ref C, above, may yet lack full recognition.

2. This comd would have very little capability to bring "full retribution" militarily upon Communist China, under the assumptions which follow:

---

[1] This telegram was one of a number of top secret Army communications for January 1952 filed together in a bound folder, which was given a single file number when received at the Department of State. Thus all top secret telegrams for January 1952 and subsequent months or half months in the 795.00 file will have the same file number.

[2] In this compilation, the title supplied for General Ridgway, and subsequently General Clark, follows the designation given in the source text. The military telegrams indicated either CINCFE or CINCUNC, the commands held by both men.

[3] The time of dispatch of military telegrams incoming to Washington from Tokyo was indicated in the source text in terms of Greenwich Mean Time. In this compilation, unless otherwise indicated, the time is given in Local (Tokyo) Standard Time, which is 9 hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time.

[4] For text of telegrams HNC 588 and JCS 90083, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1366 and 1377, respectively.

a. That the US Govt will auth and dir the UNC delegation substantially to abandon its present position which, if successfully maintained, would prohibit construction or rehabilitation of airfields for jet opns in North Korea following an armistice.

b. That if such directive were issued and subsequently an armistice were concluded, Communist China and North Korea would without delay construct and rehabilitate such airfields in North Korea as would permit the sudden surprise basing of combat aircraft thereon in strength, including jets.

c. That the US would not auth the use of atomic weapons against Communist China, including Manchuria.

d. That no substantial augmentation of our air potential would be practicable in less than from 6 months to 1 year.

3. If these assumptions materialized, the capability of this comd to penetrate into Communist China, including Manchuria, to a sufficient depth to inflict any serious lasting damage upon its economy and war potential would not exist. The present air strength of this comd is incapable of successfully extending opns into Manchuria against an air strength of over 800 high performance jet fighters arrayed against us. Without a major increase in our air capability it is questionable if the nations which subscribe to the proposed declaration could offer an effective deterrent to Communist China's renewal of hostilities. This would be particularly true if the USSR were to respond to such a UN declaration by openly or privately reassuring Communist China of her support, even if the support were limited to employment of figher defense forces in Communist China or Manchuria. Moreover, UN ability to launch limited aerial offensives would decrease proportionally to the southward displacement in Korea of Communist jet fighter concentrations, even if such fighters were restrained to a defensive role.

4. It is my belief that Communist Chinese military authorities have already reached the same conclusions I have indicated above. In my opinion the retributive potentiality of UN military power against Red China would be noneffective unless the full results of precipitating World War 3 were to be accepted, and the use of atomic weapons auth.

5. Assumption "*a*" in para 2, above, is admittedly conjectural. However it has some foundation, deriving in part from your decision not to permit me to direct the UNC delegation to inform the Communists that our present position on the point in question is final and irrevocable, and in part from continuing allusions in responsible press quarters that the US Govt is contemplating further concessions to the Communists in the armistice negotiations. One of these reports, an AP release datelined Wash, 5 Jan, is quoted below:

"America is seen prepared to make new concessions.

"*Nippon Times* 6 Jan 52.

"But it would take firm stand if Reds break truce once it is decided.

"*Kyodo-AP.*

"Washington, Jan 5—while America intends neither to give any more ground at the Korean truce talks than is found nec nor to retreat on any points to which the Reds already have agreed, the US is authoritatively described as prepared to make certain further concessions if deemed necessary.

"There was great official reluctance to discuss what form these concessions might take.

"The United States was reported Friday night to be advising its allies that a Korean armistice—if obtained—should be supported by an implied ultimatum to the Reds. This would put them on notice that an all out air-sea war will be waged against Red China if the truce is violated by new aggression.

"Word of this reported stand by the United States circulated in official circles after American Government departments concerned had reviewed the whole prolonged history of the truce parley and weighed political and military possibilities of the new position.

"From what could be ascertained in diplomatic and military quarters, the American position was apparently taking this form:

> "1. All United Nations prisoners held by the enemy would be released, with a definite deadline for the prisoner exchange to be completed.
>
> "2. The line would be at the battlefront existing at the time of settlement, presumably about where it is now.
>
> "3. If Communist Forces crossed that line and broke the truce terms, the war would no longer be confined to the Korean peninsula. Red China would cease to have the sanctuary she has enjoyed.
>
> "4. But the United States would not again be drawn into another stalemate land campaign. Army troops would not be used nor any invasion of the Chinese mainland contemplated.
>
> "Instead, a tight blockade of Red China's coast by US air and sea forces, coupled with bombardment of strategic targets within reach of land or sea-based aviation or of naval gunfire would be applied."

6. I appreciate that political discussions now proceeding in Wash as well as in the UN Councils may have a determining effect on US Govt decisions with respect to the current positions taken, and auth to be taken, by the UNC delegation here. Therefore, I do not at this time rqst further instructions.

7. I am, however, rqst that the views herein offered receive full consideration.

8. If the US Govt should decide to support our present position, even to the breaking pnt, then I suggest that the sooner the UNC delegation is empowered to inform the Communists to that effect, the sooner might we reasonably expect an acceptable armistice.

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 36

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1952—10:18 a. m.[2]

JCS 91600. From JCS re JCS 90083 and C 60961.[3]

1. Sufficient agreement has now been achieved on statement mentioned para 4 JCS 90083 to assure it will be issued. (Text being transmitted separately.)[4]

2. In view of this we attach less importance to a prohibition on rehabilitation of airfields. In this connection your C 60961 has been given careful and searching consideration. On balance, in light of all factors, decision is that you are directed that your final position will be agreement to omission from armistice terms of any prohibition on construction or rehabilitation of airfields if that becomes only unresolved point of issue on armistice agreement.

3. However, we do not feel UNC del should adopt this final position unless and until it appears clear that it is final and only breaking point for Communists.

4. Accordingly it is suggested UNC del attempt to defer further discussion airfield question until agreement reached on all other outstanding questions under agenda items 3, 4 and 5 including agreement that armistice will remain in effect until superseded by other mutually agreed arrangements. That is, believed here that if concession on airfields necessary to obtain armistice, such concession should be followed as quickly as possible by coming into effect of armistice whereupon statement referred to in para 1 will immediately be issued. Therefore, optimum would be make final agreement by Communists to armistice condition of concession.

---

[1] According to a memorandum attached to the source text (Johnson to Matthews and Hickerson, Jan. 4, 1952, not printed), a draft telegram was "worked out" between Johnson and the Army's G–3 on June 3, 1952. The next day, Acheson approved the draft message (Secretary's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609, summary of meeting with Secretary, Jan. 4, 1952).

Secretary of Defense Lovett on Jan. 4 emphasized to General Bradley the desirability of an immediate signing of the armistice at the time the concession on airfields was made. He also expressed a reservation concerning the clause "and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea" in the draft of the greater sanctions statement, which the Army G–3 had earlier and unsuccessfully recommended to State for deletion and agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the greater sanctions statement would be stronger with the word "will" in place of "should".

On Jan. 5, after the Army G–3 at Bradley's direction had consulted with Johnson, the last sentence of paragraph 4 was added. (Memoranda from Bradley to Cabell, Jan. 4, 1952 and from Jenkins to Bolté, Jan. 5, 1952; JCS records, 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))

[2] The time of transmission of military telegrams outgoing from Washington was indicated on the source text in terms of Greenwich Mean Time. In this compilation, unless otherwise indicated, the hour of transmission is given in Eastern Standard Time.

[3] The telegrams under reference are respectively JCS to Ridgway, Dec. 19, 1951, printed in *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1377, and Ridgway to the Army, Jan. 7, 1952, *supra.*

[4] *Infra.*

5. In connection para 4 request your comments on whether armistice document can be simple compilation of agreements reached under each agenda item or whether redrafting will be required.[5]

---

[5] For Ridgway's comments on this and other queries, see his telegram CX 61348 to the JCS, dated Jan. 12, p. 17.

795.00/1–3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1952—10:34 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 91602. From JCS. For your info text of jt declaration re para 1 JCS 91600 [1] follows:

"We the UN mbrs whose mil forces are participating in the Korean action support the decision of CINCUNC to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

"The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support efforts of UN to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by UN, and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support UN in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

"We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the UN, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of UN, we should again be united and prompt to resist. Consequences of such a breach of armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within frontiers of Korea." [2]

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] This text of the so-called "Greater Sanctions Statement" was approved without changes by all 16 UN members participating in the Korean war on Feb. 20, 1952; telegram 619 to Pusan, Feb. 20, 1952, not printed (795.00/2–2052).

795.00/1–1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 11, 1952—1:29 p. m.

3999. Pls deliver fol personal msg to Schuman from Sec.

"I greatly appreciate your msg of Jan 3 [2] indicating your Govts consent to the proposed statement on Korea. We are not unmindful of the difficulties, or lacking in sympathy with your Govt in regard to problems which might adversely affect the situation in Indochina. As indicated in my msg of Jan 2,[3] however, I am convinced that the proposed statement wld not aggravate the situation in the Far East. Indeed, it shld make possible the achievement of an armistice in Korea which we all desire and which cld be the first step towards a gen improvement of the situation in that part of the world.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Louis Henkin of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs and cleared by Bonbright and Johnson in draft and by Matthews in final form.

[2] Schuman's message was included in telegram 3976 from Paris, Jan. 4, 1952, p. 8.

I have considered the two points made in your msg of Jan 3. Nothing in the agreed statement intends or implies any change in existing understandings between our Govts as to prior consultations before taking any necessary action against air bases in Manchuria. If, after an armistice, the situation envisaged in the statement shld arise, the US Govt wld, except in circumstances of the gravest emergency greatly endangering the security of the United Nations forces, consult with all countries having armed forces in Korea on the specific measures to be taken against China.

In regard to the situation in Indochina, we have been informed of the plans your Govt has for bringing the matter to the United Nations in the event of certain developments.[4] If the situation in Indochina becomes one in which United Nations action is appropriate and desirable, the French Govt may count on our full support in the United Nations." [5]

ACHESON

---

[3] Acheson's message was transmitted in telegram 3780 to Paris, Jan. 2, p. 2.

[4] Reference was to the intention of France to appeal to the United Nations in the event of an invasion of Indochina by Chinese Communist forces. For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.

[5] The following phrase at the end of the telegram was deleted by Secretary Acheson, "for the measures necessary in the circumstances."

320/1-1152: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations General Assembly [1] (Roosevelt) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 11, 1952—10 p. m.

Delga 981. Re: Korea. Altho in agreement with Dept's views Gadel 613, Jan 5,[2] re desirability avoid discussion substance Korean prob at this time, believe USGADel as result debate on deferment Korean item Comite One,[3] may increasingly face necessity discussion with other dels, and possibly in open debate, certain general views on progress and prospects for Panmunjom negots and on our willingness engage in polit talks immed fol conclusion satisfactory armistice. Some such discussion along general lines, altho it avoids substantive issues, is becoming increasingly necessary to fill void re Korea created by our insistence that Korean item be deferred. Sov bloc has attempted create suspicion that we have something to hide re our attitude not only towards negots but also towards polit future of Korea, and to leave impression that we are taking exclusive and negative approach to whole Korean prob. Despite favorable vote in Comite One,[4] some weakening in support US position on indefinite deferment Korean item now becoming apparent among friendly dels, and, we feel we have been placed in unfavorable propaganda position by Vishinsky's speech in that comite. Brit and Fr have requested appointment with Gross tomorrow to discuss tactics re Korean item.

---

[1] The Sixth Regular Session of the UN General Assembly met in Paris, Nov. 7, 1951–Feb. 5, 1952.

[2] In Gadel 613, the Department of State not only suggested avoiding substantive discussion of Korea in Committee One of the General Assembly, but instructed the U.S. Delegation to state that such discussions would confuse and hinder the armistice talks. (320/1-552)

[3] For a summary of the debate, see UN document A/C.1/SR.486.

As GA concludes other business and draws towards a close, USGADel will be under great pressure to make clear position which it advocates re future handling of Korean question and wld appreciate Dept's views and guidance on nature of statement which might be made, including degree to which it wld be advisable for USGADel to reveal our views on substance and tactics in anticipation armistice will be concluded.[5]

As we see it, 2 possible alternatives now face us in handling Korean item if adjournment is in immed prospect before negots concluded Panmunjom:

1. Place Korean item at end of agenda at this session with minimum essential US exposition our point of view on status armistice and subject of course to considerations prejudical to outcome Panmunjom negots;
2. Adjourn present GA without discussion Korean item but with recommendation reopening of session New York or convocation special session, preferably making it clear as soon as possible approx when this might take place.

Wld be helpful know background issuance Ridgway statement Jan 9[6] and to have Dept and Emb Moscow evaluation of current Chi Commie attitude at Panmunjom in relation Vishinsky line at GA. It appears to many dels that positions taken both places indicate Chi Commies fol common and well-coordinated policy line which cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda.

ROOSEVELT

---

[4] The proposal to postpone consideration of item 5 (independence of Korea) on the Committee's agenda was carried by a vote of 47 to 6, with 3 abstentions.

[5] A note on the source text next to the last four lines of this paragraph read: "done by Gadel 393". For Gadel 393, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1282.

[6] According to Delga 1037, Jan. 15, not printed, Ridgway's statement of Jan. 9 linked the Soviet Union with responsibility for lack of progress at Panmunjom. The U.S. Delegation protested this introduction of a political element into the discussions and noted that it was not helpful to its task at the UN General Assembly. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 66)

795.00/1-3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET **PRIORITY** TOKYO, January 12, 1952—9:25 p. m.

CX 61348. Re JCS 91600, 91602, 91606.[1] This msg in 5 parts.

Part 1. The text of the proposed declaration contained in your 91602 which was, of course, entirely unknown here at the time of dispatch of my C 60961,[2] strengthens my belief in the soundness of the views contained therein. While my comments on the joint declaration are not asked, conscience compels me to reiterate my conviction that with presently available military resources this command would be incapable of posing a threat to Communist China sufficient in itself to deter it from renewed aggression.

Part 2. A. From the beginning it has been intended that the armistice agreement be written in considerably more detail than could result from the incorporation of the agreed principles into one document. This UNC intention is in consonance with JCS 89473 [3] which directs that the terms of the armistice agreement be formulated in such clear and detailed terms as not to require substantive decision by MAC. Examples of details required are: The numbers and locations of observer teams, their rights, duties and privileges; the organization and functions of MAC and the non-combatant supervisory organ; the methods of exchange of POWs; the "limit" of rotation of military personnel. It is impossible to predict what delays will be imposed in resolution of these details; an early agreement is possible, but more delays are probable. It would be dangerous for us to proceed so rapidly that we fail to provide for the implementation of the agreement in sufficient detail to preclude endless arguments in MAC and the relative ineffectiveness of either the agreement or the MAC.

B. The proposal contained in para 2 of your 91606 is considered to be a wholly impracticable procedure and offers no prospect for a favorable solution of the problem.

Part 3. A. In conformance with the instructions contained in your 91600, that the subject of airfield construction be isolated and deferred until it becomes the only unresolved point of issue, I intend to adopt the following procedure:

---

[1] Telegrams 91600 and 91602, both JCS to Ridgway, Jan. 10, pp. 13 and 14. In telegram 91606, JCS to Ridgway, also Jan. 10, 1952, the Joint Chiefs expressed concern that any time lag between signature of the armistice and issuance of the sanctions statement would afford the Communists a propaganda advantage, since the U.S. public and the world initially would be unaware that the concession on the airfield question would be offset by the safeguards supposedly inherent in the sanctions statement. To eliminate this possibility, the JCS advised Ridgway it would be necessary for him to insist on concurrent signing of the armistice agreement as an essential condition on the airfield question. They requested Ridgway's view as to the practicability of this procedure. (795.00/1-352)

[2] Dated Jan. 7, p. 10.

[3] For telegram 89473, JCS to Ridgway, Dec. 12, 1951, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1319.

(1) The UNC delegation, at an appropriate time in the near future, will propose that, in view of the continued disagreement upon the question of rehabilitation of airfields, the discussion on this latter question be deferred and other topics of items 3, 4 and 5 be discussed and resolved.

B. Should the above UNC proposal be accepted, drafting on the staff level of the armistice agreement details derived from the agreed principles of items 2 and 3 will be attempted concurrent with the substantive discussion of items 4 and 5.

C. The acceptance by the Communists of this proposal is not probable. They have repeatedly, in the past, refused to proceed to new topics or items, leaving unresolved ones for consideration at a later time. The discussion by the subdelegates of item 4 was undertaken with considerable Communist reluctance. Additional reluctance in this instance may be occasioned by the unfortunate probability that the Commies anticipate concession on the airfield question as a result of releases such as that quoted in my C 60961. It is doubtful that they will agree to discuss the details on item 3, even more doubtful that they will proceed to item 5, until the anticipated concession is forthcoming.

Part 4. Should the Communists agree to our proposal in Part 3A(1), above, it is important that the UNC delegation be in a position to exploit such agreement toward the successful culmination of other agenda items. Hence it is imperative that I know soonest the final positions upon the exchange of civilians and voluntary repatriation which will be acceptable to the US.

Part 5. Reference part 4, JCS 91600, subject: The duration of validity of the agreement, it is intended that the armistice agreement shall state: "The articles and paragraphs of this armistice agreement shall remain in effect until superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or until a peaceful settlement by action at a political level is achieved."

UNP files, lot 60 D 268

United States Minutes of the Forty-fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, January 14, 1952 [1]

[Extract]

SECRET PARIS, January 28, 1952.
US/A/M(Chr)/231

. . . .

2. *Korea.* Ambassador Gross referred to the Korean aspect of the Vyshinsky speech.[2] In a meeting with Lloyd and Jebb (UK), and Chauvel (France), Lloyd had expressed the view that something must soon be said in regard to Korea.[3] At any rate it would have to be mentioned before the end of the session. Ambassador Gross thought there could well be a rising tide favoring some discussion of the item, and the lack of timeliness vis-à-vis the armistice negotiations might not be enough of an argument to dissuade members of the Committee from wanting to discuss Korea.

As Mrs. Roosevelt understood Washington's views, it was that as the close of the Assembly drew near, it would be highly undesirable to discuss Korea. Therefore they might be willing to consider the convening of a special session or the reconvening of the present one in New York at an appropriate time. She felt that we should sound out other delegations on that basis and not let them get the idea that we were unconcerned about Korea. Ambassador Gross agreed, noting that the Department had already been asked for its views on this matter. He emphasized again the need for being able to agree either to discussing Korea here or at a special session in New York.

Mr. Cohen also agreed fully with this idea, and felt that we should take a strong position against discussing it here. Therefore we should favor holding a special session in New York sometime this spring when conditions favored convening it. Mr. Cohen noted a comment that he had seen in the *New York Times* of last Wednesday in which the remark was attributed to General Ridgway that the Chinese and/or Korean negotiators at Panmunjom were merely the stooges of the Kremlin, or words to that effect. He thought it was highly important that the military not make such "political remarks", when we were doing everything possible here to avoid political discussion which might in any way prejudice the military negotiations.[4]

---

[1] The minutes were circulated to the delegation on Jan. 28, 1952. Eleanor Roosevelt headed the meeting at which 43 members of the U.S. Delegation were present. Included among them were Representative John M. Vorys, Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, John Sherman Cooper, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, Benjamin V. Cohen, Ward P. Allen, Durward V. Sandifer, David W. Wainhouse, Porter McKeever, and Col. Cornelius P. Van Ness. The meeting was held at the Hotel Astoria.

[2] On Jan. 12, 1952, in general debate on agenda item 6 of Committee One, "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations", Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, A. Y. Vyshinsky, included in a general attack on U.S. foreign policy a condemnation of American efforts in Korea and he raised the issue of the Security Council assisting in the negotiations to end the fighting. See UN document A/C.1/SR. 487.

[3] A report on this meeting is in telegram Delga 817 from Paris, Jan. 2, 1952, in file 320/1-152.

In regard to Ambassador Jessup's remarks on the idea of a press release along the lines of a tri-partite statement which would give the lie to the current Soviet move on disarmament, Mr. McKeever was in thorough agreement.

In regard to Mr. Cohen's remarks, Colonel Van Ness agreed with the idea of noting the Ridgway comment to Washington.

Senator Cooper wondered what it was that Lloyd and Chauvel expected to achieve by discussing Korea at this stage. Ambassador Gross said that Chauvel was not of this opinion, or not at least to the same extent, as Lloyd on this matter. As for Lloyd, Ambassador Gross felt that domestic political considerations might play the greatest role in his expressed desire to have Korea discussed now. The general spirit of restlessness as the First Committee neared the end of its agenda was also a contributing factor. When all the items were finished except Korea, there might be a mounting pressure to consider it. Nevertheless Ambassador Gross said that Lloyd's feelings seemed to have been moderated somewhat from the position he had taken at the beginning of the conversation in which his arguments had been developed.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that if we knew for certain what position the Department would authorize us to take, we could propose a later session if such were the case, and our position could then be explained more fully, and more logically, as far as the other delegations were concerned.

Senator Cooper felt that this subject was of such delicate importance that we should definitely oppose discussing it at this time, while simultaneously making clear in the most positive terms our arguments for such a position. Mr. Mansfield stated that he and Mr. Vorys had felt that from a domestic point of view there would be much questioning if Korea were not to be discussed. However they had both agreed with the Delegation's decision to seek deferment until the armistice negotiations had succeeded or significant developments occurred. Mr. McKeever suggested that a change of nomenclature be undertaken to clarify matters and thereby our position. "Korea" was an all-inclusive term for matters which did not necessarily fall under the same type of considerations. He thought that although more cumbersome, if we were to refer to the desire not to discuss "political settlements for Korea" our position would be much clearer.

---

[4] See footnote 6, p. 16.

Senator Cooper thought that at some time during the GA some speech ought to be made by the US containing in the clearest terms, for home consumption, the reasons for our postponement position. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that we should seek to reach conclusions on what should be said for home consumption, and that a working group ought to consider it. It would be equally important for the other delegations in Paris. Mr. Wainhouse stated that most of the First Committee members agreed with the wisdom of not taking up Korea at this delicate stage. The problem at this time would be to convince world public opinion, including our own, of the correctness of our position, as we have already convinced Committee One.

Mr. Sandifer noted that we might make a speech along the lines suggested by Senator Cooper at the time we propose taking Korea up at a special session. He felt also that it would be better to reconvene the present session in New York, keeping the same officers, and avoiding administrative details involved in a special session. In regard to the Soviet disarmament proposals, he thought we should avoid precipitating the very debate we seek to avoid by proposing a resolution to which the Soviets could raise possible objections.

Mr. Cohen mentioned that in regard to Korea the grave anxiety of many delegations had been expressed to us over the fortunes of the armistice negotiations. He felt that we should be careful to distinguish between a desire to consider Korea at this time in United Nations debates and a general concern with the progress of the negotiations.

. . . .

Secretary's Daily Meetings,[1] lot 58 D 609

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1952.

Participants: Mr. Acheson
Mr. Webb
Mr. Matthews

---

[1] As of Jan. 28, 1952, Secretary of State Acheson set up a dual system of staff meetings: small meetings held Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 9:30 a.m. in his office attended by Department of State personnel he specifically designated to be present at that particular meeting (usually from 7 to 15 persons) and large staff meetings, held Tuesday and Thursday at 9:30 a.m., at which a regular group of principal officers of the Department of State (about 25 in number) or their deputies were present.

This system replaced daily meetings with the Secretary of State as well as the Under Secretary's meetings, both of which had proved unsatisfactory. The same persons who had attended the Under Secretary's meeting now attended the Tuesday and Thursday meetings, which were officially designated "Secretary's Staff Meetings".

After the small meetings in the Secretary's office, the Executive Secretariat prepared short memoranda of conversation (of which the source text is one) in summary form with extremely limited distribution. The Executive Secretariat also prepared informal summary *Continued*

Mr. McFall
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Thorp
Mr. Fisher
Mr. McWilliams
Mr. Battle
[Mr. Bohlen]

Item 1. *Korean Briefing*

Mr. Armstrong gave his usual briefing.[2]

Item 2. *Prisoner of War Issue in Korean Talks—German Agreement*[3]

The entire meeting was taken up by a discussion of two items. They are as follows:

(*a*) *Prisoner of War Issue in Korean Talks*

This discussion consumed the bulk of the meeting and revolved around the point as to whether or not we wish to agree to forced repatriation of all prisoners of war or whether we will be willing to break off the talks on this point after the Communists adhered to this position.

There was a long discussion of this matter with some alternative courses offered. Mr. Bohlen proposed that a census be taken of the prisoners of war we now hold to find out how many want to return and how many wished not to return. He said he felt that the reason for the Communists sticking to this position was that they are afraid we would rig the situation so that none of the prisoners of war we now hold would be returned. He felt if we had a definite number to offer to them which we would return we could get by this point without breaking off the talks. All agreed this was a good idea and should be pursued. However, since General Ridgway needed word of our final position immediately, it was agreed to tell him we would not agree to forced repatriation. He should be warned, however, that before coming to a final break in the talks he should get instructions from Washington.

[Here follows a summary of the discussion of the German Agreement.]

---

notes of the large staff meetings, which had no official status and no directive authority. These notes, often more informative than the short summaries of the small meetings, were given wider distribution.

[2] An intelligence briefing by W. Park Armstrong, Jr. usually began these small meetings with the Secretary.

[3] For documentation on negotiation for a contractual relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, see volume VII.

320/1-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 15, 1952—6:57 p. m.

Gadel 171. Repeated to London 3357 and Moscow 484. Korea, Delgas 932,[1] 981.[2] Dept can only speculate significance recent Sov moves which appear to be directed towards initiating Korean discussion in UN at this time. It may be, of course, that Sov does not really desire discussion Korea either in SC or GA. Entire maneuver may have been attempt confuse us, disrupt unity and support behind our CMC proposal,[3] at same time achieving Sov propaganda victory as country interested in peace in Korea and making every effort achieve it. This step might also be designed raise doubts among our friends and with people of world as to UNC handling of negotiations. It may also be intended as maneuver force UNC make concessions at Panmunjom in order keep UN from discussing Korean question.

Further possibility is that Sovs actually desire discussion Korea at this time, preferably in SC but, if necessary in GA. In such discussions, they might hope to exploit among UN Membs any dissent from or doubt about UNC handling negotiations or UNC position on specific questions. Sov may consider that by playing on universal desire for armistice they cld get expression in UN in favor dropping such questions as airfields which might force UN hand to make concessions. Further possibility that Sovs may seek inject other polit questions (e.g., withdrawal foreign forces from Korea, polit conf for other Far Eastern questions, propose solutions for Formosa and Chi representation) in effort gain concessions these questions as price for armistice. It is also conceivable, of course, that purpose is to smoke out UN attitudes re such polit questions to determine desirability armistice in light what can be expected on these polit questions after such an armistice.

Possibility always exists Sov does not desire armistice, has gained all it can from negotiations, and using device of taking matter to UN where it can inject unacceptable polit conditions as method of breaking off negotiations without incurring onus for doing so.

---

[1] Delga 932 is not printed. It was a report of a conversation between Ernest A. Gross and Y. A. Malik in Paris on the subject of postponement of the Korean item on the agenda of Committee One of the General Assembly. Gross, who favored placing Korea at the foot of the agenda, expressed concern that debate of Korea would imperil progress made at Panmunjom. Malik, who favored earlier consideration of Korea, countered that the truce talks needed "some assistance" from the General Assembly. Malik informed Gross that A. Y. Vyshinsky planned to discuss Korea "only in a very general way" to find out if the United Nations could help the armistice negotiations (320/1-852).

[2] Dated Jan. 11, p. 15.

[3] The CMC proposal refers to the Report of the Collective Measures Committee concerning measures to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, item 4 on the agenda of Committee One.

Though these hypotheses seem plausible, we do not regard any as completely satisfactory.

Dept's view remains (Gadel 613)[4] that nothing to be gained from discussing Korean item until armistice negotiations are successful or take clear turn indicating failure. It shld be possible make clear other dels that discussion at this stage cld not aid negotiations in Panmunjom but cld only hamper achievement armistice which all desire. UNC continuing in good faith make every effort bring about armistice in accordance UN principles; despite Commie intransigence UNC hopeful such armistice will be achieved. You cld also make clear that if Sov wished aid negotiations, it cld easily do so by having Commie negotiators at Panmunjom take less intransigent attitude on basic points. If Sov purpose is to raise polit questions, it is premature to do so, so long as no armistice achieved and fighting going on. You shld state that US most desirous achieve polit settlement for Korea after hostilities have ceased, and will be prepared discuss in UN means for bringing about such settlement immediately after armistice put into effect.

In private conversations, you cld, as you have been authorized, indicate in your discretion to various dels as much as you think desirable of views contained in Gadel 393.[5] Dept believes it shld be possible reassure other dels our intentions and to make clear that, as have repeatedly stated for many months, polit questions cannot be decided until fighting has stopped.

If at any stage in GA there is gen disposition to accede Sov insistence and discuss Korean item, you shld be guided by Gadel 718.[6]

Dept believes above suggestions shld obviate present need for measures suggested Delga 980[7] in which Dept sees some dangers.

ACHESON

---

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 15.

[5] For text of Gadel 393, dated Dec. 8, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1282.

[6] Gadel 718 of Jan. 15, 1952 is not printed. In it the Department of State reiterated that the U.S. Delegation should take the position that Korea should not be discussed in Committee One while the armistice negotiations were in progress. In the unlikely event that great pressure existed for early consideration of the Korean item, the U.S. Delegation was to keep substantive discussion to a minimum. (320/1–1552)

[7] Delga 980 of Jan. 12, 1952 is not printed. In it the U.S. Delegation suggested asking the Soviet Union to press for an armistice agreement in return for an assurance that the Soviet Union would participate in the political discussions on a Korean settlement which would follow. An even more hypothetical suggestion put forth by the U.S. Delegation was that the Soviet Union sought in the General Assembly a forum where it could act directly and without Peking. The U.S. Delegation suggested alerting Peking to this possibility in order to create potential differences between the two Communist powers. (320/1–1252)

795.00/1-3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1952—7:39 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 92059. From JCS. Reur CX 61348.[1]

1. We concur in your views part 2 A.

2. Your comment part 2 B confirms our doubt on practicability of such a procedure, but we wish to reiterate that all practicable steps should be taken to reduce to minimum the time between any concession on airfields and final agreement on armistice.

3. Your planned procedure part 3 approved.

4. Re part 4, as a final position, which is currently approved at highest govtl level, you are authorized to agree to an all-for-all exchange of mil POWs except that no forceful return of POWs would be required; however, prior to taking this position it should be clear that all other possibilities have been exhausted. Furthermore, since President must be informed prior to an actual breakoff, you should report to Wash before precipitating or accepting such a breakoff in negots. It is possible that in face of pressures which could develop on this issue wherein loss of some 3000 UN prisoners is balanced against the welfare of an indefinite number of Communist prisoners in our hands, the govt might find it necessary to further modify our stand. Nevertheless, you should act as if current position were final position, keeping next [*text*] preceding sentence strictly for your own guidance.

5. Accordingly, before adopting final position you should seek an agreement which makes provision for return of selected UN and ROK civilians held by Commies. Such provision for return of civilians need not be on a one-for-one basis against POWs held by UNC but should clearly place obligation on Commies to return or account for civilians listed. It is assumed that prior accepting any all-for-all agreement on POWs you would make every effort to ascertain that lists of living POWs provided by Commies contain names of all UN POWs who can reasonably be presumed to be alive and all ROK POWs whose return it is practicable to expect. Additionally any agreement on POWs must provide by one-for-one exchange or otherwise that POWs held by UNC will not be turned over to Commies until satisfied UN and ROK POWs Commies have agreed return will in fact be delivered to UNC. If in your judgment clearly no agreement whatever on civilians possible to achieve under agenda item 4 you will include specific ref thereto in formulation under agenda item 5 together with an expression of intent by MAC to facilitate and assist within limits its authority return of ci-

---

[1] Dated Jan. 12, p. 17.

vilians to their homes. Instructions paras 10 and 12 part 4 JCS 90083 [2] in conflict with this msg are hereby rescinded.

6. In order exhaust every possibility obtaining agreement on civilians under agenda item 4 or, if impossible, at minimum agreement on principle voluntary repatriation POWs only, it is suggested that at time deemed appropriate by you and consistent with objectives para 4 JCS 91600 [3] you transfer negots on unresolved issues all agenda items to full delegations and handle concession on airfield issue in such manner as to require Communist concession to our final position (para 4 above) on POWs and, if feasible, civilians. Your comments this point requested.[4]

7. In order remove any possible genuine misapprehension that UNC intends utilize voluntary repatriation principle as pretext for retaining all or most of POWs held by UNC, and to counter Commie propaganda this subj, request your comments re possibility of immediate poll of prisoners, if practicable, under ICRC supervision to determine approx number who would definitely desire repatriation.[5] Commies could then be assured that at least the number determined by such a poll would be returned.

8. Re part 5. Suggest any possible ambiguity last part your proposed formulation would be removed if amended to read as follows:

> "The articles and paragraphs of this armistice agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level."

---

[2] Dated Dec. 19, 1951; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1377.
[3] Dated Jan. 10, p. 13.
[4] See CX 61829, Ridgway to JCS, Jan. 19, *infra*.
[5] *Ibid.*

795.00/1-3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, January 19, 1952—9:09 p. m.

CX 61829. Comments requested in JCS 92059 [1] follow:

Part 1. Reference paragraph 6 JCS 92059.

A. Reference is made to part 3 my message CX 61348, 12 January 1952.[2] In order to make the proposal outlined in part 3A (1) of CX 61348 it will be necessary to convene the full delegation in plenary session. At that time we will:

(1) Propose that the question of rehabilitation of airfields be deferred, in view of the continued disagreement on both sides.

---

[1] *Supra.*
[2] *Ante*, p. 17.

(2) Propose that discussion of agenda item 5 be initiated at subdelegation level and conducted concurrently with continued discussion of unresolved topics under item 4.

(3) Propose that drafting of the armistice agreement details derived from agreed principles of items 2 and 3 be initiated at staff level concurrent with the substantive discussion of items 4 and 5.

B. Should the Communists agree to the proposals in A, above, which is considered doubtful, it will be possible to definitely establish unresolved issues on all agenda items and then proceed as suggested in paragraph 6, JCS 92059.

Part 2. Reference paragraph 7, JCS 92059:

One of strongest points of UNC proposal concerning voluntary repatriation is that choice is to be expressed by each POW at exchange point in presence of representatives of both belligerents and of neutral observers. UNC delegation has vigorously denied existence of any program to influence ultimate choice of POW and any coercion in POW camps. Consider Communists would seize upon poll by any agency whatever, as basis for further propaganda concerning intimidation and coercion, and would never accept results of poll as fact. Moreover, should poll be taken and additional POWs later elect non-repatriation it would be most difficult not to hand over total number which original poll indicated wanted to go to Communists. Furthermore, poll conducted by ICRC at instigation of UNC might impugn neutrality of that organization, since Communists could not accept invitation to participate in poll without appearing to be giving some consideration to accepting principle of voluntary repatriation. Finally, not believed here that Communists have any real concern as to numbers who may choose not to return to them; it is the principle which is anathema to them since question of the individual versus the state is the essential difference between democracy and Communism.

320/1-1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 21, 1952—4:19 p. m.

Gadel 777. Adjournment GA and Kor. Delgas 1042, 1071, 1099, 1110.[1]

1. FYI situation re armis negots as fols. Negots seriously deadlocked over two important issues (airfields, POWs). Differences re other matters not yet considered may produce further disagreement and prolong

---

[1] In Delgas 1042, 1071, 1099, and 1110, dated Jan. 16, 17, 18, and 19, respectively, the U.S. Delegation primarily reported upon tactics for adjournment of the General Assembly and postponement of discussion of Korea; none printed (320/1-1552 to 320/1-1952). See also footnote 3 below.

discussions. Even if deadlock broken there will remain task reducing points to formal written agreement. Foregoing leads to conclusion negots will in all probability continue beyond date when other GA business completed, and it wld be sheer guesswork to fix a date for their conclusion. End FYI.

2. We believe it is clear GA shld in no circumstances sit around in Paris waiting to consider Kor item. In our view it is highly desirable adjourn GA as speedily as possible.

3. Your understanding Dept's position on handling Kor item correct. Delga 1071. Dept agrees if polit and mil aspects postponed consideration Kor relief item shld also be delayed.

4. In adjourning GA Paris, you shld make it clear US favors reconvening NY as soon as time ripe for consideration Kor item. Dept does not have strong preference special session or split session and agrees decision shld be determined on basis consultations, but on balance we lean somewhat towards special session. In discussing this question, you may wish keep in mind, in addition to arguments reftel, Fr Govt invited 6th session GA to Paris on condition its entire session wld be there (UN Doc A/1788/Rev. 1, Mar 19, 1951), although we believe our commitment to Fr has been met since there will have been full session in Paris. In any event, we are definitely opposed any move reconvene in Paris.

5. Separate tel [2] re agenda 3rd Comite, Delga 1042, follows.

6. Draft res, Delga 1110, acceptable.[3]

ACHESON

---

[2] Not printed.

[3] In Delga 1110, the delegation asked for the comments of the Department of State on the texts of two similar alternate resolutions on convening a special session of the UN General Assembly in New York upon conclusion of the armistice and requesting the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to undertake negotiations for voluntary contributions to the program of UNKRA for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. This resolution, combining elements of both drafts, was passed overwhelmingly by the Assembly on Feb. 5, 1952; see UN document A/PV.375. For text of the resolution, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, pp. 2643–2644.

Truman Library, Truman papers, Department of Defense Material Relating to the Korean War [1]

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins)

TOP SECRET TOKYO, January 23, 1952.[2]

C 62064. Personal for General Collins.

---

[1] This document was part of a multi-volume series entitled "Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation" prepared by the Department of Defense for President Truman in January 1953.

[2] The JCS copy of this telegram shows the date time group as 231125Z or 8:25 p.m. Seoul time.

1. Ref A. DA 92631,[3] B. JCS 91600,[4] C. C 62009.[5]

2. A. Armistice negotiations have developed two major issues which lengthy discussion has not resolved. These are: (1) Prohibition on airfield construction (item 3). (2) Voluntary repatriation (item 4).

B. It is possible that other such issues may be developed in discussion of item 5. This, of course, cannot be determined until discussion of item 5 is initiated.

C. JCS 91600, para 2 provides for a solution of the airfield construction problem under definitely prescribed conditions, which cannot be quickly and easily established.

3. My msg C 62009 presents a detailed procedure to be initiated on or about 25 Jan which will exploit all reasonable possibilities for:

A. Deferment of further discussion of airfield construction.
B. Early initiation of discussion of item 5.
C. Obtaining agreement on item 4 if it can be done within the limits of the currently auth min pos.
D. Definite establishment of all points of disagreement on all agenda items.
E. Earliest possible submission of complete draft agreement in plenary session. This draft will contain the unresolved points of issue and will present an opportunity for compromise settlement of these points and the consequent realization of a full agreement.

4. Other than the above, there is no procedure, short of an ultimatum, which appears to me to be reasonable and feasible, which would expedite the negotiation and offer any promise of an acceptable armistice agreement.

5. For the above reasons I do not feel that my representative could contribute anything more for consideration by the secretaries. I am reluctant to have Gen Hickey absent during the period of negotiation of the admin agreement. If you desire my representative to be present, I can send Gen Wright, who is thoroughly familiar with the details of the armistice negotiation and my views thereon, as well as my views and our thinking here on possible course of action if full scale mil opns should be resumed in Korea. Please advise your wishes.[6]

---

[3] Dated Jan. 23; Collins asked Ridgway if he would send a representative to a meeting to be held among the Secretaries of State and Defense, members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, the JCS, and the senior advisers to Secretary Acheson to explore what new actions, if any, should be recommended to President Truman to bring about an armistice on acceptable terms. (Truman Library, Truman papers, Department of Defense Material Relating to the Korean War)

The meeting referred to was held on Jan. 29 at the Pentagon. For a record of the discussion, see the memorandum by Johnson, Feb. 4, p. 32.

[4] Dated Jan. 10, p. 13.

[5] This telegram, Jan. 22, not printed, is summarized in paragraph 3, below. (Truman Library, Truman papers, Department of Defense Material Relating to the Korean War)

[6] See footnote 2, *infra.*

Truman Library, Truman papers, Department of Defense Material Relating to the Korean War

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, January 25, 1952—[9:15 p. m.]

C 62217. With reference to my C 62064 of 23 Jan,[1] the following is submitted for consideration in the conferences referred to in your DA 92631 to me dated 23 Jan.[2] There is in my opinion a measurable chance of achieving real progress on acceptable armistice terms, providing there be no slightest indication revealed to the Communists from any authoritative or even normally reliable official source, that further United Nations or United States concession is forthcoming, or even under consideration. With the well known timelessness of Communist tactics in seeking their objectives, every time they gain knowledge of concessions decided, or even considered by the United Nations, or knowledge that some new course of action, not necessarily a concession, is up for decision, the Communists become more obdurate and less willing to negotiate.

We have suffered in this manner on several occasions, and on at least one item believe we lost substantial gains then almost secured.

Even high level meetings in Washington, when it becomes known that armistice negotiations were discussed, occasion, I believe, further delays, as the Communists each time wait to see what else they may possibly find conceded.

I therefore offer the view that we should be permitted to pursue the program outlined to you in part 1 of my C 62009 of 22 Jan [3] without further directed concessions, new instructions or even the holding of high level conferences to discuss our negotiations. If this is done, and authoritative speculation concurrently eliminated, it might be the Communists would move in our direction.

I believe this course has little of disadvantage except some further delay.

I recommend its adoption for approximately two weeks, unless other developments intervene.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed, but see foonote 3, *supra.* In telegram DA 93043, Jan. 26, Collins informed Ridgway that his views would be considered at the conference on Jan. 29 and it was not necessary for him to send a representative. (Truman Library, Truman papers, Department of Defense Material Relating to the Korean War)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, *supra.*

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 108

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, January 29, 1952—7:09 p. m.

CX 62465. This msg in two parts.

Part 1. Reference Joint Chiefs of Staff 90388, December 1951 [1] and Joint Chiefs of Staff 91122, 5 January 1952.[2]

A. It is probable that during the discussion of agenda item 5 between the United Nations Command Delegation and the Communists the question of the identity of "countries concerned" will arise, and that the Communists may even propose to name such countries in the recommendations. They may propose that, since Communist China and perhaps the Soviet Union are vitally concerned in any Korean settlement, those countries should be represented at the conference table.

B. We have noted State Dept msg 250410Z (Deptel msg to Paris Gadel 393, 8 December 1951)[3] and our delegation will attempt to limit its own position to naming only the United Nations and the Republic of Korea. It would seem appropriate for the United Nations Command to acquiesce to designation of the North Korean Government and possibly the Chinese Communist Government as "countries concerned", but to reject any efforts to designate other countries such as the USSR.

C. It will be very helpful if you would communicate your views, including suggested replies to Communist queries along this line.

D. Guidance on this point is requested.

Part 2.

A. Discussions of agenda item 3 bearing on a political conference have made it clear that great difficulty can be anticipated in arriving at agreement on agenda item 5. In view of the intention of the Communists to specify a time limit for the initiation of political action subsequent to the date the armistice becomes effective, expressed at the time they proposed agenda item 5, and the indications that they will propose a 90 day time limit, our anticipation of this Communist proposal might possibly speed the negotiations by making our position more palatable to them, and convincing them that we intend to press for a final settlement of the Korean problem.

B. In connection with the statement of United Nations position on agenda item 5, contained in paragraph 14 of Joint Chiefs of Staff 90083 of 20 [*19*] December,[4] I feel that to substitute some such phrase as "That steps be taken within a period of 90 days" for the presently prescribed phrase "That early steps be taken", might more quickly bring us closer to agreement.

C. Guidance on this point is requested.

---

[1] Dated Dec. 24, 1951; text in *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1435.

[2] Not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 14). In it the Joint Chiefs expressed concern that a minor concession on language in connection with the agenda of item 3 of the proposed Armistice Agreement might imply that the United States agreed to a political conference following the armistice in which participation was limited to the United States, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China.

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1282.

[4] For text, see *ibid.*, p. 1377.

795.00/2-252: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 1, 1952—5:08 p. m.

JCS 900075. From JCS. Reur CX 62465.[2]

1. It is desirable to avoid naming any govts or authorities in recommendation under item 5. Your del should indicate that it is not for mil cdrs to determine what countries or authorities are in fact concerned in a polit solution for Korea. It would be preferred, therefore, likewise to have no mention of UN or ROK in order to forestall a Communist proposal to mention Peiping, NK or USSR.

2. If, however, it should become necessary to deal with question of who are govts or authorities concerned, there would be no objection to indicating that recommendation is addressed to North Korean and Peiping regimes, as well as others, provided nature of recommendation foll lines indicated in part V, JCS 90083.[3] In other words, there is no objection to having a recommendation addressed to UN organization, to mbr states, to ROK, Peiping, NK, that they cooperate in early steps to deal at polit level with matters not settled by armistice. If question of Soviet Union arises, you should indicate Soviet Union is mbr of UN and as such recommendation is of course addressed to it as well.

3. It is important, however, in view of State Dept tel [Gadel] 393,[4] not to commit yourself to a polit conference, or polit discussions in any particular form, or with particular participants.

4. There is no objection to suggestion in para B, part 2.

---

[1] This telegram was prepared in the Department of State by UNP and approved by Johnson and Matthews on Jan. 31; see the memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Jan. 31, 1952, enclosing a draft, in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 122.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1377.

[4] For text, see *ibid.*, p. 1282.

795.00/2-452

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1952.

Subject: Position on POWs in Korean Armistice Negotiations

A meeting was held on January 22 in Mr. Matthews' office at which UNA, S/P, P, C, EUR, and FE were represented, at which the status of the Korean armistice negotiations was reviewed with particular reference to the status of the question of the US position on prisoners of war. As a result of that meeting Mr. Johnson was requested to chair a working group to prepare a paper thoroughly examining all possible methods whereby Communist agreement to the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war could be obtained and, if negotiations were to break off on this issue, how the maximum of domestic and international support could be obtained for various courses of action which might be adopted.

The foregoing paper was completed on January 25 [1] and discussed at a meeting held by Mr. Matthews the same day. It was determined that it would be recommended to the Secretary that he thoroughly discuss the question with the Department of Defense and JCS at the earliest possible opportunity. A meeting of departmental officers with the Secretary was arranged for Monday, January 28 and a meeting for the Secretary with Mr. Lovett and the JCS for Tuesday, January 29.

On January 28 a meeting was held with the Secretary at which G, C, UNA, S/P, P and FE were represented, the basis for discussion being a memorandum of questions prepared by Mr. Johnson.[2]

On Tuesday, January 29 a meeting was held at the Pentagon in the office of Mr. Lovett at which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, JCS, the Secretary of Navy, Secretary of Air Force, General Carter, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Johnson were present. At the request of Mr. Lovett, General Collins reviewed the present status of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom and it was the general sense of the meeting that the question of prisoners of war was likely to become the major unresolved issue. At the request of the Secretary of State, General Bradley, and subsequently General Collins and General Vandenberg, reviewed the military situation with particular reference to the desirability of obtaining an armistice, with the conclusion that it was in the US military interest to achieve an armistice. There was some general and inconclusive discussion of possible methods of handling the prisoner of war question during which the Secretary of State tentatively suggested the procedure of immediately screening and releasing POWs whose lives would be endangered if returned to the Communists, thereafter expressing to the Communists a willingness to enter an all-for-all exchange on the basis of revised lists of POWs held by the UNC. At the close of the meeting it was agreed that the same group should meet in two or three days further to discuss the matter. In the meanwhile Mr. Johnson and G-3 of the Army would further explore the question of possible solutions.

A meeting was held in the Secretary's office on January 31 at which G, C, UNA, P, and FE were represented, at which the question of proposing at Panmunjom referring the POW question to the ICJ prior to undertaking the release of POWs was discussed and the decision reached that the action was not desirable on the grounds that public opinion value was doubtful and it would appear to build the issue up with decreased possibility of resolution. There was further discussion and development of the course of action involving release of POWs so as to face the Communists with a *fait accompli* not requiring the acceptance of principle of voluntary repatriation. It was agreed that a meeting with Mr. Lovett and the JCS would be requested for the following day and in the meanwhile Mr. Johnson and G–3 at Army would develop a draft telegram to General Ridgway as a basis for discussion.[3]

---

[1] The 14-page paper, not printed, entitled "Measures to Achieve a Korean Armistice on Present UNC Terms and Alternatives Thereto", was prepared by the working group and transmitted by Johnson to Matthews on Jan. 25 (795.00/1-2525).

[2] The 6-page memorandum of questions, sent by Johnson to Matthews on Jan. 28, not printed (795.00/1-2852), was subsequently modified into three pages of notes for use by the Secretary in his discussion with the JCS on Jan. 29. These notes were sent by Johnson to Matthews the same day, not printed (695A.00/1-2852).

On February 1, a meeting was held at the Pentagon in Mr. Lovett's office in which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, General Bradley, Admiral Fechteler, General Collins, Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Johnson were present. The entire question of the US position on prisoners of war was freely and thoroughly discussed with particular reference as to whether the US could accept the position requiring forceful repatriation and if not, possible courses of action which would the least harm the objectives of protecting prisoners held by the Communists and obtaining an armistice. It was the conclusion of the meeting that the US should not adopt any policy which would require the forceful repatriation of prisoners and that the course of action of releasing prisoners who would be endangered by repatriation, thus facing the Communists with a *fait accompli,* should be developed. It was concluded that as the decision involved a question of fundamental national policy, recommendations of the Departments of State and Defense should immediately be put to the President for his decision and that the message should not therefore at this time be sent to General Ridgway pending that decision. Mr. Nash and Mr. Johnson were requested to draft a memorandum for submission to the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense.[4]

---

[3] A draft telegram to Ridgway was prepared by Johnson and the Army and sent to the Secretary of State on Feb. 2 for use at his meeting with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS that afternoon. In the telegram, which was never sent, Johnson summarized high-level thinking on the prisoner-of-war question and specified the alternatives under consideration. It seems likely that this is the draft telegram referred to here; therefore either the date of the draft to Ridgway or Johnson's recollection of the date of the meeting with Lovett and the JCS is incorrect. The draft telegram is not printed (695A.0024/2–252).

[4] *Infra.*

611.95A.241/2-452

Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for the President [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 4, 1952.]

Final United States Government Position on Voluntary Repatriation of Prisoners of War in Korea

It now appears likely that the question of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war will shortly become the sole remaining fundamental issue in the Korean armistice negotiations. It is, therefore, urgent that the final position of this Government on this issue be determined.

This is a question of the utmost gravity. The decision involves the basic moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our entire action in Korea, the fate of some 3,000 of our men and 8,000 other United Nations and Republic of Korea men known to their families to be alive in the hands of the Communists, and the question of whether the hostilities in Korea can be terminated upon an honorable basis or are continued indefinitely with unpredictable consequences.

Any agreement which would require United States troops to use force to turn over to the Communists prisoners who have surrendered to us and who would face an almost certain death would be repugnant to our most fundamental humanitarian principles, and would do much to jeopardize our moral position vis-à-vis the Communist world. On the other hand any position on this question entirely unaccepable to the Communists, whatever their reasons may be, will jeopardize the lives of the prisoners held by the Communists and forestall the possibility of attaining an armistice.

Regardless of whatever additional military, diplomatic and public opinion pressures it would be possible to exert against them in the immediate future, it is not probable that the Communists will accept an armistice agreement containing the principle of voluntary repatriation. Their position in this regard is probably based on considerations much broader than their attitude toward the conclusion of an armistice. These considerations involve the unwillingness of any Communist regime to recognize in any way that an inhabitant of its territory voluntarily could choose to escape from its control. Thus, the efforts that have been made in the negotiations to surround the proposal for voluntary repatriation with safeguards of neutral supervision and Communist observation may well have only increased the unacceptability to the Communists of the entire UNC proposal on repatriation. An additional factor may be a genuine belief by the Communists that it is the intent of the United Nations Command so to administer any system of voluntary repatriation that few if any prisoners of war will be returned by the United Nations.

---

[1] Johnson drafted this memorandum and discussed it with Bohlen of the Department of State and Nash of the Department of Defense. It was transmitted by Johnson to Matthews on Feb. 4, 1952. On the source text of the covering memorandum is the following note in the Secretary's handwriting: "I agree DA".

Domestic and international public opinion can be expected strongly to support as a principle the desirability of voluntary repatriation. However, support for the principle, particularly by international public opinion, will be much less if and when there is a belief that its maintenance requires a continuation of hostilities in Korea.

Nevertheless, balancing all of the considerations and weighing all of the risks it is concluded that the world moral and psychological warfare position of the United States in its opposition to Communist tyranny demands that we accept no course of action which would require the United States to use force to repatriate to the Communists prisoners of war strongly opposed to such repatriation and who would probably be subject to reprisals if so returned. However, this policy should be carried out in such a manner as to minimize the jeopardy to prisoners held by the Communists, to retain the possibility of achieving an armistice, and to obtain the maximum of domestic and international public opinion support.

The only course of action that seems to offer any reasonable possibility of carrying out this policy requires the taking of irrevocable actions at the beginning of its implementation regardless of the ultimate consequences to prisoners held by the Communists or to the conclusion of an armistice. It also involves very important considerations of the timing and methods of carrying out consultations with Congressional leaders and the other nations participating in the Korean hostilities, as well as of presentation to the public and the Communists.

This course of action is:

If and when it becomes clear in the negotiations at Panmunjom that voluntary repatriation is the sole remaining fundamental obstacle to an armistice agreement, and Communist agreement thereto appears impossible to achieve, United Nations Command itself immediately screen out by voluntary individual choice all POWs who strongly object to repatriation to Communist control. (An appropriate choice to be presented to each individual would be a firm expression of a willingness to enter the armed forces of the United Nations Command or accept repatriation to the Communists.) Notify the Communists that the names of such persons have been removed from the lists of POWs held by the United Nations Command, and that the United Nations Command is prepared to enter into an all-for-all exchange of POWs only on the basis of the revised lists.

The advantages of this course of action are:

1. It clearly demonstrates that the United States is not prepared to compromise its basic moral and humanitarian principles for the expediency of obtaining the return of its own men or achieving an armistice.

2. The Communists are faced with a *fait accompli* which does not require their agreement to the principle of voluntary repatriation.
3. The Communists have assurance that a definite number of men will be returned to them.
4. The action is similar to that which the Communists have repeatedly stated they have taken with regard to the "re-education" and release of personnel captured by them.
5. The willingness of the United Nations Command to continue negotiations on the basis of the all-for-all proposals of the Communists would force the Communists to take the initiative in any breaking off of negotiations.

The disadvantages of this course of action are:

1. The Communists may feel obliged to "re-educate" and hold back a similar or proportionate number of United Nations Command prisoners held by them, and there is no effective method of protecting our men against this possibility.
2. It is possible, but probably not likely, that the Communists would entirely break off armistice negotiations.
3. If the Communists did break off negotiations on the basis of the action taken by the United States regarding prisoners it is likely that, in spite of our best efforts, there would be little or no support from our Allies for increasing military pressure in Korea or taking military action against China.
4. While, with careful and proper preparation substantial domestic public opinion support for this course of action can be obtained, it must be recognized that if it should result in a breaking off of armistice negotiations unsympathetic criticism will present the situation in the context of the fate of our men held by the Communists and the casualties resulting from continuation of hostilities versus the fate of men who would still be fighting against us except for the accident of capture.

Successful execution of this course of action will be heavily dependent upon keeping any advance knowledge whatever thereof from the Communists. At the same time, it will be very important that the maximum of domestic and international public opinion support be obtained. Detailed plans for undertaking this difficult task will shortly be submitted if you approve the following recommendations.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1. You approve the adoption of the policy that under no circumstances will the United States accept any proposal in the Korean armistice negotiations that would require the use of force to repatriate to the Communists prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command who are strongly opposed to such repatriation and whose lives would probably be seriously endangered thereby; this policy to be carried out, however, in the manner best calculated to minimize the recognized jeopardy it presents for prisoners of war held by the Communists and to lead to successful conclusion of an armistice.

2. You approve the execution by the Departments of State and Defense of the course of action along the general lines set forth above to implement this policy.

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with this memorandum and the foregoing recommendations.

Secretary of State Secretary of Defense

695A.0024/2–452

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1952.

I refer to the proposed memorandum for the President on Prisoners of War.[1]

Since we are now at the point of final decision on our position, it seems appropriate that I record the views which I gave orally to you and on a separate occasion to the Secretary. My view is that in the final analysis we would not be justified, because of the danger of reprisals against U.S. and UN troops, in allowing the armistice negotiations to fail solely because of our refusal to return all Communist prisoners of war.

I feel that we should maintain the present position on this point for some time longer and give every indication that we will not yield on it. We might well make use of an apparent *fait accompli* device, as outlined in Mr. Johnson's draft memorandum but my own view is that we should not allow the Communists who do not wish to return to pass irretrievably out of our hands until we know for sure whether the Chinese and North Koreans will take reprisals against American and other UN prisoners of war. To forestall such reprisals I would favor handing over the Communist prisoners of war who, as Mr. Johnson's memorandum recognizes, would still be fighting UN Forces except for the accident of capture.

I recognize the very strong arguments against the principle of forced repatriation. I further recognize that the stand one takes on this must necessarily be a matter of individual judgment since there are about as many arguments on one side as the other.

I feel strongly that the Secretary's memorandum to the President should recommend that we take adequately into account the views of our UN allies who have troops fighting alongside ours in Korea after the President decides what he thinks is the right thing to do in this matter.

---

[1] *Supra.*

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1952—11:30 a. m.

. . . .

Korea—Show of Force

General Bradley: Another question which is on our minds is whether there is anything we could do to hasten the conclusion of the armistice. We have been considering, for example, a show of force by the navy in the Formosa-Hainan area, or flights along the coast, perhaps with B-29's. Do you think that action of this kind might stimulate the communists to conclude the armistice?

Mr. Nitze: What are we doing about reconnaissance?

General Vandenberg: The Air Force is doing some reconnaissance but not within China. What we would like to do is to bring some B-29's in toward Shanghai where they have large radar installations and to have the flight veer off about 15 miles away and fly down the coast.

Mr. Bohlen: We have to look at the reactions in two areas. In general I think the reaction in the free world would be poor. Right now, for instance, the House of Commons is criticizing Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden on the ground that the United States has decided to fight China. Anything that feeds that reaction is poor. On the other hand the reaction by the communists might be good except insofar as the reaction in the free world was poor and counteracted the immediate impact on the communists. These things tend to offset one another.

Admiral Fechteler: It may have been coincidence but the Egyptian thing cooled down when the U.K. announced it was increasing its Mediterranean fleet.

Mr. Matthews: The important development in Egypt was the realization by the ruling circles that the result of the action there was endangering their lives and property.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Fechteler and Generals Bradley and Vandenberg attended, as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Hull. Matthews headed the State Department group and Nash attended for the Department of Defense. Altogether, 18 persons were present. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting, which was one of a continuing series of meetings held on a regular basis.

Mr. Nitze: I think that flights over China would affect the communists. They are the people whom we want to affect and they would know about it.

Mr. Bohlen: I think that is right. A show of force might boomerang but reconnaissance might have a beneficial effect. If necessary we could deny it and still have the desired influence on the communists.

General Vandenberg: Let's not rule out the possibility that our planes may be shot down. I don't like to go over China except for good reasons.

General Bradley: How much of a chance do you take?

General Vandenberg: Well, not too much, but when one sees the extreme reactions that we get when we don't in fact go over China, I think we should consider carefully the possibility that one of our planes might get shot down. I think we would get all the advantages by having an approach to Shanghai of the kind I suggested.

General Bradley: It would be possible to deny the mission that General Vandenberg describes but we would not be able to deny a shot-down plane.

Admiral Fechteler: I must admit that I get terribly impatient about our concern for the British reactions.

Mr. Bohlen: It is a democratic country that we are dealing with and we cannot keep these things from coming up. In any event I think the communists place more importance on things that are done secretly.

General Bradley: It is not the reaction of the British which concerns us but the effect of the discussions in the Commons. Those discussions might cancel out any good effects we had on the communists.

General Hull: I admit there is a problem in the U.K. and other countries, but I wonder how long we can keep on pulling our punches if we are going to succeed in this contest with the Russians.

General Bradley: I suggest that we think this one over and discuss it again next week. We would like to do something, if possible, to hasten the conclusion of the armistice. Another possibility would be to use the Air Force in a heavy strike on the front lines with napalm. The difficulty with such an action is that the communists aren't concentrated.

. . . .

795.00/2-852

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 8, 1952.

Subject: Position on POWs in Korean Armistice Negotiations

Reference: Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 1952, on Foregoing Subject [1]

The memorandum [2] mentioned in the last paragraph of the foregoing memorandum was prepared by Mr. Johnson and was discussed with Mr. Nash and Mr. Foster of Defense on February 2. The final draft was approved by the Secretary on February 4 and transmitted to Mr. Nash on the same day.

On February 5 Mr. Nash informed Mr. Johnson that the memorandum had been shown to and discussed by Mr. Lovett, Mr. Foster and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom agreed that it accurately reflected the discussions and decisions taken at the meeting of February 1. However, in studying the matter in "black and white", Mr. Lovett had serious doubts concerning the position and questioned whether our "Yankee ingenuity" in finding better solutions had been exhausted. Admiral Fechteler stated that he entirely withdrew his previous concurrence with the position set forth in the memorandum. General Vandenberg, who was not present at the meeting of February 1, expressed his firm oppostion to the entire position. Mr. Lovett and Mr. Foster decided that another meeting between State and Defense should be held as quickly as possible.

The matter was discussed with the Secretary the evening of February 5 at a meeting attended by Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Johnson. The decision was reached that there would be no substantive change in the Department's position, that emphasis should be placed upon reaching a decision upon the principle of no forced repatriation, the details of implementation of that decision being left for later determination. It was also decided to express our willingness to meet with Defense as quickly as possible in order that a decision on the question could be reached with the least delay.

Mr. Johnson informed Mr. Nash of this decision the evening of February 5. It was determined that because of the necessity of Mr. Lovett testifying in Congress on February 6 it would be impossible to arrange a meeting for that day. The meeting was accordingly set for 3:00 p.m., February 7.

In the meanwhile, it was learned that a considerable group of Senators had expressed concurrence with a proposed Senate resolution initiated by Senator Jenner calling for an inflexible U.S. position on voluntary repatriation and that Mr. Lovett had contacted several Senators with regard to the matter.[3]

---

[1] *Ante,* p. 32.

[2] The memorandum under reference was the draft memorandum for the President, Feb. 4, p. 35.

[3] Senator Jenner's resolution was never introduced. Secretary Acheson also made reference to it and Secretary Lovett's intervention in *Present at the Creation,* p. 653.

On the morning of February 7, Mr. Nash called and asked that the meeting set for 3:00 p.m. that day be moved up to 10:30 a.m. in order that it might also consider the attitude to be taken by Mr. Lovett in discussing the above-mentioned resolution with a group of Senators that afternoon.

The meeting was accordingly held at the Pentagon at 10:30 a.m. at which Mr. Lovett, Mr. Foster, Mr. Nash, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Finletter, Mr. Kimball, General Bradley, Admiral Fechteler, General Vandenberg and General Hull were present for Defense, and Mr. Acheson, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Johnson for State.

The whole Senate resolution was discussed and it was decided that in view of its content, particularly with respect to matters concerning our Allies in the UN, Mr. Lovett would take the position that it was inopportune and that in any event it stated no more with regard to prisoners than was the present position being taken in the negotiations at Panmunjom. Mr. Lovett was not to indicate in any way that any change in the Executive position on this question was under consideration, as possible leaks would seriously jeopardize General Ridgway's negotiating position.

The question of forcible repatriation was then thoroughly discussed, each person present being called upon and being given full opportunity to express their views. On the Defense side, with the exception of Mr. Lovett, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Finletter, who were seriously doubtful as to the final position to be taken, there was a clear disposition to agree to return all prisoners of war held by the UNC, including even, if necessary, the 44,000 ROK personnel who had been reclassified to civilian internee status, to achieve an armistice. The Department of State representatives remained firmly opposed to this view.[4] No decisions in this regard were reached at the meeting.

Following the meeting, a memorandum to the President for the Secretary's signature was prepared, setting forth the views of the Department of State.[5] This memorandum was approved by the Secretary, transmitted to Mr. Lovett with the suggestion that he either join in the memorandum or set forth the Defense position in a separate memorandum and that he and Mr. Acheson discuss the matter with the President following the Cabinet meeting on February 8.

On the morning of February 8, Mr. Nash informed Mr. Johnson that while Mr. Lovett was not joining in the proposed memorandum to the President, he would not oppose it and would be prepared to discuss the matter with the President and Mr. Acheson following the Cabinet meeting. Mr. Nash also informed Mr. Johnson that as a result of Mr.

---

[4] For Secretary Acheson's account of the differences between the Departments of State and Defense on voluntary repatriation, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* p. 653.

[5] Dated Feb. 8, p. 44.

Lovett's meeting the preceding afternoon with a group of Senators interested in the proposed resolution, the Senators had decided not to go forward with the resolution. He stated that Mr. Lovett had assured the group that they would be informed if there were any change in the U.S. Government position on repatriation of POWs.

695A.0024/2-852

Memorandum by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 8, 1952.

This morning after the Cabinet [meeting] Mr. Lovett and I met with the President to discuss the attached memorandum of February 8, recommending maintenance of the present United States position regarding return of prisoners of war.[2] I presented the matter to the President and informed him of the series of conferences which we had had with Mr. Lovett, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs.[3] The President went over the memorandum.

Mr. Lovett then said to the President that he did not oppose the President's approval of this memorandum. He said that the position presented by the State Department was very persuasive and he said that there was not unanimity of opinion between the three Service Secretaries or between the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He asked that the memorandum should not be regarded as "definitive", by which he meant, as indicated by his remarks, final and irrevocable. He reported his conversation with some of the Senators who were signatories to the proposed resolution on non-forcible return of prisoners, stating that he had persuaded them that the present resolution was not properly drafted, and that any resolution at this time would be harmful. He assured them that they would be informed prior to any change in present policy, and he stated to the President and me that he thought that at some time a properly drafted resolution on this subject might be very helpful in the negotiations. He thought that we could go ahead at once in implementing the memorandum. When he concluded, the President stated his approval of the memorandum and noted his approval on the attached copy and upon a duplicate original which he gave to Mr. Lovett.

After we had left the President I spoke with Mr. Lovett about the suggestion made yesterday that perhaps an officer of this Department should accompany a representative of the Joint Chiefs to Tokyo to assist General Ridgway. I said that the logical officer to do this by reason of his prior experience and familiarity with the subject would be

---

[1] The following names were handwritten on the source text: Allison, Bohlen, Nitze, and Matthews; presumably they received copies of the memorandum.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] See memoranda by Johnson, Feb. 4 and 8, pp. 32 and 40.

Mr. Bohlen, but that in view of the departure of so many senior officers for London and Lisbon,[4] I did not see how we could spare Mr. Bohlen during the next two weeks. Mr. Lovett said that he quite understood this and indeed had said as much to General Bradley this morning. I suggested that Mr. John Ferguson was familiar with this matter, with my attitude toward it and was most resourceful. I suggested that if they wished help from us, Mr. Ferguson might go to Tokyo now and possibly be replaced by Mr. Bohlen after we returned from Lisbon. This would have the advantage of bringing back to us through Mr. Ferguson a firsthand knowledge of General Ridgway's problems and sending to General Ridgway the latest thinking of Washington through Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Lovett will talk with General Bradley and let us know their views.

---

[4] The Secretary was referring to the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in London, Feb. 13–19, and Lisbon, Feb. 20–26, and the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, 1952. For documentation on these meetings, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

795.00/2–852

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 8, 1952.

It now appears likely that the prisoners of war issue will shortly become the sole remaining fundamental issue in the Korean armistice negotiations.

This is a question of the utmost gravity. The decision involves basic principles underlying our entire action in Korea, the fate of some 3,000 Americans and 8,000 other United Nations and Republic of Korea men held as prisoners by the Communists, and the question of whether the hostilities in Korea can be terminated or are continued indefinitely with unpredictable consequences.

Any agreement in the Korean armistice which would require United States troops to use force to turn over to the Communists prisoners who believe they would face death if returned, would be repugnant to our most fundamental moral and humanitarian principles on the importance of the individual, and would seriously jeopardize the psychological warfare position of the United States in its opposition to Communist tyranny.

However, the Communists may not accept an armistice requiring their agreement to the principle of no forcible repatriation, and the maintenance of this principle will inevitably present risks to prisoners held by the Communists and to the achievement of an armistice. Also, while domestic and international public opinion can be expected strongly to support as a principle the desirability of no forcible repatriation, if and when there is a belief that maintenance of this principle requires a continuation and probable spread of hostilities in Korea, support for it, particularly by international public opinion will be much less.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson, approved by Acheson, and cleared by Matthews, Bohlen, and Nitze.

It is possible, but not certain, that courses of action may be devised which will not require, on the one hand, that we accept the use of force to return prisoners of war strongly objecting to repatriation, or, on the other hand, that the Communists accept the principle of voluntary repatriation. Such courses should minimize to an acceptable degree the risks to prisoners held by the Communists, to the achievement of an armistice, and to the maintenance of domestic and world support.

It is therefore recommended that you approve the maintenance of the present United States position, namely that we will not accept Communist proposals which would require the use of force to repatriate to the Communists prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command who are strongly opposed to such repatriation and whose lives would probably be seriously endangered thereby; this policy to be carried out, however, in the manner best calculated to minimize the recognized jeopardy to prisoners of war held by the Communists and to lead to successful conclusion of an armistice. Our key allies will be consulted in implementation of this policy.[2]

DEAN ACHESON

---

[2] At the end of the memorandum, the following note appeared on the source text in the President's handwriting: "Approved Feb. 8, 1952 Harry S. Truman".

Editorial Note

On February 9, in accordance with a discussion between Acheson and Lovett on the previous day, it was determined that Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, General Hull and U. Alexis Johnson would go to Japan and Korea to discuss and explore the prisoner of war problem with the men on the spot. Hull and Johnson left Washington for the Far East on February 11 and returned on February 22. An account of their trip is reported in the memorandum for the record, March 10, page 76.

795.00/2-1452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 14, 1952—7:47 p. m.

Telac 5. Personal eyes only for Secretary from Matthews. Re: Lovett's phone call on JCS proposal for show of force in Far East.[1] Have received from Defense on informal basis recommendations of JCS with respect to show of force.[2] (Presumably SecDef will not approve prior to talk with you.) Nature of proposed show of force involves naval sweep through Formosa Straits to and including Hainan and simulated B–29 air sweeps and strikes turning off fifteen to twenty five miles from China coast, both as described at State–JCS meeting of February 6.[3]

JCS recommendations to SecDef signed by Fechteler based on following three points:

1—JCS of opinion course of action would "improve the military position in the Far East".

2—After stating that at State–JCS meeting Dept representatives indicated an objection which was based on possible adverse effect such a course of action might have in England, JCS informed SecDef they do not consider show of force will have adverse results but instead will improve political position of UN forces in Far East.

3—Show of force will expedite conclusion of Korea armistice negotiations.

Suggest in discussions with Lovett you ask in what way show of force will improve military position in Far East. JCS recommendation does not specify nature of improvement in military position.

We are clear that proposed course of action would have adverse political effect among allies and that this will have to be balanced against any expected advantages. We pointed out at February 6 meeting adverse effect among allies might outweigh whatever beneficial effect on Commies action might have. In absence of prior consultation and explanation, allied governments will be extremely worried. Even with prior notice to governments, if such action becomes known it will almost certainly lead to statements and debates which might detract from usefulness of "greater sanction" statement. Prior notice would in itself have dangers since leaks from those opposed to course of action would blunt any effectiveness show of force possesses.

In view possibility proposed sweeps along China coast might cause Chi commies to react with force against naval units and aircraft involved, you may wish explore with Lovett consequences and possible pressures to broaden conflict.

---

[1] This telephone conversation between Lovett and Acheson took place on Feb. 12; memorandum of conversation, not printed (795.00/2–1252).

[2] On Feb. 12, 1952, the Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, sent Matthews a copy of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense to which was attached a draft of a proposed message to Ridgway ordering a show of force along the China coast (795.00/2–1252).

[3] See the memorandum, p. 39.

JCS do not elaborate view that proposed course of action would expedite armistice negotiations and we suggest you explore this question with SecDef. We doubt whether any appreciable effect should be anticipated.

For your information at conclusion initial discussion this matter February 6 Bradley suggested State and JCS think matter over and discuss it again at subsequent meeting. No further discussions have been held, and in view present status of matter we do not plan to undertake such discussions here.

WEBB

795B.00/2-1452

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

SECRET
No. 237

PUSAN, February 14, 1952.

Subject: Transmitting Memorandum of conversation between President Rhee and myself on ROK politics.

Having been concerned for some time with President Rhee's political maneuverings, some of his recent appointments, and moves to strengthen the irresponsible Youth Corps and other groups which potentially might be used as "goon squads", I called on the President on February 12 to let him know that I knew a good deal about these activities, for which he and he alone is responsible.

As I have found that on such occasions it is more effective to state my case and to refrain from argument or discussion until perhaps a later date, I adopted this tactic on this occasion. I gained the impression that the President, who had got up from a sick bed to talk with me, was somewhat shaken by what I had to say. He had very little comment to make and I expect he will do a good deal of thinking and speculating on the significance of my remarks. Regardless of any effect this may have on his actions, I believe it will do some good just to tip him off that we are closely following some of his more devious activities.

JOHN J. MUCCIO

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET

[PUSAN, February 12, 1952.]

I decided that it was time for me to make President Rhee aware of the fact that we knew of some of his more nefarious maneuvers.

I called by appointment to deliver the note in connection with the ROK proclamation of sovereignty over the high seas.[1] I then mentioned to President Rhee that I was finding it increasingly difficult to explain to my government certain manifestations here and that I hoped he would be well enough in the next few days so that I could sit down and discuss with him this matter that is disturbing me a great deal. He immediately urged that I tell him what the problem was. I hesitated since he is very low from a persistent cold.

At his insistence, I mentioned that there was the UN Commission, several other US Governmental agencies and many intelligence agencies reporting on developments on the peninsula and that Korea was in fact living in a "goldfish bowl" due to the large number of press representatives and intelligence sources from all over the world. I mentioned that CIC and ROK CIC and other intelligence units were so interwoven, we could hardly expect either side to be able to carry on any activities without the other knowing about it.

The President quickly inquired for specific cases. I mentioned that in his address to the people of Seoul on January 28, he had made certain derogatory remarks regarding General Walker[2] which had shocked Washington and jarred all the military on the isthmus. For the President to publicly challenge General Walker's gallant and courageous contribution was simply incomprehensible. President Rhee merely said that he had been speaking spontaneously and might have made such remarks, he could not recall, and muttered that the many enemies of the government had undoubtedly given me the wrong interpretation. This at least has made President Rhee aware that we are keeping tabs on his speeches. I have for some time been concerned by General Van Fleet, General Ridgway or I being on public platforms with him when he harangues "no ceasefire" and "on to the Yalu".

I then said that the Embassy and UNCURK had reported as favorably as possible on the NDC and Kochang scandals.[3] Reports reaching Washington from other sources cited the parts played therein by officers close to the President. This raised the whole question of the caliber of the men selected by him. I cited that General Kim Yun-kun, leader of the Youth Corps and in charge of coralling manpower at the time of the retreat last December and January and who was executed later was a man who had been appointed by, received orders direct from and reported directly to the President. On the Kochang incident, our controlled sources had reported that it was "Tiger" Kim Chongwon who kept the investigating committee from getting into Kochang by having some of his men fire on them as they approached, for which he is now serving a three year term. Here again was a man appointed by, reporting to and receiving instructions directly from the President.

---

[1] The note was in protest of President Rhee's proclamation of Jan. 18, 1952 claiming Korean sovereignty over the continental shelves and certain waters adjacent to the mainland and insular coasts of the Republic of Korea (795.002/1–2852).

[2] Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker was appointed by General MacArthur to take charge of the Eighth Army and other UN ground forces in Korea in July 1950. Later that month President Rhee placed ROK units under Walker. In December 1950, Walker was killed in an accident and Ridgway became Commander of the Eighth Army.

[3] For information on these 1951 scandals involving misappropriation of army funds and execution of civilian villagers for alleged collaboration with Communist guerrillas, see the UNCURK Report for 1951, UN document A/1881, pp. 19, 22–25.

I then went on to mention that I had been queried by my superiors as to the appointment to the important post of Home Minister of a man as notorious as "Montana" Chang Sok-yun, a man who had been publicly tried for misuse of appropriated funds and had been a leader in the notorious Political Action plot.[4]

I then referred to the efforts to make the recent campaigns to arouse anti-ceasefire clamor and public emotions appear "spontaneous". However, controlled American sources had reported on the official orders issued to both the police and Youth Corps last June and the specific order issued through the cabinet on November 29. This touched the President off. He said, "Mr. Ambassador, you may tell the Department of State that I will never accept a ceasefire", and went on that I should tell President Truman that he is mistaken in trying to negotiate with the Communists. I pointed out that the Youth Corps in particular were under his direct order and when one of the "Armband" boys comes into my grounds and orders my chauffeur to attend a "spontaneous" rally or when all the newspapers appear on one day as they did on January 10 with almost identical editorials based on two absolutely erroneous premises, it is hard to convince the people of the world that this has not been directed by the ROK authorities. When President Rhee excitedly replied that Clarence Rhee might have done so but that he didn't know of it, I mentioned that I knew Clarence Rhee very well and knew that he never made a move without direction.

I finally said that these things had been mulling over in my mind for some time and that I had now received a query as to whether the reports received were true that the police and Youth Corps had been used in at least three of the National Assembly by-elections on the 5th of February. President Rhee thereupon went into a long involved dissertation on Korean politics repeating over and over that I knew him and that the two of us had talked matters over very frankly and openly in the past three years; that I had been misled and that these reports came from his enemies in the U.S., and that I should dismiss them as such.

I did not take exception or argue with him as I felt I would have more influence with him, in the long run, by just letting him know that I knew how he was acting. I ended by saying that I felt I was at the end of my rope in two vital matters: (1) in having to explain and justify some of the activities of Korean officials and (2) in my attempts to allay the widespread ROK distrust of US–UN motives. I pointed out that this distrust is not new and cited as an example his refusal to accept my assurances and General Walker's assurances that we were not running out of Taegu and leaving the ROK to the mercies of the North Koreans last year. I also referred to the deadlock on the Aid Agreement. I was jarred at the attitude displayed during the long drawn out discussions. This attitude was more akin to Communists fighting Fascists, than what should prevail between allies who had fought side by side for twenty months. He thereupon went into a long discussion of the Aid Agreement which will be recorded elsewhere.[5]

---

[4] Chang Sok-yun was Vice-Home Minister; on Jan. 18, 1952, Rhee appointed him Acting Home Minister.

---

[5] Not printed.

795B.11/2-1552

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

SECRET
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

PUSAN, February 15, 1952.

DEAR JOHN: I trust that you will have seen our three part telegram regarding Syngman Rhee and the forthcoming presidential elections here (Embassy telegram No. 804 February 14).[1]

We discussed including an additional section regarding the United States influence in the elections. I decided against it, however, since it is a pretty touchy subject and am sending you my views on the question in this letter.

It is pretty clear that fate has not dealt us a good hand of cards in the coming election. As we pointed out in our telegram, Rhee is becoming increasingly recalcitrant and senile. While he is president no one else seems to have the guts to stand up to him. Two of the other possible candidates, Yi Pom-suk and Sin Ik-hi, are pretty crummy from our point of view. The best two, Chang Myon and Ho Chong, lack popular followings and are somewhat weak.

A trade of Rhee's re-election for a system of cabinet responsibility to the National Assembly would be one way of cutting Rhee down to size in the absence of another strong candidate. Rhee wouldn't have it, however, and I think it would be "out of the frying pan, into the fire", since the Koreans, I feel certain, would be totally unable to make a parliamentary system work.

---

[1] This was an 8-page telegram appraising potential candidates for the ROK presidency other than Rhee and estimating their chances against Rhee, as well as assessing Rhee's physical health, not printed (795B.11/2-1452).

Chang Myon's chances in an election by the National Assembly are probably our best hope. As we mentioned in our telegram the fact that the United States is thought to like him is perhaps his greatest strength within the Assembly. If our influence in the elections, however, became anything like a public issue, I think that the Assembly's sensitive feelings ROK dignity would flare up and Chang's close ties with the United States would be a liability rather than an asset.

This delicate situation makes an open position of neutrality between candidates essential for the Embassy. For the time being I feel that the best tactic is to let Rhee and other "subtle" operators know that we are continuously aware of their maneuverings. My most recent move with Rhee in this direction is reported in despatch No. 237 February 14.[2] If this is not wholly effective, however, the opportunity exists for us to take a very firm stand with Rhee and others in his Government on the observance of the principles of constitutional government and the holding of free elections. They must be made to understand the serious consequences of their use of political intimidation and realize that totalitarian tactics would be bound to prejudice future United Nations support for the ROK.

At the same time we will do what we can to strengthen National Assembly backbones by reassuring key members of the Assembly's right to vote independently without fear that the Assembly's decision might be disregarded and the cause of reprisals. The strengthened UNCURK which I mentioned in my telegram No. 796, February 12,[3] would help us materially in these efforts. It would also have the specific advantage of showing that the observance of constitutional practices was not just a matter of US interest.

I do not know the background for the Department's request for our views on possible candidates other than Rhee, although I realize, of course, that it was a most reasonable request (and one that we were in the process of trying to anticipate). I wondered, however, if the specific occasion of the Department's sending it might not have been an expression of opinion by another Government agency [4] as to how the vexing problem of the ROK presidency might be solved. I trust that any plans of influencing the course of ROK politics will be thoroughly coordinated in the Department. The delicacy of the situation is such and the chances of plans misfiring or boomeranging so great that I feel I should be informed of any instructions affecting the operations in this field of any group here.

---

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed (357.AD/2-1252).

[4] The reference here is to the CIA. McClurkin later assured Allison that the Department of State query was in no way an expression of opinion by "another government agency", but rather a product of the curiosity of the members of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and "was perhaps influenced by our subconscious and sometimes conscious desire that Korea could find a new and better President." (Memorandum to Allison from McClurkin, Mar. 6, 1952; 795B.00/3-652)

My very best regards,

Sincerely, JOHN

895B.10/2-1652

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for General Management (Bendetsen) to the Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Connally)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1952.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: With the knowledge and approval of the Secretary of Defense I am writing on behalf of the Department of Defense to advise you of certain aspects of the current economic situation in Korea, concerning which I feel that you, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee should be informed. I am also addressing identical letters to the Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee (House); Chairman, Armed Services Committee (Senate); Chairman, Armed Services Committee (House); Chairman, Armed Services Sub-Committee on Appropriations (Senate); and Chairman, Armed Services Sub-Committee on Appropriations (House), respectively.[2]

In the early stages of the United Nations operations in Korea the United States effected an agreement with the Republic of Korea whereunder the Korean currency (won) requirements of the United Nations forces were obtained from the Korean Government on an advance basis without concurrent reimbursement. Consistent with United States practice and policy established in World War II in similar situations, the agreement provided that negotiations for the settlement of any claims arising from the provision and use of Korean currency would be deferred to a time or times mutually satisfactory to the respective governments and the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Under a procedure related to the agreement a reserve account has been established in the United States Treasury to which counterpart values of Korean currency advanced to the United States forces in Korea have been credited by the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense appropriations have been charged for the corresponding amounts. Funds in this reserve account are available for use for the eventual settlement of the United States obligation to the Korean Government should dollar payment be required. The credits made to this account have been based upon dollar–Korean won conversion rates recommended by the United States field agencies in the Far East and approved by Washington agencies, including the Department of Defense, Department of State and Treasury Department. As of 31 December 1951 a total of approximately $70,000,000 had been credited to this account. The monthly credits to this account total approximately $5,500,000. Since March 1951, based upon recommendation of the United States field agencies that further increases in the rate would impair the political and economic stability of the Republic of Korea, it has remained at the rate of 6,000 to 1.

---

[1] The source text was a copy provided to the Department of State by the Department of the Army.

[2] None printed (895B.10/2-1652).

As of 10 October 1951 upon representations from the Government of the Republic of Korea and with the recommendation of the Department of State, a payment of $12,155,714 was made from the reserve account to that Government. This payment representing the value of Korean currency sold to United States personnel for their personal expenditure in the Korean economy from the inception of the Korean operation up through 31 July 1951, was effected with the understanding that the funds would be used by the Korean Government for supplying essential commodities to the war-torn Korean economy, over and above the types of relief supplies being brought in by the Unified Command. While to date the Korean Government has not used these funds for this purpose, it is understood that an import program has recently been developed.

Recently the Government of the Republic of Korea in a letter to the United States Ambassador stated that the won expenditures of the United Nations forces were aggravating the inflation in Korea; [3] at the present time the Korean Government was printing 40 billion won a month; as of the end of January 1952 it anticipated that the circulation of won would reach the 600 billion level (approximately $100,000,000 at 6,000 to 1 rate); and that it would be obliged to discontinue the advances of Korean currency to the United Nations forces under the terms of the existing agreement of July 1950 to prevent hyper-inflation and collapse of the Korean economy.

As a possible remedy to the situation the Korean Government has proposed that the existing agreement be cancelled and two new agreements the first, covering the sale of Korean currency to United Nations troops; and the second, covering the expenditure of such currency for United Nations forces official purposes, be consummated. Under the terms of these proposed agreements, the Korean Government would receive immediate dollar payment for the currency sold to troops and would be paid for currency used for official purposes either by repayment in local currency from the sale of non-relief goods introduced in the local economy by the United States forces or in United States dollars. In recognition of the services rendered by the United Nations forces, the Korean Government under the second agreement covering the official expenditures of the United Nations forces, would be willing to contribute one billion won per month (approximately $166,000 at the rate of 6,000 to 1).

---

[3] This letter was sent to the Embassy in Korea on Jan. 16, 1952; the text is in telegram 707 from Pusan, Jan. 19, 1952, not printed (895B.13/1-1952).

Upon being advised of the substance of the Korean Government's position, General Ridgway, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, requested authority from the Department of Defense to take interim emergency measures of procuring Korean currency for dollars from legal sources available in Korea. Although the United States Ambassador advised General Ridgway that, in his opinion the Korean Government did not really mean to do what it said, General Ridgway felt that immediate action was necessary to insure that the current military needs of the United Nations forces for Korean currency were not in jeopardy. General Ridgway indicated that he did not concede the validity of the Korean Government's contention that won expenditures of the United Nations forces had unduly aggravated inflation but felt it was absolutely essential that positive action be taken to remove the cause of the Korean Government's contention, so that corrective counter-inflationary measures could be taken by the United Nations Command and by the Korean Government.

The unfortunate preoccupation of the Republic of Korea with the United States forces drawings as the cause of the inflation has obscured the basic fact that the inflation has been an inevitable result of the war. It should be pointed out that as an offset to the United Nations forces expenditures, the Civilian Relief in Korea Program as of 18 January 1952 was in process of furnishing to the Korean population approximately $272.8 million worth of supplies. It is estimated that as of 30 June 1952 the United States Government will have obligated or expended approximately $342.1 million for this purpose. This does not include large quantities of civilian type supplies and equipment serving common military-civilian purposes which are provided as a military necessity. Because of the existence of a large refugee and indigent population, it has been necessary to distribute the great majority of these supplies on a relief basis without cost to prevent disease and unrest; thus the counter-inflationary potential of such imports has not been fully realized as yet. In addition, many of the local costs of United Nations operation in Korea, such as the maintenance and operation of the Korean National Railroad which has been borne by the United States forces as a military expedient can properly be considered costs which should have been borne by the Korean Government.

To preclude any possibility that the United Nations military operation in Korea might be hampered by the lack of Korean currency needed, General Ridgway was granted the authority, in event the Republic of Korea refused to continue to advance currency under the existing arrangements, to take necessary interim measures to insure the successful accomplishment of his military mission, including purchase of Korean currency for dollars. The payment of dollars for such currency is consistent with the practice of the United States forces in other overseas areas where they procure their indigenous currency requirements with dollars.

In view of the possible far-reaching political, military and financial implications inherent in the Korean situtation described above, General Ridgway has been requested, without committing the United States to any specific course of action, to discuss with the Government of the Republic of Korea measures which would help to solve the Korean economic problem and based on such discussions furnish the Deparment of Defense his recommendations. You may be assured that the Department of Defense will continue to pursue this matter aggressively with a view to arriving at a conclusion of the problem which would be in the best interests of the United States.

Sincerely yours, KARL R. BENDETSEN

Editorial Note

While in London from February 13 to 19 for discussions on a wide range of issues with the British and French, Secretary Acheson and British Prime Minister Churchill resolved a difference over a speech the Prime Minister was to give in Parliament replying to the Labour Party's criticisms of British Government support of United States policy in Korea. Churchill wished to show that when in power the Labour Government had agreed to the same policies in May 1951 which it was criticizing when out of office. (For pertinent documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume VII, Part 1.) In the process, however, Churchill would have revealed the essence of top secret military contingency plans. To this Acheson objected, and through the night he and Nitze made revisions to an advance copy of the speech which Churchill had provided. On the following day Churchill agreed to Acheson's changes. A copy of Churchill's speech with Nitze's and Acheson's handwritten revisions and a copy of a letter from Acheson to Churchill, February 19, explaining the changes, can be found in the Acheson papers, Truman Library. Another copy of that letter is located in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101. The incident over the speech is also described in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 618–621 and *Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known*, pages 71–75.

From February 20 to 25, Acheson headed the United States Delegation to the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, where Korean matters were not discussed.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum for the Record by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)[1]

TOP SECRET [TOKYO,] February 19, 1952.

1. *Present:*

General Ridgway
General Hull
Mr. Johnson
General Hickey
General Milburn

2. *Following were the highlights:*

a. In anticipation of a possible United States Government directive to release certain categories of POW's, who violently oppose repatriation, now in U.S. custody unilaterally without reference to the Communists, there was presented an outline of the procedure by which this might be done.

b. This procedure envisaged:

(1) A covert screening, and
(2) An overt screening.

c. If release is directed, CINCFE strongly favors the overt as against the covert, feels it should be done within the daylight hours of a single day.

d. The manner in which the choice is offered under this procedure to be carefully considered, but regardless of how done, once having been initiated, the screening and segregation is to be immediate and final.

e. The UNC to retain custody of those electing not to return and to keep them in ROK until after Armistice Agreement is in effect.

f. The procedure to be followed by the UNC Del, assuming the foregoing has been directed, to be substantially as follows:

(1) Reach agreement on Agenda Item 5.
(2) To go to Plenary Session.
(3) Propose that of the two remaining unresolved issues, that we are willing to concede on the airfields if the Communists concede on all for all exchange with voluntary repatriation. Use as an argument to support our position:

> The Communist release of ROK personnel impressed into their armed forces, which in fact represents the implementation of the principle of voluntary repatriation by the Communists. If the Communists accept, we are then practically at an agreed armistice.

---

[1] The discussion recorded in this memorandum grew out of the trip of Hull and Johnson to Japan and Korea, which took place Feb. 9–22. For a general account of this mission, see the memorandum for the record, Mar. 10, p. 76.

(4) If proposal in (3) above is rejected:

(a) Implement immediately the screening and segregation referred to in paras. 2*c* and *d* above.

(b) Inform the Communists that the voluntary repatriation which they in fact executed by their own admission, is now being applied to the POW's in our custody.

(5) Propose to the Communists an all for all exchange of the remaining POW's, retaining at this time our original position on the airfield question.

(6) If the Communists accept our proposal on the all for all exchange of remaining POW's, and propose in exchange our concession on the airfield question, we will accept. This should be our final position.

g. The proposal contained in (5) above will contain two issues which, if not accepted by the Communists, will place our Delegation in the position of having a break occur on two issues rather than a single one.

M. B. Ridgway
General, United States Army

795.00/2-252: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, February 21, 1952—4:40 p. m.

CX 64029. 1. The ques of releasing those civ internees, approx 38,000 in number, who have been twice screened by the ROK Govt, has been carefully considered here.

2. Our analysis is as fols:

a. The UNC Delegation position on civ internees is that even though they were reported initially as prisoners of war, they are in fact nationals of the ROK. Their disposition, therefore, is an internal affair of the UNC.

b. The enemy position is that at least 34,000 of the civ internees are demonstrably military personnel of their regular forces. The Communists refuse to recognize any reclassification of their military personnel as civilians and insist that the civ internees are prisoners of war who are subject to repatriation according to their army designation. The Communists cannot agree that the status of the civ internees is affected by their status as nationals of the ROK. Such agreement would adversely affect the status of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea vis-à-vis the ROK. Moreover, to them it would constitute a precedent which would be damaging to the theory and practice of world revolution. Thus, from the standpoint of the Communists, the armistice agreement cannot contain provisions which imply recognition of the ROK, or which imply that the war in Korea is a war between two sovereign governments.

c. In order to use this Communist philosophy to assist in gaining Communist acceptance of voluntary repatriation, the UNC Delegation has indicated to the Communists that it is willing to include the civ internees as well as the prisoners of war of ROK residence now held by the UNC in the group subject to voluntary repatriation.

d. The civ internees and prisoners of war of ROK residence are, in effect, bait to the Communists to accept voluntary repatriation.

3. In view of the foregoing, I have decided to hold all civ internees until the plan for their release can be included in the overall plan for the release of all internees, both military and civilian, without resorting to forced repatriation.

795.00/2-2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1952.

Subject: POW Question in Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: The President
Mr. Foster, Under [*Deputy*] Secretary of Defense
General Hull, Department of Defense
Mr. Matthews—G
Mr. Johnson—FE

General Hull briefly summarized for the President the results of the visit of himself and Mr. Johnson to Japan and Korea with regard to the foregoing question.[1] The President was informed that it was the view of General Ridgway, in which General Hull and Mr. Johnson concurred, that in the absence of Communist agreement to voluntary repatriation there was no feasible method of handling the problem of prisoners of war held by the UNC who violently object to repatriation to the Communists except by an overt screening of all POWs. It was General Ridgway's view that this could and should be accomplished within the daylight hours of a single day and that the Communists should thereupon be immediately informed of this and our willingness to enter into an all-for-all exchange upon the basis of accordingly revised lists of POWs. The President indicated his acceptance of this view. The President was informed that General Ridgway did not now require or expect additional instructions and that he would proceed to carry out his present instructions to reduce the outstanding questions to the airfield and POW questions, whereupon he would propose to concede the UNC position on airfields if the Communists would concede their position on voluntary repatriation. If, as anticipated the Communists refuse to accept this proposal, General Ridgway will report to Washington and request instructions on the basis of unilateral screening of POWs by the UNC. In the meanwhile, General Ridgway's command will continue detailed planning for promptly carrying out such screening at such time as directed. It was pointed out to the President that the implementation of such a plan would constitute an irrevocable decision on this question, and the President expressed his understanding. General Hull also informed the President that it was the conclusion of General Ridgway's headquarters that the Communists hold a considerable number of American POWs over and above the 3198 figure they have reported to the UNC. While the number of such Americans is conjectural, there is fairly firm information with regard to 562 such prisoners. It is the preliminary estimate of General Ridgway's headquarters that approximately 5000 North Korean POWs and 11,500 CCF POWs could be expected violently to resist repatriation to the Communists. It was also the view of General Ridgway's headquarters and General Hull and Mr. Johnson that, qualitatively as well as possibly quantitatively, the problem of CCF POWs and possible Communist reactions thereto was much more difficult than that of Korean POWs. General Hull informed the President that it was General Ridgway's opinion that the Communist military position is now stronger than at the beginning of the armistice negotiations, that the Communists are well dug in in depth, and that any military decision in Korea would require an additional corps of three divisions and greatly increased casualties. General Hull also stated that General Ridgway was of the opinion that while an all out Communist air attack would initially result in considerable losses to the 8th Army, such air attacks would not be able to destroy the 8th Army, which would be able quickly to adjust itself to such a situation.

---

[1] For an account of this trip, see the memorandum for the record, Mar. 10, p. 76.

In reply to a question by Mr. Matthews, General Hull said that General Ridgway no longer feels that the Communists are in such urgent military need of an armistice, that they will agree to one on the basis of unlimited concessions to our requirements.

795.00/2-252: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, February 25, 1952—6:40 p. m.

CX 64241. References (passed separately to JCS):

A. AmEmb Korea 140545Z July 50.[1]
B. AmEmb Pusan 121129Z Feb 52.[2]

---

[1] This telegram reported that President Rhee assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950.

[2] In this reference telegram, originally sent as 799 from Pusan, Feb. 12, 1952, and then relayed to Ridgway, the Embassy warned that as the realization dawned that an armistice "may soon be signed, hysteria sparked by President [Rhee] himself will continue crescendo." Muccio suggested consideration of a campaign to counter ROK opposition to an armistice (795.00/2-1252).

C. AmEmb Pusan 150500Z.[3]
D. AmEmb Pusan 150740Z.[4]
E. AmEmb Pusan 160930Z.[5]
F. HNC 937, 170901Z.[6]
G. AmEmb Pusan 191523Z.[7]
H. AmEmb Pusan 200555Z.[8]

Part 1. Pursuant to part 7 of reference F believe earliest consideration necessary at highest governmental levels of measures for promptly counteracting effects of increasingly frequent ROK Governmental attacks against armistice agreements, cite references B, C, E, F, and G. Unless ROK Government activities are promptly reversed, believe they may gravely endanger attainment of armistice, or seriously handicap subsequent political discussions, if armistice concluded, cite reference B. President Rhee's threat to withdraw ROK military forces from the operational command of CINCUNC, as implied in references B and G gives me serious concern, especially since reference A assigns command authority over ROK forces, in the name of ROK President Rhee, only "during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities." A firm agreement with the ROK Government regarding continued control of ROK forces during the armistice period is considered essential.

Part 2. Ambassador Muccio has at all times given me his full cooperation in our joint efforts to deal with the ROK anti-armistice campaign. Reference D constitutes his report of recommended courses of action to moderate ROK attitudes and reactions, agreed upon by himself and representatives of CINCUNC, UNC Del, and Commanding General Eighth Army. Recommenations for local action are being carried out, but reference H reports State Department unable to concur in recommendations 5, 6, and 7 of reference D, and considering as an alternative, a letter from President Truman to President Rhee. It seems questionable that such action will accomplish the desired result unless it can reach a sufficient number of high ROK officials in addition to President Rhee, or be publicized. ROK reaction to hysteria of leaders could precipitate a crisis in Korea. Therefore consider the situation demands immediate consideration followed by prompt and vigorous action on the government to government level.

---

[3] In this telegram, originally sent as 806 from Pusan, Feb. 15, 1952, the Embassy reported that "moderate and responsible elements of ROK Govt" seemed to be joining Rhee's current anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2–1552).

[4] Originally sent as 807 from Pusan, Feb. 15, 1952, this telegram contained the recommendations of Muccio and representatives from CINCUNC, CINCUNC Advance, and EUSAK for a plan of action to moderate the ROK anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2–1552).

[5] In this reference telegram, originally sent as 813 from Pusan, Feb. 16, 1952, the Embassy reported that South Korean concern that the United Nations would withdraw from Korea too early after an armistice and leave Korea unprotected was a principal cause of ROK opposition to an armistice (320/2–1652).

[6] In this telegram, dated Feb. 17, 1952, Joy reported the contents of a personal statement by the South Korean member of the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom, Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, opposing the armistice and concessions to the Communists (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 13).

[7] In this reference telegram, originally sent as 819 from Pusan, Feb. 19, 1952, the Embassy summarized efforts among high-ranking South Korean officials to moderate the anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2–1952).

[8] The reference telegram, originally sent as 615 to Pusan, Feb. 18, 1952, contained the Department of State approval of the general idea of a campaign to moderate the ROK anti-armistice movement, although the Department favored a confidential strong letter from President Truman, rather than letters from Secretary-General Trygve Lie and Acheson with appropriate publicity, as the Embassy in Korea had suggested (795.00/2–1552).

795.00/2-2652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 26, 1952—6:35 p.m.

628. Re Embtels 813, 819, 822, 829, 833, 835 and Deptels 615, 619.[1] Dept deeply concerned developments described ref Embtels and aware difficult task which Emb being called upon perform. Action outlined Embtels 819 and 835 has been noted with particular approval.

Dept concurs in gen recommendations contained Embtel 829. Rhee and other ROK officials must be made realize that through their undemocratic practices and polit machinations US ability gain continued UN support for ROK may be seriously jeopardized and ROK itself must bear full responsibility for actions which may prejudice govt in eyes of free world. Unless UN has confidence in ROK's responsibility, integrity and devotion to democratic principles it will be increasingly difficult rally essential UN support in future. ROK shld recall its dedication to freedom and justice of its cause provided basis for strong effective UN action and continued support following outbreak aggression Jun 25.

As repeatedly pointed out to ROK officials here US fully appreciates danger renewed aggression Korea, contemplates no early withdrawal troops and is taking active steps strengthen ROK forces. Furthermore UNKRA preparing commence full scale rehabilitation program as soon as conditions permit, indicating its confidence in future of ROK.

---

[1] Regarding telegrams 813, 819, and 615, see footnotes 5, 7, and 8, respectively, *supra*. In telegram 822 from Pusan, Feb. 20, 1952, the Embassy reported on Rhee's "campaign of crude intimidation of his political opposition" (795B.00/2-2052). The Embassy suggested combining in the proposed letter from Truman the issues of American concern over South Korea's anti-armistice campaign and its weakening in adherence to constitutional and democratic practices; telegram 829 from Pusan, Feb. 21, 1952 (795B.11/2-2152). In telegram 833 from Pusan, Feb. 23, 1952, the Embassy transmitted a suggested text of a letter from Ridgway to the ROK National Assembly in response to the Assembly's questions concerning the armistice negotiations. The Embassy believed this letter offered an opportunity to refute the anti-armistice campaign (795.00/2-2352). Also part of the effort to blunt South Korean opposition to the armistice was a meeting between Rhee and Muccio on Feb. 21, as reported in telegram 835 from Pusan, Feb. 23, 1952 (795B.11/2-2352). Finally, in telegram 619 to Pusan, Feb. 20, 1952, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the sanctions statement and the mechanics of its release after the armistice had been approved by all 16 UN members participating in the Korean action (795.00/2-2052).

FYI only: Greater sanction statement by 16 UN members participating Korean action (Deptel 619) to be issued immed after signing armistice will make it clear renewal attack in violation armistice will be promptly met. Statement not ltd to Chi Commie intervention but wld also apply case NK attack. Dept also considering and discussing with other selected nations possibility including appropriate provision in GA Res after armistice.

Re UNCURK, Dept awaiting reaction Austral Govt to suggestion to maintain strong representation UNCURK and seek influence 2 or 3 other govts such as Thailand, Neth and Turk do likewise. If advisable, US will also make representations these countries. Re Embtel 822, last para, Cordier apparently willing make trip subj SYG approval, which we hope can be obtained by Mar 1.[2] Emb will be advised further.

Dept urgently studying various other possible ways and means mtg situation described ur reftels including govt to govt approach.

WEBB

---

[2] In the last paragraph of telegram 822, the Embassy proposed strengthening UNCURK, then an "emasculated body" in Korea, by sending out a high UN Secretariat official to Korea in the immediate future.

895B.00/2-2752

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1952.

Subject: Status of the Korean Economic Problem

Except for brief periods of relative stability the Korean inflation has progressed steadily since the outbreak of the war. Prices are now about 40 times the 1947 level, and in recent weeks there has been an acceleration of the increase in the general price level. Since November the Korean Government has become increasingly concerned about this problem and has often spoken of imminent "financial collapse". During the past year the Korean Government has done all that could be expected of it to counteract the inflation. The budget has been balanced and credit reasonably well controlled. The Government has alleged, therefore, that the won drawings of the UN forces have been the basic cause of the expansion in currency and of the resulting inflation. This contention is basically true, but substantial expenditures which should properly be considered as part of the Korean budget are borne by the UN Command out of the won drawings. In addition, the U.S. has undertaken a civil relief program at the rate of $200 million a year. The value of the relief program in fact substantially exceeds the value of the won drawings.[1] Because practically all these goods must be distributed on a free basis, however, they do not serve to reduce the currency in circulation and their anti-inflationary potential therefore is not fully realized.

The fundamental cause of the inflation is that the Korean economy simply cannot bear any substantial costs of supporting the war. There is common agreement on the basic measures to be taken in the short run to control the inflation. These measures boil down to increasing imports and withdrawing from circulation the proceeds of the sales of these imports. The mechanics would be to pay to the Korean Government part or all of the dollar counterpart of won drawings; to utilize the ROK foreign exchange assets thus earned as well as that already accumulated to increase imports; to sell such imports in the open market; and to use the won proceeds of sale for anti-inflationary purposes.

You may recall that I addressed a memorandum to you on February 1 concerning an Army outgoing telegram regarding the financial situation in Korea. A copy of that memorandum is attached for your reference.[2] The reference telegram was sent because of a letter from the Prime Minister to Ambassador Muccio which contained a threat to suspend the UNC privilege of drawing won after currency in circulation exceeded 600 billion won.[3] The telegram [4] contained authorization for the UNC to offer to pay $5 million in settlement of troop purchases of won through December 31 and to make periodic settlements of troop purchases of won thereafter, and, without commitment, to discuss periodic settlements for dollars of the remainder of the won drawings. It is believed that these measures together with others discussed in the telegram [5] would go far toward achieving a reasonable degree of stability.

After receipt of the Army telegram the UNC took steps to resume the Aid Agreement negotiations with the Korean Government. We have received from the Embassy copies of memoranda of conversation relating to the first three Aid Agreement discussions.[6] Considering the negotiating tools at the disposal of UNC the results of the negotiations thus far have been discouraging. The Korean Government still balks at any wording in the Aid Agreement which connotes foreign control over the Korean foreign exchange earned outside the UN operations. On the other hand, the UNC negotiators have used little of the authority given them in the telegram to discuss the matters described above. A telegram of February 21 states that Aid Agreement discussions have been inconclusive and have been recessed from February 18 to March 1.[7]

---

[1] A note in McClurkin's handwriting on the source text at this point read as follows: "—or would if it were all getting to Korea; and I'm not sure it is."

[2] The memorandum, not printed, was not attached to the source text. (895B.13/2-152)

[3] The text of the letter is in telegram 707 from Pusan, Jan. 19, 1952, not printed (895B.13/1-1952).

[4] The telegram under reference was DA 93254 to CINCUNC, which was received by the American Embassy in Korea on Jan. 30, 1952. It is summarized and commented upon in telegram 572 to Pusan, Jan. 29, 1952, not printed (895B.10/1-2952). See footnote 5, below.

[5] Such measures included discussion without commitment between the ROK and CINCUNC on the issues of reduction of won drawings *inter alia* by payments in kind for services, transfer of some charges to the ROK budget, the cost of which was to be defrayed in part by using proceeds from sales of aid goods as ROK revenue, and a pay-as-you-go procedure for won drawings for U.S. forces' procurement, excluding expenditures on behalf of the ROK within the framework of the proposed financial agreement; telegram 572 to Pusan, Jan. 29, 1952 (895B.10/1-2952).

[6] Not printed (895B.00/2-552).

We are following these developments with the closest attention. Whether the inflation will soon degenerate into hyper-inflation and whether financial collapse is imminent is conjectural. Such a development generally reflects a change in outlook on the part of the population rather than a change in external circumstances. Should the negotiations, when resumed, continue at the indifferent level that was apparent in the report of the first three meetings, the Department must consider alternative methods of achieving a meeting of the minds on the basically simple solution to the inflation problem.

Some weeks ago Ambassador Muccio recommended a "Dodge Mission" for Korea.[8] The Department has suggested that he may wish to discuss this matter with Assistant Secretary Johnson who is currently in Tokyo. Such a mission may become necessary. We plan to draft a joint Army, State, Treasury telegram reiterating our concern over the present situation and urge the utmost efforts to reach an agreement upon the resumption of the negotiations of March 1.

I will keep you advised on this subject.

---

[7] Not printed (795B.5/2–2252).

[8] Muccio made his suggestion on Jan. 30; telegram 748, from Pusan, of that date, not printed (895B.10/1–3052).

795B.00/2–2752

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET PUSAN, February 27, 1952.

OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR ALEX: On your recent brief visit and in several recent telegrams,[1] I discussed the trying period we are going through due to the Princetonian's [2] increasing obstinacy and emotional outbursts. If he keeps on the way he is going and the present dispute with the National Assembly is not solved before the next presidential elections, there might be Hell to pay. The situation would also be acute for a while should he pass out of the scene before the National Assembly gets around to electing his successor. The fact that the Vice President is completely an invalid makes prospects more fickle. I discussed this briefly with General Van Fleet some time ago and intend to go into it further with him in a few days. I have also discussed it with Bedell's representative here.

---

[1] Johnson was in Korea from Feb. 17 to 18 as part of General Hull's mission. For a list of telegrams relating to this issue, see footnote 1, p. 61.

[2] The "Princetonian" was Muccio's nickname for Syngman Rhee, a doctoral graduate of Princeton University.

In the event of the Old Boy's taking things into his own hands or in the event of his sudden disappearance from the scene, the key to the situation would be the attitude of two forces, the army and the police. I have no doubt that we can count on the army under its present leadership to uphold law and order and the constitution. I have grave misgivings regarding the police under the present Home Minister. Furthermore, as reported, the Princetonian has revived and reinvigorated his Youth Corps, whose "goon squads" are becoming more and more evident in the current struggle between the executive and the National Assembly. The key to the problem is knowing what the Home Minister, the Youth Corps, and to a lesser extent the National Guidance Group, is doing. In these three groups, Rhee personally issues the orders, selects all key officials and relies on them for direct action and as his principal sources of information. There is no doubt in my mind that they all distort reports in favor of their own respective interests. There is also some quesiton in my mind as to whether the Princetonian realizes and is capable of checking up on the methods used in carrying out his orders.

With the army, it would be difficult to carry out activities unknown to us in view of the widespread internal ramifications of KMAG. As you know we have a few KMAG officers with the police also. However, they are not numerous and their main function has been the coordination of the use of the police in collaboration with the military. We have no one in the Home Ministry itself, the Youth Corps or the National Guidance Group.

Interwoven with all this problem is the part being played today in Korea by the Chinese. We have here the general distinction between those Koreans who spent all their exile in China and those who spent their refugee period elsewhere. We know a lot of the Chinese as we have groups of interpreters, translators and CI&E personnel brought here by our military. We also have a recently greatly augmented Chinese Embassy, military attaché and air attaché organization. It is difficult enough keeping tabs on these divergent, overt groups but in addition I am sure there are covert activities being carried on both from Taipei and from the mainland also, which our Embassy is in no position to follow. I hope somewhere along the line here or in Tokyo or Washington that some U.S. agency is aware of these numerous tentacles. I personally have a hunch that the Chinese have influenced the course of events at Koje-do and at Panmunjom. (I am not referring to the most recent riot among the ROK internees.) I also feel very acutely that if certain ambitious and unscrupulous Koreans manage to take over Rhee's mantle, we may as well turn the peninsula over to Taipei. In other words as regards the Chinese, I am not satisfied as to who is using whom vis-à-vis the US and who eventually is going to get the gravy (Korea).

In discussing the importance of getting in and knowing what is going on behind the scenes among the several power groups, Bedell's representative here and I both feel that it is essential in view of the delicacy of the work to be done that his agency promptly be given broader directives and the necessary staff to tackle the job. Specifically the needs are for: (1) competent language officers; (2) a few more mature, senior, stable, experienced operatives. It is high time the strategic importance of this region be recognized and that the agency in question gear itself for something other than order of battle targets.

My suggestion is, if you agree, that you discuss this problem directly with Bedell Smith in order to get things moving as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours, JOHN J. MUCCIO

795.00/2-252: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, February 27, 1952—4:42 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 64383. 1. During their recent visit, Gen Hull and Mr Johnson, in exploratory discussion, proposed the possibility of developing a plan for the release of those POWs now in UNC custody who violently oppose repatriation; this plan to be implemented on JCS order and only in the event the Communists irrevocably refuse to agree to voluntary repatriation with or without UNC concessions on other points.

2. After serious and deliberate consideration of the many factors involved, my strong convictions are:

a. The UNC delegation has never deviated in its efforts to attain the paramount objective set forth by you of seeking adequate safeguards to insure the safe and speedy return of UNC prisoners in enemy hands. (DA 99024).[1] Other objectives, such as return of civilians and even voluntary repatriation have been considered secondary and to be obtained only if the primary objective is not jeopardized. In my opinion this should continue to be our course.

b. The opinion of all here is that the possibility of obtaining Communist agreement on voluntary repatriation is doubtful whereas adherence to our present planned procedure offers the only possible chance of success.

---

[1] Not printed.

c. The adoption of any subterfuge designed to avoid the violence of forced repatriation will nullify and discredit our efforts and the prestige which we have gained thus far, may destroy any chance of securing the safe return of those prisoners reported by the Communists and would materially increase the difficulties of reaching agreement on an armistice.

d. Further we must never leave ourselves open to the accusation of treachery and deceit which have consistently characterized Communist dealings.

3. Therefore, I recommend the following course of action:

a. Adhere to our present planned procedure of negotiations, reducing areas of disagreement as quickly as possible to those of voluntary repatriation and airfields.

b. Go to plenary session and submit a package agreement involving both principles.

c. Negotiations can then take the following courses:

(1) We can agree to both Communist positions. I oppose this.

(2) We could trade airfield restrictions for agreement on voluntary repatriation. I would accept this but there is no slightest indication that this will occur.

(3) The Communists could accept both our positions. There is no slightest indication that this will occur.

d. It therefore appears highly probable that the Communist position on voluntary repatriation will become clear beyond any reasonable doubt, and that this position will be irrevocable rejection. At that time UNC delegation must announce the UNC decision, namely, we will or will not agree to forced repatriation and we will be prepared to break negotiations rather than concede on this forced repatriation issue.

4. In summation I am deeply and firmly opposed to any plan of premature release of POWs which can result in retaliation against our prisoners and which constitutes a breach of faith of the principles which have guided us throughout the negotiations. After months of discussion the armistice negotiations have reached a state of crisis which will inevitably restrict our freedom of decision in future discussions. Our course of action must be set with a clear objective in mind. I therefore strongly urge that I be given my final position on the POW question now, thus allowing me to press for my final objective with vigor and without deviation.

5. In this connection, removal of the current issue concerning USSR is likewise a requisite. See my CX 64342.[2]

---

[2] In this telegram, dated Feb. 27, 1952, Ridgway requested authority to inform the Communist Delegation that the UNC's refusal to accept the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Supervisory Commission was "irrevocable and no longer subj of discussion." (795.00/2-252)

795.00/2-2752

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1952.

Subject: U.S. Position on Forcible Repatriation of Prisoners of War

Participants: The President
Mr. Acheson—Secretary of State
Mr. Lovett—Secretary of Defense
Mr. Snyder—Secretary of the Treasury
Gen. Vandenberg—Chief of Staff, Air Force
Admiral Fechteler—Chief of Naval Operations
General Hull—Department of Defense
Mr. Matthews—G, Department of State
Mr. Johnson—FE, Department of State

Following the Secretary's return from Lisbon this morning, a meeting of the foregoing persons was held at the White House to discuss a telegram just received from General Ridgway urgently requesting the final U.S. Government position on the question of exchange of prisoners of war.[1] Except for Admiral Fechteler, all those present expressed themselves in favor of the U.S. not accepting any armistice agreement which would require forcible repatriation of prisoners of war held by the UNC who had violently opposed such repatriation and whose lives would be jeopardized if they were returned to the Communists. Admiral Fechteler expressed the view that from the purely military standpoint it was important that no position be adopted which would give the impression that the U.S. was abandoning to the Communists U.S. prisoners held by them in favor of the lives of persons captured while fighting against our forces. Admiral Fechteler, however, expressed the view that the question also involved larger issues of a broad political nature and that the decision was therefore primarily one for the President and the Secretary of State. General Vandenberg expressed the view, with which there was general agreement, that the policy of not agreeing to forcible repatriation should be carried out in an unmistakable manner by quickly removing from the POW camps and POW status those individuals who could be expected violently to resist repatriation, whereupon we would offer to the Communists to enter into an all-for-all exchange on the basis of the revised lists of POWs. In reply to a question Mr. Matthews stated that we had consulted with our key allies (U.K., the participating Commonwealth countries, and France) concerning our position on forcible repatriation, and that although sufficient time had now elapsed for them to do so, none of them had indicated any disagreement with our position on this question. In connection with discussion of possible Communist retaliation against UN prisoners, Mr. Johnson pointed out that in the opinion of GHQ, Tokyo, which he shared, there was a considerable number (possibly not less than 532 regarding whom there was some definite information and possibly somewhat more) Americans alive and in the hands of the Communists and not included in the lists of prisoners received from the Communists.

---

[1] *Supra.*

The President expressed his decision that the final U.S. position should be that the U.S. would not agree to forcible repatriation of POWs and that State and Defense should draft appropriate instructions to General Ridgway for the President's approval.

Note: At 1:30 p.m. a meeting was held with the JCS at which Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Johnson, General Vandenberg, Admiral Fechteler and General Hull were present, at which a telegram to General Ridgway on the subject was discussed and agreed to. The message was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and by the President and was despatched as JCS 902159.[2]

At the same meeting with the JCS, telegrams to General Ridgway on the subject of Communist nomination of the Soviet Union as a member of the neutral supervisory organ and a reply to General Ridgway's telegram CX 64241 of February 25 [3] concerning ROK attacks on armistice negotiations were discussed and agreed to and subsequently approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President and despatched as JCS 902160 [4] and JCS 902158 [5] respectively.

---

[2] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
[3] *Ante*, p. 59.
[4] Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.
[5] *Infra.*

795.00/2-2752: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952—6:37 p. m.

JCS 902158. From JCS reur CX 64241.[2]

1. Re part 1. We concur strongly in your view that ROK compliance with armistice agreement must be assured and are urgently studying questions raised therein. Particular attention is being given to suggestion that ROK agreement to continue its forces under UNC beyond period actual hostilities be obtained. However, considered here ques-

---

[1] This telegram was initialed in draft by Truman; draft copy is in file 795.00/2-2752.
[2] Dated Feb. 25, p. 59.

tionable whether formal agreement should be sought at this time, particularly in view of high emotional and unstable state of opinion of Rhee and ROK. Also to seek formal agreement at this time would appear to give ROK opportunity to impose conditions unacceptable to UNC and further jeopardize achievement of armistice. We feel that most effective way of handling problem is to intensify efforts to keep ROK in line during armistice negotiations, to present ROK with armistice as *fait accompli,* and then take strongest measures to assure ROK compliance. Believed here that at that time Rhee can most effectively be persuaded that continued presence of UN Forces in Korea and supply and training of ROK Forces which are essential for security of ROK will inevitably be influenced by full ROK cooperation, including retention of ROK Forces under UNC control until conditions in area of Korea permit their relinquishment.

2. Re part 2. Most urgent consideration being given to type of top level approach to Rhee that will be most effective.

3. Decisions reached re foregoing will be transmitted soonest.

795.00/2-252: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952—6:37 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 902159. From JCS.

1. Fullest consideration has been given at highest levels here to ur C 64383.[2] US govt will not accept any agreement which would require use of force to repatriate to Commies POWs held by UNC who would violently oppose such repatriation and whose lives would be endangered thereby. This is final US govtal position. We believe this position can be maintained without use of any subterfuge. Accordingly, as promptly as practicable after courses of action contained in paras 3*a*, 3*b*, and 3*c* (2), C 64383, you are directed at a time and by a method considered appropriate by you to remove from POW status those who you consider would be so fearful of their lives if returned to Commie control that they may be expected violently to resist repatriation. This should be carried out in manner best calculated to minimize possibilites of disorder in POW camps. Persons removed from POW status in accordance with foregoing directive will be retained in UNC custody pending further instructions.

2. Fol reclassification of POWs contemplated by this directive, Commies should be informed of removal of names of POWs from lists previ-

---

[1] This telegram was initialed in draft by Truman; draft copy is in file 795.00/2-2752.

[2] Dated Feb. 27, p. 66.

ously furnished to them and of willingness of UNC to enter into agreement for all-for-all exchange upon basis revised lists. It should be made clear in negots at Panmunjom that this action has been taken only because of refusal of Commies to enter into agreement for voluntary repatriation upon fair basis proposed by UNC, and that it is within precedent of reclassification already freely admitted to have been established by Commies.

3. Suggest you discuss public information aspects of this problem with Gen Floyd Parks [3] now en route Tokyo with view developing coordinated public info plan.

4. Previous instructions regarding necessity to force Commies to initiate any break in negotiations remain in effect.

---

[3] Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks was Director of Information, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.

~~FE files,~~ lot 55 D 128, tab 86

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952—6:38 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 902160. From JCS. Reur CX 64343 [*64342*].[2]

1. You are authorized to make it entirely clear to Commies that UNC refusal to accept Soviet Union as a member of Neutral Supervisory Commission is absolutely firm and irrevocable. There is no propaganda problem in regard to our position on this question. Therefore, we consider amplication of basis for UNC rejection of Soviet Union not necessary beyond that required to make it clear to Commie Del that UNC position this regard is entirely firm.

2. We believe that a position along the fol lines might be set forth by the UNC Del at your discretion if you believe agreement can be advanced thereby. The UNC initially proposed that inspection teams be composed of the belligerents of both sides. This proposal was rejected by the Communists. The Communist proposal for neutral supervisory agency consisting of neutral nations acceptable to both sides was accepted by UNC, but the Communists failed to comply with the terms of their own proposal. As a solution, the UNC could propose that an armistice supervisory organ and inspection teams be constituted to consist of nations selected by each side regardless of their combatant status in the Korean hostilities. UNC Del should make clear that under this proposal it would feel free to select any countries participating in hos-

---

[1] This telegram was initialed in draft by Truman; draft copy is in file 795.00/2–2752.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 67.

tilities under UNC, which would include the US and Commies would have similar rights to include USSR.

795.00/2-2952

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 29, 1952.

Subject: Suggestion for Mission and Letter to President Rhee

In response to the suggestions made by General Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio [2] for action from Washington which will assist their efforts to prevent President Rhee and other members of the Government of the Republic of Korea from making statements or taking actions which jeopardize the possibilities of attaining an armistice, I submit for your approval a draft of a letter from you to President Rhee.[3]

You will note that this letter provides for its delivery by a special representative to be designated by you who will discuss the matter in detail with President Rhee and other members of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

In order to unmistakably impress President Rhee with the extreme gravity with which the United States Government views this matter, it is suggested that this representative should be an individual of the highest caliber and greatest possible personal prestige in the eyes of President Rhee. I suggest that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz would be a suitable person who might be available to undertake the mission.

For your ready reference there is also attached a copy of President Rhee's letter of July 28, 1951 and your reply thereto,[4] to which reference is made in the attached draft letter.

DEAN ACHESON

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson. After the signature on the source text was typed the following note: "You might wish to talk with Lovett and me about the individual before you decide. We are checking with the JCS to see whether they have any views. DA."

[2] In telegram 807 from Pusan, Feb. 15, 1952, not printed (795.00/2–1552); see footnote 4, p. 60.

[3] The draft letter, not printed, is virtually the same as the letter sent on Mar. 4, p. 74.

[4] For the text of Rhee's letter to Truman and Truman's reply, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 745 and 774.

795.00/3-352

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1952.

Participants: Secretary of Defense Lovett
Mr. Acheson

Mr. Lovett called Mr. Acheson this afternoon regarding the proposed message to President Syngman Rhee on the question of the personal representative of the President to deliver that message.[1] Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Murphy had called him before lunch and said that the President wanted to know the JCS views on the matter. Mr. Lovett had the JCS consider it at their two o'clock meeting this afternoon and they have reached the following conclusions:

1. They consider a message from the President to Syngman Rhee appropriate.
2. They have no comments on the details of the message which they regard as purely political.
3. They prefer a non-military man as personal representative and think it would be a mistake to use an active five-star admiral for this purpose for the following reasons:

    a. They are afraid rumors will start about impending action against China or something of that sort. They also fear that it will be interpreted as an indication that truce negotiations have broken down.

    b. They think it will be very hard to explain publicly. (Mr. Acheson agreed this was a difficult problem.)

    c. Admiral Nimitz would need extensive briefing here in Washington before he could make the trip.

Mr. Lovett said he did call Mr. Murphy back on these matters and Mr. Murphy remarked that the President had spoken to Admiral Dennison about it and that he understood from Admiral Dennison that the President was now opposed to any message at all.

Mr. Lovett asked the Secretary whether he should await word from him before doing anything further and the Secretary said that he should and promised to discuss the matter with people in the Department this afternoon.

---

[1] On Mar. 1, 1952, Johnson prepared a memorandum for the JCS on this question at the request of General Collins. It was attached to a memorandum from Johnson to Matthews, Mar. 1, 1952, neither printed. (795.00/3-152)

695.0026/3-352

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1952.

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson—British Embassy
Mr. Johnson—FE

Mr. Tomlinson called this afternoon at his request and read to me three telegrams[1] from the U.K. Chargé at Peking (Lamb) concerning the current Chinese charges that the UNC is engaged in biological warfare in North Korea.

---

[1] Copies of these British telegrams were not filed with the source text.

Lamb was very concerned over the build-up in the Chinese campaign and particularly on the apparent effect it was having on representatives of other agent countries in Peking. It was stated that both the Indonesian Chargé and Burmese Counselor had asked him what he thought about the matter in view of the endorsement given to the charge by Chou En-lai. Lamb also stated that Panikkar had informed him that the Soviet Ambassador had stated that he had received from the Chinese evidence with regard to biological warfare activities of the UNC but that he (the Soviet Ambassador) had not yet had an opportunity to evaluate the evidence. The Indian and the Pakistan Ambassadors also expressed to Lamb their grave concern over the wide acceptance in Peking of the allegations being made by the Chinese. Lamb stated that Chinese activities and propaganda on this subject in Peking is being heavily aimed at the Asian audience and the Asian Embassies in Peking. He is gravely concerned over the effect that it is having.

I informed Mr. Tomlinson that the charges were of course absurd and that as even Lamb had pointed out it was ridiculous to think of engaging in biological warfare by dropping bugs, fleas, and grasshoppers over North Korea in the dead of winter. I said that however I did share the concern of the U.K. that the Chinese were becoming enmeshed in their own progaganda net on this subject and desired to find some method of counteracting this danger as well as meeting the propaganda problem in other Asian countries. I stated that Lamb's suggestion that we propose an impartial investigation by some "neutral" agency such as the ICRC seemed to me to be a good idea although I was not sure that the ICRC was the proper body. In reply to my request for any suggestions as to how the matter might be most effectively handled, Mr. Tomlinson suggested that the Secretary make a strong categorical denial in a press conference and at the same time suggest an impartial investigation by some neutral agency.

In reponse to his request, I promised to keep Mr. Tomlinson informed of any action which we decided to take in this regard.

795B.11/3-552

President Truman to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Last August, in my reply to your ltr of July 28,[2] I took occasion to refer to certain matters which were giving the US Govt great concern. I regret that circumstances make it imperative that as Chief Executive of the country which has been charged by the UN with exercising the Unified Command, I must again bring them to your most urgent attention.

---

[1] This letter was transmitted to Korea in telegram 646 to Pusan, Mar. 5, 1952. As the JCS did not favor sending Nimitz and because other suitable persons were not available, Acheson recommended that the President send this letter through the normal channel of the Ambassador in Korea. The President approved the text of the letter and agreed to Acheson's suggestion for method of transmission; memorandum for Truman by Acheson, Mar. 4, 1952, not printed. (795.00/3–452)

[2] For the texts of these letters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 745 and 774.

As an indication of the importance which I attach to these questions, I have requested that Amb Muccio personally deliver this ltr to you. It is my hope that you will accept this ltr in the same frank and friendly spirit in which it is offered, and that any misunderstandings which may have arisen with regard to the policy of the US toward Korea may be eliminated.

The Govt of the US has noted with mounting concern the statements which have been made with increasing frequency by reps of the Govt of the ROK expressing open opposition to the efforts which are being made by the Unified Command to bring the hostilities in Korea to an honorable and satisfactory conclusion consistent with the security of the ROK and with the objectives of the UN. From these statements it would appear that your Govt is taking a stand which not only is sharply at variance with the policies and objectives of the UN which are fully supported by the US, but also threaten to jeopardize the success of the UN efforts on behalf of your people. If this is in fact the case, and your Govt is not fully resolved to continue its cooperation with the nations that have come to its assistance at great cost, I am convinced that only the most serious consequences can ensue.

It should by now be abundantly clear that the UN action in relation to your country has from its very inception been motivated by the deepest concern for the protection of the ROK against its foes and, beyond that, for the achievement of a just settlement of its problems by peaceful means in full knowledge of and in accordance with the desires and aspirations of the Korean people. The US Govt has never deviated from these aims, nor will it now.

The UN action in Korea has been marked by an outstanding unity of purpose on the part of all of those nations participating in it. It has been this unity of purpose which has led to the repelling of the aggressive attack upon your country while avoiding the dangers of a broader conflict which might destroy forever the freedom of your country and lead to untold misery for the world. This unity of purpose must, therefore, be maintained at all costs. To allow divergencies to develop within your own country or between it and the UN which would threaten the support of the UN at this critical period in your history, would be to court disaster for your country and to weaken, if not destroy, the chances for the achievement of its just aspirations.

The degree of assistance which your Govt and the people of Korea will continue to receive in repelling the aggression, in seeking a just political settlement, and in repairing the ravages of that aggression will inevitably be influenced by the sense of responsibility demonstrated by your Govt, its ability to maintain the unity of the Korean people, and its devotion to democratic ideals.

Because the people of the US have the future of Korea and the peace of the world so deeply at heart, I feel that I can ask that you assert your influence and that of your Govt in restoring to our association in this great cause the essential spirit of confidence and understanding which alone can ensure its success. I hope that in response you will assure me that your Govt, its armed forces and the people of Korea will continue to cooperate in every way with the UNC.

Very sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN

795.00/3-1052

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1952.

Subject: Position on POWs—Korean Armistice Negotiations

Reference: Memorandum for the Record, February 8, 1952, foregoing subject.[1]

The memorandum to the President mentioned in penultimate paragraph in the foregoing memorandum was approved by the President on February 8 (see Secretary's record of his and Mr. Lovett's conversation with the President on this subject).[2]

In accordance with the discussion of the preceding day between Secretary Acheson and Secretary Lovett concerning a mission to Tokyo and Korea to explore and discuss the problem on the spot, on February 9 it was determined that General Hull, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and Mr. Johnson would depart as quickly as possible.

On February 11 a meeting was held in Mr. Lovett's office to give General Hull and Mr. Johnson an opportunity to obtain a full understanding of all the views on this subject and discuss the objectives of their mission. The Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; Mr. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Service Secretaries were present. It was agreed that the purpose of the mission was not to transmit any instructions to General Ridgway, nor were General Hull and Mr. Johnson authorized to reach any decisions on behalf of Washington. The purpose of the mission would be to brief General Ridgway and his staff fully on the discussions and decisions that had taken place in Washington, and to explore all possible methods of solution, the final decision to be reached following the return of the mission to Washington or receipt by Washington of recommendations from Tokyo.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 40.

[2] *Ante*, p. 43.

General Hull and Mr. Johnson, accompanied by Lt. Col. Jack Matthews of the Army G–3 section, departed Washington the afternoon of February 11 and arrived in Tokyo the evening of February 13.

The morning of February 14 a meeting was held with General Ridgway in which General Hickey, Chief of Staff; General Wright,[3] G–3; General Milburn, G–1; and Admiral Joy were present. General Hull and Mr. Johnson fully briefed the group on discussions in Washington and the decisions that had been reached, and the prior problem was thoroughly discussed with the group. Admiral Joy expressed the strong view that any unilateral reclassification of POWs by the UNC so as to present the Communists with a *fait accompli* in order to solve the problem of forcible repatriation would be an act of bad faith on the part of the United States and inevitably result in reprisals against prisoners held by the Communists. No other members of the group appeared to share this feeling, at least in the same degree, although all recognized the possibility of reprisals. General Ridgway strongly expressed the view that the principle of voluntary repatriation was very important. General Hickey expressed the view that there should be no attempt to carry out the *fait accompli* principle until negotiations had reached the point that the UNC had presented the offer of conceding the airfield issue in exchange for the PW issue and that tactic had failed. It was determined that Mr. Johnson, in cooperation with General Milburn, would explore all possible solutions to the problem while General Hull carried out inspection of Army installations in Japan.

The afternoon of February 14, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews met at various times with Colonel Salisbury, G–1 officer principally concerned with POW matters, thoroughly to explore the factual situation with regard to POWs; Colonel Rasmussen, G–2, to explore the situation with regard to UN prisoners in Communist hands and not accounted for in the Communist lists of POWs; and General Milburn.

The morning of February 15, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews met with General Ennis, G–2, who agreed to their request to have a thorough study immediately undertaken of the numbers of American and other UN prisoners, probably alive and still in the hands of the Communists but not included on the list of POWs given to the UNC.

The morning of February 16, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews met with Colonel Svensson of G–2 Section; Colonel Nugent, Chief, CI&E Section; Colonel Chaplin, Provost Marshal; Colonel Kogstad, G–1 Section; and Colonel Salisbury to explore at length the views of the group with regard to the probable number of POWs who would violently oppose repatriation and possible covert as well as overt methods of identifying such individuals. All of the group appeared thoroughly to understand and approve the *fait accompli* principle, and to believe it to be practicable of application.

---

[3] Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright headed the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, which was established by MacArthur in 1949 and staffed with representatives from the three services. The group had responsibility for high-level military planning for the UNC during the Korean war.

The evening of February 16, General Hull and Mr. Johnson met with General Hickey, at which time Mr. Johnson reviewed the results of his conversations thus far and suggested that Headquarters immediately undertake the Staff Study of the problem,[4] which could be discussed following the return of General Hull and Mr. Johnson from Korea on February 19. General Hickey agreed to have work on this study immediately undertaken.

The morning of February 17, General Hull, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews flew to Pusan and by light plane to the island of Koje, accompanied by General Mood, 8th Army Chief of Staff; General Yount, Commander of Korea Logistic Command; Colonel Fitzgerald, Commander of Prisoner of War Camps; Lieutenant Colonel Dame, former Commander of the Camps; and Ambassador Muccio. A brief inspection of the Prisoner of War inclosures was carried out during which, and proceeding from and back to Pusan, conditions in the camps and sentiments of POWs were discussed with the foregoing officers.

The evening of February 17, General Hull, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews, accompanied by General Mood, proceeded to Seoul and spent the night at the 8th Army Headquarters. The morning of February 18, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews proceeded by light plane to Munsan and from 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. thoroughly discussed with Admiral Joy, Admiral Libby, Colonel Galloway, and Colonel Hickman the entire prisoner-of-war question, as well as the general status of the armistice negotiations. All four of the officers expressed their strong opposition to the *fait accompli* course of action, athough they were unable to suggest any possible solutions other than forcibly returning to the Communists all POWs held by the UNC. However, Admiral Joy felt that there was some chance the Communists would accept the principles of no forcible repatriation if a firm and unalterable stand were taken. Admiral Libby felt that there was no possibility of the Communists accepting the principles of non-forcible repatriation.

The evening of February 18, General Hull, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews returned to Tokyo. The morning of February 19, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews briefly discussed the GHQ Staff Study with Colonel Salisbury and Colonel Murray (USMC and member of Admiral

---

[4] On Feb. 18, 1952, Headquarters, UN POW Camp Number 1, sent CINCUNC certain POW information in telegram 2207, to which was attached a 12-page paper entitled "Summary of United Nations PW Information". Presumably this is either the staff study under reference or the information on which it was based. A copy of this telegram and its attachments is in FE files, lot 55 D 128.

Libby's staff), during which Colonel Murray expressed his full understanding and approval of the *fait accompli* course of action.

The morning of February 19, a meeting was held with General Ridgway, General Hickey, General Wright and General Milburn, during which the Staff Study prepared at GHQ was preliminarily discussed, particularly the alternative overt and covert methods of identifying prisoners who would violently oppose repatriation. General Ridgway expressed the view that only the overt method should be used. At the close of the meeting a memorandum of results of the meeting was drawn up and discussed and subsequently approved by General Ridgway.[5]

General Hull, Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews departed from Tokyo the afternoon of February 19, and arrived in Washington the morning of February 22.

---

[5] Dated Feb. 19, p. 56.

795.00/3-1152

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is a brief report on developments in my field since you went away.[1]

1. The Communist campaign against us, charging that we have engaged in biological warfare, has been making headway in the Asian countries. We thought it necessary to take some further step to counteract it. After conferring with General Ridgway, I sent off last night a letter to the President of the International Red Cross, the text of which follows this message to you.[2] We plan to release it when it has been delivered and to plug this heavily on the Voice of America and other media.

2. General Ridgway is worried about economic deterioration and mounting inflation in Korea and has asked for a top negotiator to work out agreements with the Korean Government to improve matters. We are talking with the Pentagon today and will suggest a joint approach to Joseph Dodge to do this for us.

3. We are also concerned about the stalemate which the truce negotiations seem to have reached. We are conferring with the Pentagon and will do so with General Ridgway who is now at Munsan. We hope to have a joint recommendation for you soon.

[Here follow paragraphs 4 and 5 in which the Secretary of State reported on the Batista Revolution in Cuba and the Soviet Union's note of March 10 enclosing proposed principles for a peace treaty with a united Germany.]

---

[1] President Truman was in Key West, Florida.

[2] For the text of this letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 452.

Respectfully yours, DEAN ACHESON

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 72: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET MUNSAN, March 11, 1952—11:23 a. m.
PRIORITY

HNC 1033. 1. Following summary of current status of armistice negotiations has been prepared following full discussion with all United States Delegates and Senior Members of Delegation Staff.[2]

2. A. We do not presume to know whether Communists desire or do not desire an armistice.

B. We do not presume to know Communist intentions with respect to any particular currently unresolved issues.

C. We deem it dangerous to assume that we do know his intention with respect to the foregoing and even more dangerous to the attainment of our objectives were we to base our plans on assumed Communist intentions which intelligence in our possession does not support.

D. With three major and several minor unresolved issues now existing; [3] with the attitude of the Communist negotiators on all these major issues remaining obdurate without any indication of willingness to make concessions thereon; with the demeanor of the Communist negotiators becoming increasingly arrogant and threatening and their language intemperate; the position of the delegation verges on one of humiliation, derogatory to our national dignity without discernible probability of improvement and in fact with positive indications of the probability of further deterioration in negotiatory strength of our position.

---

[1] A note attached to the source text indicated that this copy of the telegram was brought to the attention of the Secretary of State at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

[2] Just 2 days prior to dispatch of this telegram, Joy and his staff completed a review of the truce negotiations and recommended two alternative courses of action to Ridgway. The first entailed presenting the Communist side with a complete armistice agreement incorporating some concessions, but with an ultimatum backed up by a time limit after which hostilities would be resumed if the Communists did not agree. The second merely entailed submission of a complete armistice agreement—again with some concessions—but without the ultimatum. The Communist delegates would be informed that no further concessions would be made by the United Nations. Ridgway pointed out that each of these courses of action was an ultimatum—one stated, the other implied—and he informed Joy that the time was not right for such a move; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 163–165.

[3] The major issues were voluntary repatriation of POWs, restrictions on construction and rehabilitation of airfields, and the participation of the Soviet Union on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Minor issues included rotation of troops, the number of ports permitted to handle rotation and replenishment of men and supplies for inspection purposes, and control of coastal waters. These minor issues were well on their way to settlement; *ibid.*, pp. 160–162.

E. There are, I think, two courses of action, either of which may arrest this deterioration, restore some measure of bargaining power to our delegation and relieve these honorable high-principled representatives of the United States of America who compose the delegation, of the rankling humiliation of having their government, the United Nations, and the principles for which both stand, daily subjected to vituperative venom and falsehood.

F. The first of these two courses of action is to reveal to the Communists the determination of the United States to stand inflexibly on stated minimum positions with respect to the major issues. The benefits to be derived from following this course will depend upon whether or not the Communists still desire an armistice. We should at least obtain an answer to this essential question by so doing. If the publicly announced statement of its position by the United States can be concurrently supported by like public statements from our principal United Nations allies, its effectiveness will be greatly increased.

G. The second course of action is to apply the one influence which the Communists the world over recognize, and that is force.

H. I consider the second course as one of last resort, and that the situation has yet to reach the point where it would be in order for me to submit to you my detailed views.

I. I consider adoption of the first course now imperative in order to arrest the very evident present deterioration in our negotiating position and permit progress with some measure of amelioration of the adverse influences under which we now negotiate. Removal of the USSR as an issue is a prerequisite to resolution of the other remaining major issues, i.e., airfields and voluntary repatriation.

3. Accordingly I recommend, the United States Delegation unanimously concurring, that the United States Government with the least practicable delay, publicly announce, and with concurrent like public announcements by as many of its principal United Nations allies as practicable, its decision irrevocably to reject the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

4. It would be very helpful to know soonest the authoritative reaction of the United States Government to this recommendation.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1952—noon.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: We have prepared a draft message to Ridgway on the question whether he should submit a package proposal on the remaining issues. Do you also have a draft on this subject? [2]

Mr. Matthews: Yes, we do.

General Bradley: It seems to us that one question is whether we should try to resolve the issue of Soviet representation on the armistice machinery before we submit proposals for the settlement of the other outstanding issues.

Mr. Matthews: We lean to the idea that we ought to put all of these problems, including Soviet representation, into one package proposal.

General Bradley: You might like to look at our draft which was prepared by the Army and which we have been discussing.

(The conferees read the draft army message.) [3]

Mr. Matthews: It is not clear to me from your draft when the proposal would be made.

General Collins: Your are right, that is unclear.

Mr. Bohlen: The third paragraph gives the implication that this has already been done.

General Bradley: One implication of the amendment proposed by the Navy is that we should try to resolve the small issues before submitting proposals on the three basic issues.

Mr. Johnson: Do you include among these small issues the inspection of "secrets"?

General Collins: Yes, and a few others. I should also point out that we intend to refer at the end of the message to our plan to issue a general warning against a violation of the armistice.

General Bradley: Yes, that is one amendment we intended to make. The two messages relating to the general sanction are still in effect and this should be noted. Do you in the State Department believe that we should try to resolve the minor issues or should we include them also in the package proposal?

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the Chiefs of Staff, Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended, as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Twining. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent and General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense. Altogether 18 persons were present. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting, including the imminent transfer of command authority in the Philippines–Formosa area to CINCPAC from General Ridgway.

[2] For text of the Department of State draft, see *infra*.

[3] Not found.

Mr. Nitze: Can we concede on the minor ones? Are they of much importance to us? I take it that the question whether there are five or six ports of entry at which we could inspect is not of much importance.

General Eddleman: We have been holding out for six; in fact, six represents a concession for we wanted the right to inspection at eight. However, I believe this one could be settled without much difficulty.

Mr. Nitze: If we could accept five, that would be one more concession that we had made and might improve our bargaining position on the others. I take it from what you have said that the communists' demand for inspection of "secrets" is a silly demand and one that we could not accept.

General Collins: I think we should just ignore it.

General Bradley: I don't know what they have in mind.

Mr. Nitze: If it relates to their charges of bacteriological warfare, we might be better off to take the position that they can of course look at such things.

Mr. Matthews: Returning to General Bradley's question, I still lean to putting all these issues into one package. The decision depends in part, I suppose, on how much time General Ridgway needs for segregation of the prisoners of war who do not wish to be repatriated.

General Bradley: Does anyone disagree with this point of view?

General Collins: General Ridgway's incoming message [4] speaks of the settlement of the Soviet representation issue as a prerequisite to the settlement of the other issues. It is not clear to me whether General Ridgway believes that he should refuse to accept the Soviet Union in the armistice machinery under any and all circumstances.

Mr. Johnson: It looks to me as though he has not paid attention to paragraph 2 of our message [5] on this subject.

General Collins: That is a question. Perhaps he disagrees with us on this point and has not explicitly said so.

Mr. Matthews: It has seemed to us that there might be some advantage in having the Soviet Union on the inspection teams provided the Soviets are not called "neutrals".

Mr. Johnson: I agree with that. I think it might be desirable to spell out our point of view a little and to let General Ridgway shoot at it if he wants to.

General Bradley: It looks to me as though there is no basic disagreement amongst us on this message and that what we have is a drafting problem.

---

[4] *Supra.*

[5] JCS 902160, dated Feb. 27, p. 71.

Admiral Fechteler: I would like to ask a question. General Ridgway's message refers to his desire to adopt inflexible minimum positions on the basic issues. The army draft agrees with respect to the three basic outstanding issues. It suggests that they should be put up in a single package. It does not seem to me that the State draft gives General Ridgway the answers he says he needs. If I were General Ridgway I would interpret the last part of State's message to mean that positions are not necessarily final positions and might be changed at some time in the future.

Mr. Johnson: That was not our intention.

General Bradley: That is why I say that this is a problem of drafting. I don't think there really is any disagreement.

Mr. Bohlen: Paragraph 1*a* of the State draft seems to me to say what Admiral Fechteler thinks we should say.

Admiral Fechteler: But the preceding language refers to the tactics of the negotiations, which puts the issue somewhat in doubt. Where, in your message, does it say that these are final and inflexible positions?

General Bradley: I think we should take these two messages and combine them into one. Could we let Mr. Johnson and General Eddleman work on this?

Mr. Matthews: Do we need to ascertain from General Ridgway the time he requires for carrying out the segregation?

General Bradley: I think that is an important point.

General Collins: As regards the drafting problem I think we might take the first part of Army's proposed message and use that instead of the first part of State's draft. In the second part of the message we could use more of State's language. In that part we would also put in the Navy's point about resolving the minor issues.

General Bradley: I think we might link that with the problem of segregation. We might advise General Ridgway to try to resolve the minor issues during the time that he is carrying out the segregation process.

Mr. Bohlen: There is one difference between these messages which we perhaps ought to consider. It relates to timing. The Army message seems to refer to an intermediate phase whereas the State message eliminates any intermediate phase and suggests that we get to the final phase as soon as possible.

General Collins: I don't think there is any real difference on this point. It is our view also that we should get everything ready before we spring the package. I take it that you would prefer to eliminate the intermediate phase and I agree with that. It would be much more impressive if we make the whole proposal at one time.

Mr. Bohlen: The communists may not be willing to accept the top level meeting and may propose that the present elements do the job. I think we have got to be prepared to do the job. It seems to me that it is to our advantage to get a meeting between General Ridgway and Kim Il Sung. What would be the effect of dropping back to Admiral Joy and his opposite number?

General Bradley: You are asking in other words what the effect would be of putting the package forward at something less than top level? I think we might say that we are putting up important proposals on the following day and ask how the communists want to conduct this meeting. Do they want it to be a top level meeting or a meeting of delegates? We would say that we are prepared and ready to meet with their senior commander if they so desire and if they do not so desire we are prepared to meet in the present group. This might be a difficult point to spell out in the message.

General Collins: I think we might say something along those lines. Perhaps we should indicate that we would regard a top level meeting as desirable but that we would be prepared to make our proposals at the present level if the communists prefer that. We should make it clear that we are going to make important proposals on the following day.

General Bradley: I think we should get this thought into the message. I think we should explain the disadvantage we would incur if we proposed a top level meeting and the communists rejected that proposal. In other words, we should explain why it is important in our view to make a double-barrelled proposal. I suggest that Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews prepare a new draft. I also suggest that they use all the words necessary to make our position perfectly clear. There is no premium on brevity.

Admiral Fechteler: I hope the drafters will delete any such phrases as "maximum possible support" to General Bradley's position. That is not nearly strong enough.

Mr. Matthews: Would it not be helpful to him to know that this is going to get a lot of public attention in this country.

General Bradley: I think Admiral Fechteler is right. Your thought is not really expressed by the language he referred to. Again this is a drafting problem.

General Collins: In this connection I think the drafters might look at the last paragraph of our proposed message. It refers to a Presidential statement and to obtaining the endorsement of the other UN countries, etc. Would that meet your point, Admiral Fechteler?

Admiral Fechteler: Yes.

General Bradley: The Navy made one other comment which we did not like too well. That is the comment which relates to the support of the other allied governments. Of course we have got to get their support.

General Collins: Our message assumes that we will get it.

Mr. Johnson: We feel sure that the other governments will give us good support on this thing. I don't think the proposal will take them by surprise. We have prepared them to some extent for this development.

General Collins: In this connection, there is one word in the British paper which we are about to discuss [6] which scares me.

General Bradley: We should circulate the new message and meet on it again tonight or tomorrow morning.

Mr. Bohlen: We will not try to tell General Ridgway, I assume, how to play his hand. However, in this case I feel quite strongly that we should not bat the breeze at length with the communists. We should lay our proposals on the table and say that they remain open. Our closing note will be very important. We should give the impression that here are the important final proposals and that if the communists change their minds we will be glad to hear about it. We shouldn't slam the door and lock it.

General Bradley: Can we get together later today or in the morning if necessary?

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

. . . .

---

[6] The next topic discussed at the meeting was a British paper on covert operations.

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 82

Draft Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 12, 1952.

1. Careful consideration has been given here to methods whereby impasse in negotiations reported by ur HNC 1033 [2] may be broken. View here is that future tactics in armistice negotiations should:

a. Make unmistakably clear to Commies what are in fact our minimum positions and disabuse them of any misconceptions concerning possible success of continuation their present tactics in bringing about modifications in our minimum positions.

b. Bring to a conclusion further apparently fruitless discussions between delegations at Panmunjom while not modifying our consistent posture of continued willingness to negotiate and making Commies bear entire onus for any breaking off of negotiations.

c. Require the Commies shortly clearly to show whether they are willing enter into armistice upon basis already agreed points and our minimum positions on remaining points.

d. If Commies break off negotiations have break come about in context several unresolved issues on all which Commie position is one of intransigence rather than single issue which may result in strong pressures on US to compromise principles on such an issue whatever it may be.

---

[1] This draft was prepared in the Department of State by Johnson and sent to Matthews, Bohlen, Nitze, and Hickerson for suggestions. It was then considered at the State–JCS meeting of Mar. 12, 1952; for the text of a memorandum of discussion at the meeting, see *supra*.

[2] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

e. While bringing maximum pressures on Commies to agree to armistice on basis our minimum terms and not compromising any our basic principles, carry out foregoing so as to reduce prestige factors militating against Commie acceptance our positions.

2. View here is that foregoing objectives can best be obtained by the following procedure:

a. Discussion remaining three basic issues (Soviet Union as member neutral inspection organization, airfields, and forcible repatriation POWs) be moved to plenary sessions full delegations, with primary emphasis placed on POW question.

b. Discussions in plenary be carried on only so long as is required for you to complete plans for implementation of directive to identify and remove from POW status those POWs held by UNC who you consider would be so fearful of their lives if returned to Commie control that they may be expected violently to resist repatriation along lines set forth JCS 902159.[3]

c. When you are prepared to implement plan for POWs held by UNC accordance foregoing paragraph, request a meeting between yourself and two opposing commanders.

d. If and when proposal for foregoing meeting is accepted implement the plans for POWs envisioned in paragraph *b*, timing the implementation thereof and the date of the meeting so that you will be able at that meeting to make announcement to Commies along lines set forth paragraph 2, JCS 902159. (In the meantime the highest possible degree of security would be maintained concerning the action being taken re POWs.)

e. At meeting envisioned by foregoing paragraph *c* you would:

(1) Make announcement to Commies re POWs along lines paragraph 2, JCS 902159.

(2) Indicate desire and willingness immediately to discuss and settle airfields and Soviet Union as neutral inspector issues in such a manner as to make it entirely clear that your position on both of these questions as well as on POW question are completely interrelated and that Commies as well as public opinion cannot interpret action as any willingness to concede on one without Commies acceptance of others. Your position on airfields would be to concur in the elimination from the armistice agreement of any mention of airfield reconstruction or rehabilitation. Your position on the Soviet Union would be along lines set forth paragraph 2, JCS 902160.[4] Positions on both issues would be presented as UNC concessions in interest prompt attainment armistice.

(3) Express willingness forthwith to sign armistice on foregoing basis, and expectation that two opposing commanders as parties principal will be able and willing to do the same.

(4) If, as is likely, opposing commanders demur and request time for consideration, your position would be that of complete willing-

---

[3] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.

[4] Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.

ness again to meet with them at such time as they are prepared to accept your proposals. In the meanwhile, any requests for meetings of delegations would be countered with expression of your willingness to meet with opposing commanders when they are prepared accept your proposals.

3. Your position in meeting envisioned in paragraph 2*e* would be given the maximum possible support by simultaneous high level US Govt statements and diplomatic action.

4. Request your comments soonest.

795.00/3-1452

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 14, 1952.

The Secretary went over to the Blair House with General Bradley to discuss with the President the message to General Ridgway.[2] The President has approved this message and it has been sent.

The Secretary discussed with the President the proposal that the President make a statement [3] in connection with General Ridgway's package approach to the North Koreans and Chinese. The President liked the idea and also liked the tone of the speech as the Secretary outlined it to him. The Secretary said that he followed the same line which he had in a discussion with Alex Johnson and me prior to going over to see the President. I have given Mr. Shulman my notes on this. The President is expecting us to submit a draft to him.

The President said he would be perfectly willing to fly up here [4] for the purpose of making this statement or for consultation with Congressional leaders. The Secretary told him that he did not think that this would be necessary and said he thought that he, Mr. Lovett and General Bradley could handle the consultation angle which they would do just prior to the actual move by Ridgway.

---

[1] The source text indicated that this memorandum was addressed to the Executive Secretariat, but the names of Johnson, Sargeant, Hickerson, and Matthews were handwritten on it, and presumably they received copies.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] For text of the President's statement, given on May 7, 1952, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953,* p. 321.

[4] President Truman would fly up from Key West, Florida, if necessary.

795.00/3-2452 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET — WASHINGTON, March 15, 1952—7:44 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 903687. From JCS.

1. We have considered HNC 1033 [2] and agree that time is near to convince Communists of our determination to stand inflexibly on stated minimum positions with respect to the three unresolved major issues and in doing so to utilize fully the public backing of United States and Allied Govts. We recognize that your recommended action represents one approach. However, we feel that it may be more effective to present our minimum positions on the three unresolved major issues in a single package rather than on a piecemeal basis. Such an overall approach would possess certain advantages in that it would have greater impact, it offers equal, if not better, chances of acceptance by Communists, and, if rejected, would place the UNC in a favorable position vis-à-vis public opinion and international support should negotiations subsequently be broken off by Communists.

2. Broad outline of this approach could be generally as follows:

A. Expedite resolution remaining minor issues at sub-del level. Those not resolvable at sub-del level should be added to package indicated in subpara D (1) below. (Your final and irrevocable positions on such issues should be cleared with JCS prior to presenting them as such to Communists.)

B. As soon as minor issues are resolved or no further progress thereon at sub-del level appears possible and you are prepared to implement plans for reclassification and segregation POWs as set forth in JCS 902159,[3] negots should be moved from sub-del level to plenary session.

C. At this plenary session review outstanding issues, seek to determine whether Communists have any new suggestions for resolving these issues, and assuming they do not, have UNC del propose on your behalf a mtg between yourself and two opposing cdrs. This proposal should be substantiated by ltr from you to two opposing cdrs to be delivered by UNC del. Your proposal for mtg should be in such terms as would readily permit return of negotiations to plenary session of dels if rejected. Date specified for such mtg to be such as to allow prior implementation of plans for reclassification and segregation POWs accordance subpara B above and announcement by you at such mtg along lines set forth para 2, JCS 902159.

---

[1] This telegram was the result of Johnson's and Lt. Col. Matthews' combination of the drafts of the Departments of State and Defense and the recommendations arising from the discussion at the State-JCS meeting of Mar. 12; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 82. The telegram was then discussed with President Truman, who approved it; see the memorandum, *supra*.

[2] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

[3] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.

D. At mtg of senior cdrs:

(1) You would set forth final and irrevocable positions on major issues as follows and on such unresolved minor issues as have been approved previously by JCS.

(*a*) No restrictions in armistice agreement on reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields. (In this connection if armistice is achieved, jt declaration will be issued in Washington as envisaged in JCS 91600 and JCS 91602.)[4]

(*b*) Any one of folg alternatives, which we feel should be presented concurrently, concerning organization and composition of supervisory commission on which you can get agreement appears acceptable to US:

(*1*) As set forth in para 2 of JCS 902160,[5] the "neutral" designation of supervisory commission be entirely eliminated and supervisory organization and inspection teams be constituted to consist of nations selected by each side regardless their combatant status in Korean hostilities or acceptability to other side. Under this proposal UNC would be free to select any countries whether or not partcipating in hostilities and Commies would have similar right to select any countries. In event Commies select USSR (or Communist China) as mbr it would then be mandatory that mbrs from our side include United States. View here is that while Soviet Union (or Communist China) entirely unacceptable in position of "neutral" there is no objection to Soviet Union as mbr of supervisory commission that is not identified as "neutral" provided United States is also mbr. Commission would then be composed of United States along with, for example, Sweden and Switzerland on our side, while on Communist side Poland, Czechoslovakia and USSR would be acceptable; or

(*2*) Along lines already agreed in principle on this issue, that is, composed of "neutral" (noncombatant) countries acceptable to each side, in which event UNC refusal to accept Soviet Union as mbr of "neutral" supervisory commission is absolutely firm as stated in para 1, JCS 902160; and

(*3*) Inspection behind lines of each side to be carried out by inspection teams composed equally of reptvs of belligerents from opposing side responsible to mil armistice commission as set forth in original proposal this subj made by UNC. (This proposal would only involve composition and organization of inspection teams and would not imply any renunciation by UNC of any such agreements as have thus far been reached between two sides on places at which teams will be stationed and duties and rights of such teams.)

(*c*) All for all exchange of POWs based on lists revised by having removed therefrom those POWs reclassified and segregated accordance JCS 902159 and presentation thereof to be along lines set forth para 2 that msg.

---

[4] Both dated Jan. 10, pp. 13 and 14.

[5] Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.

(2) In presenting foregoing final positions you should present all of them in such a manner that your position on each of these questions is inseparably related to your position on each of the other questions and Communists or public opinion will not be able to interpret action as willingness to concede on one question without Communist acceptance your position on others. Positions should also be presented so that it will be clear that they do in fact represent our final and irrevocable positions. However, in so doing you should also present these positions as fair and reasonable reconciliation of opposing points of view in interest of prompt attainment of armistice.

(3) You would express willingness forthwith to sign armistice on foregoing basis, and expectation that two opposing cdrs as parties principal will be able and willing to do same.

(4) If, as is likely, enemy cdrs demur and request time for consideration, your position would be that of complete willingness to meet with them at such time as they are prepared to reply to your proposals. In any such subsequent mtg between you and opposing cdrs or mtgs in plenary session of dels you would, as appropriate, reiterate positions set forth in first mtg. While responding to any reasonable requests for amplification or explanation, you would avoid being drawn into any extended debate.

(5) If Communists then flatly reject your package proposal your position would continue to be that it remains your final and best offer and that while you or UNC del continue willing to meet whenever Communists desire, you would refuse to be drawn into debate on individual points. It is important that our proffered package not become a new point of departure for negots on individual issues.

3. If Communists reject your proposal for mtg of opposing cdrs:

A. Actions indicated in para 2 D above could be carried out in plenary session; or

B. Appropriate parts of para 2 D above could be transmitted in formal msg from you to opposing cdrs.

4. In undertaking actions outlined you would be accorded full polit and dipl support of United States Govt. The details of this remain to be developed.

5. Request your comments. Pending receipt thereof final action on HNC 1033 is withheld.

795.00/3-2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET EMERGENCY TOKYO, March 17, 1952—7:40 p. m.

CX 65424. Re JCS 902159.[1]

---

[1] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.

1. Agreement to move discussions in item 4 from subdelegation to staff officer level has opened a remote possibility that agreement might be reached with the Communists under which lists of POWs in UNC custody would be so adjusted as to permit acceptance of an all-for-all exchange of remaining POWs while at the same time eliminating forced repatriation. These new lists would, by mutual understanding, omit selected captured persons released from POW status and designated by some term such as "special refugees" prior to the date of exchange of POW lists. An addendum list of civilian internees desiring to go to the Communist side would also be furnished by UNC.

2. Our proposal would have to be made in such a way as to specify the return of the 11,559 POWs now held by the Communists in exchange for all the POWs held by the UNC who would not violently oppose repatriation. We believe such agreement would permit the UNC to obtain all of the non-Korean UN POWs and the great majority of the other POWs the Communists hold, while agreeing to the all-for-all exchange of the newly listed POWs. This would satisfy the Communists' insistence on agreement to the letter of the principle of release and repatriation of all POWs and would be consistent with JCS 92059 [2] which authorized UNC to agree to an all-for-all exchange if necessary so long as there is no forced repatriation.

3. Should Communists indicate receptive interest in any such proposal it would be necessary to immediately screen and segregate all POWs who indicate they oppose repatriation, and to screen civilian internees to segregate those who desire return to the Communist side. POWs desiring not to be returned to Communist control could be given some appropriate designation other than POW. New lists of POWs to be repatriated, made up as of a date mutually agreed upon by both sides, would then be prepared as quickly as possible for submission to the Communists, such lists representing the total number of POWs and civilian internees to be returned to Communist control.

4. As I have previously indicated, I am convinced that any covert plan to select that category of prisoner who would violently resist repatriation because of fear for his life is thoroughly inadequate to acccomplish the objectives you have set. Any plan which does not entail individual self-expression of the prisoners concerned can be only partially successful and will carry positive danger of violence at the time exchange takes place. Equally, it is impossible to develop a screening plan that can distinguish between those who would violently resist repatriation to the point of self-destruction and those who merely elect a choice because of the circumstances existing at the moment. Our latest estimate, while admittedly highly conjectural, is that about 73,000 persons, including civilian internees, may elect not to be returned. To

---

[2] Dated Jan. 15, p. 25.

screen and segregate the population at UN POW camp with a minimum of administration will take about 5 days.

5. The possibility of obtaining agreement is tenuous. The Communists may reject any such plan solely on the basis of the uncertain future disposition of those POWs reclassified to a designation other than POW and retained in UNC custody. However, the exploration of this proposal at staff officer level will at least serve as a gauge of their resistance to any plan to circumvent forced repatriation.

6. A statement substantially as follows can be submitted by UNC staff officers at the appropriate time:

"On 15 March the sub-delegations of both sides agreed that their respective staffs meet for the purpose of exploring the stated positions of each side with a view to their further clarification and with a view to seeking, and recommending to the sub-delegations, means by which progress can be made toward a solution mutually satisfactory to both sides.

"Each side has made a proposal which it considers is a proper basis for negotiating a solution to our present differences. If each side is completely sincere in its expressed desire to negotiate a solution to these differences, our 2 sides may be able to utilize these 2 proposals as the basis for such a solution.

"We are well aware of your repeated insistence that both sides must agree to the principle of release and repatriation of all prisoners of war in the custody of each side. We are aware too that you have stated that you cannot accept any actions of our side to retain your captured personnel under the guise of voluntary repatriation or no forced repatriation.

"You, in turn, are well aware that we cannot agree to any solution which does not provide for the return to our side of all our military personnel in your custody who desire to return to our side. Likewise, we cannot agree to any principle or armistice agreement wording which will require us to participate in forced repatriation of prisoners of war.

"What is required is a compromise solution which will satisfy the legitimate interest of each side and which will be mutually agreed to by both sides as a part of the armistice agreement.

"We have, through the past discussions, developed certain basic facts. Each side has, during the period of Korean conflict, taken into custody large numbers of personnel. Our side announced a total of over 176,000 such persons. Your side has announced capturing upwards of 65,000 in the first 9 months.

"On 18 December our 2 sides exchanged data on prisoners of war then in the custody of each side. Neither side was, for various reasons, fully satisfied with the lists exchanged. These reasons are well known to each side.

"It appears that both sides might reconsider the lists previously exchanged, and that upon the basis of such reconsideration agree to exchange new lists which could satisfy the stated requirements of both sides. These lists would contain only prisoners of war in the custody of each side at the agreed date of the exchange of the lists.

"It would be understood, of course, that the new lists of POWs in the custody of each side as of the agreed date would not include captured personnel already released by either side,[3] such as those released at the front; and would not include civilian internees, although those of this latter group who wished to go to your side would be permitted to do so, and the names furnished you in a separate list.

"It is our belief that this process might solve the problem without the necessity for including in the agreement any renunciation by either side of its declared principles, while at the same time obtaining its legitimate objectives. It would insure the return of the upwards of 11559 POWs held by your side in exchange for all the POWs held by our side except those who would violently resist,[4] plus all of the civilian internees who desire to join you.

"We request that you study our statement carefully and that you give us your comments."

7. Should this proposal be rejected at staff officer level it will not disrupt our present planned procedure for a final stand. Should it be accepted, we will have achieved both our primary objectives of the return of our PWs and of no forced repatriation. However, it is essential that no publicity be given to this until after the exchange has been effected. While some propaganda advantage initially may accrue to the other side, once the exchange is completed, the UNC can make factual explanation of its approach and possibly recover the propaganda initiative.

8. My primary objective has been and continues to be the safe and prompt return of all our prisoners in Communists' custody. I feel, as do all here, that there is grave danger to them in any attempt to circumvent what we can to date only accept as absolute Communist insistence on forced return; that every possibility must first be exhausted to determine whether or not the Communists will yield on this position; that every possible effort should be made to achieve our primary objective without resorting to forced repatriation; and that only in the event of complete conviction that this last is impossible of attainment should the US Government even consider its action stated in para 1 of JCS 902159.

9. In event of failure to secure these 2 objectives I continue to feel, as do all here, that execution of the directive contained in paragraph 1 of JCS 902159 will gravely imperil the safe return and even the lives of UN personnel now in Communist hands.

10. Request your earliest consideration.

---

[3] In a separate telegram, CX 65436 from CINCUNC to JCS, dated Mar. 18, 1952, the UNC requested the following editorial change at this point: the substitution of the phrase "released by either side prior to that date" for "already released by either side". (795.00/3–2452)

[4] In CX 65436 UNC requested the following editorial change at this point: substitution of the phrase "except those would have to be forcibly repatriated" for "except those who would violently resist".

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 8 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET   TOKYO, March 17, 1952—8:22 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 65430. Reference JCS 902159 [1] and JCS 903687.[2] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

A. Among the major issues growing out of our constant effort toward obtaining a just and honorable armistice agreement is that pertaining to POWs. There has never been the slightest deviation in the UNC delegation effort to seek adequate safeguards towards insuring the safe and speedy return of all UNC prisoners in enemy hands and this remains our first and paramount objective. Failure to obtain Communist agreement on the basis for exchange of POWs and the execution of the plan directed in JCS 902159 will, in my opinion, gravely jeopardize the safe return of those 11,559 UN prisoners reported by the Communists. It is, therefore, imperative that every effort be made to determine positively that the Communist stated position on forced repatriation is in fact unalterable. To this end, the UNC delegation must exhaust every possibility toward obtaining Communist agreement to an exchange that will not involve forced repatriation (See C [*CX*] 65424).[3]

B. In view of the above, I believe our present negotiatory plan should be continued for a period of time in a further effort toward reaching a status of 2 unresolved issues, airfields and voluntary repatriation. The removal of the USSR as an issue still remains a prerequisite to resolution of those 2 major issues.

Part 2. Specific comment regarding JCS 903687 as requested in para 5 of that msg follows:

A. I am strongly opposed to any meeting of field commanders, at least until the actual signing of an armistice agreement. To establish such a meeting infers authority on the part of Communist commanders which we believe does not exist. Furthermore, the introduction of the commanders unnecessarily complicates the problem by establishing another level of the negotiation with the inevitable attendant delays.

B. The basic structure for the approach outlined in JCS 903687 is reclassification of [*and*] segregation of POWs. As indicated in my C 64383,[4] I feel we must exhaust all other possibilities in relation to this issue prior to taking such an irrevocable step which, in my opinion, may destroy all chances of securing the safe return of those prisoners reported by the Communists. Under the proposal suggested in JCS 903687, wherein 3 major unresolved issues are presented in 1 package, it is possible that we jeopardize an armistice agreement through requiring the Communists to give on 2 issues (USSR and voluntary repatriation) as against 1 (airfields) by the UNC.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.
[2] Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.
[3] Dated Mar. 17, *supra.*
[4] Dated Feb. 27, p. 66.

C. I am extremely reluctant to reverse our previously irrevocable stand against the USSR as a member of any supervisory organ, and am equally reluctant from the practical viewpoint of our inability to control their activities should they be given freedom of movement in our area. I feel we should never concede on this point. In light of Communist reaction to Secretary Acheson's public announcements last summer on issues of 38 parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops, we feel a strong possibility exists that the Communists may concede this issue of the US position in that regard if made crystal clear by US govt public announcement as previously recommended.

D. As indicated in para 2 of JCS 903687, it is important that any proffered package agreement which states final and irrevocable positions must not become a new point of departure for negotiations on individual issues. In order to insure that it does not, it is essential that prior to proffering such a package agreement there be a US govt decision that, in event of Communist refusal to accept our position within a reasonable and stated period of time, the US govt will consider the Communists have terminated the negotiations and further, that the Communists be so informed when the "package" is tabled.

Part 3.

A. It is therefore my recommendation that the UNC delegation continue the present effort to bring negotiations to the point of 2 major unresolved issues.

B. In order to determine the Communist desire for an armistice, it is vital that every possible step be taken to remove the issue of the USSR. I, therefore, adhere to the recommendation contained in HNC 1033.[5]

---

[5] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

795.00/3–1952

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1952.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Immediately upon the receipt, March 17, of General Ridgway's C 65430 [1] and CX 65424,[2] Colonel Matthews and Mr. Johnson conferred and thoroughly discussed both messages. Both recognized the obvious dangers inherent in the proposal set forth in CX 65424, and that the approach in C 65430 seemed to be sharply at variance with that of HNC 1033.[3] There was general agreement on the broad lines of a reply to both messages.

The two messages were discussed at length with the Secretary by Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Ferguson, Mr. Allison, Mr. Phillips, and Mr. Johnson on the afternoon of March 18 and again by the same persons except Mr. Allison on the morning of March 19.

The morning of March 19 a meeting was held with the JCS [4] at which General Bolte, General Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler were present for the JCS, and Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Ferguson, Mr. Phillips, and Mr. Johnson for State. A draft reply prepared by the Army, with some textual changes proposed by State, was thoroughly discussed and a final text agreed to by all present.[5] During the course of the discussion General Vandenberg asked Mr. Matthews whether he could confirm General Vandenberg's understanding that, at the meeting with the President on February 27 concerning the final US Government position on POWs, the President expressed the desire to re-examine the question prior to implementation of any plan for screening and segregation of POWs.[6] Admiral Fechteler somewhat more doubtfully and tentatively indicated that it was also his impression that this was the President's desire. Mr. Matthews, with confirmation by Mr. Johnson, indicated that this was not his understanding, it being clear at the meeting with the President that General Ridgway had asked for a final position on the POW question and that the decision was then being made by the President and confirmed by him through the approval of a telegram which was subsequently transmitted to General Ridgway the same day. However, Mr. Matthews stated that this should not preclude re-examination of the question by the President if such course appeared desirable.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.

[3] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

[4] Regarding this meeting, see the memorandum of Mar. 19, p. 99.

[5] See JCS telegram 904101, p. 104.

[6] See the memorandum of conversation, p. 68.

795.00/3-1952

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET PUSAN, March 19, 1952.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR ALEX: I am enclosing for your personal background information a memorandum prepared by Phil Manhard commenting on the problem of the Chinese POWs on Koje-do. A few days back, I arranged for him to give similar impressions to General Yount in my presence in even more detail than he has in the enclosed memorandum. General Yount also wants Phil to talk directly to General Dodd, now in overall command on the island.

General Yount appreciates that there are many unsatisfactory aspects to the situation on the island. He does not have full confidence in the trustees and interpreters who are the go-betweens for the Americans and the Chinese prisoners themselves. He is now studying measures that might be more effective in making American policy and aims better known directly to the prisoners so as to make it more difficult for the interpreters or trustees to distort or shade the UN Command position.

Sincerely, JOHN

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by P. W. Manhard of the Political Section of the Embassy to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET [PUSAN,] March 14, 1952.

The following comments are based on first-hand observation and knowledge gained incidental to interrogation work among Chinese POWs on Koje Island from July to December 1951 and during the last week of February 1952.

Chinese prisoners of war are controlled by a thin veneer of PW trustees not freely elected by the prisoners whom they control, but appointed by US Army camp authorities on the basis of ostensible anti-Communism. These trustees are mostly composed of two mutually antagonistic pro-Nationalist groups: (1) former CNA MP's mostly captured by the CCF on Hainan Island and in South China, and (2) company-grade officer graduates of CNA military academies, many of whom were demoted to enlisted status upon absorption into the CCF. A third group of trustees, members of a secret society formerly strong in Ssuchuan Province, have been dominated by the first two groups in the camp. Very few members of any of these cliques ever engaged in serious combat against Chinese Communist forces during the warfare in China.

These trustees exercise discriminatory control over food, clothing, fuel and access to medical treatment for the mass of Chinese prisoners. With encouragement from Formosan Chinese assigned to PW work by GHQ Tokyo, the trustees have for several months conducted a drive to collect petitions for transfer to Formosa. This propaganda drive is now reaching a climax with use of brutal force to obtain signatures. The trustees maintain control over the Chinese compounds by means of force and coercion. Beatings, torture and threats of punishment are frequently utilized to intimidate the majority of Chinese POWs. Trustees have openly announced to fellow prisoners, "It has been officially decided that all who wish to do so will be guaranteed an opportunity to go to Formosa—those who do not wish to fight Communism will remain in the POW camp indefinitely."

Recent, successful attempts to escape to other compounds by Chinese POWs reveal rising fear and alienation among ever larger numbers of Chinese prisoners from any possible pro-Nationalist attitude. If allowed freedom to choose a PW compound under the leadership of pro-Nationalists or pro-Communists, I believe many would flee their present compounds to pro-Communist ones in the hope of escaping intimidation and the denial of even minimum human freedoms by trustees whose behavior has commanded the respect of very few POWs.

Most of the prisoners believe that these trustees cannot remain in power without the support of the UN camp administrative authorities, and the mounting resentment among the Chinese POWs constitutes an increased threat to security within the UN POW camp.

This situation is vitiating efforts at reorientation of Chinese POWs, minimizing the appeal of the Chinese Nationalists, and playing into Communist hands by demonstrating an attempt at forced, coerced removal to Formosa in direct contradiction of the UNC stand at Panmunjom on voluntary repatriation of internees.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Message on Package Proposal to General Ridgway

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the Chiefs of Staff, General Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended, as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Bolté. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense, and Lay for the National Security Council. Altogether 17 persons were present. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.

(*Note:* Almost the entire meeting was devoted to a revision of an army draft message to General Ridgway[2] commenting on General Ridgway's reply[3] to the first Washington message[4] on a package proposal on outstanding issues. This summary of the meeting does not attempt to record most of the discussion at the meeting but attempts to set out the principal points of interest to State.)

General Vandenberg: When we had the meeting with the President it was my impression that he had a slight reservation in his mind on the POW issue. I felt that he wanted to consider this matter once more before finally going ahead with the segregation of prisoners who do not want to be returned.

Mr. Matthews: That was not my impression. I thought a final decision had been taken; in fact, I thought we had so stated in the outgoing message.

Mr. Johnson: That was also my impression.

General Vandenberg: We did put a statement to that effect in the outgoing message; however, Secretary Lovett has the same idea that I do. We both felt that there was a reservation.

Mr. Matthews: If there is any doublt about it, we can ask him.

Admiral Fechteler: I had the same impression as General Vandenberg.

Mr. Matthews: We took this matter up because General Ridgway had asked for a final and irrevocable position and because everyone thought he was entitled to such a position.

General Vandenberg: In my view the Administration, particularly Defense and State, are going to find themselves in the middle of a fine political situation. It is a situation in which we can't win. Regardless of what the opposition says we will be in a difficult position.

General Bolte: Is there not real doubt concerning the attitude which the U.S. public will take on this matter? No one knows which position they will most strongly support. Will they advocate leaving our boys in communist hands or will they want to insist on the principle of no involuntary repatriation? I think that is the question which the President is up against.

General Vandenberg: Secretary Lovett and I spoke to the Senators about this problem and told them of the decision that had been taken. We urged them to go ahead with the resolution on this matter. I think it is noteworthy that no resolution has been forthcoming. This may indicate that there is a shift in their thinking.

---

[2] The revised telegram under reference was sent as JCS 904101, Mar. 20, 1952, *infra.*

[3] The telegram under reference was C 65430 to JCS, Mar. 17, p. 95.

[4] The message referred to was JCS 903687 to Ridgway, Mar. 15, p. 89.

General Bolte: Of course that may be because the President has taken the initiative by making the decision. He has taken the ball and run with it and they may have lost interest for that reason.

Bacteriological Warfare

Mr. Matthews: I would like to raise one question with you regarding a message we have received from New Delhi relating to bacteriological warfare.[5] The Indian Ambassador in Peking has sent Nehru a message on this subject which Foreign Minister Bajpai has showed Ambassador Bowles. Among the points the message makes is that the Chinese Communists have specifically charged that on 6 March three U.S. planes dropped cannisters containing germ-laden flies on Tsingtao. The Chinese Communist Foreign Office states that these cannisters and their contents are now being scientifically studied in the Peking medical center. The Chinese Communists state that this is the first time U.S. planes have attacked China proper. They further state that similar cannisters have been picked up near Panmunjom and elsewhere in North Korea.

Mr. Johnson: The Chinese Communist radio has elaborated this theme. It has reported that a U.S. plane flew over Tsingtao and that all kinds of bugs were released—ants, beetles, flies, fleas, etc.

Mr. Matthews: Of course we know that no bugs were dropped but we wanted to be sure before replying to New Delhi that no U.S. planes were over Tsingtao on reconnaissance missions.

General Vandenberg: Certainly no such flights have been authorized. If you wish I can query to determine whether any flights were undertaken on local authority.

Mr. Matthews: Do they have local authority to make such flights?

General Vandenberg: They are doing some reconnaissance over Manchuria.

General Lee: [6] They have no authority locally to fly over the area you mentioned.

Mr. Johnson: It would be helpful if we could state categorically that no planes were over that area.

Admiral Fechteler: I think you should make such a categorical statement in any event.

General Vandenberg: If any were flying over they were only taking photographs. I doubt that there were any there.

Mr. Matthews: Is it your answer that there were no planes there?

---

[5] The reference was to telegram 3381, from New Delhi, Mar. 18, 1952, not printed. (611.0026/3-1852)

[6] Maj. Gen. Robert M. Lee was the Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, U.S. Air Force.

General Vandenberg: I recommend that you state categorically that none were there whether or not any were there. I do not think any were there.

Message on Package Proposal to Ridgway

The first point to be discussed was the section of the message querying General Ridgway about his proposal on POW's.

Mr. Johnson said that it was important to know whether General Ridgway thought that the list of 3100 U.S. POW's included all of the U.S. POW's alive and in communist hands. He thought that our decision on the POW issue would be affected if we thought that General Ridgway's proposal would really secure the return of all American POW's. It might be that we were not going to obtain the return of all American POW's in any event. He also thought we should obtain General Ridgway's view as to whether the communists would reclassify some of the ROK POW's.

Admiral Fechteler thought there was no point in querying General Ridgway on these matters because he couldn't possibly answer the questions.

Colonel Matthews pointed out that General Ridgway had stated that his plan would result in getting back all of the non-Korean POW's and most of the Korean POW's. That was the basic argument in support of General Ridgway's plan. Colonel Matthews stated that there was some doubt in Washington about this judgment. He therefore thought that General Ridgway ought to be queried on the point in order to determine whether or not he could back up his statement.

Admiral Fechteler thought that it was unnecessary to have a long explanation as to why we concurred in General Ridgway's desire not to meet with the top communist general. He suggested that we merely state that we deferred to his judgment. After some discussion this suggestion was accepted. In the course of this discussion Colonel Matthews stated that we in Washington were all becoming aware that a Congressional investigation of these matters might lie ahead and that General Ridgway was building up a terrific case for the record. He thought that if we merely deferred to General Ridgway's judgment on this point it would make the JCS look like a "bunch of stoops" since the JCS had advocated a top level meeting strongly in its outgoing message. Admiral Fechteler replied that this possibility had never entered his head and he didn't give a damn about it anyway.

The next point discussed concerned the advisability of a three part package as compared to a two part package. Admiral Fechteler was inclined to think that we should accept General Ridgway's view on the advantages of getting rid of the Soviet representation issue first, which would leave two issues outstanding. He took this view because he thought that General Ridgway was in a better position to judge the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches from the point of view of the negotiations.

Mr. Bohlen stated that General Ridgway probably was in the best position to judge the negotiating problem but pointed out that our recommendation rested on our view that it would be preferable from the point of view of world opinion to suspend negotiations with three issues outstanding than with two issues outstanding. He said that some doubt had already been cast on the firmness of our position with respect to airfields. Therefore, General Ridgway's proposal, if accepted, would focus world attention on the POW problem which, as everyone recognized, presented many difficulties from the point of view of world opinion.

Mr. Ferguson pointed out that General Ridgway did not understand Washington's position on Soviet representation and that there might be only two issues—airfields and POW's. Mr. Matthews said that General Ridgway had never told us why he thought we should not accept Russia under any circumstances on the inspection teams.

Admiral Fechteler asked whether we would still favor a three part package if it would be possible to dispose of the Soviet representation issue either by making them a member of the inspection commission or by rejecting them as a neutral. Mr. Matthews indicated that we still would favor a three part package because we felt that there were great advantages in having three outstanding issues, in order to avoid overemphasis on the POW problem. It was agreed that it was important to explain fully to General Ridgway why we favored a three part package and then to query him as to whether, in light of our explanation, he still favored disposing of the Soviet representation issue first.

Later in the meeting there was again a discussion of the POW matter. Admiral Fechteler asked the State representatives to explain once more why they favored a three part package. Mr. Bohlen stated that there was general agreement that the POW issue was a very tough issue for us to handle. We all felt that there would be a great uproar if this was the only issue preventing the conclusion of an armistice and the return of our own prisoners. If the negotiations were to collapse in any event, it would be advantageous for us to show that there were three good reasons why an armistice could not be concluded. It would be advantageous, in other words, that the communists were intransigent with respect to airfields and Russian representation as well as the POW's.

Admiral Fechteler said that a number of fellows in Tokyo and Korea felt that if Washington would only give up its altruistic concern for a lot of worthless Chinese there wouldn't be any problem about POW's. Mr. Bohlen took issue with Admiral Fechteler and stated that there was nothing altruistic about our position. We had attached great importance to the POW issue and the communists knew that it was repugnant to us to force the return of prisoners who did not want to return. If, having taken this strong position, we should now cave in on it it would be convincing to the Communists that in a pinch we will cave in on anything, even if it is of great importance. The communists and other totalitarians work on the basis of test, test, test, to find out how solid the opponent's position is. If we should now change our position we would greatly weaken ourselves vis-à-vis the communists. It would be interpreted as a real sign of Western weakness.

There was some discussion of General Ridgway's belief that the communist position on Soviet representation would definitively clarify whether or not the communists want an armistice. It was agreed by the conferees that an adamant communist stand on Soviet representation would probably show that the communists did not want an armistice; however, it was also agreed that a communist revision of their position on Soviet representation would not necessarily indicate, as General Ridgway thought, that the communists want an armistice—especially while other important issues remain open.

Mr. Bohlen, referring to the package problem, said that perhaps General Ridgway's objective was to obtain a deadlock on the Soviet representation issue alone. It was possible that General Ridgway felt that the communists were not going to budge on this one and that our position would be best if a deadlock arose on this issue before we ever got to the POW and airfields issues. At the same time Mr. Bohlen thought that we should not predicate our position on a break—rather we should take the point of view that if it becomes necessary to recognize that a total impasse has been reached, it would be desirable to break on three issues rather than one or two.

. . . .

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 20, 1952—2:18 a.m.

JCS 904101. From JCS.

1. Concur in your view that every effort should be made to determine whether our 2 objectives of obtaining prompt return UNC POWs and of avoiding forced repatriation can be attained by agreement with Commies prior to taking action directed in Para 1, JCS 902159.[2] Fur-

---

[1] This message was sent to the President in Key West as JCS 904095 on Mar. 19, 1952. On the assumption that it represented no change in previously approved policy and that the views therein expressed were subject to comments from Ridgway, Truman approved it; telegram from the U.S.S. *Williamsburg*, Naval Aide to President to Joint Chiefs of Staff, DA IN 118190, Mar. 19, 1952. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 27)

[2] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.

ther concur that action proposed in CX 65424[3] may offer some remote possibility of accomplishing this, and in any event, may serve as possible gauge of Commie reaction to action directed in JCS 902159. However, there is grave concern here over certain implications of your proposal on which we would like your addl comment prior to our making final decision.

2. We recognize that if Commies reject your proposal we have lost nothing. On other hand, if they accept, they could then have an agreed principle on which to base further reclassification and downward revision of lists of UNC POWs already furnished. That is, in spite of efforts made to avoid such result in proposed statement in Para 6 of CX 65424, UNC will have in effect agreed to Commie retaliation against UNC POWs, if such should take place, thereby seriously weakening our future position on this question. Thus, unless unmistakably clear that Commies, in accepting your proposal, will acquiesce to downward revision of our lists without similar action on their part, which would seem to be most unlikely, action proposed in CX 65424 may actually increase dangers of retaliation against UNC POWs. Of course, we recognize that if Commies do acquiesce to downward revision of our lists without similar action on their part, your proposal offers some advantages over action directed in JCS 902159; however, in this connection it should be noted that if Commies acquiesce in your proposal it appears likely that they would also acquiesce in action directed in JCS 902159 modified as proposed in JCS 903687.[4]

3. In addn to comments on foregoing, request your comments on folg specific questions raised by CX 65424:

A. Re second sentence Para 2. Do you now consider that list of 11559 POWs received from Commies includes all non-Korean personnel captured by Commies and now alive in their hands? Do you now consider that South Koreans included in list of 11559 POWs represent great majority of Koreans captured by Commies and now alive in their hands?

B. Re Para 4. Fully recognized here that no system of either covert or overt screening can be completely accurate and that some personnel will inevitably be classified incorrectly. We are prepared to accept this. Also recognize that circumstances existing in enclosures at moment of screening will inevitably influence choice of many individuals. However, consider that methods used should do all possible to minimize these factors and to distinguish to max practicable extent between those who would violently resist repatriation and those who would merely elect not to be repatriated if given completely free choice, with view of restricting those retained to former category. If you desire, we will make every effort to provide you with any technical assistance available to United States Govt in formulating polling methods to achieve these purposes.

---

[3] Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.

[4] Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.

4. Re Part 1 C 65430.[5]

A. As indicated above we concur fully that UNC should exhaust every reasonable possibility of obtaining Commie agreement to an exchange that will not involve forced repatriation and at same time not unduly jeopardize prompt return of UNC POWs, and we are prepared to give full consideration to any proposals you may have in this regard. It would appear from here that efforts to obtain Commie agreement on POWs can be taken within the broad terms of approach outlined in JCS 903687. It was not intent of this proposed approach to rule out any further efforts to obtain such an agreement by other tactics if this appeared possible. However, JCS 903687 was based on impression created here by your HNC 1033 [6] that further negot by subdels under then existing conditions was intolerable and that only by convincing Commies of our determination to stand inflexibly on minimum positions on the 3 major issues could we hope to make any progress toward an acceptable armistice. If you now feel that there is possibility of progress without adopting inflexible final positions we have no objection to your making further efforts in that direction, bearing in mind considerations set forth in Para 2 above.

B. If Commie position on forced repatriation is in fact unalterable it would not appear that any course of action can be devised that could result in successful conclusion of armistice based upon our minimum positions on outstanding issues. If, however, Commie position is not entirely unalterable, tactics outlined JCS 903687 would seem to offer best chance of success as they would permit Commies to interpret UNC position on airfields as clear concession and UNC position on inspection organ as reasonable compromise, while not requiring Commies agree to principle of voluntary or non-forcible repatriation. Also, our determination on issue of forcible repatriation of POWs would have been unmistakably demonstrated to Commies by prior screening and classification of POWs held by UNC. Also, if Commies are willing to agree to armistice on basis our minimum positions, proposal outlined JCS 903687 would appear offer best possibilities for expediting negots and thereby hastening return of UNC POWs held by Commies. If Commies are not willing to agree to armistice on basis our minimum positions, tactics proposed JCS 903687 would not in themselves appear to increase hazards to UNC POWs held by Commies. However, if you feel that there are clear advantages in making known to Commies our intent reclassify and segregate POWs who would violently object to repatriation prior to or at time action is taken we have no objection.

5. Re Part 2 C 65430.

A. We defer to your judgment.

B. Re Paras B and C. There appears to be misunderstanding with regard to irrevocable stand authorized you on Soviet issue. The irrevocable position authorized you in Para 1 JCS 902160 [7] referred to unacceptability of USSR as a mbr of a neutral supervisory commission. As indicated in Para 2 C 65430 we saw no objection to Soviet mbrship on a supervisory commission which was not designated as neutral. Our views on this question are further amplified in Para 2 D (1) (B) (*1*) JCS 903687. Considered here there would be definite advantages to having Soviet Union publicly associated with and forming part of armistice mechanism in position clearly identifying Soviets with Commie aggressors. While difficulties arising from presence Soviets in ROK full realized, it is not considered these should be markedly more serious than presence of satellite ofcrs among whom in any event at least some Soviet Natls will probably be included. Such difficulties should be more than offset by advantage of presence of United States personnel on inspection teams in NK in event Commies accept this alternative. Considered here any of three alternatives set forth Para 2 D (1) (B) JCS 903687 is acceptable and that our general position is much stronger if we put forward these three constructive alternatives for solving this issue rather than remain in an essentially negative position of simply opposing Soviet Union as a "neutral". In view of above do you still believe it would be desirable to try to dispose of Soviet participation question prior to presentation of final positions on airfields and POWs?

---

[5] Dated Mar. 17, p. 95.

[6] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

[7] Dated Feb. 27, p. 71.

6. If it becomes necessary to recognize that total impasse has been reached it would be to our advantage that Commies be forced to reject our proposals on several grounds and thereby emphasize their intransigence. For this reason we favor the package deal. We believe that proposed package deal does not increase danger of providing a new point of departure for negots beyond that which already is inherent in situation. For instance, if issue of USSR on inspection teams is disposed of, leaving only exchange of prisoners and airfields, and it becomes necessary at some point to propose compromise now contained in package deal on these points, this would offer as much of a point of departure as package deal itself. It would seem necessary to us in either case to insist that offer should be accepted or rejected as whole. If it is rejected, then it would be possible to recess daily mtgs until Commies wished to reconsider their rejection or have further proposals for final settlement. The package deal seems to us to have advantage of having such recess occur with 3 items open rather than merely the 1 issue of POWs.

7. Re Part 3 Para B, C 65430. It is possible we do not understand clearly your apparent view that final Commie position on Soviet issue will indicate whether Commies desire an armistice. It is view here that adamant Commie insistence on Soviet participation as neutral probably indicates they do not desire an armistice. On other hand, Commie recession on this issue does not necessarily indicate desire for an armistice so long as other issues, particularly POWs, remain unsolved.

8. Your further views are requested re JCS 903687 as amplified in foregoing pd [paragraph?].

795.00/3-2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, March 20, 1952—5:53 p. m.

CX 65592. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. Fol msg received from CINCUNC Adv on 20 March 52 is quoted for your info, without any evaluation here, and without altering in any way the recommendations contained in CX 65424 and CX [*C*] 65430: [1] "This msg in 2 parts.

"*Part 1.*

"Para 1. For past several days Communist correspondents at Panmunjom have been casually vague but persistently optimistic over early settlement of remaining issues of armistice. They have also dropped frequent veiled hints to UNC newsmen that 'secret discussion' might be one way of resolving current problems.

"2. On an individual basis responsible UNC correspondents have attempted to firm up Commie hints with some degree of success. Fol is a reasonably complete compilation made by UNC Adv as result of conversations with above mentioned UNC correspondents:

> "A. Communist correspondents feel item 3 as good as settled but won't say so specifically. Communists give impression they are prepared to yield on nomination of Soviet Union at appropriate time, or alternatively, USSR will ask that her name be withdrawn. No mention made or hints given on airfield rehabilitation issue. Three to 4 weeks is time period most frequently mentioned for complete armistice.
>
> "B. Communist correspondents are more specific on item 4, and indicate March 5 proposal means they are willing to forget about 44,000 names they have submitted to UNC if UNC forgets about 53,000 figure mentioned frequently by UNC.
>
> "C. They also hint they would be agreeable to having Staff Officers work out new prisoner of war list from which would be eliminated all those not desiring repatriation. One Red correspondent says new lists should total same figure as Dec 18 list, and he hints the deletions presumably would be made up for by inclusion of similar number of names of prisoners taken since that time. They appear to be highly sensitive to idea of NK or Chinese PW publicity denouncing Communism at exchange point as we have suggested in our voluntary repatriation concept and will do much to avoid this possibility. They also appear to recognize as a practical fact that there are PWs in UNC camps who will resist repatriation, violently if necessary.
>
> "D. The Communist newsmen's tentative exploration on 'secret discussions' could be a sounding out of UNC correspondents to attempt to determine feelings of UNC Press on accepting this possible restriction on the hitherto free flow of news.

---

[1] Both dated Mar. 17, pp. 91 and 95.

"*Part 2.*

"1. The preceding information indicates that at the proper time the solution of remaining issues might be facilitated by maintaining secrecy of subject matter of truce discussions for a limited period. A change from the current press policy is an obstacle which is not considered serious if tactfully handled. It is believed it could be handled by a tacit understanding on temporary press policy by the Communists and the UNC delegation and possibly a carefully worded statement of policy to the correspondents.

"2. Although UNC correspondents here represent working level press rather than executives and policy makers who are in Tokyo and/ or Zone of Interior, feeling at press train is that a postponement in the flow of detailed daily info would be completely acceptable if by so doing an armistice could be hastened. In fact, they are incorrectly but quietly speculating amongst themselves that the absence of any hard news on PW staff discussions during past 3 days means that 'secret talks' are already under way. Furthermore, they are accepting their inaccurate assumption with good grace. Signed Harrison."

Part 2. In view of the fact that disclosures of above information would probably prevent success of the plan, it is mandatory that every possible security precaution be taken to prevent leakage.

795.00/3-2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, March 20, 1952—11:13 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 65650. Para 8 requires immediate consideration.

Comparison of JCS 904101 with CX 65424 and C 65430 [2] reveals differences in understanding rather than disagreements in principle. With this in mind I make the following comments:

1. *Re para 2:* There is no intent to accept any substantial downward revision of numbers of UNC POWs already furnished by Communists. It would be made very clear to them that the agreement to exchange POWs is contingent upon acceptance by each side of the revised lists of POWs to be exchanged. This agreement to revise the lists and the checking of the revised lists before accepting them as the bases for exchange is a safeguard which would eliminate the chance of Communists retaliation against UNC POWs, whereas implementation of plan set forth in JCS 902159 [3] provides no guarantee whatever and would leave our POWs at the mercy of the Communists. The UNC Delegation feels

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

[2] For text of JCS 904101, Mar. 20, see p. 104; both other telegrams are dated Mar. 17, pp. 91 and 95.

[3] Dated Feb. 27, p. 70.

that Communists might agree to an exchange based on revised lists, but would never accept a *fait accompli.* The basic difference in plans (JCS 902159 and CX 65424) is one of approach.

2. *Re Para 3A:* It is possible that there are a small number of non-Korean POWs alive in Communist hands who have not been reported on the Communists list. We also believe there are a considerable number of South Korean POWs in Communist hands who are not included on POW list, most of whom have been incorporated into the North Korean Army. We believe that the list of 11,559 is all the POWs which the Communists will ever admit are in their hands. We know of no procedure or plan yet conceived which would increase the number to be exchanged. The foregoing of course excludes POWs captured subsequent to 18 December.

3. *Re Para 3B:* It is felt here that no screening either covert or overt can be undertaken without such action becoming quickly known to the Communists. We therefore feel it essential, in order to avoid jeopardy to our own POWs, to seek Communist agreement to plan proposed in CX 65424 which would necessarily include screening of the POWs we hold. We are giving detailed study to the method of screening prisoners of war so as to insure, insofar as practicable, the selection out of only those who would oppose violently return to Communist control. If our detailed plans reveal a need for technical assistance we will make our requirements known to you. The offer contained in JCS 904101 is greatly appreciated.

4. *Re Para 4B:*

A. The whole basis under the plan (CX 65424) is to obtain prior agreement with the Communists to elimination of forced return of POWs without thereby jeopardizing our own POWs. This appears to us to be the course of action which would expose our POWs to the least possible chance of retaliation. It would avoid a unilateral and covert reclassification made without prior agreement with or notice to the Communists and would likewise avoid forcing the Communists publicly to agree to voluntary repatriation.

B. Only by allaying any possible Communist suspicion that the UNC is adopting under-handed and unilateral methods, can we protect ourselves against their taking retaliatory measures against UNC POWs in their hands. The UNC Delegation has found by experience that the Communists are extremely sensitive toward any proposal or action on our part which is unilateral or arbitrary. They insist on bilateral agreement on even unimportant matters. We feel strongly that arbitrary action by us on such a vital issue as this would be a grave mistake.

5. *Re Para 5B:*

A. Essentially I object, both ideologically and practically, to the acceptance of the USSR as a member of a supervisory organ under any circumstances. From a practical viewpoint acceptance of Soviets in a privileged status in our rear areas presents an intolerable problem of control. In essence, the admission of Soviet personnel to membership in any organ created by the Armistice Agreement confers upon them a measure of authority unaccompanied by any restraining responsibility. I cannot agree with the thesis that this membership would identify the Soviet Union with the Communist aggressors. Neither do I agree that Soviet membership would be no worse than Czech or Polish membership. We are already committed to accept the latter. We are totally uncommitted to accept the Soviet Union.

B. I feel we should never concede on this point and believe there is an excellent possibility the Communists will concede subsequent to the action recommended in my HNC 1033,[4] which I strongly reaffirm.

6. *Re Para 6:* In the last analysis it may become necessary to resort to a "package" proposal involving unresolved major issues. However, the probability of acceptance of a package is enhanced by any reduction of the number of issues involved, particularly if the concessions involved in acceptance are more equalized. Consequently, we are seeking the resolution of as many issues as practical and possible prior to presentation of the "package" draft of the Armistice Agreement. Based on experience the UNC Delegation feels this approach is that most favorable to eventual attainment of an armistice.

7. *Re Para 7:* I consider that at this stage in negotiations, the resolution of the Russian issue as well as any other major issue involving Communist concession would be an additional indication of a desire to attain an armistice and a step towards its attainment. It must be fully realized, however, that the Communists possess the capability of introducing at any time additional issues and then of magnifying them to major proportions.

8. The virtual standstill in discussions on Agenda Item 4 dictates urgent action. Accordingly, I plan to present to the Communists at Staff Officer level, at the meeting scheduled for 1100I March 23, the proposal outlined in CX 65424. I interpret the final sentence of your Para 4A JCS 90401 [*904101*] as authority for this action. Does this interpretation reflect your view? [5]

9. The view contained in this and referenced messages are the result of the full collaboration of the UNC Senior Delegate and key US members of the Delegation and represent unanimity of opinion.

---

[4] Dated Mar. 11, p. 80.

[5] The President was favorably impressed with Ridgway's views in paragraph 5 of this telegram and approved the proposal in paragraph 8; telegram, Naval Aide to the President to JCS, DA IN 118977, Mar. 21, 1952. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 37)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 21, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

General Collins stated that the Joint Chiefs had a draft reply [2] to General Ridgway's cable [3] which they would like to discuss with the State Department representatives. (They provided copies of the draft cable for discussion. The draft cable authorized General Ridgway to proceed to discuss with the Communists the possibility of exchange of revised lists of POW's.)

Mr. Johnson stated that in general he believed the State Department position was not far apart from that of the Joint Chiefs. He thought the answer to General Ridgway should be considered in the light of the hints that the Communist correspondents had been dropping at Panmunjom and also in the light of the minutes of the last meeting at Panmunjom. The Communists seemed to be trying to say something to us. It is possible that what they were trying to say was that they couldn't agree to the principle of no forcible repatriation but that if they could get something in the order of 132,000 prisoners and if there were no further talk about principles involved, some sort of arrangement might be possible. The Communists probably might not be willing to make a clear cut agreement to accept lists of prisoners which were revised explicitly in accordance with the principle of voluntary repatriation. They might, however, agree to some sort of an approach in which we stated to them they must realize we had a problem in that we have some people who just wouldn't go back, that we had some people who would go back who were not on our present lists, and that a revision of the Prisoner of War list, which added up to approximately the same numbers as were now involved, might be a useful thing to do.

General Vandenberg thought that General Ridgway was making two particular points. First, that if segregation were postponed until the question had been discussed with the Communists, there was no reason why in case of Communist rejection the UN could not proceed later with unilateral reclassification. Second, that if we would proceed now with unilateral reclassification, we might endanger UN prisoners who were in Communist hands.

---

[1] A note on the title page of the source text read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of the participants."

Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Allison, Ferguson, Johnson, and Stelle attended for the Department of State. These seven men were the only participants. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.

[2] This draft was sent out in final form as JCS 904385 to Ridgway. For the text, see p. 116.

[3] *Supra.*

Mr. Johnson stated that in general the State Department was in agreement with this point of view. However, the State Department was worried about giving General Ridgway authority to make the specific statement which he had proposed in his earlier telegram.[4] This statement seemed to be too precise and almost too cut and dry. Because of the Communist hints that they might settle on a basis of approximate numbers without any agreement as to principle, it might be useful to use somewhat more finesse in exploring enemy intentions.

General Collins asked whether we could arrive at a figure of 132,000 prisoners after screening out those who would forcibly resist repatriation.

Mr. Johnson thought it might be possible.

General Vandenberg queried the possibility on grounds of General Ridgway's estimate that about 70,000 [5] people did not want to go back.

Mr. Johnson stated that the staff study [6] which had been prepared in Tokyo for General Hull and himself had arrived at a figure of between 3,000 and 4,000 Koreans and 11,000 Chinese who would not want to be repatriated. He personally, although he was obviously in no position to question the estimates, felt that the Chinese figure might be high. We had added possibly 500 prisoners since the lists were exchanged and there might also be a possibility of making some substitution from the approximately 7,500 civilian North Koreans who want to be repatriated.

General Collins pointed out that the possibility of substituting either civilians or recently captured prisoners had not been presented to General Ridgway. He felt that General Ridgway should have an opportunity to comment on such a possibility before anything in the nature of instructions along these lines were sent to him.

Mr. Ferguson stated that the point really was not to make any promise to the Communists of meeting a given figure of POW's, but to find a way to probe Communist intentions in the light of their recent hints without presenting them with a proposition which they would be called upon either to accept or to reject.

General Vandenberg interpreted General Ridgway's earlier telegram as indicating his intention to probe Communist intentions.

General Collins felt that the State Department had reason to be concerned over the way this probing was carried out. He suggested that it might be useful to explore the possibility of holding confidential discussions with the Communists on the POW issue, and thought that Mr. Ferguson's language of probing Communist intentions without presenting a specific proposition for acceptance or rejection might well be used in a message to General Ridgway. (It was agreed that Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews would draft a message[7] along these lines for circulation early in the afternoon of the same day.)

---

[4] The telegram under reference was CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, Mar. 17, p. 91.

[5] For Ridgway's estimate, see telegram CX 65424, *ibid.*

[6] See footnote 4, p. 78.

. . . .

---

[7] In final form this draft was transmitted as JCS 904385 to Ridgway. For the text, see p. 116.

795B.11/3-2752

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PUSAN, March 21, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your good letter of March 4, 1952[2] was handed to me personally by Amb Muccio and I am exceedingly sorry to realize how I have caused you so much concern by my open statement re the cease-fire negotiations. I need not remind you that it is you who have saved us by your momentous decision to defend Korea against aggression and that we owe you our very lives. My people have been given at least, a fighting chance. Not only Koreans will remember you with deepest gratitude but all the peoples of the free world will always acclaim you as the greatest leader in world history in the cause of human freedom and security. Indeed I am the last person to raise voice against any change you may deem necessary to pursue in your efforts to settle the Communist problem in Korea as well as in the entire world.

Mr. President, allow me to express frankly what I have had in mind for some time past. Please accept this as a sincere personal conviction of one of your grateful admirers, whose only desire is to see you succeed in completing the greatest service you undertook to render to all humanity by checking the expansion of Communism. You will remember how spontaneously the entire free world responded to your call for a joint action against the Communist aggression in Korea and against the possibility of another world war. The cease-fire talks have, however, dampened the morale and high spirit you so inspiringly and effectively aroused among all free men everywhere, besides allowing the Communists to build up to dangerous proportions. I always believed in a strong American leadership in the Orient and I was strengthening the

---

[1] This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 937 from Pusan, Mar. 27. The original letter, dated Mar. 21 but handed by President Rhee to Muccio on Mar. 27, was pouched to the Department.

[2] *Ante*, p. 74.

American hand against the middle ground groups in the United Nations. I counted upon a final positive direction coming from the United States at the last moment. Now I simply cannot persuade myself to believe that it is your own opinion and conviction that this change is a right course to follow.

If it is truly your personal conviction that armistice of some kind must be agreed upon and if you want my cooperation in it, there is no question of my doing my best to rise to your expectation, even if I have to do so against my own judgment. But my personal cooperation wld not mean much unless I won a solid support from my people. It is my deep belief, therefore, that my collaboration with you in this matter wld be more effective and more heartily embraced by my people, if the following suggestions could receive your favorable consideration.

(1) A mutual security pact between our two nations, I sincerely believe, is an essential thing. Since your desire has been, as we all know, to defend Korea against Red aggression, there can be no reason for objecting to such a pact which alone wld give the Korean people the supporting assurance they would badly need during a hazardous armistice. With a mutual security pact backing me, I am sure Mr. President, I can succeed in persuading my people to accept an armistice. The absence of any pact of reassuring nature, on the other hand, wld dangerously accentuate the prevalent dread that Korea will be abandoned, if the worst comes to the worst. In that case, the Koreans wld rather fight to death.

Among various current reports, some of which I expect to turn out as groundless rumors: There is a persistent story that certain high US authorities are of the opinion that Koreans cannot defend their country without aid from their neighbors and that the neighbor that would help them is Japan. Should this rumored idea be translated into policy, the Communist cause wld be boosted as being patriotic, native forces fighting Communism utterly demoralized. From bitter past experiences, many non-Communist Koreans wld be forced to hug Communism as preferable to Japanese domination.

(2) The ROK army expansion program should be speeded up, I believe. The Communists keep building up their fighting forces wherever possible and by all available means. We cannot afford to lag behind the Communist tempo in building up our own defences. The dependability and fighting capability of Korean boys have been amply proved in the present conflict in Korea. I willingly place the Korean manpower at the disposal of the free world. If you could commission proper authorities to train, equip and arm an adequate number of Koreans, part of whom wld serve as UN police force anywhere in the world, if so required, it wld be a wise plan for world security, apart from the security of Korea. I very much wish your govt explicitly to commit itself to a definite well-worked-out program for expanding ROK army. I do not doubt that my people thus assured of their national safety, will be more readily persuaded to cooperate with you in the matter of armistice.

Let me say a few more words to assure you that this nation is one in perfect unity, so far as our struggle against Communism is concerned, which assurance you seem to like to have, as a certain passage in your letter indicates. There is nothing that will shake this national unity. It is true that we have political controversies from time to time. But it is a distortion to represent these controversies as disunity. As a matter of fact, controversies are inalienable from free discussion, just as free discussion is inalienable from democracy. Stamp out controversies and we shall stamp out democracy.

Recently, an amendment of the Constitution was proposed to the effect that the President be elected by popular vote instead of the Assembly vote, as provided for in the present Constitution, and that the National Assembly be made bicameral.[2] The proposal was made with a view to broadening as well as perpetuating the basis of the republican form of govt. The developments around this problem of constitutional amendment have been misrepresented as something threatening the national unity. But, I assure you, Mr. President, that they do not affect unity, so long as they take place in the free atmosphere of open discussion. It is my faith that the will of the people will be the ultimate arbiter of all political matters.

With sincere wishes and prayers for your good health and success.

Yours cordially, SYNGMAN RHEE

---

[2] This amendment to the Republic of Korea's constitution was the focal point of conflict between President Rhee and his opponents in the National Assembly. In an effort to assure his own reelection, Rhee attempted to force the amendment through the Assembly with the required two-thirds majority. Failing this, Rhee tried to go over the heads of the Assembly members by suggesting that the issue be settled by popular referendum. The National Assembly members countered with an amendment of their own calling for a parliamentary system with the cabinet responsible to the Assembly rather than the President. For more details on this constitutional crisis, see UN document A/2187, pp. 5–6.

795.00/3–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 22, 1952—1:15 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 904385. From JCS. Re para 8 your C 65650.[2]

1. As indicated in JCS 904101 [3] we have no objection to your making further efforts to obtain agreement with Communist on an acceptable basis for POW exchange. Communist statements in staff ofcr mtgs of past 2 days coupled with impressions contained in your CX 65592 [4] would seem to indicate definite possibilities in this regard. We feel that Communist position should be explored as carefully and thor-

---

[1] This telegram was approved by President Truman; telegram from the U.S.S. *Williamsburg*, Naval Aide to the President to JCS, DA IN 119063, Mar. 22. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 41)

[2] Dated Mar. 20, p. 109.

[3] Dated Mar. 20, p. 104.

[4] Dated Mar. 20, p. 108.

oughly as possible. We suggest that this might best be accomplished, at least initially, through a more informal and flexible approach than that embodied in para 6 CX 65424.[5] In this connection we consider private mtgs would offer definite advantages and should be used if practicable. In any event we suggest that timing of issuance of formal specific proposal contained in CX 65424, which Communists might consider must be either accepted or rejected, might well be held in abeyance pending further informal exploratory negots. Such exploratory negots might indicate desirability of modifying proposed formal proposal or might even remove need for such proposal. Therefore, final sentence of para 4A JCS 904101 should not be interpreted as approval for presentation of proposal along lines set forth in para 6 CX 65424 until from further exploration of Communist position it is clear to you that presentation of such proposal would offer definite possibilities for settlement of agenda item 4 without dangers set forth in para 2 JCS 904101.

2. Pending outcome of above approach, final decision on your other recommendations outstanding as well as approach outlined in JCS 903687 [6] is withheld.

---

[5] Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.

[6] Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.

795.00/3-2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, March 24, 1952—11:05 a. m.

C 65765. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 1082.

"Ref C 65730.[2]

"1. In view of recent developments at Pan Mun Jom,[3] the statement outlined in CX 65424 [4] is obsolete. The Communists have made their position as clear as they are likely to unless and until UNC indicates a willingness to talk in concrete and specific terms. It is vital that we take advantage of Communists present apparent willingness to make a deal and evident to delegation that further indefinite and vague 'exploration' can serve no purpose. Requisite degree of informality is in our view implicit in the fact that staffs rather than sub-delegations are conducting discussions, and that starting tomorrow these will likely be executive sessions. The stage is set for getting right down to cases. We are convinced that this should be done now. Communists made us a proposal on 21 March.[5] Experience has proved that the best way to progress is to submit them a counter-proposal or a revision of their proposal.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

[2] The source text indicated that this telegram could not be identified; it has not been found by the editors.

[3] In the Staff Officers meetings on item 4, there were signs that the Communist Delegation was altering its position and the UNC Delegation discerned hints that the Communists wanted executive sessions so that free discussion could ensue; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 168.

[4] Dated Mar. 17, p. 91.

"2. To this end, and in consonance with JCS 904385,[6] we propose to proceed along the following lines at staff officers meeting 241100I March.

"A. Give a statement, couched generally as follows: Careful consideration has been given to the discussions of the past several days and particularly to the proposal of March 21 and to the further exposition made of it on March 22. These have encouraged hope that a solution acceptable to both sides is not beyond the realm of possibility.

"The proposal of 21 March with proper adjustments might well constitute a suitable basis for such a solution. Obviously, however, neither side can agree to a proposal without a thorough understanding of its contents and of its implications with respect to its minimum objectives. Consequently, agreement in principle must follow rather than precede a general understanding on the details of the proposal. Our side is interested only in the end result and in the welfare of the POWs. This need not be inconsistent with the result to be obtained through application of the principle of repatriating all the POWs in the custody of both sides at the time of signing of the armistice agreement.

"We seek to insure the return to our side of all the captured persons of our side and to insure the return to you of all captured personnel held by us except those released because they originally resided in the area of our side or because they are subject to a special situation such as you referred to on March 22.

"In this connection the figure 132,474 set forth in your principle of the 21 does not fully reflect all pertinent factors. This figure included approximately 16,000 persons who are residents of the area of our side. Therefore it should be reduced by this number. Some additional adjustment might be needed to accommodate POWs released because they are subject to a particular situation. What, if any, such additional adjustment might be we cannot estimate. However, our side will make every effort to insure that any such additional adjustments will be reasonable. Such an indefinite answer may not be satisfactory to you as a basis for an agreement. If an accurate estimate would be helpful we are willing to suspend discussion of the March 21 proposal until such time as it can be prepared.

"Once the numerical adjustments are agreed to, it would be desirable to revise the lists of POWs previously submitted to reflect such adjustments, as well as deaths, escapees, and so forth. On the basis of these revised lists there should be no trouble in agreeing upon a principle of repatriating all POWs in the custody of each side, when the armistice agreement is signed. We are prepared to submit a revision of the 21 March proposal which should be acceptable to both sides. Agreement to this proposal would be contingent upon the acceptability of the revised lists to both sides.

---

[5] On Mar. 21, the Communists offered their "provision in principle" based on their proposal of Mar. 5 that the POW question be settled on the basis of the lists exchanged on Dec. 18, 1951. This "provision of principle" called for release and repatriation of the 11,559 prisoners in the Communists' custody in exchange for release and repatriation of the 132,474 prisoners held by the UNC and for a final check of the lists of POWs by the staff officers of both sides. On the next day, the Communists asserted that some "adjustments" to the numbers of POWs might be necessary. A record of the submission of the proposal of Mar. 21 can be found in telegram C 65665, Ridgway to JCS, Mar. 21, 1952 in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 36. For a general discussion of the significance of the proposal and the "adjustment" statement, see Vatcher, *Panmunjom*, pp. 140–141.

[6] *Supra.*

"B. If Communist reaction to foregoing is favorable, submit to Communists at appropriate time the following revision of their 21 March proposal:

"The Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers on the one hand and the United Nations Command on the other shall release and repatriate all prisoners of war held in custody at the time the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected on the basis of lists which shall be checked by staff officers of both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement."

"3. In summary, we are convinced that only by being specific to this limited degree can any progress be made. Even if Communists reject our ideas we have lost nothing; and if they accept them we shall have gained much. On the other hand, further temporizing can serve no purpose, confuses the issue, and may result in loss of favorable opportunity to settle this issue.

"4. Request any additional instructions you deem necessary prior to 240800I March if possible. This is last message for item 4 for 23 March. Signed Joy."

795.00/3-2452: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation at Panmunjom (Joy)

TOP SECRET TOKYO, March 24, 1952—11:55 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 65762. Re HNC 1082.[1] Concur in your proposed action except as indicated below:

1. Change your para 2A as follows:

a. In fourth subpara delete the last 2 sentences which read "Such an indefinite answer may not be satisfactory to you as a basis for an agreement. If an accurate estimate would be helpful we are willing to suspend discussion of the 21 March proposal until such time as it can be prepared."

b. In fifth subpara delete the next to last sentence which reads "We are prepared to submit a revision of the 21 March proposal which should be acceptable to both sides."

c. In fifth subpara change the words "When the armistice agreement is signed" to read "At the time the armistice agreement is signed".

---

[1] *Supra.*

d. The deleted portions of your para 2A should be replaced by appropriate questions to determine whether the Communists agree with the approach of adjusting the basic UNC list of Communist POWs.

2. No accurate estimate should be offered to the Communists at this time. Considered here that no reasonable estimate can be made by UNC without actually screening and segregating POWs concerned. If the Communists ask for an estimate or if agreement cannot be reached without furnishing the Communists an accurate estimate, appropriate recommendations will be made to JCS from here.

3. The proposal contained in your para 2B should be held in abeyance until reaction of the Communists to above approach is determined. Before the proposal is made the last sentence should be changed to read as follows: "The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected on the basis of lists which shall be checked by, and be mutually acceptable to, both sides prior to the signing of the armistice agreement."

4. The Communists should also be informed that revisions in existing lists will be determined discreetly and without publicity.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley asked whether in the view of the State Department it would be helpful or hurtful for the Air Force to strike at power plants in North Korea—not the plants on the Yalu but plants as close as ten miles to the Yalu. Some of these plants supply power to the Soviet Union. The Air Force has not been hitting these plants for some time.

Mr. Matthews stated that the Department of State had never objected to the bombing of power plants. Mr. Bohlen thought that it might be actually helpful as a means of expediting the negotiations. He emphasized the importance of not straying over the frontiers, particularly in Northeast Korea.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Matthews headed the Department of State participants. Nash attended for the Department of Defense, and Lay represented the National Security Council. In all, 19 persons attended.

Korea did not form a substantial part of the discussion. The other topics dealt with were Japan, Southeast Asia, and Trieste.

There was some discussion of the question whether Russians are flying MIG's in North Korea. General Vandenberg said that no Russian pilots had been captured but that the pilots were speaking Russian on their intercoms.

Mr. Matthews said that he had noticed with some concern that the Soviet Union was building up a good North Korean air force. It was his impression that we were not doing this in South Korea. He thought this might have some serious implications for the future.

General Vandenberg said that it was a long process to build up an air force and that the Russians had probably been working at it for several years. Mr. Bohlen said that he had noticed a pattern of some interest. Apparently the Soviet Union has concentrated its energy and resources on the training and supplying of North Koreans rather than Chinese Communists. He thought that this allocation of effort was continuing and found some confirmation of this in the fact that we were beginning to see North Korean air divisions. General Vandenberg thought that if we knew the facts we would probably find that Chinese Communists, Russians and Germans were all included in the North Korean air force. He thought that it was impossible to get as many good pilots as were obviously available from North Korea alone. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that there were many Soviet Koreans who had served in the Soviet Army during World War II. Some of these might be employed.

. . . .

795B.5 MSP/3-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Austria [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 28, 1952—8:11 p. m.

2450. For: Clarence Meyer, Chief of Mission, MSA. Draft terms of reference for Special Presidential Mission to Korea [2] as follows:

Verbatim text. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Chief of the Unified Command Mission to the Republic of Korea. Subject: Terms of Reference for the Unified Command Mission to the Republic of Korea.

I refer to your recent acceptance of an assignment to head a Special Presidential Mission to negotiate financial, economic, and other appropriate agreements between the Unified Command* and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

---

[1] This telegram was drafted and cleared by members of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] On Mar. 10 and 12, Ridgway and Muccio requested that a high-level mission be sent from Washington to settle the outstanding problems of economic and financial relations between the UNC and the ROK. Meyer was chosen to head the mission; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 219.

The President has authorized me to act for him in arranging for designation of other members of your mission, developing the position of the Unified Command on the various matters which will be handled by your mission, and supervising your negotiations with the ROK. Accordingly, it is requested that you keep the Department of State continuously informed of the activities of your mission and that all communications from your mission to the Unified Command be addressed to the Department of State.

By mutual agreement among the various interested agencies of the Unified Command your mission will include the following representation:

Special financial and economic representative of the Secretary of Defense, with personal rank of Minister.
Senior military representative of the Department of Defense.
Appropriate representatives of the Department of the Army Staff.
Representatives of other Unified Command agencies as considered necessary.

It is the general purpose of your mission to obtain ROK agreement on appropriate joint or unilateral measures to facilitate military operations of the United Nations Command in Korea and to support United Nations and United States aims in Korea, including the continued development of an enduring friendship between the people of Korea and those members of the United Nations represented in the Unified Command.

In accomplishing the general purpose of your mission and the specific objectives outlined above, you are authorized broad discretion to discuss with the ROK any issues directly affecting the mission of the Unified Command. However, if other issues should be raised by the ROK, you should explain that such issues are not within the scope of your authority since you are representing the Unified Command.

In return for satisfactory financial, economic, and aid agreements with the ROK and demonstration of reasonable ROK efforts to achieve financial and economic stability, you may make the following commitments regarding reimbursement of the ROK for advances of Korean currency to the United States:

a. Prompt settlement (at the rate of exchange at which sold) for all advances of Korean currency which has been sold or may be sold in the future to personnel of United States forces for their personal use in the Korean economy;

---

*For technical reasons it may be necessary that some of these agreements be negotiated on behalf of the United States, rather than the Unified Command. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. Prompt settlement (at whatever you may consider a realistic rate of exchange—substantially in excess of 6000 to 1) for Korean currency which has been advanced for bona fide military requirements of United States Forces subsequent to 31 Dec 1951. (You are not authorized at this time to commit the United States regarding the time of settlement for advances of Korean currency made to United States forces for official expenditures prior to 31 Dec 1951.)

c. Subsequent monthly settlements (at a rate of exchange determined by the United States to be realistic in consideration of Korean economic factors, such as price levels, wage rates, etc.) of Korean currency advanced for (1) sale to personnel of the United States forces and (2) bona fide military requirements of United States forces. Such settlements to be made within sixty days after the month in which Korean currency was advanced, contingent on continuation of reasonable ROK efforts to achieve economic and financial stability;

d. Settlements will be made in dollars unless it may appear more appropriate at the time of such settlement, after consultation with the ROK, to make payment in kind.

The announced aim of the United Nations, as expressed in the June 27, 1950 Resolution of the Security Council, is to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The current general objectives of the United States in this regard are to:

a. Seek through appropriate United Nations machinery, a settlement of the Korean conflict acceptable to United States security interests;

b. Develop and equip the armed forces of the ROK so that they may assume increasing responsibility for the defense and security of the ROK;

c. Continue to seek to develop strong barriers against communist subversion and military aggression in Korea, and to develop political and social conditions in Korea which will facilitate United States security interests.

In the conduct of your negotiations with the ROK you should give priority to those matters which you may consider most urgent in accordance with the general purpose of your mission. It now appears, however, that your negotiations should place immediate emphasis on expeditious accomplishment of the following specific financial, economic, and aid objectives:

a. Continued adherence to the terms of the financial agreement of 28 July 1950;[3]

b. Conclusion of satisfactory arrangements covering the substance of the proposed "Agreement on the Relief and Support of the Civilian Population of Korea", which has been the subject of extended negotiations between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and the ROK.[4] (Such arrangements should include, but not necessarily be limited to (1) appropriate joint arrangements for coordinating use of

---

[3] For documentation on this agreement, see *Foreign Relations,* 1950, vol. VII, pp. 271 ff.

[4] For documentation on this subject, see *ibid.,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 910 ff.

ROK foreign exchange resources and (2) establishment of machinery for an effective joint effort to control inflation.)

It shall also be your objective, at the earliest appropriate opportunity, to negotiate a satisfactory civil affairs agreement providing essential administrative and base rights arrangements in the ROK for forces of the United Nations Command.[5]

In addition to the foregoing commitments, you are authorized to agree to apply the Economic Cooperation Administration counterpart fund against the existing overdraft account of the ROK in the Bank of Korea.

In the event you should consider it desirable to make other commitments to the ROK, you should submit appropriate recommendations, together with justifications therefor, to the Unified Command.

You should maintain close liaison with the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and with the United States Ambassador to Korea; and in your communications to the Unified Command you should indicate their positions on any substantive issues that may arise.

The Department of Defense and other interested agencies of the Unified Command will provide your mission such assistance as may be appropriate. Necessary administrative support for your mission will be furnished by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. However, each agency represented on your mission is responsible for defraying the individual pay and travel costs of its own representatives."

Above draft not finally approved by State.

Pls cable your time arrival Wash when firm.

ACHESON

---

[5] The members of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and the Embassy in Korea were strongly opposed to the idea of negotiation of a Civil Affairs Agreement because such an agreement could be regarded as an invasion of Korean sovereignty. In view of the highly charged political atmosphere centering on the forthcoming Presidential elections and the "hypersensitivity" of ROK officials, they considered the time inopportune for such negotiations; memorandum by Young to Allison, Mar. 31, 1952 and telegram 944 from Pusan, Mar. 28, 1952 (795B.5 MSP/3-3152 and 795B.5 MSP/3-2852, respectively).

795.00/4-152

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1952.

NOTES FOR JCS MEETING, APRIL 2, 1952[1]

KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

Summary of Present Situation:

Agenda Item 3

Agreement has been reached on all details except translation of "Korea", where UNC Delegation has proposed that both the Communist version "Chosun" and the UNC version "Han Kuk" be used. Remaining outstanding issues are airfields and Soviet Union as member of neutral supervisory body. Communist Delegation has recently avoided discussing Soviet Union issue at staff officer meetings and has asked for a meeting of sub-delegations on this agenda item to which UNC Delegation demurred but has now agreed to such a meeting for April 3, Korea time. There are no firm indications as to position Communist Delegation may take at this meeting.

Agenda Item 4

In meetings up to April 1 Communists agreed to apply voluntary repatriation principle to all POWs who resided in South Korea prior to outbreak of hostilities but not to persons residing in North Korea nor to Chinese. However, there was little discussion of problem of North Koreans. Emphasis in Communist discussions was upon alleged activities of KMT personnel employed by the UNC in Chinese POW camps and charges that purpose of UNC was to turn Chinese POWs over to "Chiang Kai-shek's brigands on Taiwan". Beginning with meeting on March 31 there was a return to the Communist emphasis on "round figures" and at the meeting of April 1 Communist emphasis was almost entirely on this point, with no mention whatever of problem of Chinese. UNC Delegation has been pointing out that figures could not be given prior to screening prisoners, which has not been carried out by UNC.

Ridgway's Instructions

On March 11 (HNC 1033)[2] General Ridgway requested a US Government statement as well as statements by principal Allies irrevocably to reject the Soviet Union as a member of the neutral supervisory commission so as to prepare the way for an offer to concede the UNC position on airfields for the Communist position on POWs.

---

[1] For a memorandum of the discussion of this meeting relating to Korea, see *infra*.

[2] *Ante*, p. 80.

On March 15 a radio to General Ridgway (JCS 903687)[3] requested his comments on a "package proposal" which would involve:

(1) Prior screening out and reclassification of POWs who would violently oppose repatriation;
(2) Concession of the UNC position on airfields;
(3) Acceptance of the Soviet Union on supervisory commission subject to elimination of the "neutral" designation and US membership, retention of the "neutral" designation with commission to be composed of non-combatant countries acceptable to each side in which event UNC refusal to accept Soviet Union is firm, or inspection to be carried out by teams composed of representatives of belligerents from opposing sides;
(4) All-for-all exchange of POWs based upon lists revised by UNC in light of results of screening and reclassification.

General Ridgway expressed strong opposition (C 65430, March 17)[4] to prior screening of POWs on grounds would gravely jeopardize safe return of UNC prisoners held by Communists, as well as to meeting at field commander level, package deal involving three unresolved issues, and any position which would accept Soviet Union as member supervisory organ. On March 20 (JCS 904101)[5] we concurred with Ridgway that package proposal need not be presented at meeting of field commanders and amplified our position on acceptance of Soviet Union as member of supervisory commission and position on package proposal containing three issues. On March 22 (JCS 904385)[6] it was suggested that the UNC Delegation explore thoroughly the Communist position on POWs in executive sessions and General Ridgway was informed that pending the outcome of such explorations a decision was withheld on the POW *fait accompli* and three-item package proposal outlined in JCS 903687, as well as on General Ridgway's reiteration (C 65650)[7] of his request for high level US Government statement on the unacceptability of the Soviet Union as a member of the supervisory commission.

Discussion:

At sub-delegation meeting on Item 3, April 3, Communists may adopt one of following courses of action:

1. Maintain present positions on airfields and Soviet membership on supervisory commission;
2. Offer to drop Soviet membership on supervisory commission in exchange for UNC position on airfields;

---

[3] *Ante*, p. 89.
[4] *Ante*, p. 95.
[5] *Ante*, p. 104.
[6] *Ante*, p. 116.
[7] Dated Mar. 20, p. 109.

3. Offer to accept UNC position on airfields in exchange for Soviet membership on supervisory commission.

The second course of action might well be adopted as it would place maximum pressure upon the UNC position on POWs, leaving that issue isolated. While in this event UNC might well, at least for the record, maintain for time being its present position on airfields, the value of this is greatly weakened by the leaks that have already taken place concerning our willingness to concede the airfield issue. In view of the lack of emphasis upon the Soviet Union issue during recent weeks, any high level U.S. Government statement on this subject at the present time would appear out of keeping with the situation and, if the Communists are in fact now prepared to concede on this issue, introduction of the prestige factor by a high level statement might cause them to reconsider. Therefore, further consideration should not be given to such a statement pending the outcome of sub-delegation meetings on Agenda Item 3.

While in the executive sessions on the Agenda Item 4 the Communists have thus far taken a very firm position against the application of the principle of non-forceful repatriation of Chinese POWs, it cannot yet be said that there is no hope of further progress in these meetings and they therefore should be continued. The Communists have shown the greatest sensitivity to the activities of alleged KMT personnel employed by UNC in connection with the Chinese POW camps and to Chinese POWs joining the forces of the "Chiang Kai-shek brigands". With respect to the first point, Admiral Joy has recommended to General Ridgway that all "Taiwanese" employed by the UNC be removed from the area of the camps. We have no information yet as to what action has been taken on this recommendation. With regard to the second point, if from subsequent negotiations it appears that the issue may be of major importance in achieving an armistice, consideration might be given to: (1) a pledge by the UNC, after consultation with the Chinese Nationalist Government, that any Chinese POWs who might eventually proceed to Formosa would not be incorporated into the Chinese Nationalist forces. In this connection it has already apparently been agreed that repatriated POWs will not be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict. (2) Alternatively, consideration might again be given to the possibilities of resettlement of Chinese in places other than Formosa. However, the possibilities in this regard appear to be almost nonexistent unless the U.S. Government would be willing indefinitely to guarantee the support of such persons.

While no decision need now be reached on whether the *fait accompli* principle shall be carried out with regard to POWs held by the UNC, it appears that the course of negotiations on POWs is such that the possibilities of obtaining Communist agreement to an armistice by application of the *fait accompli* principle are being reduced.

Also, while no decision need now be reached on presentation of the "three-item package proposal", it is entirely possible that Communist moves in the negotiations may destroy or greatly weaken the value of such a package and that those moves may result in isolating the POW issue in the negotiations.

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 2, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: I think you have seen the Ridgway telegram [2] that he doesn't want the Russians participating in the Truce Commission under any circumstances. The question is, should we accept his view or not. Ridgway appears to feel very strongly about this.

Mr. Bohlen: What the USSR really wants is to be designated as a neutral. This naturally, we don't want. But if they are tagged as participants, I should think we would like it. The Russians would try to fuzz it up, but it would really be a concession from the USSR rather than from us. However, I don't think the advantage to us is important enough to force it on Ridgway.

General Collins: I think it is a 100 per cent political question.

Mr. Matthews: I don't think the issue is really very important.

Mr. Nitze: Shouldn't we wait and see what the Communists do on the issue?

Mr. Bohlen: I think it would be useful to correct Ridgway's feeling that our proposal represented a concession to the Russians, but at the same time making clear to him we don't think the issue is important enough to press.

General Bradley: There is a new telegram [3] just in from Ridgway which refers to an article in *Newsweek* of March 31 in which Ridgway thinks there must have been a security leak as well as criticism by someone of the U.S. negotiators. Ridgway would like an investigation and also wants some action taken to back up U.S. negotiators.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended for the Joint Chiefs while Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. In all, 15 persons attended. Matters other than Korea were discussed at this meeting.

[2] The telegram to which Bradley was referring was C 65650 to JCS, Mar. 20, p. 109.

[3] The telegram under reference was CX 66304 to JCS, Apr. 2, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 10)

Mr. Nitze: How do you get an effective investigation?

General Bradley: Not with the present law.

Mr. Johnson: Ridgway's request for backing up the negotiators has really already been met several times in many statements.

General Collins: It might be useful to arrange for a Presidential Statement backing up the negotiators.[4]

Mr. Johnson: We can work one out with Col. Matthews.

General Bradley: Coming back to the question of the Russians, I suggest the staff draft a reply to Ridgway and include Bohlen's comments.

(Matthews at this point gave General Bradley a draft of the Indochina paper,[5] commenting that he was giving it to the Chiefs informally for their information.)

General Bradley: The paper that we are preparing in response to an NSC request still needs some working over. We hope to have it for you soon.

. . . .

Mr. Matthews: Another point, Senator McCarthy asked Mr. Hickerson, is it or is it not a fact that General Ridgway is bound from bombing the Yalu power plants.

General Vandenberg: I am not clear as to that. He may be under some restrictions.

General Bradley: Last time the question was raised was in a message to MacArthur. He said he didn't want to bomb them.[6] You might be able to use that as an answer.

---

[4] Truman made such a statement at a Presidential news conference on Apr. 3; for full text of the transcript of the conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953,* p. 230. Truman also sent Ridgway a personal message informing the Commander in the Far East that he viewed with grave concern the breach of security, that the article was not based on an authorized release, that the leak was being investigated, and that he was publicly reaffirming his support of the negotiators at Panmunjom at the news conference; Truman to Ridgway, telegram 031645Z, Apr. 3, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 17)

[5] The reference was presumably to NSC 124/2, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia", June 25, 1952. For documentation on this subject, see volume XII, Part 1.

[6] Presumably a reference to the JCS query to MacArthur in JCS telegram 99713, Dec. 26, 1950 and MacArthur's reply in telegram C 52125, Dec. 27, 1950, neither printed. (JCS files) MacArthur at that time indicated that the installations had no further military significance. See James F. Schanabel, *Policy and Direction, The First Year* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 347–348. MacArthur subsequently submitted in telegram CX 56453 to the JCS, Feb. 26, 1951, the urgent request of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, for permission to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex including the plants on the Yalu River, and requested instructions. The JCS in telegram 84577, Mar. 1, 1951, refused to give their approval. See *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, footnote 2 on p. 202.

General Vandenberg: We are preparing a list of targets we are going to query Ridgway about. Should we include plants on the Yalu? Is there any political reason for not including them?

Mr. Matthews: Are they militarily important?

General Vandenberg: My impression is no, but I would like to ask about them.

Mr. Matthews: I see no reason why you shouldn't ask about them.

. . . .

795.00/4–252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1952.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. U. A. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Johnson this afternoon at 4 o'clock by prior appointment. He asked Mr. Johnson whether there had been any developments in our thinking with regard to the future course of the negotiations at Panmunjom, with specific reference to the so-called "package" proposal.

Mr. Johnson replied that there were no major changes to report and that we were continuing to follow the general approach with which Mr. Tomlinson was already familiar. With regard to the "package" proposal, Mr. Johnson stated that we had not given up the idea of such a proposal if it became desirable to put it forward, but explained that at the time this formula was under consideration the negotiations then appeared to have deteriorated into a series of recriminations without immediate prospect of further progress along the lines then being followed at Panmunjom. However, since we had agreed with the Communists to go into executive session on the prisoners of war question there had been more hope that progress could be made and that for the present, therefore, we expected to leave the "package" proposal in abeyance. In other words, it was felt that all room for further maneuver in the negotiations along present lines on the outstanding issues had not yet been exhausted. There was to be a further meeting on Item 3 this evening and we might have a better picture of the situation on which to base a decision with regard to our future tactics when the results of this meeting were known.

Mr. Tomlinson then stated that it was assumed by his Government that in no event would the "package" proposal be put forward by the UNC delegation in such a manner as to constitute an ultimatum to the Communists. Mr. Johnson replied that this assumption was correct and that, while we had hopes that the "package" formula might at some point result in effective progress being made, we wished to keep the discussion of the various outstanding points of difference encompassed within the "package" from degenerating again into a series of individual issues. In any case, we would explain to the Communists that this was merely a formula which we hoped would facilitate progress and would in no way present it as an ultimatum.

Mr. Tomlinson then expressed the great preoccupation of his Government over the dilemma presented by the prisoner of war issue, stating that if the UNC delegation were either to abandon the principle of non-forcible repatriation or to make this principle an issue over which the negotiations would break down, there would in either event be serious political repercussions in Parliament for the British Government. He stated that his Government felt strongly that the other participating UN members should be consulted prior to any such decision on the part of the United States and asked whether he could provide his Government with such assurance. Mr. Johnson replied that he could in fact do so but that this, of course, must be without prejudice to the approach presently being followed in the negotiations by the UNC delegation, whereby we were seeking both to avoid forcible repatriation and, at the same time, to avoid prejudicing the safety and return of our own prisoners in Communist hands. Mr. Johnson pointed out that, of course, the developments resulting from further discussions with the Communists might necessitate some readjustment in our approach to this problem within the limits of the two extremes posed by Mr. Tomlinson.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that in a recent discussion with Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Allen of EUR concerning the constitution of the neutral inspection teams he had understood that we would not make an issue of the individual national representation on each of the teams.[1] Mr. Emmons suggested that what had evidently been meant was, while we insisted that the numerical representation on the inspection teams should be equal as between the neutrals nominated by each side, we would not necessarily insist that these representatives be paired off in such a manner that each of the individual neutral nations would all have exactly equal representation on each team.

---

[1] The discussion under reference took place on Mar. 13 at the Department of State. (Memorandum of conversation, Mar. 13, 795.00/3-1352)

Mr. Tomlinson then asked whether we believed that the proposal put forward by the Communists for Soviet participation in the neutral inspection was carried out under direct instructions from the Soviet Union or whether this proposal had been initiated by the Chinese Communists merely with Soviet acquiescence. Mr. Johnson replied that while it obviously must have had at least Soviet acquiescence, there was no firm indication whether or not the proposal had been initiated by Moscow. He stated that, in any case, the proposal seemed to have been presented as a propanganda move by the Communists to enable the Soviet Union to pose as a neutral, and that it is entirely unacceptable to us. Mr. Tomlinson then raised the question of whether, if the whole idea of neutral inspection teams were dropped and the Soviet Union were to participate in other than a neutral capacity, we would nominate non-neutrals on our own side. Mr. Johnson replied that in such circumstances we would undoubtedly do so but remarked that General Ridgway was opposed to the presence of Soviet observers in South Korea in any capacity, either as "neutrals" or otherwise.

Mr. Tomlinson then asked whether the Department had any further views on the suggestion which had been made earlier that India participate in the political conference on Korea to follow the conclusion of an armistice.[2] Mr. Johnson replied that we continue to be opposed to India's participation, feeling that participation in this conference on the UN side should be on the basis of active support of the UN military operations in Korea; to include India would open up the field to a much broader group of nations which might have to include, for instance, some of the Arab and other Asian countries and that from our standpoint it was most desirable to limit the conference in this respect. Mr. Tomlinson referred to the Canadian interest in seeing India represented at the conference and reiterated his Government's view that since India was the second most important country in Asia it seemed desirable from the British standpoint that it be included. Mr. Johnson replied that we would still be unsympathetic to such a proposal.

---

[2] On the specific instructions of the Foreign Office, the Counselor of the British Embassy had raised the issue of Indian participation in the future political conference on Korea with members of the Department of State; telegram 3645 from London, Feb. 21 and memorandum of conversation by Henkin, Feb. 22 (795.00/2–2152 and 795.00/2–2252, respectively). Almost a month later, the Second Secretary of the Canadian Embassy informed Department of State officials that Secretary of State for External Affairs Pearson thought India "ought to be invited to the conference"; memoranda of conversation by Allen and Henkin, Mar. 28 (795.00/3–2852).

795B.5/4-252[1]

Memorandum by the United Nations Adviser to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1952.

Subject: Additional Troops for Korea.

A meeting was held on Monday, March 31 of representatives of the geographic bureaus and UNP to discuss possibilities for obtaining additional armed forces for Korea. It was agreed that further approaches might be made or that additional information might be requested from our Embassies in the cases of Luxembourg, New Zealand, Turkey and Israel; that subject to further consideration by ARA additional steps might be taken in connection with Brazil and Cuba and possibly six other Latin American states; that a further approach to Greece should be made as soon as the present crisis subsides. There was a division of opinion with regard to a further approach to Norway for specialists in winter warfare. Additional details follow.

Australia. Through its Minister of Defense, Australia recently gave some indication of a desire to withdraw its forces as soon after the conclusion of an armistice as possible. Our Embassy is at present under instructions to forestall any such premature reduction.

New Zealand. For the past six months the New Zealand Government has been in the process of preparing for a 50% increase in its forces in Korea, but there has been no recent indication of progress in this direction. No response has been made to the Department's February 22 circular concerning the need for additional forces in Korea.[2] It was agreed that the Department might ask our Embassy in New Zealand for information on recent developments.

France. In view of the situation in Indochina any further approach to France for additional troops for Korea should be deferred.

UK. In response to our last approach the UK replied that at best it could only make minor adjustments in its present contingent in Korea. In view of the situation in the Suez Canal zone a further approach to the UK at this time does not appear appropriate. There was some discussion that an approach might be made if UK troops were withdrawn from Suez.

Belgium and Luxembourg. The Belgian Government in response to our last approach gave assurances that it would continue to keep up its reserves in Korea and provide for the replacement of its losses. No further approach appeared hopeful at this time. The Luxembourg Government had recently issued a new appeal for volunteers. On February 22 the Department instructed our Embassy in Brussels and our Legation in Luxembourg to reaffirm the UC need for additional troops in Korea and at the same time be on guard for any indications of a desire to withdraw forces. It was decided that a further approach to the Luxembourg Government might be made inquiring concerning the result of the appeal for volunteers.

---

[1] The 795B.5 file is the most important collection of documents relating to the question of additional troops for Korea in Department of State files.

[2] Not printed; it was a circular airgram. (795B.5/2-2252)

Netherlands. The Netherlands recently sent about ten fliers to Korea for training in jet aircraft. On February 22 the Department reaffirmed the position with regard to the need for additional forces and asked our Embassy to keep us advised of any indications of a desire to withdraw forces.

Norway. The Norwegian Foreign Minister in conversation with the Secretary last September suggested that possibly his Government might contribute a small contingent of winter warfare specialists. There was some discussion whether we should renew discussions with regard to these winter specialists at this time, some arguing that if we wanted the winter specialists by next winter we should start now, others arguing that a request in April for winter specialists would indicate that we expected the warfare to continue through next winter. No final decision was reached.

Denmark. The Department of Defense has informally supported General Gruenther's view that no further approach should be made to Denmark in the light of the urgent need to increase existing forces for NATO.

Sweden. Our Embassy in Stockholm states that the former Defense Minister has filed a report advising against setting up a special Swedish UN force at this time but recommending an amendment to the conscription laws so that Swedish forces could be engaged abroad on special international tasks, subject to parliamentary approval in each instance. Our Ambassador reports that in the present situation the Swedish Government would deem it incompatible with Swedish interests to send Swedish troops abroad.

Greece. Some time ago the Greek Government had indicated a willingness to double its present forces in Korea. Two weeks ago we instructed the Embassy in Athens to withhold a further approach on this subject until the present crisis had passed. If we receive no new reports within a reasonable time the Embassy might be asked to make a fresh approach.

Turkey. The Defense Department believes that Turkey could increase its present force in Korea. It was agreed that we might suggest to our Embassy in Turkey that the question might be again mentioned.

India. Ambassador Bowles reported in January that he had made an approach on this question and would continue to keep it in mind. It was agreed that the Department should not take any further step for the time being with respect to India.

Israel. The question of forces for Korea has been taken up twice with the Israeli Ambassador here and once through our Embassy there. No response has been received. It was agreed that the Department should call the Israeli Ambassador in again and request a reply.

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon. We approached these countries in December and received rather unqualified negatives in January.

The Philippines and Thailand. The JCS has recommended against any further approaches to these countries at this time.

Brazil. ARA tentatively agreed that the question of additional troops for Korea might be reopened in Rio. The Department is now drafting a telegram for clearance.

Cuba. The Cuban Government made an offer of troops well over a year ago. Our Embassy checked up on it on February 27 and at present is discussing a possible offer of three planes and crews by the Cuban Government. It was agreed that in future approaches we might emphasize more strongly the need for ground troops. The Department is now drafting a telegram for clearance.

Mexico and Argentina. Both Governments have made it clear that they will not send troops to Korea.

Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay. In 1950 Bolivia made a formal offer of 30 officers which was deferred by the US. The other Governments have at one time or another given some reason for hope that offers might be made but in numbers less than the minimum which the Defense Department regards as desirable. We would have difficulty in getting the Defense Department to accept these offers especially as strong assurances on the matter of reimbursement would also not be forthcoming.

It was agreed that ARA would check concerning the political desirability of going ahead with these approaches.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Command, as the official military history of the Korean war points out, was seriously handicapped in its discussions on item 4 at Panmunjom by ignorance of the actual number of prisoners who would resist repatriation. In mid-February, the Chief of the UNC Staff estimated that approximately 16,000 of the 132,000 military prisoners and 30,000 of the 37,000 civilian internees held by the United Nations would resist repatriation; see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 168–169. On March 17, Ridgway reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the latest, although highly conjectural, estimate was that 73,000 persons including civilian internees, might not elect to be returned; see Ridgway to JCS, telegram CX 65424, March 17, page 91. When the UNC and Communist staff officers met in executive session at Panmunjom to discuss the prisoner of war question, Colonel Hickman of the UNC Staff observed to his Communist counterpart on April 1 that possibly 116,000 persons would indicate "the magnitude of the exchange" although the figure was by no means definite. On the next day, the Communists suggested that debate on the POW question be deferred while both sides checked their lists and determined a "round figure" of prisoners to be exchanged. A summary of these executive sessions is in telegrams C 66228 and C 66285, Ridgway to JCS, April 1 and 2 (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 7 and 9, respectively).

795.00/4-352 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET MUNSAN, April 4, 1952—1 a. m.[1]
EMERGENCY

HNC 1118. This message in two parts. Part 1 requests immediate decision.

Part 1.

1. Discussions with the Communists on the POW question have reached the point where we are convinced that no further progress is possible unless and until we can give them a reasonably accurate estimate of how many POWs would be returned to them under our proposal. The Communists understand that the development of such a figure requires screening of UNC held prisoners of war and civilian internees. Their insistence upon a round figure for use in further discussion and their proposal of a recess to develop such a figure implies their tacit acquiescence in the screening process. In view of this and the fact that the question of the numbers and nationalities of the POWs to be returned rather than the principles involved appears to be the controlling issue, I believe that the screening and segregation of all POWs and civilian internees should begin at the earliest possible date which we estimate to be within five days.

2. Approval of this plan requires prior US Government understanding and approval of the following features:

a. Screening and segregation once accomplished are final. Prisoners having once chosen to identify themselves with one group or another, thereafter cannot be permitted to change their minds, or to remingle.

---

[1] Because of the international dateline, this telegram was sent from Korea at 1 a.m. local time, Apr. 4, yet was received in Washington on the afternoon of Apr. 3, Eastern Standard Time.

Therefore it must be accepted that forced repatriation might be unavoidable in some cases.

b. Once a figure has been given to the Communists the UNC must be prepared to deliver substantially the number reported. Major downward revisions of this figure could not be made.

c. The US must accept responsibility for continued custody and support of POWs who are not to be returned at least until such time as the UN, through the US as its executive agent, reaches a decision as to their ultimate disposition.

3. Screening and segregation are inevitable under any solution except unconditional repatriation of all POWs. The longer we wait, the longer we delay the return of our own POWs, the more we risk armistice failure and the greater is the danger of serious outbreaks on Koje-Do. A potentially explosive atmosphere now exists there which is capable of developing to such a point it might result in heavy loss of life and great discredit to the US and the UNC. Measures to reduce this danger such as breaking the camp into small units and dispersing them over a wide area or removing them from Korean territory are beyond the capabilities of the UNC.

4. Request authority as a matter of urgency to proceed immediately as indicated in para one, since Item Four meetings are now of necessity being recessed from day to day pending receipt of this authority.

Part 2.

1. It is clear that the armistice conference is at a stage requiring decisive action. In our judgment we have explored and developed the enemy attitude on POW exchange as far as is possible without the information we will obtain from the action outlined above. Subsequent to this action we intend to proceed as follows:

a. Present our figure of POWs to be repatriated to the enemy and receive their corresponding figure. The UNC revised list will exclude (*a*) POWs and civilian internees of ROK residence who do not desire to go to the other side and (*b*) other POWs whose repatriation would require the application of force. The excluded personnel will previously have been assigned a status other than POW. The UNC will insist on the enemy list being substantially the 11,559 UNC POWs previously submitted.

b. Seek agreement on the figures in (*a*) above. If successful, we would have disposed of Item Four of the agenda, and would then be in a position to trade airfield restrictions for withdrawal of the USSR issue, thus completing the armistice.

c. If unsuccessful, present a package proposal including the following points: (1) Deletion of airfield restrictions from the armistice agreement. (2) Withdrawal of USSR and Norway from the lists of nominees for the neutral nations supervisory commission, thus establishing a 4-nation neutral commission composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. (3) Agreement upon all-for-all exchange of POWs based on revised lists.

2. This course of action requires that at the time the UNC delegation presents the above proposal, it inform the Communists that the proposal must be accepted or rejected *in toto*; that debate on these subjects is unnecessary since all have been exhaustively explored by both sides; and that therefore the UNC will not debate them further. The delegation will represent its proposal as an equitable compromise solution which is the final stand of the UNC on the unresolved issues. The UNC delegation will, of course, make plain its willingness to continue meeting with the enemy delegation for the purpose of discussing non-substantive changes in its proposal and will avoid any appearance of terminating negotiations. Thus if the enemy breaks off negotiations rather than accept the UNC proposal, the breakoff will involve enemy rejection of a patently fair solution and will conform with your desire that such a breakoff be over a multiplicity of issues. Contingent upon your approval of Part One, I request your further approval of the action outlined in Part Two herein.

795.00/4–352

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with JCS, April 3, 1952

A meeting was held between State and the JCS at 3:45 p. m., April 3, to discuss the reply to General Ridgway's HNC 1118 [1] which had been received the same afternoon. Mr. Allison, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Stelle and Mr. Johnson were present for State, and General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg and Admiral Duncan for the JCS.

There was immediate and general agreement that General Ridgway should immediately be authorized to undertake the action proposed in Part 1 of his HNC 1118. There was also general agreement that he should be authorized to take the action proposed in Part 2 of HNC 1118, but that the advantages of proposing the Soviet Union as a member of the supervisory commission not designated as "neutral" should be more fully set forth to him. Accordingly a draft telegram along these lines replying to Part 2 was discussed and agreed to.

The drafts of the telegrams were subsequently discussed with the Secretary, and General Bradley was informed of the Department's concurrence the same afternoon. General Bradley undertook to obtain the

---

[1] *Supra.*

President's approval and the telegrams (JCS 905426 [2] and JCS 905427)[3] were dispatched the evening of the same day.

---

[2] Not printed; it approved action proposed in HNC 1118, part 1 and informed CINCUNC that the decision on part 2 was being sent by a separate message, JCS 905427 to CINCUNC, Apr. 3. (795.00/4-352)

[3] *Infra.*

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 3, 1952—5:57 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 905427. From JCS. Re Para 5 C 65650 [1] and part 2 HNC 1118.[2]

1. Alternative position on Soviet Union as mbr Supervisory Commission, if "neutral" designation eliminated and United States is also mbr, as set forth para 2D (1) (*b*) (*1*) JCS 903687,[3] is in no way considered here as any concession whatever to Commie position on this point. As Soviet Union can introduce Soviet natls into mbrship teams from satellite countries, only real value to Soviets' overt mbrship on teams is propaganda value of ability to pose in role of "neutral" in Korean hostilities. Suggested alternative, if used, would, of course, be presented in negots by UNC Del as compromise. It might well be so interpreted by international opinion to our consequent advantage. By placing Soviets openly on side of Commie aggressors only real advantage to Soviets of mbrship on inspection commission is destroyed and chances of their acceptance this alternative would appear to be very slight. Thus, it appears here that this alternative offers very advantageous negotiating and propaganda possibilities with minimum of potential disadvantages.

2. If, in spite of foregoing considerations, you continue to feel that this alternative proposal should not be presented, you are authorized to proceed according to your best judgment as indicated in para 1*b* part 2 HNC 1118. Under these conditions part 2 is approved.

---

[1] Dated Mar. 20, p. 109.

[2] Dated Apr. 4, p. 136.

[3] Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.

795B.5 MSP/3-3152

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 4, 1952.

Subject: Background Memorandum on the Objectives of the Special Presidential Mission to Korea, and Major Issues to be Negotiated.

This memorandum is for your use in meeting with Mr. Meyer and any other members of his mission.

I. *Objectives*

The basic objective of the mission is to negotiate an agreement with the Republic of Korea which will provide for the establishment and operation of joint machinery to stabilize the economy. This involves the effective utilization of United States economic aid, the adoption of appropriate fiscal and monetary trade measures to alleviate the inflation, and provisions for settlement by the United States for some of the won drawings under the Financial Agreement of July 28, 1950.

We intend to emphasize the importance of establishing the proper negotiating atmosphere prior to the discussions. Mr. Meyer will be briefed on the political situation in Korea and the general feeling of frustration which the Government apparently now has with respect to its efforts to stabilize the economy.

II. *Economic and Financial Issues*

There are the following economic and financial issues to be resolved during the course of the negotiations.

1. *The payment of the accumulated dollars in the Suspense Account.* The Suspense Account contains the dollar equivalent of the won which has been advanced by Korea to the Unified Command. The Financial Agreement of July 28, 1950 provides that a future settlement will be made of these won drawings at a mutually agreed time. The Korean Government has requested that full settlement be made immediately, so that private imports can be increased to alleviate the inflation. It is the opinion of the concerned agencies in Washington that it would be unwise to turn over to the Korean Government the balance in the Suspense Account, which totals over $70 million. This is Korea's main foreign exchange asset, and considering the uncertainty of future United States budgetary appropriations for economic aid to Korea, this money can probably be better utilized at some future date for basic rehabilitation purposes. It is felt that if the United States proceeds on a current settlement basis most of the inflationary pressure can be removed. In addition, the question of claims and counterclaims complicates a settlement, and in accordance with practice in other countries during World War II a settlement is more practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

2. *Joint control of foreign exchange of the Republic of Korea.* This was the main point of contention in the negotiations between CINCUNC and the Korean Government. The Korean Government has stated in the strongest terms that joint control of all foreign exchange is an unwarranted infringement of its sovereignty. President Rhee has indicated, however, that he would agree to joint control of foreign exchange arising from United Nations operations. The Department of State op-

poses joint control of all foreign exchange. Mr. Foster and the fiscal people in the Department of Defense favor it.

3. *The conversion rate of won to dollars.* The present rate of 6,000 to 1 has been in effect for a year and is no longer realistic. The present Korean price level would justify a rate of at least 10,000 to 1. The Korean Government, however, desires to continue the 6,000 rate because it feels that further depreciation would accelerate the inflation.

4. *The Financial Agreement of July 28, 1950.* The Korean Government wishes to supplant it with a new agreement providing for current settlements. General Ridgway, on the other hand, desires to continue the Financial Agreement, which provides for the won drawing privilege, in the light of the highly uncertain military situation in Korea.

5. *Effective machinery for joint economic planning.* This should not be a serious problem, since both the Korean Government and CINCUNC agree to the need for some formal arrangements for a joint effort. The mission can direct its efforts toward insuring that such a committee will actually be effective.

6. *Adjustment of dollar payments to the Korean Government for those expenditures made by the Unified Command which can be considered a proper burden for the Korean budget.* Examples of this type of expenditure are the Unified Command's support of the Korean Railway and of certain public utilities. It will be difficult to obtain agreement of the Korean Government both on the principle involved and the criteria which will be applied in application of the principle.

III. *Other Issues*

There is attached my memorandum of March 31, 1952 [1] outlining State's opposition to a civil affairs agreement. This matter has been deleted from our redraft of the terms of reference. Defense will probably fight this.[2]

---

[1] Not printed; see footnote 5, p. 124.

[2] As a result of staff level discussions between the Departments of State and Defense, Meyer was provided with only discretionary authority, subject to further instructions from Washington, to initiate negotiations with the ROK for a Civil Affairs Agreement; telegrams Topad 2667 to Tokyo and 719 to Pusan, Apr. 5 and telegram 726 to Pusan, Apr. 10 (795B.5 MSP/4-552 and 795B.5 MSP/3-2952, respectively).

795.00/3-1952

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1952.

DEAR JOHN: Thanks very much for your letter of March 19 [1] enclosing the memorandum by Phil Manhard on the problem of Chinese POWs on Koje-do. In view of the developments which will have taken place prior to the receipt of this letter, I am particularly glad that you took the initiative to see that this information got to General Yount and General Dodd. All I can now do is to keep my fingers crossed and hope for the best. I do not feel that it would have been possible for us to have taken any other course and from the standpoint of Korea I know that you will agree.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 98.

I also want to thank you for your letter of February 15 [2] to John regarding the presidency. I have been making good use of it in my conversations with the other agency. However, I have been so tied up with the POW armistice problems I have not been able to spend as much time as I wished on the question of the elections.

I also have your letter with regard to the staffing in Korea of the other agency.[3] Either John or myself will write you shortly on results of the efforts we have been making to comply with your suggestions.

I know that you must be looking forward to getting out of there next month and we will be looking forward to seeing you. It now seems to me that the armistice negotiations must be largely resolved one way or the other by then.

Sincerely, U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

---

[2] The letter under reference was to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, p. 50.

[3] Not found in Department of State files. The "other agency" was the CIA.

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army (Jenkins)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 10, 1952—10:18 a. m.

C 66649. Urmsg DA 905740.[1]

1. Screening and segregation plan for personnel at Koje-Do is known as Operation SCATTER.[2]

A. *For North Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War:*

(1) Commanding General Army Eight was directed to conduct screening and segregation with a view to making maximum number of prisoners of war available for return to Communist control, reduced by

---

[1] Not printed.

[2] On Apr. 4, the UNC Delegation informed its Communist counterpart at Panmunjom that it agreed to begin preparation of the revised prisoner of war lists in accordance with the Communist proposal of Apr. 2; see the editorial note, p. 135. The Communists then gave their tacit approval. A summary of the executive session in which this agreement occurred is in telegram C 66397, Ridgway to JCS, Apr. 4. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 124)

those who, in his judgment, present reasonable evidence that they would forcibly resist return to Communist control.

(2) An orientation program was conducted 6, 7 Apr which covered mechanics of screening plan, importance of decision which individual was to make, and emphasized the many disadvantages and the uncertainty which would result from refusal to return to Communist control.

(3) Operation SCATTER went into effect 8 Apr. Each individual is being asked a series of questions in personal interview designed to determine, insofar as possible, whether he would or would not forcibly resist repatriation. Those who indicate they would forcibly resist return to Communist control are being segregated immediately in new compounds constructed for this purpose.

(4) Finality of decision and fact that no reclama [*reclaim*] can be made is being stressed.

B. *For South Korean Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees:*

Prior orientation covers only manner in which screening will be conducted. In interview, these personnel are being asked only if they desire return to North Korea.

2. Re State Dept suggestion concerning ICRC observing screening procedure, do not consider it advisable to make special effort to inform local representatives. UNC is following policy of secrecy agreed upon for executive sessions in Item 4 throughout screening program. While leaks may develop through native Korean channels any overt action by UNC that might compromise security agreement with Communists would affect negotiations. Should ICRC delegates visit Koje-Do on their own volition for routine inspection we will not attempt to stop them, but, depending upon the amount of information they acquire during such visit, we may ask their cooperation in not publicizing the purpose or the procedures of the screening program.

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army (Jenkins) [1]

TOP SECRET   TOKYO, April 12, 1952—5:29 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 66832. Re opn SCATTER.

1. The cumulative results of the screening operation as of 2400, 11 Apr 52 are: Read in 3 cols, col 1 total screened, col 2 total to return to Communist control, col 3 total indicating they would forcibly resist repatriation.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.

	1	2	3
North Korean POWs	51491	21102	30389
Chinese POWs	17593	3467	14126
South Korean POWs	14616	3559	11057
Civilian Internees	21303	2628	18675

2. As a result of the screening completed in opn SCATTER to date approximately 44,000 North Koreans, South Koreans and CIs have either refused screening or are in compounds where prisoners representatives object to their compounds being subjected to screening. In addition, some 12,000 POWs and CIs in the hospital area in camp nr 10, Pusan, have not been screened.

3. To determine a reliabie round number and accurate rosters for submission to the Communists, a plan for screening or otherwise designating those POWs and CIs mentioned in para 2 above is being developed.

795.00/4–1552

Memorandum on the Events of April 14, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1952.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

General Ridgway's C 66832 [1] was discussed the morning of April 14 with the Secretary, the Under Secretary, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Allison and Mr. Johnson. As a result of that meeting, a meeting with the JCS was requested and held early in the afternoon of April 14,[2] at which General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler were present for the JCS and Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Allison and Mr. Johnson for State. There was a general discussion of problems raised by the fact that the screening thus far indicated a far higher portion of prisoners of war who would violently object to repatriation than had been anticipated. A radio to General Ridgway on the subject was discussed after the meeting and drafted by Mr. Johnson and General Bolte. The radio, together with some subsequent minor changes suggested by State, was approved by the JCS and subsequently by the President with whom it was discussed by General Bradley and the Secretary of State. It was despatched the same afternoon as JCS 906314.[3]

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] For the substance of discussion of this meeting, see the memorandum, *infra.*

---

[3] Dated Apr. 15, p. 152.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1952—1:30 p. m.

Korean POW's

General Bradley: What I have been wondering about is how many of these POW's really want to return but like the life they are leading in the prison camps.

Mr. Bohlen: That is really the first question we had. We wonder what General Ridgway's judgment is as to the reliability of the poll. How much confidence does he have in it? The second question we had in mind related to the 44,000 POW's who, according to General Ridgway's telegram [2] do not want to be screened at all. We thought that it might be possible to say to these prisoners that if they resist screening we will regard that as an indication that they want to return.

General Vandenberg: Supposing we take this position, what if a large number of them commit suicide on the way back?

Mr. Bohlen: We felt that the position I outlined would be one which we could explain and stand on.

General Bradley: The trouble is that it does not cover the individuals in the camps who might desire to remain.

Mr. Bohlen: I recognize that that is a problem and that we have only the word of the camp authorities at present concerning the desires of the men in the camps.

Mr. Johnson: We do know, however, that these camps contain the most intransigent communist groups.

General Collins: As regards the general problem of the very large number of POW's who desire to remain, this is a problem that I have been afraid of all along.

Mr. Nitze: Do we have any estimate at all of how many of the 44,000 might desire to return?

General Collins: Personally, I won't worry much about them. The thing that is worrisome to me is the 75,000 who say that they would forcibly resist repatriation. I wonder if there is any way to reduce that number.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended. Nitze headed the Department of State contingent and General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense. Altogether 18 persons were present.

[2] Telegram C 66832, Apr. 12, p. 143.

Mr. Bohlen: Of course this just indicates what the size of the problem is and has been from the start. It underlines the fact that we had a very big problem on our hands because there always has been a large number who would forcibly resist repatriation.

General Bradley: Just imagine what a problem it would have been to have pushed four out of five of our POW's back into communist hands against their will! There just isn't any way to force that high a proportion back. I am inclined to ask General Ridgway for his recommendation on the 44,000 who have refused to be screened.

General Bolte: Why not tell the communists to come and get them?

General Bradley: It is a hell of a job to handle POW's who do not want to cooperate. This isn't like the situation we had in North Africa. I can remember when the Italians were surrendering in large numbers there and all we had to do was to post MP's to direct the flow to the prison camps. All we really needed was a sign reading "This way to the POW camps". We don't have that kind of a problem now.

Mr. Bohlen: Assuming for the moment that we can not sizably reduce the number who would forcibly resist repatriation and assuming that most of the 44,000 will desire to return, we might consider what negotiating position to take vis-à-vis the communists. There are two possibilities, it seems to me. We might stand on our original position and insist on the principle of voluntary repatriation. This would be our present formal position including the use of the International Red Cross for screening purposes. Secondly, we might tell the communists what we have done and that we have done it as honestly as we know how. We would inform them that 75,000 POW's desire to return and can be returned immediately on an all-for-all exchange for our own prisoners in their hands. As for the 74,000 who do not want to return, we might say that we would be prepared to let any appropriate neutral body screen them again after the armistice has been completed in order to determine whether any of them have changed their minds.

These are the parts of the problem as we see it. I think it is clearly established now that we really never could have agreed to an all-for-all exchange.

Admiral Fechteler: What will we do if most of the 44,000 want to remain also? It seems to me that we ought not to say anything about the 44,000 at all. If we do say anything we are likely to find ourselves in trouble, for many of them may opt for staying with us. I think we ought to retain flexibility in this matter and play it the way circumstances indicate that it is desirable to play it.

Mr. Nitze: Then we might find ourselves caught in a trap. We might have lost our moral position and be compelled to forcibly repatriate many POW's.

Admiral Fechteler: However, as Mr. Bohlen says, we would have a defensible position.

Mr. Bohlen: We would have a defensible position only if we had given them a chance to choose whether or not to be screened in light of the warning that we would regard a refusal to be screened as an indication that they wanted to be repatriated.

Mr. Johnson: Furthermore, as matters now stand, our negotiators have got to put in a round number soon. We have got to indicate in round numbers how many POW's are to repatriated.

General Collins: The Army has prepared a draft message [3] on this problem. It has not been seen by anyone here but perhaps I might circulate it as a basis for our discussion.

Mr. Nitze: (Referring to the draft message) You state here that the North Korean figure appears particularly high and out of line with the previous estimate. Is not the number of Chinese Communist POW's who would forcibly resist repatriation out of line with our previous estimate also?

Mr. Johnson: Not as far out of line as the North Korean figure.

General Bradley: Personally, I thought it would be about a 50–50 split.

Mr. Nitze: At any rate the Chinese Communists present our most difficult problem.

General Vandenberg: Of course this may all be a deep-dyed plot on the part of the Chinese Communists to get a lot of their people into Formosa and into a position to really subvert a lot of the Chinese Nationalists.

General Bradley: I think we can be confident that the Chinese Nationalists are fully capable of taking care of that problem if it is a problem.

General Ruffner: It seems to me that the Chinese Communists will not be too anxious to continue the war if they get a lot of publicity to the effect that 100 out of every 120 prisoners do not want to return to China. It seems to me that the Chinese Communists might not be averse to a solution which would avoid a lot of publicity.

Mr. Bohlen: It seems to me, General Collins, that this message might be misconstrued. It is possible to read it as though we are determined to reduce the number of POW's who would forcibly resist repatriation. The problem rather is to determine on the best basis we can which of the POW's really would forcibly resist repatriation.

Mr. Johnson: I think the whole message might be put more into the form of a query.

Mr. Bohlen: The whole point of this from the beginning has been that we do not want to hog-tie a lot of POW's and throw them back into communist hands. The message could be read to mean that we are determined to keep down the number who would forcibly resist and that we are not too concerned about how many get shot once they have been returned. In a sense we are in a paradoxical situation. As I remarked to our Secretary this morning, we seem to have won an important skirmish in the battle for men's minds and now we are alarmed at the victory we have won.

---

[3] After revisions, this draft was sent as JCS 906314 to Ridgway, Apr. 15, *infra*.

(At this point Admiral Wooldridge entered the meeting.)

General Collins: If we query General Ridgway on the accuracy of the screening I think he can only reply that the men in his command were given certain orders and that they are accustomed to following out their orders and that he assumes the results are a correct reflection of the situation.

Mr. Bohlen: I think I would delete the first sentence which indicates that we are concerned by the number who would forcibly resist repatriation. I think we might say instead that the estimate appears out of line with previous estimates—particularly as regards the North Koreans—and ask General Ridgway whether he thinks that a recheck would lower the number.

General Collins: (Referring to the original instruction to General Ridgway) The directive under which General Ridgway was operating called for the return of the maximum number of communist POW's subject to the elimination of those who gave reasonable evidence that they would forcibly resist repatriation.

General Bradley: I would be surprised if General Ridgway himself is not somewhat surprised by the results and if he had not therefore initiated inquiries concerning the satisfactoriness of the screening.

General Collins: In the screening process our people were supposed to point out the importance of the decision and the fact that this decision by each POW was a final one. Our people were also supposed to point out the disadvantages and uncertainties for each POW which would result from his refusal to be repatriated. Our people stressed the finality of the decision and the impossibility of changing it.

Mr. Bohlen: I think it is apparent that the procedures followed were such that it is unlikely that we can expect much change as a result of a recheck.

Mr. Johnson: But it is true, is it not, that we have no knowledge of the exact procedures followed?

General Collins: That is right.

Mr. Bohlen: We do not know, I take it, whether the Formosan Chinese did the actual interrogation? I recall that we sent one message recommending that these Formosan Chinese be removed from the camp areas. Do we know whether that was done?

Admiral Lalor: How long ago was this message?

Mr. Bohlen: It was about at the time when the negotiators went into secret sessions in the tents and the Chinese Communists raised the point that the Formosan Chinese were being employed by us.

General Bradley: I wonder whether our message should not take the form of an expression of some surprise at the results and of a query on two points: First, whether he is satisfied that the interrogations were carried out in accordance with his instructions, and second, whether it is necessary to screen the 44,000 or whether we can safely assume that these people want to be repatriated. We might perhaps add one more point. We might query him as to whether there was anything in our instruction to him which affected the result by leading the POW's to expect too much.

Mr. Johnson: I think we ought also to query him about the implications in his judgment of the results for the negotiations.

Mr. Bohlen: I think we should ask him what his views would be as to the handling of the matter in the negotiations—in the event that the results are an accurate reflection of the desires of the POW's. We are very lucky that this process and the results thereof have so far been kept out of the press. Now that the results are in, it is probable that there will be leaks in the near future.

General Bradley: If this does leak it could create a very serious problem.

Mr. Bohlen: There must be a good many people, including a lot of South Koreans, who know the results. Furthermore, I assume that the prisoners who would forcibly resist repatriation are being segregated in special camps.

General Bradley: His message states, I believe, that they were to be segregated immediately.

Mr. Bohlen: In light of all this I think we have to assume that there will probably be leaks before long. We have got to decide how to deal with this matter with the communists and we ought to do it as soon as possible so our negotiators can explain it to the communists before the matter is aired in the press.

General Bradley: We have found that message that you were referring to, Mr. Bohlen. The incoming message is from Admiral Joy and is dated March 31.[4] Joy recommended the removal of Formosan Chinese from the camp areas.

Mr. Bohlen: I have wondered whether the Chinese Communist broadcast regarding an amnesty for all those who elected to return was used in the screening. I suppose it was for I think that we in effect suggested that the communists take this measure.

---

[4] Presumably a reference to CINCFE telegram C 66197 to the JCS dated Mar. 31, not printed, which furnished the substance of the transcript of executive sessions of staff officers on Mar. 31 in Korea. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

General Collins: I have scribbled down here a brief revision of this draft message. (General Collins then read his draft, the main points of which were about as follows: The results of the screening show a much higher percentage of POW's who would forcibly resist repatriation than we had anticipated. We request your reaction to the acceptability of the screening process and to the effect of the results on the armistice negotiations. We also request your recommendations concerning the desirability of screening those POW's whose camp leaders refuse screening.)

General Cabell: Is any point served by showing surprise at the results?

Mr. Allison: Do we not also want to suggest a way of proceeding with the 44,000?

General Vandenberg: Why do we announce anything concerning these 44,000? Why don't we preserve some flexibility on this score. We may not get an armistice and in that event we might want to keep these people.

Mr. Nitze: We have got to get a round number for negotiating purposes.

General Vandenberg: Well, I would give them a round number.

General Collins: (Referring to a second message from General Ridgway) General Ridgway estimates that only 800 of the North Korean POW's (these account for 37,800 of the 44,000) would forcibly resist repatriation. The leaders refused screening on the ground that everyone in their camp wanted to return.

Even if this estimate is correct, we have still got 56,000 POW's who do not want to be returned.

Mr. Bohlen: Although this number is larger than we anticipated, it does conform with the whole pattern of the Korean war. The whole movement of refugees has been in our direction from the very beginning; in fact, substantial numbers of North Koreans fled to South Korea even before the Korean war began.

General Bradley: Perhaps we should not be too surprised by this.

Mr. Bohlen: I don't believe we are going to reduce the number much by any recheck we might do. Furthermore, there is some disadvantage in going into this process at all unless it is going to get a substantially different result. A difference of three or four thousand will not be of great importance in the armistice negotiations. I think the sooner we can get our negotiating position fixed and presented to the communists the better off we will be.

General Bradley: How do they propose to return the POW's who desire to return?

Mr. Johnson: I think the plan is to take them by landing craft to Inchon and then to take them to the Panmunjom area.

General Bradley: I think we ought to take them to North Korea so that they will be out of our hands as soon as we put them ashore.

Admiral Fechteler: Suppose General Ridgway replies to our message by saying that he does have doubts about the accuracy of the screening. What are we going to tell him to do then?

General Collins: I don't think he would say that unless he also made recommendations as to what he ought to do about it.

Admiral Fechteler: Why don't we just query him regarding the effect of these results on the negotiations?

Mr. Nitze: We may be in an unsound position regarding the 37,000. Perhaps some of them will want to stay. We might get into some trouble if a substantial number of them did want to stay and we had promised to return 37,000.

General Vandenberg: I still think the main point is that we ought to get our own prisoners back. I have always thought so and still do, but of course I go along with the policy.

Mr. Bohlen: Of course the screening merely shows the problem we would have faced if we had tried to return all of these POW's.

General Bradley: I have written out a redraft of this message now which tries to get away from the point that we did not expect these results and which merely notes the large number who would forcibly resist repatriation and requests his recommendations regarding procedure. I think I will have this typed so that we can look at it.

Mr. Bohlen: Well, we all know that the effect of this on the armistice negotiations is going to be punk. The real problem is what position ought to be taken in the negotiations.

General Bradley: There is only one position to take, isn't there?

Mr. Bohlen: Well, there are two possibilities. We could stand pat on the principle of voluntary repatriation, or we could give them a round number as we have promised and offer to permit the International Red Cross or perhaps the armistice supervisory commission to interrogate the ones who have elected to stay some time after the armistice.

General Collins: I think we would have to suggest these two possibilities to him. They would not necessarily occur to him.

Mr. Nitze: I don't think we would want to recommend the first. I think we are well past that.

General Bradley: I agree.

Mr. Nitze: So we really have only one suggestion to make and that concerns those who have elected to stay behind.

Mr. Bohlen: Should we offer to let them be interviewed before or after the armistice?

Mr. Johnson: After, I think.

Mr. Bohlen: I think afterwards is better. Of course this will still have a poor effect on the armistice even though the communists will get about four prisoners to every one of ours they will return. They will surely charge duress.

General Bradley: We can even let them have observers present if they want it. I would be willing to let them do almost anything they want within reason to check on the accuracy of the screening.

Mr. Bohlen: We have kicked around one other idea a little bit. Since we are faced with the situation we have wondered whether there might be some value in going to the Russians—not to negotiate with them but simply to present the facts to them and get the record straight. The importance of this might be that the Russians, who are the boss people in all this, might get a distorted view from Panmunjom. They may think this whole thing has been rigged. All we could do would be to tell them that we cannot and will not forcibly return POW's and that the results are the results of as honest a screening as we could take. We would not ask them to do anything but it might be useful if they know the truth. Then if they want the armistice they might on their own account try to use their good offices to prevent this thing from blocking an armistice.

General Bradley: I think we would have to take this up first at Panmunjom. We have agreed with the communists to take this up in executive session with them.

Mr. Bohlen: If it were to be taken up with the Russians I think it ought to be taken up simultaneously with the Panmunjom session and certainly not before.

(At this point General Bradley's redraft was circulated and read by the conferees. Mr. Bohlen drafted some additional language concerning the proposal for a possible post-armistice rescreening by the International Red Cross. After some brief further discussion it was agreed that Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews would prepare a revised draft for clearance in State and Defense later in the day.) [5]

---

[5] Transmitted as JCS 906314 to Ridgway, Apr. 15, *infra.*

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 15, 1952—9:30 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 906314. From JCS.

1. Have read your C 66864 [2] and note large nbrs of those who would forcibly resist repatriation. Request your views and recommendations as

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.

[2] Not printed, but similar information is in telegram C 66832, Apr. 12, p. 143.

to further procedure including necessity or desirability of further attempts to screen those compounds whose leaders refuse cooperation.[3]

2. Since large nbrs opposing repatriation may be expected stiffen Commie resistance to any acceptable agreement on POWs, request your views re our negotiating position when screening completed. Suggest consideration be given to proposing agreement on POW issue be reached on all for all exchange based on UNC determination of those willing accept repatriation, those opposing repatriation to be subj to rescreening after armistice enters into effect by any appropriate international neutral body such as but not confined to ICRC, together with observers from each side if desired. Any who as result such rescreening indicated willingness accept repatriation would then be repatriated by UNC.

3. Consider that most careful and coordinated plan required for handling public relations aspects of this problem as soon as knowledge of screening and results thereof become public. Request soonest your views and plans for meeting this.

---

[3] On Apr. 10, 1952, during Operation SCATTER, a riot took place in compound 95, enclosure 9 on Koje-do Island among North Korean prisoners who objected to screening. As a result of the riot and the UNC response, 4 ROK guards and 3 prisoners were killed, 60 POWs, 4 ROK guards, and 1 U.S. officer were wounded. The UNC reports of this incident are in telegrams C 66761 and C 66838, Ridgway to G-3, Apr. 11 and 12, 1952, in file 795.00/4-352.

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 15, 1952—8:35 p. m.

CX 66953. Ref JCS 906314.[1]

1. Results of Opn SCATTER to date and best estimates of those not yet screened indicate that about 70,000 persons will be available for return to Communist control. Plans are now being formulated as a matter of urgency for relocation of non-repatriates from Koje-Do and possible rescreening to determine those who have changed their opinions and desire to be included in the exchange. Further plans, also as a matter of urgency, include screening of non-cooperative compounds after additional data has been obtained as a result of this relocation. This is necessary as preliminary step for preparation of rosters listing those to be returned to Communist control. However, firm conviction here that the 70,000 figure will not be materially changed.

---

[1] *Supra.*

2. Request ASAP authority to implement, at a time of my choosing, the following plan of procedure which with the possible exception of para *e* is believed to be in full accord with the spirit and letter of your instruction:

a. Reconvene at earliest opportunity Staff Officer Executive Session.

b. Inform the Communists that as a result of screening it is anticipated that there are about 70,000 persons in UNC custody who will not require forced repatriation to their side.

c. If their reaction to this large reduction from rosters initially exchanged, 18 Dec 51, is unfavorable, every effort will be made to convince them that we have encouraged the maximum possible number of North Koreans and Chinese to return to their side.

d. In addition, the UNC Delegation will agree that any North Koreans and Chinese who previously have declared their violent objection to repatriation and who reverse their decision would be returned to their control at any time until the exchange is completed.

e. If Communists continue to maintain opposition the UNC will offer a bilateral proposition that will permit rescreening of those persons who have indicated violent opposition to repatriation by:

(1) Any international neutral body, such as but not confined to, ICRC, together with military observers if desired, or

(2) Joint Red Cross Teams with military observers from each side if desired.

f. If the Communist position still appears to be irrevocable, our delegation will propose a recess of Staff Officer Executive Sessions and will propose that discussions move to plenary sessions.

g. If accepted, introduce package proposal at plenary session as outlined in HNC 1118.[2]

3. Ref para 3 urmsg. Public relations aspects of this entire problem are being carefully analyzed and our plans on this subject will be submitted to you as soon as practicable.

---

[2] Dated Apr. 4, p. 136.

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 16, 1952—5:46 p. m.

CX 67005. 1. At the completion of Opn SCATTER it will be nec to reclassify those South Korean, North Korean, and Chinese POWs refusing to return to enemy control. Our present planned procedure is to reclassify and segregate:

a. South Korean POWs refusing return to enemy control as "civilian internees."

b. North Korean and Chinese POWs refusing return to enemy control as "displaced persons in protective custody of the United Nations Command."

2. CGArEight would be instructed to treat "displaced persons in protective custody of United Nations Command" in accordance with the humanitarian principles of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions. The administration of civilian internees would continue to be in accordance with our C 58702, Dec. 51.[1]

3. Rosters of individuals reclassified in accordance with procedure outlined in Para 1 would be furnd ICRC.

4. Rqst approval of planned procedure outlined above.

---

[1] Dated Dec. 5, 1951, not printed. (JCS files)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 16, 1952—10:30 p. m.

. . . .

Ridgway Proposals for Handling the POW Issue

(A draft Army message was circulated which replied to General Ridgway's incoming message outlining the course he proposed to take in negotiations on the POW issue.)[2]

General Collins: The major point at issue is whether, if time permits, the rescreening should be done before we put our final position up to the Communists. We might find ourselves in some difficulty if we gave the Communists a round number of 70,000 who would be repatriated, and if subsequently a recheck turned up 90,000 who would be willing to be repatriated. In these circumstances the Communists could make a lot of hay propaganda-wise. They could say that the whole process had not been any good and that all their POW's would have returned if the screening had been properly done. It seems to me that the timing question is all important. There may not be time to do the rescreening. For this reason we do not believe that we should direct General Ridgway to do it but should merely stress our view that it would be desirable if it is possible.

---

[1] A note on the title page read as follows: "State Draft. Not cleared with any participants."

Chief of Staff General Collins and Vice Chiefs of Staff General Twining and Admiral Duncan attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent and General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense, while Lay represented the NSC. Korea was one of four topics discussed; the others were Japan, Yugoslavia, and Germany.

[2] This draft, after revisions and combination with a Department of State draft, was sent to Ridgway as JCS 906539, *infra*. The message from Ridgway under reference was CX 66953, Apr. 15, p. 153.

Mr. Johnson: I believe the matter is beginning to come to public attention. I heard over the 8 o'clock news this morning a reference to the segregation of prisoners on Koje Island.

General Collins: I heard that same report at 8 o'clock but only caught part of it. It was reported that the POWs on Koje were being segregated. I guess this cat is getting out of the bag.

(The meeting then took up a detailed revision of the draft Army message.)

Mr. Johnson: We have one question concerning General Ridgway's paragraph *e*. It is not clear to us whether the rescreening he proposes is to be done before or after the armistice comes into effect. There is an implication that it is to be done before the armistice takes effect. Our outgoing message recommended a post-armistice rescreening. It probably doesn't make much difference as far as the Communists are concerned whether the rescreening is done before or after the armistice—assuming that they are willing to accept the situation at all. We believe that we might get into a great deal of trouble if the rescreening is done before the armistice. The Communists could use it for propaganda and to delay the coming into effect of an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: We might get into the same difficulties that General Collins just referred to.

(At this point General Eddleman entered the meeting.)

Mr. Johnson: We have some draft language on this point which we might circulate.

(The State Department draft[3] was circulated and discussed. The propaganda point was deleted and the language was simplified in various respects. The emphasis was thrown on the point that a pre-armistice screening might seriously delay the coming into effect of the armistice.)

Mr. Bohlen: What worries me the most about this is that it might provide the opportunity for the Communists to put additional emphasis on the POW issue as *the* outstanding issue.

General Collins: I take it that you mean increased pressure on the U.S. public to get our POW's back.

Mr. Bohlen: That and an opportunity to make use of the rescreening to throw doubt on the whole process.

---

[3] This draft, after the revisions indicated in the memorandum, was combined with the Department of the Army draft and was sent out as JCS 906539 to Ridgway, *infra*.

General Collins: I doubt whether it is necessary to give all the arguments contained in this message. I think that General Ridgway can read them all in.

Admiral Duncan: How important is it in your opinion whether this rescreening is done before or after the armistice?

Mr. Johnson: It seems quite important to us, especially from the point of view of the time element, that is, the time when an armistice would come into effect.

Mr. Bohlen: If we have another screening before an armistice there will be a good opportunity for the Communists to make trouble in the camps. The Communists can threaten reprisals against the families of those men who elect to stay. We could easily find ourselves in a real mess. Furthermore, the Communists can throw doubt on the whole screening that we have done. The situation would be quite different if the armistice was already in effect.

General Collins: If the Communists do not accept a settlement on this basis and if the armistice talks collapse, it occurs to me that we may want to have a third screening in order to get more POW's to say that they will not return. I don't think we need to interject this issue now but we may want to have a third screening under the auspices of the International Red Cross if only to show that the job was honestly done to begin with.

(Turning to the other chiefs) Are there any other comments on this?

I am very doubtful about your last paragraph. Why do you want all this information on the procedures which were followed in the screening?

Mr. Johnson: We want it simply for background purposes. As soon as this thing breaks in the press we are going to have to explain what has been done to our allies and probably also to the U.S. public.

General Collins: In that case, I think you ought to say why you want the information and say that it is in order to brief the allies and for press purposes here. Otherwise, General Ridgway may wonder whether we are about to walk out on him.

Admiral Duncan: I think this point ought to be covered in a separate message.[4] It is not really germane to the rest of the message.

(This was agreed.)

General Collins: I think we might run together our two draft messages with the revision that we have considered. We might take our paragraph as the first paragraph and follow it with your two paragraphs, closing with an approval of his plan of action subject to the qualifications contained in these messages. This will give him authority to go ahead as he outlined if it is impossible or impractical for any reason to accept our recommendation. I will have clear copies run off so we can read it and look at it once more.

---

[4] The separate message referred to was DA 906549, Jenkins, G-3, to Ridgway, Apr. 17, 1952. In it Ridgway was asked for a summary of the screening operation, including sample questions asked and the method by which these questions were put to the POWs. The telegram also requested information on the persons used in the operation and whether the ICRC carried out any visits to the camps during the screening period or observed any part of the screening process. This information was needed, Ridgway was informed, so that the Department of State could have background information to brief allies and to counter false accusations (795.00/4-352).

. . . .

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 16, 1952—5:59 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 906539. From JCS reur CX 66953 and CX 67005.[1]

1. We note with approval that you are giving consideration to re-screening by UNC. We consider that this should be done, if practicable from your viewpoint and time permits, prior to submitting any revised figure to Communists. Such re-screening, if undertaken, should be done under the most stringent criteria designed to verify number of POWs who would actually forcibly oppose repatriation. However, if you consider it impracticable to re-screen POWs prior to submitting revised figure to Communists you are authorized to proceed without such re-screening.

2. Proposal for neutral re-screening non-repatriates folg armistice probably acceptable to Communists as proposal for neutral re-screening prior to armistice. View here is that in event Communist acceptance screening folg armistice offers us many advantages. Proposal for screening proposed in para 2*e*, CX 66953 prior to armistice would appear give Communists opportunities for further delaying entry into effect of armistice.

3. Therefore, suggest you give consideration amending para 2*e*, CX 66953 so as to make clear that at least initial UNC del proposal will be that any neutral re-screening non-repatriates take place folg entry into effect of armistice by either method mentioned therein. If you concur with foregoing suggestion you are authorized implement plan of procedure set forth para 2, CX 66953 with subpara *e* thereof appropriately amended. However, if there are clear advantages not apparent here to re-screening proposed in para 2*e* taking place prior to armistice, you are authorized to implement plan of procedure set forth para 2 ur CX

---

[1] Dated Apr. 15 and 16, pp. 153 and 154, respectively.

66953. Planned procedure outlined ur CX 67005 also approved for implementation at time you consider appropriate.[2]

---

[2] The final sentence was added at the suggestion of the Department of State subsequent to the State-JCS meeting on Apr. 16.

Secretary of Defense Lovett then approved the final text of the telegram and expressed agreement with Matthews' view that the telegram need not be held for the President's return to Washington since it did not make any substantive changes in previously approved instructions. (Memorandum from Carns to Collins, Apr. 16; JCS records, CCS 000.5 (5-12-49))

795.00/4-352 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 17, 1952—11:26 p. m.

CX 67067. Re JCS 906539.[1]

1. I have directed the UNC delegation to implement without delay the procedure outlined in para 2, CX 66953,[2] modified as follows:

a. The use or omission of para 2*d* is left to the discretion of the armistice delegation.
b. Final decision on the introduction of para 2*e* will be made prior to moving to plenary session, depending on the development of negotiations. I concur with your para 2 of JCS 906539 that this proposal would be more effective if it were limited to re-screening of non-repatriates after the armistice is in effect, and instructions to this effect have been issued to the delegation.

2. The decision to introduce the figure of 70,000 as a round number without screening being completed was made only after careful consideration of the many factors involved. The time required to *complete* screening, (which involves the relocating of many camps and the forced screening of those individuals who have so far obstructed screening), the increased impatience of the Communists and of the US and UN public, do not permit the delay which we estimate will be three to four weeks especially since I do not expect the final figure to differ materially from our estimate of 70,000. Rescreening of those North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who have already been segregated as non-repatriates, and screening of those who initially refused to cooperate will continue insofar as practicable. Every conceivable effort is being made to return the maximum number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to the Communists without resort to forced repatriation.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated Apr. 15, p. 153.

795.00/4-352 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Department of the Army [1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 19, 1952—3:50 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 67178. Re DA 906549. This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

1. Opn SCATTER was developed in order to conduct screening and segregation of North Korean and Chinese POWs with a view to making the max nbr aval for return to Communist control, reduced by those who present reasonable evidence that they would forcibly oppose return to Communist control. For South Korean POWs and civilian internees, Opn SCATTER segregated only those who elect to return to Communist control.

2. Opn SCATTER, Koje Do: On 6 Apr orientation of POWs and CIs started at UN POW camp Nbr 1 including conferences with compound leaders, announcements over PA systems and posting of written contents of announcements in all compounds, as fol: "All POWs will be individually interviewed by impartial UNC pers within the next few days. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of determining which POWs desire to be repatriated to the Korean People's Army or to the Chinese People's Volunteers and which ones have compelling reasons which they feel would make it impossible for them to return to their own side. This determination will speed up the rate of repatriation at the time POWs are exchanged.

"At this time I must caution you that the decision you make is a most important one, probably the most vital one you will ever be called upon to make. You must carefully consider each aspect of the matter. You must make your own decision. For your own safety it is essential you not discuss this matter with others, and above all that you let no other person, even your best friends, know what your decision will be, until you are asked for it at the interview.

"To those POWs who will not violently oppose repatriation, the UNC will guarantee return to your authorities at the time POWs are exchanged. Your decision in this matter will be considered final. The UNC can make no guarantees whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who refuse to go back to their own people.

"Before any of you, for any reason which you think may be compelling, decides irrevocably to reject repatriation, you must consider the effect of your decision on your family. The fact that you are a POW has been reported to your authorities and they know that you are alive and well. If you fail to return, the Communists will undoubtedly consider your family suspect. You may well never see your family again. You must consider this matter from every angle.

---

[1] This telegram was for G-3. It was in response to DA 906549 to Ridgway, Apr. 17, 1952 asking for details on Operation SCATTER for briefing purposes and to counter false accusations; DA 906549 is not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 157.

"If your final decision is that you are violently opposed to repatriation, you may be held in custody here on Koje Do for many long months. However, the UNC cannot house and feed you forever. The UNC can make no promises regarding your future. In particular, the UNC cannot and will not guarantee to send you to any certain place. This is a matter which you should consider most carefully.

"Interviews will be conducted in each compound to prepare rolls of the POWs to be repatriated.

"Rosters by bn have already been prepared.

"Within a few days interview points will be established near the sally port in each compound.

"At the appointed hour POWs will be formed by bn according to roster. Unarmed UNC clerks and US MPs will enter the compound to supervise the interviews. POWs will move to the interview points when called by the clerks, where they will be asked to express their decision. They will carry their equip and clo with them.

"Depending upon each individual's decision, he will remain in present compound or be removed immediately.

"After individual interview, POWs who are to be repatriated will be housed in compounds separate from those POWs who strongly oppose repatriation.

"You are reminded that quiet and good order must be maintained within the compound during the conduct of these interviews."

In addition, the fol announcement of a msg received from the Communists and broadcast over radio Pyongyang was given wide publicity: "The spokesman of the Korean People's Army and the Command Hq of the Chinese People's Volunteers has been auth on Apr 6, 1952 to make the fol statement concerning the release and repatriation of all prisoners of war following an armistice in Korea.

"The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have always held that, fol the cessation of active hostilities, both belligerents should speedily release and repatriate all the prisoners of war in their respective custody. This reasonable position of ours definitely will not undergo any change on account of the fact that a nbr of our captured pers, during the period of captivity, have had their arms tattooed or have written certain documents or committed other similar acts. We are deeply aware that such acts have certainly not been done out of their own volition and that they should not be held responsible for these acts.

"We wholeheartedly welcome the return of all of our captured pers to the arms of the Motherland; we have further guaranteed, in an agreement reached with the other side, that all captured pers shall, after their repatriation, rejoin their families to participate in peaceful construction and live a peaceful life."

3. The fol questions were asked those who were screened: "Will you voluntarily be repatriated to North Korea or China?" "Would you forcibly resist repatriation?" "Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family?" "Do you realize that you may remain here at Koje Do long after those electing repatriation have been returned home?" "Do you realize that the UNC cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place?" "Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation?" "What would you do if you were repatriated in spite of this decision?"

4. Questions were asked one at a time and reply was awaited before next question. If at any time POW expressed a decision to accept repatriation the questions ceased. If at any time the POW mentioned suicide, fight to death, escape, braving death or similar information, the POW was segregated with those who would resist repatriation. The above briefing and questions applied only to NKs and CCF POWs. CIs and SKs were asked only, "Do you desire to return to North Korea?"

5. *a.* Results to date—Koje Do:

	A	B	C
	"Screened to Date"	"To Return to Communist Custody"	"To Remain in UNC Custody"
NK POWs	51,861	21,248	30,613
SK POWs	14,723	3,622	11,101
CCF POWs	17,593	3,467	14,126
CIs	22,199	2,907	19,292
Totals	106,376	31,244	75,132

b. Seven North Korean compounds containing 37,628 POWs have thus far refused screening. One predominantly hard-core Communist civilian internee compound contains 5,700 persons who have refused screening.

6. In order to reduce the population per compound and screen those who thus far have resisted, movement of non-repatriates from Koje Do to newly established compounds in South Korea began today. Chinese and North Korean POWs who have been segregated on the basis they will not be returned to Communist control will be given one more opportunity to consider their decision prior to departure from the island.

The fol statement will be made: "You are now to be shipped to a new camp. This is your final opportunity to return to control of auth representing Chinese Volunteer Army (or NKPA as applicable) at the time POWs are exchanged. If you elect to return you will be moved to a new compound immediately, where you will be protected and housed only with those who make the same decision."

a. POW will then be asked: "Do you wish to return?"

b. Those who desire to return to CCF or NKPA control will then be immediately diverted to a holding compound for eventual return to the enemy.

7. After relocation of non-repatriates has been completed, those who previously refused screening will be broken into smaller groups, separated by compounds and screened.

Part 2. Opn SCATTER—Hospital Compound, Pusan: Similar procedures are being used in screening of POWs and CIs now in custody at the Hosp Compound, Pusan. Opns there started 16 Apr and results to date are as fol:

	A	B	C
	"Screened to Date"	"To Return to Communist Custody"	"To Remain in UNC Custody"
NK POWs	3,158	2,793	365
SK POWs	732	437	295
CCF POWs	1,832	1,306	526
CIs	790	238	552
Totals	6,512	4,774	1,738

Part 3.

1. The fol additional info is considered pertinent, especially for State Dept use, as outlined in ref msg:

a. Opn SCATTER was conducted on the soundest, most objective basis possible within our capabilities.

b. Pers used in interrogation were carefully selected and highly qual pers, the majority of them being US Mil.

c. No Taiwanese were used as interrogators of Chinese POWs.

d. Actual questioning was conducted indiv and in reasonable privacy with as many distracting factors as possible removed during screening procedures.

e. Among North Korean and Chinese POWs, every effort is being made to determine and segregate for retention in UNC custody only those persons who would actually forcibly oppose return to the Communist auth. Those of doubtful mind are being included in the group to be returned to Communist control.

2. Re Para 2, C 66649,[2] no special effort was made to invite ICRC representatives to witness Opn SCATTER, although the POW camp was not barred to them. Since this screening is so closely related to the secrecy agreed upon by both sides while in Staff Off Executive sessions of Item 4 negotiations, it is necessary to reduce publicity insofar as possible. Local ICRC Delegates have been told only that relocation is taking place to reduce incidents of violence, lessen the administrative and logistical burden of so large an installation, and permit additional space for the pro-Communist element of the POW and civ internee population at Koje Do. They have not been informed of Opn SCATTER, although unofficial press speculation and their knowledge of the POW situation has probably provided them with an accurate estimate of our intent. Camp auth have been specifically directed to show ICRC representatives customary courtesies and not to prohibit them from visiting compounds.

3. *a.* I understand that one of the purposes of your request for these data is to provide US Govt agencies with info which they can use in answering inquiries by foreign govts and individuals. All info so furn can be expected quickly to be public knowledge.

b. In view of the intimate relationship of Opn SCATTER to Item 4 and hence to the armistice negotiations, it is essential that the same measure of security be exercised for both if we are not to compromise our agreement with the Communists.

4. I will report developments.

---

[2] Dated Apr. 10, p. 142.

795.00/4–2052: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, April 20, 1952—3:39 p. m.

CX 67235. Ref HNC 1118,[2] CX 66953,[3] and CX 67067.[4]

1. It is difficult to anticipate the trend of negotiations henceforward, particularly the timing for introduction of a package proposal, assuming, of course, that such proposal becomes nec. Our future negotiatory steps, as outlined in CX 66953, and modified by CX 67067, must be un-

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.

[2] Dated Apr. 4, p. 136.

[3] Dated Apr. 15, p. 153.

[4] Dated Apr. 17, p. 159.

dertaken with due consideration to Communist reaction to our proposals concerning the POW issue.[5] Communist violent opposition to the 70,000 figure of persons to be repatriated may well initiate an inexorable and rapid progression of events which will force us to introduce the package proposal in the very near future in order to avoid Communist adoption of a psn difficult of recession.

2. Consequently, the UNC must be in readiness to present a package proposal at any time. In event of such proposal, I plan to issue a concurrent public statement from Tokyo as fols:

> "The UNC has been negotiating with the Communist aggressors in Korea for more than 9 months in an endeavor to achieve an armistice. We have known that all the peace-loving nations of the world share our sincere desire to obtain a just and honorable cessation of hostilities in order to terminate the terrible toll of suffering, destruction, and bloodshed, and by lessening the risk of spreading the conflagration, to advance the cause of world peace. After many months of UNC efforts to cope with Communist intransigence, bravado, and illogic, it is apparent that negotiations are at a standstill and further progress is not now in sight.
>
> "Three questions remain to be resolved. These are Afld restrictions, the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supv Com, and the basis of exchange of POWs. All 3 issues have been exhaustively explored in discussions with the Communists. The psns of both sides on these issues have been carefully and searchingly reviewed by the UNC.
>
> "It is apparent that these issues cannot be solved separately. The UNC will not accept an indefinite continuation of negotiations without hope of the termination of hostilities within a reasonable pd of time.
>
> "Therefore, in a final endeavor to bring about a cessation of hostilities by means of an hon armistice fair to both sides, the UNC del today presented to the Communist del a just and integral solution to all remaining issues.
>
> "It is of the utmost importance to all the nations of the world that they realize with crystal clearness that this comp solution embodies the final and absolute psns acpt to the UNC. There will be no further compromise. Our proposal is equitable to both sides and must be acpt in whole without substantive change, or not at all. We shall have nothing further to offer and shall debate these issues no longer.
>
> "The responsibility for peace or cont hostilities in Korea now rests squarely on the Communist leaders."

3. To achieve max eff with a package proposal, its full import must be driven home to the Communists. I consider the psych impact of ofl

---

[5] The Staff Officers meetings resumed at Panmunjom in executive session on Apr. 19 and the UNC representative informed his Communist counterpart that approximately 70,000 captured persons would be repatriated. The Communist Staff Officer, Colonel Tsai, asked for an hour recess, after which he read a prepared statement which stated that the UNC figure could not be considered as a basis for further discussion. The next day Tsai mounted a full-scale attack on the 70,000 figure in the Staff Officers meetings. The substance of the record of these two meetings is in telegrams C 67190 and C 67242, Ridgway to JCS, Apr. 19 and 20, 1952 in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 14 and 17, respectively.

pub announcements spt [supporting?] a final package would be of incalculable value in securing early Communist agreement.

4. Accordingly, I recm that any package proposal which we may present in accordance with existing authorizations be immediately supported by authoritative pub statements of the United States Government, and of as many other UN nations as possible.

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 22, 1952—1:25 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 906923. From JCS reur CX 67235.[2]

1. In view of relative success of exec sessions of staff ofcrs on agenda item 4, view here is that there would be considerable advantage in proposing that exec sessions of plenary dels be held at time of presentation of package proposal. In event of Communist acceptance of exec sessions for plenary dels, public statement such as that proposed below would of course not be appropriate, but suitably modified version could be used at such time as knowledge of contents of package becomes public. Request your views.

2. As stated in Para 2D (2) and (5) JCS 903687,[3] considered here that any statements issued in connection with introduction of package proposal should, while reflecting final and irrevocable position on each question, also make clear that proposal is fair and reasonable reconciliation opposing points of view and willingness of UNC Del to continue to meet whenever Communists desire. Therefore statement should not be couched in terms which could be interpreted as an ultimatum that decreases probabilities of Communist acceptance and, in event of Communist rejection, raises domestic and international expectations of prompt decisive mil action. In light of foregoing, consider that statements to be made at time of introduction of package proposal while clear and firm, should not assume Communist rejection or be so worded as to make acceptance thereof difficult for Communists. Also, at such time as public statement re package proposal is issued by you consider that, in order to avoid distortions and misunderstandings, important that substance of proposal be included in your statement or be

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by the Department of State and approved by the Armed Services, the Department of Defense, and the President; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 173, footnote 76.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated Mar. 15, p. 89.

covered by separate statement. Therefore, suggest that your proposed statement be amended to read as follows:

"UNC has been negotiating with Communists in Korea for more than 9 months in an endeavor to achieve an armistice. We have known that all the peace-loving nations of world share our sincere desire to obtain a just and honorable cessation of hostilities in order to terminate the terrible toll of suffering, destruction and bloodshed and, by lessening the risk of spreading the conflagration, to advance the cause of world peace.

"After many months of patient negots by UNC, 3 questions still remain to be resolved. These are: Basis of exchange of POWs, restrictions on reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields, and acceptance of Soviet Union as mbr neutral nations supervisory commission. All 3 issues have been exhaustively explored in discussions with Communists.

"It is apparent that these issues cannot be solved separately. Therefore, in max endeavor to bring about cessation of hostilities by means of an honorable armistice fair to both sides, UNC Del today presented to Communist Del a just and integral solution to the 3 remaining issues.

"The solution provides that UNC is willing to exchange the approximately 70,000 persons who do not violently object to repatriation for the 12,000 UNC personnel which Communists state they are now holding as POWs. UNC continues its willingness to permit folg an armistice any suitable international body of jt Red Cross teams together with observers from both sides to interview persons held by UNC who have indicated they would violently oppose repatriation, and to return promptly to Communists any such persons who it is determined would not so object. In turn UNC agrees that the armistice provisions will not make any reference to reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields. This solution also provides that UNC will accept Communist nominations of Poland and Czechoslovakia for mbrship on neutral nations supervisory commission and that Communists will accept UNC nominations of Sweden and Switzerland.

"It is of the utmost importance that all nations of the world realize with crystal clearness that this fair and equitable reconciliation of opposing points of view embodies final and absolute positions acceptable to UNC. The proposal made by UNC Del is not subj to substantive change and must be considered as a whole by Communists.

"Responsibility for peace in Korea rests on Communist leaders."

3. Second sentence 4th Para of proposed statement is based on assumption that the proposal for post-armistice re-screening of non-repatriates cited in Para 1*b* ur CX 67067[4] has been made and rejected by Communists prior to introduction of package proposal. If such proposal has not been made and is being introduced in connection with package proposal, second sentence 4th Para of foregoing draft statement would require appropriate modification.

---

[4] Dated Apr. 17, p. 159.

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 23, 1952—8:22 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 67399. Urmsg JCS 906923.[1]

1. In order to explore Communists reaction to the conditions stipulated in the package proposal in a less formal and more favorable setting, I have authorized my delegation to submit the following suggestion in Staff Officers Executive Session on item 4:

> "As the Staff Officers responsible for Agenda Item 3 have stated many times our side can never accept the USSR as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The achievement at any time of an armistice is dependent upon your side withdrawing this artificial barrier to an armistice which your side has needlessly erected. Aside from this, only two major differences stand between our two sides and our common objective, the attainment of an early armistice. One is in Item 4, the other in Item 3. It is the feeling of the Staff Officers of our side that agreement on Agenda Item 4 would open the way to early resolution of the only difference of substance in Item 3."

2. If the Communists indicate an interest in this exploratory suggestion, the continuation of the discussion will be suggested at level desired by them. If plenary session is selected, it will be suggested that the discussion be conducted in executive session under this condition. I believe best interests UNC dictate avoidance of publicity that might provide unfavorable Communists reaction.

3. If the Communists indicate no interest in the suggestion, or categorically reject it, there is no advantage in keeping our proposal secret. Hence, we should propose open plenary session, present package proposal, and concurrent therewith issue a statement essentially as suggested by you in reference message.[2]

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] The JCS in telegram JCS 907037 on Apr. 23 informed CINCFE: "We approve action suggested in Para 3 ur CX 67399. View here is that exec sessions of full dels offer considerable advantages as indicated in ur Para 2, and should be held if acceptable to Communists unless Communists display unqualified hostility to approach mentioned in ur Para 1." (795.00/4-352)

795.00/4-2452

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1952—3:50 p. m.

Subject: Military Build-up by the Communists in Korea

---

[1] A note attached to the source text indicated that Sargeant did not feel he should dictate this memorandum in the first person for the Secretary because Sargeant was present for such a short time during the conversation.

Participants: General Walter Bedell Smith
The Secretary
Mr. Sargeant
Mr. Matthews

I took part only in the last few minutes of the conversation between the Secretary and General Smith. Mr. Matthews was there for the same period of time. General Smith repeated to us what he had apparently been telling the Secretary—namely, that the extent of the military build-up by the Communists in Korea was not appreciated by the American people, nor were the American people prepared for the potential launching of a major offensive and the renewal of large-scale hostilities. He summarized certain kinds of intelligence which indicated the possibility of the launching of an offensive, but stated that in his personal opinion, there would not be any immediate Communist offensive, even if the negotiations did break down.

I summarized the steps that had been taken to secure a statement from General Ridgway's headquarters in the near future that would call attention again to the extent of the Communist military build-up. I stated that I had talked with Clayton Fritchey of the Department of Defense within the past hour and that Mr. Fritchey was in the process of preparing a draft message which, if agreed to by the interested parties, would be sent at once to General Ridgway. I outlined some of the possible methods of supporting statements emanating from General Ridgway's headquarters by appropriate people here in the United States.

General Smith said that he had not been aware that this action was already under way and he expressed his pleasure that this was being done. He thought the urgency was such that a statement should, in fact, be issued within a matter of hours. Although he was not pressing to have one issued that same evening, he hoped that it might be made the following day. (He indicated also that nothing should be allowed to create the public impression that once again United States intelligence had been at fault and had been unaware of the extent of the military build-up, or of the possibility of the launching of a sudden and large-scale Communist offensive.)

I also reported that I had met with Mr. Short, Admiral Dennison, Mr. Tubby and Mr. Fritchey yesterday at the White House, and the whole problem of preparing public opinion with respect to possible events in Korea had been reviewed. I said that I had not yet had the opportunity to brief the Secretary personally on these most recent developments.

The Secretary asked me to be responsible for seeing that the message to General Ridgway and the following action was kept in channels and moved along rapidly. General Smith, in taking his leave, again emphasized the great importance he attached to having this information reach the American people widely and promptly, and said that it indicated a certain unhappy lack of adequate liaison when the Under Secretary of State, the Under [*Deputy*] Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board, and the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board were all so uninformed about actions and decisions of primary concern to the conduct of psychological warfare. The General added that the State Department had two good men on the Psychological Strategy Board staff (naming George Morgan specifically) and that he hoped we would take adequate steps in the Department to see that they were kept thoroughly briefed and filled in on matters of this kind.

HOWLAND H. SARGEANT

Secretary's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Executive Secretary (McWilliams)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 25, 1952.

Subject: Summary of Meeting with the Secretary.

Participants: Mr. Acheson
Mr. Bruce
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Sargeant
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. McFall
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Howe
Mr. Nitze
Mr. McWilliams
Mr. Battle

Item 1. *Korean Briefing*

Mr. Howe gave the briefing.

Item 2. *Negotiations in Korea*

Practically the entire meeting was spent in a discussion of the current state of negotiations in Korea and the steps which should be taken to prepare American and world opinion for the decisive turn of events which seems to be at hand. The two main questions at issue are:

(1) Should we make a public statement in respect to the build-up of Communist strength and the probability of a heavy resumption of hostilities. General Smith is anxious that something be done on this.

(2) Should we have congressional consultations at this stage of the negotiations.

The matter was left that Messrs. Matthews, Sargeant, Bohlen, McFall and Johnson would get together this morning and try to outline the course of action which should be taken during the next 48 hours.

[Here follows a summary of discussions on Trieste and the Varvaressos report on Greece. For documentation on these two issues, see volume VIII.]

W. J. McWILLIAMS

795.00/4-2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1952.

Subject: Korea

Participants: The Honorable P. C. Spender, Australian Ambassador
Mr. David W. McNicol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary (UNA)
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary (FE)
Mr. David W. Wainhouse, UNP

The Australian Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. McNicol, came in to see Mr. Hickerson this morning at his request.

The Ambassador stated that he found it difficult to believe that approximately 70,000 prisoners of war including civilian internees will have their lives jeopardized if they are returned to the Chinese Communists and to the North Koreans. He felt that the questioning of the prisoners of war was superficial and did not go to the heart of the problem. In his view the questions put and the answers elicited did not get at the motives of the prisoners. The motive for refusing to go back is to the Ambassador the heart of the problem to which the questioning should have been directed.

Mr. Hickerson explained that the problem involved in the (forcible) return of the prisoners of war was not whether the lives of the POWs would be imperilled but whether the POWs would return without our having to apply force to make them return. Mr. Hickerson further explained the method and the care that was used in screening the POWs mentioning particularly that our screeners made known to the POWs the Communist announcement of amnesty to all POWs who are returned. We ourselves were astounded at the large proportion who said they would resist being returned. Mr. Hickerson stated that the figure has deeper significance than we realized of conditions in China. The Ambassador thought it was better food and better treatment in the camps than they got at home.

Mr. Johnson told of screening POWs in a hospital in Pusan. Notwithstanding the good treatment, better food and care, the proportion desiring to return was considerably larger than at the camps. The Ambassador replied that that was not surprising to him. When people are sick he went on to say they naturally want to be home.

The Ambassador inquired whether other representatives (presumably of countries with troops in Korea) had raised any objections to the method of screening. Mr. Hickerson replied that no other representative has raised objections to the method of screening.

The Ambassador said he wanted it made clear that he was not receding from the position taken on forcible return of POWs.

Mr. Hickerson made it clear to the Ambassador that at the forthcoming plenary our negotiators will state that we are prepared to return some 70,000 POWs for the 12,000 POWs which the other side holds, and that after an armistice is signed we are prepared to have the rest of the POWs we hold rescreened either by some international group such as the ICRC in the presence of military observers of both sides, or by joint Red Cross teams in the presence of military observers of both sides.

The Ambassador again asked whether 60,000 would violently resist or commit suicide. Mr. Hickerson said that 60,000 perhaps would not commit suicide, but they would resist, and we are not willing to use force to make these people return. Mr. Hickerson repeated that the screening was a good one. The Ambassador however said he was not satisfied with the method. The proportion of those refusing to return he felt is too large.

The Ambassador then asked if General Ridgway had estimated the reaction of the Communists to "the package proposal," i.e., will they accept the package or will they break off negotiations. Mr. Hickerson replied that he has not seen any estimate by General Ridgway and there is no way of telling what the Communist reaction would be. Mr. Wainhouse said that General Ridgway has taken the view in the past that the Communists want an armistice and presumably in making this package proposal has taken this into account.

795.00/4–2652

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1952.

Subject: Consultation with Far East Subcommittees on Korea.

On the morning of April 26 in accordance with a request by the Department, Mr. Allison and Mr. Johnson met informally at the Capitol with the Far East Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. Mr. Burleson, Chairman; Mr. Carnahan; Mr. Lanham; Mr. Judd; Mr. L. H. Smith; and Mr. Vorys were present.

The Department's representatives reviewed the course of the progress made in the armistice negotiations to date and set forth the positions to be taken by the UNC Delegation in the plenary session scheduled for that evening. There was detailed discussion, particularly of the position on airfields and prisoners of war and all the questions put by the members of the Subcommittee were fully and frankly answered in confidence. The only critical note was from questions raised by Mr. Judd concerning the screening of prisoners of war on the basis of whether they would forcibly resist repatriation rather than by free and voluntary choice by them. After the reasons for the type of screening that was carried out were fully explained to Mr. Judd he appeared to be somewhat satisfied, although still of the opinion that it should have been upon a fully voluntary basis. Otherwise the members of the Subcommittee appeared fully to understand and to accept the action being taken. All members of the Subcommittee expressed their great appreciation for the meeting.

Subsequently on the afternoon of April 26 Mr. Allison visited Senator Hickenlooper at his home, the only member of the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee available. Mr. Allison went over the Korean armistice negotiations along the same lines as above. Senator Hickenlooper stated that he did not agree with the position being taken on the airfield question and intended to oppose it, although in view of the present state of negotiations he would not, as planned, speak in the Senate on the subject the early part of next week.

795.00/4-352 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, April 26, 1952—6:34 p. m.

C 67603. For info, CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 1190.

"There follows the opening statement which I intend to make in presenting the package proposal in plenary session. This statement is substantially as approved by you, except for major additions (fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs) made essential by recent events in item 4 staff officers' meetings.

"For more than 9 months our 2 delegations have been negotiating for an armistice which will bring a cessation to hostilities in Korea. We have progressed to the point where only 3 issues remain between us and final agreement on an armistice. These three issues concern first, whether there will or will not be restrictions on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields; second, the basis of exchange of prisoners of war; and third, the nations to compose the neutral nations supervisory commission.

"As for the first issue, for many weeks the United Nations Command delegation has stated that in order to maintain the stability of the armistice and prevent the creation of tension which might lead to a resumption of hostilities it is highly desirable that restrictions be placed on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. Your side has opposed this limitation on what would be a manifest increase of offensive potentiality upon the ground that it would constitute interference by one side in the internal affairs of the other. Yet, if your side is moving in good faith toward an armistice, you should have no hesitation in agreeing not to build up your military air potential.

"As for the second issue I have referred to, for many weeks the UNC delegation has stated that all POWs must be released but that only those should be repatriated or turned over to the other side who can be delivered without the application of force. Your side has opposed this principle and has, instead, insisted that certain POWs must be repatriated even if physical force is necessary, asserting that to accord respect to the feelings of the individual prisoner is unprecedented and deprives a prisoner of war of his rights. Your current attitude on this question is inconsistent with the historical facts that during the Korean war your side has followed the practice of inducting captured personnel into your armed forces, and that you have in this and other ways disposed of approximately 4/5 of the military personnel of our side who fell into your custody.

"The UNC holds as POWs some 116,000 North Koreans and Chinese People's Volunteers. 59,000, or more than 50 percent of this number held by our side will return to your side without being forced. In addition, some 11,000 citizens of the Republic of Korea, now in our custody, have elected to go to your side under the principle of free choice. This is in marked contrast to the 12,000 captured personnel of our side whom you have stated you will repatriate, a figure which is less than 20 percent of those you have admitted having taken into custody.

"The foregoing figures are now a basic factor in the prisoner of war question. It was with the [illegible] concurrence of your side that the POWs in our custody were screened to determine their attitude as regards repatriation. Once screened, POWs had to be segregated in accordance with their individual determination. No action can now be taken by either side to alter materially this situation. It is an accomplished fact. For you to pretend otherwise would be completely unrealistic.

"Moreover our side has indicated our willingness to send to your side any prisoners of war who may change their views on repatriation between the time of the initial determination and the completion of the exchange of POWs. We have also informed you that, if you wish, you may verify the results of our screening processes after the armistice is signed. Your side can at that time interview those persons held by the UNC who have indicated that they would violently oppose being returned to your side. If any indicate that they are not still so opposed, the UNC will return them promptly to your side.

"Lastly, in regard to the third issue, although both sides agreed to nominate mutually acceptable nations to compose the neutral nations supervisory commission, you have continued to insist on membership for a nation which the UNC will not accept.

"The issues are clearly drawn. The discussions of the past several months have clearly defined the differences on the issues, but such discussions have failed to develop any common ground for resolving these differences. Within the limit of these discussions each side has indicated that its position is firm and unshakeable. We believe that because of the strong views already set forth by both sides in the respective meetings, we will only prolong the stalemate on each of the three differences if we attempt to discuss them further or to settle them separately. Therefore, we believe it absolutely essential that the three remaining issues be settled together. It is evident that if both sides remain adamant in their present position on the three issues, these negotiations will be deadlocked indefinitely. If an armistice agreement is to result from our efforts here, if we are to bring about the long-awaited cessation of hostilities in Korea, if we are to build the bridge which is to lead to a solution of the Korean problem, the three issues must be resolved at the earliest practicable date. There are two ways to accomplish this objective: Either one side could concede on all issues, or each side could accede to the position taken by the other side on some of the remaining issues. The only alternative to the foregoing is for these delegations to admit that they have failed to accomplish their mission.

"I state categorically that the United Nations Command will not accede to your demands on all matters at issue. I assume that you would make a similar statement on behalf of your delegation. It is clear, then, that unless you are willing to accept the entire responsibility for the failure of these negotiations, you must join us in seeking a compromise solution which both sides may accept in the interest of reaching an early agreement on an armistice.

"The United Nations Command has carefully reviewed the positions taken by both sides on the three issues. It remains our conviction that the stability of an armistice would be increased by restricting rehabilitation and reconstruction of military airfields. We are fully aware that you consider that any such restriction constitutes interference in your internal affairs. We utterly disagree with your contention in this regard, since this is a military armistice, designed to freeze the military situation in *status quo* pending a final peaceful settlement. However, in the interest of reaching an early armistice agreement, we are willing to accede to your stand that no restriction be placed on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields.

"I must make it absolutely clear however, that our acceptance of your position regarding airfields is contingent upon your acceptance of our positions regarding prisoners of war and the composition of the neutral nations supervisory commission. As you know, our position regarding prisoners of war is the exchange of 12,100 prisoners of war of our side for approximately 70,000 of your side. You also know that our position regarding the neutral nations supervisory commission is that this commission shall be composed of representatives from the four neutral nations which are acceptable to both sides.

"The United Nations Command delegation submits a draft wording for the entire armistice agreement.[1] This draft wording incorporates all the agreements hitherto reached on agenda items 2, 3, 4, and 5. It omits any restriction on the rehabilitation and construction of military airfields. It provides a specific agreement on the nations composing the neutral nations supervisory commission. Lastly, it provides a practical and realistic basis for the exchange of prisoners of war.

"We formally proposed that this draft armistice wording be approved *in toto* by our delegations and that the liaison officers be directed to prepare the formal armistice agreement for signature by our respective commanders. Our liaison officers will be prepared to discuss details concerning minor changes in wording and necessary administrative matters.

"The United Nations Command has now made its final offer in an effort to reach an armistice. The UNC delegation desires to make it unmistakably clear to you that we will not agree to any substantive change in this proposal, and that we are absolutely firm that this proposal must be considered as a whole. The fate of this armistice conference, and future peace in Korea, now rest fully and exclusively with you. Signed Joy."

---

[1] Not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 76a).

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)

TOP SECRET FLASH TOKYO, April 27, 1952—5:17 p. m.

C 67640. Reference JCS 907347[1] and CINCFE CX 67619.[2]

1. The following are the comments of the UNC delegation on JCS 907347.

"A. This proposal appears to be based on JCS 906923.[3] Since the dispatch of this JCS message the negotiatory situation has been fundamentally altered by the enemy's unilateral abrogation of the executive sessions on agenda item 4. By this action Communists indicated their intention to try the POW case in open forum before world public opinion. Any attempt now to avoid meeting the enemy in their chosen forum prejudices negotiating position of the UNC.

"B. A proposal of inter executive session is wholly inconsistent with our objective which is to avoid substantive discussion of the package proposal elements. It is implicit in the idea of executive sessions that full and free discussion will be encouraged, in fact is the very purpose of executive session, which invites fullest exchange of points of view.

"C. To present the package in an executive session proposed by the UNC tends to indicate we are fearful of public reaction to it in its present form. The enemy would be justified in drawing the inference that the package did not in fact represent our 'final' position, and that further concessions by the UNC might be expected.

"D. All separate elements of the package proposal have been fully publicized individually particularly the POW question, which the enemy has thrown before the world. The nature of the compromise proposed in our package has unfortunately been repeatedly suggested in the press.

---

[1] JCS 907347, dated Apr. 26, was drafted in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army, at the request of U. Alexis Johnson; transmitted to CINCFE after clearance in the offices of the military service chiefs by Bolté. In it, the JCS advised Ridgway that "belief here is that exec sessions would offer most fav atmosphere for introduction of package proposal. Unless proposal for exec session is clearly rejected by Communists prior to holding of plenary session, we urge that proposal for exec sessions be made at opening of plenary." (795.00/4–352)

[2] This telegram, addressed to Bradley, and sent early in the morning, local time, of Apr. 27 (270210Z April 1952), was Ridgway's urgent response to JCS 907347. It read:

"1. Was deeply concerned over the possible consequences of last minute basic change in our planned course of action, occasioned by JCS 907347. Since I could only interpret last sentence as a directive, and since upon its receipt I had less than two hours to act, following its receipt, I dispatched my CX 67613 [not printed] to UNC Del at once by flash msg, info to you.

"2. One hour later, at urgent telephonic request of Adm. Joy, and prior to departure of delegation for Panmunjom, I authorized Joy to request immediately a postponement of today's plenary session, in order that UNC Del views of what it considers to be the potentially serious consequences of this change of action planned for today, might receive full consideration.

"3. Immediately following my receipt of delegation views I shall, I believe, wish to submit recommendations to you as a matter of great urgency.

"4. The purpose of this msg is to express the hope that such recommendations can receive immediate action and I be informed ASAP thereafter." (795.00/4–352)

[3] Dated Apr. 22, p. 166.

"E. To cover in a cloak of secrecy the equitable solution offered in our package deprives us of the public support induced by its fairness and by the fact the UNC has made a major concession in a sincere effort to reach an armistice. Secrecy of our offer invites speculation by press of free world that UNC may be abandoning its actual POW position, a position which has been strongly supported by US press. Ultimate disclosure of unchanged UNC position in this regard may not correct lack of public support at time it is most needed.

"F. There is now no particular inducement to the enemy implicit in the executive session, since their acceptance of the package would immediately result in an armistice, with attendant full publicity of the agreement reached.

"G. There is no guarantee that the enemy would agree to executive session. Yet regardless of whether the enemy accepts or rejects the executive session, the mere proposal of it by the UNC weakens our position."

2. I concur, but far more than that, I feel the action I am urged to take for the stated purpose of developing the Communist reaction to an approach already rendered meaningless and sterile thru the swift sequence of events since the idea of that approach was first suggested, would gravely prejudice such chances as exist for the successful accomplishment of our mission. All our actions had been carefully planned, coordinated and approved with the clear recognition that each was an essential link in one strong chain connecting our principles with our package proposal. To me delay or hesitation at this stage would expose us to grave loss of confidence by our friends and ridicule by our foes.

3. I therefore urge with all earnestness that you at once grant me full authority to proceed with action as planned, reported and approved prior to receipt of your 907347.

795.00/4–352 : Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) [1]

TOP SECRET FLASH WASHINGTON, April 27, 1952—12:01 p. m.

JCS 907378. From JCS. Urmsg C 67640.[2] Based upon UNC Del comment in Para 12 B HNC 1182 [3] understanding here was decision as to form of plenary to be proposed was being held in abeyance until immediately preceding opening session plenary. Also view here was that since dispatch of JCS 906923 [4] desirability of proposing executive sessions plenary had increased for reasons set forth in detail below, and therefore JCS 907347 [5] was dispatched to give you full benefit of latest thinking here. Although most careful consideration has been given points made in your C 67640 view here is that advantages of at least proposing executive sessions of plenary dels are overriding.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Major Dwan and approved at a 10:30 meeting at the Pentagon attended by Bradley, Bolté, Jenkins, Eddleman, Dwan, and for the Department of State by Allison, Bohlen, and Johnson. Bolté had secured the approval of the other Chiefs of Staff prior to the meeting. Bradley then cleared the message with Lovett and Truman. (Memorandum for the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Apr. 29, 1952, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea)

[2] *Supra.*

[3] This telegram is not printed; it included the substance of the record of the Staff Officers meeting on item 4 of Apr. 24 as well as comments by the UNC Delegation (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 38).

We realize that likelihood of Communists acceptance of package proposal under either procedure is questionable at best. However, we feel any chance Communist acceptance our minimum terms as contained in package proposal is enhanced by presentation in executive session.

If Communists accept executive session and breach understanding in attempt gain initial propaganda advantage we feel this places on them clear onus for failure to reach agreement and would in effect improve our propaganda position. If Communists refuse proposal for executive sessions, thus rejecting another clear effort by UNC to prevent negotiations falling into propaganda morass, Communists incur serious additional onus. This will facilitate important objective of maintaining allied unity and support for positions taken in package proposal as well as continued support US Govt policies in event negotiations are suspended or broken off by Communists.

Therefore, we desire you instruct UNC Del to proceed as directed by you in CX 67613.[6] If Communists reject proposal for executive sessions, you are authorized to drop proposal, and to proceed at once in open session with action as planned and approved prior to receipt of JCS 907347. Consider it highly important begin plenary session soonest, if possible on morning April 28 your time.

---

[4] Dated Apr. 22, p. 166.

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

[6] This telegram, dated Apr. 26, 1952, is not printed; in it Ridgway instructed Joy to introduce the package proposal in executive session (795.00/4–352).

Editorial Note

The UNC and Communist Delegates convened in plenary session at 11 a.m. on April 28, 1952. The UNC Delegate expressed his intention to propose an overall settlement in executive session. Following a 30-minute recess, the Communist Delegate agreed to go into executive session. The UNC Delegate, Admiral Joy, made his statement (for text, see telegram C 67603, Ridgway to JCS, April 26, page 173) which was duly noted by the Communist Delegate, General Nam Il, who asked for another short recess until 2:30 p. m. Following this recess, General Nam stated, "Our side fails to see how your proposal this morning can really be of help to an overall settlement of the remaining issues." Nam then called for a recess. Joy made the final statement before adjournment of the session when he reemphasized that the UNC offer was its "final and irrevocable effort." Thus the "Package Proposal" was delivered. A record of the substance of this session, in telegram C 67677, Ridgway to JCS, April 28, 1952, is in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 87.

INR–NIE files

Special National Intelligence Estimate [1]

TOP SECRET
SE–25

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1952.

MILITARY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE COMMUNIST ATTACK IN KOREA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE [2]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate, on the basis of military indications, Communist intentions with regard to a large-scale military attack in Korea in the immediate future.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There has been a general strengthening of Communist military capabilities in Korea since the beginning of the armistice negotiations. The enemy is credited with a greater offensive potential than he had previously enjoyed and is believed capable of launching a major ground attack with little warning, and air attacks which initially could be of substantial proportions.

2. In recent weeks there has been increased enemy activity in Korea. There have also been reports, partly unconfirmed, of aggressive enemy intentions. These activities and reports do not constitute acceptable indications of a Communist intent to initiate large-scale offensive action in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the increased military activity in Korea and the general situation in Korea may represent preparations taken in anticipation of a political decision either:

a. To launch a limited offensive, with little or no warning; or
b. To undertake a large-scale offensive.

---

[1] Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE's) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SNIE's were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of the SNIE's.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Apr. 24, 1952.

DISCUSSION

Communist Capabilities in Korea

3. During the armistice negotiations, the Communists have substantially increased their capabilities in Korea. They have replaced their losses, re-equipped their units, retrained their troops, and reorganized and redisposed their forces. They have built up their ground forces from an estimated 502,000 to the present estimate of 866,000 personnel. Qualitative improvement has accompanied the quantitative build-up; they have made significant additions of armor and artillery and have substantially increased the fire power of all units. (A detailed chart of build-up since July 1951 is attached hereto as Annex "A.")[3]

4. The Communists have made excellent use of the long period of fairly static operations to improve their logistical position. As a result the supply position of the Communists in forward areas, despite continued air and naval attacks by UN forces, is far better than at any time since the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

5. The enemy ground forces in Korea could launch a major attack with little warning. It is estimated that the Communists have the logistic capability to maintain the momentum of a major offensive for from 5 to 10 days. Difficulties in connection with the movement of supplies from forward dumps to the attacking units would be the limiting factor.

6. The capabilities of the Communist Air Force in the Korean area (North Korea, Manchuria, and Northeast China) have improved steadily and rapidly. During the armistice negotiations, the estimated Communist combat aircraft strength in the Korean area has increased from 500 aircraft to the present total of 1,250 aircraft plus 75 transports, including an increase from 450 jet fighters to the current 800. There are also 400 combat aircraft deployed in south and central China which could not be committed in Korea without redeployment. There is a sufficient number of operational airfields in Manchuria from which attacks by the above aircraft could be launched against UN forces. An apparently effective system of air control and warning is believed operating in North Korea. Communist pilots in Manchuria have been engaged in an intensive training program. The Communists have also demonstrated a significant capability to support logistically a sizeable air force in Manchuria.

7. The Communist Air Force in the Korean area could launch an air attack which might inflict substantial damage upon United Nations ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of communications in Korea. Initially, a force of approximately 500 MIG-15's, 150 piston-engined fighters and 150 light bombers could be made available, but

---

[3] Not printed; it is a chart comparing Chinese Communist forces and North Korean Army strength in July 1951 and April 1952.

without unusual success in countering UN efforts against this attack, it is believed it could not be sustained.

Indications of Communist Military Intentions in Korea

Ground

8. In recent weeks there have been several indications, generally unconfirmed, of increased enemy activity in Korea.

a. The movement of two Chinese Communist armies, one forward towards the western sector and one eastward towards the central sector, has been accepted. The movement of three other CCF armies toward the western sector has been reported but is unconfirmed.

b. Reports of PW's and other information point to the possibility of a forward movement of some armored vehicles from the Wonson area on the east coast. Elements of the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions are accepted as attached to or in direct support of front-line units on the west and west central fronts. Other elements of these two divisions remain unlocated. During the past several months unconfirmed reports have also referred to the southward movement of the North Korea V Corps.

9. During the past few weeks there have been four PW reports of a new offensive. Most PW's, however, have continued to refer to enemy defensive plans, including the strengthening of defense fortifications and the rotation of front-line units.

10. The possibility that the enemy is preparing to relieve some front-line units is further suggested by PW reports that the CCF 67th Army will relieve the 68th Army and that the CCF 26th Army is to be relieved in the immediate future. There is no confirmation, however, that the relief of any front-line units is under way.

11. There has been one recent report that North Korean guerrilla forces are being trained to infiltrate UN lines (a tactic which has preceded previous offensives). This report receives some substantiation from the recent capture by UN forces of a small number of line-crossers.

Air

12. The most significant recent incident with respect to enemy air activity was a visual sighting on 13 April of 450 jet aircraft on Tatungku airfield and 50 on Antung airfield. This is approximately twice the number of aircraft ever before sighted on these airfields and very nearly the total estimated MIG–15 strength in Manchuria. Although an error of up to 75 aircraft in this sighting is possible, this report is regarded as substantially accurate. Subsequent observations during the day disclosed that this total has been reduced to approximately 200 aircraft on both fields. Possible explanations for this concentration are that bad weather precluded the use of other Manchurian airfields or that this was a test of personnel and facilities under crowded conditions. It is also possible

that this represented a "show of force" designed to influence the armistice discussions.

13. Other indications that the enemy may be preparing for increased air activity, possibly including operations over South Korea on a large scale, were: (*a*) the reported observation on 1 April of a MIG-15 over the Seoul-Suwon area on what appeared to be a photo-reconnaissance flight; (*b*) recent increased willingness of enemy pilots to engage UN aircraft; (*c*) reported repairs of Pyongyang airfields; and (*d*) observation of some vehicle activity at Taechon airfield on 13 April, the first observation of activity at any of the three airfields in the Sinanju area in some time.

795.00/4-352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 29, 1952—6:04 p. m.

CX 67738. Re C 67178.[1] Available data on Opn SCATTER as of 28 Apr is shown below:

1. Total number screened to return to Communist control: NK POWs 25492, SK POWs 4240, CCF 5202, CIs 3657, total 38591.

2. The total number of unscreened POWs and CIs in compounds where screening has not been initiated: NK POWs 39471, SK POWs 263, CCF 1147, CIs 6449, total 47330.

3. Results to date of rescreening those who initially were screened and elected to remain in the UNC custody:

Col A. Initially screened to remain with UNC; NK 31369, SK 11602, CCF 14487, CI 26120, total 83578.

Col B. Number of those Col A rescreened; NK 29179, SK 10987, CCF 14127, CI 21059, total 75352.

Col C. Total number remaining in UNC custody after rescreening; NK 29062, SK 10906, CCF 13712, CI 20919, total 74599.

Col D. Total number who reversed decision and are to return to Communists; NK 117, SK 81, CCF 415, CI 140, total 753.

4. Shipment from Koje-Do of those who will be retained in UNC custody after rescreening: NK POWs 19045, SK POWs 9043, CCF 10712, CIs 15974, total 54774.

---

[1] Dated Apr. 19, p. 160.

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, April 29, 1952—11:15 p. m.

CX 67750. Re CX 67738.[2]

1. *Koje-Do:* It now appears clearly evident that in those compounds at Koje-Do yet to be screened, any screening and segregation program will meet with violent resistance.

a. These compounds are well organized and effective control cannot be exercised within them without use of such great degree of force as might verge on the brutal and result in killing and wounding quite a number of inmates. While I can execute such forced screening, I believe that the risk of violence and bloodshed involved, both to UNC personnel and to the inmates themselves, would not warrant this course of action. Further, the unfavorable publicity which would probably result, regardless of our attempts to keep the forced screening program from the press, would provide immediate and effective Communist propaganda material extremely difficult to counteract at this stage of negotiations.

b. Therefore, unless instructed to the contrary, I plan to omit screening of those compounds at Koje-Do which have violently opposed the screening program to date, and list all their inmates for return to Communist control. In the event that any inmates of these compounds should forcibly oppose return to Communist control at the time the exchange takes place, they would then be retained in UNC custody and their names deleted from the rosters submitted to the Communists with appropriate explanation.

c. This course of action would, I think, conform to US principles on POW issue.

2. *Pusan:* A different situation exists at hospital compound number 10 at Pusan where there are approximately 3500 POWs and civilian internees yet to be screened. General Van Fleet reports that a situation has developed in this compound which requires immediate action to establish firm control and to protect sick and wounded. Such action may involve force and possible loss of life. Such screening as is practicable will be conducted at this compound but only as an incident to establishment of necessary control.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.

[2] *Supra.*

3. Since screening, with preparation of final rosters, is scheduled to begin on or about 1 May, request approval of action outlined in para l*a*, or other instructions, ASAP.[3]

---

[3] In telegram JCS 907528, dated Apr. 29, 1952, the JCS approved Ridgway's plan to omit the screening of those compounds where he feared the process would meet with violence. Ridgway was also explicitly ordered not to furnish the Communist Delegation with any additional lists of POWs at that time (795.00/4-352).

795.00/4-3052

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1952.

Subject: Letter from President Syngman Rhee, March 21, 1952

I am transmitting to you herewith President Syngman Rhee's reply [2] to your letter of March 4, 1952 [3] in which you requested his assurances of the continued cooperation of the Government of the Republic of Korea with the United Nations Command. Although President Rhee gives assurances of his personal cooperation in any armistice which may be concluded, he points out that to be effective an armistice agreement must also receive the support of the Korean people. He suggests that in order to encourage such support, the United States and the Republic of Korea negotiate a mutual security pact at an early date and endeavor to speed up the expansion program for the Korean armed forces. I recommend that you do not reply to President Rhee's letter but I believe that the points which he raises should receive our most careful consideration.

Although I believe that it would not be in our national interest to negotiate a mutual security pact at this time, I suggest that every opportunity to be taken to reassure the Korean Government and people that it is not the intention of the United States or of the United Nations to desert the Republic and thus leave it exposed to a renewed Communist aggression. So long as the United States and the United Nations retain adequate military forces in Korea there would seem to be no necessity for a formal security agreement. Prior to the withdrawal or large-scale reduction of forces, however, I would suggest that the entire question be reviewed by the National Security Council.

With regard to President Rhee's recommendation for an accelerated military expansion program, the objectives of such a program are entirely in accord with the policy approved by you in NSC 118/2,[4] to the effect that this Government should assist the Republic of Korea to increase her capabilities for assuming a greater responsibility for the defense of her boundaries. I believe that our endeavors in this direction should continue to be carried out as vigorously and rapidly as is consistent with our world wide commitments, in order that the Republic's forces may play a considerably greater role in her own defense and thus in the maintenance of the security of the Far East. The Departments of State and Defense are maintaining close coordination on this problem and no action on your part is required at this time.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and cleared by McClurkin and Young of that same office. It was then cleared by Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson as well as Meloy of S/S. The memorandum went through a number of minor revisions, the history of which can be found in the following documents, none printed: memorandum by Young to Johnson, Apr. 8 (795.00/4-852); memorandum by Allison to Acheson, Apr. 18 (795.00/3-452); and memorandum by Walmsley to Matthews, Apr. 22 (795B.11/3-2752).

[2] The letter from Rhee was not filed with the source text. For text, see p. 114.

[3] *Ante*, p. 74.

DEAN ACHESON

---

[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

II. MAY 1–JULY 14, 1952: THE SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL CRISIS AND THIRD PARTY APPROACHES TO END THE WAR

POW INCIDENTS; THE MEYER MISSION; KOREAN POLITICAL CRISIS; INDIAN-CHINESE DISCUSSIONS ON A POW SETTLEMENT AND CONSIDERATION OF AN APPROACH TO THE USSR; EXECUTIVE SESSIONS AT PANMUNJOM

795.00/5–252

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Barbara Evans of the Office of the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1952.

Participants: Mr. Short
Mr. Acheson

Mr. Short telephoned the Secretary today and referred to Syngman Rhee's letter of March 21 to President Truman [1] and to the Secretary's memorandum to the President [2] recommending that there be no reply. Mr. Short said that the President thought that the letter should have a reply. The President had said he thought Rhee's letter was a very good letter and deserved a reply and that the reply should be sent at an early date. Mr. Short asked if the Secretary thought there was a possibility of a non-committal reply.

The Secretary said he thought there could be, but the troublesome thing was the question Rhee raised of the possibility of a security treaty. The Secretary pointed out that we could not enter into this and it would be difficult to write a letter which would ignore it or brush it off. We could not give him encouragement. The Secretary said that in answer to the President's feeling that it would be discourteous not to reply, that any letter sent to Rhee would be a reply to the Rhee reply to the President's previous letter, and that this might involve a long correspondence which would be difficult to shut off.

Mr. Short then suggested that maybe some sort of message could be gotten informally through Muccio to Rhee giving him the President's greetings and saying that the President was pleased with Rhee's letter. Mr. Acheson said he thought this was a good suggestion and he would try to have Mr. Allison draft something to be submitted to the President when Mr. Acheson sees him on Monday.[3]

---

[1] For the text of this letter, see p. 114.

[2] *Supra.*

---

[3] Acheson met with Truman on Monday, May 5. He showed the President a reply worked out by Allison and Short and the President approved it. (Secretary's Memoranda with the President, lot 65 D 238) For the text of the reply to Rhee, see memorandum by Allison, May 2, p. 189.

795.00/5–252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1952.

Subject: Extraordinary Efforts to Bring About an Armistice in Korea.

In view of the current status of the Korean truce negotiations, I believe that we should consider two steps which might help bring about an armistice on our terms:

1. *Approach to Nehru.*

We should consider asking Ambassador Bowles to invite Nehru's intercession with the Communists to agree to an armistice on the basis of our package offer. Indications from New Delhi are that India supports our position on the prisoner of war question as well as on the question of excluding Russia from the neutral observation commission. It is pleased with our decision to concede on the airfields question. There would seem to be a reasonable chance, therefore, that Nehru might agree to approach either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that these are the only issues remaining in the truce negotiations, there is no danger that Nehru might insist that we make some concessions in return.

If Nehru agrees to make the approach, it might have some effect on the Communists. In any event, it could do little harm and if the approach is made and fails, it would help bring home to Nehru Communist intransigence and accelerate the process of his education in regard to the East-West struggle.

2. *Approach to the Russians.*

We should also consider an approach to the Russians through Ambassador Kennan. We would make it clear to the Russians that this is our final offer, stress the dangers inherent in failure of the armistice talks and continuation of the Korean fighting, and emphasize that an armistice in Korea could be a first step towards solution of the Korean problem and thereafter to consideration of other Far Eastern questions troubling the peace of the world.

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Matthews, Perkins, Allison, Byroade, Bohlen, and Nitze.

If such an approach to the Russians is to be made, we would have to consider its timing both in regard to the status of the negotiations at Panmunjom and in regard to the possible Nehru approach discussed above. As to the latter, it would seem that the two approaches are not inconsistent and would supplement each other, and we might consider whether they should be more or less simultaneous, or have one follow the other.

It might be desirable for us to get together on these suggestions after you have had some time to consider them.

J. D. H.

795.00/5-252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1952.

Subject: Reply to President Rhee's Letter of March 21, 1952 to the President.

I refer to your telephone conversation of May 2 [1] with the White House Press Secretary, Mr. Joseph Short, concerning a reply to President Syngman Rhee's letter of March 21, 1952. The following is the text of a suggested informal message which Ambassador Muccio at Pusan might give to President Rhee with regard to this letter: [2]

"You are requested to convey to Dr. Rhee the President's greetings and say that the President deeply appreciated his letter of March 21, 1952, which he has read with great interest. You should then inform President Rhee that the contents of his letter have been made available to the various officials of the United States Government, concerned with Korean affairs, and that the points which he has raised therein will be most helpful in future policy considerations with respect to Korea." [3]

---

[1] See the memorandum, p. 187.

[2] In telegram 800 to Pusan, May 6, 1952, Muccio received instructions to convey this informal message from Truman to Rhee. (795.00/5-652)

[3] At the bottom of the source text are the initials "H.S.T." in Truman's handwriting.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 6, 1952—11:55 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 908093. From JCS re JCS 907528.[1]

1. We fully appreciate difficulty of situation in compounds at Koje-Do cited in para 1*b* ur CX 67750.[2] Since screening is not feasible, we

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to CX 67750, p. 185.

[2] Dated Apr. 29, p. 184.

approve your plan to list inmates of these compounds for return to Communist control. We assume no new or revised list will be given to Communists until after general agreement in principle has been reached by both sides to Armistice terms.

2. Re second sentence para 1*b*, we are concerned that any deletions from rosters after exchange of new lists might subject UNC to Communist propaganda charge of abrogating part of agreement with possible adverse effect on prompt return of UNC POWs in Communist hands. Suggest therefore you consider feasibility of some form of announcement to inmates of unscreened compounds to effect that, on str of previous affirmations of compounds leaders, UNC assumes all inmates of these compounds desire to return to other side, and that they will be so returned folg an Armistice. Whether such announcement could be combined with some type of at least nominal opportunity for those who violently object to repatriation to express their sentiments is questionable, although considered desirable. It might be assumed that those inmates who would violently oppose return would, if given chance, be as willing now to run the risks attendant on an expression of their feelings as at time of POW exchange. Once this opportunity had been given, all inmates would be aware that time for choice has passed. UNC could then consider all inmates of these compounds to be in same status as those others who, after interviews, did not give evidence of violently opposing return to Communists, and who were told that segregation, once effected, was final.

3. Request your comments.

795B.5/3-452

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1952.

Subject: Reply to Defense Department's proposals of March 4, 1952 [2] regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistical support furnished foreign troops in Korea

Background:

Since September 1950 the U.S. has dealt with questions regarding reimbursement for logistical support provided foreign troops in Korea according to a directive of the Secretary of Defense, concurred in by State and Treasury and approved by the President. In general the following procedure has been followed: (1) Before the U.S. accepts an offer of troops, the offering government is required to acknowledge an obligation to reimburse the U.S. for any logistical support furnished, the terms to be negotiated at a later time. (2) Some time after the troops are in Korea, the U.S. initiates negotiations with the objective of obtaining an agreement, if possible, for regular dollar payments on a current basis. Alternative terms of settlement can be considered if the preferred terms are not obtainable. Decisions on the application of the directive to individual cases are made by State, Defense, and Treasury through informal consultation.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Mortimer Goldstein of the Monetary Affairs Staff of the Office of Financial and Development Policy and cleared by Jack C. Corbett and Alexander M. Rosenson of that same office. It was then cleared by Ruth Bacon of FE, Ward P. Allen of EUR, Charles R. Burrows of ARA, Harry M. Howard of NEA, Joseph J. Sisco of UNA, Walter N. Walmsley of C, and Alfred G. Vigderman of L/E.

[2] Not printed (795B.5/3-452).

Defense now proposes that this procedure be changed by making the "cash-on-delivery" provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act [3] the foundation of U.S. reimbursement policy. The U.S. would seek to obtain agreement on handling reimbursement under Section 408(e) before accepting any new offers of troops and would also seek agreement on such terms wherever reimbursement negotiations with respect to forces now in Korea have not yet been concluded. This proposal, it is believed, would not only have effects inimical to the primary U.S. objective of obtaining additional offers of troops for Korea but would put the U.S. in a difficult position in negotiating for reimbursement. Furthermore, contrary to the Defense view, the Department's legal analysis indicates that the Congress did not intend Korean reimbursement matters to be dealt with under Section 408(e).

Defense also proposes that the National Security Council be responsible for financial decisions in this field. It is not believed that this would be an appropriate job for the Council, although it is recognized that more formal arrangements than now exist in the Executive Branch might be desirable.

Defense proposes, lastly, that State take over from Defense the primary responsibility for handling negotiations with foreign governments on reimbursement. This proposal would give to State a responsibility that Defense desired in 1950 and that probably should not have been assigned outside of the State Department in the first instance.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Secretary Lovett (Tab A).[4]

---

[3] Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-329), approved Oct. 6, 1949; for its text, see *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 63, part 1, pp. 715-721.

[4] The letter to Lovett, not printed, was signed and a copy was attached to the source text. Also attached to the source text were copies of an undated, unsigned memorandum on section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and a copy of the directive of the Secretary of Defense of Sept. 1, 1950; neither is printed.

695A.0024/5–1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, May 12, 1952—3 p. m.

1100. No distribution. Eyes only for Park Armstrong from Chase.[1] Arrived eleventh. Delay Tokyo regretted but, resulted useful meeting Lt. Aoa Meisling, one of senior "linguists" handling screening Chinese POW's. Selected as China expert, he came fresh to task with no previous POW connection. I have known and respected him since my 1943 Pentagon assignment.

Based his own observations and harrowing experiences as active participant before SCATTER operation including premature orientation phase, outstanding feature was extent pro-Nationalist POW's controlling administration camps 72 and 86 (Main hq. camps totaling 14,350 men) dominated proceedings through violent systematic terrorism and physical punishment of those choosing "against going Taiwan" (as the issue was militantly advertised by pro-Nationalists) throughout both orientation and screening phases. Severe beatings, torture, some killings. Meisling estimates this factor reduced Chinese POW's choosing repatriation by upwards 2000. He believed other linguists' impressions similar his own. Showed me supporting top secret memorandum[2] he prepared "for record" only (in view his non-connection regular POW work). Carefully detailed, impressive.

G–1 and G–2 officers regularly handling POW affairs (but not participating in actual screening) with whom I talked Tokyo, while admitting KMT violence during operation, showed disinclination treat or discuss it as possibly decisive factor (though agreeing some KMT cumulative camp influence probably not without some effect). G–1 officer who had specially recommended my seeing Meisling became distinctly unhappy when I expressed interest getting copy his memorandum, terming "only one man's observations," and I dropped request.

Accordingly, believe must feel my way cautiously this aspect, realizing of course, that Meisling's picture possibly overdrawn or untypical and in any case not entire answer to puzzle. Proposed discreetly seek opportunity interview one or two other supervising "linguists" (now understood scattered Korea, Tokyo, Hong Kong). Meanwhile, feel duty report my tentative feeling importance Meisling testimony as probably revealing one important factor that is better discoverable from linguists than POW's and that already materially lessens extent to which we likely find phenomenon attributable causes general long term significance.[3]

---

[1] The large number of Chinese prisoners who indicated in Operation SCATTER that they would violently resist repatriation prompted officials at the Department of State to question whether these sentiments reflected a significant lack of support for the Chinese regime or the People's Liberation Army. After agreement by the UNC, A. Sabin Chase, Chief of the Division of Research for the Far East, assisted by Philip Manhard of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, was sent to conduct interrogations of selected Chinese POWs; telegram 755 to Pusan, Apr. 22, 1952 (795.00/4–2252), and telegram C 67563, CINCUNC to the Department of the Army, Apr. 26, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 63).

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

Svensson M. Kogstad and other officers Tokyo all cooperative, helpful.

MUCCIO

---

[3] On May 23, Chase reported that his interrogation of sample Chinese POWs clearly showed that the screening results reflected local factors—not least among which was KMT camp influence—and were without importance from the standpoint of appraising the strength of the People's Republic of China (telegram 1147 from Pusan, May 23, 1952; 695A.0024/5-2352).

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY MUNSAN-NI, May 12, 1952.

HNC 1236. Reference HNC 1234.[2] This message in 3 parts.

Part I. It has become evident that the Communists will continue to use further meetings solely as a propaganda vehicle and that they have no intention of accepting the UNC proposal at least not for the immediate present. In effect, the Communists have laid down a challenge to the UNC to either back up its statements of finality regarding our package proposal, or compromise the POW issue. Today the Communists in effect challenged the UNC to terminate the conference unless we are willing to meet daily.

It may be that the Communists do not expect a concession by the UNC but are instead seeking to provoke the UNC into breaking off the conference, i.e. they are unwilling to meet our terms in order to get an armistice, but wish to put the onus for breaking off the talks on the UNC. We believe the issue must now be squarely faced. It appears to the delegation that the time for decisive action is here; that a determination must be arrived at to risk the onus of a possible breakoff of negotiations in a final effort to achieve an armistice. To continue along the present lines of action is to exhibit serious weakness at a time when a posture of strength is imperative. In view of the strong statements made by the President and other high officials of the United Nations that our present position is final, the delegation considers we should be authorized to announce unilaterally a suspension of the conferences until the Communists are ready to accept the UNC proposal of 28 April without substantive change. We would accompany this announcement with a statement that liaison officers would maintain contract [*contact*] during the period of suspension. We recognize that the Communists could utilize this action to support a charge that the UNC broke off negotiations. We also recognize that even were the Communists to break off negotiations themselves, they would charge the break-off to the UNC.

---

[1] Gen. Mark W. Clark assumed command of the following, effective 10 a.m. May 12: The Far East Command, the UN Command, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, and the governorship of the Ryukyu Islands. Clark transmitted this telegram from Joy to the JCS as C 68350, May 12, 1952, 6:40 p.m. A marginal notation on Clark's telegram indicated that the Secretary of State saw the cable.

[2] The telegram under reference, relayed by Clark to the JCS on May 12 as C 68349, contained the record of the plenary session of May 12 at Panmunjom, which was characterized by long and acrimonious propaganda statements and charges (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 78).

If the Communists will ever accept an armistice on our terms, the action recommended will not cause them to break off negotiations. If they are determined not to accept our terms, no action by UNC short of capitulation to their position will gain an armistice. Further discussion of the remaining issues is futile, since all have been exhaustively and thoroughly discussed. The UNC Delegation cannot thwart the Communist intent to utilize the Plenary Session as a propaganda outlet so long as these sessions continue.

Part II. Two courses of action are open, (1) We can continue to meet daily at Communists' insistence. This is an evidence of UNC weakness and follows Communist initiative and desires. (2) We can unilaterally suspend further meetings until the Communists are willing to accept our 28 April proposal without substantive change. We would, in this course of action, maintain contact through the liaison officers.

Part III. The delegation unanimously recommends implementation of course (2) at the discretion of the Chief Delegate.[3]

---

[3] General Clark cabled the JCS the following by separate telegram: "I heartily concur in the views of the Delegation and strongly recommend that I be authorized to implement course of action (2) at my discretion." This message was CX 68355, May 12, 1952 (795.00/5-3152). For Clark's recollection of why he supported the delegation's proposal, see his *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 104–105.

795.00/5-1452

Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with JCS, May 14, 1952.

The following were present at the meeting with the JCS on this date: Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Allison, Mr. Nitze, and

Mr. Johnson for State; General Bradley, General Bolte, Admiral Fechteler, and General Twining for the JCS.

First, a telegram to General Clark recommending approval of a request for USIS and news correspondents to film and record broadcasts of interviews of POWs who have been screened out as violent objectors to repatriation was discussed. It was the general view that USIS should not be permitted to undertake such an operation unless news correspondents were also given substantially the same privileges. It was felt that we have general free world support on our position on nonforcible repatriation and that such activities were not necessary to contribute to that support. In view of the explosive potentialities of the whole POW situation, it was the general view that requests of both USIS and news reporters should be denied. Mr. Johnson and General Bolte were instructed to prepare a reply along those lines.[1]

The desirability of General Clark's issuing a further clarifying statement with regard to the Koje Do incident involving Generals Dodd and Colson [2] was discussed. There was general agreement on the text of such a statement to be made by General Clark and it was decided that it would be recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense discuss the matter with the President.

There was then a general discussion of the reply to Admiral Joy's and General Clark's messages recommending a unilateral suspension of the armistice talks.[3] There was general agreement that now was an entirely inopportune time for such a unilateral suspension and that the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom should take greater advantage of the meetings to engage in a propaganda and psychological offensive against the Communists. There was also general agreement that consideration should be given to proposing at some stage during the present meetings of the Delegations an examination by an impartial body, including Communist observers, of the POWs violently objecting to repatriation in order completely to undermine the Communist contention that these POWs were being coerced and restrained by the UNC. General Bolte and Mr. Johnson were instructed to prepare a telegram along the foregoing lines to General Clark.[4]

---

[1] The reply was transmitted as DA 908803 to Clark, May 14, 1952, not printed (795.00/5-3152).

[2] On May 7, 1952, pro-Communist POWs of Compound 76 captured Brigadier General Dodd, the commandant of Koje-do Island prison camp, and demanded permission to organize and operate a vast POW organization as the price of Dodd's release. The prisoners later escalated their demands by insisting on a statement by the acting commandant, Brigadier General Colson, that UNC prison authorities would not undertake alleged force screening and inhumane treatment of prisoners in the future. To win Dodd's release Colson signed the statement late in the evening of May 10. Communist Delegates at Panmunjom made enormous propaganda advantage of this confession of supposed guilt. Extensive accounts of this incident and its important repercussions can be found in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 243–254 and Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 36–49. A contemporary narrative of the seizure is in telegram GX 5777 TAC KCG, Ridgway to JCS, May 8, 1952, not printed (795.00/5-3152).

[3] This reply was transmitted to Clark as JCS 908998, May 16, p. 203.

There was also general discussion of the desirability, at some time soon, of having Ambassador Kennan at Moscow make an approach of some kind to the Soviets on the question of the armistice negotiations with the view of making the UNC position on the negotiations completely clear to the Soviets. However, no decisions were reached on this.

There was also an inconclusive discussion of the necessity, at such time as decision might be reached unilaterally to suspend the armistice negotiations, of informing and obtaining support from our Allies for whatever military courses of action we intended to adopt under these circumstances. This discussion included mention of the possibility of "*de facto*" armistice conditions without an armistice agreement, as well as the possibilities of obtaining a *de facto* exchange of POWs prior to an armistice and eliminating from the armistice agreement the entire question of POWs.

---

[4] Telegram JCS 908998, p. 203.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: Shall we discuss the question of repudiating the Colson agreement?[2]

Mr. Matthews: Yes, we can do that. We think it would also be useful to discuss where we go from here in the negotiations.

General Bradley: We have several unanswered questions from over there.

Mr. Hickerson: Do you mean in connection with Nam Il's statement in the tent?[3]

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Chairman of the JCS General Bradley, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Fechteler and Vice Chiefs Generals Twining and Bolté attended. The Department of State contingent was headed by Matthews. General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense and Gleason represented the NSC. In all, 23 persons were present. In addition to the discussion on Korea, Berlin was a topic at this meeting.

[2] For information on the Colson agreement, see footnote 2, *supra.*

[3] Presumably the reference was to a statement on the Koje-do incident made at Panmunjom on May 14, 1952; the text was included in telegram C 68446, Clark to JCS, May 14, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 92).

General Bradley: Yes. We had a telecon with Clark and he had one with Van Fleet.[4] They are of the opinion that we should not take drastic steps in busting these officers until we know a little more about it. I don't know whether Clark spoke about repudiation in the telecon. The two unanswered questions were repudiation and the break-off of the Panmunjom sessions. He asked two more questions this morning. The first was that USIS had asked permission to take tape recordings of prisoners who elected to remain in U.N. custody. He recommended going ahead with this one. The second was that the press had asked to interview the prisoners who say they would forcibly resist repatriation. He believes this would help and would authorize the interviews in areas other than Kojedo unless we say no. I don't know what the Chief's thoughts are about these last two questions. The message just came in.[5] I think the first is O.K. but we ought to try these controlled interviews by the USIS and see what the situation is.

Mr. Matthews: It might stimulate pressure on our own prisoners.

Mr. Johnson: I don't think you could let the USIS do it and not let the rest of the press in.

Mr. Matthews: I am dubious of the whole operation.

General Bolte: During hostilities you don't let newspaper men talk to prisoners.

Mr. Bohlen: In the round-up of our missions which we undertook we have found strong support for our position in the countries I have seen reports from, so we don't need this sort of thing and it might hurt the chance of getting an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: My view is that we ought to throw out the whole damned press.

General Bolte: My people didn't see any objection, but I do.

General Bradley: Can the Army and Johnny Johnson get together and deal with this?

General Bolte: Yes.

Mr. Bohlen: We ought to get in any message the idea that we don't see the necessity for it since we have wide support.

Question of Calling Off the Meetings of Negotiators

General Bradley: Can we take up the question of calling off the meetings? I think we are in worse shape to do that now than we were a few days ago.

Mr. Matthews: That is right.

---

[4] The official record is located in teletype conference, DA TT 5819, May 13, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 86). For Clark's own recollection of these telecons, see his *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 47–48.

[5] The reference was to telegram CX 68425, Clark to Department of the Army, May 14, 1952, not printed (795.00/5-3152).

General Bradley: I think Joy could overcome a lot of this if he had an answer to the statements they make each day.

Admiral Fechteler: I don't think you could call the meetings off.

Mr. Matthews: Well, certainly before we called them off we would have to check with our allies.

General Bradley: Before calling them off I think we ought to step down the number—perhaps to one or two meetings a week.

Mr. Bohlen: There was a radio report that Nam Il said the meetings ought to end. If they are in that mood we may want to do something soon.

Mr. Johnson: With respect to our position, we sent a message several days ago saying we thought it important that our negotiators get statements out each day.[6] Admiral Joy came back and asked for reconsideration of this view and we wired him that we still thought he should issue counter-propaganda statements.[7]

General Bradley: He ought to issue a statement every day.

Mr. Nitze: I get the feeling there may be some problem between Washington and the field. They think it important to make it appear that the package deal is the final deal and yet the package deal has boiled down to a POW question as the only negotiable point. There is an area of possible negotiation in connection with the manner and timing of the rescreening of the POWs.

General Bolte: That is the strongest point in the whole thing.

Mr. Nitze: There is a line you could take—that the question comes down to one issue and a case should be built on that. The package deal as a whole does not make sense any more and the boys there are still stuck on that.

Mr. Hickerson: There is one possible slight variant that we discussed before the package proposal was made. That was to agree to Red Cross teams with observers from both sides interviewing before an armistice. The Turks and Australians suggested it as something to propose before a breakdown. The British have supported it also. In the tapering off process, Joy might make such a suggestion and link it up with Nam Il's claim of forcible retention. Then we could suggest a recess to allow them to consider it.

Mr. Matthews: It might be useful propagandawise but it won't help an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: It would in any case be useful for the Commies to reject something, since the situation is mixed up out there now by a combination of circumstances.

---

[6] The reference was to JCS 908433 to Ridgway, May 9, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–3152).

[7] The references were to telegrams CX 68269, Ridgway to JCS, and JCS 908528 to Ridgway, both May 10, 1952, neither printed (795.00/5–3152).

General Bradley: There is one thing to remember. Some of these prisoners may have changed their minds.

Mr. Hickerson: Yes, and a rescreening might lead to an armistice.

General Bradley: It would set us back in propaganda.

Mr. Bohlen: Not too much. We could prepare for that.

Mr. Hickerson: You face the contingency that some might change their minds even if you don't screen until after an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: The real problem is that the explosive nature of the camps would give them a field day.

Mr. Nitze: But you would restrict them to the camps of people who don't want to go back. You could get the Commies out of those camps in advance.

Mr. Matthews: I think you could handle it in the tame camps.

Mr. Bohlen: The question then is when such a suggestion should be made. Incidentally, I have had several questions from correspondents as to why the rescreening must follow the armistice.

Mr. Nitze: I think we would have some trouble with our negotiators who might consider this a weakening of our final position.

General Bradley: I think we could put the suggestion in at the end of one of the Commies' tirades.

Mr. Bohlen: It would be useful to show that we are not wedded to any particular method.

General Bradley: What is the feeling of the Chiefs?

Admiral Fechteler: Let's see a proposed dispatch.

General Bradley: I am afraid Joy will oppose it.

Admiral Fechteler: If it is spelled out that this is not a substantive change it might be O.K. with him.

Mr. Hickerson: The Australians asked us to hold up the package deal until we considered the suggestion but we said it would not be necessary since it would not be a substantive change.

Mr. Nitze: To get on with an armistice, we will have to do something that will still preserve the principle.

Repudiation of Colson Agreement

General Bolte: I understand the President feels it might be better if no formal statement were made. I can get off a message saying it now appears more firm here that Clark should make no further statement.

General Bradley: That is the question we ought to discuss here.

Mr. Bohlen: He has made one statement casting doubt on the validity of the agreement.[8] Both here and out there someone will ask a question and neither he nor we will be able to duck it completely.

Mr. Matthews: If he is going to answer a question he ought to have a careful statement.

---

[8] Bohlen was presumably referring to Clark's press release of May 12, 1952, which is described in Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu,* pp. 46–47.

Mr. Nitze: This is a nettle we really ought to grasp now.

General Bradley: Mr. Lovett thinks if we don't issue a statement we are likely to have a congressional investigation.

Mr. Matthews: I showed the draft to our Secretary who liked it.

General Bolte: Clark says the message is all right, except for the last sentence about a trap.

General Bradley: Mr. Lovett has redrafted that part but the redraft has an awful lot of surmises in it.

Admiral Fechteler: I think we are God damn lucky there hasn't been more interest in our press about what is happening to our prisoners.

General Bradley: What I am faced with is Mr. Lovett's desire to put something like this last paragraph in. We don't like it very well and you don't either.

Mr. Matthews: We don't mind if it says it was a trap for propaganda purposes.

General Bradley: That doesn't say much and Mr. Lovett thought there should be something more.

Mr. Johnson: Do we want to say we fell into a Communist trap.

General Bradley: We did.

Mr. Bohlen: I think the statement without the last paragraph would do what we want.

General Bradley: Yes, I thought that was enough. If we get it to that short a statement, do you think Clark should issue it?

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

Mr. Bohlen: I don't think he can avoid a statement.

General Bradley: I take it, it is your view that we should make the statement and that it should be this paragraph.

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

General Bradley: Can you make this statement without saying something about Colson and Dodd?

Mr. Nitze: I think it might be well to separate the two things.

General Bradley: Then if we agree to the first paragraph we don't have to ask for Clark's comments since he has already said the statement is O.K. except for the reference to the trap.

Won't the President be asked tomorrow at his Press Conference[9] if this statement means repudiation?

Mr. Bohlen: He can say the agreement has no validity and that the statement speaks for itself.

Mr. Matthews: We will speak to our Secretary.

General Bradley: I'll take it to Mr. Lovett.

Mr. Matthews: This statement[10] should be made before the President's Press Conference tomorrow.

---

[9] For a transcript of this conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953*, pp. 334–339.

[10] The text of the statement to be made by Clark was transmitted in telegram JCS 908789 to Clark, May 14, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–3152).

Mr. Nitze: It is better to protect the President from being in the position of repudiating the agreement.

General Bradley: Well, if that is agreed, we will go ahead with our Secretaries.

Mr. Matthews: Our allies are probably going to ask us what we are going to do next now that there is a stalemate in Panmunjom.

General Bradley: Johnson and Bolte are going to draft a message raising the point of a rescreening before an armistice.[11]

Mr. Matthews: We can probably get by for a bit.

General Bradley: I think the question is whether we continue as we are or enlarge the action. If we enlarge it I think we would have to go to Congress. I think a blockade is an act of war.

Mr. Matthews: If we enlarge the fighting we would certainly have to talk to our allies.

Mr. Nitze: I still feel we might consider an idea we took up earlier of some unilateral action in which we withdrew, leaving the South Koreans to hold the line and announcing if the line were violated we would take action against China. As a last resort, this might be better than extending hostilities or staying in Korea forever.

Mr. Hickerson: What bothers me is whether you would do this before doing something about our prisoners. There are other things you might want to offer first. Maybe you would offer to exchange 70,000 of their prisoners for ours without an armistice and stop the air attack.

Mr. Nitze: You could not stop the air attack until you were able to get your forces out.

Mr. Johnson: There have been instances when you have had an exchange of prisoners without an armistice.

General Bradley: Those are possibilities but I think we should try out the screening idea first.

Mr. Hickerson: That is right.

Mr. Matthews: Another idea is whether we should go to the Russians. Kennan is there now.

General Bradley: Maybe we should ask the Russians to go in and talk to the POWs and convince the Chinese that they really don't want to go back.

Mr. Matthews: They would not want to do that. I had in mind telling them we can't give up on this principle and see what they can suggest to bring about an armistice.

---

[11] Johnson and Bolté did not include the issue of rescreening prior to an armistice in their draft, which was transmitted as JCS 909104 to Clark, May 17, p. 208. Instead they omitted the issue altogether to allow further State–JCS consideration. Department of State comment on telegram JCS 909104, in draft, can be found in the memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Bohlen, Nitze, *et al.*, May 16, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 3).

Mr. Hickerson: There is a certain logic in making an approach to the Russians. It was Malik's speech that led to the negotiations.

Mr. Matthews: It is not as simple as that.

General Bradley: We approached them once, did we not?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, Kirk saw Vishinsky last fall.

Mr. Bohlen: In the Kirk–Vishinsky exchange [12] they blew it right off. It may or may not have had an effect on the resumption of meetings since the talks were stalled then, but I have not checked. I think the resumption came after that.

Mr. Stelle: It did.

Mr. Bohlen: You would not expect a direct result, but it still could affect the negotiations. What Stalin would have to do would be to weigh the risks. We have Kennan there now who could do it to the queen's taste.

General Bradley: I think the thing to do now is to get ahead with the rescreening idea.

Mr. Bohlen: One other possibility is to proceed ourselves with a rescreening by an international body and tell them to have observers there if they want to.

. . . .

---

[12] For background, substance, and results of the Kirk–Vishinsky conversations in Moscow, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 970 ff.

795.00/5-1552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 15, 1952.

Subject: Nehru–Eden Exchange Re Korean Armistice.

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, UK Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Henkin, UNP

Mr. Tomlinson called on instructions to inform the Department in strictest confidence of a recent exchange of communications between Prime Minister Nehru and Foreign Secretary Eden and left with us copies of the communications (attached).[2]

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Louis Henkin of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.

[2] The first communication was an undated copy of a letter from Nehru to Eden in which the Indian Prime Minister related a conversation in Peking between Madame Pandit, who was the head of an Indian cultural delegation, and Chou En-lai. Speaking with great earnestness, the Chinese Premier said that the POW question remained the main stumbling block to an armistice and expressed the hope that the British Government might use its influence with the United States to overcome this hurdle, thus preparing the *Continued*

In commenting on the exchange, the Foreign Office stated that it is fully aware of the possibility that the Chinese Communists may be attempting to break the united front of the participating nations on the prisoner of war exchange. At the same time, the Foreign Office felt that there is some possibility that the Chinese Communists may be looking instead for a face-saving device which would permit them to accept in substance the UNC position on this question.

I expressed the Department's appreciation at being informed of the exchange and the hope that the Embassy would let us know of any further reply from Nehru. I agreed that without being too optimistic of any fruits from these developments, it was important to follow them carefully in the hope that the Communists might be seeking a face-saving device which could lead to their acceptance of the UN position on PWs.

U. A. J.

---

way for a broader settlement in the Far East. Nehru asked Eden to consider whether some new approach could be made to break the deadlock over the POWs.

In the second communication Eden replied to Nehru by identifying the crux of the problem as the Communist assertion that prisoners described by the UNC as opting against repatriation were doing so because of force and intimidation and not by their own free will. Eden conceded that perhaps this belief could be genuinely held in Peking. He noted that to meet this difficulty, Ridgway had offered on May 7 a further impartial interrogation of POWs refusing repatriation by any suitable body or joint Red Cross teams with observers from both sides. The Communists, Eden continued, had plainly placed themselves in the wrong by refusing this fair offer. The issue of voluntary repatriation was so crucial, however, that Eden believed that no pains should be spared to clear up any doubts in Peking about the voluntary nature of the decision taken by those who opted against repatriation. Eden concluded that this could easily be established by suitably qualified independent investigators, but the problem was to induce the Communists to accept their findings.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 16, 1952—2:41 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 908998. From JCS.

1. In view of confused and unsettled public attitudes toward recent events involving POWs held by UNC, we do not consider it advisable to approve at this time recommendation for unilateral suspension of mtgs contained in CX 68355 [2] and HNC 1236.[3] Possible advantages of unilateral suspension set forth in HNC 1236 are recognized. However, it is considered that present disadvantages of unilateral suspension are overriding in terms of need for continued domestic and internatl sup-

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 194.

[3] Dated May 12, p. 193.

port for UNC. Also, among other disadvantages, is fact that unilateral suspension by UNC would require Communists to take initiative for any subsequent mtgs and thus make it more difficult for them to concede to UNC posn.

2. In view of above, continued sessions afford excellent opportunity to intensify propaganda pressures on Communists to put them increasingly on defensive to maintain and utilize present strong worldwide support for UNC posn on POWs for purpose of achieving armistice. Considered here essential UNC del make full and appropriate statements at every session, emphasizing basic humanitarian principles of UNC posn and utilizing folg themes which bring out most vulnerable weaknesses of Communist posn:

A. Screening entered into in good faith with tacit appvl of Communists, and screening procedures were scrupulously fair.

B. UNC impartial rescreening proposal is direct refutation of Communist statements on forceful retention of POWs.

C. Communists are seeking to compel UNC to jeopardize lives of POWs by insisting UNC use force and violence in sending POWs to Communists against their will.

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 1: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, May 16, 1952—6:25 p. m.

CX 68567. Ref JCS 908093.[1]

1. The following breakdown indicates the number of screened and unscreened personnel:

a. Screened personnel to return to Communist control:

NK POWs	26,161
SK POWs	4,287
CCF	5,236
CIs	3,801
Total	39,485

b. Unscreened personnel at Koje-Do:

NK POWs	37,624
SK POWs	64
CIs	6,115
Total	43,803

---

[1] Dated May 6, p. 189.

c. With regard to the 3500 unscreened personnel at Inclosure No 10, Pusan,[2] the emphasis will be placed on control, accomplishing only such screening as proves practicable as an incident thereto. Those inmates of Inclosure No 10 who remain unscreened as of 18 May will not be included in the rosters scheduled for completion about 20 May. They will be placed on an addendum roster to be furnished to the Communists at the time of repatriation. Failing to roster an estimated 2800 prisoners desiring to return to Communist control is considered an advantage in that it will compensate in numbers for inaccuracies that are inherent in rostering of prisoners in recalcitrant compounds of Koje-Do without actual count as of rostering date.

2. The following was broadcast several times over loud speakers to all inmates of unscreened compounds at Koje-Do on 13 May 1952:

"On the strength of previous statements of compound leaders, the UNC assumes that all inmates of blank compound desire to return to the other side and that they will be so returned following an armistice.

"It is now necessary to furnish an accurate roster of all prisoners of war who will be repatriated to the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The names of all of you will be included in these rosters. However, if there are any of you who violently object to repatriation, you have the opportunity, individually, to report to, and place yourselves under the protection of the UN guards.

"There will be no screening to determine your wishes. There will be no opportunity for you to remain in South Korea once the rosters have been prepared. If you violently oppose repatriation, you must act quickly to keep your name from being included in the roster."

As the result of this broadcast, 4 PWs have reported themselves to the UNC guards as violently objecting to repatriation.

3. The following message from Eighth Army was delivered in writing to the leaders of Compound 76 on 13 May 1952:

"To the prisoners of UNPW Enclosures:

"This is to insure that you fully understand the following:

> "(1) The letter dated 10 May, addressed to Association of PW Representatives of KPA and CPV Chief, and signed by Brig Gen C F Colson in no way admits that the UN forces have in any way violated the Geneva Convention and agreement on treatment of prisoners of war.
>
> "(2) The UN Forces have always scrupulously complied with the Geneva Convention Agreement of 1949."

4. Eighth Army will complete the preparation on 20 May of final rosters to be submitted to the Communists. These rosters will contain:

---

[2] Enclosure 10 at Pusan was for hospital cases. Some patients and hospital work details refused to be transferred to new compounds. On May 20, UN troops moved into the compound using tear gas and concussion grenades on recalcitrant prisoners forcing them into their new compound. (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 255–257)

a. Those North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who at a screening interview indicated that they would not forcibly oppose return to Communist control.

b. Those South Korean and CIs who elect to return to Communist control.

c. Those POWs and CIs remaining in compounds which have resisted screening after the announcement was made as indicated in Para 2 above.

5. To attempt to break the present deadlock in the armistice negotiations, I plan to take the following action:

a. No more individual screening will be attemped on Koje-Do.

b. As soon as practicable, inform the Communists thru Liaison Officers that approximately 80,000 individuals will be returned to their control, indicating that rosters containing at least this number will be available in a short period of time if the Communists agree in principle with the revised figure.

c. If general agreement is reached on the 80,000 figure, submit to the Communists rosters outlined in Para 4 above.

d. If both sides accept the revised rosters, we will repatriate all POWs and CIs whose names appear on the rosters which we submitted to the Communists.

6. It is believed desirable to release a statement that fully clarifies the screening procedure followed by the UNC, this statement to be released concurrently with the submission of the 80,000 figure to the Communists. I am preparing and will submit to you shortly such a statement for your consideration.

7. Request concurrence in procedure outlined above ASAP.

795.00/5-1752: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, May 17, 1952—5 p. m.

4282. In conversation with Bajpai today he opened up question of Korea.

Bajpai stated great deal had been going on last two or three days and he would like give me full facts. . . .

1. On May 10 Madam Pandit cabled Nehru after talking to Chou En-lai she was convinced Chinese Communists really wanted truce in Korea. She admitted possibility trickery but stated he emphasized so hard desire of Communist Government for some solution she personally inclined believe him.

2. Chou En-lai, however, stated his opinion Americans were anxious carry on war and if possible to expand it in hopes that this might split Communist China from Soviet Union.

3. Madam Pandit expressed strong opinion to Chou En-lai that Americans were fully anxious for peace, that they had no desire to

attack anyone and that if both sides generally wanted truce it should be easy to establish it.

4. Chou En-lai stated his government could not accept return of only 70,000 prisoners but hinted compromise might be reached at 100,000.

5. Madam Pandit urged her government to do everything possible develop some compromise which might be acceptable both sides.

6. On Monday, May 12, after discussion with Bajpai Nehru sent cable to Madam Pandit stating in his opinion Chinese Government position on promises was wholly unsound; that it was wrong arbitrarily to condemn some prisoners to one side and others to other; hence that it was not actual number of prisoners returned that was important but the method by which the choices were made. Cable emphasized that Nehru is giving his views to her for background only and that GOI argument with Chou En-lai might only harden situation generally.

7. Nehru's cable then suggested that perhaps all prisoners could be placed under neutral control, that Communists might be given opportunity to talk to them; and every method developed to see that completely friendly decision was made in each case. However, he urged Madam Pandit to propose this as coming from her and not from him because it otherwise might be assumed that he was simply forwarding suggestion from US Government. Nehru asked Madam Pandit to immediately reopen subject on her own initiative again Chou En-lai.

8. On Wednesday, May 14, cable arrived from Panikkar stating Madam Pandit was leaving Peking and that she agreed with him it would be mistake to reopen subject with Chou En-lai following Eden speech in House of Commons and President Truman's speech of May 7[1] which in opinion of Chinese Government closed door to any agreement.

9. On May 15 Nehru cabled Panikkar . . . that he had received most reassuring message[2] from Eden and that if Madam Pandit left Peking, Panikkar himself was instructed carry on discussions in line with Nehru's previous cable.

Bajpai asked for my comments. I said I felt deeply appreciative of what GOI was trying to do and I thought their position was proper and reasonable. I again went over all facts on prisoners of war issue including missing 50,000 UN prisoners said to be captured by Communists. I told him that under no circumstances would we depart from moral position involving forced repatriation but it would be obvious to anyone we were not anxious maintain and feed potential Communist agitators in South Korean prison camps; that we had every reason to want return of every Communist soldier who wanted to go back; but that I was sure the method by which we might decide exactly who wanted to go back and who did not was certainly open to full discussion and suggestions. I happened to have President Truman's May 7 statement with me and went over it carefully with Bajpai who agreed it closed no doors and offered absolutely no basis for Communist blow-up.

---

[1] For text of Truman's speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953,* pp. 321–322; for Eden's remarks of May 7, 1952, see *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 500, pp. 383–387.

[2] Presumably Nehru was referring to the letter from Eden described in footnote 2, p. 202.

I will discuss all this in detail again with Prime Minister Sunday night. . . .

BOWLES

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 17, 1952—11:48 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 909104. From JCS reur CX 68567.[2]

1. Procedure you suggest of informing Communists that approx 80000 individuals will be returned to their control not considered desirable here. Believed here that submission of 80000 figure would not increase likelihood of Communist agreement, and on other hand might have folg disadvantages:

A. Strengthen Communists allegation that initial screening by UNC was improper.
B. Encourage them to delay agreement further in anticipation possible addl increase round figure by UNC, thereby weakening present firm UNC position.
C. Jeopardize strong general support UNC now has on POW question by casting doubt on validity of initial screening opn.

2. Without revising round figure previously announced to Communists, UNC del could reiterate to Communists that 70000 figure is best estimate UNC can make at this time, that UNC has no desire to retain any POWs who desire to return to Communists, that any POWs who indicate at any time desire to return to Communists will be permitted and assisted to do so, that in furtherance of this UNC has repeatedly offered to rescreen POWs after an armistice on impartial basis, but that under no circumstances will UNC become party to any agreement which requires UNC to use force to return POWs.

---

[1] A notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.
[2] Dated May 16, p. 204.

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 31: Telegram

The Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Joy) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

SECRET MUNSAN-NI, May 19, 1952—7:50 p. m.

HNC 1255. 1. *a.* On the assumption that our assigned objective remains to obtain an armistice at the earliest possible date, it is the unanimous conviction of the delegation that we could not make a worse tactical error than to continue daily plenary sessions.

b. We are constrained to go on record as saying that in our judgment and in the light of months of personal experience in dealing with the Communists, our inability to accept the Communists challenge to suspend negotiations has convinced them that our psn is not in fact firm. We believe that by far the strongest move we can make is to emphasize the finality of our stand by recessing the plenary sessions until the enemy is ready to accept our proposal of 28 April. It is obvious that Communists will not accept the prisoner of war situation unless they want an armistice badly, and the mere fact that they would have to so indicate by calling a plenary session would not in our opinion be controlling. On the other hand, daily meetings subject the UNC and the nations it represents to a stream of vituperation and abuse which, although unfounded, leaves the delegation with the only alternative of becoming mired in a propaganda morass which the JCS in their 907378 [2] indicate a desire to avoid. The stand of the UNC has been firmly and fully stated and is well known to the free world. It can be reinforced but little by repetition. In contrast, the Communists, unhampered by any considerations of truth or scruples, have every advantage in the propaganda exchange and will exploit it to the utmost. The Koje-Do situation has played directly into their hands and gives them a plausible basis on which to build propaganda which, however false, will by sheer force of repetition work to the eventual detriment of the UNC position.

c. In summary, we believe that only by the display of determined strength can the situation be salvaged; and that the strongest act we can perform now is to proceed as recommended in HNC 1236.[3]

2. This is being forwarded in advance of our meeting at Eighth Army, 20 May as Harrison and I wish to discuss this subject with you.

---

[1] This telegram, which was sent to the JCS for their information, was Joy's last comment as Senior UNC Delegate; he was succeeded by Harrison effective May 23, 1952.

[2] Dated Apr. 27, p. 178. A marginal notation by Young at approximately this point read as follows: "How complete is his understanding of situation and inability to handle it propaganda-wise [?]"

[3] Dated May 12, p. 193.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 19, 1952—6:04 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 909231. From JCS. Reur CX 68642 [2] and JCS 909111.[3]

1. We concur in need for breaking tight control Communists have over POWs on Koje and appreciate difficulties of carrying this out. We consider your plan to be sound though it is not possible from this distance to gauge its details. You are authorized to proceed as you deem essential.

2. In view definite possibility violence stemming from actions contemplated, we consider it essential that we maintain solid support of domestic and international opinion. Accordingly, your views are requested on folg:

A. Degree participation by ICRC, if any.
B. Handling news media.
C. Feasibility of "internationalizing" POW guard detachment on Koje by employing reptv proportion UN Forces along with United States in this capacity. Having forces from other UN countries share this responsibility has definite polit advantages; however, we recognize that practical considerations in field may be overriding.

3. We note with appvl your careful and thorough approach to this delicate problem. It would be helpful if you continue keep us fully informed of progress of program.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

[2] In the telegram under reference, dated May 17, Clark submitted for concurrence Van Fleet's plans for establishing and maintaining uncontested control of all prisoners in South Korea by their dispersal to new enclosures on Koje-do and Cheju-do Islands as well as the South Korean mainland, if necessary. Also included were interim measures to prevent further outbreaks prior to the implementation of the plan (795.00/5-3152).

[3] In the telegram under reference, dated May 17, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan for dispersal of the POWs for planning purposes, while it assessed the full implications of the scheme (795.00/5-3152).

330/5-2052

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1952.

Subject: Security Council Consideration of Communist Bacteriological Warfare Charges.

I have been giving thought to the possibility of action in the United Nations to meet the sustained and sensational Communist charges that the United Nations forces are engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea.

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Bohlen, Nitze, Allison, Johnson, Sargeant, McFall, and Armstrong.

Such action might be taken in the Security Council, where the Russians would in all probability veto a resolution proposing the creation of an impartial commission of inquiry and a subsequent resolution condemning the Communists for frustrating such investigation.

Tentative outline drafts of the two resolutions are attached.[2]

There are two alternative lines of procedure which could be pursued in bringing the matter to the Security Council's attention.

One opportunity will arise when Malik assumes the Security Council Presidency, in the month of June, and when the first report of the Disarmament Commission comes before the Security Council. In the Disarmament Commission, Malik has repeatedly sought to debate the bacteriological warfare question. If, as we expect, Malik repeats the Communist charges in the Security Council, I feel that we should not hesitate to counter these charges by introducing a separate agenda item leading to the passage of resolutions such as those attached.

A second possibility would be to take the initiative in advance of the Security Council debate on the Disarmament Commission report, submitting our complaint and immediately circulating the first resolution. If this is done, it would probably be preferable to start the proceedings before Malik assumes the presidency.

Certain questions must be resolved before a decision can be taken on this course:

1. *Is the Communist campaign tapering off and will our initiative serve to revive it?* Our propaganda and intelligence personnel estimate that the campaign is not dying down and that it may reach a high point in June. A Soviet veto would therefore be useful to us.

2. *Are we prepared to carry on a long debate in the Security Council on all aspects of the Korean problem and perhaps other Far Eastern issues as well?* We must assume that Malik will attempt to broaden the discussion in this way, including reference to prisoners of war, withdrawal of troops, charges of atrocities, conduct of armistice negotiations, etc. On balance, I do not believe we would find such a discussion harmful at present.

3. *Would our friends in the Security Council and the other states with forces in Korea support an initiative of this kind?* It would be necessary to consult with the British, the old Commonwealth, the French, Dutch, Greeks and Turks—the Security Council members with troops in Korea. We would have to inform Brazil, Chile, Pakistan and China before we move. India should also be informed before action is taken.

---

[2] These tentative outline drafts were not attached to the source text; for the texts of the resolutions as they were introduced into the Security Council, see UN documents S/2671 and S/2688 printed in the Department of State *Bulletin,* July 7 and 28, 1952, pp. 37 and 159, respectively.

In deciding whether to take the initiative, we must take into account our discussions with the Indians, as well as any approaches we may wish to make to the Russians.

My own inclination would be to initiate the suggested consultations with friendly Security Council members at once.

J. D. H.

795.00/5-2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, May 21, 1952—7 p. m.

188. Personal for Secretary, eyes only. Since arrival here I have become acutely aware of the impasse in truce talks at Panmunjom and the general effect in this area which seems obviously adverse to our best interests. Clark and I have had several informal talks[1] about the position and the growing conviction of many here that the mechanical continuance of the daily sessions is a serious tactical error. I share that opinion knowing that there are important reasons which require US to demonstrate every willingness to terminate Korean affair by negotiation if possible.

This question is outside my official jurisdiction but perhaps you would not find it amiss if I mention to you personally my opinion. It would seem evident that some flexibility of maneuver in UN approach is urgently necessary. This could take the form of adjournment of daily meetings until Commies state readiness to talk substantively, or at least of finding pretext for UN reps not attending meetings at caprice our opponents. We should create doubt in adversaries' minds that we are under compulsion to submit to their daily vituperation.

Our present method savors of the mechanical regulatory of Goering's air attacks on London in September 1940 which always followed the same pattern and which resulted in a small number of Spitfires destroying most of the German bomber force.

I know it is superficial for me, at this early date, to describe sentiment in this area but from what little I have learned thus far the lengthy monotony of our tactics in these negots does not enhance our prestige in Japan or strengthen our position. The effect in Japan seems to be a certain contemptuous ridicule in our regard and a sentiment that we must be very weak indeed to submit to enemy's tactics according to his choosing. It is of course difficult for Japs to understand why powerful UN nations, especially US, which defeated Jap should be at a standstill in an area where Japs succeeded in dominating situation single handed over so many years.

---

[1] For Murphy's personal account of these discussions, see his *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 432.

I believe that we should cancel and postpone meetings from time to time perhaps on ground that further study of certain phases is required, or that we are not convinced Commies are in earnest, or that they are clearly not prepared to negotiate in good faith.

MURPHY

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952—11 a. m.

Prison Camp Incidents

General Collins: The report on the incidents in the camp in Koje will be arriving by courier. We have a summary from Clark. Action will have to be taken by the Army and the press release will come from the Secretary of Defense's office.

Mr. Matthews: We were not raising any question as to the responsibility for dealing with the officers. That is certainly the Army's responsibility.

General Collins: If the Secretary of Defense takes the recommendation I will make as to the statement on this matter, we can get our people to work on it right away. The Secretary of Defense will probably show you the release.

Mr. Sargeant: I talked with the Defense people yesterday about the questions that are likely to be addressed to General Ridgway while he is here in Washington. I have given Clayton Fritchey the information we have picked up in domestic and foreign press reports.

The kind of thing we have spotted is a need for more positive information that will carry the ring of credibility with respect to our good treatment of the prisoners. So far the information has been largely negative.

Second, I gather from the queries we have had that there is a question of a Congressional inquiry and the possibility of resolutions, et cetera. There may be a need of a comprehensive report of how the Commies treat their POWs.

Third, I am happy that the negotiators are beginning to do more and more about propaganda in Panmunjom. I think they should concentrate on a few points—the impartial screening, the desperate attempts to obscure the results of the UN screening and their vulnerability on the

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the Chiefs of Staff, General Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended; Vice Chiefs General Twining and Admiral Duncan also participated. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense and Gleason represented the National Security Council. In all 21 persons attended.

Geneva Convention. We must stick to simple points and brief the U.S. press.

General Collins: This raises the question of whether the machinery we now have is adequate. This isn't really the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs who are only supposed to give strategic guidance. We should not really give propaganda and press guidance.

I have set up such an agency in the Army. I don't think the JCS should be in on it.

Admiral Fechteler: I agree 100 percent.

General Collins: We have responsibilities as the individual Chiefs of services, but these matters really don't fall on the JCS. The coordination should be between the Secretary of Defense and the State Department.

Mr. Johnson: Is there a channel from the Secretary of Defense to the field?

General Collins: The JCS can transmit messages but we do not have to assume responsibility for all of them. Many of the things we send out are Government decisions.

Admiral Fechteler: You can go back even earlier. The Joint Chiefs individually have never agreed on the principle of no forcible repatriation. I know I haven't and I don't think Van [Vandenberg] has either.

Mr. Matthews: I know you have never agreed, but at the White House meeting [2] Van did not press the point.

General Collins: I don't think that is an issue here now. I was raising the question of propaganda and psychological warfare guidance.

Continuation of Meetings in Panmunjom

Mr. Matthews: I gather we will soon have a question of whether we will go on with the meetings in Panmunjom.

General Collins: That is a matter we should take up here.

Mr. Pace is getting in this morning. I am prepared to give him a recommendation on what should be done with respect to the Koje-do incident. When we advise Clark of the action to take, we think he should make a statement. Clark had planned by this time to go to Korea and talk to Van Fleet but he is now going to wait for our advice.

I believe Ridgway had sided with Joy in feeling we should say we should have no more meetings until the Communists have something to say about the package proposal.

Mr. Matthews: We thought last week wasn't a very good time to break off the meetings, but I gather the question is coming up again.

---

[2] Presumably the reference is to the meeting at the White House on Feb. 27, 1952; for a report of the discussion at that meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, Feb. 27, p. 68.

General Collins: Clark hasn't come in with anything new, so all we have is Ridgway's recommendation.[3]

Mr. Hickerson: It may be useful to lay some considerations on the table. Our Allies may well feel that if we terminate the meetings we are really issuing an ultimatum. Also, you will recall that the Australians proposed we have an impartial screening prior to an armistice.[4] We talked about a different twist on that last week in the form of a proposal to let the Commies see that there was no forcible retention.[5] By that means you would avoid a re-screening.

Mr. Matthews: It's a 90 percent chance the Commies would turn it down. If they did not, I can see some difficulties.

General Collins: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: We were also wondering whether you could taper off in the meetings.

Mr. Nitze: It seems to me that any statement to the effect that we are not going to talk is very important.

General Collins: I would suggest that State frame such a statement and then discuss it with the Secretary of Defense. This really isn't a JCS matter.

Mr. Matthews: Do you mean the statement? I take it you do feel the question of continuing the meetings is a matter for JCS consideration?

General Collins: Well, it is really a question for the Government.

Mr. Hickerson: Yes, it is partially a JCS responsibility.

There may also be room for seeing whether there is anything you can do without an armistice—maybe an exchange of the wounded. There are indications both ways on whether the Commies want an armistice. There are some indications from the Indians[6] that they do but the Indians aren't too reliable.

General Collins: The Commies would tell the Indians that anyway.

Mr. Matthews: I think this is something you can't proceed far on now. You have not had Clark's recommendation.

General Collins: I'd like to tell Brad [Bradley] that this public relations thing ought to be held on another level. The other Chiefs I think agree. I think we ought to set up some other form of organization—maybe an *ad hoc* organization.

Mr. Matthews: It is important there should be a channel.

Mr. Johnson: We would welcome a channel on these matters.

---

[3] Clark did, however, concur with the view of Joy that the negotiations at Panmunjom should be unilaterally suspended until the Communists accepted the "package proposal"; see footnote 3, p. 194.

[4] This proposal was reported in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 3, 1952, not printed (795.00/5-352).

[5] See the memorandum of discussion, May 14, p. 196.

[6] The indications under reference are described in telegram 4282 from New Delhi, May 17, p. 206.

General Collins: We will try to discuss it with the Secretary of Defense today. What would be your view on a proper channel? Would you favor some group?

Mr. Matthews: I think so, at least while this thing is so hot.

General Collins: I think it would be advisable. Someone like Frank Nash and maybe Fritchey and the State representatives, and maybe a representative of Dr. Allen's PSB.

Mr. Matthews: You are in touch with Fritchey, aren't you Howland?

Mr. Sargeant: Yes, daily.

Mr. Nitze: I think this is basically a substantive matter with psychological overtones. It must be handled as a matter of policy between the Secretary of Defense and the State Department and appropriate representatives from the JCS. This thing will have many repercussions for you.

[Here follows a short discussion of the inadvisability of the Washington-based NATO Standing Group joining the Mediterranean Command and the Middle East question.]

Course of Action in Korea

Mr. Johnson: There is some feeling on our part that NSC 118/2 [7] as now formulated does not adequately deal with the possible future eventualities in Korea.

Admiral Wooldridge: The NSC put it back in the Senior Staff and I understand the thing is remaining dormant. I understood we were waiting for something further from State. It went up to the Council as a split paper.

Mr. Bohlen: There was only a split on one point.

Admiral Wooldridge: The Senior Staff was to await a study on naval blockade.

Mr. Bohlen: That has just been completed. I understand the Council approved all of the paper but the one point of disagreement on naval blockade.

Mr. Gleason: That is correct.

Mr. Bohlen: What Johnny is talking about relates to situations that are not fully covered in the paper. What is not covered is the situation of just having the thing peter out in Korea. We are covered if the enemy attacks or builds up an air offensive. I don't know what you can say about the petering out because I understand we have no military plans to initiate an offensive.

General Collins: If there were any change in the Government objective we would have something to work on. If the objective is to maintain the *status quo* we would just maintain it. If the objective is to change the situation, it ought to be raised in the NSC.

---

[7] For text of NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

Mr. Nitze: It is clear that it would be desirable to get our troops out of Korea, so we ought to explore the possibility of finding ways of doing this.

Mr. Johnson: There is also the possibility of getting an exchange of prisoners without an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: I don't understand that point. If you had an exchange of prisoners you would have an armistice. The only thing I see is the possibility of declaring a *de facto* armistice on our side and threatening the greater sanction if they do anything to us.

Mr. Nitze: There aren't many alternatives.

Mr. Bohlen: That's right. It's because of the situation.

General Collins: If we announced an armistice unilaterally we would have to stop bombing. That is impossible.

Mr. Bohlen: Exactly. That is the difficulty.

Mr. Nitze: It isn't quite as simple as that. If you were able to get your troops out then you might stop the bombing.

General Collins: While the training of South Koreans is moving ahead, if we pull out the morale would be terrible and Syngman Rhee would blow up.

Mr. Nitze: You would have to go on bombing while you get your troops out.

General Collins: But suppose Rhee says that if we pull out they will go off on their own?

Mr. Nitze: There is a real problem, but I think we ought to go around the problem again. Staying forever in Korea has disadvantages. Taking wider action does also. So you have to weigh these things.

Mr. Johnson: You have Rhee's request for a security guarantee. If you want to withdraw, such guarantee might ease the problem.

General Collins: Frankly, I don't see any immediate hope of withdrawing forces.

Mr. Nitze: Looking six months or a year ahead, there may be possibilities. I agree there are no immediate prospects.

General Collins: We might get a division back to Japan. We ought to examine the possibility of getting other forces in.

Mr. Hickerson: There are some possibilities—perhaps a division from Brazil, maybe some from Pakistan and a battalion from Israel.

General Collins: At what cost?

Mr. Hickerson: Well, the cost would be considerable. We might even get some Indians. Maybe that is going too far, Doc.

Mr. Matthews: That's too far for me.

General Collins: Our bargaining position would be immediately weakened if we unilaterally pulled our troops out.

Mr. Nitze: Oh, of course.

General Collins: We are going ahead with the training of South Koreans. From an equipment standpoint, Ridgway feels, and I agree, that until you get the Japanese police forces developed you should not increase the number of South Koreans to be trained. When the Japs can take over the responsibility for the security of Japan I would recommend pulling our two divisions out of Japan. We always get back to the problem of equipment.

Mr. Nitze: Domestic production looks somewhat better now.

General Collins: Yes, if this House limitation on expenditures does not stick. It appears that the Senate will knock it out.

As to what we do if the armistice negotiations collapse, I thought aside from the NSC, Mr. Lovett had said at the Armed Forces Policy Council [8] meetings that he would like a review.

General Cabell: The JSPC is studying that.

General Collins: Can't we give them a deadline for the study from the military point of view?

Mr. Matthews: That would be very helpful.

General Collins: I should think we could get something in ten days or maybe a week. I think the State Department should do a somewhat similar thing. Then, Slim [Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge], if the NSC Senior Staff can take prompt action on the blockade issue we would be pretty far along.

Admiral Wooldridge: Yes, we ought to take a careful look at the paper.

General Collins: I think the NSC should go ahead with its consideration.

Mr. Bohlen: I take it you mean on the point where the views were split.

Admiral Wooldridge: I think we should consider all of it. I don't think the Council approved the paper; I think it was left in suspense.

Mr. Bohlen: When we get what you are doing and what we are doing you will have a basis for consideration.

General Cabell: Our difficulty in the JSPC is that we don't know what the stated ends are that we want to accomplish. The JSPC normally makes plans to achieve stated ends.

Mr. Nitze: You can't have much judgment about national policy until you know what you can do.

Admiral Fechteler: From the military point of view the only thing that makes sense is to put enough in to beat hell out of the Commies. We did it once.

---

[8] The Council was comprised of the Secretary of Defense, as chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations. It advised the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.

General Collins: At West Point the President seemed to indicate that we had achieved our objective.[9] If that is the position, the military will say we can hold where we are.

Mr. Hickerson: There are two objectives—to repel the aggression and restore peace and security in the area. We have done the first but not the second. The problem is where you get the forces.

General Collins: We can just sit.

Admiral Fechteler: We can do more than that.

General Collins: We can do more if the restrictions don't apply. If the decision is to drive the Commies out you would need very large forces. To have a JSPC estimate they would have to take two or three assumptions. One would be driving the Commies out, another would be maintaining the *status quo*.

General Bolte: They have such a working paper in draft.

General Cabell: There could be a third assumption—the forces necessary to apply pressure for an armistice but not enough to drive them out.

General Collins: An economic and naval blockade might be enough of a squeeze to get an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: In other words, you can use the greater sanction to get an armistice rather than only if you don't get one.

General Collins: What about the CIA estimate on a blockade? [10]

Mr. Nitze: We have received that. (Mr. Nitze then summarized the contents of the estimate.)

General Collins: We have already explored those things pretty thoroughly in the Southeast Asia paper.[11]

---

[9] The reference was to Truman's statements on Korea in his "Address at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the United States Military Academy," May 20, 1952. For a text of this address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953*, pp. 348–353.

[10] The reference was to SE-27, entitled "Probable Effects of Various Courses of Action With Respect to Communist China," completed on June 5, 1952, which set out to analyze, among other things, the effectiveness of a naval blockade of the People's Republic of China. The conclusion of the paper was that while this blockade would subject the People's Republic of China to considerable economic strain, there would be no significant reduction in China's military capabilities or in the stability of the regime. For text of this intelligence paper, see volume XIV.

[11] The reference was to NSC 124, Feb. 13, 1952; for text, see volume XII, Part 1.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, May 22, 1952—4:55 p. m.

CX 68858. Re JCS 909104.[1]

---

[1] Dated May 17, p. 208.

1. In view of ref msg, the procedure contemplated in para 5, our CX 68567 [2] is being held in abeyance. We recognize the advantages of complete screening as a device that fully substantiates our position on refusing to use force to return any POW or CI to Communist control, and the desirability of this position from a public relations point of view. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of individuals in the unscreened compounds who might be waiting for an opportunity to escape from the violent control of the Communist leaders. The small number of POWs to date who have turned in as a result of the announcement made to POWs, contained in para 2, CX 68567, it is believed, does not approach the number who would forcibly oppose repatriation.

2. In the light of recent developments at Koje-Do, particularly the action contemplated to gain complete and uncontested control as approved by you in JCS 909231,[3] it is possible that, after uncontested control has been secured and the population of compounds reduced to a manageable size, screening can be conducted without difficulty. Should such a situation develop we could adopt a satisfactory screening procedure that would give us our final figure and rosters. What effect this delay will have on negotiations is difficult to assess, but it appears to be unavoidable if individual screening is to be completed without force.

3. I am concerned over the publicity aspects of the screening program to date. Most of the details of the method, the procedures, and the objectivity are well known to the press here. The failure to screen a large number of POWs, other than by an announcement, and the reason for not doing so at this time are understood by the press. If we should attempt to justify the announcement of 13 May (as reported in para 2, CX 68567) as a true screening, our stand on no forced repatriation may be compromised. In view of the publicity that has already been given on the current situation at Koje-Do, the introduction of additional US troops, and the emphasis being placed on control measures, I feel that a press release on the question of further screening is neither necessary nor desirable at this time.

4. Once full control has been established, I will be able to make a firm recommendation on the feasibility of screening those compounds which to date have not been screened.

---

[2] Dated May 16, p. 204.

[3] Dated May 19, p. 210.

795.00/5-2252

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1952.

Subject: Suspension of Korean Armistice Negotiations

After much thought on the subject I have come to the strong conclusion that we should not yet agree to any indefinite suspension of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

The principal advantage of suspension would be that it might in some small degree additionally impress the Communists with the firmness of our position. A subsidiary reason is that it would deny to the Communists a propaganda forum of which they seem to be able to make somewhat better use than our delegation. However, recently our delegation has been doing better in the propaganda aspects than in the past. There is also the argument that by supinely attending fruitless meetings at Communist instigation we lose respect and prestige.

Opposed to the foregoing are the following factors:

1. By unilaterally suspending meetings we are doing exactly what the Communists have apparently been attempting to goad us into doing.
2. However skillfully we handle a unilateral suspension, the Communists will unquestionably exploit the action in their propaganda as a unilateral breaking off of negotiations by the UNC, UNC unwillingness to negotiate in the face of Communist willingness to continue the talks, UNC unwillingness to face the "facts" concerning the screening of prisoners of war as exposed by the Dodd-Colson incident; and, in general, heavily exploit the action to the propaganda disadvantage of the UNC, particularly among wavering opinion which has no clear-cut conception of the issues involved.
3. There appears to be little or no domestic pressure for suspension of the talks.
4. There will be strong international opposition to the suspension of the talks even among our key Allies. All personnel in the Department concerned with public relations and our overseas information program are of the opinion that unilateral suspension by the UNC at this time will operate to our strong propaganda disadvantage in international public opinion.
5. Unilateral suspension at this time will, with the obvious deadlock created thereby, probably enable the Soviet Union to attract considerable support for moving the negotiations in some way to the Security Council during the month of June while Malik is president of the Security Council.
6. Because of the great confusion created by the Dodd-Colson incident and other information regarding conditions in POW camps that is gradually coming out, the Soviets are now in a position to exploit to the maximum doubts regarding our stand on the POW issue.

---

[1] Copies of this memorandum were sent to Bohlen, Allison, Nitze, Hickerson, and Sargeant.

The release of the Dodd report together with some disciplinary action against Dodd and Colson [2] can by no means wholly correct this situation. It will merely mean that the officer who was in charge of the screening upon which our present stand on POWs is based has been shown to be incompetent. In time the suspicion will inevitably arise that if the pro-Communist camps were out of control and were able with impunity to terrorize anti-Communist prisoners in our midst, the same situation might well have existed in the anti-Communist camps, and that therefore the results of the screening may well lack validity. While our proposal of impartial rescreening following an armistice is a logical answer to such charges, there will be an increasing suspicion among reluctant adherents to our position that an entirely objective screening by competent personnel might have produced results sufficiently different to have obtained Communist agreement to an armistice. We can expect that in time the figure of 100,000 mentioned in the conversation between Madame Pandit and Chou En-lai [3] will become known, as well as the figure of 83,000 [4] which the UNC apparently even now would be able to return.

As an example, whereas the UK Government had complete Parliamentary support for its stand with us on the POW issue prior to the Dodd–Colson incident, since that time there have been increasing questions and evident doubts. Yesterday the UK Embassy informed me of a message from Eden [5] expressing his great concern over this development and strongly urging that a rescreening of the prisoners be carried out in order to restore confidence in our position.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that our present position is entirely reasonable and logical, I am completely convinced that there is so much confusion on the subject that only a bold and clear-cut move on our part can restore domestic and international confidence in our position and assure the maximum of international support if an armistice is not obtained.

---

[2] At Clark's recommendation, Dodd and Colson were reduced in grade to colonel (Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, p. 48). On May 22, Clark sent the JCS a proposed text of a narrative account for release in Tokyo of the series of violent incidents in the prisoner of war camps leading up to and including the Dodd seizure. Clark requested JCS concurrence with its release or comments upon it; Clark to JCS, CX 68845, May 22, 1952, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 63).

Clark's report on the Koje-do incident, presumably the "Dodd Report", reached Washington on the morning of May 23, 1952. It was not released to the press, but Secretary of the Army Pace released the text of a letter of that date to Senator Richard B. Russell, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, constituting the Army's report on the Koje-do incident and the disciplinary action taken against Dodd and Colson. Secretary Pace and Army Chief of Staff Collins met in closed session with the members of the Committee for 2½ hours on May 23, 1952. (*New York Times*, May 24, 1952, p. 1)

[3] For a report of this conversation, see telegram 4282 from New Delhi, May 17, p. 206.

[4] The figure of 83,000 was obtained by adding the number of prisoners and civilian internees screened who stated their wish to return and the number of personnel at Koje-do who refused screening. For the exact figures, see Clark to JCS, telegram CX 68567, May 16, p. 204.

[5] The message under reference was reported in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).

As I see it, the action to be taken must be either a clear-cut offer in the armistice negotiations to carry out an impartial rescreening of the prisoners with Communist observation prior to the armistice conditioned upon Communist agreement to abide by the results, or an international rescreening, preferably with some Asian participation, in such a manner that there would be maximum confidence in the results.

I believe that apart from all other considerations the US Government in its own interest should, in the absence of any rescreening, conduct a thorough investigation, possibly with the participation of some of our Allies, into the previous screening carried out under the supervision of General Dodd. This issue is too vital to the future of our country to permit considerations of the *amour propre* of the Army to stand in the way of doing what is required by the circumstances. We should not lose sight of the basic fact that, however logical our present position may be, the issue of peace in Korea or possibly greatly enlarged hostilities for ourselves and our Allies does in a large degree hang upon our acceptance of the results of a highly complex and delicate operation carried out by an officer whose competence in related matters has since been brought into serious question.

If you concur I strongly suggest that if at all possible we thoroughly discuss this matter with the Secretary, prior to his departure.[6]

---

[6] See footnote 1, p. 227.

A note typed at the bottom of the source text read as follows: "This was dictated prior to knowing of the results of the meeting with the Secretary this morning, but is distributed as a possible basis for the paper which the Secretary desires to have for discussion with the President." For a report of the meeting with the Secretary of State, see *infra.*

Secretary's Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75

Notes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, May 22, 1952, 9:30 a. m.[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1952.

Korean Military Situation

1. Mr. Armstrong stated that there was nothing to report on the Korean military situation.

Communist Propaganda Activities

2. Mr. Harvey[2] reported that the Communists continue to concentrate their propaganda efforts on the Koje incident.[3] They are using this

---

[1] The Secretary of State chaired this large staff meeting, at which 23 other Department officials were present, including Allison, Armstrong, Bohlen, Hickerson, Jessup, Matthews, McFall, Miller, Riddleberger, Sargeant, and Thorp. This document was circulated as SM N-34.

[2] Mose L. Harvey, Chief of the Division of Research for the USSR and Eastern Europe.

[3] For information on the Koje-do incident, see footnote 2, p. 195.

incident to support their claims of atrocities and our use of germ warfare. However, there is no indication that the situation in Korea is about to collapse.

[Here follows a brief report on Communist propaganda activity with respect to Germany.]

Korean Truce Negotiations

4. Mr. Sargeant stated that he felt the Chinese Communists were making every effort to force us to break off truce negotiations. He pointed out that the American public is becoming impatient with the negotiations. We have indicated that we are prepared to talk further, but the Communists have seized upon the Koje incident and have played it in such a way that we are in a bad propaganda position. Mr. Sargeant stated that he had polled the public affairs officers in the Department, and they have agreed with him that we would lose, propaganda-wise, if the truce negotiations were suspended in the foreseeable future. The Communists would make every effort to convince the peoples around the world that we broke off the negotiations. Mr. Sargeant stated that public opinion is bringing pressures to bear on the Government for a break-off of negotiations but, from a propaganda point of view, yielding to this pressure would be unfortunate. We must first gain the initiative and make it very clear that we have explored all means for a settlement. In any event, we should not break off negotiations before July, if this is possible from a policy point of view.

5. Mr. Allison stated that Mr. Sargeant's views should be given very serious consideration. Our Allies in Korea are against a break-off. Mr. Eden would like a rescreening of the POW's by neutral countries.[4] There are many arguments against Mr. Eden's suggestions, but we might have to yield to them. We could propose this rescreening process with the understanding that the Communists would accept the results, which, of course, they would not do. Mr. Allison stated that Mr. Hume Wrong is concerned about the possibility of a break-off and feels that we should rescreen the prisoners.[5] He suggested that the International Red Cross be utilized in this respect. Mr. Allison suggested that we consider a panel of countries such as India, Sweden and Switzerland, and let them rescreen through a unilateral proposal which we would make. This action would suspend the negotiations for a while. Mr. Allison agreed that we needed a new ingredient in the present situation if we could expect to announce effectively suspension of the talks.

6. The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Lovett had previously objected to efforts along this line because he felt it might appear that we are

---

[4] Eden's request was reported in a memorandum of conversation, by Johnson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).

[5] Wrong's concern was reported in a memorandum of conversation, by Hickerson, May 21, 1952, not printed (795.00/5–2152).

breaking our position under Communist pressure. However, the Secretary felt that Mr. Lovett might go along with this new approach if a statement were carefully prepared and studied by him. Mr. Bohlen asked why the International Red Cross could not be utilized rather than a group of neutral countries. Mr. Hickerson explained that the International Red Cross would not agree to rescreen the prisoners unless the Communists agreed to this proposal. The Secretary felt that we could not continue the talks as they were going at the present time and some new element had to be added. Mr. Bohlen stated that we have never had and probably never would have, a good moment to break off negotiations. He felt that there was a danger in our position if we were afraid to break off negotiations. He suggested that we should arrange for a recess with a definite time limit to reconvene and reject the Communist position that we are breaking off negotiations. Mr. Allison emphasized that many doubts have been raised because of the Koje incident. Mr. Bohlen felt that this rescreening process would be a good effort and would provide us with an opportunity to suspend talks for a while.

7. The Secretary felt that there were two basic problems which must be kept separate. First, we must give consideration to the problem of whether breaking off or postponing negotiations is an impossible approach. He agreed that it was not impossible to take this line. The second problem is how to correct our position on the POW repatriation issue, which has been undermined by the recent series of events. The Secretary felt that this situation must be corrected as soon as possible. Mr. Jessup suggested that if we adopt the position that the prisoners should be rescreened by a neutral commission, he thought it would be to our advantage that these countries be solicited by a neutral, such as the Secretary General of the UN. Mr. Hickerson felt that this would be possible to arrange.

8. Mr. Bohlen stated that this problem was discussed generally with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about ten days ago.[6] Mr. Matthews added that in discussions with the Joint Chiefs, they felt that the propaganda problem involved in the prisoner of war issue is an important one, but is not one for the exclusive attention of the Joint Chiefs. The Chiefs suggested that an *ad hoc* committee be appointed to study this problem and General Balmer has been selected to represent the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Johnson will represent the State Department. This group will meet today.

9. In conclusion, the Secretary urged that Mr. Hickerson and others make every effort to get a position on this problem. He indicated further that he might discuss this matter with the President today.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than Korea.]

---

[6] The question of rescreening by a commission of neutral nations was discussed at a Department of State–JCS meeting of May 14; see p. 196.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238

Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1952.

Item 1. Korean Negotiations.[1]

I reviewed for the President the various messages which had been coming in recently from Admiral Joy, General Clark and Ambassador Murphy,[2] relating to the undesirable effects which were occurring in the Far East as a result of the continuance of daily meetings at Panmunjom with the vituperative propaganda of the communists which issued therefrom. I told the President that we might soon expect recommendations from General Clark and that my guess was that he would recommend discontinuance of daily meetings. I said that the Department believed that there was much to be said for this attitude and that the Department is not taking any rigid attitude that the daily meetings must continue. Indeed, we were actively at work on a proposal which would permit recessing the meetings for say two weeks or ten days, but that it was imperative at the same time to take some steps which would restore international confidence in the moral position which we had taken on the POWs. I thought that international opinion and some opinion in this country had been shaken by the Dodd–Colson episode and the continuing difficulties in the prison camps.

The President interjected that he had given Secretary Pace instructions to take vigorous measures to regain control of the camp situation. I suggested to the President that if it were possible to get two or three nations who did not have troops in Korea to undertake an impartial rescreening of the prisoners we had already screened—the nations which suggested themselves were perhaps India, Sweden and Switzerland—I thought we could then have strong international support for requesting the hearings while this took place. I said that I was not asking the President's approval of such a plan which, if possible to work out, would come to him through regular channels, but that if it did come to him during my absence I wanted him to know that I was strongly in favor of it.

The President said that he liked the idea. He asked the very sound question, whether the presence of any nation on such a rescreening board would interfere with the services of that same nation as a neutral observer of the armistice should one be brought about. I said that this would require careful thought.

---

[1] Acheson also discussed at this meeting with the President the EDC and contractual negotiations, the Benton–McCarthy suit, Bolivian recognition, and approval of a message to the Netherlands Government on the question of duration of the EDC Treaty.

[2] For Clark's and Joy's messages, see HNC 1236, May 12, p. 193; for Murphy's recommendations, see telegram 188, May 21, p. 212.

D. A.

795.00/5-2252

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1952.

Attached is a copy of a telegraphic instruction from the UK Foreign Office to the UK Embassy in Washington delivered to the Department today just prior to your departure.[1] It is possible Mr. Eden will raise the question with you.

Our preliminary reaction is that Mr. Eden's draft formula contained in the telegram is entirely consistent with our package proposal and we would wish to know how he would intend to develop it. Our only doubt is the emphasis in the first paragraph of the draft upon the applicability of prisoners held by both sides. While we could not object to this in principle we somewhat fear that it might be interpreted by the Communists as an invitation to attempt to reduce the figure of 12,000 UNC prisoners they have thus far agreed to return.

We will inform you by telegram of any differing views we may have as a result of further study of Mr. Eden's proposal and what we tell the UK Embassy here.

[Here follows a United Kingdom Foreign Office telegram to the British Embassy in Washington, May 22, which contained a formula by Eden for resolution of the deadlock at Panmunjom. The Eden proposal was based on four principles: 1) all prisoners should be released, but none sent to a destination against his will; 2) all prisoners should be offered facilities to return home; 3) an independent body should interview prisoners electing not to return to their homes; and 4) no compulsion should be used to influence prisoners' decisions.]

---

[1] During the afternoon on May 22, Acheson left Washington by plane for Bonn for final negotiations and signing of the contractual agreements bringing to an end the Allied occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Presumably this memorandum was given to him just before his departure. Acheson was in Bonn until May 26, when the agreements were signed. He then journeyed to Paris to sign on May 27 the treaty establishing the EDC. The next day the Secretary of State left France for Washington. For more information on the contractual agreements, see volume VII, and on the EDC, vol. V, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.

795.00/5-2352

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [PUSAN, May 23, 1952?] [2]

Participants: President Rhee, Ambassador J. J. Muccio and E. Allan Lightner.

I called on President Rhee on May 23 to tell him that I had been requested by the Department of State to return for consultation, that I was leaving with the Meyer Mission on the 24th,[3] that I expected to be gone 10 days or two weeks and that Mr. Lightner would be in charge of the Embassy in my absence. I mentioned that there were a good many matters which I wanted to discuss in the Department relating to future decisions in Korea and that I had not been home for a year and a half and that I thought the trip would be most beneficial. I asked him if he had any suggestions as to things that I might discuss in Washington.

The President replied that he thought it was a very good idea for me to be going home at this time as he hoped I could explain to President Truman the Korean position on various problems. He said he had a very high regard for President Truman who had saved the situation in Korea on at least two occasions, the first time in 1947 in his strong anti-Communist statement and the second time at the time of the Communist Attack in 1950. President Rhee was hopeful that President Truman realized now the futility of negotiating with the Communists and that he would remain firm in the discussions at Panmunjom. I commented that I thought there could be no doubt about the U.S. position at Panmunjom remaining firm, that this had been made crystal clear during the past six weeks and furthermore I believed the record of the long negotiations disproved President Rhee's earlier fears that the UN delegation might be weak. Rhee admitted that the UN delegation had been firm up to now and he was hopeful that with President Truman's support it would remain that way.

Rhee went on to say that after the luncheon today he had talked with Mr. Meyer and Finance Minister Paek; that he was glad their negotiations had been successful and he had authorized Paek to sign the documents. He said there was one point the Korean Government wanted to make, which was not necessary to be in writing in the agreement or in an exchange of correspondence, but which he wanted to make clear: this was that the present arrangements in no way constituted a settlement of the money that was still due the ROK Government as a result of the UN won drawings. I assured the President that this point was implicit in the arrangements and was fully understood on the US side. The President went on for some time to explain the importance, in fact the necessity, of receiving payment for the full amount due at an early date. He said that if President Truman would give the word this could be done in a moment and he hoped that I would explain the Korean side of the case to the President. His arguments were somewhat confusing and involved. He referred to the importance of a currency conversion and the need to back up the new currency by a substantial dollar fund. This fund could only come from the remaining amount due to the ROK from the UN won drawings. I reminded the President that the necessity at a later stage of a currency conversion was understood and accepted by the United States but that it could not come until the present inflationary situation had been checked and present efforts were being directed toward achieving the first goal. In the meantime the funds the President was counting on remained as a nest egg, so to speak, and we could talk about a settlement at a later date after the inflation was under control. The President never seemed to get this point because he came back again and again to the urgency of the transfer of this amount of money to the ROK as a means of getting industry, trade and commerce and economic activities in every field going again. This he said could not be really gotten under way until the currency conversion, with the accompanying dollar backing needed to restore confidence. He made some further suggestions showing how fixed an obsession the acquisition of these funds had become with him. For example he suggested that if it were not possible to transfer the funds already put aside, they might be taken from the funds already appropriated for the supply of relief goods to Korea. I again mentioned the importance of tackling the inflationary problem and my belief that until that was in hand it was premature to suggest a currency conversion or the transfer of the balance of the funds that might be due the ROK.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Lightner.

[2] The source text was a copy provided the Department of State by the Embassy. Received in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs on June 10, 1952, it was undated. Presumably Lightner drafted it immediately after the meeting on May 23, 1952.

[3] For the official report of the Meyer Mission, see p. 238.

I told the President there was one matter that disturbed me lately and that I wanted to inform him about. It had come to me that irresponsible elements had been circulating rumors to the effect that I and members of my staff were opposed to his re-election as President and otherwise taking a partisan interest in the present complicated internal political situation. The President replied that he had not heard any such rumors and would not believe them if he had. However, he would like to make his position clear. He had only a few more years to live. He had no particular desire to continue as President. There were many things which he wanted to do for his country which he had been unable to do and he was not unrealistic enough to believe that time would be available for accomplishing these goals. On the other hand, a group of Koreans who were not interested in the people's welfare, were bent on seeking power for themselves. He could not permit this to come about and would do everything possible to prevent it. He would not leave office until this matter was clarified. The only way to make sure that the people's will was followed was to create a bicameral legislature and to establish a system for the direct election of the President. These objectives he simply had to accomplish before leaving office. He referred to the factionalism which had played havoc with the provisional Korean Government in Shanghai before the liberation. He said that there were still many factions in Korean politics which were now united more or less as one group to oppose him. If he left office these groups would no longer hold together and the struggle that would go on between the factions would be disastrous for Korea and for Korean unity.

He said I could be sure that law and order would be preserved. He referred to the recent demonstrations and to a group that had waited on him that very morning. He had told them when called out to the gate to speak to them that the people's will must be made known and that if they wished to demonstrate against him or against any member of the Government or against the National Assembly that was their right as members of the democratic community. However, they must not resort to violence. Rhee went on to explain that this was his position with respect to the demonstrations and that I could be sure that no violence would be resorted to. I told him that I was fearful that other elements, including the Communists, would use the present tense situation for their own purposes and that this was already apparent since various hoodlums had resorted to violence. The President said that he realized this was the case and that as a matter of fact he had just talked to the Minister of Defense who had urged him to proclaim martial law in the Tongnae area and in two other neighboring districts. The President said that he had approved and had also asked the Defense Minister to include Pusan itself in the areas to be put under martial law. He again assured me that he had the situation well in hand and that the corrupt, venal and unpatriotic elements who were responsible for the situation would be prevented from accomplishing their fell purposes. He added that he could not even trust the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who had fallen under the influence of the anti-Nationalists (evidently referring to the release of So Min-ho),[4] and that he was going to have to take action against him.

My only reply to this outburst was to remind the President that the eyes of the whole world were on Korea and that it would be most unfortunate for Korea if internal developments here were of a nature to reflect seriously on its leaders since this could only discredit the ROK in the eyes of the free world.[5]

---

[4] So Min-ho, a leading independent member of the National Assembly and a critic of the Rhee administration, shot a ROK army captain on Apr. 24, 1952. Claiming he had acted in self-defense, So Min-ho gave himself up the next day and was brought to Pusan district court to stand trial for murder. On May 14, in accordance with Article 49 of the ROK Constitution, the National Assembly had So Min-ho released from detention so he could attend meetings of the Assembly. Rhee's supporters claimed that the Assembly had released illegally a murderer; in fact, So's trial began on May 22. For further information on the trial, see UN document A/2187, pp. 6, 18–19, and 36–38.

---

[5] A marginal notation written next to this paragraph in the source text read: "How true!" Its author is unknown.

795.00/5-2352

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1952.

Subject: Courses of Action in the Event of a Break-off of Negotiations

I believe that the NSC should urgently consider whether, in the event that armistice negotiations are terminated and it becomes apparent that the Communists do not intend to initiate an all-out offensive, this Government and the UNC should:

(a) Recognize the existence of a military stalemate and endeavor to create a situation which, for all practical purposes, would achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 1 of NSC 118/2 [2] without regard to the formal conclusion of an armistice agreement (Tab A); or

(b) Exercise additional military and economic pressures designed to inflict severe punishment and heavy casualties upon the enemy, thereby forcing him to accept an armistice on the basis of our "package proposal" (Tab B); or

(c) Launch an all-out offensive designed to drive the Communist forces from Korea and unify the country by force (Tab C).

In the event that the Communists terminate the negotiations and resume hostilities, we will be faced with a *fait accompli,* and the only reasonable course open to us will be to oppose force with force and endeavor to impose such heavy casualties and inflict such punishment upon the aggressor that in due course we may assume the military initiative and compel him to accept our stated terms for an armistice, or if the occasion presents, destroy his forces and achieve a complete victory.

It is entirely possible, however, that even though the negotiations are terminated, the Communists will not assume the offensive, but will continue to adopt a defensive posture, thereby leaving the next move up to the United Nations Command. Under these circumstances, our selection of the appropriate course of action will be based on military as well as political factors. I recognize the tremendous effect which the military factors must have on our selection and do not believe a final decision can be made until such time as the Military Establishment has reviewed the alternatives in light of UN and Communist capabilities, the strategic importance of Korea to our security interests in Japan and the Far East, and the feasibility of expanding the ROK forces. For this reason the papers attached at Tabs A, B and C confine themselves only to a review of the probable political advantages and disadvantages accruing to each of the aforementioned courses of action, and to comments on the applicability of specific provisions of NSC 118/2 to those courses.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Frelinghuysen.

[2] For text of NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

Tab "A"

Memorandum Prepared by H.O.H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Problem

To determine whether it is politically advisable and feasible for this government, in the event of a break-off of armistice negotiations, to adopt a course of action which would recognize the continued existence of a military stalemate; and whether, if it is decided to adopt such a course of actions, the recommendations contained in NSC 118/2 are applicable.

Discussion

Our military objectives in Korea are to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area. Secretary Acheson and our military leaders have stated publicly that these objectives could be achieved if the territorial integrity of the ROK were maintained, the fighting brought to an end, and safeguards established against the renewal of aggression. We are trying to get the enemy to stop fighting on this basis. The failure of the current armistice talks would not, of course, alter these objectives.

A course of action recognizing the military stalemate, minimizing our casualties and the hostilities, except for air and naval action, would for all practical purposes accomplish these objectives. It would command the support of the participating nations and other UN member states. It would keep to a minimum the number of casualties resulting from hostilities, and reduce our economic and military burden. It would permit our efforts and treasure to be devoted to the expansion of ROK forces and the rehabilitation of the country, and reduce the likelihood of an extension of the hostilities. It would, at the same time, with expanded ROK forces progressively replacing UN forces, permit the maintenance of strong military positions on a defensible line and pose a constant threat to the Communists, thus tying down Chinese forces and preventing them from engaging in action elsewhere. It would probably tend to encourage both the participating nations and those not now participating to contribute additional troops as a sign of their continuing interest in Korea and it would permit us to maintain a strong security outpost for Japan.

On the other hand this alternative would be criticized by those who already believe we have appeased the Communists. It would give added emphasis to the charges that we do not want to win a victory in the Far East. Being unacceptable to the ROKs, it would increase the danger of their non-cooperation and possibly inspire them to take such military action as would in effect nullify our own efforts to restrict the hostilities. It would incur the risk of having the Communists interpret our action, particularly if they involve the reduction of our forces, as a sign of weakness thereby encouraging them to launch an offensive at some later date. Since it would not be a clear-cut victory on our part, it would have an adverse propaganda effect in the Far East. It would impose no moral obligation on the Communists not to renew hostilities, thereby leaving Korea as a continuing source of danger.

Concurrent Action

In considering the possible adoption of this course of action which would have the effect of restricting the hostilities to minor skirmishing and probing action together with continued air and naval bombardment, we should examine whether there is any possible concurrent action which might be taken to make this plan a more effective means for implementing U.S. foreign polity [*policy*] vis-à-vis the Communists.

One of the chief arguments for renewing full-scale hostilities in Korea is that failure to do so would constitute appeasement and would be proof that the U.S. and UN are prepared only to resist small aggressions, and not major ones. If, however, we can keep the fighting and casualties to a minimum, continue to confine the area of hostilities to Korea while at the same time emphatically and dramatically indicating our determination to resist Communist expansion in the Far East, we would not only strengthen our ties with our Allies and win new friends in Asia but also avoid charges of a vacillating and ineffectual Far Eastern policy.

It is suggested, therefore, that the NSC might consider, as an alternative to assuming the offensive in Korea and as an action supplemental to the recognition of a military stalemate in Korea, the strengthening of the general structure of the security in the Far East. To this end, our efforts and resources which would otherwise be expended in probably futile hostilities on the narrow front of the Korean peninsula should rather be invested on the broad front of Asia, including Korea, Japan, Formosa and Southeast Asia.

A full-scale renewal of Korean hostilities would require us to maintain our forces in Korea at least at their present level, incur countless casualties and expend treasure at the rate of approximately $5 billion per year. Were such monies, troops and efforts utilized instead in a general security assistance program embracing the expansion of ROK forces in order to permit a gradual reduction of our own forces elsewhere in the area, the strengthening of our Far Eastern Air Force for action anywhere in the area, military aid to Japan, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and Formosa, we would establish a broad and powerful front of resistance to Communist expansion. Such a plan would be in accord with recent requests of ROK for increased military assistance; would reduce losses of our own manpower, would be more acceptable to our Allies, particularly the UK, Australia and France; and more importantly, would constitute a far more serious blow to the Communists who fear such a united front, than would an all out offensive in Korea. It would strengthen forces of the countries of Asia and the Pacific area and facilitate the eventual formation of a regional system in which each participant would play its role in a master plan designed to defeat Communist efforts at piece meal conquest of the Far East.

Applicability of NSC 118/2

The course of action which has been proposed appears to have the practical effect of achieving all the objectives set forth in Paragraph 1 of NSC 118/2 except for Paragraph 1 *a* (1) which provides for the conclusion of an armistice and for Paragraph 1 *c* which provides for military action until an armistice is agreed and therefore is more in accord with the course of action envisaged in "Tab B". Economic and political sanctions could, however, be continued and, if deemed advisable and feasible, intensified.

The recommendations contained in Paragraph 2 *b* are not directly applicable to the situation envisaged herein and should be carefully reviewed prior to implementation.

Paragraph 2 *b* (2) is inapplicable.

Paragraph 2 *b* (3) would remove all restrictions on military action and therefore, would probably be unacceptable to our Allies as leaving too great discretion to the Military Commander enabling him to make decisions which could void completely the effect of the contemplated course of action.

Paragraph 2 *b* (4). Same objection probably applies.

Paragraph 2 *b* (5). Although this might create some objections by our Allies, this Government should seriously endeavor to implement it.

Paragraph 2 *b* (7) should be implemented and could be expected to be successful particularly if the participating and other nations were convinced that neither we nor the ROK would initiate military action which would spark an all-out offensive by either side.

Paragraph 2 *b* (8) is a matter for military determination but certainly contains inherent dangers.

Paragraph 2 *c* is of course directly opposed to the course of action recommended here and is discussed at Tab "B".

Paragraph 2 [*d*]. All recommendations are applicable and political advantages can be obtained from a vigorous implementation of 2 *d* (2).

Tab "B"

Memorandum Prepared by H.O.H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Problem

To determine whether, in the event negotiations fail, this Government should adopt a course of action which would call for the exercise of such additional economic and military pressures as would force the Communists to accept an armistice; and to determine whether, in the event it is decided to adopt such a course of action, the provisions of NSC 118/2 are applicable.*

If the armistice negotiations terminate unsuccessfully or even if they are protracted indefinitely and fruitlessly this Government will be under heavy pressure from American public opinion to follow a course of action which would force the Communists to accept an armistice on our terms. Recent public opinion surveys indicate a growing dissatisfaction with the present political and military stalemate and reveal a repetition of the earlier demands for a clear-cut victory in Korea including the imposition of the necessary economic and military pressures to bring it about. Similarly such a course of action would receive the whole-hearted backing of the people and government of the ROK.

There is little doubt that if this end would be accomplished without too great an additional U.S. military commitment or without disproportionately heavy casualties, it would represent a great victory for the UN, and tend to emphasize any divergencies existing between the USSR and Communist China. It would increase presently existing strains in the Chinese and North Korean Regimes, and at the same time enhance our prestige in the Far East and other countries now threatened by Communist aggression. It would reduce the Chinese Communists and North Koreans effectiveness as military powers, and contribute to the continued security of the ROK, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, an important source of World tension. It would encourage the people and Government of ROK, thus enabling them better to attain political, economic and military stability.

---

*The Staff Annex of NSC 118/2 fully analyzes the pros and cons of this course of action. [Footnote in the source text. For text of the Annex, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1387.]

On the other hand, such a course of action would probably prove undesirable if not unacceptable to our Allies, perhaps making it necessary for us "to go it alone"; the greatly increased casualties and the fate of the prisoners of war would undoubtedly create demands for the extension of hostilities to Manchuria and the China mainland thereby increasing the risk of Soviet involvement and a third world war; would adversely affect our military assistance programs to other areas of the world; might, in the event that it appeared to be succeeding, inspire aggressive Communist action on other frontiers to relieve the pressure; would probably be met with every possible resistance on the part of the Soviet Union including the possible use of its air force, submarines and perhaps specialized ground elements.

Applicability of NSC 118/2

The course of action considered herein is, in practically all respects, in accord with U.S. objectives as set forth in Paragraph (1) *a* NSC 118/2. Paragraph (1) *a* (4) would, however, need clarifying as it is unlikely that the desired political objectives could be accomplished if the stated limitation remains imposed on the expansion of ROK forces. The difficulty of achieving the objective cited in Paragraph (1) *b*, i.e. "Avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war . . . ." will be greatly enhanced but not necessarily made impossible.

As far as the Recommendations are concerned Paragraphs 2 *b, c,* and *d* are applicable and despite the objections which some of our Allies may raise to having all of these recommendations put into effect, the exigencies of the situation and the dissatisfaction of the American public with "half-way" measures will undoubtedly make it imperative that we make every endeavor to implement them.

Tab "C"

Memorandum Prepared by H. O. H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Problem:

To determine whether, in the event of a break-off of armistice negotiations, this Government should initiate an all-out military offensive designed to drive the Communists out of Korea and unify the country by force; and, whether if it is decided to adopt this course of action, the recommendations contained in NSC 118/2 are applicable.

Discussion:

(This course of action is fully analyzed in the Staff Annex of NSC 118/2.) It would be the course of action most acceptable to the Government and people of the ROK and to that segment of American public opinion which demands "total victory". It would, if successful, eliminate Korea as a source of world tension and represent a major victory in the free world's struggle against Communist expansion. The strength and determination evidenced by such action would undoubtedly give renewed faith and encouragement to the people of the Far East and other areas faced by or struggling under Communist oppression. It would inflict a major blow to the military strength of the Chinese Communists, perhaps resulting in a major split in the Sino-Soviet partnership. The unification of Korea would not only eliminate Korea as a world trouble spot but would also reduce our future economic commitment to that country by restoring it to a position where, with rehabilitation assistance from the U.S. and U.N., it could gradually attain economic viability.

Since the attainment of this objective would represent such a tremendous victory for the U.S. and democratic interest, it is clear that the Communist orbit, led by the USSR, would probably be prepared to go to almost any lengths, including total war, to deny its achievement. At the present time there exist a number of points susceptible to undesirable Communist pressures designed to reduce the success of our efforts in Korea. It is probable that in direct proportion to our success in subjecting North Korea to our control, Soviet-inspired incidents, if not actual hostilities would break out at one or several of such points. It is extremely probable that, in the event of a UN attack sufficient to unify Korea by force, the Soviet Union would be prepared to render all necessary assistance, including the direct involvement of Soviet forces, to forestall such an eventuality.

A course of action contemplating the defeat of Communist control in Korea would be unacceptable to our Allies and undoubtedly result in a gradual loss of their support. Indeed, they would probably exhibit an increasingly hostile attitude which would have an adverse effect on the successful implementation of our foreign policy in other areas. The success of which would be further reduced by the tremendous burdens imposed upon our national economy and military production, thus necessitating a drastic curtailment of our assistance programs.

Applicability of NSC 118/2:

The objectives envisaged in the course of action discussed above are not in accord with those set forth in para 1 of NSC 118/2. The latter document envisaged the termination of hostilities at as early a date as possible and the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean Armed Forces. Although NSC 118/2 provides for the development of "strong barriers against Communist subversion and military aggression in Korea", it does not contemplate the elimination of Communist control from all of Korea nor the achievement of the unification of the country by force. This is made clear in para 1*d* which states that the U.S. should have as its objective the development of "political and social conditions in Korea which would facilitate an independent and democratic Korea."

The recommendations in paras 2*b, c, d* though applicable to the course of action under discussion would probably not be sufficient for the accomplishment of the objectives thereof. Para 2*b*(2) recommends that this Government "increase the scale of military operations consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of the UN forces". It is apparent from the discussions contained in the NSC staff study and from General Ridgway's recent statements before Congressional Committees [3] that the forces presently available in Korea are not sufficient for an all out offensive.

---

[3] For a summary of Ridgway's remarks before an executive session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 21, 1952, which were made public by Senator Richard B. Russell, see the *Washington Post*, May 22, 1952.

795B.5 MSP/5–2452

The Chief of the Unified Command Mission to Korea (Meyer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PUSAN, May 24, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to refer to your letter of 10 April [1] advising me of my designation by the President to head a special mission to negotiate financial, economic and other appropriate agreements between the United States or the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea.

I now have the honor to report the negotiation with the Government of the Republic of Korea of an "Agreement on Economic Coordination Between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command," signed at Pusan, Korea, on 24 May 1952. In addition, certain financial arrangements between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command were accomplished in an exchange of notes effectuated the same day at Pusan.[2]

The terms of reference incorporated in your letter of 10 April directed negotiation of agreements with the Republic of Korea on measures which would promote the stability of the Korean economy and facilitate the military operations of the United Nations Command in Korea. With particular reference to financial and economic agreements, these terms of reference, as subsequently amended, stressed the importance of agreement on (1) continued adherence to the terms of the Financial Agreement of 28 July 1950 between the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations;[3] (2) establishment of measures for effective joint efforts to stabilize the Korean economy; (3) appropriate arrangements for control and/or coordination of the foreign exchange resources of the Republic of Korea; and (4) conclusion of arrangements for settlement by the United States for certain of the won drawn in accordance with the Financial Agreement of 28 July 1950.

---

[1] Not printed (795B.5 MSP/4–1052), but see telegram 2450 to Vienna, Mar. 28, p. 121, for the terms of reference for the Meyer Mission.

[2] For texts, see TIAS 2593; 3 UST 4420.

The Agreement on Economic Coordination and the exchange of notes, copies of all of which are attached,[4] establish agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command on each of the above numbered points as follows:

1. It is specifically provided that the Agreement on Economic Coordination does not supersede in whole or in part any existing agreements between the two parties; in addition, there is specific provision that certain settlements by the United States for advances of Korean currency will be made under the terms of the Agreement of 28 July 1950.

2. With regard to effective joint efforts to stabilize the Korean economy the Agreement provides for the establishment of a Combined Economic Board, comprised of one representative each of the Republic of Korea and of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. The primary function of the Board will be to promote effective economic coordination between the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command; the Board's recommendations will be directed toward the development of a program designed to provide maximum support to the military effort of the United Nations Command in Korea, to relieve the hardships of the people of Korea, and to develop a stable Korean economy.

3. With respect to foreign exchange and foreign credit resources of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Korea undertakes to make prudent use of such resources and to utilize them to the extent necessary, first towards stabilization (by prompt importation into Korea of saleable essential commodities), and then toward revitalization and reconstruction of the economy of Korea. The use of all foreign exchange of the Republic of Korea will be coordinated by the Board in order to integrate the use of such exchange with United Nations Command assistance programs. In addition, all foreign exchange, from whatever source acquired, now held by the Republic of Korea and all foreign exchange which subsequent to the effective date of the agreement is derived by the Republic of Korea from any settlement for advances of Korean currency to the United Nations Command will be used only as recommended by the Board.

4. Arrangements for settlement of won drawings provide for full payment in dollars for all won sold or to be sold to United States troops. With respect to won used for military purposes the arrangements vary according to periods of time. In conformity with our terms of reference we have made no commitments with respect to settlement for advances of Korean currency made to United States forces for official expenditures prior to 31 December, 1951. For the period 1

---

[3] For documentation on this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 271 ff.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, above.

January 1952 to 31 May 1952, in order immediately to provide the Republic of Korea with substantial foreign exchange resources, we have arranged for prompt repayment at the existing military conversion rate of 6000 won to $1.00 for all won drawn by United States forces during the period and used for bona fide military purposes. For the future it has been agreed to pay to the Republic of Korea the sum of $4,000,000 per month on account to be applied in settlement for Korean currency used for bona fide military requirements of United States forces. This amount will be subject to revision upon material change in volume of won drawings or other factors and will be contingent upon continuation of reasonable efforts on the part of the Republic of Korea to achieve economic and financial stability. In addition, as soon as practicable after 31 March 1953, the United States will make full and final settlement at realistic conversion rates for any won used between June 1, 1952 and March 31, 1953 for bona fide military purposes and not previously settled for. Similar procedures will be applied in succeeding years. In this connection, the Government of the Republic of Korea has agreed that currency used for bona fide military requirements of the United States shall be considered as 90% of the total amount of Korean currency advanced and used by the United States for all purposes other than for sale to personnel of the United Nations Command. The remaining 10% of such total amount shall be regarded as having been properly expended as a contribution of the Republic of Korea to the combined effort in Korea.

It is my belief that the above agreements provide the basis for counter-inflationary actions which can greatly reduce the current inflationary pressures which now plague the Korean economy. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that the effectiveness of the agreements and of our relief and economic aid programs depends entirely upon the manner in which they are implemented. Until the price level has become more stable, and indeed, if it is to become more stable, the understandably strong pressures for premature substantial reconstruction and development—with their further inflationary effects—on the part of both the Republic of Korea and our own forces in Korea must be resisted. We must make every effort to minimize our military expenditures of won. In addition, greater efforts must be made than at present to sell more of our aid goods and to sell these goods at prices approximating those of the free market in Korea if won are to be withdrawn from circulation at a rate which even approximates our military expenditures of won. Similarly, the Republic of Korea, consistent with the terms of the agreements, must take appropriate internal measures to stabilize the economy and, in particular, must make every effort to utilize its earnings of foreign exchange so as to achieve the maximum counter-inflationary effect. The war devastation suffered by the nation and the destitute condition of the Korean people both tend to evoke great sympathy for measures which can only result in greater inflationary pressures carrying with them the threat of complete economic collapse. Effective counter-inflationary action at this time, and I emphasize this point, of necessity requires a tough-minded approach to the problem and a point of view which extends beyond the immediate future. Fuller recommendations on this subject by the mission will be presented in a separate report in the near future.

In addition to the negotiation of economic and financial agreements with the Republic of Korea our terms of reference directed that we investigate the relationship between forces under the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea to determine to what extent negotiation of an agreement on civil affairs matters would be desirable during the course of our mission. Further, after our arrival in the Far East Command, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, recommended that we seek to negotiate an agreement with the Republic of Korea with respect to the support the Government of Korea would furnish for the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and for prisoners of war, based on the present strength of Korean armed forces under current conditions.

The Agreement on Economic Coordination contains certain broad and general agreements in these two fields. With respect to civil affairs matters the Republic of Korea undertakes to grant to individuals and agencies of the Unified Command, except Korean Nationals, such privileges, immunities and facilities as are necessary for the fulfillment of their function within the Republic of Korea under pertinent resolutions of the United Nations, or as have been heretofore granted by agreements, arrangements or understandings or as may be agreed upon formally or informally hereafter. The Republic of Korea also undertakes to provide logistic support to the armed forces of the Republic of Korea to the maximum extent feasible and to furnish to the United Nations Command timely information concerning the details of this support in order to permit coordinated budgetary planning.

In our explorations of these two subjects with the Republic of Korea, it became apparent that any endeavor to conclude more definitive arrangements might lead to a counter proposal on the part of the Republic of Korea for the conclusion of a mutual security agreement with the United States. Consequently, it was the opinion of our mission, in which Ambassador Muccio and General Clark concurred, that it would be desirable to defer recommending the negotiation of a civil affairs agreement until the matter could be studied further by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, and the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea in the light of the situation which develops in the implementing of the Economic Coordination Agreement.

In conclusion, I wish to express on behalf of the members of the mission and myself our sincere appreciation to the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Both the Ambassador and the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the individuals and agencies functioning under their direction, have given us every cooperation and service throughout the course of our studies and negotiations. Their advice, counsel, and guidance proved of invaluable assistance in bringing to successful fruition the tasks and objectives of our mission. I would also like to express the gratitude of our mission to the Departments of State, Defense and Treasury for their splendid support from Washington of the work of our mission.

Respectfully yours, C. E. MEYER

Editorial Note

At midnight on May 24, the Government of the Republic of Korea proclaimed martial law in Pusan and 22 counties in south Kyonsang and Chohlas. Immediately prior to this proclamation, President Rhee appointed Yi Pom Suk, Home Minister; Hong Pom-Hi, Vice Home Minister; and Yun-Kyong, Chief of National Police. The first act of the government under martial law was the arrest of So Min-ho early in the morning of May 25. Republic of Korea military police then began to roust opposition assemblymen from their beds and arrest them, but they arrested only four legislators.

According to the Republic of Korea Constitution, the National Assembly had the power to end martial law. The United States Embassy staff in Pusan believed that Rhee was making every effort to prevent the Assembly from gaining a quorum and thus acting to end martial law. The Embassy also concluded that the imposition of martial law was a political maneuver to provide an excuse for extralegal action by Rhee. A fuller account of these details can be found in telegram 1160 from Pusan, May 26, 1952, not printed. (795B.00/5-2652)

795.00/5-2652

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1952.

Subject: Further Steps Regarding the Present Korean Situation.

There is attached an analysis in outline form [2] of further steps to bring about an armistice agreement without resort to hostilities. After considerable discussion and thinking about all of the possible moves and counter moves, I am left with the strong impression that precipitate closing down of the armistice negotiations would not serve our national interest at this time, and that all of the many possible devices of breaking the POW impasse would be too difficult or uncertain to risk trying at this stage. The conclusions of NA from this analysis are as follows:

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Johnson.

[2] Not printed.

1. There are many arguments for sticking to the April 28 proposals in spite of the world-wide impact of Koje-do. After all, the reaction of Koje-do will be temporary, and we have only been in the present stage of negotiations for a month; that may be a short time in the Communist way of doing things. Therefore, we must not be too hasty in seeking an escape; nor must we permit any impression of uncertainty on our part. We must convince the Communists that we intend to stand firm.[3]

2. For the next few weeks[4] we must use the sessions at Panmunjom to explain and elaborate our proposal on post-armistice rescreening. We should refer to it as a repatriation process and the UNC Delegation should attempt to draw out the Communists' comments on it.[5]

3. It is imperative that we undertake to provide the UNC Delegation with more prepared instructions from time to time both on the handling of the repatriation process as well as on overall propaganda requirements.[6]

4. After a study of all possible ways of breaking the impasse on the POW issue, it is clear that intercession of a third party, such as the Government of India, would increase the chances of reaching agreement on any one. It is impossible at Panmunjom to get information from the Communist representatives on various possibilities and to exchange ideas with them as to how this matter could be worked out. The sessions at Panmunjom have ceased to be a negotiation. We must seek to develop a channel to Peking through which we can obtain Communist reaction to our current proposals as well as technical suggestions from Peking on how to solve the dilemma.[7]

5. As well as stand on our present position, we should develop a hard hitting propaganda program that exploits the obvious Communist vulnerabilities on the POW issue. Since Communist propaganda now has overtones which transcend the Korean situation and since the solution of the Korean conflict is in turn related to other issues in the US–USSR

---

[3] The following marginal notations appeared next to this paragraph: "O.K. (with some reservations)" in Allison's handwriting; "Agree" in Johnson's.

[4] The phrase "next few weeks" was underlined and Allison noted on the margin the following: "Probably too long".

[5] Johnson noted in the margin next to this paragraph the following: "Trying do this".

[6] The following marginal notations appeared next to this paragraph: "Agree" (Allison), "Being done" (Johnson).

[7] The following appeared next to this paragraph: "Agree" (Allison), "Now trying to get Gov't agreement on this" (Johnson).

conflict, our propaganda should turn its full weight on the vicious campaign that Moscow is now pushing to extremes.[8]

6. In the meantime, we should explore with our Allies and with certain governments not actively participating in the Korean affair, various ways of breaking the jam on the POW issue. At the appropriate time in the negotiations and following adequate sounding out of Peking, the UNC Delegation could then propose pre-armistice review of the repatriation problem or an international screening of the non-repatriates.[9]

---

[8] The following appeared next to this paragraph: "Agree" (Allison), "Trying do this" (Johnson).

[9] The following appeared next to this paragraph: "Agree" (Allison), "Trying do this" (Johnson).

795.00/5–2652

Draft Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1952.

Eyes only for Clark.

Part I.

1. Careful consideration is being given here to next step in armistice negotiations. As we see situation here following factors must be included among those to be considered.

A. We continue to have strong domestic and international support, notably including India, for the principle of non-forcible repatriation of POWs;

B. However, we must frankly recognize that recent events on Koje Island have seriously undermined previous confidence in our handling of POWs and validity results screening; on one hand there is concern over inability thus far screen pro-Commie camps and thus number non-repatriates too low, and on other hand that pressure factors were permitted to operate on individual POWs in anti-Commie camps so that number of non-repatriates too high;

C. Prior to recent events on Koje Island all of our principal allies strongly urged that our offer of impartial rescreening after armistice be modified so as to permit such rescreening prior to armistice subject to prior agreement by each side to abide by the results. We rejected such suggestions at that time on grounds (1) not likely to be any more acceptable to Commies than screening after armistice, (2) obvious disadvantages to UNC compared to screening after armistice, and (3) we would not regard such a proposal as a substantive change in April 28

---

[1] This version was originally drafted by Young on May 22, 1952, and given to Johnson that evening. Johnson made substantial revisions and also sent Young's draft to Matthews, Hickerson, Bohlen, Sargeant, and Nitze with a request for their comments. This draft of May 26 was the product of their suggestions. The May 22 draft and the comments thereon are included in FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 73 and 74. The May 26 draft was then submitted to the JCS. After many subsequent revisions this draft was sent as telegram JCS 910484, June 5, p. 310. For information on the various revisions, see footnote 6, p. 261 and memoranda of discussion, pp. 256 and 295.

UNC package proposal so that if negotiations on that proposal indicated timing of screening was only major point at issue we would at that time consider pre-armistice screening;

D. Subsequently Allies have strongly renewed pressure for some type of rescreening, principally a UNC offer of impartial rescreening prior to an armistice with Commie observation and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results;

E. Regardless of the logic and reasonableness of our position on impartial rescreening following an armistice, our principal Allies would not now support a unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations, at least until after an offer of rescreening prior to an armistice has been made in some way and rejected by Commies;

F. A unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC would give Soviets basis for exploiting subsequent situation as a "breaking off negotiations" by UNC in face Commie willingness and desire continue talks and UNC unwillingness to face facts "exposed" by incidents on Koje Islands. Such attacks could at this time do much to exploit wavering opinions among our friends and Allies;

G. A unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC, particularly without solid support from our principal Allies, would give Soviets basis for moving negotiations to Security Council (which Soviets chair during June) on grounds deadlock at Panmunjom, and opportunity in Security Council to link other questions with Korean settlement, thereby beclouding Korean issues and confusing and dividing general support we now have on fundamental positions re Korea;

H. Additionally, there have been some still entirely inconclusive indications received through diplomatic channels that Chinese might seek a resolution of the POW question and have indicated principal difficulty may be lowness of UNC figure on repatriates, a figure of 100,000 possibly being a basis for resolution this issue, and question of Chinese POWs being relatively more important than NK POWs. This is known to several Governments and may be expected eventually to become generally known.

Part II.

1. Therefore, while a unilateral indefinite suspension of the negotiations in the face of continued Commie intransigence may serve additionally to impress Commies with firmness of our position, if such suspension were accompanied by evidences of Allied disunity, the opposite effect might result. Thus, while sympathetic with extremely trying and difficult situation faced by UNC Del, do not consider here that time now propitious for a unilateral indefinite suspension of negotiations by UNC.

2. However, as stated in JCS [909747][2] no objection is perceived to holding meetings only every three or four days if by agreement of Dels. Additionally, even if Commies do not agree, no objection perceived here to UNC Del occasionally indicating without explanation its inability to meet for two or three days so that UNC Del is not placed

---

[2] Dated May 26, not printed (795.00/5–3152).

in position of being continuously responsive to Commie importunities for meetings.

Part III.

1. In considering what additional measures can be taken to restore confidence in and unqualified support for our position on POWs, two possible courses of action are being examined here. It is considered that the course of action adopted should, in itself, contribute whatever may be possible toward the achieving of an armistice without any concession of our basic principles, obtain maximum effectiveness from the unilateral indefinite suspension if all other efforts fail, and assure maximum support for the US if an armistice is not ultimately achieved.

The two possible courses of action are:

(a) An offer to the Commies of an immediate impartial rescreening of non-repatriates prior to an armistice, with Commie observation, and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results;

(b) An immediate rescreening of all POWs by or under the observation of a group of countries not participating in the hostilities in Korea (such as Switzerland, Sweden and India), such screening to be carried out at the unilateral initiative of the UNC and without any invitation for Commie observation.

2. In order to minimize any erroneous implications that UNC was willing to compromise its basic principles on non-forcible repatriation, and to maximize possibilities Commie acceptance, the offer mentioned in para 1 (a) above could originate as a mediation proposal from some third country which could test Chinese Commie reactions to it. If rejected by the Commies, the fact of the offer, Chinese rejection and US acceptance could be made public to the great advantage of the US. If accepted in principle by the Chinese it would, of course, be necessary that it subsequently be introduced into the negotiations at Panmunjom for confirmation and agreement on details. Alternatively or subsequently, the offer could be introduced by the UNC Del at Panmunjom within the context of UNC refutation Commie allegations on coercion and forceful retention non-repatriates. In this connection we note with approval that in several recent restatements of UNC position on POWs UNC Del has omitted reference to timing of impartial rescreening proposal.

3. While there are obvious and serious disadvantages to rescreening prior to an armistice as compared with rescreening subsequent to an armistice, we do not consider that those disadvantages are so serious as to outweigh advantage of achieving an armistice. Additionally, if, as would be necessary, both sides would agree to abide by results, essential difference from post armistice screening should not be great and in negotiations on details it might be possible so to maneuver agreement that difference was more apparent than real.

4. If Commies continue to remain entirely intransigent on subject forcible repatriation the line of action set forth in para 1 (b) above could only serve purpose of restoring confidence in results UNC screening and complete reasonableness of UNC posture on POW question. If basis of Commie disagreement on POW question is now large proportion of non-repatriates, particularly among Chinese, line of action set forth in para 1 (b) could contribute to achievement of an armistice only if results of such rescreening were likely to be more favorable to Commies. It would therefore be important that we have the best estimate of the situation in this regard it is possible for you to make.

Part IV.

1. Request your comments on Parts II and III.

695.0029/5-2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1952.[2]

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations
Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, UK Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Henkin, UNP

Mr. Tomlinson called to give me the substance of a telegram from the Foreign Office, reporting further on discussions between the UK and the Indian Governments. In a telegram to Mr. Eden, Selwyn Lloyd reported a further visit from the Indian High Commissioner in London. The High Commissioner stated that he had recommended to Mr. Nehru the formula which he and Mr. Eden had tentatively agreed upon.[3] He asked whether Mr. Nehru would be prepared to have Ambassador Panikkar propose this formula to the Chinese Communists as the best formula which the Indian Government could propose to the UK. He would not indicate that the British had seen this formula.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that the proposed procedure seemed excellent and that I hoped it might bring fruit. I pointed out, however, that in my previous conversation I had given Mr. Tomlinson my preliminary reactions but that I had assumed that there would be additional opportunity for study and comment upon the formula. Mr. Tomlinson replied that the formula was not in any sense "frozen", and it would not be communicated to the Communists immediately. Nehru's reaction to the UK High Commissioner's recommendation would undoubtedly be communicated to the British and there would be further opportunity to comment on the formula.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henkin.

[2] This memorandum was dictated on May 27.

[3] The formula under reference was set forth in the British telegram handed to Johnson; see the memorandum by Matthews, May 22, p. 227.

I then suggested that the introductory portion of the formula, as presently drafted, might be construed as an invitation to the Communists to hold back some of the 12,000 UN prisoners of war whom they had agreed to return. Mr. Tomlinson agreed that this point had some merit, and after discussion we suggested that the relevant portion might be revised to read "for ascertaining the views of all prisoners captured in the Korean conflict about repatriation." I also expressed to Mr. Tomlinson our difficulty with the phrase in paragraph (A) providing that "all prisoners should be set at liberty." I pointed out that, particularly in regard to the Chinese, they would have to be maintained in some refugee status and probably kept in camps until a place were found for them to go. Also, in view of our rescreening offer, it would be necessary to keep all POWs who refused repatriation in one place so that they would be available for interviews. I suggested, therefore, that instead of the phrase indicated the formula should read "All prisoners should be released from POW status and permitted to go to any destination of their own choice available to them." Finally, I suggested that the formula might be strengthened by the addition of a point "(F)", emphasizing that none of the POWs, either those repatriated or those who refused repatriation, would be allowed to take up arms again in Korea. I pointed out that this was already provided in the draft armistice agreement to which both sides had agreed. Mr. Tomlinson agreed that the point would be helpful and it was decided to propose the following wording: "No prisoner shall again bear arms in the Korean conflict."

I told Mr. Tomlinson that these suggestions were still not final, but I would confirm them later by telephone. (Later in the day, May 26th, I called Mr. Tomlinson and informed him that these suggestions were being proposed to the Secretary, who would probably discuss them with Mr. Eden.[4])

Mr. Tomlinson also reported that the Foreign Office was informed that on May 20th the Indian Government received a communication from its Ambassador in Peiping which indicated that in the Chinese view there is a sharp distinction between Chinese and North Korean POWs. The Koreans were in civil war and therefore, so long as the Koreans remained in some part of Korea, they were, in a sense, not being denied repatriation. The Chinese could not agree, however, to the retention of a single Chinese.[5] The Indian reaction to this communication, as reported to the Foreign Office, was that it must be viewed with caution. It noted that this would narrow the problem, since only some 15,000 persons would be involved, but they recognized that the difficulty of principle remained unresolved. Mr. Eden, upon being informed of this communication, commented that it must be viewed with caution, but that if accurate it might be interesting as evidence of a desire to reach some compromise. I noted that the communication did not make clear whether the Chinese had in fact stated this position to Panikkar or whether Panikkar himself was exploring for a possible solution. I emphasized, of course, that the question of principle applies equally to the Chinese.

---

[4] At a meeting in Paris on May 26 between Acheson and Eden, the Foreign Ministers discussed, *inter alia*, the Indian presentation to the Chinese of the formula worked out with the British. Eden reported that the preliminary Chinese reaction was not unfavorable, but that they had raised the issue of a reciprocal visit of POWs refusing repatriation. Acheson stated that this demand would meet with strong opposition in Washington. In light of this reaction, Eden observed that the Indians should be discouraged from pushing the formula in Peking. In any case, Eden expressed pessimism over Indian efforts ever coming to anything. At this point, Acheson related current relevant thinking in Washington: an ICRC rescreening with Communist observers and a clear agreement by both sides to accept the results of that rescreening. He added, however, that the Communists were not likely to accept this solution. Therefore, the UNC would unilaterally arrange a recheck by a neutral such as Sweden or Switzerland. Adding that this course of action was not yet finally determined as the U.S. Government position, Acheson concluded that the important thing was to reestablish the moral position undermined by the riots in the prison camps. (Minutes of Bipartite Foreign Ministers meeting with the British, May 26, 1952, 9:45 p.m., lot 59 D 95, CF 110, "SCEM Minutes and Memoranda of Conv")

Mr. Tomlinson also read to me a critical telegram from the Foreign Office. The telegram stated that the Foreign Office had been led to believe that all the prisoners of war had been screened and that a statement to this effect had been made to Parliament. They were dismayed, therefore, to learn that this was not, in fact, the case. The Foreign Office stressed the great importance which Parliament attaches to the accuracy of statements made to it by members of the Government. I reminded Mr. Tomlinson that he had been informed, and that he had in fact indicated that he had told the Foreign Office. Perhaps we should have emphasized more frequently the fact that certain compounds could not be screened and that the 70,000 estimate was based in part on a guess as to the attitudes of these POWs. It had never been intended, however, to deny or to conceal this fact, and we had been under the impression that the UK and the other Governments understood this situation.

---

[5] In telegram 4371 from New Delhi, dated May 23, 1952, not printed, Bowles reported that Bajpai had informed him of similar indications from Peking. (693.95B24/5-2352)

695.0029/5-2752

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1952.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henkin and approved by Johnson.

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, UK Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Henkin, UNP

Mr. Tomlinson called to inform me, with some embarrassment, that contrary to his assurances of yesterday that the Indian-UK formula[2] would not be transmitted to Peiping for some time, New Delhi had jumped ahead and had in fact instructed its Ambassador to transmit it to the Communists. According to the telegram which London received from New Delhi, Nehru had Panikkar transmit the formula as suggested, i.e., as the kind of proposal which Nehru is prepared to make to the UK and to ask the UK to discuss with the U.S. Panikkar has reported that the initial reaction of the Communists "warrants some hope." The matter is to be discussed again by Panikkar on June 1st. The UK will keep us fully informed.

The UK Foreign Office further suggested that if the Communists in fact prove receptive to the formula, there were several possibilities for following it up: a.) The same channel, i.e., India, might be used to reach agreement with the Communists on behalf of all the UN participating nations. Introducing this new channel might prove a desirable new factor leading to more easy agreement; of course it would be important to give Panikkar very specific and limited instructions. b.) In the alternative, the UNC might make this suggestion at Panmunjom.

In regard to the timing of the making of the proposal, the UK Foreign Office thought that the offer should not be made until the possibility of a pre-armistice screening had been exhausted, but should be made as soon after that as possible.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that I did not understand the meaning in this context of their last point about pre-armistice screening; Mr. Tomlinson admitted that he did not either. This led to re-examination of the formula, which I indicated I had understood to comtemplate screening after an armistice. It was because I construed the formula to be entirely within our present proposal (including post-armistice screening) that I had stated that the formula might prove an adroit and useful way of getting the Communists to accept our present position. In the light of Mr. Tomlinson's suggestion that he construed the formula to contemplate pre-armistice screening, I suggested that we would appreciate having the Foreign Office give its view as to the respects, if any, in which the formula differs substantially from the present UNC proposal.

I then expressed my unhappiness and concern over the fact that the formula had been transmitted to Peiping before the U.S. had had a full opportunity to make suggestions. Any suggestions which might be made now would be sharply scrutinized by the Communists and might be perverted by them for propaganda purposes. We still considered the suggestions which we had made yesterday, and which Mr. Acheson may be taking up with Mr. Eden at this time, to be important. While I made no firm suggestions as to how to undo the damage, I expressed the view that the suggestions might well be communicated to Peiping and that it would be easier if they were made at an appropriate opportunity by the Indians rather than later by the UK, or still later by the U.S.

---

[2] The reference was to the formula set forth in a British telegram handed to Johnson; see the memorandum by Matthews, May 22, p. 227.

Mr. Tomlinson reported that a telegram from Mr. Eden states that he agrees that it would be desirable to make the offer of pre-armistice screening to the Communists and that he hoped it could be done. I informed Mr. Tomlinson that we were still considering very actively and on a very high level the suggestion that we offer the Communists pre-armistice screening. I hope to have some definite reaction for him in a few days.

Mr. Tomlinson also informed me that apparently Mr. Eden did not share Selwyn Lloyd's concern (expressed to me the day before) over the fact that the 70,000 figure was based in part on an estimate of the views of PWs whom it was not possible to screen.

I gave Mr. Tomlinson the latest figures on the distribution of PWs in various camps and compounds as of May 26th. I also agreed to give him the material for a reply to a parliamentary question on the use of Chinese Nationalist personnel in indoctrination of PWs before the April screening.

795.00/5–2752: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 27, 1952—6:49 p. m.

877. To Lightner from Muccio. Urtels 1163, 1164 and 1169.[2] See Rhee soonest to deliver personal msg from me as fols:

"In our last mtg before my departure [3] I explained that Pres Truman personally concerned over polit situation in Korea and wished to have direct report from me on latest developments. That is why I have returned to Wash. Immed on arriving here I was presented with reports from the Emb and the UN of the even more disturbing actions reportedly involving use of force and coercion which officials ur Govt and personally controlled groups have taken in the last few days. This will be even more difficult for me to explain to Pres Truman. Furthermore members of press are already pressing me for explanations as to the significance of these actions and what effect they will have on Gen Van

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Muccio and Young and cleared with Allison and Johnson.

[2] These three telegrams from the U.S. Embassy in Pusan, dated May 27, 26, and 27, respectively, reported on the events of the ROK internal crisis, none printed (795.00/5–2752, 795.00/5–2652, and 795.00/5–2752, respectively).

[3] For a report of that meeting, see p. 228.

Fleet's responsibilities for repelling aggression and maintaining security of UN forces.

As Pres Truman has asked me to see him Thurs morning [4] I urge you to provide me through Mr. Lightner with such explanations as I may present to Pres Truman of the need for the recent actions and the steps being taken to restore order and stability."

Pls send Rhee's comments niact. FYI it is hoped that import of this msg may restrain Rhee from further actions and induce him correct situation. Fol Deptel [5] contains additional steps for ur guidance. Suggest in ur discretion you inform Gens Clark and Van Fleet of this msg.

Bruce

---

[4] May 29.

[5] The next telegram to Pusan which provided the kind of guidance described was 887, May 29, p. 264.

795.00/5-2752: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, May 27, 1952—midnight.

1170. Rptd info CINCUNC EUSAK Advance DIP 203. In response to UNCURK invitation [1] Gen Van Fleet came Pusan this afternoon to discuss polit sitn. I accompanied him to meeting with UNCURK 4 p.m. He informed group neither he nor ROKA Chief of Staff informed or consulted in advance of decision for martial law in Pusan and other areas. He was naturally concerned at use of army for polit purposes and furthermore he had no reason to believe local police force unable cope with sitn. This was his main concern but he appreciated broader polit factors which were disturbing UNCURK and Emb, particularly effect Rhee's methods wld have on outside world and on UN cause in Korea. Gen indicated that he and army shld support Pres of ROK until latter is proven wrong. There was some discussion at this point on whether or not Rhee had already proven to be in wrong. Was indicated that if one waited too long to [act?] might be faced with *fait accompli* even more difficult to solve. During course of discussion, UNCURK outlined action already taken and intention follow-up with another call on Pres, probably tomorrow morning. It was arranged that the Gen and I wld call on Pres immed.

In mtg with Pres at 6 p.m., Gen Van Fleet stated that Gen Clark had asked him to come to Pusan to speak to Pres about certain factors in sitn here which were of concern to the army. Gen made clear he was not fully informed of details of the polit controversy that was going on, but that he and Gen Clark were concerned lest developments here shld reflect unfavorably on Govt of Korea and that it wld be most unfortunate at this time if anything happened which wld cause the outside world to lose confidence in ROK. He went on to say that in view of his responsibility to safeguard reputation of armed forces and importance of keeping them from being involved in politics, he was also worried with respect to the uses to which they were being put in Pusan under the martial law regime. He said he had not been informed or consulted on necessity for establishing martial law in this area and that as far as he knew the situation did not require intervention of military. He went on to indicate he understood there was also some question about transferring additional ROK troops to the Pusan area and he pointed out that the transfer of any combat troops at this time wld weaken the front and that the enemy might well take advantage of any loopholes thus created. He had informed Gen Lee, whom he understood had been requested come Pusan to see Pres, of this sitn and had advised him that he would not approve any such transfers of combat troops.

---

[1] The UNCURK invitation to Van Fleet was extended in the hope that the General would use his great personal influence with Rhee and reinforce the Commission's own action (telegram 1164 from Pusan, May 26, 1952; 795.00/5-2652).

Pres Rhee replied that the decision to establish martial law had been taken by cabinet toward end of last week and that when his approval had been requested he had agreed and in fact he had suggested that Pusan be included because of the unsettled conditions in the city due demonstrations in which hundreds, perhaps thousands, of innocent, democratically minded citizens had been injured. By the time matter came his attn it was felt necessary to put martial law into effect without delay and without going through formality of obtaining written orders from Chief of Staff. Pres thereupon telephoned Gen Lee[2] who agreed that defense minister wld issue decree, Major General Wong Yong-tok wld be appointed martial law commander and wld take orders directly from Pres. However, Pres said martial law in Pusan itself had proved unpopular and that if Gen Van Fleet desired he wld be glad lift it. Gen Van Fleet reiterated he felt this was a good idea. He went on to suggest possibility removing martial law from other area six provinces wherever not necessary in connection with planned anti-guerrilla operations.

No definite commitment was obtained from Pres this point.

Rhee then mentioned he had some news which he knew wld make the Gen unhappy. He said that, unfortunately, word had reached him that Chief of Staff Gen Lee was implicated in the plot against him and that he wld have to be removed. Gen Van Fleet expressed incredulity at this because he was convinced, as result long association Gen Lee, that Gen Lee's principal interest in life is in building up ROK and that he was sure Gen Lee completely loyal to Korea and Pres Rhee. Furthermore, it was almost an obsession with Lee to remain aloof from internal politics, a principle he had tried to inculcate throughout the ROKA. Rhee held out some papers, which he said were messages from Gen Lee to Gen Won and other officers, in effect countermanding oral understanding made with Pres last week and ordering the martial law commander to take no action except under instrs from himself. Gen Lee is expected Pusan in morning but Rhee seemed to have already made up his mind to fire him. Gen Van Fleet asked that Gen Lee be given chance to answer these charges which he (Gen Van Fleet) was most hopeful would be answered satisfactorily. However, in event the Pres was convinced that change must be made, Gen Van Fleet pointed out the necessity of obtaining very best man available to take his place. After some discussion of candidates, Gen Van Fleet said he felt best man would probably be Gen Paek Sun-Yop, altho it would be a loss to take the best fighting general away from the Third Corps.

---

[2] Gen. Lee Chong Chang, ROKA Chief of Staff.

I referred to Gen Van Fleet's remarks with respect to the unfortunate effect which current actions against Natl Assembly were bound to have abroad.

Rhee said he was aware many of his enemies were circulating many lies re issues at stake. Facts were that group of gangsters had obtained majority in Natl Assembly, many bribed with funds through traitorous connections with Korea's enemies, and in cahoots with anti-Natl DNP they had determined to seize govt. They already had plans for electing their own gangster president and had agreed on their future cabinet. Masses of evidence had been available to him for long time which proved beyond doubt that these men were traitors. Up to now he had hesitated to crack down on them because he had hoped to prevent them from gaining their goal without drastic action. He realized that necessity for such action now to save Korea and the democratic cause would subject him to criticism that he was doing it to assure his own election as Pres. However, he assured us this was not the case, that Korea's future was at stake and he, not the Assemblymen, was the champion of democracy in Korea.

I commented Embassy was not interested whether Assembly had been right or wrong in its position re amendments to constitution and other controversial issues but that no matter what the justification might be for the course that the President was pursuing, I could assure him that the impression on the outside world would boil down to few simple facts: That the executive was preventing the democratically elected legislature from meeting; that his political opponents in the Assembly were being arrested; and, in short, that drastic police measures were being taken to prevent the legislature of the country from proceeding with its business. I said that the peoples and govts of the democratic countries abroad, including especially the US, would see this picture and this picture only and I was alarmed at the thought of what repercussions might be and the effects they might have on future economic and military aid to Korea. The repercussions in Communist countries and in other countries of Asia were also important considerations.

The President began to get hot under the collar. He reiterated some of the points already made and likened the Natl Assembly to a legislature in which gangsters had obtained control and passed a law legalizing murder. He asked what should people of that country do in such sitn. (The group now controlling the Natl Assembly he was convinced were in this category and the nations of the world should appreciate this and rally to his cause which was the just and democratic cause.) He did not have to rely on the military or the police because he had the people with him as we well knew and the people through him would triumph. If the nations of the world, through faulty info they probably recd, should criticize him he would pay no attn because he knew he was right. He would proceed with his just purposes regardless of outside pressures. Given two months we could be sure sitn would be well in hand, order would be restored and no one would have any cause for worry.

I asked him if at the end of 2 months we wld have democratic govt in Korea. He sputtered at this, asking what I meant and I asked whether the govt wld include a duly elected Natl Assembly free to conduct its business without interference. The President, with considerable vehemence stated that of course there wld be such an Assembly, that during the 2 months the principal traitors in the Assembly wld all be arrested and put out of the way (they wld of course be given fair trials open to the public), and that their places wld be taken by individuals who wld truly represent the people who wld put them in office thru democratic by-elections. On this note the interview ended.

Following is Embassy's appraisal present situation:

1. Lifting of martial law Pusan area, if carried out, will accomplish positive result in removing stigma from Army of complicity in political maneuvering. On other hand it will not prevent further high handed actions, since President can use police who are now in "gentle" hands Yi Pom-Sok. Also wld provide excuse for resuming demonstrations which temporarily abandoned during martial law phase, with possibility mob violence.

2. No doubt Rhee has large popular following including inarticulate masses. On other hand most intellectuals, businessmen, and increasing numbers govt officials, army officers and other educated groups comprising potential leadership ROK wld welcome change govt. However, except for embattled Assemblymen and two newspapers, few of these elements willing take positive stand under present circumstances.

3. Believe Rhee sincerely convinced own mind group opposing govt are rascals and that he himself is only one who can prevent them from gaining power. He associates perpetuation himself in power with country's welfare.

4. Rhee is therefore determined at all costs rid himself of enemies and return himself to power. He appears willing to face criticism from abroad, despite fact he has in past been sensitive to world opinion. He also seems to be banking on fact US and UN will not intervene in manner sufficiently strong to divert him from his course.

5. Believe further informal representations such as made by UNCURK, Gen Van Fleet and Emb will be ineffective. Stronger action now seems required.

LIGHTNER

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: We might discuss this draft telegram to General Clark.[2] We have talked it over here. It seems to us that if you are going to have rescreening before an armistice, you don't gain anything by letting the Communists be observers. No matter what happens they are bound to come down, look around, and then go back and say the situation was just what they thought it would be and that all prisoners who say they don't want to be repatriated are, in fact, being forcibly retained. It is possible that the second alternative mentioned in the telegram might be useful. That would be to have a sufficient number of neutrals assist in a rescreening so that there will be an effective counter to what the Communists are saying.

Mr. Nitze: It seemed to us that the important point in the first alternative was that we would secure Communist agreement to abide by the results of a rescreening.

General Bradley: In that case we should say not only that they must abide by results but that they would conclude an armistice on the basis of the results. But in any case it seems to us that we should have enough neutral nations to attest to the accuracy of the results of the rescreening and counter whatever the Communist observers might say.

Mr. Johnson: We agree there is a basis for your worries about having Communist observers, but we don't believe the Communists will agree to this proposal, and if they refuse we think it would weaken their propaganda position.

---

[1] A note on the source text read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Generals Bradley, Collins, and Twining and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS; Bohlen, Nitze, Allison, Johnson, Stelle, and Ferguson represented the Department of State. These ten were the only participants at the meeting. Berlin was also a topic of discussion at the meeting.

[2] Dated May 26, p. 244.

General Collins: The trouble is the Communists could agree to abide by the results and then repudiate the agreement after they had been observers at a rescreening. I don't see that we gain a thing by having any Communists take part in screening. They would come down, observe the situation, and then repudiate their agreement, then go back and beat their drums. It seems to me we have already made too many mistakes in assuming the Communists might operate as decent people should.

Mr. Bohlen: Nobody is going under the assumption the Communists are decent people. We know just the opposite. What we have to figure is how to deal with people whom we must consider thoroughly crooked and dishonest. I agree that there is no point in undertaking a rescreening unless the Communists do agree to conclude an armistice on the results. I personally think that the lack of confidence in the validity of our screening on the part of our Allies isn't sufficient to justify the necessity for such a rescreening. After all, the troubles have been in the Communist camps on Kojedo who have not been screened and not among the anti-Communists who have said they don't want to go back. If, however, we make a proposal for a rescreening on the basis that the Communists agree to abide by the results and conclude an armistice, I think the possibility that they might make such an agreement and then repudiate it is a calculated risk worth taking.

General Collins: I am interested in Mr. Bohlen's statement that he doesn't think the Allied lack of confidence in our screening necessitates a rescreening.

Mr. Johnson: Actually we are caught by worries on both sides. Congressmen tend to worry about the pro-Communists we haven't screened whereas the UK is worried that the figures of non-repatriates which we have secured are too high.

General Collins: I don't see how the figures can be too high. Anybody who once said he doesn't want to go back to a Communist country would hardly reverse himself now. If he did go back he would know just how he would be treated after having once said he didn't want to go back. If there really are major doubts on the part of our Allies on that point, why don't we ask the UK and Australia to send over a group not to rescreen prisoners but just to check to their own satisfaction on the validity of the screening that has already taken place. But I really don't see why you should let Communist observers come in on any screening.

Mr. Nitze: We only would if we could get a commitment from the Communists to conclude an armistice on the results of the screening. Nobody can guarantee that if the Commies made such a commitment they wouldn't repudiate it. On balance, however, even though it is unlikely they would make such a commitment, it would seem probable that if they did agree to a rescreening and to abide by the results, they would only do so if they had the intention of arriving at an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: What we really have to think about is how we can improve our position in the negotiations. The Kojedo business has made it difficult to go ahead with what we originally planned to do. We wanted to present a clear package proposal and then suspend negotiations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The questions that have come up because of the Kojedo mess make it seem unwise to suspend negotiations at this particular juncture because of the confusion that has followed the Kojedo business. We can't now suspend negotiations with the support of our Allies. If we could introduce some new element by making an offer of screening before an armistice, maybe even screening prisoners of both sides, then we might get back to where we were before and have Allied support for suspension of negotiations if the Commies should reject such an offer.

General Bradley: Is there some message in the British talks with India which deals with the possibility of screening prisoners of both sides.

Mr. Johnson at this point read the draft telegram to General Clark [3] informing him about Nehru's suggestions to the British and Eden's reply.

General Bradley: My personal opinion is that we are now on dead center. Maybe we have to do something, which may have to be through an intermediary such as India, but our principal worry is whatever we do there should be enough neutral nations represented on any rescreening to be able to refute Communist statements and to demonstrate that our screening has been OK.

Admiral Fechteler: Aren't we waiting for suggestions from General Clark as to what things should be done.

General Collins: I think on the other hand he is waiting for some decision from us.

Admiral Fechteler: For my part I am against any rescreening by anybody at any time.

General Bradley: Is there a message in from George Kennan on the desirability of our standing firm on all our positions at this time.

Mr. Bohlen: That message dealt with Berlin and pointed out what was already agreed on—that we should be firm in case there is an encroachment on our rights in Berlin.[4] I would like to know of Admiral Fechteler how he thinks without any rescreening we can get off dead center.

---

[3] This draft was eventually sent as JCS 910520 to Clark, June 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/6–2852).

[4] For documentation on Berlin, see volume VII.

Admiral Fechteler: Just break off negotiations and wait for them to agree.

Mr. Bohlen: If it hadn't been for Kojedo, we might have done just that, but with this Kojedo business, we need some new element.

Admiral Fechteler: I think that from the very beginning all our guesses about the screening business have been bad.

Mr. Bohlen: I agree there is no point in rescreening just for the sake of rescreening. But if you get a commitment for an armistice on the basis of the results, that seems to be a different matter.

General Bradley: Personally, I have a feeling that we must insist on two things. First, enough neutrals must be present at any rescreening, and second, there must be a Communist commitment for an armistice on the basis of the rescreening.

General Collins: It seems to me that this telegram mixes up two different things. We have two objectives. The first is to try to put the Communists on the spot so that if we do terminate negotiations we can do it on a good basis. The second is to try to get Allied approval and support for what we have done already. On the first alternative my major worry is that the Commies might agree to abide by the result of a rescreening and then repudiate that agreement. On the second alternative I can see some merit in having some sort of interrogation or sample questioning by our Allies of the validity of the screening that has already been accomplished. I am still worried that we may not be clear enough in our realization that these Communists are and will act like SOB's. What guarantee can there be that they won't repudiate any agreement they make.

Mr. Nitze: There can't be any guarantee that the Commies wouldn't repudiate an agreement to abide by the results, but we figure that even if they would make such an agreement and then repudiate it, we would still come out on top propagandawise.

General Bradley: It is essential that we have enough neutrals to refute the charge that the Communists would make if they did repudiate an agreement. I think it would have to be neutrals like the Indians, Swiss, and other people and not the ICRC.

General Collins: You can't trust the ICRC. They are objecting right now to legitimate measures that we have to undertake in restoring control of the prison camps, such as cutting off food or use of concussion grenades.[5] I believe the telegram should be redrafted by State and clarified. We should put forth clearly objectives that we are after and means we are considering to reach those objectives. The first objective is to put the Commies on the spot. To that end we must have neutrals to observe any rescreening and we must have a Communist commitment to conclude an armistice on the basis of the results. Our second objective is to allay any questions as to validity of our screening operations thus far on the part of our Allies. To this end we might have an interrogation of those prisoners who have refused repatriation undertaken by a group of our Allies.

---

[5] The objections to which General Collins referred were contained in a letter from the Chief of the ICRC Delegation for Korea, Dr. Lehner, to Clark; the letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information as telegram CX 69236, Clark to JCS, May 28, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 128).

General Bradley: The question of how necessary it is to satisfy the doubts of our Allies and how we should best go about it is really State's business. We have to take your judgment on the necessity of such an operation and go along if you think it is necessary. But if we do take any such action as rescreening, let's be sure to have enough neutrals to refute Communist arguments.

Mr. Bohlen: The question of how necessary it will be to allay doubts of our Allies depends a good part on what happens in the next few weeks. It's possible that the whole Kojedo matter might subside, in which case it might not be necessary to take any steps to allay Allied doubts.

General Collins: The trouble is that things are apt to get worse rather than better. I am sure chances are 10 to 1 that we are going to have further bloodshed when we try to break up prisoners in small controlled groups. The Commies, of course, will say that bloodshed came about because we were trying to screen the camps forcibly.

Admiral Fechteler at this point suggested a redraft of the message which in essence would have given General Clark considerations set forth in State's draft and asked for Clark's proposals for a course of action.

General Bradley: I feel that we have to do something. If we should break off negotiations now, we would undoubtedly lose a lot of domestic and Allied support for the operations in Korea.

Mr. Bohlen: For a new element, we might try to get back to principles rather than to mechanics. Our principle is clear. We won't agree to forcible return of prisoners. We might reiterate this principle to the Communists, tell them that we are not fixed on any particular procedure through which to arrive at this principle and ask them what proposals they have to make. It is my thought that they can't agree to the principle, that they will refuse it—then we can break on a matter of principle rather than on a question of mechanism. In effect, that is what the British proposal adds up to.

Mr. Nitze: Of course they might come up with a mechanism which we would find unacceptable and then we would have to argue with them on procedure.

Mr. Bohlen: They might, but in general I don't think they could even accept the principle.

General Bradley: It might be helpful if we would go ahead and ask neutrals to undertake interrogation of the prisoners we have already screened.

General Collins: The type of question we are now discussing can't really be settled by any agency in the Government except the NSC. This kind of question is largely political and really isn't a JCS business. Our business is really only strategic guidance. The State representatives here also aren't really the policy deciders on these questions. It seems to me these questions should be settled in some forum where decisions can actually be taken.

Mr. Nitze: The Secretaries of State and Defense really have to decide as to what recommendations to make to the President, but they can't go into the whole range of questions that we have discussed this morning. We can advise them as to what kind of recommendation we think they should make to the President [6] and in advising them, the kind of discussion that we have had this morning is very useful.

General Bradley: The point is that the JCS does not make decisions in this field. These policies are governmental policies. Statements have been made in fairly high quarters in the State Department that the Joint Chiefs determined what happens in Korea. We don't set the policies, we just transmit decisions to the field.

Mr. Nitze: I am not aware of any such misunderstanding. Certainly all of us here realize what the Joint Chiefs role is.

General Bradley: My impression of the misunderstanding really arose from an accumulation of things, some of which came from correspondents, attributed to the State Department, who must have been talking at a pretty high level.

Mr. Bohlen: In arriving at policy decisions you have to consider the practical situation involved and what our actual capacities are for dealing with them. For example, with the question of rescreening it will be the U.S. Army which in the last analysis will have to arrange for the rescreening and we have to find out that kind of thing over here.

---

[6] According to a memorandum for the record by Johnson, dated May 31, 1952, it was agreed that Johnson would redraft the message to Clark to meet some of the points raised in this State–JCS meeting. Johnson did this and submitted a redraft to General Bolté on May 29. The Operations Deputies of the JCS decided, at a meeting on May 29, that they were not qualified to consider the message. On May 30, the message was again presented to a meeting of the Operations Deputies and again they decided they could not consider it and that it must be handled by the JCS (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 154).

Johnson's revised draft contained minor stylistic revisions and two additions. In Part III, paragraph 1, subsection (a), the following sentence in parentheses was added to the first possible course of action, which was an offer of an immediate impartial rescreening with Communist observance and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results: "(This would apply to all non-repatriates including those which would develop from future screening in compounds hitherto unscreened.)" The other major change was the addition of paragraph 5 to Part III which read as follows: "Alternative 1 (a) [impartial rescreening with Communist observance] would appear to be preferable and the making of this offer, if rejected, would not preclude subsequently taking the action set forth in alternative 1 (b)." A text of this revised draft is attached to a memorandum by Johnson to Acheson, May 30, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128 tab 146).

For subsequent revisions of this draft, see the memorandum of discussion, p. 295; a text of an earlier draft, May 26, is printed on p. 244; the draft message was sent as telegram JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.

Mr. Nitze: Also, as an example, without the discussion this morning we might have gone off on the wrong track on the question of ICRC handling our rescreening. It was very useful to have your opinions on the inadvisability of that.

General Bradley: We agree that these discussions are useful but we just want it clear that the JCS isn't a decision-making body on these questions.

. . . .

611.95/5-2852

Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1952.

Subject: Discussion of NSC 118/2 by Policy Planning Staff.

The Policy Planning Staff on May 27 discussed NSC 118/2, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", in view of the suggestion made in the NSC Steering Committee that the paper be reviewed and of the consideration given to Korea at a recent State–JCS meeting. Besides Mr. Nitze and members of the Policy Planning Staff, there were present Ambassador Muccio and Messrs. Young, McClurkin, Frelinghuysen and Emmerson.

With respect to the contemplated meeting of the NSC Steering Committee next week, it was the consensus that the Department representatives need not be armed with a definitive position. They would be receptive to proposals or estimates prepared on the military side. Out of the meeting would probably come arrangements for a State–Defense working group to develop concrete proposals with respect to NSC 118/2.

The position which apparently received the support of the persons present and which was outlined briefly by Mr. Nitze at the end of the meeting is approximately as follows:

1. Unless the JCS indicate preparedness to allot additional military power to Korea and permit stepped-up military action, the alternative would appear to be continuance of the present situation and the bringing about of a situation in which ground action would be at a minimum and progress toward a *de facto* cease-fire might be possible.

---

[1] The following marginal annotation was written on the top of the source text: "Any comments?, J[ohn] A[llison]". The query was apparently directed to Johnson.

2. Failing to achieve an armistice agreement, the UNC would continue air and naval action and would maintain roughly present positions and present strength in Korea. UNC willingness at all times to conclude an armistice agreement would be manifest to the Communists and any opportunities for effecting exchanges of prisoners, with or without formal agreements, would be seized.

3. Efforts would be increased to build up the numbers and efficiency of the ROK forces. (The JCS position that priorities should go to the Japanese Police Reserve was discussed, but it was pointed out that the 10-division force in Korea could be strengthened by additional mechanization, etc.)

4. The U.S. should make every effort to increase its general position in Asia as a deterrent against Communist aggression.

5. The U.S. should explore every possibility for strengthening the government of the ROK. Ambassador Muccio pointed out the numerous suggestions which he had made in the past for placing American advisers in the key posts throughout ROK ministries. He still felt this was a sound plan and if carried out, would contribute considerably to the stability of the ROK administration.

5. [*sic*] Consideration might be given to what military actions could be taken which would improve the UN position and impress Asians and allies generally.

Mr. Nitze felt that by following a policy as outlined above for about one year, the increased strength achieved by that time might make possible certain withdrawals of UN forces from present front positions and eventually from Korea. He proposed that the beginning of such withdrawals should be accompanied by a "greater sanctions" statement which would serve definitive notice on the Communists that any crossing of the line by them would be met by retaliation against China itself.

It seems to me that a general program as outlined above has much to recommend it. It would appear to me, however, that if it is obvious that the armistice negotiations are not going to succeed, we should consider the issuance of a "greater sanctions" statement at that time, rather than to wait for the period of build-up which Mr. Nitze suggests.[2]

It is assumed that the military estimate under preparation at the Pentagon and the paper prepared by NA will serve as bases for the work of preparing an NSC position on 118/2. It is noted that SE-27,[3] the intelligence estimate on the naval blockade, will be of pertinence to this study.

---

[2] At this point, Johnson wrote the following marginal comment: "Probably so, but I doubt ability to get Allied agreement. I thoroughly approve rest of paper."

[3] For the text of SE-27, entitled "Probable Courses of Action With Respect to Communist China," completed on June 5, 1952, see volume XIV.

795B.00/5-2852: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, May 28, 1952—noon.

1171. Rptd info CINCUNC Advance, EUSAK Advance DIP 204 by other means. Previous telegrams should give pretty good background recent developments Korean political sphere. Seems to us we have now very clear picture President Rhee's intentions and methods he intends pursue to accomplish his purpose. Decision that must be squarely faced is whether we will permit him get away with his program. If in line with traditional non-intervention policy decision as to let him succeed, assume our action will be confined to diplomatic protest for the record. If we decide to go all-out in support of ROK constitution and democratic govt set up under UN aegis, series much stronger measures required and required soon. We envisage what amounts to ultimatum demanding immediate action to release Assemblymen (except So Min Ho whose case very special one), full protection of Assembly to meet, guarantee that Assemblymen and their families will be protected from future arrest and from mob violence and warning that if action not carried out within 24 hours necessary protective action will be taken by UN forces (possible removal of Assemblymen to safe areas).

Believe it still desirable for initial formal protest and demands be made by UNCURK, which I understand is discussing draft of such demands. However, suggest Dept needle Secretary General to give full support to UNCURK. If UNCURK action fails produce immediate results believe US Govt should follow through promptly on lines indicated above.

Realize we are not in position assess all angles of problem but I submit that if democratic process is permitted to be violated here in Korea where UN forces and agencies are in special position in security, economic and political fields, we will give impression to the new governments of the Far East and to the world in general that we are unwilling fully back the system and ideology we profess. This applies particularly to Korea where the very elements on whom we have been relying for building democracy here will be completely disillusioned.

LIGHTNER

795.00/5-2952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 29, 1952—7:23 p. m.

887. Amb Muccio discussed Kor situation with Pres Truman full detail this morning. Pres personally gravely concerned domestic polit

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and Young and cleared by Matthews, Allison, and Johnson.

crisis in Kor and expressed profound disappointment with course recent events.

Bitter partisan conflict between Pres Rhee and Assembly groups receiving generally unfavorable reaction US press. Reurtel 1194 Dept sending info such reactions on current basis.[2] In addition other govts participating UN action Kor have approached US expressing their concern at development indicating Kor disunity and failure follow legal and constitutional processes. Whole result present domestic polit crisis is undermine confidence in ROK and redound most unfavorably both immed and long-range interests Kor. Regardless statements already made by Pres Rhee and his ans to Amb Muccio foregoing represents both press and official reaction US and elsewhere. Expect such reaction become greatly intensified if polit crisis continues.

Specifically fol unfavorable results now taking place or foreseen:

1. Increasing danger renewed Commie offensive as they see opportunity exploit internal disunity within ROK.
2. Prejudicial effect on current and continuing efforts secure additional contribution forces for Kor action from countries presently participating or others.
3. Increased difficulty securing finan contributions UNKRA and highly competent personnel for UNKRA and UNCACK.
4. At very time when whole econ situation under review as result Meyer Mission increasing doubts as to whether ROK Govt sufficiently stable to warrant substantial dols payments.
5. Increased difficulty securing serious consideration within US Govt for additional milit assistance ROK armed forces.

We are urging Defense send msg Gen Clark which will be passed to you. Msg wld instruct him discuss milit dangers of present situation along foregoing lines with Pres Rhee.

Pres Truman has instructed Amb Muccio return Kor soonest possible (early next week) and convey Pres Truman's personal concern directly Pres Rhee. You may so inform Pres Rhee. In addition gen line foregoing paras shld be followed both with Rhee and with opposition groups. While you shld let UNCURK, Clark and Van Fleet carry as much burden representation as possible believe whole emphasis formal and informal representations shld be upon need for restoration essential ROK unity. Both Rhee and opposition groups shld be encouraged find some reasonable means compromise perhaps through good offices UNCURK which will demonstrate to world ability Koreans meet and solve their polit problems through normal democratic processes. Early elimination martial law Pusan wld be major help creating more favorable public reaction outside Kor.

Bruce

---

[2] Not printed (795.00/5-2952).

795.00/5-3052: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, May 30, 1952—8 p.m.[1]

1200. Rptd info CINCUNC Tokyo EUSAK Advance DIP 222.

I delivered fol ltr President Rhee at 3 p.m. (please note text slightly altered from that submitted earlier): [2]

> "Excellency: I have the honor to state that I have been instructed by my govt to inform the Govt of the Republic of Korea that the US Govt has been following closely the current situation in the ROK and that it is its view that martial law shld be lifted immediately in the Pusan area where in the judgment of the CG EUSAK it is not required as a military necessity. The US Govt also wishes to state that it approves the statement [3] which the UNCURK discussed with Your Excellency on May 29, and is prepared to support it."

President commented after reading ltr, "You can tell your govt that martial law will be lifted shortly." I asked what shortly meant, two days—two weeks. He replied it would be lifted shortly, that might be two minutes or two months.

He said he did not understand why everyone was getting so excited over the situation. I said the record of events that had transpired in the past week was such that impression was being given outside world, including Korea's friends and well-wishers, that constitutional govt was being threatened. This excited Rhee and he launched into well-known defense his actions as representative will of people. He said, "It will all be revealed" in a very short time in public trials of enemies of democracy. He said two notorious Commie underground agents had been arrested in last few days, that there was great conspiracy afoot, and it was his duty as protector of democracy to take necessary measures. I stated no one had greater interest in taking action against Commie agents than the US and UN but that all it had to go on, except for Rhee's own statements, was record of actual events taking place. I said I cld not help note that all persons arrested were members of his own opposition in the Natl Assembly and that coincidence of their being traitors was too much to believe. Rhee waxed wroth at this point, stated US and UNCURK were plainly interfering in ROK internal affairs. He referred to UNCURK's predication of their statement as showing that UNCURK was supporting his enemies. I remarked US had no interest any particular political group or individual; was concerned with principle only. I said there came time when principle of nonintervention had to be weighed against principle of protecting constitutional govt and human rights, I thought present struggle with Commie world had something to do with latter principle; that that principle was involved in UN efforts here in Korea; furthermore, that US and UN had special position in Korea, owing to their participation in the birth of the Republic and in present mil and econ commitments in support of ROK. The President then declaimed that he had spent his life working for democracy, that his sole aim at the present time was to promote democracy and human rights and that in short time "all wld be revealed" and his doubters wld be satisfied. I said I hoped he knew what he was doing but that interference with Natl Assembly, arrest of many members, and rumors of arrests of many more did not jibe with what he had been telling me. I asked what was connection between arrest of two Commies and arrest of Assemblymen. He became sarcastic at this point and said he had made this clear many times but if I still cld not understand he wld repeat. He said many people wld have to be arrested as a result of evidence revealed by arrested Commies which implicated many people including Assemblymen. I remarked that I had understood that some Assemblymen had been arrested for action taken in the Assembly including voting against govt's proposed constitutional amendments. Rhee said, in effect, this was damn lie. I said I was only going by what UNCURK had informed me he had told them on the 29th. He insisted UNCURK misquoted him. I asked if that meant that all Assemblymen arrested were being charged with Commie conspiracy. He had difficulty [garbled group] he was choking with anger. He accused me of being obtuse and went on to say that he had internal conspiracy to cope with and that he cld not take into account whether accused persons were members of the Assembly or not and that all guilty parties wld be punished. His enemies abroad cld make the most of sitn but it was an internal problem for him to cope with and that outside world had better keep hands off. He said I shld tell my govt that he was working for democracy, that he had to bring traitors to heel, that this was his govt's problem alone and that if we wld be patient all wld be settled soon.

---

[1] Although the file copy does not indicate the time of receipt, telegram 1201 (*infra*) was received at 9:02 a.m., on May 30.

[2] The last sentence of the text submitted earlier read as follows: "The US Govt also wishes to state that it fully supports the statement which UNCURK discussed with President Rhee on May 29." The complete text of this earlier version can be found in telegram 1196, from Pusan, May 29, 1952, not printed (795B.00/5-3052).

[3] On May 28, UNCURK presented its views to Rhee in a formal statement expressing active interest in the political development of the country, the observance of democratic guarantees, and the maintenance of a constitutional form of government. UNCURK recommended that martial law be lifted in Pusan, and that Assemblymen still under arrest be released so the Assembly could function freely and normally. On May 29, UNCURK released to the public the full text of the statement. A text of the statement and UNCURK's own view of its position during the political crisis in Korea can be found in UN document A/2187, pp. 12–17.

I think comments on foregoing wld be superfluous.

LIGHTNER

795B.00/5-3052: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, May 30, 1952—8 p. m.

1201. Deptel 887, May 29[1] received after delivery official letter to Rhee (see Embtel 1200, May 30).[2]

Am sure series our messages reveals logical arguments such as have been made to Rhee again and again fail utterly to impress him. His personal political stake, which he identifies with good of Korea, is paramount consideration with him and as of today no sign he is weakening or will weaken in determination proceed on lines now clearly spelled out.

Pending decision pointed up in Embtel 1171, May 28,[3] believe no stones should be left unturned in continuing apply heat even if representations kept to mere expressions concern or dissatisfaction. Therefore, welcome suggestion General Clark meet Rhee to emphasize military danger. Rhee, of course, will express complete sympathy and appeal for couple weeks more when quiet (of police state) will be restored. Of course, I shall welcome Ambassador's return and will inform Rhee he is coming.

As for emphasis on need for restoration essential ROK unity and reconciliation Rhee and opposition, this sounds reasonable enough but I am afraid dodges real issue and fails take into account sharpness of cleavage. This is now struggle to death: Either Rhee has his way or Rhee falls. No one that I know close to scene here disagrees with that estimate. Washington agencies must make decision posed in Embtel 1171 and should make it now. In few weeks horse will be stolen and too late lock barn door.

In this respect I am concerned lest mil's primary interest in maintaining security of rear areas and emphasis on law and order lead us to accept, however grudgingly, Rhee's (and Peron's[4]) version of law and order with eclipse of constitutional govt and regime of law. Rhee's recent actions are alienating many people previously his close supporters, and while masses apathetic responsible circles growingly hostile to him. If he permitted have his way hope of ever having democratic govt here will be postponed indefinitely.

Rhee has thumbed his nose at US Govt today. He is playing for time and doesn't need much. He appears quite willing receive any number official visitors, listen to their protestations, play through his well-known phonograph record and then go on with his dirty work. My point is situation is crystal clear; US Govt cannot fall back on excuse later that it didn't know what was up; and must decide now (I mean now) whether to let this thing slide or take necessary steps thwart it.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 264.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] *Ante*, p. 264.

[4] Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina.

Matter of asylum becoming more pressing every day. Threat that 60 more Assemblymen about to be arrested makes this no longer question applying to few individuals. UNCURK discussing appeal of large group this afternoon. I appreciate no action possible until decision referred to above is made. Imminence of further arrests such that here again may be too late unless we have very early answer.

LIGHTNER

795B.00/5-3052: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 30, 1952—3:50 p. m.
PRIORITY

894. Urtels 1171,[2] 1201.[3] Recognize force position set forth ur 1201 but believe every effort shld be made along lines indicated Deptel 887.[4] Re ur comments on restoration unity and reconciliation and ur estimate sharp cleavage, believe essential this stage you shld make every effort thru UNCURK and Emb facilities to compose differences. Before anything more positive done along lines ur 1171 and while urging lifting martial law believed here essential try everything possible to find compromise formula.

Gravity of our imposing martial law for polit purposes such that we must exhaust every effort short such step. Meanwhile to help our consideration recommendations ur 1171 request you consult with Van Fleet and Plimsoll (and other UNCURK members at ur discretion) on most confidential basis and tel soonest ur best ans fol questions: [5]

1. What is opinion UNCURK and Van Fleet as to desirability UNC taking over exercise police powers or imposing martial law Pusan? What do they think about timing?
2. Wld UNCURK be willing report SecGen UN recommending desirability such action if situation continues deteriorate? Once decision made we wld lay foundation for such step by appropriate representations each govt represented UNCURK as well as our principal allies.
3. What dangers wld be created of internal disturbance ROK directed against UNC? What wld be reaction Rhee, and his followers and ROK armed forces? What are possibilities Rhee continuing defiance of Natl Assembly, inspiring demonstrations and mob violence, or declaring emergency to gain his ends by any means if martial law lifted or taken over by UNC?

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by McClurkin and cleared with Allison and Johnson.

[2] Dated May 28, p. 264.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Dated May 29, p. 264.

[5] The Embassy in Korea answered these questions in telegram 1228, June 1, p. 279.

4. What wld be probable polit consequences in ROK especially re constitutional amendments and election pres? What are possibilities Natl Assembly will proceed, if practicable, elect new pres and Rhee nevertheless continue act as pres under emergency powers with control of police and armed forces?

5. What comments on best procedure bringing about imposition of martial law if it is considered feasible and desirable and also on its scope and method subsequent exercise?

In all discussions this subj you shld remember and stress decision not made for intervention this nature and we simply endeavoring assess possible effects of what wld be extremely serious action and be prepared for all contingencies.

Ur 1200[6] just recd. Also desire ur estimate whether any validity at all attaches Rhee's claim Commie plot exists.

Bruce

---

[6] Dated May 30, p. 266.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Tokyo, May 31, 1952—11:58 a.m.

C 69351. Refs: A. C 68350.[2] B. JCS 908998.[3] C. CX 68655.[4] D. CX 68355.[5] E. JCS 909747.[6]

1. I have conducted an extensive review of the records of the recent meetings of the armistice negotiators, held personal discussions with Adm Joy, and secured comments and recommendations from the armistice delegation pertaining to Communist reaction to our package armistice proposal and possible future means of conducting negotiations. It is our unanimous belief that the Communist opinion of the firmness of

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

For Clark's own account of why he sent these recommendations, see his *From the Danube to the Yalu,* pp. 106–107.

[2] Printed as HNC 1236, May 12, p. 193.

[3] Dated May 16, p. 203.

[4] The telegram, dated May 18, 1952, is not printed. In it Clark transmitted to the JCS the recommendations of the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom, which was more than ever convinced that it faced a protracted period of propaganda and, from a negotiating point of view, believed it would be advantageous to unilaterally suspend the talks until the Communists accepted the proposal of Apr. 28. Joy, speaking for the delegation, realized however that this course of action was not approved by Washington. He therefore recommended continued adherence to his existing tactic at Panmunjom: refusal to discuss the elements of the proposal of Apr. 28 combined with an aggressive propaganda campaign against the Communists (795.00/5-3152).

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 194.

[6] Not printed (795.00/5-3152).

the UNC final position has been materially lessened in recent meetings conducted under present operating instructions. It is our unanimous opinion that the only hope for an armistice on present terms lies in convincing the Communists that our position is firm and final. Prior to 23 May the Communists had on many occasions stated that, unless the UNC was prepared to formally terminate negotiations, we could have no justification for objecting to the holding of normal meetings; in fact, they stated it was our duty to do so. Evaluation of the Communists act on 23 May of insisting that the UNC delegation establish the date for the next meeting cannot be effected at this time. It may be another form of a challenge to terminate negotiations. Failure to accept this challenge can only indicate weakness in our position.

2. Present procedure has thus far proven ineffective in securing an armistice, and it is considered that this condition will continue to exist. This, in some respects, is supported by the relief shown by the Communists, as reported in ref C, when we adopted our present position of making statements other than to reiterate our firm, final, and irrevocable position. It is believed that this belief stemmed from relaxation of fear engendered by one of two causes:

a. That our position was indeed firm;

b. That we would accept their challenge to unilaterally terminate negotiations. Communists may have definite date to which the negotiations must be extended.

Adoption of course of action recommended in part II (2) of ref A (unilateral suspension of further meetings until Communists accept our terms, maintaining contact with them by liaison officers), to which I gave my concurrence in ref D, is the means by which we can best convince the Communists that our position is firm, final and irrevocable. It is the nearest we can approach accepting their challenge to unilaterally terminate negotiations. If the Communist desire for an armistice is sincere and if they will ever accept our firm stand on the POW issue, it is considered that responsibility for reconvening plenary sessions to accept our terms would not be a controlling factor.

3. Communist ability to continually propagandize their arguments and positions, however unfounded, and to refute UN proposals by warped, slanderous and fallacious charges, counter-charges and statements by means of a controlled press has given them a decided propaganda advantage. The UNC delegation has habitually presented factual information supporting our firm and reasonable proposals. However, experience has demonstrated that our press representatives generally show little or no interest in filing copy which merely repeats arguments supporting UNC position after such arguments have lost their immediate news value. For this reason it is considered that the only effective means of soliciting additional public and international support for UNC

position is to publicize our position and arguments in support thereof at governmental level. Such would heighten their news value. This is especially true if it is considered that adoption of the course of action as recommended in para 6 below is dependent upon securing still further public and international support.

4. Several possible courses of action in addition to the one recommended in para 6 to solve the present deadlock in negotiations have been considered here. These include such actions as:

(1) Propose that liaison officers meet to investigate procedures which could be employed to accomplish our proposed impartial rescreening of all POWs after the armistice is signed.

(2) Unilaterally suspend negotiations for a definite fixed period, such as for one week.

(3) UNC delegation launch a strong propaganda attack against Communists doctrine and philosophy.

(4) Adopt delaying tactics, i.e., agree to a meeting on the subsequent day but short time prior to scheduled meeting notify Communists that we are unable to attend, continue such for several days, meeting with them at occasional intervals.

5. The foregoing courses of action are not recommended at this time.

6. Adm Joy, Gen Harrison, members of the delegation, and myself are unanimous in our opinion that we should now make firm plans to execute the recommended action set forth in HNC 1236.[7] We believe the most logical procedure to follow in accomplishing our mission is that shown below:

a. Continue sessions as at present, meeting as infrequently as possible, using themes in each session as suggested in ref B and refuting Communists false accusations. We would thus continue until we are able to present a firm, final, and accurate figure based on the completed rosters of those PWs and CIs who are to be returned to Communist control. These rosters can be made up to include either:

> (1) Those who have now been screened and have indicated their desire to return Communist control, plus those in pro-Communist compounds who have not as yet been screened, or
>
> (2) Provided screening is possible as outlined in my CX 68858,[8] all of those POWs and CIs who indicate their desire to return to Communist control after the complete screening has been accomplished. The time for the completion of total screening would be dependent upon the success of the present operation to seize uncontested control of PWs and CIs at Koje-Do.

b. Submit to the Communists and to the press the new firm figure of PWs and CIs to be repatriated, stating emphatically that this is not a new proposal and that it merely replaces the previous approximate figure of 70,000. We would simultaneously make an appropriate explanation of the accuracy of the new figure. At the same time we would inform the Communists of the fairness, firmness and finality of the UNC proposal and immediately propose a recess for an appropriate time (approximately one week) for them to restudy and reevaluate our final proposal. We would also state our willingness to amplify and clarify at any time any portion of our proposal which they might not understand. These foregoing statements would be couched in such terms as to clearly imply that if the Communists do not accept our proposal within a reasonable time, the UNC would then unilaterally recess negotiations until the Communists indicate their readiness to accept our proposal of 28 Apr.

---

[7] Dated May 12, p. 193.

[8] Dated May 22, p. 219.

c. If, after receiving the new firm figure, the Communists do not agree to an armistice within a reasonable period (approximately one week), the UNC would recess unilaterally until such time as the Communists accept our offer or break negotiations. We would clearly state to the Communists that our liaison officers would continue to be available for the purpose of clarification or amplification of our package proposal and to arrange details for a plenary session when the Communists decide to accept our final armistice proposal as submitted to them on 28 Apr.

7. It is requested that I be permitted to implement the above course of action at my discretion. The basis for final rosters will be determined after the implementation of the operation for seizing uncontested control on Koje-Do (see my CX 68858).

8. If the foregoing procedure should fail to result in an armistice and the Communists should not terminate negotiations, it is doubtful whether any further progress could be made at this level. I am in no position to properly evaluate the last final step which my govt or the United Nations might take to achieve an armistice in Korea. One possible final effort might be to attempt, via circuitous channels, to implant the idea that the UNC might accept a proposal and to induce the Communists to make a proposal whereby the armistice would be signed on presently agreed terms which would exclude repatriation of POWs. Upon signing of the armistice, the control, the responsibility for feeding, clothing, etc, and the determination as to the ultimate disposition of all POWs of both sides would pass to a group of neutral nations. Both sides would agree in the armistice to abide by the decision of such neutral group. It would be desirable to have the United Nations General Assembly as the "neutral" group. A more acceptable solution to the Communists might be to have the neutral group composed of United Nations countries which have not actively participated in the Korean War. If efforts to influence the Communists to make a proposal similar to the foregoing were unsuccessful, such might be suggested by the United Nations or, as appropriate, members of the United Nations, employing diplomatic channels.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) [1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 31, 1952—4:31 p. m.
EMERGENCY

CX 69393. Ref DA 910149, 31 [*30*] May.[2] This message in 5 parts.

Part 1. 1. In accordance with instructions cited in reference message, I plan to meet Van Fleet in Pusan Monday, 2 June. After conference with Lightner and UNCURK, I plan to see Rhee, accompanied by Van Fleet. At this conference I will outline the 12 major points covered in reference message. At this time I do not intend to indicate, in any way, that I am delivering a final ultimatum, but will state in strongest terms my position as the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in support of stand taken by United States Government and UNCURK.

2. It may be necessary for this Command to tolerate actions by Rhee which are abhorrent and to endure embarrassing political incidents precipitated by him. It is believed that all such incidents and actions should be handled by other departments of the United States Govt with advice of the military until such time as the results adversely affect either the combat operations of 8th Army or the social and economic situation in Korea which, in turn, will adversely affect the combat operations of 8th Army. At such time the military will be forced to act.

Part 2. My views on present critical political situation are as follows:

1. For the immediate present there are 2 possible courses of action, to wit:

> A. Continue to urge Rhee to moderate his illegal and unconstitutional action with the forlorn hope that he will listen to reason.
>
> B. Only other alternative would be to take over and establish some form of interim govt.

2. For present and unless serious civil disturbances interfere with military operations, I believe it wise and intend to follow the line of action in 1A above. If necessary to take action indicated in 1B above, I

---

[1] This telegram was sent to Van Fleet in Korea for his information.

[2] The Department of State sent a copy of DA 910149 to the Embassy in Korea for its confidential information as telegram 892, May 30, 1952 (795B.00/5-3052). In it, Clark was informed by Collins that the Departments of State and Defense were disturbed over the political and military implications of the internal ROK crisis. They believed that the UNC should support U.S. Government and UNCURK efforts to convince Rhee to lift martial law and restore constitutional processes as the best means of securing stability and security in the Pusan area.

The Department of Defense suggested that Clark or Van Fleet meet with Rhee and bring home "in strongest terms" the danger of Korean political instability to the UN military operations in Korea. The General was to urge Rhee to compose his differences with the National Assembly. Finally, he was to register strong objections that unjustified martial law in Pusan had not been lifted and inform Rhee that the UNC supported the UNCURK statement of May 28. Collins asked for Clark's views and recommendations on the military aspects of the situation.

will require advice and guidance in detail as to the type of interim govt and the auth for its establishment.

3. For future planning to meet the occurrence of below listed contingencies which may occur at any moment I submit the following courses of action:

> A. *If an election is held and President Rhee is not elected:*
>
> (1) In the remote possibility that President Rhee accepts defeat gracefully, it is recommended that he should be urged to serve his country by making a world-wide lecture tour at UN expense to explain his country's problems and needs.
>
> (2) Pres Rhee may successfully order the dissolution of the National Assembly, declare the election null and void, and install himself as head of State, or he might accept defeat but organize strong opposition and resort to strong-arm methods. Such actions on the part of President Rhee would undoubtedly cause serious internal disturbances and as a consequence might endanger the supply lines of the 8th Army and the mil situation in general. In the event that such disturbances seriously interfere with mil operations, it will be necessary for me to assume control and again I will require advice and guidance outlined in para 2 above.
>
> B. *If National Assembly is sufficiently intimidated and Rhee is reelected:*
>
> Continue present policy of supporting the legally elected President of the ROK, using all means available to influence him to stay within the bounds of law and constitution.
>
> C. *If no election is held and the Presidency becomes vacant:*
>
> Again in this case it will be necessary to assume control and I will require the advice and guidance outlined in para 2 above.

Part 3. The following action could develop in the immediate future and would influence most adversely the mil situation: President Rhee remains adamant in his refusal to lift martial law and, in an attempt to employ the ROK Army and the National Police for his own political purposes, takes action to abrogate the agreement which places the ROK Army under the UNC.[3] It is absolutely essential to preclude such action. I plan to have General Lee, Chief of Staff ROKA, assured that under such circumstances he will receive complete UNC support in continuing the ROKA on its present mission of repelling Communist aggression. In case of defection of individual ROKA units, the 8th Army will be directed to withdraw logistic support from those units and block their movement. 8th Army will be further directed to deny transportation for movement of National Police units to affected areas if such units are operating under Rhee's direction.

Part 4. In the case of any of the developments outlined in part 2, para 1B, 3A (2) and 3C and part 3 above, the 8th Army will require immediate and strong reinforcement, both in combat troops and military government specialists. The only immediate combat reinforcements are those in the Far East Command. Adequate mil govt reinforcements are not immediately available to the UNC. The current restrictions imposed on movement of troops from Japan do not permit the dispatch of any sizeable force to Korea. Even if such restrictions were lifted, I do not consider that I can reduce the forces presently in Japan beyond 1 RCT without seriously jeopardizing my ability to carry out my primary mission, the defense of Japan.

---

[3] President Rhee had assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950. (UN document S/1627; printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206)

Part 5. Summary.

1. The situation created by Syngman Rhee's flagrant violation of governmental processes may lead to a serious situation requiring positive and forceful mil action on the part of the UNC.

2. Until the situation deteriorates to the point where our mil operations in Korea may be jeopardized, I believe negotiations and pressure upon Pres Rhee to desist from his high-handed procedures should be handled through diplomatic channels, specifically by UNCURK and the Embassy in Pusan, supported by myself and my subordinates. The point I am making is that as long as the difficulties remain largely political, political channels should direct our efforts to bring normalcy to the situation. In this connection it seems to me particularly unfortunate that Ambassador Muccio should be absent at this critical time.

3. I also feel very definitely that even though Pres Rhee may refuse to heed the admonitions of our govt and the UN, as he has already done, and even though his acts bring embarrassment and shatter some of the democratic ideologies which we hold dear, we still must not, through precipitous action, or the threat thereof, do anything that will jeopardize the military situation. It is apparent to all that any such threats as we may make will be realized by Rhee, as well as ourselves, as emanating generally from weakness. We do not have the troops to withstand a major Communist offensive, to regain uncontested control of prisoners of war on Koje-Do, and to handle major civil disturbances in our rear areas at the same time. Therefore, we must swallow our pride to a certain extent until Rhee, through his illegal and diabolical actions, has catapulted us into a situation where positive action must be taken. Then I will muster all the forces available, even establish mil govt or martial law, or such other steps as may have been directed by my govt to handle the situation.

795.00/5-3152: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, May 31, 1952.[2]

1217. Rptd CINCUNC Tokyo and EUSAK Adv as DIP 236. Re DA 910149 [3] requesting Gen Clark and/or Gen Van Fleet visit Rhee to support US Govt–UNCURK action on behalf UNC.

Gen Clark has asked Gen Van Fleet meet him Pusan June 2 to carry out this mission after consulting with UNCURK and myself.

I note tenor of instructions is to point out concern over present internatl developments as constituting mil danger and as interfering with constitutional process of govt and to point out that UNC backs UNCURK statement. In short, representation apparently will be another expression of views, even though in course of expressing them the generals succeed in impressing Rhee that they are really seriously disturbed.

I submit that Rhee's time schedule is such that another representation limited to an expression of views is likely to be brushed off in same manner as previous representations. Vital time will be lost since next step will have to be delayed beyond June 2.

I wld appreciate instructions before morning June 2 whether foregoing type of approach stands or whether Dept and Def wld approve fol:

> After forceful presentation of reasons for UNC concern, that generals be authorized to demand immed action by ROK Govt to fulfill both points in UNCURK statement. They shld also be instructed what to reply to any question as to what happens in event demands not promptly fulfilled: Possibly that this wld be matter having gravest consequences, for which Rhee alone wld be held responsible.

I recognize I may be beating the gun in making such proposal, but I am sure Dept knows from preceding msgs my feeling that issues at stake justify nipping this thing in the bud and that time is of the essence. My suggestion these demands be made by Gens Clark and Van Fleet on behalf of Unified Comd is based largely on their great prestige with Rhee although I realize that demands of this nature shld normally be presented by chief of mission. I would of course be glad to present demands if Dept so desires.

LIGHTNER

---

[1] This telegram was relayed to the Department of Defense upon receipt at the Department of State.

[2] The source text did not indicate the time of transmission from the Embassy in Korea; the telegram was received at the Department of State at 12:50 p.m., May 31.

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

795.00/6–152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 1, 1952—1:50 a. m.

899. Urtel 1217.[2] While appreciating many merits ur suggestion Dept believes present instructions to Clark provide effective enough basis for his meeting with Rhee without adding ur suggested approach. US Govt must be in position to carry thru any implied threats. Therefore, must await ur reply Deptel 894 [3] and Clark's recommendations fol his conferences Pusan before making top level decisions here on specific courses of action if Rhee remains adamant and situation deteriorates further.

Request that recommendations you and Clark fol call on Rhee cover specific measures short of Deptel 894, particularly specific proposals for providing safe quarters and protection for National Assembly, as indicated in latter part first para ur 1171 [4] and suggested ur 1216.[5]

We are inclined to favor such action at least as a first step if Clark's representations not effective. Preliminary view here is that it wld be important that any action of this type be taken in response to a request from the Assembly to UNCURK and UNCURK's recommendations to USG as Unified Command. Prompt action to reach nec USG decisions will be taken upon receipt of recommendations from you and Clark. We will also undertake immed to consult with principal interested Governments. As recognized in ur 1216 it wld be important that such governmental decisions be reached prior to Assembly or UNCURK action of this kind. In event governmental decisions reached to take such action and request received from Assembly can we be confident UNCURK wld take nec steps implement such a plan?

Dept also believes it wld be advisable, fol Gen Clark's mtg with Rhee, you convey in appropriate manner to Assembly leaders position US Govt which has been presented to Rhee including substance ur May 30 note. Purpose to ensure both executive and legislative authorities have same understanding of US Govt position.

ACHESON

---

[1] This telegram, repeated to Tokyo for the information of CINCUNC, was drafted by Young and cleared by Johnson.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated May 30, p. 269.

[4] Dated May 28, p. 264.

[5] Not printed (795.00/5–3152).

795B.00/6-152: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 1, 1952—11 p. m.

1228. Rptd info CINCUNC, EUSAK Advance DIP 244 by other means. Deptel 894, May 30 [2] received late May 31 stresses importance exhausting every effort find compromise formula before imposing martial law and asks five questions to help consideration of problem.

I met morning June 1 with Plimsoll (UNCURK chairman for June) and Major Gen Herren (Gen Van Fleet's rep here) to discuss reply and fol represents joint views unless otherwise specified.

1. Agree Gen Clark's estimate contained his CX 69393 [3] that martial law should not be imposed until combat operations or social and economic situation of Korea is adversely affected which in turn adversely affects military operations.

Fol are my additional comments this question: foregoing conditions subject wide degree interpretation as to when one or both of these conditions exists. I recognize must not take precipitate action of kind to jeopardize the military situation but trust this vital consideration plus need to get concurrence other govts won't cause dangerous delay. Time now being used by Rhee to continue arrests (he has started on non Assembly groups), to bring in police reinforcements and to prepare his case for Communist conspiracy. Further dangers in time factor are: that internal troubles here may influence Red decision renew offensive, in which case we might be forced come to some kind agreement leaving Rhee in control, and that Commies can be expected make most of situation and step up subversive activities in ROK. These are main considerations that have influenced me to advocate speedy action as seems clear less costly take action now than later.

2. Plimsoll believes that if situation deteriorates to extent US Govt and UNC feel that military operations are affected, commission would recommend imposition of martial law by UNC.

3. Regarding effects of martial law in ROK circles, we feel that Rhee has capability, if unrestrained, of creating internal disturbances through his nation-wide organization. His reaction to M/L lifted no reason to believe Rhee would cease to defy National Assembly, etc. However, if UNC imposed M/L his actions would depend largely on scope permitted him (see first sentence this para).

4. As for political consequences, feel that moment new pres takes over, public would accept him: educated groups would welcome change; passive masses would cause no trouble and soon accept situa-

---

[1] This telegram was relayed to the Department of Defense upon receipt at the Department of State.

[2] *Ante*, p. 269.

[3] Dated May 31, p. 274.

tion. In absence extreme pressure from UNC or martial law under UNC, considered probable Rhee would attempt nullify election new pres and continue in office. Under present harassment and intimidation possibilities National Assembly continuing to function diminishing daily.

5. Regarding procedures, scope and methods putting M/L in effect, believe M/L shld be accompanied by maximum publicity in Korea and throughout world a proclamation giving reasons for and objectives of such action. Objectives presumably shld include fact M/L limited to Pusan for period necessary to restore processes of constitutional govt.

Before imposing M/L believe UNCURK (after decision by US and other govts) shld request Unified Command take all appropriate measures, including if necessary use of force, to enable election of pres to be held freely and in accordance ROK constitution. This wld be followed at once by Unified Command directive to UNC. Action by UNC shld then be swift and decisive to minimize hostile reaction.

Immediate tasks might include:

1. Demand full cooperation of Rhee and Cabinet and exercise necessary surveillance to insure compliance. In case of refusal to cooperate take pres into protective custody.
2. Take over ROK police and military establishments Pusan.
3. Protect assemblymen and families, insure freedom of National Assembly to meet and effect release of those detained or arrested.
4. Issue directives to Information Media.
5. Provide fullest possible publicity as to reasons for action, including appropriate notification to provincial authorities.

LIGHTNER

795B.00/6-152: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 1, 1952—midnight.

1229. Rptd info CINCUNC, EUSAK Advance DIP 245 by other means. Re Embtel 1228, June 1,[2] rptd CINCUNC and EUSAK Advance as DIP 244.

There may be other alternatives to UNC martial law which might be tried pending decision and clearance to embark that irrevocable action. I refer to measures touched on in previous messages, steps beyond normal diplomatic approaches but short of UNC intervention.

1. Announcement withhold economic aid (except relief) along lines mentioned Embtel 1216, May 31.[3]

---

[1] This telegram, upon receipt at the Department of State, was relayed to the Department of Defense.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed (795.00/5-3152).

2. Movement of Naval vessels to Pusan harbor.
3. Movement UNC troop units to areas near Pusan.
4. Demands.
5. Exploration possibility arranging have ROK Army and Naval units act in much same way as UNC martial law envisaged.

LIGHTNER

795B.00/6-252

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1952.

Subject: The Issues Requiring Decision in the Korean Internal Political Situation.

The Issues

The basic problem is to determine whether or not the interests of the United States and the United Nations Command require the drastic action of intervening directly in Korean political affairs to maintain constitutional government in order to assure continued operation of the entire Korean civil and military administration without which the United Nations Command could hardly carry out its military mission. The immediate issues are: the release of National Assemblymen, the ending of intimidation and coercion of the Assembly, the resumption of normal functioning of the National Assembly, and the lifting of Rhee's martial law in Pusan. If public and official pressures continue to have no effect on Rhee and his cohorts, the United States Government and the other interested governments or United Nations agencies will have to make grave decisions on whether or not to permit the demise of representative government and the rise of personal dictatorship and bitter political strife behind the lines in Korea.

Korean Government

Since my report to you of May 29,[2] the political cleavages have become even more sharp and intense. President Rhee has ignored the admonitions of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the United States Government, the Commanding General Eighth Army, the Korean Cabinet, the National Assembly and many Korean civil and military leaders. A small coterie of fanatical, unscrupulous, and self-seeking followers of Rhee are clearly the mainspring in the drive to squash the National Assembly and establish their absolute control over the Republic of Korea. Rhee is completely under their influence. They are continuing to arrest and intimidate the

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young.
[2] Not printed (795B.00/5-2952).

Assemblymen. Rhee is generating an intense propaganda campaign against the National Assembly and against any possible outside intervention, while at the same time his lieutenants have muzzled the domestic press and radio. The Rhee group controls the police, and the political machinery in the provinces. In the absence of any real counter force, Rhee is capitalizing on the present confusion to continue arrests, augment his police forces and to prepare and utilize a smokescreen of an alleged Communist plot. By driving his opposition underground, Rhee is preparing an open pit for subversion and revolution from which it is probable that only the Communists will benefit.

Rhee and his group are claiming that they have imposed martial law and arrested Assemblymen in order to break a Communist plot. United States and United Nations authorities do not believe that the evidence supports the existence of such plot, but that it is a clever move to cloak Rhee's schemes to break his opposition. There would appear, however, to be some Korean politicians who have been tainted with Communist or with Japanese funds, perhaps unknowingly.

Despite increasing coercion, the National Assembly continues to meet and to oppose Rhee, but its ability to continue functioning appears to be diminishing daily. The opposition to Rhee is leaderless, incohesive, and without effective means of self-protection. Nevertheless, the Embassy reports that dissatisfaction with Rhee's tactics and objectives is increasing throughout the Korean Government and surmises that many of his present backers may hop on the bandwagon if they were sure that Rhee was on the way out. Korean military officials are becoming increasingly dissatisfied.

UNCURK

UNCURK believes that reconciliation between Rhee and his opposition is impossible and immediate strong actions are needed. UNCURK has recommended that General Clark make a strong approach to Rhee and that President Truman send a strong personal letter to Rhee. UNCURK's chairman believes that the Commission would recommend the imposition of martial law by the United Nations Command if the United States Government and the UNC deem it necessary. UNCURK seems to think that major decisions for concrete action are now beyond its purview and are squarely up to UN member nations who must decide at once how far to go. UNCURK and UNKRA are exploring possibilities of holding up reconstruction projects until constitutional government is restored, and are so informing Rhee. The Embassy and United States military authorities in Pusan are meeting daily and keeping in closest possible touch with UNCURK. In response to a suggestion from the Department, the UN Secretary General has encouraged UNCURK to take a strong stand in this crisis.

General Clark

On May 30 a joint State-Defense message[3] was transmitted to General Clark instructing him to meet with Rhee to add the support of the United Nations Command to the stand taken by the Embassy and UNCURK on the lifting of martial law and restoration of constitutional processes. Clark has been told to use "the strongest terms" in his talk with Rhee. However, there is no open threat or ultimatum in his instructions. In reply[4] to the joint message, General Clark has stated his view that the situation may require positive and forceful military action by the UNC; but that political negotiations and pressures upon Rhee should, if possible, continue to be used to restore normalcy. General Clark pointed out that military intervention is somewhat of an empty threat as long as we do not have sufficient troops simultaneously to meet a possible major Communist offensive, regain control over the POWs on Koje-do, and handle possible disturbances in our rear areas. He believes that we must wait until the situation is clearly getting out of hand and positive action is required, before mustering all of the forces available and establishing military government or martial law. General Clark visited Pusan on June 2 to consult with the Embassy, UNCURK, and presumably with Rhee and his principal Cabinet officers responsible for the crisis. However, Clark indicated on June 1 that he was not sure he would see Rhee because it might stiffen Rhee's resistance. General Van Fleet has categorically opposed the imposition of ROK martial law in Pusan and urged the United States Government and the United Nations to take strong measures.

The Embassy

On May 30 the Embassy delivered a note to President Rhee[5] urging him to lift martial law and informing him that the United States Government is prepared to support the UNCURK statement along the same lines. Rhee treated this note with evident contempt and arrogance. During the past three days, Lightner has taken a strong stand that the time for talk is over and that action is urgently needed before it is too late and Rhee has gained his ends. The Embassy has recommended an ultimatum to Rhee to release the arrested Assemblymen, guarantee the functioning of the National Assembly, and assure the protection of the Assemblymen and their families. The Embassy would couple this ultimatum with a warning that the United Nations would assume responsibility for the protection of the National Assembly if the ultimatum is unheeded. In advocating speedy action now as less costly than any action that might be unavoidable later, the Embassy has specifically suggested several actions short of the imposition of martial law:

---

[3] Reference was to telegram DA 910149, CSUSA to CINCFE, May 30, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 274.

[4] Telegram CX 69393, CINCUNC to CSUSA, May 31, p. 274.

[5] The text was transmitted in telegram 1200, May 30, p. 266.

a) Assumption of control over ROK police and military establishments in Pusan;
b) UNC protection for Assemblymen and families and measures to assure freedom of National Assembly to meet together with release of arrested Assemblymen;
c) Withholding of economic aid and implementation of the recently concluded economic agreement, except for direct relief supplies;
d) Full publicity for these actions including notification to provincial authorities;
e) Takeover of martial law by ROK Army and Naval units under the direction of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

Department

The Department has approved the text and delivery of the above note but has withheld its public release pending final decision in Washington. The Department has informed the Embassy that any representations to Rhee at this time should not contain any ultimatum or implied threats of retaliation, as the United States Government must be in a position to carry through on any action.

We have also informed the Embassy that we are inclined to favor action which would provide protection for the National Assembly, at least as a first step, and that any action of this type must be taken in response to a request from the National Assembly to UNCURK and then in response to UNCURK's recommendations to the United States Government as the Unified Command. The Department is concerned over the grave consequences and long-range implications of direct and active intervention by the United States Government in the Korean internal situation.

Decisions Required by the United States Government

It is urgent that the following decisions be taken as soon as possible:

a. Whether the United States Government, in consultation with UN agencies and other interested governments, should take all measures short of martial law to restore political stability in the ROK; such measures to include publication of the United States note of May 30, diplomatic protests from interested governments concerned, withholding of additional economic aid, maximum publicity regarding Rhee's defiance, safe quarters and moral support for the National Assembly under UN auspices and provided by the UNC, a show of UN military force in cooperation with loyal ROK armed forces to restore stability, and withholding of recognition of any elections that Rhee and his supporters may hold to replace National Assemblymen or eventually to create an entirely new government.
b. Whether in case the above measures fail to bring about the desired results, or necessitate still further action, the United States Government should fully intervene to restore political stability by taking over the

Korean national police, imposing martial law through the use of United Nations forces, including Korean elements thereof, making provision for the security of President Rhee as well as the National Assembly and supporting the new President to be elected by the Assembly.

Possible Consequences of Above Decisions

In considering these decisions, it should be recognized that direct intervention could result in the following eventualities:

a. Rhee may inspire demonstrations and riots;
b. Rhee might withdraw Korean forces from General Clark's control;
c. political jockeying within the National Assembly may increase and the United States may be directly associated with subsequent political leadership;
d. a vicious propaganda campaign against foreign intervention will arise;
e. limited intervention as proposed by the Embassy may lead unavoidably to full intervention and the imposition of martial law by the United Nations Command; and
f. Rhee and his coterie may not give up but will use their political and police powers to keep and enlarge control over the machinery of government—legislative and executive.

Conclusion

The single crucial issue is now to ensure the integrity of the National Assembly and the constitution. If that is not done, the course of events in Korea will severely damage the interests of the United States and the United Nations, for the whole mission of the United Nations will become gravely endangered by internal dissension, while world-wide support for the Republic of Korea might disintegrate.

795.00/6-252

President Truman to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 2, 1952.

Amb Muccio has reported to me on the situation in Korea and is returning immed at my request to discuss it with you.

I am shocked at the turn of events during the past week reported to me by many official sources. I find it difficult to believe that, at this critical hour in the history of the ROK, differences between the several branches of the Korean Govt cannot be resolved in a manner which will maintain the confidence of the peoples of the US and the free world in Korean leadership and Korean democratic institutions. It would be a tragic mockery of the great sacrifices in blood and treasure which the people of many free nations and of Korea have made in the past two years if any changes considered necessary in the political structure of the ROK cannot be carried out in accordance with due process of law.

---

[1] The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 900 to Pusan, repeated to Tokyo for CINCUNC, June 2, 1952; it was drafted by Johnson and cleared with Matthews and President Truman.

Therefore I urge you most strongly to seek acceptable and workable ways to bring this crisis to an end and hope that you will take no irrevocable acts[2] before Amb Muccio returns to Pusan. When he arrives he will immed convey my further views to you.

---

[2] On the morning of June 2, President Rhee informed his Cabinet that he was asking his Prime Minister to communicate the following ultimatum to the National Assembly: agree to pass his amendment for direct election of the President within 24 hours or he would dissolve the Assembly (telegram 1244 from Pusan, June 2, 1952, not printed; 795.00/6–252). In telegram 901 to Pusan the same day, Lightner was authorized to make it clear to Rhee that Truman's reference to "irrevocable acts" referred to this ultimatum (795.00/6–252).

795.00/6–252: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 2, 1952—7:14 p. m.

881. For State Dept distribution only. Re ROK political crisis.

Re Pusan 1241, June 2,[1] Malania, UN,[2] has given us following text of message from Mathieu summarizing UNCURK's meeting with Generals Clark and Van Fleet:

"At 1300 hours today at UNCURK comm had emergency informal meeting with Generals Clark and Van Fleet. General Clark said, like any friend of democracy, he sympathized with UNCURK's views. However, he was only preoccupied with military aspects. Since present situation did not endanger military operations or maintenance of order in rear area, and as long as remained so, he was not prepared to go any further in conversation with President scheduled for 1430 hours this afternoon. This would be strictly limited to military matters. It might be that we did not approve Rhee's policy, but we might be obliged to put up with him for years. Therefore, the general was not going to press for lifting of martial law and liberation of assemblymen but he would draw the President's attention to possibility his attitude might have repercussions on sending of troops by UN members concerned. Chairman Plimsoll pointed out danger Rhee's coming to conclusion divergence between comm and military and disapproval by latter of comm's action. Short term advantage sought by army through avoiding getting mixed up with present happenings likely to be heavily outweighed by danger of future developments which might include complete loss of Korea to democracies. He indicated possible further steps by UN govts such as suspension conversation with ROK on long-term rehabilitation planning and of rebuilding of Seoul. General Clark agreed these steps could be contemplated but repeated his intention of strictly limiting talk to military matters. If however he was asked by journalists whether he agreed with UNCURK, he would say '100 percent'. General Van Fleet remarked that if we publicly branded Rhee as dictator, we would be confirming what Communists said all along; [Plimsoll?] pointed out Rhee's present attitude was new development. Was later informed by Teodoro (UNCURK press officer) that when journalists saw General Clark after his conversation with Rhee, he said they had talked about military matters only. A UP journalist asked whether he agreed with UNCURK. General said he was in great hurry and did not answer question. Journalists hope catch him on his return from Kojedo and ask it again. Comm just received (Monday 1400 hours) answer dated May 31 from President Rhee to UNCURK letter mentioned by UNKOR 99 saying 'Members are welcome to attend and observe the forthcoming trial of So Min Ho. General Won Yong Duk, the martial law commander, will extend full courtesies to the comm and to other international observers and he will inform you of the arrangements being made for the trial.' Comm releasing both letters to press. Members are very discouraged by military attitude."

---

[1] This telegram was the Embassy's preliminary report on the meeting between UNCURK and Generals Clark and Van Fleet, not printed (795.00/6–252).

[2] Leo Malania, Assistant to the Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

GROSS

795B.00/6-252: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 3, 1952—1 a. m.

1243. Definitely no distribution outside Dept and please no reference to this message in subsequent telegrams. Ref Embtel 1241, June 2.[1]

In conversation with UNCURK and myself prior to meeting with Rhee, General Clark pointed out our government frequently had to deal with dictatorial regimes, that recent revolution in Cuba had not led to any US intervention, and that we might well have to swallow pride here in Korea and go on working with Rhee even after watching him overthrow democracy. As indicated in reference telegram, Clark stressed fact troops simply could not be taken from front or from Koje-do or elsewhere in Far East to bring to Pusan and real threat to military operations would have to occur before such action could be considered. He wished UNCURK and Embassy well in efforts in political realm to stop Rhee but made it clear UNC not likely to be able to assist for reasons mentioned above.

Plimsoll recognized usefulness having Clark today approach matter from military angle but also pointed out long-term significance of whole situation here if political efforts failed and nothing further done to prevent Rhee accomplishing his purposes. Plimsoll went on that the very elements on whom UN depended to build up democratic state were being persecuted and many might lose their lives before it was over, that he was convinced establishment of Rhee tyranny would be end of all hopes for democracy here and that country wld be Communist in short time. He could not comment on availability of forces which was wholly military matter but believed further efforts should be made at once of stronger nature than those used to date. He asked General Clark if he thought economic sanctions might be tried. Clark agreed and said this and all future steps were not in his field and he did not want to discuss them.

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

I suggested that there was one step that had been suggested in UNCURK meeting recently which did involve the military which I thought shld be briefly discussed. I referred to informal query by National Assembly opposition leaders regarding resolution requesting protection of members and meetings by UN.

General Clark, who had read Deptel 899, June 1,[2] just before the conference, stated UNCURK obviously in no position to provide protection and undoubtedly any protection this nature wld have to be furnished by UN forces not now available in Pusan. Even if Assembly passed resolution and UNCURK recommended its implementation, his position wld have to be that troops necessary to carry it out not available. Clark reiterated he did not want to discuss future steps at this time and in any case he thought principal recommendations shld come from UNCURK and Embassy.

In outlining what he planned to tell Rhee he stated he wld not put himself in position which UNCURK and Embassy were in, of taking strong exception to President's action in political field, as he did not wish to invite recriminations.

He was going to Pres as a friend to point out his concern as commander in chief that deteriorating situation cld endanger the success of military operations in Korea, have world-wide repercussions that cld result in United Nations withdrawing support, which cld be exploited by Communist forces and finally cld have disturbing effect on Pusan supply operations. He intended then to express hope for continuing ROK support of the war effort. (No specific mention that Rhee shld compose differences or objection that Rhee had failed lift martial law in defiance National Assembly, cabinet, UNCURK and US Govt or statement that he supported UNCURK statement.)

Clark asked what he shld tell press after interview, suggesting he merely indicate that he was seeing the Pres in connection with possible repercussions in military field of present political crisis. Plimsoll asked if correspondent questioned him as to attitude UNCURK statement whether he cld not reply that he supported it and Gen Clark said he wld be glad to do that.

---

[2] *Ante*, p. 278.

After meeting with UNCURK I had few minutes with Clark alone and saw prepared written statement along lines outlined above which he planned give Rhee. I told Clark while agreeing his approach shld be from military angle that I had impression State Dept at least considered his representations today as part of series diplomatic approaches and expected him to lend his weight to approaches already made. He asked to see UNCURK statement of May 28[3] and Embassy's letter of May 30[4] and after reading them and my stressing fact Embassy letter represented views of US Govt, Clark agreed that he wld begin his statement to Rhee along fol lines:

"While thoroughly endorsing UNCURK's statement and US Govt position as conveyed by Embassy, I am approaching the problem in this meeting with you today from point of view of its effects on the military situation". He also said that he wld not present his prepared written statement to Rhee in view of this addition.

Clark explained that he thought it best that I not accompany him and Gen Van Fleet. Col Hensey who carried his papers apparently did attend meeting. I had previously conveyed Muccio's suggestion that PM and Ministers of Home Affairs and Defense be present at interview and reasons therefor. Clark turned this suggestion down as he felt meeting shld be very small one and that he preferred to talk with the Pres only.

Gens were in hurry proceed Koje-do after meeting and I had only very brief fill-in. Clark reiterated what he told Rhee (along lines above) and few other details already reported in reftel. With entire emphasis on not hurting war effort, Pres was able to give full assurances ROK soldiers at front lines need not be concerned and no question of withdrawing any to Pusan, all troubles shld be over soon and gens have no cause to worry (whole meeting very friendly and cordial). Gen Van Fleet mentioned to me necessity of getting along with govt of whatever complexion and mentioned something about reports he received which differed from Embassy's regarding character and competence of Yi Pom-Suk.

A few correspondents were at air strip and Clark had only few minutes with them. According to one of them Clark said UNC concerned lest happenings Pusan affect front. In reply to questions he said made no demands but laid all cards on table, Rhee in congenial mood, on whole I feel relieved; fully support previous UNCURK and US Govt moves.

Since I did not get very far in discussing with Clark substance Deptel 899 (although part of reply is contained above), I shall discuss possible future courses of action with Plimsoll and reply shortly. However, probably will not have much to add to suggestions already advanced. One thing is clear—today's approach had very little if any effect. What I fear is that Rhee came away with added confirmation his theory that no matter what he does US/UN will remain aloof. Any appearance of weakness on our part at this time will only encourage him and make possibility of his backing down more remote.

---

[3] For a text of the UNCURK statement, see UN document A/2187, pp. 13–14.

[4] Text of the letter is in telegram 1200 from Pusan, May 30, p. 266.

LIGHTNER

795.00/6-352: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 3, 1952—7 p. m.

1252. Rptd info CINCUNC, EUSAK Advance DIP 260 by other means. Deptels 900[1] and 901,[2] June 2. Substance rptd CINCUNC and EUSAK Advance as DIP 258.

I delivered Pres Truman's message to Pres Rhee at 11 a. m. In next room I observed what appeared to be full Cabinet in meeting which I learned later had been called to rubberstamp Rhee's order to dissolve Assembly. Have just been informed by Prime Minister that up to time my arrival Cabinet had been getting nowhere in remonstrating with Rhee; that Cabinet knew I had given Rhee paper which he had in his hand when he returned to Cabinet meeting but were not informed of contents; that after further discussion Rhee agreed not dissolve Assembly, at least for present.

Since definitely confirmed this morning that ultimatum already has been delivered to Assembly opposition and their negative reply conveyed to Rhee, I expanded supplementary statement to Rhee to include among "irrevocable acts" any arbitrary dissolution of the Natl Assembly.

Timely message from President Truman appears to have had most encouraging positive effect, but Rhee gave me no hint he intended back down in my talk with him as following account will reveal. Fact he did act shows mounting pressure can produce results and shld be continued.

After reading message Rhee commented he feared Pres Truman was ill-informed, that everything that was being done here was being done in perfectly legal way and that Pres Truman, State Dept and Ambassador Muccio shld have more confidence in him and in his reputation as up-holder, not destroyer, of democracy. He hoped Ambassador on his return wld not destroy affection Korean people hold for him by joining those who, having been taken in by bad elements in Korea, seemed to want to destroy Rhee and his govt. He referred to Gen Clark's visit and the General's concern over effects on military sitn and said he hoped he had convinced the General that nothing wld happen to affect the war effort. He said, however, that unless he took prompt action to set things straight, to restore orderly govt and to guarantee law and order, he did not know what wld happen since thousands of patriotic citizens from the provinces were already coming into Pusan to express the people's will against the Assembly.

---

[1] Telegram 900, not printed, transmitted a note from Truman to Rhee; for text of the note, see p. 285.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2 to Truman's note to Rhee, p. 286.

. . .[3] that this development could reach very large proportions and disturbances wld be inevitable. He laughed and said some people claimed he had some influence over the people in the provinces and could, if he would, prevent mass demonstrations but this was quite contrary to facts. He stated he could not help it if Pres Truman and the State Dept and other foreign govts misunderstood him. We could be sure, however, that through his friends in the US the American people wld get the true story. He warned, however, that the US Govt shld keep out of this internal sitn; that it was not its business and it wld be deplorable if the friendly relations between the two countries shld be impaired. He said that already the people of Korea were becoming alarmed and indignant over the interfering actions of UNCURK and the Embassy. He said Embassy seemed to be siding with the Communist conspirators, preferring to believe them rather than Rhee himself. He made it clear that his course was a clear one, that he had explained it many times and that nothing wld deter him from doing what he believed to be right and to be fully in accordance with the real spirit of democracy. He did not understand why we could not get this simple fact through our heads and why we appeared to be siding with the traitors. He then expounded again his thesis that the ring leaders in the Assembly were in the pay of the Communists, that they had already selected a new president and other principal members of a govt which when established wld immed seek to unify Korea by a deal with Commies in North Korea. They had succeeded in gaining a majority in Natl Assembly mainly thru bribery of assemblymen with Commie money. He could not tolerate this; he did not see why we shld tolerate it; he implored that the US trust him and give him a little more time in which he could put everything in order.

I replied that neither the Embassy nor the US Govt had any desire to take sides as between individuals and political groups in Korea; that we were, however, greatly concerned over the fact that his methods ignored the constitution of the country and the majority of the people's elected representatives in the legislature.

---

[3] This telegram was transmitted in 4 sections; between sections 1 and 2 some of the text was omitted.

It was a question of principle, since we could not ignore such developments behind the front lines in a country which was being defended by the collective action of many democratic countries in a cause that was fighting for the very principles of constitutional govt, human rights and freedoms. There were many dangers in the situation: The effect on the future support of Korea by the United Nations, including question of the maintenance of their forces here after armistice; possibility of events here influencing the Communists to launch a major offensive in Korea, and other aspects pointed out by Gen Clark yesterday. I said, however, that I thought that the question of principle referred to above, that is the inconsistency of our fighting the totalitarian Communist world for a democratic order and the prospect of being faced with the eclipse of such an order in Korea, was the point that troubled us most. If latter development shld take place democratic nations that have been supporting the ROK might have to reconsider their whole policy toward ROK. I said I could not understand his assertions that only legal methods were being pursued and asked him how his statement jibed with the introduction of martial law in Pusan, the conduct of martial law and the failure to lift martial law. I also asked whether there was anything in the constitution which permitted him to dissolve the Natl Assembly.

He only replied to the second statement saying that there was nothing in the constitution which prohibited him from dissolving the Assembly and that any such action was further legalized by the fact that the people of the country demanded it. He made the same offer to me that he had previously made to UNCURK that he wld be glad to have Emb reps go out to the provinces to ask anyone they wanted to whether they supported him or the Assembly. (He made clear once again that his whole case rests on the allegation that the will of the people as expressed in petitions, resolutions of the newly elected provincial councils, and public demonstrations justified any action required to get rid of his opposition in the Assembly. In short, such action being based on the people's will is fundamentally democratic, while any narrow judgment that the Assembly still is a representative body with the right to assert its prerogatives under the Constitution overlooks the very essence of democracy.)

I mentioned the fact that we were familiar in the US with the process of petitions and telegrams by interested groups and individuals to our Congressmen and Senators, and that we had also frequently had occasions when the majority in the Congress were opposed to the White House; yet we had lived through such periods without having the executive blot out the Congress. We did not rely on these expressions of opinion or on Gallup polls as such conclusive expressions of the peoples' will as to disavow the Congress and while we realized the representative system might not be a perfect indication of the desires of the people at all times everywhere, it was still the keystone of the democratic process. Therefore, it wld be most difficult for Americans or other peoples living under democratic systems to understand Rhee's reasoning.

I went on that no evidence had been presented to prove there was a major Commie conspiracy involving scores of men whose known records were as anti-Communist as his own, that I realized Assemblymen had probably been bought but that this applied to both sides and that Commie money was no doubt coming into Korea as the Commies could be expected to try to disrupt the govt but this did not prove all recipients were aware of the source and otherwise in league with Commies.

Rhee replied I was grossly misinformed and all wld be revealed soon to prove he was right. In meantime I shld stop listening to his enemies. Interview ended on his remark that he hoped Amb Muccio wld understand his position and that US Govt wld let things alone here.

LIGHTNER

795.00/6-352: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 3, 1952—midnight.

1259. Rptd info CINCUNC, EUSAK Advance DIP 263 by other means. Two Embassy officers called on Prime Minister Chang at 1300 today, arriving just as Prime Minister returned from Cabinet meeting at President's residence. Chang told them with sigh of relief that President had backed down on threat dissolve National Assembly. Chang reported Cabinet session with Pres as follows:

Pres continued insist Cabinet endorse his plan dissolve National Assembly. Most of Cabinet members refused support plan. After long and fruitless discussion, meeting interrupted by Lightner's arrival (to deliver Pres Truman's letter of June 3 [*2*]).[1] As Rhee left room he told Cabinet that if they cld not accept dissolution National Assembly, they must devise other means accomplish his ends.

Upon returning to Cabinet meeting, with Pres Truman's letter in hand, which he refused to show to Prime Minister even though requested to do so, Rhee asked Cabinet what suggestions they had to make in lieu of dissolving National Assembly. Home Minister Yi Pom-Sok came up with remarkable suggestion that all Assemblymen be arrested and "put in stockade". Prime Min stared at Yi with amazement and said, "What a fine set of brains you have! You are 52 years old. Is that all you have to contribute?" When no one else produced alternative plan,

---

[1] For the text of this letter, see p. 285.

Rhee then launched into tirade. He reminded Cabinet that "thousands, perhaps millions" of people are streaming toward Pusan to demand dissolution Assembly. He said there would be terrible disorders "in two or three days" and Assemblymen's lives wld not be worth much before demonstrators' wrath. Pres turned to Home Minister Yi and ordered him not to prevent flow of these people into Pusan.

Prime Min previous to this Cabinet meeting had been trying devise plan to forestall Rhee's attempt dissolve Assembly and to placate Rhee enough to give Assembly breathing spell permitting continued functioning of Assembly. To this end Prime Min had drafted "compromise" constitutional amendment for submission by Rhee to National Assembly. Central provisions this draft amendment:

1. Direct election Pres.
2. Prime Min nominated by Pres and confirmed by National Assembly; Prime Min be removed at any time by two-thirds no-confidence vote of National Assembly.
3. Pres can only nominate Cabinet Ministers proposed by Prime Min for confirmation by National Assembly.

When Rhee said Cabinet must devise means to prevent bloody disorders, Prime Min proffered above draft amendment. Pres read draft and, making no reply, closed his eyes and sat head in hands "for full ten minutes". Slowly raising his head, Rhee asked Prime Min, "Do you think you can push it through?" Chang promptly said, "I can".

After hearing PM's account of Cabinet meeting, Emb officers asked PM if Rhee's apparent acceptance of "compromise" amendment means that arrested Assemblymen would be released. Chang said that, since President's promise on June 2 to release four of them had not been fulfilled, he felt that arrested Assemblymen would remain in prison, and that in fact more Assemblymen would probably be imprisoned.

Emb officers asked PM how "compromise" amendment was going to resolve crisis in view of fact that even if amendment introduced today it could not constitutionally be acted upon by National Assembly for one month, whereas under constitution Presidential election must be held by June 23. PM made some vague reference to postponement election until middle of July. When pressed on apparent constitutional restrictions prohibiting such an act, PM refused to discuss it further, saying National Assembly would cross that bridge at appropriate time, inferring that he had some stratagem to circumvent this problem. He said primary consideration now is to get time and opportunity for Assembly to continue its functions, and that was his only motive in proposing draft amendment. He said this move would not totally solve current polit imbroglio, but only countered Rhee's attempt dissolve National Assembly.

At this point Emb officers showed PM letter from Truman, which Rhee had previously refused show him. Upon reading letter and expressing pleased amazement that US Govt had acted in such timely fashion, PM commented "Then it must have been this letter that made Rhee change mind about dissolving Assembly." PM added he had about reached end of his resources last night but that Truman's letter gave him new hope and determination once again.

Emb officers asked PM if he thought Assemblymen would accept "compromise" amendment, and he said they would not accept it. PM was then asked if he was going to sponsor proposed amendment, and he replied, "Of course not".

Emb officers received impression during conversation PM that prior to reading Truman's letter he had believed he was reduced to staving off imminent disaster posed by Rhee's ultimatum and ordered "compromise" amendment as move of desperation. However, after learning that US Govt would consider dissolution of National Assembly "irrevocable act" on Rhee's part, and gaining renewed hope thereby that US Govt had no intention give up pressure on Rhee PM seemed greatly encouraged.

LIGHTNER

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1952—11 a. m.

Rescreening of Prisoners of War

General, Bradley: Do you want to take up the draft message about rescreening? (The draft message attached to Mr. Johnson's memorandum of June 2 to Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, etc.[2]) In the first place, we think that since it is in the propaganda field and has a world-wide effect on our allies it really is a political problem. Two things worry us. One is the use of the word "rescreening". We have offered to let them rescreen after an armistice but that is not what we have in mind now. We don't expect them to interrogate everybody before an armistice but only a sampling. The Communists are going to do a lot of talking when they go back. You don't run into this problem in a unilateral interrogation.

Mr. Matthews: On the first point I don't see any objection to changing the word.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended; Bolté was also present. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and General Ruffner the Department of Defense. In all, 20 persons participated

[2] This draft message to Clark, which was not attached to the source text, underwent a number of revisions; see an earlier draft telegram, p. 244 and footnote 6, p. 261. It was sent as JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.

Mr. Johnson: We don't see any objection. We have already agreed to that. In fact, we have agreed to the Army redraft.

Mr. Nitze: On the second point, if an armistice is to be concluded immediately thereafter, then it would be a complete rescreening.

Mr. Matthews: The chances of the Commies accepting this are less than a hundred to one. As to the propaganda, what they would say when they went home would be bad anyway.

Mr. Bohlen: The key thing is that the results should be accepted by both sides. If you got an armistice, you would not care what they said.

General Bradley: Not if you got an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: It certainly would help with our allies.

General Bradley: There is a divergence of view between the Chiefs. Some think there should be no rescreening.

Mr. Matthews: Some of our people have doubts about paragraph 3(b) which suggests unilateral interrogation. The message, however, only asks for Communist interrogation.

Mr. Johnson: Harrison has almost been saying this already in the meetings and the Commies have turned it down.

Mr. Matthews: He hasn't specified whether the rescreening would be before or after an armistice.

General Bradley: We think paragraphs 3(a) and (b)[3] are both primarily political, but we wanted to put forward some of the dangers that we saw.

Mr. Matthews: There is another point in the message about getting away from daily meetings. I would like to strengthen that part. The last sentence of the message says that we perceive no objection to occasional interruption in the meetings. We would like to change the language to say that we would like interruptions and thereby strengthen it.

General Bradley: Well, that is all right.

Admiral Fechteler: I have no objection to sending the message, but I don't agree with 3(a) or (b). I want to be sure that Clark has a free chance to comment.

Mr. Johnson: We certainly can make that clear.

Admiral Fechteler: He ought to be able to come and say both alternatives are bad.

Mr. Bohlen: We can say we want his comments before we draw any conclusion.

Mr. Nitze: You can say "additional measures, if taken, should".

Admiral Fechteler: That would do it.

---

[3] In paragraph 3 (a) of the draft under consideration, Clark was instructed to consider prearmistice interrogation of nonrepatriate POWs with Communist observers in attendance; in paragraph 3 (b) the alternative proposed was an interrogation of POWs at the unilateral initiative of the UNC without the Communists observing. In an earlier draft (p. 244) these paragraphs were Part III, paragraphs 1 (a) and (b). In the final telegram (p. 310) they became paragraphs 4 A and B.

General Bradley: I don't think there is any doubt we would like to accomplish these things.

General Collins: Could we say "additional measures, if any are taken, should"?

Mr. Matthews: I have an additional suggestion in paragraph 8. I would suggest we say "It is clear that the question of Chinese POWs is more important than North Korean POWs".

General Collins: I have a suggestion in paragraph 6. If you take the first sentence of 6 out of context it is bad. We ought to change it to read "alleged facts". In Part II, paragraph 4, the words "impartial rescreening" should be "interrogations". In paragraph 5 it should be rescreening.

General Bradley: The next to the last word in paragraph 4 refers to rescreening after an armistice. I think it is all right.

General Collins: If we propose 3(a), the Commies must agree to accept the results. This should be made clear.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

General Collins: I would also change the phrase that says negotiations could be maneuvered so the difference is more apparent than real.

Mr. Johnson: What I had in mind was that if both agree to abide by the results, there isn't much difference between that and rescreening after an armistice.

General Collins: I think the proposal is stronger if you just cut out the phrase.

Mr. Johnson: All right.

Admiral Fechteler: In paragraph 3 of Part II, we should change the first sentence to read "To achieve the foregoing results, *a suggestion has been made here* that impartial interrogation be made by" instead of "consideration being given here". This would make it clear he doesn't have to choose one or the other.

General Bradley: That might make it clear to Clark this isn't firm in our minds.

Mr. Nitze: That is all right because it isn't clear in our minds.

General Bradley: What do we do if the Commies come up with Poland, Hungary, etc., when we suggest the Swedes and the Swiss.

Mr. Johnson: This isn't a case of both sides nominating countries.

General Bradley: Well, under 3(b) it is unilateral but what about 3(a)?

General Collins: I favor going ahead with 3(b) without getting Commie approval. It isn't clear because 3(b) says impartial interrogation.

General Bradley: I think it is clear.

General Collins: I don't think it is clear that we would do 3(b) without advising the Commies that we were going to do it. I think they might think in Tokyo we would tell the Commies about it at Panmunjom.

Mr. Nitze: We could clarify that.

General Bradley: Well, you might tell the Commies you were going to do (b) if they turn down (a).

General Cabell: What do you do if you go ahead with (b) and the Commies say they have been excluded?

Mr. Bohlen: You don't go to (b) until they have turned down (a). You really have only one proposal—that we are going to proceed with an impartial interrogation and if they will agree to the results they can send observers.

General Collins: If we have in mind what Chip has said, we ought to spell it out.

Mr. Johnson: That isn't what we had in mind.

Mr. Nitze: You could do it either way. You could propose (a) and if rejected go to (b), or you could do (a) alone or you could do (b) alone.

Mr. Bohlen: Would it be enough to get Clark's comments on (a)?

Mr. Matthews: You might as well get his comments on (b) too.

General Collins: I think we ought to get his views on both. I do think we could make the point that Paul has just made. What is your objection to 3(b) Chip?

Mr. Bohlen: I think any rescreening or interrogation is going to be messy. I think it is fine if they agree to abide by the results because then they are in a bad way if they violate their agreement. But if you do it to cleanse your soul it isn't going to work. Neutral observers will make a hell of a lot of what happened during and before the initial screening.

General Collins: Murders didn't occur to make the prisoners say they didn't want to be repatriated.

Mr. Bohlen: We are likely to have all kinds of charges with no advantages.

General Collins: You have told us that the allies are skeptical of the screening. If that isn't true, let's drop the whole thing.

Mr. Bohlen: It is true, but I don't think alternative 3(b) will help you.

General Collins: If the screening was done according to the instructions, then clearly no one was forced to refuse to return.

General Bradley: I think both proposals should be sent to Clark for comment. We all have doubts about them here.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

(Mr. Nitze read a new paragraph to be added to the message to clarify the possibilities of proceeding with (a) and (b), and this paragraph was accepted.)[4]

Psychological Warfare

General Bradley: We got a paper here a while ago about some psychological stuff for use in the negotiations. Do you have it? (This refers to the proposed message[5] suggesting that psychological warfare experts be furnished to assist the UN Command in Korea.)

Mr. Matthews: It was handed to me just before we came over but I have not read it.

General Bradley: We thought the idea was good. We are in more of a cold war than a hot war and we would like to have some experts in psychological warfare to help us in this Korean business. We think the idea is OK, but whether the language of the message is or not we don't know.

General Collins: It is a good idea. We might both look at the wording.

Mr. Matthews: I have a few pencilled changes on my copy. (He read these off to the meeting.)

It was agreed that Mr. Johnson and General McClure would get together on the language.

Syngman Rhee

Mr. Matthews: Could we go on to Syngman Rhee and his troubles. Everybody is worried. Muccio should get back there tonight. We are preparing instructions to him which are coming over here,[6] and we have drafted a possible message from the Secretary of Defense to Clark (attached)[7] to parallel our message to Muccio. We have instructed Muccio to stop in Tokyo to consult Clark.

. . . .

Admiral Fechteler: Why do you need paragraph 1 of the draft message? The only reason I would include paragraph 2 is that it contains a reference to the President's personal message.

General White: I think the last paragraph is about all you need.

General Bradley: I don't think it would do any harm to give him the background.

General Collins: I am not sure it is necessary to send any message, but if you are going to send one I think the complete message is good.

Mr. Allison: This more or less backs up what he has already done.

---

[4] The draft under consideration was sent as JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.

[5] The message was sent as JCS 910473 to Clark, June 5, p. 308.

[6] Telegram 907, June 4, p. 302.

[7] This message was not attached to the source text; for its text, see *infra*.

General Collins: Should we add that Clark will be furnished with a copy of the instructions to Muccio?

Mr. Johnson: All right.

General Bradley: Is the second sentence clear? Shouldn't we say "The U.S. Government"?

General Collins: Why not make it two sentences.

Mr. Allison: I think two sentences would be better.

Mr. Matthews: Paul points out that we should say "latter contingency" rather than "such a contingency".

General Bradley: Does this have the approval of the State Department?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, including the Secretary. We do intend to get the clearance of the President on the instruction to Muccio.

(At this point Mr. Kenneth Young arrived with the draft instruction to Muccio.)

Mr. Matthews: Unfortunately, there is only one copy of this telegram. Shall we have Mr. Johnson read it?

General Bradley: Yes.

Mr. Young read the message.

Mr. Johnson: On the question of holding up the implementation of the economic agreement, it was agreed to deal with that problem separately after clearance all around.

Admiral Fechteler: Did you have something in the message about safety of UNC forces?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Admiral Fechteler: I just question whether you want to put that in. This bastard (Syngman Rhee ?) may be on their side. If you give him the idea that he has the safety of our forces in his hands, you may have trouble.

General Collins: Could we say security of our forces?

Mr. Allison: What Admiral Fechteler means is that Rhee might use it against us. He is bad, but I doubt if he is that bad.

General Collins: The thing that might have the most effect on Rhee is that this business threatens his own neck. If he doesn't do something we may have to support someone else. If you could put a threat in, it might help.

Mr. Johnson: We have a threat in the message in one sense.

Mr. Nitze: I feel we are threatening the wrong thing. Rhee knows we are going to continue in Korea. The only real alternative is that we might have to support someone else.

General Collins: That's my point. He knows that if we put in a military government, he would be safe.

Mr. Johnson: We are not as worried about Rhee as about the group around him. If you could take some direct action with respect to them, it might help.

General Collins: The CIA might help.

Mr. Allison: We have discussed that.

Mr. Matthews: I think we should get some threat in.

Mr. Johnson: It's awfully hard to threaten. You don't have anyone standing on the side lines to support.

General Bradley: You might use military people, but that would defeat your purpose.

Mr. Matthews: We have thought of that, but you want a civilian government.

General Bradley: Military people might be used for a military government.

General Collins: If a military government is to be set up, I would hate to see it done except under South Koreans.

Mr. Johnson: The attitude of the ROK Army and Navy has been fine.

Mr. Young: The Air Force too.

Mr. Matthews: Is this message agreeable to you then?

General Bradley: Yes.

General Collins: I seem to harp on this point, but I don't think it is whether it is agreeable to us.

Mr. Matthews: Well, it isn't a purely political matter. All of us have an interest in it.

[Here follows a brief discussion on Greece and Turkey.]

795.00/6-452: Telegram

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1952—3:29 p.m.

DEF 910410. From Secretary of Defense signed Lovett. Secretary of State and I appreciate your analysis of military factors in present Korean political crisis and your representations to Rhee. The United States Government is fully aware of the serious military implications of taking direct action in the near future. Since collapse of the Korean Government through bitter political deadlock would injure United Nations and United States interests and jeopardize the security and functioning of your command, we strongly hope agencies of the United Nations and of the United States Government will join their efforts and use their great powers of persuasion in taking measures short of the grave and distasteful steps of open military intervention. We share your hope that the extreme step of imposing any form of military government can be avoided. The United States and United Nations political objectives in Korea would be jeopardized on the one hand by undemocratic methods of the Government of the Republic of Korea or by the imposition of military government by the United Nations Command Forces. The latter contingency should be contemplated only as a last resort if necessary to support the military effort. Our chief objective must therefore be to facilitate a political solution which will make possible continued support by Government and People of Republic of Korea of United Nations action against the aggressor.

---

[1] Drafted in the Department of State; see memorandum, *supra.* A text of this cable was sent to the Embassy in Korea, "eyes only for Muccio", as telegram 915, June 4, 1952, not printed (795B.00/6-452).

The military and political factors in present domestic crisis in Korea are clearly interrelated. The present main burden of approach and representation to President Rhee must rest with UNCURK, the United States Ambassador and Diplomatic Representations from other governments; however, United States Government believes it imperative that prestige and influence of CINCUNC be used to greatest extent feasible in presenting strong unanimity of views. Effect of President Truman's personal message to Rhee has created situation in which continued firm representation to Rhee may yet bring about abatement of crisis and attempts at compromise reconciliation between groups, which is immediate objective of United States Government. Care must be taken that President Rhee be given no room to imagine divergencies exist between United States political and military viewpoints which he would quickly exploit to his advantage.

We hope you will continue close and active cooperation and consultations with the United States Ambassador in Korea and with UNCURK in order to advise them and provide them with full support, short of active military intervention. Copy of State's instructions to Muccio will be furnished you by him.[2]

---

[2] *Infra.*

795.00/6–452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1952—3:36 p.m.

907. For Muccio. (Tokyo pass to CINCUNC for info.) FYI our desires and views with regard to internal situation in ROK remain much the same as when we met with you here. That is: (1) every means must be exhausted to obtain a resolution of this internal crisis by methods short of active military intervention. Apart from question of its undesir-

---

[1] This cable, which was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 400, was drafted by Johnson and cleared by President Truman. The following marginal notation appeared at the end of the source text "OK, H[arry] S. T[ruman], 6/4/52".

ability we do not have available the milit forces that wld be required for the complete milit intervention which might eventually be required if we embark upon course of even limited milit intervention. (2) There has to be some leadership in the ROK Govt. It appears that this leadership can best be provided by Rhee under some controls and in a more chastened mood. It appears here that US and UN interests wld best be served if the end result is that Rhee remains as Pres. Rhee wld have much more standing within and without Korea if he were elected by popular vote rather than by a reluctant and coerced Assembly. However, we believe that he shld be subj to Assembly controls along the lines suggested by the PriMin in his Points 2 and 3 set forth in penultimate para section 1 Pusan's 1259.[2] Therefore we believe that constitutional amendment providing for popular election of Pres and subjecting him to greater degree of parliamentary control might be the most desirable outcome of the present crisis.

Foregoing shld not be interpreted as inflexible instructions as we recognize you must have and we desire to give you as much flexibility as possible to act immed on the spot to meet situation as it develops. We recognize the great influence that this Govt is able to bring to bear upon the situation but we prefer to be in a position of guiding and helping the two sides to the controversy in finding mutually acceptable solution rather than coercing either one or both sides.

Bearing in mind the foregoing you shld see Pres Rhee as quickly as possible fol your arrival in Pusan and discuss the internal polit strife in ROK making, in your discretion, all or such of the fol points as you deem desirable in light of immed situation existing at time of your interview with him:

1. As indicated by your personal visit with Pres and his msg to Rhee of Jun 2, the Pres, as well as the Depts of State and Defense, are deeply concerned over internal polit situation in ROK, and shocked at actions taken by Pres Rhee during the past two weeks.
2. Amer press and Cong are showing concern over situation. Support for relief, reconstruction, and milit strengthening of ROK is now in jeopardy.
3. Respect for the sovereignty of other states is a basic tenet of US policy. We have consistently applied this policy in our relations with the ROK. We are also deeply concerned over welfare of Korean people as most recently shown in a major matter by the conduct of negots leading to and content of Economic Coordination Agreement negotiated with the ROK. However, impossible to expect that US can remain indifferent to an internal situation in a country which owes the very fact of its existence to the still continuing loss of life and sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of Amer men, as well as to the sacrifices of all the Amer people.

---

[2] Dated June 3, p. 293.

4. If, in fact, there is an internal communist conspiracy involving ROK Assemblymen and officials and with connections outside Korea, it is a matter of the gravest moment and concern to the UNC as well as the US, involving as it wld the security of UNC Forces. In this event it is surprising Rhee did not inform the Embassy and the UNC of the fact in order that the resources of the UNC and the USG within and without Korea cld assist Govt of the ROK in exposing and dealing with the menace in consultation with each other so as to eliminate possibility of any unfavorable reactions against the ROK and avoid interference with the milit situation. If the situation required extraordinary measures, the USG and UNC wld be the first to cooperate with the ROK in taking all necessary action. If the alleged conspiracy is not of such nature there is no valid reason that it cannot and shld not be dealt with by normal legal process. In any event, USG must protest the action of Rhee in imposing and continuing martial law in the important base area of Pusan without consultation with and against explicit statements of CINCUNC and CGEUSAK.

5. The US has consistently supported and defended the Govt of the ROK against its detractors upon the basis of ROK performance under a democratic constitution and legal system.

6. Communists have capability launching large scale hostilities any time, and will seize opportunity exploit polit instability ROK. Thus present internal situation cld well be invitation for Communist attack.

7. Rhee should appreciate that degree of support he will continue receive as President ROK from US and other interested UN countries is inevitably related to his actions in this situation.

8. US Govt will be gravely concerned if large groups of people come to Pusan to protest in any fashion whatsoever, as this Govt will only conclude that such demonstrations will be inspired and controlled by Rhee. Such acts will constitute in opinion of US Govt continuing intention to go against unanimous advice all interested friends of Korea, internal and external.

In light of foregoing you are authorized to inform Rhee US Govt supports UNCURK statement that martial law be lifted, and Assemblymen except possibly So Min Ho be released.

Secondly, you shld emphasize in strongest terms necessity for Rhee as Pres of ROK to compose differences with opponents in form of working polit compromise within legal framework ROK constitutional structure. You shld refer to PriMins suggestion (urtel 1259) as an example. Only a quick resolution of polit differences along foregoing lines will maintain vital support in UN for Korean operation. It is also suggested you discuss with PriMin possibilities of a compromise solution along these same lines.

In connection with these discussions, you shld tell Rhee that US Govt so far has, despite strong pressure, not made public its attitude toward recent events in the ROK. However, unless satisfactory actions are taken immed to resolve crisis, US Govt will have to reconsider its stand in this matter.

Request your recommendations as to further steps which you may consider necessary.

FYI the Pres has approved these instructions.

ACHESON

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Korean Internal Political Situation"

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET OFFICIAL–INFORMAL PUSAN, June 5, 1952.

DEAR KEN: I expect the Ambassador will be back in the morning and I feel I have a few matters I should get off my chest as I relinquish charge of the office to him.

Let me say that we were greatly heartened by the message [1] you so kindly sent a day or two ago expressing appreciation for our reporting on the current political crisis. We have of course been pretty steadily on the job, both in and out of the office, from morn to morn but no one has complained and everyone involved, including the boys in the Political Section, the Stenographers, and the boys in the Code Room really rose to the occasion. I intend to send a separate letter of commendation mentioning the names of the people concerned which might be included in their personnel dossiers.

Our reporting has been so voluminous that we have told you just about everything we know that has been going on here, but since the written word can never quite tell the whole story I realize that there are impressions you may have gained which do not accurately reflect our thinking here. For one thing I hope you do not feel that we have been taken in by one crowd or another. It is true that particularly during this crisis key figures in the opposition to Rhee have more frequently come to us than the leaders on the Rhee side. This is only natural under the circumstances. On the other hand, we have given you everything we had on the Government side of the case. The various interviews with Rhee in which I participated and the second-hand accounts of interviews he has had with others (UNCURK, Sulzberger,[2] Alec Adams and Plimsoll) have revealed in a very clear way both the intentions and the strategy of Rhee and his cohorts. Rhee of course has accused the Embassy, as well as all other foreigners, as being too prone to listen to the opposition and as lining up with the opposition against him. I would like to say in this connection that neither I nor the boys in the Political Section have any delusions about the character, the integrity and the devotion to democratic methods of the people who are lined up against Rhee in this struggle. We have not been interested in them as individuals nor in their party affiliations. Since we have felt strongly the importance of having this Government conduct itself in accordance with its constitution, and have forcefully expressed ourselves on that point, it is perhaps natural that Rhee feels we have taken sides since he is the one who is obstructing the constitutional process.

---

[1] The message under reference was telegram 906 to Pusan, June 3, 1952, not printed (123 Lightner, Edwin Allan).

[2] Arthur Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times.*

In thinking over our reporting during the past two weeks I am not sure we have emphasized enough the conviction that all of us here in the office have reached during the past fortnight that the whole issue comes down to whether or not Rhee will be permitted to remain Chief of State. This view is shared by Plimsoll and several other members of UNCURK. Of course, it is based on the fact which Rhee has himself made perfectly clear, that come Hell or high water he will break the Assembly opposition and by hook or crook get himself re-elected. Hence there is no possibility of "reconciling differences". It is a fight to the finish. As I tried to tell you ten days ago the issue seemed then crystal clear and it was up to the Government to decide whether to permit Rhee to win or whether to take all action necessary to thwart him and to stand firmly by the principle that constitutional changes must be effected in a constitutional way.

The question of what kind of a Government might emerge if we stood by our principles has an important bearing on a decision of this kind. An embryo state like the ROK no doubt needs a firm hand at the helm. There is no obvious alternative candidate in sight. Therefore there is a certain risk that a future Government without Rhee might be less effective than the Government we are used to. We here in the office (as well as Plimsoll) have felt the principle at stake was sufficiently important to out-weigh this risk. The ROK Government up to now has paid a price for Rhee's system of one-man Government. Cabinet members, with a few exceptions, have been afraid to make decisions clearly within their province without referring even trivial matters to the President. UNCACK efforts toward decentralization, in order to get on with important business at the Cabinet Minister level, have not been very successful. The situation is even more awkward at the Vice Minister and Bureau Chief level, where most of the officials concerned are afraid of their own shadows under the Rhee system. We do not deny that a non-Rhee Government might be subject to all sorts of divisive influences, particularly if a parliamentary system were adopted. We cannot foresee how it would actually work out. There would no doubt be benefits in terms of decentralization, correcting somewhat the situation described above. A strong Prime Minister with the support of the Assembly might well be able to organize a plausible government. The essence of what I am trying to say comes down to this: that we here have reached the conclusion that for various reasons, which should be well known to you, Rhee is now such a menace that literally any other man would be an improvement. An appraisal of our judgment on this depends largely on importance which is attached to the development of democracy in Korea. We can have Rhee and give up all possibility of continuing to work toward a democratic state here or we can give the democratic principle a tremendous boost and take our chances on the people who must be relied on to run the Government.[3]

Another thing which our reports may not have stressed enough is the surprising degree of opposition to Rhee that has developed among educated circles during the past two weeks. One has to have lived through this period here to appreciate the change. Many people have gone along with Rhee for one reason or another, even though they disliked many of the things he was up to. More and more these people have come to members of the Embassy staff begging us to do something and expressing the belief that there was no hope for Korea unless the Old Man could be brought to heel. The masses are completely uninformed as to what is going on, owing largely to the almost complete censorship of everything except the official statements of the OPI. The illiterate masses are not the element that we are counting on for developing democracy here anyway and the danger of permitting Rhee to get his way lies in the effect it will have on the educated groups. After the present experience, if it ends with Rhee's triumph, it will be a long, long time before any of them are courageous enough to take an independent stand. Certainly none of the better elements will want to participate in a rubber-stamp or subservient legislature.

A final point: I was somewhat worried by the plans and suggestions for a possible UNC take-over here. While we envisaged that as a last resort, the disadvantages of such direct and complete intervention were self-evident. Our view has been that a decision to thwart Rhee must envisage taking all steps necessary to do so, even including this last most undesirable one. We felt, however, that the important thing was for the U.S. to take a very strong position throughout. If Rhee were convinced that we meant business and were prepared to go the limit, it might not be necessary to go the limit. The trouble with the situation as of this evening is that, particularly after the visit of Generals Clark and Van Fleet, Rhee does not believe we will go all the way. If it proved necessary to resort to really strong action, we felt serious consideration should be given at least to exploring the practicability of letting the ROKs, through their Chiefs of Staff, take the situation into their own hands. The main point in the foregoing is that we are lost if Rhee remains with the impression that we will let him get away with his designs.

---

[3] The following sentence was handwritten in the margin with the indication that it should conclude this paragraph: "Rhee can't last many years anyway, and there may be real advantage in having his successor take over now when US/UN influence and personnel are available on the spot to guide him, rather than later when that influence will be less."

To tell Rhee to settle his differences with the opposition means only one thing: to get the opposition to climb down. Once the opposition is convinced they can't win (by realizing the US/UN are not prepared to give them full backing on the constitutional issue), they may cave in. Or they may come to a so-called "compromise", whereby Rhee would be reelected but additional checks placed on his power. I suppose this would be hailed with a sigh of relief in certain quarters as an apparent solution. But you see if one feels about Rhee as we have come to feel, one cannot believe this would be anything but a face-saving device. The present Constitution with all its drawbacks provides some very good checks and balances, but Rhee has found ways to circumvent them. Now he has made it clear he has no regard at all for the Constitution. We simply do not believe he will be restrained from the arbitrary exercise of his authority by any device and that he has now become the symbol for arbitrary misuse of power in the eyes of the intelligentsia and educated circles generally. It is not only Rhee himself who is dangerous; it is the little group that surrounds him, eggs him on and carries out his dictates—above all Lee Bum-suk. In short, if he remains at the head of the state the development toward a one-party, police state with a cowed, docile legislature will be inevitable, and everyone in Korea and throughout the world will soon recognize the situation for what it is.

I am looking forward eagerly to Muccio's arrival tomorrow but from the way I sense the situation I am almost afraid to hear what his new instructions are.

Sincerely yours,

E. ALLAN LIGHTNER, JR.[4]

---

[4] Printed from a copy which bore this typed signature.

795.00/6–2852: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1952—11:50 a. m.

JCS 910473. From JCS.

1. We are aware that you are confronted with serious United States and internatl pub opinion problem at present and for future. We believe you will be assisted if we can work out means of giving improved support to your cmd through cooperation of appropriate agencies here to supply you with useful info and suggestions. This subj has been discussed in detail by appropriate ofcrs of Def, JCS, three mil services, State and CIA. Submitted herewith for your comment is analysis of

principal difficulties we have to meet together with suggestions for action here and by your cmd.

2. Communist propaganda is engaged in world-wide "hate America" campaign of an intensity, ferocity and vulgarity which is comparable to that directed at Germany at height of last war. Until recently allegations our use BW was principal theme. These charges continue but even greater accent is now being placed on charge of atrocities against POWs. Simultaneously, understandable doubts have been raised in United States and among our Allies by incidents on Koje and progress of talks at Panmunjom has created pessimism. Hence Communist anti-American campaign falls on receptive ground. Although Communist propaganda has not yet seized on ROK polit situation this too may be perverted to discredit United States unless we are alert.

3. We appreciate that series of circumstances, such as lull at battlefront, lack of news from protracted armistice negots are responsible for major attention to POW camp disorders and to some extent for resulting imbalance and lack of perspective in news coverage.

4. First suggestion is to arrange rapid and consistent flow info and advice on propaganda matters between us and elms your cmd which can make use of such material. We are prepared to set up here an interdepartmental watch committee to supply your needs. This committee would supply you with the daily résumé of United States news stories and editorial reaction to subjs concerning you. This would be accompanied when appropriate by suggestions for steps to be taken to correct unfavorable reactions. At frequent intervals it also would supply info on foreign pub opinion and on important Communist propaganda activities knowledge of which may not be readily available to you. You would see that appropriate ofcrs ur cmd receive and use this material and you would advise us on pub statements or other actions which might be taken here to reinforce ur posn.

5. In addn we are prepared to send you immediately two ranking specialists in PsyWar, one from State and other from Def in order acquaint you fully with special domestic and internatl problems which confront us. They would be available if you wish for limited time in order to assist in setting up coordinated mechanism which functions smoothly.

6. To illustrate reasoning which leads to above suggestion we cite these examples where exchange of info might have avoided difficulties or helped overcome them. Specifically our hope would be to supply info not readily available to you and which requires special interdepartmental effort here.

A. We feel ur CX 69109 [1] is acute and accurate description ur problem with press on Koje. Censorship and other handling these correspondents is matter for your decision. You should know, however, that Canadian Emb has asked State if it would not be possible to remove correspondents or to exert stricter censorship and has objected to quotations attributed to three Canadian EM on Koje in Associated Press disp dtd 25 May. United States Emb London continues to report that British opinion is disturbed by evidence of "incompetence" in handling POWs and that officials do not feel we are doing enough to remove this impression. United States Consulate Hong Kong reports that Communist propaganda on POW issue is proving so effective that it recommends tight censorship from Koje. Publication of documents [2] submitted yesterday to Senate Armed Services Cmte should help to correct this impression. Statements such as yours published in *New York Times* 3 June and determination shown by you and Gen Boatner [3] also are corrective. Nevertheless, POW problem will confront our news and propaganda for some time.

B. At present United States and World Press features number seemingly true on spot reports, inadvertent comments by unidentified armed forces personnel. At same time it appears evident that Commies making determined effort to counter each of Gen Boatner's strong moves with some sort of incident that provides copy for press, namely, tanks used to knock down flags which Commies re-erect next day and provide cause celebrate for press treatment.

C. Monitoring analysis all Soviet external and internal radio broadcasts for week ending 31 May show 1 percent devoted to BW and 16 percent to Korea. Of this 15 percent 14 was on POW issue.

---

[1] In this telegram, dated May 26, 1952, CINCFE expressed its concern that the kinds of speculative and sensational news stories emanating from correspondents on the Koje-do and earlier incidents should be countered by public disclosure of a full narrative of important incidents which occurred at Koje-do prior to the Dodd case. CINCFE believed that the appearance of these stories with the implication of official secrecy was providing "the Communist propaganda machine" with ammunition (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 100). CSUSA, in telegram DA 909857, May 27, authorized CINCFE to prepare a complete but concise factual statement for clearance in Washington. (JCS files)

[2] Not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 11).

[3] Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, USA, was appointed Commandant, Prisoner of War Camp, Koje-do, in May 1952 succeeding Brigadier General Dodd.

795.00/6–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 5, 1952—12:55 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 910484. From JCS.

Part I.

1. Your analysis in C 69351 [2] most helpful re consideration here of

---

[1] Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram. This telegram included the substance of the Department of State draft, May 26, p. 244 and changes resulting from the views expressed at the State–JCS meeting, June 4; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 295.

[2] Dated May 31, p. 270.

next steps to be taken in armistice negots. As situation viewed here, folg factors must be included among those to be considered in determining future course of action:

A. We continue to have strong domestic and internatl support, notably including India, for principle of non-forcible repatriation POWs.

B. However, recent events on Koje have tended to undermine previous confidence Allied Govts as well as public in validity results of screening. Allied Govts have expressed particular concern that pressure factors may have operated on individual POWs within anti-Communist camps so that number non-repatriates too high.

C. Prior to recent events on Koje all our principal allies strongly urged that our offer of impartial rescreening after armistice be modified to permit such rescreening prior to armistice subj to agreement in advance by each side to abide by results. United States Govt replied that this proposal would probably not be any more acceptable to Communists than screening after armistice, and that it would have disadvantages for UNC compared to screening after armistice, but that if negots indicated timing of screening was major point at issue we would at that time consider pre-armistice screening, and could present such modification as in no way substantive change in UNC package proposal of 28 Apr.

D. Subsequently allies have strongly urged some type rescreening, principally UNC offer of impartial rescreening prior to armistice with Communist observation and commitment by both sides to abide by results.

E. Regardless of logic and reasonableness of our posn on impartial rescreening folg armistice, our principal allies would not now support unilateral indefinite suspension of negots, and probably not in any case until after an offer of rescreening prior to armistice has been made in some way and rejected by Communists, or until some other new elm had been introduced into situation.

F. Unilateral indefinite suspension of negots by UNC would give Soviets basis for exploiting subsequent situation as "breaking off of negotiations" by UNC in face of Communist willingness and desire to continue talks and UNC unwillingness to face alleged facts "exposed" by incidents on Koje. Such attacks could at this time do much to exploit wavering opinions among our friends and allies.

G. Unilateral indefinite suspension of negots by UNC, particularly without solid support from our principal allies, would give Soviets basis for moving negots to Security Council (which Soviets Chair during June) on grounds of deadlock at Panmunjom, and would provide them opportunity in Security Council to link other questions with Korean settlement, thereby beclouding Korean issues and confusing and dividing general support we now have on fundamental posns re Korea.

H. Additionally, there have been some indications, still entirely inconclusive, through dipl channels that Chinese might seek resolution of POW question, that principal difficulty for Chinese may be lowness of UNC figure on repatriates, that figure of 100,000 may possibly be basis for resolution of this issue. It is clear that question of Chi POWs is more important to Communists than that of NK POWs. This known to several Govts and may be expected eventually to become generally known. Separate msg fols on other developments in this regard.

Part II.

2. View here is that modification of 70,000 figure based on original screening opn would not be more acceptable to Communists than present figure. In addn such modification would tend to increase public confusion over validity of original screening.

3. Accordingly, addl measures, if any are taken, should:

A. Contribute whatever may be possible toward achievement of armistice, and, if negots suspended or Communists break off, make unmistakably clear that issue was principle of non-forcible repatriation rather than entirely subsidiary question of validity of results of UNC screening or method of confirming results.

B. Restore allies confidence in validity of results of UNC screening so that if armistice is not achieved allies support for United States policy will not be jeopardized by any feeling that screening results could have been significantly more favorable to Communists.

4. To achieve foregoing results suggestion has been made here that impartial interrogation prior to armistice of all or a reptv sample of non-repatriates be made by or under observation of group of countries not participating in hostilities in Korea (such as Switzerland, Sweden, and India). Interrogation would apply to all non-repatriates including those who would develop from screening in compounds hitherto unscreened. If such interrogation determined that any individual POWs would not in fact forcibly oppose repatriation, such POWs would be transferred to group available for repatriation. This impartial interrogation might develop from one of two alternative courses of action:

A. Proposal could be made that Communist reptvs observe interrogation along with reptvs from UNC, that both sides agree in advance to abide by results, and that immediately upon conclusion of interrogation both sides conclude armistice on basis of results and on agreements thus far achieved on other issues; or,

B. Impartial interrogation could be carried out at unilateral initiative of UNC and without any invitation for Communist observation. After results of interrogation were determined, as suggested in subparas 6B and 6C ur C 69351, it would be feasible to propose recess for reasonable period (approx 1 week) and, if Communists acceptance then was not forthcoming, unilaterally to recess until Communists accepted or broke negots.

5. Course of action 4A above would particularly contribute to objective set forth Para 3A, while course of action 4B would particularly contribute to objective in Para 3B. The two courses of action are not mutually exclusive since if Communists reject proposal to observe interrogation it might still be desirable for UNC to proceed unilaterally with impartial interrogation. If it were decided to adopt course of action in-

volving both Para 4A and Para 4B above, one of two procedures might be followed:

A. First would be to tell Communists at Panmunjom that we propose neutral interrogation; that, if Communists are prepared to accept results and conclude armistice on basis of these results, we are prepared to invite Communist observers; and that, if Communists reject this offer, we will proceed unilaterally.

B. Other alternative would be to offer proposal 4A to Communists at Panmunjom. If Communists reject proposal, we would proceed unilaterally with procedure outlined in Para 4B without further discussion at Panmunjom on subj.

6. In order to minimize any erroneous implications that UNC was willing to compromise its basic principles on non-forcible repatriation, and to maximize possibilities of Communist acceptance, offer mentioned in Para 4A above could originate as mediation proposal from some third country which could test Chi Communist reactions to it. If rejected by Communists, fact of offer, Chinese rejection and United States acceptance could be made public to great advantage of United States. If accepted in principle by Chinese it would, of course, be necessary that it subsequently be introduced into negots at Panmunjom for confirmation and agreement on details. It would also be necessary that agreement of non-combatant countries selected to serve in such capacity be obtained through dipl channels. Alternatively or subsequently, offer could be introduced by UNC Del at Panmunjom within context of UNC refutation of Communist allegations of coercion and forceful retention of non-repatriates. In this connection we note with approval that in several recent restatements of UNC posn on POWs UNC Del has omitted ref to timing of impartial rescreening.

7. While there are disadvantages to any interrogation to be carried out before armistice as compared with present offer of rescreening after an armistice, disadvantages do not appear so serious as to outweigh advantage of achieving armistice. Additionally, if, as would be absolutely essential, both sides would agree to abide by results and conclude armistice on basis thereof, essential difference from post-armistice screening should not be great. In event of Communist refusal to abide by results United States Govt would be in favorable polit and propaganda posn to cope with resulting situation.

8. Request your comments on Part II.

Part III.

9. Re Para 7 ur C 69351. Until receipt your comments requested above, decision on course of action proposed ur Para 6 will be withheld, and you should continue to be guided by JCS 908998.[3] However,

---

[3] Dated May 16, p. 203.

as stated in JCS 909747[4] there is no objection to holding mtgs only every 3 or 4 days if both sides agree. Additionally, even if Communists do not agree, we suggest UNC Del occasionally indicate without explanation its inability to meet for 2 or 3 days so that UNC Del is not placed in posn of being continuously responsive to Communist urging for mtgs.

---

[4] Not printed (795.00/5-3152).

FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 34: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, June 5, 1952—5:44 p. m.

CX 69687. Re CX 64029.[1]

1. Since General Ridgway notified you in para 3 of referenced message of his decision to hold all civilian internees until the plan for their release could be included in the overall plan for the release of all internees, both military and civilian, there have been several developments which indicate that those CIs who have been screened and have indicated they do not wish to return to Communists control, should be released from UNC custody as soon as appropriate arrangements are made with ROK.

2. In arriving at the above decision, I have carefully examined all aspects of this problem and have discussed it personally with Van Fleet and Harrison, both of whom recommend release. The primary deterrent to releasing the CIs to date has been the adverse effect upon the armistice negotiations and a possible retaliation against UN POWs. However, this deterrent is not considered valid at this time. Harrison submitted to me his analysis of the question, pertinent parts of which are quoted below:

> "The civilian internees are not POWs in fact, having been reclassified as civilians and so reported to the ICRC. They therefore are, or should be, outside of the POW issue. In item 4 staff discussions the Communists tacitly accepted this view when the [*they*] proposed POW exchange based on 18 December lists. The release of the civilian internees I consider a matter of justice consistent with our position on the entire POW issue. If we do not release them it can be inferred that our proclaimed final stand is not actually final and that we are so afraid of not achieving an armistice that we are prepared to sacrifice our widely publicized humanitarian principles in the interests of expediency. Release of the civilian internees would tend to prove that our stand is final and that we do not fear the consequences of the act.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 21, p. 57.

The objection has been advanced that their release may influence the enemy to break off negotiations or to delay an armistice indefinitely. I consider this risk negligible. Although current enemy statements indicate that they include these persons among those they want returned to them, their earlier statements in staff discussions indicate their willingness to ignore them. I consider it very unlikely that a major decision would be determined by an issue that the enemy has already discounted.

I also consider it a negligible risk that release of civilian internees might cause enemy to retaliate by holding UN POWs now in their hands. The only way we can expect the return of our men is through an armistice. If the enemy wants an armistice sufficiently to agree to our package proposal there will be no point in his not exchanging the 12,000 UN prisoners for the 70,000 we hold, as specified in that proposal. We can exercise some degree of control by regulating the rate of exchange of the prisoners on a proportionate basis. For the enemy not to return the UN prisoners, or to threaten not to return them in order to influence negotiations would be a complete repudiation of all that he has said in the conferences and to the world about repatriation. In my opinion the probability of the return of our men in enemy hands is approximately equal to the probability of achieving an armistice.

While we cannot accurately foresee the consequences of releasing the civilian internees, it would appear reasonably certain that the enemy will use it as fuel for his propaganda and, if he desires, to justify delay or prevention of an armistice. However, he already has ample propaganda material and can manufacture more at will. Fear of what the enemy might say should not, in my opinion, deter action otherwise indicated. I believe that in case of doubt the bolder course should be followed.

3. The question of the continued detention of the CIs has been a constant source of irritation to the ROK govt and the ROK people. In this connection, Pres Rhee has repeatedly made strong representations to CGArEight and AmEmbassy (Muccio) for the release of CIs. Delay in their release will unquestionably result in unrest and further incidents such as that which took place in compound nbr 14 Yongchon, reported to you in para 3B, CX 69308 and para 3 CX 69622.[2] We anticipate increased activity by infiltrated Communist agents attempting to further this unrest. It is also believed that the release of the CIs can be accomplished without materially affecting the present crisis within the ROK govt.

4. In addition to the advantages outlined above, the release of approximately 27,000 CIs would materially reduce the logistic burden of the military and free vitally needed overhead personnel for other duties.

5. The timing and general plan for the release of the CIs will be furnished you before actual release begins.

---

[2] Neither of these telegrams, dated May 30 and June 4, is printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tabs 151 and 20, respectively).

6. Although I consider the decision to release CIs within my province, in view of the effect such action might have on the armistice negotiations, request your views soonest.[3]

---

[3] The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this proposal in principle on June 10, 1952 in JCS 910811 to Clark (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 82).

795.00/6-552

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman [1]

SECRET PUSAN, June 5, 1952.

I wish to thank Your Excellency for the messages transmitted to me through the US Embassy and, in reply, I wish to inform Your Excellency that the current political disturbance here is not as serious as a small group of opponents of the Government are endeavoring to make it appear. There was a disturbance resulting from a series of demonstrations but since the Government took a firm stand in enforcing the law and order it has been quieted down.

There is still some danger of recurrence of collision between the general public and the National Assemblymen, some of whom insist on electing the President by themselves in contravention of a nationwide demand to elect the President by a direct popular ballot.

The people have firmly and clearly demonstrated their unanimous will through their mass meetings, in which they passed resolutions signed by nearly all the voting population of the nation demanding the dissolution of the Assembly, piles of which have been accumulating during the last three months. Besides, all of the provincial legislatures south of the present battlefront have likewise submitted resolutions emphasizing on, among other things, the dissolution of the National Assembly. The Govt, deriving its power solely from the will of the people realizes, therefore, its duty to carry out the mandate of the entire nation. I am still seeking, however, to meet the situation without going to that extent. I assure Your Excellency that I am still hopeful that we may succeed in it.

I share with you the concern of the whole free world that "the great sacrifices in blood and treasure" shall not have been made in vain here in Korea. This is precisely why it is extremely important to our Allies, as well as to ourselves, that this administration succeeds in achieving a more democratic, representative form of government.

---

[1] Rhee requested that the American Embassy in Pusan transmit this message to Truman and that the Department of State furnish a copy to the Korean Embassy in Washington. The letter was sent in telegram 1290 from Pusan, June 5, 1952, and was repeated for information to CINCUNC, EUSAK, EUSAK Advance, and UNCACK. For the text of Truman's letter to Rhee dated June 2, see p. 285.

I humbly beseech you to be a little more patient with us while we properly settle this problem, thereby proving that the principles of democracy can be upheld and representative government placed upon a firmer basis.

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE [2]

---

[2] On June 5, Secretary Acheson left Rhee's letter with President Truman with the advice that it did not call for a reply since Muccio had already been instructed as to how he should represent the President's views to Rhee. Acheson noted that Truman was pleased that as a result of his message to Rhee the South Korean President at least had been given "some pause" (memorandum of conversation with President Truman, by Secretary Acheson, June 5, 1952; 795.00/6–552).

695A.0024/6–652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1952.

Subject: Ambassador Panikkar's Action in Peiping on Prisoner of War Issue

Participants:
- Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. D. A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Mr. Tomlinson today informed me of a message from the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi which confirmed that Panikkar had transmitted the first Eden rough draft formula on prisoners of war to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at Peking,[1] with a prefatory statement to the effect that the GOI was maintaining close contact with other governments to evolve a formula on the prisoner-of-war issue which might meet the point of view of the Chinese Communist Government. (According to the telegram it appeared that Panikkar's prefatory statement could well be interpreted by the Chinese as indicating that the formula had the approval of the UK and possibly even the US Governments.) In addition, Panikkar had entirely on his own initiative put forward the suggestion that the rescreening of prisoners of war take place in some "neutral territory" and in reply to the Vice Minister's question had suggested Kaesong. Panikkar pointed out that this part of his proposal did not commit the Government of India and that it had not been seen by any other government.

---

[1] In a memorandum of conversation, by the Counselor of the Embassy in New Delhi, transmitted to the Department of State as despatch 2968 from New Delhi, June 5, 1952, Counselor Drumright passed on the following information which he received from the acting British High Commissioner: "The Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs had indicated that he personally felt that the five-point approach might have some chance of acceptance, but it would have to be considered by Chou En-lai." (795.00/6–552)

. . . .

Mr. Tomlinson stated that comments of the Foreign Office had not yet been received and that he would get in touch with me again as soon as they came in.

Mr. Tomlinson and I agreed that this action by Panikkar appeared to have greatly diminished prospects for any constructive use of the Government of India channel for arriving at any resolution of the POW question.

795.00/6-1052: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, June 10, 1952—5:10 p. m.
PRIORITY

913. For Hickerson (UNA). Suggestion by Kennan in Moscow's No. 1966, June 9,[1] that Dept consider "discreet, informal contacts" with Sov re Korean armistice tends to confirm my own feeling discussed with you June 5 that such contacts carefully studied and timed might be productive and in any event would serve to establish record of effort which would be potentially useful in future negots with our Allies. Such contacts, made here or in Moscow, should safeguard two tactical principles: (1) Avoid direct or indirect commitment on our part, and (2) leave Sov easy exit so that they would, as Kennan suggests, be in a position to assure China in case of leaks or queries that they have had no discussions with us.

Possible methods of approach for Dept's consideration might be: (1) Leading Malik (possibly at his SC dinner this month) into very general conversation on Korea during course of which POW subject could be raised in most casual manner, further conversation on issue being subject to response, if any, from him; or (2) similar approach to Zinchenko at Malik dinner; or (3) discussion in Moscow.

As to (3), I am of course not in position to make suggestions as to how or when suitable opportunity might arise or be created.

Advantage of courses (1) or (2) would be: (*a*) Contact would be of routine and "natural" character, and (*b*) any interesting development could be promptly followed up in similar routine manner.

GROSS

---

[1] Not printed (795.00/6–952).

Editorial Note

On June 10, 1952, Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, suggested to President Truman that a military commission of neutral nations be asked to observe treatment of prisoners held by the United Nations in Korea. The President thought the idea had merit and asked the Secretary of Defense to implement the plan. When Secretary Acheson learned of the decision over the radio, he immediately warned Truman that the invitations to the suggested neutral nations—Sweden, Switzerland, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia—would be declined. (See the memorandum by Allison, page 405.) Acheson's appraisal was right and the scheme came to nothing. Secretary Acheson later wrote that the President's approval of Russell's plan was "one of the very few instances when the President did not consult me on a matter of foreign policy." See *Present at the Creation,* page 655, for Acheson's comments and *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953,* pages 414–415, for Russell's letter to Truman and the President's memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.

795.00/6–1252: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, June 12, 1952—7:47 p. m.

CX 50050. References: A. JCS 910484.[2] B. JCS 910520.[3] C. CX 68858.[4] D. C 69351.[5] This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

1. Although we have carefully analyzed reference A, and although we recognize that the concept of rescreening by neutral nations may offer a possible chance to obtain a successful armistice, I consider it imperative that such action does not jeopardize the early completion of the initial screening program which was interrupted by the violent action of certain compound leaders on Koje-Do.

2. I am proceeding as rapidly as possible to achieve uncontested control of Koje-Do in accordance with the plan as set forth in reference C

---

[1] Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

[2] Dated June 5, p. 310.

[3] In this telegram, dated June 5, the JCS informed Clark of the recent Indian-Chinese discussions on the POW question in Peking and sent him the text of the Eden draft formula for a settlement of the issue with the U.S. Government's suggested revisions (795.00/6–2852).

[4] Dated May 22, p. 219.

[5] Dated May 31, p. 270.

and initiated on 10 June. However, I consider the maintenance of law and order on Koje-Do after the completion of this operation, using the minimum of guard personnel, to be dependent upon the removal of the anti-Communists from the Communist compounds. Experience has shown that the number of incidents in compounds containing POWs with like political beliefs is much lower than in compounds with inmates of mixed political beliefs. Our completion of the initial screening of all POWs and CIs as soon as practicable has the following additional advantages:

a. In case the Communists agree to an armistice on the basis of the 28 April proposal, we will be prepared to execute immediate exchange with final rosters prepared on the basis of the completed screening. We cannot do this now.

b. We will have a final accurate figure of the number to be repatriated which we can justify, whereas we are now vulnerable to an attack on our 70,000 figure (even as an estimate) since only about 39,000 of the 70,000 have been selected for repatriation through a proper individual screening.

c. After the completion of initial screening the conduct of any rescreening could be executed with less chance of violence because the hardcore Communist POWs and CIs would not be involved.

d. Does not appear to jeopardize the possibility of obtaining agreement on a bilateral rescreening by neutrals nor of completing a unilateral rescreening program.

e. If the completion of screening results in a figure appreciably higher than 70,000, there is a slight possibility that the Communists may agree to the revised figure.

3. I consider the foregoing advantages to completing the initial screening are over-riding and require that this operation be completed without delay before the question of rescreening can prevent such action being taken. Accordingly, I intend to accomplish screening of the individuals in the unscreened compounds at the earliest possible date after uncontested control is gained. I have directed the immediate preparation of careful plans for the completion of the initial screening with particular reference to the essential precautions which must be taken to avoid the charge of forced screening.

4. In view of the above, I strongly recommend that I be given authority at a time of my choosing to complete the screening program for POWs and CIs who have not been screened to date. Considering our previous exchange of messages resulting in agreement to discontinue screening, I feel it necessary to secure your approval of this program. I further recommend that the action on the neutral rescreening concept not be allowed to interfere with the completion of screening.

Part 2.

1. We can see no cogent objection to a rescreening by or under the observation of a group of neutral nations of those POWs who have stated that they would violently resist repatriation, provided we are

able and permitted to first accomplish an initial screening of all POWs for reasons as stated in part 1. The proposed rescreening might assist in obtaining an armistice. Once initial screening is completed and we have a firm, final figure of those to be repatriated, any rescreening of non-repatriates might increase our final figure and hence the concept might be acceptable to the Communists because all advantage of rescreening accrues to them. If a rescreening of non-repatriates produces a material increase in the number of pro-Communist POWs, we might expect some criticism of our initial screening from Allies and the US public. However, I do not consider that this can offset the advantage of securing an armistice.

2. The likelihood of Communist acceptance of any rescreening by a group of neutral nations as a basis for an armistice is doubtful. I believe that in reality the Communists are fully aware that we were impartial in our screening and that the current figure of approximately 70,000 is generally valid. They must also realize that a rescreening, even conducted by or under a group of neutral nations, will still leave an impressive number of POWs who will violently resist repatriation. Their propaganda and moral defeat would still remain an ugly fact in their eyes. Further, they have repeatedly declared the very act of screening to be illegal and unacceptable. While I believe they are more influenced by figures than principles, their constant denunciations of the screening concept has placed them in a more and more uncompromising position from which they will find it progressively more difficult to extricate themselves. If the Communists agree to participate in any manner in any rescreening program, I would consider that an armistice was imminent.

3. Part I H of reference A, further amplified in reference B, sets forth a possible means of achieving an armistice via diplomatic and circuitous channels. Since these means are outside the scope of my command and progress may be long delayed, I have not considered them in developing my proposed plan. I believe it better to develop as sound a procedure as possible within the means and facilities available to us, while at the same time keeping such plans flexible enough so that any adjustment can be made to fit into developments which might arise from unofficial diplomatic representation to the Chinese Government.

4. Part II of reference A leaves some question in my mind as to whether the composition of the group of neutral nations to accomplish the rescreening would be determined bilaterally or unilaterally. Reference B indicates that such a group would be determined bilaterally. I feel that this is dependent upon whether the rescreening is to be accomplished under the observation of the group of neutral nations or by such a group. A bilateral agreement as to the neutral nations to conduct or observe the rescreening will be more palatable to the Communists. If a bilateral agreement on neutral nations to participate in the rescreening

is to be sought, I consider that we must be prepared to accept the enemy's nomination of Communist nations. However, I would strongly oppose the acceptance of Russia. In this connection it might be better to refer to the nations concerned as non-participating rather than neutral. I believe, rather than have the armistice delegation introduce the subject of specific neutral nations across the conference table and then attempt to secure bilateral agreement, that prior diplomatic representation would probably avoid long discussion and delay and allow us to better maintain our firm position in plenary session.

5. The participation of Communist-dominated countries as members of the group of neutral nations to accomplish the rescreening directly affects my opinion as to whether such rescreening should be accomplished by them or only under their observation. If accomplished by them with Communist-dominated countries as members, it would afford them many opportunities to delay, obstruct, and influence the rescreening process. If accomplished under the observation of a neutral group such opportunities would not exist. I believe that we should attempt to secure Communist agreement for the rescreening to be only observed by the group of neutral nations. Further, I believe that we should resist efforts by our Allies which would permit any Communist-dominated country to participate in the rescreening other than as an observer. If the Communists fail to agree to participate in any rescreening, and if participating nations are non-Communist-dominated, it would then be preferable for the rescreening to actually be conducted by the group of neutral nations and observed by members of the United Nations Command.

6. In view of the foregoing, I propose that our plans to accomplish rescreening by a group of neutral nations proceed along the lines set forth below. Each successive proposal contributes less to the achievement of an armistice but tends to increase the support of our Allies for our position. The Communists may construe these steps to be a recession from our present position. Rescreening, however conducted, should provide for observation throughout by ICRC.

a. After prior diplomatic agreement, if all possible has been obtained on specific neutral nations to accomplish the rescreening, propose in plenary session that a group of neutral nations to observe the rescreening be determined on a bilateral basis; that the rescreening to establish the validity of resultant number of persons to be repatriated be accomplished under the observation of the group of neutral nations; that prior to initiating the rescreening both sides agree in advance to abide by results, and that upon the conclusion of the rescreening both sides conclude the armistice on basis of results and on agreements thus far achieved on other issues; that with the foregoing understanding, a cease fire be executed prior to initiating of rescreening; that Military Armistice Commission and neutral nations supervisory personnel be assembled, organized and prepared to function upon signing of the armistice;

and, that representatives of the Chinese Communist and North Korean Army Forces and members of the UNC observe the rescreening. There would have to be a definite understanding as to the terms of the "cease fire." The agreement might well include provision for the repatriation, prior to determination of results of rescreening, of those POWs of both sides who have indicated that they desire to be repatriated, such repatriation to be based on rosters to be exchanged prior to concluding the agreement to abide by results. Although the term rescreening has been employed above, the agreement would be couched in such terms as to insure that the group of neutral nations would screen the POWs of both sides who have stated they would resist repatriation. Such is deemed necessary to insure the return of the maximum number of United Nations POWs being held by the Communists. The same provisions to insure the safe return of United Nations POWs might be desirable in the proposal as set forth in the following subparagraph.

b. If the Communists fail to agree to the foregoing, we would then make the proposal set forth in 6*a* above, but excluding that portion pertaining to any agreements to abide by the results of the rescreening, to the cease fire, and to the organization and establishment of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

c. If the Communists fail to agree to either of the foregoing, we would inform them that we are proceeding with the rescreening of those individuals who have stated they would forcibly resist repatriation, that this rescreening is to be conducted by a group of neutral nations (such as Switzerland, Sweden, India), and that representatives of the Chinese Communists and North Korean Army Forces would be welcome to observe the rescreening.

d. We would then proceed on a specified date to initiate the rescreening with or without representatives of the Chinese Communist and North Korean Army Forces present. This would be conducted by the group of neutral nations and not just under their observation.

7. If the rescreening were conducted in accordance with the procedures as set forth in either paragraphs 6*b, c,* or *d* above, the new firm figure of POWs to be repatriated to the Communists would be supplied to them as soon as available. This figure would be submitted to them in the manner as set forth in paragraph 6*b* of reference D. The support of the public and our Allies for the United Nations Command position would have to be evaluated at this time to determine if delivery of the figure should be accompanied by an implied threat of a unilateral recess. This same factor would determine if we would at a later time unilaterally recess in the manner as set forth in paragraph 6*c* of reference D.

8. In presenting the proposal as set forth in paragraph 6, I feel that the following additional comments are pertinent:

a. There is some security risk in allowing the neutral nations, sponsored by the enemy, to enter the rear areas and to visit POW camps while the war is still in progress. This concession might allow communication and contact with subversive pro-Communist elements in our rear, both in and out of our prisoner of war camps.

b. The proposal as set forth in paragraphs 6*b* and *c* might be accepted by the Communists. Such a proposal might afford us some initial propaganda advantage. However, I consider their acceptance of such would be primarily to secure material for their propaganda machine rather than a real interest in the validity of the screening.

c. Allowing representatives of the armed forces of the enemy in our rear areas, with no real indication of an armistice (as would be the case in proposal as set forth in paragraphs 6*b* and *c*) is, I believe, without precedent, and such concession might be employed by the Communists in their propaganda campaign.

9. I consider that there is a marginal advantage in having a neutral nation rather than the UNC itself initiate any proposal to accomplish a rescreening of the POWs by a group of neutral nations. Prior assurances of cooperation of other collaborating neutral nations and Communist-dominated nations should be secured before such a proposal is made by a neutral nation. Such a procedure would, in addition to avoiding long, drawn-out arguments between the United Nations Command and the Communists in present armistice sessions, also provide a means of testing their reaction to such a proposal and might provide some slight aspects of "face saving" for the Communists if they should elect to propose such a rescreening themselves. After such a proposal has been initiated by a neutral nation, a reasonable length of time should be allowed for the Communists to propose such in the armistice meetings. If they fail to do so, the United Nations Command Delegation would then propose such in the sequence as set forth in paragraph 6*c* above.

10. We are constantly seeking possible courses of action which may be employed in future negotiations. Will advise you of any courses of action which we consider practical.

795.00/6–1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PUSAN, June 12, 1952—11 p. m.
PRIORITY

1350. Rptd info CINCUNC (personal for Gen Clark), EUSAK Advance (personal for Gen Van Fleet) as DIP 320 by other means. Re Deptel 941, June 10.[1]

I have just spent the most futile hour with Pres Rhee I have ever spent with him.

---

[1] In this telegram, the Department of State instructed Muccio to inform UNCURK, Rhee, and the leaders of the National Assembly that the U.S. Government supported the UNCURK letter of June 7, which reiterated its request to lift martial law and to release those Assemblymen under arrest, and which called for a "political holiday" of ten days during which efforts to reach an agreement between the ROK executive and legislature could be made (795B.00/6–952). A text of the UNCURK letter is in UN document A/2187, pp. 16–17.

Upon arrival by appointment at my request, I mentioned my concern over the posters throughout the city damning foreigners for interfering in Korean affairs. Pres Rhee said he would not have Koreans take such a stand against "the hand that was feeding". He immediately called the chief of his palace guard, Capt Kim and spoke heatedly to him in Korean. The Pres then went on to say that he understood special police precautions had been placed about foreign installations and residences. (I had expressed surprise of need for this to Lee Bum-Suk and to Paik Ta-Chin previous day). He said that was very repugnant to Min and asked me to notify him personally at once of any such acts so that he might correct them.

I then conveyed to him the first para of ref tel re US support of UNCURK's ltr of June 7. This touched him off on one of the most irrational explosions I have ever had to endure:—He said Pres Truman and the Amer Govt had been too drastic and did not understand his noble purposes, went into heated detail about UNCURK's interference and leakages to press, claimed he was alone, cld not depend on anyone, world was against him, he was tired, hoped successor wld do better, needed a rest and then most fervently described the plot to take over govt and make a deal with the Communists.

The Pres was so completely irrational, that it is impossible to make detailed summary of his wanderings.

I left with impression he was both physically and mentally exhausted and did not know to whom to turn. He made vague references to turning things over to someone or other and seeing whether they cld do better.

In the six days since my return, I have been forced to the conclusion that we cannot expect effective leadership from Pres Rhee. There is no question in my mind that he is absolutely convinced of a plot against him and Korea. I feel strongly that the "Lee Bum-Suk" group has practically taken Rhee over completely. Our main immediate problem is to thwart the Lee Bum-Suk group from taking over. This group is now finalizing its control over the police—it has the martial law Commander Gen Won in its camp—and has made certain moves towards the Korean army, thus far unsuccessfully in the latter field.

I am keeping in very close touch with the chairman of UNCURK and Gen Van Fleet. I am still doing everything possible to impress upon all Koreans I know the need for some sort of satisfactory solution to the present crucial situation. This is merely a prelim report to forewarn of the probability of a precipitous deterioration of the situation here which may even be in the form of a violent forceful move to eliminate all opposition at any time, by Lee Bum-Suk acting ostensibly in the name of Rhee.

Attempts at clarification of four questions posed by the Dept [2] will be made in separate message.

MUCCIO

---

[2] In telegram 941 to Pusan, June 10, the Department of State asked Muccio four questions concerning the internal situation in Korea: 1) Was it certain Rhee would accept and not oppose the National Assembly's choice for President other than himself if his amendment for direct election was first passed; 2) or would he insist on direct election and declare null and void the Assembly election of his successor; 3) did Rhee envision direct election in 1956 or before; and 4) what was the status of a compromise amendment proposed by the ROK Prime Minister (reported in telegram 1259 from Pusan, June 3, p. 293) (795B.00/6-952).

795.00/6-1352

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1952.

Subject: Continuing Political Crisis in Korea

We continue to be concerned about developments in Pusan. President Rhee, instead of being chastened by protests and *démarches,* persists in his disregard for the ROK constitution and democratic processes, for world opinion and for the views of the United States and the United Nations. He has, in effect, rejected President Truman's protest of the other day.[2] He has proceeded to make clear publicly that he will dissolve the Assembly in the very near future unless the Assembly capitulates to him. Instead of calling off the demonstrations in Pusan he has issued a statement which, in effect, invites the demonstrators, cautioning them only to wait for his signal.

Ambassador Muccio's report on his conversation with President Rhee upon the Ambassador's return to Korea reveals no basis for optimism that President Rhee will be deflected from his present course. It is little encouragement that Ambassador Muccio believes that President Rhee will probably not dissolve the Assembly for a few days.

We are convinced that the interests of the United States and of the United Nations require that Rhee be prevented from achieving his goal in violation of the ROK constitution and of democratic processes. The United States was the prime mover in bringing constitutional democracy to Korea. We brought the Korean problem into the United Nations and made Korea, in effect, a ward of the United Nations. When aggression came, we called for United Nations action and have made great sacrifices to safeguard the Republic of Korea. Our association with the ROK is such that whether we take effective action or refrain from taking action we will not escape a major share of the responsibility for what happens.

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Allison, Johnson, and Nitze.

[2] Hickerson is presumably referring to Rhee's reply, June 5, p. 316, to Truman's letter of June 2, p. 285.

Already the governments and peoples of United Nations Members participating in the Korean action, many of whom have been highly suspicious of President Rhee, are asking whether it is this for which they have been sacrificing. The American people are raising the same question—including those whose sons have fought in Korea. If Rhee succeeds the United States will be constantly embarrassed in the future by the character of Rhee's conduct, and the Communists will have a rich source of material for attacking the United States and the free world generally. The blot on the record of the United Nations action in Korea will affect any future attempt to obtain United Nations action to resist aggression. It will also impair the position of the free world as an exponent of democratic government, particularly in Japan.

Within the United Nations we will have the following: a very damaging UNCURK report; continuing Communist propaganda attacks; pressure in certain countries to withdraw forces from Korea, and certainly to prevent the contribution of any further forces; increased difficulty in obtaining contributions for UNCURK; greater reluctance, in case there is no armistice, for obtaining additional measures such as a United Nations embargo or blockade; lack of support for the Rhee Government in any plan for a unified Korea after an armistice; and little support for ROK membership in the United Nations.

If the present crisis is to be resolved in a manner consistent with US-UN interests, as well as of the Korean people, the first, essential and immediate step must be the restoration of constitutional government. A "Compromise", forced on an unwilling Assembly through martial law and threats to the persons of the Assemblymen, would be essentially capitulation to Rhee and a blow to US-UN interests and prestige in Korea. Only after constitutional government has been restored should steps be taken, in accordance with Ambassador Muccio's present instructions, to get the factions together, with the aid of the United States and of UNCURK, to seek an arrangement which would assure stability as well as democratic government in Korea.

We therefore urge that:

1. Supplementary instructions should be sent to Ambassador Muccio instructing him to call upon President Rhee immediately to lift martial law, to release members of the Assembly and to restore constitutional government. Ambassador Muccio should state that if President Rhee fails to do so, a grave situation would arise which, in the view of the United States Government, would endanger the United Nations action in Korea and would have to be dealt with accordingly.

2. If Rhee complies and democratic processes are restored and the Assembly allowed to meet freely without fear, Ambassador Muccio should, in cooperation with UNCURK, continue efforts to bring about a compromise solution consistent with the principles of representative

government and with the interests of the Korean people, of the United States and of the United Nations.

3. We should discuss with other participating nations and with UNCURK the steps which might be taken if Rhee refuses to restore constitutional government, proceeds with further arrests of the Assembly, and presses ahead with his plans to dissolve the Assembly. If UNCURK and the other participating nations approve such a course, we should, as a last resort to prevent Rhee from gaining his ends, instruct General Clark to assume responsibility for the situation in Pusan, and through use of Korean forces under Korean command, to take over martial law in the Pusan area and assure the continued safety and effective operation of the National Assembly. Such action should be designed to create conditions which would allow a fair compromise between the opposing factions.

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Korean Internal Political Situation"

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1952.

Subject: General Approach and Possible Active Steps to Meet the Korean Internal Political Crisis.

The Korean internal situation gives the superficial appearance of simmering down since the President's message to Rhee[1] caused him to hold off dissolving the National Assembly. However, there are no indications that any diplomatic or political representations have actually deflected Rhee and his followers from reaching their target of reducing the Assembly to impotence and gaining complete ascendancy over the Republic of Korea. On the contrary, there are disturbing signs that Rhee will win his struggle by devious means, despite our admonitions. His so-called compromise formula may not be a compromise at all, since it could serve to emasculate the Assembly. Rhee's agents persist in going after the opposition by individual attrition. Lee Bum Suk is still striving to take over the ROK armed forces. Even so, these trends lack the surface sharpness of last week's direct assault on the Assembly. With the situation temporarily blurred, while Rhee plays for time, it is more difficult, and perhaps too late, to take decisive steps. Nevertheless, the present stage may only be the calm before the storm. A chief executive must be elected within the next 60 days—that is unalterable. Anything can happen in that time. The crisis hangs on at the breaking point. We must prepare for any contingency. This memorandum discusses the various conflicting possibilities of a policy of aloofness versus a policy of intervention.

---

[1] Dated June 2, p. 285.

THE POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION

Favorable Aspects

In terms of traditional United States policy and the desirability of not over-extending our commitments, the policy of non-intervention in the crisis has much to be said for it.

(1) It would avoid the inevitable involvement of American troops in an internal political affair in Asia, which the Koreans might openly resist, the Communists would intensively exploit, and other nations in Asia might severely criticize.

(2) A policy of aloofness would not implicate us on behalf of any particular Korean group or personality; it would leave the resolution of the crisis to the Koreans themselves in the hope that they will work out their own problems somehow. Rhee's victory might actually stabilize the political situation for the next few months, at least superficially. In any event, there are limits beyond which Rhee cannot go in bending the Korean Government and its people to his purposes. He is limited on the military side by the threat of Communist aggression and his written and oral commitments to the United Nations Command not to interfere with the disposition of Korean armed forces. He must realize his long-run dependence on the influence and resources of the governments now supporting the Republic of Korea.

(3) Any policy of intervention may be impracticable in view of the military burdens which the United Nations Command is already carrying or threatened with.

(4) In the long run, this crisis may be merely one of a series that the United States will have to put up with. We should not attempt to settle each hyper-instability which occurs.

(5) Finally, we must not overlook the remote possibility that active intervention in internal Korean affairs would dovetail into any Communist design, to distract and disburse our available ground forces in the Far East Command by the threat of an imminent major offensive, riotous outbreaks of Communist prisoners of war on Koje-do, sabotage and organized violence in Japan, and exploitation of political dissension within the Republic of Korea.

Unfavorable Aspects

On the other hand, NA believes that the immediate and long-range dangers of taking no effective action greatly offset the advantages of this policy. NA believes that, if we let nature take its course in Korea, the United States will be in an exceedingly difficult situation.

Reactions inside South Korea. Unless the political crisis abates and some honest compromise is reached in the near future, success in Rhee's efforts will permit the most corrupt, incompetent and unreliable coterie of Rhee's politicians to seize power. Rhee will probably not be able to unsaddle Lee Bum Suk and the others, once they have full control over the main elements of power. This clique is not popular, will alienate important government circles, and has no ability to govern. Rhee's political opposition will go underground where it will be, to an increasing extent, amenable to Communist exploitation because of

Rhee's personal dictatorship. Of even graver import will be the development of intense dissension within the armed forces and the efforts of President Rhee and Lee Bum Suk to weed out politically uncertain, but capable, generals, who would then be replaced by loyal, and in many cases, incompetent officers. Thus, Rhee's victory, if we let him run his course, will create seething dissension and will probably lead to violent reaction by his opponents and governmental breakdown. The effects of such a stoppage or breakdown in supporting the United Nations Command behind the lines in Korea are only too obvious. For one thing, it might lead to the unfortunate need to establish military government over the Republic of Korea. Finally, the Rhee–Lee regime would give the Chinese Nationalist officials a good deal more influence on the peninsula of Korea than is now the case and perhaps more within the Republic of Korea than the United States itself would have in spite of its huge military resources protecting the Republic.

Communist Reactions. Another possible danger of the Korean internal crisis is the excuse it might give the pro-war faction among the Chinese and North Korean Communists to launch a major offensive now, in view of the armistice stalemate and the build-up of Communist air and ground strength—provided, of course, Moscow permits. A more immediate and probable Communist reaction would be stepped-up exploitation by the Communist underground of political tensions within South Korea. There is already some evidence from North Korea that the Korean Communists are beginning to pay increased attention to the South Korean internal situation. While Rhee's allegations of a Communist conspiracy may have been chiefly for purposes of screening his own attempts to throttle his opposition, the political tensions within the Republic of Korea may be developing in orthodox pattern of Leninist theory: a so-called revolutionary situation, ripe for Communist takeover, is in the making with a "reactionary regime" supported by "imperialist powers" absolute control, the masses brow-beaten, the liberals impotent, frustrated and desperate. A policy of non-intervention would let this situation fester and ferment. The Communists would be the only benefactors.

International Effects. Whatever his proclaimed goals, the establishment of Rhee's personal dictatorship by such high-handed tactics would do immediate and lasting injury to the United States position in the Far East, which is our primary objective to advance. It would reduce real support for the United Nations operation in Korea, a most serious calamity. Our reputation and prestige among important Japanese circles would drop, while relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan would become even more seriously strained. In most of the rest of Asia, the United States would again be tarred with Rhee's brush, which in turn would detract from our moral and political position. The two most likely interpretations in Asia of Rhee's success would both be uncomplimentary to the United States; either the United States tacitly supported Rhee's seizure of complete power or the United States is incapable of coping with his defiance. In Europe, support for the United Nations operation and for the reconstruction of the Republic of Korea would diminish as a result of official and popular rejection of the Rhee regime.

Reactions on US Policies and Actions in Korea. US policy calls for the strengthening of Korean security forces as well as Korean political and economic institutions for the purpose of building increasing local strength to supplement the commitment of the US and its major allies. Every possible course of action in Korea includes a strong and stable Korean republic as a key element. A policy of aloofness would nullify this national policy.

Policy of Intervention. For all the above reasons the United States Government cannot permit political civil war in South Korea to jeopardize the collective effort to repel aggression or endanger military operations. Therefore, the United States Government and its principal Allies must take strong measures to end this crisis. Action or inaction will each have great effect on Korea. The degree of intervention will depend on the gravity of the situation at any given time.

I. *"Cease and Desist" Measures.*

For the immediate future every appropriate agency should continue to strengthen the efforts to date to hold Rhee and his followers back from making irrevocable steps that could only lead to bitter irreconcilable deadlock and disunity. We should capitalize on the effects of the President's message, on the principal interested governments' concern, on Ambassador Muccio meetings with Rhee, and on UNCURK. If these diplomatic representations do not influence Rhee to take satisfactory remedies, the United States Government should then use public media for adding pressure on Rhee. At the same time the US Embassy and UNCURK should work with both parties in this dispute to devise a compromise formula for an acceptable and workable reconciliation that will stabilize the political situation as soon as possible, without stifling the National Assembly as a "going concern."

II. *Pressure by Injunction and Sanctions.*

If it appears that the above efforts are failing or if Rhee takes some drastic action against his opponents, the UN and US should indicate to Korean leaders on both sides through informal advice that (*a*) UNKRA will withhold its economic reconstruction projects pending return to legal and democratic processes; (*b*) Various governments concerned will hold up or reconsider their financial contributions to UNKRA; (*c*) The US Government may do nothing about payments under the Economic Coordination Agreement pending clarification of the situation; and (*d*) The United States Government might further indicate that it is in no position to consider additional military assistance or security arrangements with the Republic of Korea until political stability, acceptable to the United States, is restored. The threat of such sanctions could be coupled with the intimation that the United States Government would provide technical and administrative assistance, as well as economic and military aid to the Republic of Korea, once stability is returned.

Using the Economic Coordination Agreement as a sanction is a questionable tactic that could easily boomerang. After careful study of this problem, NA strongly feels that we should take no *formal* action to delay formation of the Board or repayment of the initial check of some $35,000,000.[2] Such action would constitute a breach of the agreement and exchange of notes. It might do more harm in the long run than any immediate benefits might justify. However, NA also believes that it would be prudent temporarily to delay payment and organization of the Board ostensibly for some administrative reasons, which actually do exist. The Koreans would get the point; it is the money they want, not the Board. There is no legal basis for indefinitely postponing formation of the Economic Coordination Board unless the Unified Command takes the contradictory position that the ROK Government with which the agreement was negotiated is no longer the Government of the ROK, which in fact has not changed in two weeks. Also, there is no legal ground on which payment can be withheld. In all events, handling of this delay should be done skillfully, because it might expose the United States to a charge of violating an international obligation; lead to a ROK counter-sanction by cutting off the won advances to the United Nations Command which would create a serious emergency for it; and delay in implementing the Meyer agreements would be more grist for the hyper-inflation now gutting Korea. However, Congress and United States public opinion certainly would not understand giving $35,000,000 to Rhee a few days after President Truman says he is shocked by Rhee's actions.

III. *The Exercise of Protective Surveillance under UNC Auspices.*

If, despite all efforts to temper Rhee's campaign against his opponents, he takes irrevocable acts to snuff out the duly-elected Assembly as well as other opponents, and the situation in and around Pusan endangers the MSR [*MLR*?], the United States Government, with the support of its principal Allies, would have to take active corrective measures. For the basis of such action we might consider irrevocable acts by Rhee to consist of any of the following: (*a*) additional arrests of Assemblymen; (*b*) dissolution of the National Assembly; (*c*) prevention of its normal functioning through intimidation, threat of assassination or absence of Rhee's supporters from regularly held meetings; (*d*) organization of mass demonstrations in the Pusan area against the National Assembly; and (*e*) bi-elections to fill seats of Assemblymen under arrest or in hiding.

---

[2] By the terms of the Economic Coordination Agreement, a result of the Meyer Mission's negotiation with the ROK, the UNC agreed to settle all won advances made between Jan. 1 and May 31, 1952 at the existing conversion rate of 6,000 won to the dollar; for a summary of the agreement, see p. 238.

If Rhee refuses to make any move along the lines of reconciliation and continues his campaign against his opponents through high handed, illegal, and vicious tactics, we should instruct General Clark to support whatever actions are necessary to ensure the continued functioning of the Korean National Assembly and the safety of its members as well as the safety of President Rhee. In effect, we will have to act as an umpire to separate the two feuding parties so they do not tear the Government of the ROK apart. This would represent a grave decision for the United States to take. Only an advanced stage of a political crisis in Korea would justify it, such as a real jeopardy to the Pusan base area and the MSR. However, such a step would be necessary in order to protect the Command and maintain world support for the UNC mission against aggression.

In taking such steps, the auspices, conditions, and timing of such intervention would be terribly important. We must associate ourselves not only with UNCURK, but also with as many participating states as possible. Detailed consultations with at least the Commonwealth countries would be necessary. If they will not share the responsibility, we can hardly intervene. If at all possible, the administration of security in the Pusan area should be undertaken by reliable and well-trained Korean troops under Korean leadership with full support and endorsement of the Korean Chiefs of Staff, CINCUNC, and the Governments represented in his command. One method of surveillance might consist in the rotation of police units in the Pusan area. Another would be the use of ROK forces, now in training, as security patrols for the Pusan area, under the control of the Second Logistical Command, as General Lee,[3] ROKA Chief of Staff has suggested. At least, the chain of command should be reestablished from the ROKA Chief of Staff to all military officials having anything to do with martial law in Korea.

As to the legal aspects of such actions, it would appear tentatively, on preliminary advice from L, that legality is not relevant if martial law or police powers are exercised for reasons of military necessity, that is *force majeure.* UNC martial law should be avoided; instead the action should be considered the exercise of police powers or security control.

---

[3] No record of General Lee's suggestion has been found. In a meeting with President Rhee and Van Fleet on May 28, Lee made it clear to Rhee that he was opposed to use of the ROK Army for political purposes. Lee fully expected to be fired and perhaps even imprisoned for his opposition, and Rhee was prepared to replace him, but Van Fleet successfully insisted that such a move would be "absolutely unacceptable" to the United States (telegram 1178 from Pusan, May 28, 1952; 795B.00/5–2852).

Protective surveillance would be put into effect by a letter from Clark to Rhee on behalf of the United States, and by an order to General Lee and the Second Logistic Command. Extensive military and diplomatic preparations would be required.

IV. *Political Rehabilitation of the Korean Government.*

UNCURK and United States agencies should do everything possible at every stage in the Korean political crisis to encourage reconciliation among the opposing groups. To be worth anything, such reconciliation must start with *unreserved* respect for the constitutional framework of the Republic of Korea by all factions. The three most essential factors in any political rehabilitation are: the future status of President Rhee, the integrity of the National Assembly and the attitude of the Korean armed forces. If our policies in Korea are to mean anything, we must inevitably take a stand on each of those factors.

Rhee's Future

Our policy should be to circumscribe Rhee's position and eliminate the Lee–Yim–Yun trio.[4] If a program of political action is practical, we should either endorse Rhee's reelection after he has been politically sterilized or indicate support for some respectable alternative.

During the past six years, Rhee has eliminated many capable Korean leaders because of their opposition to him. His present terroristic raid on the National Assembly is merely the most high handed and dramatic episode in his obsessive drive to establish a personal machine which henceforth will stifle all opposition. It is hard not to conclude from his recent statements and actions that he is an incorrigible autocrat with little virtue or stature left to devote to the real welfare of his country, however redoubtable an anti-communist he is. By his obstinate assault on the legislature, he has deceived and maligned his friends who saved him from extinction. He is playing right into political bankruptcy and communist receivership.

The question of an alternative may be less important than the difficulty of finding an answer might imply. Let us recognize that there is now no national "brand" name to substitute for Rhee in the Republic of Korea. But let us also acknowledge that the need for a national figure, for another man with Rhee's national standing, or for Rhee himself, is not overriding. The important thing for the United States is the development of a healthy, constructive, stable regime in the Republic of Korea that can hold its own—with some well-placed props—in the years ahead against communist subversion. In that sense, it is high time we started thinking about alternatives, since nature, if not politics, will inevitably force that decision on the Koreans themselves. Right now, any alternative to the Rhee–Lee regime would be much less objectionable to our interests. If most of the civil and military leaders want to make a fresh start under new management, they should be encouraged to do so.

---

[4] The trio referred to was made up of Lee Bum Suk (Yi Pom Suk); presumably Louise Yim (Im Myong Shin), former ROK Cabinet minister; and Yun Kyong (Yun Ch'iyong).

There are difficulties in carrying out the above policy. The chief handicap is Rhee's control of the police and the provincial political machinery. However, these he might lose if CINCUNC can find ways to gain operational control over the national police and ensure the authority of the Korean Army Chief of Staff over martial law, if a government of "national patriotic unity" can be formed, and if the armed forces, the press, and the intellectuals unite. Rhee's grip would probably collapse if his henchmen were ousted from positions of control in the Government. Rhee's popular backing seems to be synthetic. Most of the rural masses are apathetic. If this analysis is correct, as DRF tentatively indicates, the control of "political machinery" may be only an apparent asset. In any test of strength with a new regime, the control of the governmental apparatus will determine the outcome. Rhee would have difficulty in sabotaging or frustrating an energetic and more competent successor.

He continues to defy the United Nations and the United States. Our efforts to date have merely modified his methods, and perhaps delayed his timing. We must carefully scrutinize Rhee's compromise plans. Any reconciliation that in effect cancels out his opposition will amount to a capitulation to Lee Bum Suk and his crowd. They will then be firmly in the saddle, with all that it unhappily implies for United States policies and prestige, particularly in the military field. They will move in to take over the Korean armed forces. United Nations support for the Republic of Korea will fade.

The National Assembly

Therefore, a program of political rehabilitation must begin with insistence on the integrity of the National Assembly because it has become the symbol of democratic processes and the rule of law in Korea. Admittedly, many of its members are incompetent and corrupt; some may be even subversive. The National Assembly probably has not handled its feud with Rhee too skillfully. It may not fully represent the "will of the people". However, its liquidation will lead to all of the inimical consequences discussed above. We must not be too sensitive over the substance of representative government in Korea in view of political realities there. However, the policies of the United States and the mission of the United Nations will be nullified if even the facade of representative government and due process of law are tramped on with impunity. These are the irreducible essentials for the United States and the United Nations in Korea. Their suspension is sheer mockery of a real effort at collective security.

Furthermore, the Assembly may die of attrition if it is not effectively defended on grounds of basic principles. The other nations of the world will be watching to see what happens. The United States and the UN must insist on the release of the Assemblymen and the guarantee of the Assembly's constitutional integrity as a condition for any compromise with Rhee.

The ROK Armed Forces

It is equally essential that Rhee and his followers not be allowed to infiltrate the ROK armed forces at any level with their stooges or incompetents. CINCUNC and the Ambassador must insist that Rhee leave these forces alone. As a recent G–2 summary has indicated, the leaders of the ROK armed forces appear to be solidly against Rhee's tactics. This is the most important asset we have in this crisis. Whatever political settlements are made, they should bear the endorsement of Korean military leaders. At the same time we should take care not to stimulate involvement of the ROK armed forces in politics, after General Van Fleet and KMAG have put so much successful effort into taking them out of politics.

In any event, if Rhee should rescind his letter of July [15] 1950[5] putting all ROK forces under UN operational control, we would be forced to intervene out of military necessity. Such an attempt on Rhee's part would constitute irrevocable, intolerable defiance of the UN, even though he is commander-in-chief of Korean forces. It is probable that Korean military leaders would ignore such an act and remain loyal to the UNC. Its threat to Korea's long term interest might serve as a pivotal rallying point for civilian and military leaders.

Constitutional Amendments

In theory there is merit in President Rhee's desire for a reformed governmental structure to make it more responsive to the views of the Korean people. A combination of various constitutional amendments might strengthen and stabilize the governmental process in Korea. The difficulty is not in drafting the terms of such an amendment, but in settling the underlying political issue: Is Rhee to remain in power or not? Until the Koreans resolve this dilemma, constitutional compromise is somewhat academic.

A Political Program

In summary, the United States, in its own interest, should encourage Korean efforts to (1) remove Lee Bum Suk and General Won, (2) install a competent Defense Minister, (3) reestablish an unbroken chain of command from CINCUNC through the ROK Chief of Staff to all military and police units, (4) develop a united cabinet and a national patriotic coalition for the duration of the war, and (5) formulate sound constitutional reforms to take effect after August 15, 1952. The United States should give full backing to such a program and be prepared to extend assistance of many kinds to an ROK government comprised of the above elements. The United States should support Rhee *only* if the above items are put into effect with his full cooperation. At some point he might conceivably reach out for a constructive program to save him from utter frustration and defeat at the end of his career. If such a program fails, Rhee continues his defiance, and disturbed conditions threaten the Pusan base area, the United States will have to resort to the ultimate measure of military government unless the situation becomes so chaotic with Koreans actually fighting themselves and UN forces that the UNC can not fulfill its mission. Although such a project is unlikely, and the establishment of a military government extremely distasteful, the Departments of State and Defense should continue to consult informally on tentative plans for UNC martial rule and interim government administered by Korean agencies to the greatest extent possible.

---

[5] On July 15, 1950, President Rhee assigned to General MacArthur command of the ROK armed forces. (UN document S/1627)

CONCLUSION

The justification for intervention rests on the intimate and unusual relationship among the United States, Republic of Korea and the United Nations since V-J day. This association has become so interlocked that we cannot disclaim all responsibility for the past or the future of the ROK. We are involved in whatever happens there. We would even be implicated in the establishment of a personal dictatorship, even though we might strongly disapprove of it.

795.00/6-1452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 14, 1952—8 p. m.

1371. Rptd info CINCUNC (personal for Ed [*Gen.*] Clark), EUSAK Advance (personal for Gen Van Fleet), Major Gen Herren as DIP 333 by other means.

During the past week we have succeeded in influencing Rhee only to the extent of preventing him from taking any irrevocable act.

He has not taken a single step towards conciliation or compromise and his full apparatus for cowing the Natl Assembly is running in full gear. I feel basic reason for his failure to be more impressed by serious concern of US and UN in ROK internal situation is his idea that the mil are not interested (unless open civil war occurs). If this critical situation here is to be brought in hand it is indispensable that we find means of convincing him that mil are as disturbed as civilians at course being pursued.

While mil operations may not be directly affected as the problem is bigger than that, whole mil effort in the near future and mil plans for more distant future can be very seriously undermined by continuing deterioration of situation here. Rhee shows no disposition to lift martial law or to permit Assembly to meet freely and without intimidation; he talks of more arrests and necessity to make big clean-up of Assembly before even considering compromise amendment; his goon squads remain active; demonstrations, started again this week, showing reaching crescendo of fervor with possibility serious incidents occurring any day. Despite Pres Truman's appeal, selected groups from provinces ("reps" of councils and so forth) have continued be brought to Pusan through Rhee's nationwide apparatus for demonstrations. In short, despite ceaseless pressure from foreign govts and foreign press Rhee seems determined to go ahead with his plans very much on lines mapped out several weeks ago.

In view foregoing I believe it is urgent to have: 1) Meeting between UNCURK and CINCUNC; 2) Discussion re steps to be taken if public disorders leading to bloodshed occur in Pusan and 3) Joint appeal to Rhee earliest possible date by Gens Clark and Van Fleet and myself. On this end, I am suggesting that Gens Clark and Van Fleet meet with UNCURK and myself in Pusan Monday June 16 if possible.

MUCCIO

FE files, lot 55 D 338: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 16, 1952—5 p. m.

DIP 342. Rptd Gen Van Fleet. Dept for info. Reur CX 50221, June 15.[2]

1. I recognize statements made by you and Gen Van Fleet have supported US and UN positions as presented by polit reps. I recognize also validity your stand, supported by State and Defense Depts, that this is

---

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to the Department of State as telegram 1382. The source text is the copy from the Department of State files.

[2] In this telegram to the JCS, Clark stated that he did not believe he or Van Fleet should actively participate in pressing Rhee and until the situation deteriorated to the point where military operations might be placed in jeopardy, he felt that no direct threat of UNC military actions should be made or implied (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413). A separate note, Johnson to Allison, was attached to the Department file copy of telegram 1382 from Pusan which referred to this cable by Clark; it read: "There is also a tel[egram] from Clark (Emmons has) to JCS saying he doesn't want to get mixed up in this. I've tried unsuccessfully to get Frank Nash. I think he must be disabused of [the] idea that Rhee is not deriving much encouragement from his (Clark's) apparent aloofness. I asked Emmons to draft and show to you [a] tel[egram] that we think Defense shld send in reply to Clark's incoming."

still diplomatic phase and shld be handled through dipl channels as mil opinions [*operations*?] not yet directly affected.

2. As I tried to point out in Embtel 1371, June 14 [3] serious misconception of views of Gen Van Fleet and yourself has unfortunately been created in Rhee's mind. This may be intentional distortion fabricated for his own purposes but I think it more likely in view peculiar lapses his memory lately that he is actually convinced your interest so remote that he in effect need not worry on that score.

3. I feel there is imminent possibility of further deterioration in situation, e.g., more arrests, dissolution of Assembly, public disorders, or even breakdown in Rhee's health, leading to great confusion and possible takeover by Yi Pom Suk. (Rhee has been under terrific strain and shows signs physical and mental weakening.) Therefore to prepare for such eventualities I suggested advisability mtg with you (thinking you were still in Korea) and Gen Van Fleet and UNCURK to discuss possible courses should we precipitously be forced to go beyond diplomatic phase. I still believe we shld do so at your earliest convenience.

4. As to my point (3) in Embtel 1371, I had no intention bringing you and Gen Van Fleet into active participation "with the political reps in the application of pressure brought to bear on Rhee". I suggested joint appeal to Rhee, mainly for the purpose of straightening out in his mind (preferably in presence of Yi Pom Suk) the misconception referred to in para 2 above. I still am convinced that even slight moderation at this time in Rhee's adamant stand would go great deal towards making compromise possible. I am further convinced that such an appeal from you and/or Gen Van Fleet will have much more effect, at this stage, than anything I or UNCURK may do. Its effect on Rhee's decisions and on those of his chief henchman may spell the difference between success or failure in our efforts to get an acceptable solution.

5. I had opportunity to discuss these matters briefly with Gen Van Fleet today. He told me of your heavy schedule and commitments this week and I now suggest that appeal to Rhee be made by Gen Van Fleet alone and without any publicity. It would be in same friendly, personal vein that Van Fleet uses so well with the old man. The lines I hope he might follow would be approx as fols:

a. Outline mil situation.

b. Appeal for use of Rhee's great influence and unique leadership towards bringing unity among Koreans. He cld do so if he wld.

c. Point out that US had always looked to Rhee for leadership . . .[4] in spite of Rhee's idea that we are against him . . . that US still looks to continuation of Rhee's constructive leadership now and in future.

---

[3] *Supra.*

[4] The ellipses in this paragraph appeared in the source text.

d. Express concern that numerous anti-foreign gestures (posters, handbills, speeches) appearing past week may have harmful effect on UN forces.

e. Refer to impressions gained in previous interviews (May 27 and June 2)[5] that all wld be straightened out within few weeks. Point out that crisis continues without showing signs of abating or solution.

f. Point out that mil operations are adversely effected not only by direct effects on disposition of troops and public disorders but by other indirect developments. Continuing rumors and partial info reaching the ROK Army will not be helpful to its morale. Internatl reactions, both in the press and in official quarters, have already been such as to affect internatl good will towards ROK Govt. Effects on further mil contributions by foreign nations cannot be estimated at this stage but unless quick solution is reached in way that will be acceptable to foreign public opinion, foreign support for war effort and for Korean security forces in future is bound to be affected.

6. I hope you will approve this suggestion. The need to discuss the matters mentioned in para 3 above still remains urgent and I hope you will authorize Gen Van Fleet and/or Maj Gen Herren to discuss them with UNCURK and myself if you yourself are unavailable.

Muccio

---

[5] For reports of these meetings between Clark and Rhee, see telegrams 1170 from Pusan, May 27, and 1243 from Pusan, June 3, pp. 252 and 287, respectively.

611.95A241/6-1852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)

SECRET [Washington,] June 18, 1952.

Subject: Panikkar's Discussion with Chou En-lai on the question of Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

Participants: Mr. D. A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director

Mr. Greenhill came in on another matter and then asked whether Mr. Allison or Mr. Johnson could see him since he had some news of importance concerning Panikkar's discussion with Chou En-lai on the repatriation of prisoners of war. Since neither Mr. Allison nor Mr. Johnson was available, he gave the information to me, leaving with me the brief summary of the Chinese position which was attached to the memorandum to Mr. Allison on this subject of June 18,[1] and a copy of which is attached to the original of this memorandum of conversation.[2]

---

[1] Not printed.

[2] Attached but not printed.

Mr. Greenhill said that according to the reports he had received Panikkar had had a new conversation of over two hours on June 15 with Chou En-lai about the armistice negotiations. In the course of this conversation, Chou En-lai had finally outlined two possible lines for breaking the deadlock over repatriation of prisoners of war. They preferred the first alternative, which involved a settlement on the basis of 90,000 Koreans and 20,000 Chinese, although Panikkar reported his impression that they might settle for 100,000 if the total included 20,000 Chinese. The second alternative includes an acceptance of the principle of the Geneva Convention as being applicable and an agreement that prima facie all prisoners of war desire repatriation. However, any who showed a disinclination could be brought to Panmunjom, but *not* under military escort, and could be interviewed there by neutral personnel from the four neutral states agreed upon and from the Red Cross. The Chinese and North Korean Governments would abide by the views expressed at this interview. Chou En-lai appeared to place special importance upon the lack of military escort.

The Indian Government in commenting, said that the second alternative seemed to rest upon the assumption that only those who were against repatriation *after* being free from military control and the influence of Kuomintang and Syngman Rhee agents should be interviewed by an independent body. The British Foreign Office had been told that Nehru was inclined to prefer the first alternative, although he foresaw that there might be some difficulties, in which case the second alternative seemed to provide a possibility for satisfactory solution.

The Foreign Office is inclined to be somewhat skeptical about this proposal. . . . However, they believed that it should be very carefully considered and that we should consult together as to possible action. Sir Christopher Steel is to come in to see Mr. Allison at 4:30 on June 19 to get our preliminary reaction.[3]

---

[3] For a report of this meeting, see p. 344.

795B.00/6-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, June 18, 1952—11 p. m.

1395. Rptd CINCUNC Tokyo (personal for Clark) and EUSAK Advance personal for Van Fleet and Deputy CG EUSAK Gen Herren as DIP 349.

Emb, as well as UNCURK, has been taking every possible opportunity to persuade Pres Rhee and several key polit leaders on both sides of the controversy to get together and come up with some solution to the present impasse that wld be plausible in the eyes of the free world. We have been very patient. Under existing conditions we can hardly expect at best a compromise solution arrived at in a manner that will stand up to too close scrutiny. The line between what we can condone and what we cannot accept may be difficult to draw.

One of the principal stumbling blocks appears to be Rhee's phobia against the US and UN for having "thwarted his revolution". This has made him all the more stubborn as he is loath to take any action that might imply that he has not been 100 percent right from the start. Another element of difficulty is Rhee's feeling that the mil (UNC), even if not approving of all he is doing, are not sufficiently interested to take a stand against him unless his actions seriously undermine the military situation. Then there is Rhee's deeply ingrained personal characteristic as a fighter who hates compromising. As long as he feels he can get what he wants without compromise he will be inclined stand pat.

As for his opposition there are difficulties there too since many of them feel compromise leaving Rhee in power, even if it included written restrictions in his power, wld be tantamount to capitulation. Substantial opposition groups have of course been encouraged by world opinion and they have interpreted action of US/UN reps here as an indication that intervention is possible. These elements appear to be more interested in convincing US/UN of need for intervention, with consequent benefit for themselves, than in working with fellow Koreans towards a compromise.

I am guided by my instructions and my conviction that no action in the nature of intervention shld be taken except under explicit orders from Washington. Furthermore, it is essential up to the very moment of intervention, if that becomes necessary, that all US/UN elements here shld scrupulously avoid any indication that the US/UN at present contemplating such action. Both the Emb and UNCURK shld keep their principals fully and currently informed of developments. We shld watch developments closely, keeping eye out particularly for anyone who is apt to come to the fore in any upheaval. Calibre of leadership that emerges is of utmost importance. The reps of the unified command of the 17 nations having forces in Korea meet regularly in Washington and are constantly informed of the polit situation in Korea.

As I see it intervention wld have to be seriously considered if one of fol developments occurred: (1) An irrevocable polit act, such as dissolution of assembly, further mass arrests of assemblymen, etc.; (2) In event Pres Rhee suddenly incapacitated, physically or mentally; (3) In event Lee Bum Suk started moving in to take over control by force with police and youth corps; (4) In event of interference with ROKA, or; (5) Outbreak of serious violence. In case violence breaks out UNC must be in position to take necessary measures instantaneously. In other cases matter cld be referred Washington for decision.

If intervention decided upon it wld be essential that the necessary steps be taken in the name of the UN and on the basis of a carefully laid out program that could be put into effect at a moment's notice. Action would be implemented under specific instructions to CINCUNC from Unified Command, followed by orders from CINCUNC to the UN field commander, who in turn would have all measures taken by the ROK army through the chief of staff. If we are forced to intervene, it is essential that action be prompt and decisive to forestall the likelihood of armed conflict breaking out between the army, police and/or youth corps goon squads and before Pres Rhee or persons acting in his name can make a nationalistic emotional appeal to the Korean people against the US/UN.

I consider it essential that the polit and mil authorities have complete understanding of the objectives to be achieved and the tactics to be employed and therefore again suggest early mtg recommended mytel 1382 of June 16.[1]

MUCCIO

---

[1] Printed as DIP 342, p. 338.

Editorial Note

On June 18, 1952, Yakov Malik, President of the United Nations Security Council for June, submitted a draft resolution calling for all states to accede to and ratify the Geneva Convention of 1925 on the prohibition of bacteriological warfare (for a text of the draft resolution and the relevant debate, see United Nations document S/PV.577). As the United States had not signed the Protocol and because of the propaganda success of the allegations that the United Nations forces in Korea had engaged in germ warfare, the United States Representative to the Security Council sought to seize the initiative with a draft resolution (United Nations document S/2671), submitted on June 20, requesting that the International Committee of the Red Cross investigate the charges against the United Nations in Korea and report to the Council (a text of the resolution can be found in the Department of State *Bulletin,* July 7, 1952, page 37). On June 25, after unsuccessful attempts by the Soviet Union to convince the Council to invite the People's Republic of China and North Korea to participate in the discussion, the Security Council voted to include on its agenda the United States draft resolution calling for an investigation. On the next day, the Council rejected the Soviet Union's draft resolution on the Geneva Protocol. The Representative of the Soviet Union refused to participate further in the ensuing debate on the United States draft resolution and on July 3 cast a veto against it. The United States Representative then introduced a new draft resolution (United Nations document S/2688, dated July 3,

1952) condemning the dissemination of false charges (a text of this resolution is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 28, 1952, page 159). On July 9, 1952, the Soviet Union, casting its 50th veto, defeated this resolution. For more information on the tactics followed in the Security Council and in the larger context of the question of bacteriological warfare, see files 695.0026 and 695A.0026.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1952.

Subject: Panikkar's Report of Communist Proposal on Prisoner of War Question

Participants: Sir Christopher Steel [2]
Mr. Dennis Greenhill
Mr. John D. Hickerson
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Louis Henkin

Sir Christopher Steel and Mr. Greenhill called to obtain our preliminary reactions to the report of Panikkar's conversations with Chou En-lai [3] which the British had given to us the previous day. Sir Christopher stated that they now had another report on the same Panikkar-Chou conversations from the UK High Commissioner. This report accords pretty well with the one which had been reported previously by the Indian High Commissioner in London. There is no difference in the two versions of alternative "a". In alternative "b" the UK High Commissioner reports Chou told Panikkar that there should be agreement in principle on the provisions of the Geneva Convention and that in implementation thereof the steps outlined should be taken. This second version of the report spoke of a "neutral place", not specifically Panmunjom, as the place to which PWs would be brought; it made no mention of the Red Cross teams of both sides; and it spoke in terms of "recommendations" by the neutral commission, rather than a determination by this commission of the desires of the PW who allegedly refused repatriation. The report added that Chou En-lai also complained that agents of Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek had been smuggled into the camps. He also complained about the tone which the UNC delegation was taking in the negotiations.

---

[1] This memorandum, which was dictated on June 20, was drafted by Henkin.
Marginal notation on the source text, presumably written by Henkin, read as follows: "Hold very close—very touchy!"

[2] Minister, British Embassy in Washington.

[3] For a report of this conversation, see p. 340.

I told Sir Christopher that it was our impression that the Chinese Communists have not put anything in writing and that we have only reports based on Panikkar's recollection. Sir Christopher agreed that that was his impression also. In the circumstances, I continued, . . . the reports must be viewed with care, but I agreed that the matter should be followed up "cautiously but promptly". Dismissing alternative "a", I stated that alternative "b" has interesting possibilities. If the Communists really want an armistice this might be a reasonable basis for achieving it and offers them a face-saving device. There are, however, several points requiring clarification and elaboration and our initial question is what is the best way of getting it.

Sir Christopher agreed and stated that our reaction was exactly his. We discussed possible channels of communication with the Chinese Communists and discarded the possibility of using the UK Chargé at Peiping, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, the Swedish Representative in Peiping, or a direct approach by the US or the UK to Moscow. We agreed that it would be best to continue with India as the channel, and to let the Government of India itself decide what is the best way of getting a message to Peiping.

I then suggested that in our view the kind of message which the Indians should send to Peiping would read as follows:

> "The alternative proposal 'b' which Chou En-lai is reported to have offered as a possibility for breaking the deadlock in the armistice negotiations, is interesting and would seem to offer possibilities for progress. There are, however, a number of points in regard to this proposal which require clarification and elaboration. It would be desirable to know what channel or machinery would, in Chou En-lai's view, be appropriate for such clarification and elaboration."

We would hope that the Indians would use this language, without indicating US authorship, but describing this as the US reaction in which the UK concurred. Sir Christopher agreed with this approach and suggested that it might be even better if this message were represented as the UK reaction in which the US concurred. I indicated we would have no objection and that we would leave that matter to the UK Foreign Office.

I then informed Sir Christopher of some of the points in the message which, in our preliminary reaction, seemed to require elaboration or clarification. For example, is it intended that this interviewing of PWs by a neutral commission should take place before or after an armistice? Would the steps outlined be written into the armistice agreement? How could resisting PWs be brought to Panmunjom except under a "military escort" (Mr. Johnson pointed out that we may have trouble getting them there even under military escort, since these are persons who would resist repatriation and who might not have full faith in the outcome of this proceeding). We also wished to know whether persons not resisting repatriation would be exchanged before this procedure begins since we are, of course, anxious to obtain the return of our own PWs. Also, what if there is disagreement among the neutrals as to what the true wishes of a PW are? I cited these merely as examples of questions which occurred to us on a preliminary reading, stressing, of course, that since we have nothing in writing there is no point in weighing the exact language of something which is only one person's recollection of a conversation. Sir Christopher agreed. He did express that in his opinion the Communists probably do want an armistice and would want to use this method as a means for resolving the impasse while saving face. He thought the proposed procedure would be written into the armistice agreement and would be carried out after an armistice goes into effect. He agreed, however, that there are questions which require elaboration.

I told Sir Christopher that we have not told either our people in New Delhi, or at USUN of these latest developments and that we considered it important that as few as possible know about them. In about a week, however, when Ambassador Bowles returns to New Delhi, we intend to inform him fully, and we hope that the UK Foreign Office would instruct its High Commissioner at New Delhi to work closely with Ambassador Bowles. I expressed the hope also, since Sir Christopher indicated that Sir Gladwyn Jebb and the Commonwealth countries have already been informed, that these would be urged to exercise the greatest discretion and to discuss the matter with no one.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

FE files, lot 55 D 338

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) [1]

SECRET PERSONAL TOKYO, June 20, 1952.

DEAR JOHN: General Clark is away for a few days on an inspection trip to Hokkaido, etc. This morning General Hickey asked to see me and showed me your telegrams to General Clark of June 16 [2] and June 18 [3] and after discussion with him I said that I would write you personally to explain that General Clark, from what he has told me and from what Hickey tells me, objected to going to Pusan and intervening at this stage because he is convinced that you should be able to handle this as a political matter for which you are best qualified. He believes that as there is no apparent danger of disturbance of military lines of communication or to the ROK troop situation, it would be premature and inadvisable for Clark to inject himself into the Pusan picture.

---

[1] Murphy sent a copy of this letter to Allison with the explanation in a covering letter that he was writing to Muccio at the insistence of FEC. The source text was Allison's copy.

[2] DIP 342 from Pusan, p. 338.

[3] Presumably telegram 1395 from Pusan, which was repeated to Clark, p. 341.

I gather that he has indicated to Van Fleet that the latter should be available if there is no alternative and it appears urgently necessary. Here again I know before departure Clark indicated that he thought that Van Fleet should be injected into Pusan politics only when urgently necessary.

The other point that was made is that in your telegrams you continually speak about an eventual compromise but have never outlined what your opinion of a satisfactory and favorable compromise would be. According to Hickey it would seem that your Embassy from the beginning took the side of the Assembly and never gave Rhee any support on the issues. Hickey expressed the opinion that the Assembly could not be 100% right and Rhee 100% wrong on the initial issues.

Would it be possible for you to outline for strictly US consideration, of course, what basically a fair and practicable compromise could be and then using that as a target try to figure out ways and means of putting pressure where pressure may be made to achieve that target? Merely to generalize about a compromise would not seem to advance matters far.

I know that you will understand that I am writing to you personally and with no desire to inject myself into a matter which is so primarily your responsibility but if I can be helpful in any way, please do not hesitate to tell me. I realize what an unenviable situation you have on your hands.

All the best,

Yours ever, ROBERT MURPHY

795.00/6-2852: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 23, 1952—6:17 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 911932. From JCS. Personal for Gen Clark further to JCS 910520.[1] Folg from State fwdd for ur info. Circulation info in this msg shld be kept to minimum.

"1. UK Emb has informed State of conversation held by Panikkar, Indian Amb to Peiping, with Chou En-lai, 15 June.[2] While UK has received two reports of conversation, one from UK High Com, New Delhi, one from Indian High Com in London, they are generally in accord. It should be kept in mind, however, . . . and accounts made available to State are based entirely on Panikkar's recollection his own conversation.

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 319.

[2] For a report, see memorandum of conversation by McClurkin, June 18, p. 340.

2. According to report, Chou En-lai stated Chi People's Govt (CPG) is willing to consider two alternative proposals for solution of POW question:

> a. CPG prefers round figure 20,000 Chi and 90,000 Koreans (or perhaps total of 100,000 provided 20,000 Chi included). Such a solution wld eliminate necessity discussing principle which is difficult agree upon.
>
> b. UNC wld accept in principle, all POWs on conclusion armistice cld return to their homes; those who elected otherwise cld be brought to Panmunjom, not under mil escort, and interviewed there by committee from neutral states agreed upon plus Red Cross from both sides. Chi and NK wld abide by views of POWs as expressed in these interviews. Chou wld discuss such a proposal if United States (presumably UNC) agreed that prima facie all POWs must be assumed to desire repatriation and only those who oppose, after being freed of mil influence and control of Kuomintang and Rhee agents, shld be interviewed by independent body.

(Other report of this conversation also includes in alternative 'b' that there must be agreement in principle of provisions of Geneva Conv, with proposed procedure described as being in implementation these provisions. Other report also contains no mention Red Cross, speaks of 'neutral place' instead of mentioning Panmunjom specifically as place for interviewing POWs not desiring repatriation, and speaks in terms recommendations by neutral comm instead of determination by comm POWs desires.)

3. In conversation between State and UK Emb reptvs, State spokesman agreed that alternative 'b' has interesting possibilities and, if Commies desire armistice, might be reasonable basis for achieving it while saving face. State spokesman agreed that matter shld be followed up 'cautiously but promptly.' He added, however, that several points require clarification and elaboration and initial question is what is best way of getting it.

State agreed it wld be desirable to let India Govt determine best way of getting msg to Peiping and suggested text msg which might be put Chi Commies without stating origin but with indication is substance of United States reaction in which UK concurs. UK Emb spokesman suggested it might even be better if msg were represented as UK reaction in which United States concurred. State indicated this wld be agreeable. Text which UK Emb agreed to pass FornOff with recommendation it be transmitted India Govt folls:

> 'Alternative proposal "b" which Chou En-lai is reported to have offered as possibility for breaking deadlock in armistice negots is interesting and wld seem to offer possibilities for progress. There are, however, number of points in regard to this proposal which require

clarification and elaboration. It would be desirable to know what channel of machinery wld, in Chou En-lai's view, be appropriate for such clarification and elaboration.'

4. Matter being handled with utmost secrecy and shld be handled similarly by you. You will be informed of further developments."

FE files, lot 55 D 338

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) [1]

SECRET PERSONAL PUSAN, June 23, 1952.

DEAR BOB: Your good letter of June 20 [2] was brought to me by Colonel Larson Saturday night.[3] It certainly jarred me to find that at this late date we still do not have a meeting of minds between myself and Tokyo, and also to find that we are against Rhee.

At this phase we are still governed by the Department's 907,[4] delivered to me there in Tokyo, a copy of which was passed to CINCUNC. You will recall that (2) thereof specified that we continue to look to Rhee for leadership and that our best interests would be served were Rhee to remain "under some controls and in a more chastened mood." This decision was made at the top-level meeting we had in the Secretary's office the day I left Washington. It was further discussed at the Pentagon later that day.

I arrived here on the afternoon of the 6th to find Rhee seething and fulminating against the United States and against the United Nations for having thwarted him.

When I saw Rhee, after making the points elaborated in the instruction, he asked me what I thought should be done. I told him that it was not up to the United States or the U.N. to tell him what to do, but that I felt that it was essential for the good of Korea's present and future for the Koreans to get together and come up with some solution to the political turmoil that would be plausible and acceptable in the eyes of the American people and of the American Congress, and of the free world generally. I felt, I went on, that his proposed amendment and the proposal of the National Assembly (I left with him Stan Carter's A.P. article) were such that they should be able to combine the two. Since then, he has told me time and again that he must have (1) direct election of the President, although he says that this could become effective after this election; and (2) a bicameral system. He further has told me repeatedly that he is prepared to accept the provision regarding the appointment of the P.M. and of the rest of the Cabinet. I saw the Prime Minister, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Assembly, and several other leaders, including the active head of the DNP. I emphasized in each case that the military situation was so critical and enemy capabilities so great that we could not afford the luxury of "politics as usual" and of the political turmoil that was going on. I again emphasized that it was not up to me, or any other foreigner, to indicate how to solve the impasse, but that to avoid the growing misunderstandings around the world, particularly in the United States and the United States Congress, it is essential for the Koreans to get together and work this thing out. All of these leaders indicated that they were prepared to work towards such a solution. In view of Rhee's and the leaders' reaction, I felt that it should be possible to arrive at a compromise. But jockeying is still going on.

---

[1] The source text was the copy of this letter which Muccio sent to Allison.

[2] *Ante*, p. 346.

[3] June 21.

[4] Dated June 4, p. 302.

Briefly, the situation here is that Rhee is more and more exhausted physically and mentally. A group that he himself dismissed in the spring of 1950 has been moving in on him. Many of the more sordid acts in the last few weeks have been by this sinister group, and I think it is essential for the United States somehow to make the "Princetonian" realize that this group is "taking him in".

I am the last one to want the Military to get enmeshed in this situation. Rhee, however, has been left with the impression, or he has taken that guise upon himself, that General Clark and General Van Fleet don't care what happens here so long as there is no upheaval. At one time he told UNCURK that Van Fleet had gone along with imposing martial law in Pusan. As regards the international ramifications of the alleged conspiracy, please see No. 4 of 907. The idea here was not to have our CIC work with ROK CIC and police. I certainly feel that this would lead to a mess. However, I think that if General Clark or General Van Fleet, or if their G–2's, had made an approach to Rhee for data on the international ramifications of their conspiracy outside of Korea so that the resources of U.S./U.N. could be used to ferret them out, he might not be able to come up with anything, and this might help make Rhee less convinced that this is a clear-cut case. I know that Rhee himself has misgivings in this regard and has told me and Plimsoll that his whole record and reputation depend on this case. Anything that we can do to open Rhee's eyes to the machinations of Lee Bum-suk, *et al.*, would be helpful to us.

With Rhee in his present mood towards me and towards the United Nations Commission, I pressed for a good word from General Clark and/or General Van Fleet. This was the idea behind my 342 of June 16.[5] My 349, of June 18,[6] was motivated by my fear that the wrangling that is going on here may lead to open bloodshed at any moment. The ROKA has been out of it thus far, except for the Martial Law Commander General Won. But the sinister group has been using the police and the Youth Corps, with its numerous affiliated goon squads.

---

[5] *Ante*, p. 338.

[6] Printed as telegram 1395, p. 341.

If we are forced to take action, we must have complete understanding of the mechanics between the Military and ourselves. I would be very glad to come over and talk to General Clark there. My suggestion for a meeting with General Clark on the 16th was made under the impression he was on the peninsula. However, any intervening that we might be forced to do should be done in the name of the UN—in other words, UNCURK must be brought into the picture.

I understand Big Jim [7] is coming down tomorrow and I look forward to the opportunity of having a talk with him then.

I may be a bit of an ostrich, but I still feel that this thing should work out without blowing up in our face, but it is absolutely essential to have a meeting of minds all the way around in order to get the best end result.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. MUCCIO

---

[7] Presumably the reference is to Gen. James Van Fleet.

Editorial Note

On June 23, United Nations air and naval air forces bombed five North Korean hydroelectric plants, including the large generating plant at Sui-ho on the Yalu River, with additional strikes taking place over the next four days. For accounts of these air operations, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 320–324; R. Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953,* pages 451–453; James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea,* pages 436–439; and Malcolm W. Cagel and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea,* pages 441 ff.

Since July 1951 CINCUNC had discretionary authority to order these operations, except against the Sui-ho target. Regarding this authority, see paragraph 6 of the JCS directive to CINCUNC in telegram JCS 95977, July 10, 1951, printed in *Foreign Relations,* 1951, volume VII, Part 1, page 646. Five days before the attack the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the State–JCS meeting on June 18, had informed the State members in attendance that Clark was planning to bomb the hydroelectric plants in North Korea and had asked if State had any objection to including the plant on the Yalu River. Matthews and Nitze had replied probably not, but they would check with the Department of State. (State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417)

On June 19, with the approval of the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram

JCS 911683 advised Clark that restrictions on attacks against North Korean hydroelectric installations on the Yalu River were removed and he could initiate attacks. Clark was specifically advised that this authorization did not include authority to attack Manchuria or the territory of the Soviet Union, and as a matter of policy no operations would be conducted within 12 miles of Soviet territory on the Asiastic mainland. (795.00/6–1952 and Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* page 656)

795.00/6–2452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 24, 1952—7:39 p. m.
PRIORITY

Tosec 14.[2] Mtgs were held between Dept and Selwyn Lloyd June 23 and 24 [3] and between Alexander, Lovett and Bradley on June 23. Bruce and Matthews participated in mtg between Lovett, Bradley and Alexander afternoon June 23.

Lloyd spoke in glowing terms of impressions he and Alexander had recd on way things being handled in Korea and success in welding diverse UN forces into homogeneous fighting unit. Impressed with job Boatner has done in cleaning up Koje. Also Lloyd, on basis personal questioning number of individual North Koreans classified as resisting repatriation and discussions with US officers charged screening Chi, expressed full satisfaction with screening and accuracy of results. Lloyd also expressed satisfaction with UNC Civil Info and Education program among POWs.

Lloyd asked for US views on "strong" joint US–UK representations to Rhee or preferably by Clark to Rhee involving nine-point program, viz.: (1) constitutional compromise embodying Rhee's proposal for popular election Pres and bicameral legislature and Assembly's proposals for increased Assembly power over govt; (2) lifting martial law; (3) release arrested Assemblymen without prejudice subsequent trials; (4) trials of Assemblymen to be in civil courts open to public; (5) free elections possibly under some form independent observation; (6) no purge polit opponents and no death sentences to be carried out for polit offenses; (7) removal of some of Rhee's advisers and officials such as Lee Bum Suk; (8) freedom of Army from polit interference and polit appointments; (9) cessation of anti-foreign propaganda. Lloyd apparently thinking in terms of ultimatum type approach to Rhee by Clark making clear that if Rhee accepts, all agreeable that he continue as Pres. Dept agreed take UK views under consideration. Dept also pointed out importance of knowing what we are able and willing to do if Rhee refuses demand.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared by Perkins and Matthews.

[2] On June 22, Acheson left Washington for London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro as well as minor stopping points for refueling the Presidential plane *Independence*, which Truman had lent him. The trip was essentially ceremonial; for more information, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1544–1548, and Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 658–670.

[3] Fuller accounts of these discussions can be found in files 795.00/6–2352 and 795.00/6–2525, respectively.

Lloyd also raised with Dept, and Alexander and Lloyd with Defense assignment of Brit Deputy Chief of Staff to UNC. Defense indicated receptivity to this proposal but desired to consider and discuss further in US Govt before giving definitive reply. FYI only JCS have stated desire discuss this with Dept at mtg June 25.[4] Dept will take position that from polit standpoint we support UK proposal provided UK obtains agreement other Commonwealth countries having forces in Korea that such representation will also cover their interests.

At mtg Noon, June 24, Lloyd expressed considerable concern over UK reaction to bombing Yalu River power plant. Made points (1) that at talks between you and Morrison September 11, 1951,[5] UK had assented to US view that in event breakdown armistice negotiations, among other measures Yalu River dam and power installations wld be bombed, there thus being at least implied commitment by US not to bomb under other circumstances except after consultation; (2) that it was common public knowledge that during "MacArthur period" there had been restrictions on bombing Yalu dam even fol entering Chi Commies into hostilities, and therefore polit significance, particularly in UK public opinion, was inevitably attached to bombing dams at this time; (3) that although power installations bombed were entirely in North Korean territory it was known that installations also supplies [*supply*] considerable power to Manchuria and therefore could not be said objective attack was simply cutting off power North Korean industries and facilities. Dept reps replied that they not aware of any commitment requiring consultation prior to bombing Yalu power plants within NK and that decision do so did not represent any change whatever in either polit or mil policy of UNC. Decision bomb plants and timing dictated entirely by mil considerations. Also emphasized that attacks were directed only against power installations all of which on Korean side river and not against dam.

Subsequently Dept also pointed out to UK Emb which is transmitting to FonOff that Yalu plant was only one of five plants included in coordinated attack upon power installations and that while Yalu plant also supplied power Manchuria its operable capacity available to North Korea represented 40 per cent of all operable hydroelectric capacity available to North Korea. We referred also to press reports which we cld not yet confirm that Pyongyang including Pyongyang radio had been entirely blacked out ever since raid.

---

[4] The extract of the State–JCS meeting of June 25, p. 356, does not include discussion of this question. The matter was only briefly discussed. The plan was agreeable to the JCS who thought it should be cleared by the President. Truman agreed (Telac 4 to London, June 25, 1952; 795.00/6–2552).

[5] See the U.S. Delegation minutes, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 893.

Alexander raised with Bradley and Lovett question of polit adviser for Clark devoted solely to CINCUNC matters. Defense reps replied Clark was not in favor. Lloyd also raised same question with Dept which replied question wld be considered.

BRUCE

Truman Library, Truman papers, White House central files, "Confidential file"

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman [1]

[SEOUL?,] June 25, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today is the Second Anniversary of the war in Korea. For two long years the Korean people have bled, suffered, and died in their unwavering determination to resist the Communist aggressors, and, thanks to you, the Free World rallied and joined us in the front-line battle against the common enemy. I wish to remind Your Excellency again of the fact that the whole Korean nation shall forever be grateful to you for your courageous decision and for the gallant and generous contributions of the American people.

It is my earnest desire to express to Your Excellency my sincere regret over my inability to comply with the suggestions and requests made by the United Nations regarding the current disturbance in Pusan. I feel that I owe you a fuller explanation, which I was unable to give at first.

The information that has been so widely circulated in the foreign press has so grossly distorted the true facts that it is not at all surprising that our friends have been shocked and concerned. These stories manufactured by my political enemies were accepted at face-value, and in some cases they were so fantastically exaggerated that even I myself was overwhelmed!

However, I have a firm belief that the truth will reveal itself and all my friends will come to understand. In fact, it has been impossible for me to explain fully my position under the prevailing circumstances. I beseech you and other friends to be a little more patient with me, so that as the facts unfold one by one you will know why it was impossible to carry out the suggestions of the United Nations representatives at once.

---

[1] No action was taken on this letter until Aug. 13, 1952, when Acting Secretary Bruce sent a memorandum to Matthew J. Connelly which read in part as follows:

"Action on your memorandum has been delayed until now in order to permit the Department to determine whether developments in the Korean political situation might necessitate either further action by the Government or a reply by the President. In recent weeks the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea has approved the constitutional amendments desired by President Rhee, martial law has been lifted and popular presidential elections have been held in a seemingly free and uneventful atmosphere.

"In light of these developments and the fact that President Rhee's letter is not considered to have constituted a conclusive or adequate reply to President Truman's earlier suggestions and recommendations, it is not believed that further action or an acknowledgement by President Truman is necessary or desirable." (Truman Library, White House central files, "Confidential file")

It has been published in the press more than once, and as I have personally explained in confidence to the members of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the United States Embassy, that a serious Communist conspiracy in connection with certain members of the National Assembly has been discovered; it is evident and clear that the Communists are trying to get into the Korean Government through the back-door; in a short time, the trial will reveal all these facts surrounding the conspiracy. Unfortunately, the foreign representatives here seem to have ignored the serious nature of the case involving our national security and continue to press me to lift the martial law and to release the accused Assemblymen. But that is just what our enemies want us to do, because if that is done the way will be wide open for the Communists to come in and take the Government under their control.

This, then, is the reason why I was unable to carry out your advice. I make this brief explanation with the hope that Your Excellency will understand that I have not been purposely uncooperative. Believe me, Mr. President, when I say that out of my deep gratitude to Your Excellency and the other friendly nations I am ready always, to accept any advice and counsel which you may deem advisable to offer. Naturally, no matter what the cost—personal or otherwise, I cannot surrender to the Communists the common cause for which all our gallant allies and ourselves have sacrificed so much.

Please be reassured that I will never make of myself a "dictator" nor will I ever be a hindrance to the development of democracy. I continue to strive, despite the many adverse pressures exerted upon me, to seek a solution that will be acceptable to the people of Korea without going to extremes and taking irrevocable steps. I am still endeavoring to solve the problem without dissolving the Assembly. The people are demanding immediate action for an election which would ultimately result in a reorganization of the Assembly, which of itself will reflect the will of the people. The recalcitrant elements in the Assembly are still obstructing the adoption of the constitutional amendment; this deadlock may lead to a serious repercussion and some action should be taken without further delay. I hope to see a solution reached within a short time.

Thanking you for your patience and understanding, I remain, as always,

Your loyal ally and friend, SYNGMAN RHEE

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Air Attacks on North Korea Power Plants

General Bradley: I have just talked with Eden on the telephone about the power plants in North Korea.[2] I told him that the machinery had been removed from these plants and for a long time there was nothing there. Recently machinery had been put back in and power was being made available to industry in North Korea so we decided to hit them. They only became a military target a short time ago.

Mr. Johnson: Hasn't the machinery been in the plant at Suiho all the time? I discussed it with the Intelligence people yesterday and I gathered that that plant had been in operation.

General Bradley: Yes, I think that is right, but it is not true of the other plants.

Mr. Matthews: We have taken the line that this was a straight military decision and not a change of policy. Do you know whether the British liaison man in the UN Command would have known about this?

General Bradley: Probably not. The big trouble is that this thing happened while Alexander [3] happened to be here and he didn't know about it.

Mr. Matthews: We refrained from speaking to the British about it because we didn't want to give the idea that the matter had political importance. I had understood that you were going to mention it to Elliot.[4]

General Bradley: I seldom speak to Elliot about the Far East.

Admiral Fechteler: I think it would be a mistake to do so because if you start, the French will want to get in on it.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the JCS, Generals Collins and Vandenberg, and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chief Bolté. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent; Gleason represented the NSC and Admiral Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 19 persons attended. In addition to Korea, Turkey, air defense of Japan, and British representation on Clark's staff were discussed at this meeting.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 351.

[3] The bombing caused an adverse reaction in other nations participating in the UN effort in Korea, particularly Great Britain. Lord Alexander of Tunis, British Minister of Defense, was in Washington at the time and, as Bradley noted, was not informed. For Acheson's account of this incident and the "snafu" which resulted in the failure to inform the British, see *Present at the Creation*, pp. 656–657.

[4] Sir William Elliot, Air Chief Marshal, Royal Air Force, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, and U.K. representative on NATO Standing Group.

Mr. Matthews: Perhaps I misunderstood, but I thought that after our last meeting,[5] when I spoke to you about this matter, that you were going to speak to Elliot.

General Bradley: I didn't understand that.

Admiral Fechteler: The surprising thing is that we didn't lose a man or a plane. That is because we caught them flatfooted.

General White: They had two hundred planes on the ground that didn't go up. I think it must have been one of the days they were not supposed to fly and the local commander didn't send them up.

Admiral Fechteler: This leads me to feel that they must be having some trouble with POL. If we shut off some more shipping I think it would hurt them.

General White: They have a shortage of parts also.

General Bradley: At Mr. Lovett's press conference[6] one of the newspaper men asked whether we realized the political implications. He pointed out that Taft[7] had said we had lost control of the air over North Korea, and Truman had denied it and then we carried out this raid to show that Truman was right. He asked Mr. Lovett if this was the reason for the raid. It is amazing how people read political implications into everything.

Draft Message to Muccio and Clark concerning Military Intervention

General Bradley: The draft message to Clark[8] seems OK to us.

Mr. Matthews: I don't believe we have any changes to suggest.

General Bradley: We were wondering if the attempted assassination of Rhee[9] was staged with an empty gun.

Mr. Matthews: That crossed our dirty minds too. Lloyd[10] has raised the question with us of having Clark talk to Rhee because of Clark's influence with him. In view of the message Clark has delivered to Rhee through Van Fleet[11] we don't think this needs to be decided at present. In any case it will be useful to get this message out to Clark and Muccio because if it later proves desirable for Clark to talk to Rhee we should know what we are going to do.

---

[5] State-JCS meeting, June 18, 1952; memorandum of discussion, not printed. (State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417)

[6] For a report on Lovett's press conference of June 24, 1952, see the *Washington Post*, June 25, 1952.

[7] Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.

[8] The draft under reference was sent as JCS 912098 to Clark and Muccio, June 25, 1952, *infra;* the draft can be found in FE files, lot 55 D 128, attached to a memorandum by Young to Johnson, June 25, 1952.

[9] A 62-year-old man, identified as Yu Sit'ae, was seized by Korean police while attempting to assassinate President Rhee at a ceremony marking the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict in Korea. The ROK Government charged that the assassination was part of a plot by the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) and arrested two of its members (draft memorandum, June 26, 1952; FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Korean Internal Political Situation").

[10] On June 23, Selwyn Lloyd and members of the U.K. Embassy met with principal officers of the Department of State, excluding the Secretary who was in the United Kingdom. For a summary of their discussions on Korea, see Tosec 14, p. 352.

[11] Van Fleet informed Rhee that he and Clark were in complete accord with the political position of the U.S. Government and the United Nations in the Korean internal crisis and that there was no divergence between U.S. and UN political and military positions (telegram 1437 from Pusan, June 25, 1952; 795B.00/6-2552).

General Bradley: Did Lloyd think we should approach Rhee and lay down the law or else?

Mr. Matthews: Yes. At first he suggested a joint U.S.-U.K. approach, but we pointed out that with UNCURK there this bilateral approach would look bad. He agreed with that, but he wanted Clark to press Rhee right away. It is our view that we might come to that but not right away.

Mr. Allison: Yes, we may have to come to it.

General Collins: Is it clear in this proposed message that any military action taken would be UN rather than U.S. action?

General Bradley: In paragraph 5 it says: "On authorization by U.S. Government to intervene, CINCUNC should take action." I think that makes it pretty clear, but we might put in that the U.S. Government would be acting as Executive Agent for the UN.

General Collins: I think that would do it.

. . . .

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET — WASHINGTON, June 25, 1952—3:50 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 912098. From JCS. Reur CX 50416 [2] and Muccio's 1395.[3] CINCUNC pass to Muccio.

Part I. As Def and State now view polit sit created by Rhee, two different gen lines of development appear possible.

1. First, there may not be any sudden or critical development requiring, on purely mil grounds, direct intervention, or providing adequate

---

[1] A draft of this telegram prepared in the Department of State as guidance for Ambassador Muccio is in FE files, lot 55 D 128, attached to a memorandum by Young to Johnson, dated June 25, 1952. At the suggestion of Collins, State agreed that the telegram could be sent to Clark, as well, as a joint State-Defense telegram.

The text of JCS 912098 was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 25, after which Bradley secured the informal approval of Secretary of Defense Lovett. President Truman approved the text with the addition of the words "as exec agt for UN" in the first sentence of paragraph 5; it was transmitted as a JCS telegram. (JCS 1776/298, June 25; JCS files)

[2] In telegram CX 50416, Clark to Muccio, June 18, 1952, Clark regretted that his schedule precluded meeting with Muccio and UNCURK. Clark had no objection to Van Fleet making a further representation to Rhee. Clark noted, however, that he had not yet received policy direction from the JCS on the issue of intervention in ROK politics. When he did, he or Van Fleet would be willing to meet with Muccio and UNCURK to discuss courses of action beyond the diplomatic stage (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

[3] Dated June 18, p. 341.

justification for direct intervention upon polit grounds. This appears to be present sit in which only feasible action appears to be intensification of polit measures. Ur suggestions wld be most helpful as to what addl dipl and mil representation cld be applied to whatever degree possible to resolve polit crisis.

2. Second, sit may deteriorate to point where, in order prevent interference with UN mil opns, direct intervention in sit cannot be avoided. As this action may be forced upon us suddenly by one or more incidents, Depts desire you confer with each other earliest in order develop and submit to Wash for approval detailed polit and mil plan accordingly. Depts concur that premature disclosure of existence such plan cld be extremely embarrassing to United States Govt, therefore, UNCURK participation in ur planning shld be to extent to which you mutually determine to be necessary.

Part II. To facilitate ur planning folg guidance is furnished:

3. It is hoped that necessity for implementation of plan can be foreseen sufficiently in advance to permit implementation to be on decision by highest govtal authy. However, in event of sudden outbreak of violence, civil disorder or an emerg necessitating immed action, CINCUNC will be authorized to implement the plan without further authy, reporting his action expeditiously.

4. Under less emerg conditions the plan shld contemplate action along folg lines:

a. If circumstances permit, UNCURK, Emb and CINCUNC shld present appropriate demand that Rhee or other responsible official take such immed action as, in judgment of UNCURK, Emb and CINCUNC, is required to restore sit.

b. If circumstances do not permit making foregoing demand or if requested action is not immediately taken by ROK Govt, CINCUNC, preferably at UNCURKs request shld recommend to United States Govt that intervention be authorized.

5. On authorization by United States Govt to intervene as exec agt for UN, CINCUNC shld take action along folg lines:

a. Direct ROKA Ch of Staff to assume cmd of all ROKA Forces, quasi mil forces and such elements of natl or local police as CINCUNC may deem necessary, and thereafter to administer and direct martial rule in Pusan area. As matter of policy utilization of UN troops other than Korean shld be avoided or minimized to greatest extent possible.

b. Administration of martial rule shld be such as to preserve to maximum possible extent authy and functioning of an ROK Govt organization as a symbol of ROK sovereignty. Orders issued to ROKA Ch of Staff under these circumstances shld be of such nature as to envisage local martial rule in Pusan area, supplemented by ROK civil govt agencies which are capable of continued functioning. These orders shld clearly provide for preservation of constitutional govt and early restoration of civil power where such power is necessarily suspended. Appropriate individuals and organizations of ROK Govt shld be given full protection and, as soon as order is restored, they shld be encouraged to take such action as necessary to effect continuation of normal functioning of constitutional govt.

c. While foregoing contemplates use of ROK forces only, and while that is desirable from viewpoint of world opinion, there is no restriction on use of other UN forces shld sit require.

6. Re this request appraisal as to dependability of ROKA Ch of Staff, and ROKA forces, under these conditions, particularly shld Rhee as an anticipatory measure, rescind his order of 14 Jul 50 which placed ROKA under CINCUNCs cmd.

7. In implementation of foregoing there shld be maximum coordinaton between CINCUNC, UNCURK and American Amb.

8. Request ur comments.

695A.0024/6–2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PUSAN, June 28, 1952—noon.

1474. For Armstrong eyes only. Re Deptel 946, June 12 and 992, June 23.[1] Fol from Manhard:

Highlights interviews Chinese POW leaders Koje-do June 20–24 fol. All comments POW opinion unless otherwise indicated.

Approximately two-thirds pro-repatriation Chinese were tattooed against will. POW estimates vary from 2,800 to 3,200, by [*but*] observation indicates over 1,500.

Main immediate factors influencing choice against repatriation include (1) info blockade by POW trusties preventing most POW's from hearing broadcasts and reading orientation bulletins with result many POW's not sure polling directly connected with POW exchange, (2) partially successful deception by POW trusties that polling was only test to distinguish pro-Communists for later punishment and execution by UN authorities, without choice to return mainland, (3) physical terror including organized murders, beatings, threats, before and even during polling process.

Claimed higher casualties than camp records which show 5 killed in 72 and 2 in 86, many badly beaten during Operation SCATTER [garbled group] minimized fear of reprisal by mainland authorities after return, but emphasized that cumulative effect of pro-Nationalists political indoctrination by CI and E. Sun Chen Kuan believes many CCP members now among anti-repatriation group will eventually attempt escape if given better opportunity such as release from close confinement in connection with transfer to Formosa. Many pro-repatriation Chinese POW's assert American chaplain and his Korean assistant played major role in deterring Chinese from choosing repatriation between first and second polling in 72 and possibly in 86. Sun maintained that major reason for 1,200 of 1,400 from work detail in compound 70 choosing repatriation was the weakness of pro-Nationalist POW leadership that group and lack physical violence. He assumed compound 70 politically typical of majority Chinese POW's.

---

[1] In these telegrams, the Department of State dealt with the mechanics of and method of reporting Manhard's interviews with top Chinese Communist POW leaders at Koje-do (695A.0024/6–1252 and 695A.0024/6–2352, respectively).

Interview notes and personal observations airpouched DRF today.

Muccio

795B.00/6-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, June 28, 1952—9 p. m.

1470. Rptd info CINCUNC as DIP 396 by other means. Lloyd's nine-point program[1] very good indication our present aims involving compromise settlement which would give Rhee opportunity remain in power (with certain restrictions on use that power) and at same time go long way to restore independence to National Assembly. However, I feel strongly it would not be desirable or feasible right now to present demands in virtual ultimatum.

To submit strong demands this nature requires decision time has come to force showdown and readiness to follow up any refusal with necessary force. In view of additional time afforded by extension President's term, postponement of election and indications compromise settlement may be possible without UN intervention, I wld not advise calling for showdown now. Need could arise suddenly, as dramatically illustrated by assassination attempt June 25, and we should be prepared for all eventualities (see ourtel 1395 June 18).[2] Need quite possibly will not arise if Rhee can manipulate things in way to achieve his goal without having to resort to new actions that world opinion cannot possibly condone. It looks more and more as though he may accomplish this by establishing ascendancy over Natl Assembly and securing his re-election either by present Assembly or direct election after amendment adopted. (I will discuss this situation and comment on Point 7 in Lloyd's proposal in separate message).[3]

There is another aspect of ultimatum that I think requires careful consideration in connection any plan for intervention. Intervention by armed (ROK) forces would have to be executed with utmost speed and precision, very first move being if Rhee and his present friends had sufficient warning (1) to issue emotional nationalistic appeal to country through their nationwide political apparatus, (2) to call on police and army to rally to Rhee's support or (3) to flee from Pusan. Ultimatum might give just such signal.

---

[1] See Tosec 14, June 24, to London, p. 352.

[2] *Ante*, p. 341.

[3] *Infra.*

In my view, if time comes for intervention, ample grounds will exist without need to spell them out in last minute attempt at suasion (indeed case can be made that sufficient grounds already exist). Rhee knows perfectly well what we want and basic points have been presented to him in numerous official representations and through informal channels. Emb and UNCURK shall miss no occasion add to list during period ahead. Presentation of package demands, with intimation we prepared follow through, not likely in my view to lead to capitulation on his part but wild outburst and attempt to resist to last, which at that stage could seriously complicate operation which ought to be fairly simple.

As far as Lloyd's specific points concerned I have little comment, except to stress importance of 7 (in accompanying tel). Nine points are reasonable but in dealing with Rhee, that does not mean they are susceptible of negotiation. There would definitely be no useful purpose served by putting them up to him as normal diplomatic representation. He would be expected in such circumstances to equivocate or otherwise refuse to take action "for time being" on two, three, four, six and seven. He would say he had long ago agreed to number one but nothing he could do to get Assembly's approval. He could with honesty claim number eight already in effect and further that he was doing his best to meet number nine. He might also agree to number five, assuming this meant casual type UNCURK observation of popular election of Pres. End result would be merely make him more furious than ever with foreign interference.

As far as attitude Assembly opposition concerned they could be expected buy all nine points without delay, but in this situation and by very nature of the demands Rhee is main stumbling block.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6–2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, June 28, 1952—11 p. m.

1471. Rptd info CINCUNC DIP 397 by other means. ReEmbtel 1470, June 28.[1] As indicated reftel there is good possibility Rhee will win out without having to resort to or being faced with measures or situations which wld invite UN intervention. It is therefore important to take stock of situation we wld be confronted with in those circumstances.

---

[1] *Supra.*

Since Rhee probably will maintain martial law and proceed with trials of arrested Assemblymen up to moment of victory, we will have hard time regarding his victory as having taken place in manner acceptable to free world. We will also have to face up to other unpleasant realities, e.g., it will be harder to obtain support in the future for mil and econ programs in Korea; many moderate Koreans will be disillusioned and less inclined step forward and prestige of US/UN will be at low ebb in Korea and restraining influence vitiated; if ROK Govt still dominated by group now in saddle they will lead country still farther from democratic path, resort to police power and intimidation and ignore counsel of moderation.

Key to problem will be calibre of group around Rhee (See Lloyd's point number 7 Deptel 1005, June 25, rptd Tokyo as 662. [2]) If Yi Pom-Suk–Louise Yim–Ahn Ho-Sang–Yun Chi-Yun–Gen Won crowd, who are now in inner circles, remain in positions of influence, possibilities for anything approaching decent govt, efficient econ admin, and so forth, would be virtually hopeless. On other hand there is group of more moderate Koreans who have shown administrative ability and considerable honesty and integrity on previous occasions who are not embroiled in present conflict and who might be willing take over key posts if Rhee threw out present incumbents. They are now to great extent disillusioned and bitter, but being fundamentally men of good will they might be expected answer call help make best of bad situation.

Importance principal advisers around Rhee will probably be greater in future than in past since, as I have reported, Rhee showing signs of weakening under hurly-burly and stress present crisis. Doctor tells me his physical condition good for man his age, but I have in mind mental deterioration, frequent lapses memory, and impression he gives on his bad days being uncertain, groping, friendless, suspicious (of everyone), and senile. In short more and more he likely be used by scheming group around him. It is not that he has full confidence in them. Indeed, he does not. (He has used same group before and cast them aside and may do so again when he feels they no longer useful). Danger lies in what they are doing and may do in future without his knowledge or approval while still retaining positions of power or influence. As they become entrenched their power may become so great that very difficult to remove.

I have had some small success sowing seeds Rhee's mind that Yi Pom-Suk and company dangerous for him, for Korea and for UN. Several members UNCURK have taken similar line. Not sure whether Dept has opportunities talk same direction but might bear this in mind when meeting members Korean Emb or newsmen. I feel problem one to watch and keep after but not much we can overtly do about it at this moment. Yi has lots of rope and may hang himself before it is over.

---

[2] In this telegram, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Korea of Lloyd's points and asked for its comments (795B.00/6-2552).

MUCCIO

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, June 28, 1952—11:15 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 51050. Re CX 50050.[1]

1. Basic statistics from present POW screening operation in Korea indicate that total number of POW and CIs to be returned to Communists control will exceed 80,000. This increase over 70,000 figure can best be used to our advantage by the submission of a new figure to the Communists in open plenary session. This action should be accompanied by a full and complete explanation as to how such figure was obtained, stressing its finality and the objective way in which the screening was conducted. After statement is given to the Communists it should be released to the press immediately.

2. Strongly recommend that the UNC delegation be authorized to submit a new final figure to the Communists as soon as available in accordance with the procedure outlined in Para 1 above.

3. The statement to be made at the time of submission of new figure is under preparation now and will be furnished you in advance.

---

[1] Dated June 12, p. 319.

795.00/6–3052: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, June 30, 1952—11:58 a. m.
PRIORITY

986. Re Korean truce talks. At Malik SC dinner June 27, I had following conversation with Zinchenko (UNASYG) on Korea:

While chatting about summer vacation plans, I commented that it did not look as if the SC would have to meet in August. Zinchenko at once said in a questioning manner, "unless perhaps Korea?" I replied that I thought an armistice in Korea was not possible so long as the Communists insisted on forcible repatriation of POW's and that I could not understand how the Sov Govt could support the Chi and NK contention in view of principle adopted by Sov Govt regarding German POW's. Zinchenko, who perhaps expected this question, replied that although he did not know too much about what I had called a "principle", it was necessary for us to realize there was an "important difference between repatriation during a war and after an armistice". The Geneva Convention "had to be applied" after the end of hostilities. Furthermore, during the war against Nazi Germany, it was "necessary to do everything to disintegrate the Nazis". Moreover, the Sov Govt found great difficulties put in the way of their attempts to get in touch with Russian POW's held in various parts of Europe. He implied the Sov position was taken in the hope of facilitating the return home of Russian POW's.

I said I could not see how these matters affected the fact that the Sov Govt had taken the position that it was a humane principle to allow POW's to go where they desired at end of hostilities. I disagreed with his interpretation of the Geneva Convention and insisted it was not intended under any circumstances to require forcible repatriation. This whole question was one we felt deeply about and would not retreat from. I added that representatives of Asian, Middle East and other countries had expressed to us their full support of this issue, in addition to the public statements which have been made by many govts.

Zinchenko replied that he understood the difficulty for us but "we must also realize how difficult it is for the other side". He said with a shrug "after all, it is only offered to return about 60,000; that is not possible".

I said Zinchenko must be aware we had done our best to discourage POW's from resisting repatriation, that we were very disappointed when the screening showed such a large figure. We had no reason to want to hold on to them. Zinchenko asked "how about the difficulties on Koje?" I answered that everyone knew that organized troublemakers among the POW's on Koje were to blame. Moreover, I felt the Communists had no moral standing on the whole POW question because of their refusal to agree to impartial supervision of screening or of POW exchange arrangements.

Zinchenko seemed to turn over in his mind my reference to impartial screening or supervision. After a brief hesitation, he said that I must realize the "Red Cross Committee" (presumably he meant ICRC) is "unacceptable" to the Chi and NK. However, "there are other Red Cross societies". These societies could be used and there was no reason for us to insist on the "Red Cross Committee". He then added that he was "confident" that the problem of both sides regarding the POW question, could be resolved, but there were "many difficulties in attempting to settle all the questions before an armistice".

Zinchenko asked quite bluntly: "Why not sign an armistice on the basis of the Geneva Convention? After the armistice, if some of the prisoners on either side do not want to be repatriated, this could be taken into account."

At about this point in our conversation, we were joined by Dr. Morozov, whom I had known in 1948 as the Sov rep on the Legal Committee of the 3rd GA but had not seen since. After listening for a moment, he had a few comments about the background of the Geneva Convention, agreed with Zinchenko's argument that the convention required repatriation of all POW's, and that it should be applied "in principle". He then left us.

I said I could not imagine signing an armistice which dealt with the POW issue merely by including a general undertaking "to apply the Geneva Convention". This was impossible since both sides had conflicting views as to the convention. Zinchenko denied that he was suggesting this. When I pressed him as to just what he did mean, he avoided a precise formulation. However, his suggestion appeared to boil down to this: Sign an armistice agreement which would provide for the application of the Geneva Convention. The Communists would insist this "in principle" requires general repatriation. It would be understood that "difficulties arising in applying the convention" would be taken into account. Presumably a group of National Red Cross societies, I suppose including one or two from satellite countries, would supervise the "application of the convention".

I said I frankly could not see much chance for real progress along this line, although I was gratified to know that Zinchenko understood we were firmly determined not to agree to any principle or procedure which would involve forcible repatriation.

Zinchenko said he knew I was aware he was speaking "only as a person". But he felt he had a "special responsibility" because of his position in the UN and his "interest in the UN". I replied it was obvious we were both speaking purely personally. In this same spirit, did he mind if I asked him whether he thought the Communists really wanted an armistice in Korea? Zinchenko replied at once that he thought they did. He himself had felt at the time the Chi Communists and North Koreans agreed to start armistice talks that "they really wanted to reach agreement". We should find some way to overcome the great difficulty they have in accepting the POW arrangement we were proposing.

Up to this point, Zinchenko had not referred to the suggestion relayed to us by Rafael, of the Israeli del.[1] Taking advantage of the informal tone of our conversation, I told Zinchenko that I had heard of a talk he had held with Rafael, but was not quite clear in my mind about the substance of it. After considering for a moment, Zinchenko said he had in a personal way mentioned to Rafael a "theoretical possibility" of signing an armistice and leaving the POW question to be settled afterward. He thought it was "important to discuss all possibilities". However, he did not seem interested in following up this line and I did not think it wise to pursue the point.

---

[1] The reference is to Zinchenko's observation to Rafael in early June that the armistice could be initialed on the basis of issues already settled and on the understanding that it would become effective upon resolution of the POW question; this information is contained in telegram 893 from New York, June 4, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

Comment: During this conversation, which lasted 10 to 15 minutes, Malik was standing a short distance away conversing with several dinner guests. He did not join us. My impressions are:

1. Zinchenko deliberately opened up a discussion on Korea and Morozov's participation was prearranged. In the many social and official encounters I have had with Zinchenko during the past two years, he has never talked so explicitly and in such a relatively unguarded manner. I was struck by such direct expressions as "why not sign an armistice, etc".

2. The Sov Govt may be using Zinchenko for sounding us out rather than Malik, probably because Zinchenko's UN position furnishes the Sov Govt a plausible reason for getting into the act so directly. In addition, it provides them an easy exit by way of denial or repudiation of anything Zinchenko says, since he is "not a Sov representative". I am inclined to think Malik deliberately avoided joining us. On other similar occasions he has frequently done so.

3. The earnestness of Zinchenko's manner as well as his avoidance of the usual recriminatory remarks conveyed a strong impression at least of a personal hope to see an armistice concluded. It is, of course, highly doubtful that Zinchenko, who we know maintains the closest contact with Malik, would hold or express such views if contrary to the Sov line.

4. I believe Zinchenko would be surprised if I did not follow up with him.

5. A question: We must not lose sight of the possibility that the Sov hate campaign is intended to prepare public opinion for Sov intervention in Korea or even for general war. However, might not the hate campaign be related to a possible Sov desire to see an armistice in Korea? One motive for the suddenness and violence of the campaign cld be to pave the way for the Communists to hail an armistice as the triumphant conclusion of a crusade to halt an "American reign of terror" in Asia. This could, to some extent at least, deflate the enormous prestige which an armistice would bring to the UN and to the US throughout the world, particularly in Asia and in Sov-controlled areas.

GROSS

795B.00/6–3052

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

PUSAN, June 30, 1952.

DEAR ALEX: I want you to know that I have had nothing out of CINCUNC as to their thinking on the mechanics for intervention should it become inevitable. Only occasionally am I informed of telegraphic exchange between CINCUNC and DeptAr. On matters pertaining to the Korean situation you can assume that messages which do not clearly specify "repeated to Pusan" are not seen here.

I know that this matter has been the subject of study in Tokyo for some time. Last week Schirven and another lad from G–5 spent some time here. Schirven called on me, but made no mention of this project. We discussed only the problem of activating the Economic Board [1] and staff for UNC membership.

What disturbs me is the indication that the thinking in Tokyo is in the nature of military government set-up for Korea if intervention becomes necessary, calling for American personnel in the hundreds.

General Herren and I have discussed this matter entirely on our own, and we agree that the concept of military government for Korea with a huge staff is dangerous and unnecessary. My concept, which is shared by Herren and Plimsoll, is that if the need arises, UNC would have to take the responsibility on the basis of proper directives, but would act through the ROKA Chief of Staff or ROK Chiefs of Staff. When the decision is made, or should an "explosion" here precipitate the need for taking such a deplorable step, we would have to move decisively and instantaneously and isolate the very few "bad eggs" and preserve as much of the ROK governmental administrative structure as possible.

Colonel Hensey and a large delegation are due in Seoul today, and here Wednesday morning. This note is mainly a suggestion that NA keep its eye out in order to avert the possibility of JCS approving some program that has not been thoroughly cleared here.

My very best to you. I still don't feel anywhere satisfied with our efforts thus far. We still need your prayers.

Sincerely,

JOHN

---

[1] The reference was to the Combined Economic Board, which the Meyer Mission recommended. With a member from the Unified Command and the ROK, the Board was to be given the power of making binding recommendations on the use of all foreign exchange and the task of integrating such recommendations into the UNC assistance program (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 219).

Editorial Note

On July 1, 1952, the Senior United Nations Command Delegate, General Harrison, noted during a session at Panmunjom that both sides had agreed, with the exception of a few minor administrative details, to 62 of 63 paragraphs of the draft armistice agreement. The sole remaining disagreement concerned paragraph 51, the POW question. Harrison urged the other side to accept the paragraph as written, which he believed was in full accord with the Geneva Convention and which he maintained provided a reasonable basis for settlement. The Communist Delegation apparently interpreted this statement as a prelude to concessions by the United Nations Command. On July 2, it asked for a recess to study Harrison's statement and then, on July 3, requested that the meetings go into executive session. The substantive record of these meetings for July 1 to 3 can be found in FE files, lot 55 D 128, telegrams C 51133 and C 51282, both Clark to JCS, July 1 and 3, 1952, respectively. The report of the Communist request for a recess is located in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413, telegram C 51166, CINCUNC to JCS, July 2, 1952. See also Vatcher, *Panmunjom,* pages 160–161 and Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 272–273.

695A.0024/7–252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, July 2, 1952—7 p. m.

18. Eyes only Armstrong–R. ReDeptel 992 June 23.[1] Fol from Manhard: From info my disposal previous POW resistance to camp authorities Koje-do stemmed from (1) uncontrolled internal political agitation and unauthorized polit indoctrination, (2) misuse of inadequate force by camp command and (3) food bulk below non-combat standards of Commie forces.

Camp authorities usually took stand POWs internal discipline and control within compounds no concern of camp command unless personal safety UN personnel endangered or duties interfered with. Instead of carefully-supervised elections lower echelons camp admin appointed or confirmed POW trustees on basis self-styled anti-Communism in many compounds. Trustees assumed almost complete internal admin and judicial control, removed rivals by informing authorities of alleged Commie plots, which were investigated superficially, if at all. UNC–CI and E stepped in with "reorientation" program, using mostly self-appointed POW instructors who tried emphasize anti-Commie polit indoctrination often requiring POW participation by force. Camp command thus appeared in position actively supporting one polit faction against another. For POWs war was not over. Polit "civil war" continued with camp replete with kangaroo courts, polit murders, beatings, torture. Bitter tension mounted between POWs opposite polit poles while little educated, politically-inert majority fearfully followed orders strongest POW leadership. Conviction grew among POWs all factions camp authority ended at compound gates, POWs cld "negotiate" requests in return for cooperation with camp command.

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 360.

By Jan 1952 reaction had begun in many anti-Commie Korea compounds, some of which pro-Commies took over, directed efforts to taking revenge on anti-Commies and sabotaging CI and E program. Commie POWs intransigence focussed increasingly on camp command as power behind anti-Commie trustees.

In past camp command has had difficulty enforcing discipline among US and ROK troops. Some trigger-happy men had not been adequately trained in Govt control techniques and equipped with non-lethal weapons. Stones, songs and insults have on occasion been silenced by bullets and bayonets. Authorized personal possessions POWs frequently confiscated by other POWs, ROK and US personnel.

Amount and type food ration subj constant complaint among practically all Chi POWs regardless of polit attitude, and presumably among many Korean POWs. Since original diet established, rice ration lowered in quality, two-thirds replaced by inferior grains often indigestible for many POWs and requiring more fuel to prepare. Stomach and digestive diseases long chronic among large numbers POWs.

One result repatriation polling placed intractable pro-Commie POW leaders in undisputed control many large compounds without internal control by UN. These leaders possibly feared being killed or punished whether or not they followed camp orders. In May widespread POW rumor, presumably fostered by Commies, alleged anti-repatriation POWs were being armed by UN and might be turned loose on pro-repatriation group. Pro-Commie leaders based requests concerning conditions of captivity and representation on Geneva Convention and assumed equal right to judge conformity of camp admin to Convention. Violent resistance to camp command May and June apparently local decision POW leaders. No concrete evidence available to show initiative, direction or timing by Commies outside camp.

Muccio

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 2, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: I would like to talk about the latest message from General Clark.[2] Clark now has the final figure of 83,000 prisoners who are willing to be repatriated. He recommends that we give this figure now to the Communists. We have some concern that if we do give the 83,000 figure to the Communists, the Communists might think if they wait another three months we might come up with a 100,000 figure. On the other hand if we don't give the Communists a figure and the figure leaks, the Communists might be able to put us in a bad propaganda position by saying we weren't telling them the facts.

Mr. Matthews: My feeling is that if we officially say we have 83,000 now they would feel they could sit tight and we would eventually up the figures some more. I grant there might be some difficulty if the figure leaked.

Mr. Bohlen: I think it would be a mistake to give them a figure. This doesn't seem to be just the right time to focus attention on figures by raising them officially. If the figure should leak, I don't think we would be in a too bad position. We could say to the Communists we weren't aware that they were interested in figures, but just the general principle, and we didn't think there was any utility in discussing figures with them.

Mr. Matthews: The timing is probably important. The Zenchenko talk with Gross[3] seems to approximate fairly closely Alternative B which Chou En-lai was supposed to have proposed to Panikkar.[4] If we come in now with an official figure, we might upset whatever is cooking through the Indian channel.

General Bradley: That was actually the general feeling among the Chiefs here. I personally was the one that was most worried about what would happen if there were a leak, but I think Chip's answer is a good one.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft—Not cleared with any of participants." Generals Bradley, Collins, and Admiral Fechteler as well as Vice Chief Bolté attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. In all, 13 persons were present at the meeting. In addition to Korea, the following topics were discussed at this meeting: Spain, the Middle East Command, and Southeast Asia.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] For a report of that conversation, see telegram 986, p. 364.

[4] Regarding this proposal, see the memoranda of conversation, pp. 340 and 344, and telegram JCS 911932, p. 347.

General Collins: I think we should send Clark a message telling our reasons for not wanting to give a figure, filling Clark in on the background in the Panikkar–Zenchenko [*Chou*] talks and giving him the line that Chip suggested should be followed if there should be a leak.

General Bradley: Perhaps Johnson and G–3 can work out the message.[5]

. . . .

---

[5] Presumably the message referred to was transmitted as telegram JCS 912791 to Clark, July 3, p. 375.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, July 2, 1952—9:40 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 51216. Re CX 51050.[1]

1. Re para 3, ref msg, I intend to authorize the UNC delegation to make the fol statement if approval is given for the submission of the new figure:

"The interviewing of all prisoners of war to determine the nbr to be repatriated to your control has, within the past few days, finally been completed. You will recall that in Apr you agreed to a recess the purpose of which was to give us time to conduct a poll of all POWs in order to determine a round nbr of prisoners of war who would be returned to your control. In order to assist us you furnished an amnesty declaration, which we used. During that recess we interviewed all of the prisoners of war except those in certain compounds where the mutinous and violent attitudes of some of the prisoners of war made impossible a fair and just interview. In these few compounds we made an estimate of the nbr who could be repatriated to your control. We did this in order to determine a round nbr as quickly as possible in accordance with your rqst. This estimated nbr we added to the results obtained in those compounds where the POWs were actually interviewed. The sum was a round nbr of 70,000 individuals who could be returned to your control. However, it must be remembered that this 70,000 was an approximation; we were always prepared to repatriate any larger nbr resulting from more complete info.

We have now completed the interviews of all the prisoners of war, including those whose attitudes we previously had estimated. The interviews were conducted in such a manner as to give each man an opportunity to make his own decision; the questions employed, as you are aware, actually encouraged each individual to return to your control. Representatives of the press observed the operation. The amnesty proclamation you furnished us in Apr was also made known to the prisoners prior to conducting interviews.

---

[1] Dated June 28, p. 364.

We now have a total of blank individuals whom we are prepared to repatriate to your side after the signing of an armistice. This nbr consists of blank NK; blank CCF; blank SK; and blank CIs.[2] It is the final total of those we will return to your control and is subject only to negligible alterations resulting from the few who might die, or escape, or from last-minute changes of mind of the prisoners themselves. It is our intention to return to you every NK and CCF POW who will not violently resist such return. It will take a short while yet to prepare the complete rosters of these individuals. In exchange for these rosters we should like to obtain from your side an up-to-date and complete roster of the UNC prisoners of war whom you propose to return to our side. I therefore suggest that we set a date convenient to both sides on which our respective lists can be exchanged.

Since this is the final nbr of individuals who can be returned to your control, and since the achievement of an armistice is prevented solely by a failure to agree on the nbr to be repatriated, we strongly urge that you agree to an exchange of rosters of POWs for verification and a subsequent exchange of POWs based on those rosters".

2. For your info, ICRC was invited to witness the recent screening operation but declined the invitation.

3. ArEight is now preparing a new figure which will be as accurate as possible, subject only to negligible alterations resulting from the few who might die or escape, or from last-minute changes of mind of the prisoners themselves.

---

[2] The most up-to-date figures as reported in telegram CX 51283, Clark to JCS, July 3, 1952, were as follows: to return to Communist side, 62,169 NK, 6,388 CCF, 4,560 SK, and 9,954 CI, for a total of 83,071; to remain with the UNC, 34,373 NK, 14,412 CCF, 11,744 SK, and 26,338 CI, for a total of 86,867 (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

795.00/7-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET Moscow, July 3, 1952—8 p. m.

27. Appreciate receiving inf contained Deptel 936, June 30[1] concerning Zinchenko talks. I am inclined, however, to question whether we wld not be better advised to keep both channels, i.e. Indian-Chi channel and Zinchenko channel, open and active at this stage. This wld give us opportunity to detect any differences of approach between Russ and Chi and a cross-check on any errors of understanding or memory that

---

[1] In this telegram, the Department of State informed Kennan of the Zinchenko-Gross conversation and stated that it did not intend to pursue this channel for fear of "crossing wires" with the Indian-Chinese connection (795.00/6-3052). Regarding this conversation, see telegram 986, p. 364.

may slip into the somewhat involved and indirect channel to Chi Commies.

KENNAN

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, July 3, 1952—4:45 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 51286. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. Fol comments on HNC 1360 [1] received from Harrison as HNC 1361.

"1. Communist statement in todays meeting in my opinion offers hope of early armistice. Communists accept not only principle but wording of para 51. This is a new concession on their part and recognizes that at time of signing of armistice we will repatriate only those held in custody at that time as prisoners of war. Communists recognize that there will be a reclassification of prisoners of war.

2. I intend to agree to executive sessions beginning 4 July.

3. Recommend:

a. Immediate authority to release latest screening results to Communists.[2]

b. Final rosters of prisoners of war to be repatriated be furnished me as soon as possible.

c. No public release of either new figure or lists until after we reach some agreement with Communists, or fail to reach one.

4. Ref Communist request for executive sessions, the Communist correspondent, Winnington, on 1 July dropped unsolicited hint to UNC newsmen that meetings would get nowhere unless they went into executive session. Since this remark was made prior to UNC statement of 1 July it may be that Communist suggestion today for executive sessions was under active consideration by them prior to 1 July and our 1 July statement merely firmed up their thinking."

Part 2.

1. I note Harrison's optimism for an early armistice. I cannot share this optimism without further elaboration by the Communists. Harrison's evaluation may be the result of having heard and seen the statements delivered.

2. I am approving only Harrison's recommendation to meet in executive session.

3. Request that your decision be forwarded as soon as possible on my CX 51050.[3]

---

[1] HNC 1360, which was transmitted to the JCS as C 51282 by Clark, July 3, 1952, is not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 369.

[2] At the end of this sentence the word "no" was written in the margin in Johnson's handwriting.

[3] Dated June 28, p. 364.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1952—4:46 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 912791. From JCS.

1. Ur C 51282 [1] and C 51286 [2] are encouraging. This development, together with approach outlined JCS 911932 [3] and what may be parallel suggestion by a Soviet official in UN (details being transmitted in sep msg), appears significant. However, a literal reading of Commie statement in C 51282 wld not appear to indicate any basic change in Commie position. It may in fact be that our bringing up subj of wording of Article 51 has been misinterpreted by Commies as indicating change in UNC position. Accordingly, we believe that UNC Del must proceed cautiously, fully exploring Commie position, and seeking as clear meeting of minds as possible with Commies on interpretation of Article 51 prior to UNC making any firm commitment as to lists or numbers. In this connection it appears obvious that main problem remains question of disposition of Chinese. We have no clear solution to this problem but are entirely flexible and open minded on any solutions within framework principle nonforcible repatriation which may suggest themselves as result further negots. If disposition of Chi POWs not repatriated appears as final and only bar to agreement on POW issue we wld appreciate ur estimate as to whether a firm commitment not to send these POWs to Formosa might result in agreement to armistice. Request ur views and suggestions on this point as negots develop. Meanwhile, however, in accordance with previous guidance, you are auth to make clear to Commies if question raised by them that we have no plans for disposition such POWs and that their ultimate designation is entirely question of individual desires.

In view of foregoing:

a. UNC Del shld proceed to explore Commie position and seek as clear meeting of minds as possible with Commies on interpretation Article 51. We agree that executive sessions offer best climate for accomplishing this.

b. We believe best chance of obtaining Commie agreement may lie in avoiding discussion or use of numbers and reference to "screening" or "rescreening", and leading negots directly to point to which each side wld exchange lists. It appears here that by avoiding discussion of numbers and "screening" or "rescreening" Commies may be able to accept our proposal without having, on record, accepted principles applied by US in compiling lists or acknowledging the relatively small number of POWs who are willing to return to Commie control. In presenting the UNC list to Commies UNC Del shld represent it as full compilation of POWs available for repatriation avoiding emphasis upon finality of list. However, on other hand, UNC Del shld do all possible to avoid giving Commies impression that this list represents merely another intermediate bargaining position on part of UNC.

---

[1] Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 369.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated June 23, p. 347.

c. If tactics set forth in Subpara b above not successful and Commies insist on discussion numbers either prior to or fol exchange of lists, you are auth, at time of ur discretion, to submit new figures of POWs available for repatriation to Commies. When and if new figure is submitted to Commies, believed proposed statement in ur CX 51216[4] shld be revised to take into account sit as it has then developed. However, in this connection, we believe preferable to avoid emphasis upon finality of figure and continue to avoid use of words "screening" and "rescreening". It wld appear more desirable to stress impartial and objective manner in which figure was obtained, and that it represents best figure UNC can reach at this time. If Commies clearly reject figure UNC Del position shld be that UNC always ready consider any reasonable proposal Commies may have for impartial verification of figure either before or after an armistice has entered into effect.

d. Foregoing shld be considered only as general guidance subj to modification as negots develop. We desire to give you all possible latitude at this critical stage of negots and are prepared promptly to act upon ur recommendations for such changes as may be considered desirable during progress negots.

3. Presume that you will solicit cooperation of local press representatives in preserving executive nature of discussions as long as sessions are continued and respected by Commies.

---

[4] Dated July 2, p. 372.

Editorial Note

On July 2, 1952, the Republic of Korea Government announced that Assemblymen who failed to attend the special session of the Assembly, called to pass President Rhee's revised constitutional amendments, would be "guided and escorted" by the police to the Assembly Hall. A police search rounded up legislators and scores of them spent consecutive nights at the Hall. Even the seven Assemblymen on trial in the Communist conspiracy case were brought to the Assembly to take part in the proceedings. With a quorum thus assured, the Assembly began work on the amendments. On the evening of July 4, a plenary session of 166 members of the legislature received a report by a special committee of their members which had studied the constitutional amendment calling for direct election of President and Vice-President, a bicameral legislature, and limited cabinet responsibility. The substance of the amendment was adopted that night by a vote of 163 to 0 with 3 abstentions. On July 15, the Assembly passed legislation to give effect to these new constitutional provisions. Shortly afterward, political trials against Assemblymen came to an end. For an account of these events, see United Nations document A/2187, pages 9–11.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET　　TOKYO, July 5, 1952—4:21 a. m.
ROUTINE

CX 51399. Ref JCS 912098, 26 [*25*] Jun,[2] CX 50901, 27 Jun,[3] DA 912291, 28 Jun.[4]

1. The detailed plans referred to in para 3 of CX 50901 have been prepared covering a series of eventualities. These plans have been coordinated with Eighth Army and discussed with Muccio. I had my rep meet with UNCURK and explain my plan but UNCURK has not been apprised of the existence of any plans for intervention.

2. Ref para 4a, part 2 of JCS 912098—do not cons that UNCURK, Embassy and CINCUNC jointly shld present any demands on Rhee until decisive action has been rqst by the nations involved and all plans have been perfected for subsequent action if demands are not complied with. Ref para 4b, part 2 of JCS 912098—I do not believe that I shld recommend to US JCS that intervention be auth based on a rqst fr UNCURK and my rep has not informed UNCURK. In my opin proper procedure wld be for UNCURK to pres their recommendations through their normal rptg channels. UNCURK undoubtedly feels that CINCUNC shld make strong stand vis-à-vis Rhee but seems unwilling to anticipate any subsequent action in case strong stand by CINCUNC is ignored by Rhee.

3. Ref para 5 of JCS 912098—the principles gen agreed to are that in any action short of estab of a UNC govt the symbol of the ROK Govt

---

[1] This telegram was sent separately to Muccio, Van Fleet, and Herren for their information.

[2] *Ante*, p. 358; the reference telegram was sent on June 25, EST, and presumably it was dated by CINCUNC according to the time of arrival in Tokyo.

[3] In this telegram to the JCS Clark stated that, for the present, he believed that all representations to Rhee from the UNC which would serve any useful purpose had been made. However, he thought it wise to continue diplomatic pressure on Rhee and believed Muccio and UNCURK were in the best position to take such action. To prevent suspicions from being aroused as to the existence of a plan for intervention in South Korea, Clark suggested that he and Muccio not meet for the moment, but that coordination take place at the staff level. Clark informed the JCS that he and his staff had been working on a detailed plan for intervention and that both he and Van Fleet believed that the ROK Chief of Staff and ROK forces would be loyal to the UNC (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

[4] In this telegram the Army Chief of Staff informed CINCFE that the JCS agreed that Clark and Muccio should not meet and the contact should be at the staff level. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

shld be preserved and that the action in the name of the UNC shld be called "assistance" even though the assumption of a certain amt of control wld be neces. The use of the ROK Army alone is not considered advisable since it might precipitate a form of civil war, or if such did not result, then later, enmities caused by the ROK Army action might result in serious repercussions against individuals in the ROK Army who acted against their own countrymen. I cons it preferable to use a majority of ROKA troops augmented by UN troops under UNC command.

4. I am prepared to take action in case widespread disorders affecting my mission suddenly break out. If there were time, it would be preferable that any action taken wld be at the rqst of the nations actively participating in the conflict against Communist aggression in Korea.

5. It is not consd here that this matter shld be refd to the Security Council of the United Nations since this wld result in publicity being given the plan prematurely and wld permit Rhee to organize his resistance against foreign intervention.

6. In order to be prepared in case intervention becomes neces, I am having a detailed plan prepared along the fol lines:

a. Pres Rhee wld be invited to visit in Seoul or elsewhere—anywhere to get him out of Pusan.

b. At an apptd time the UNC comdr wld move in to the Pusan area and seize between 5 and 10 key ROK officials who have been ldrs in Rhee's dictatorial actions, protect all UNC installations and ROK installations deemed advisable, and take over the control of martial law through the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, until it is lifted.

c. Rhee wld then be informed of the action taken as a "*fait accompli*". He wld be urged to sign a proclamation lifting martial law, permitting Natl Assembly freedom of action and estab freedom of the press and radio without interference fr his various strong armed agencies.

d. If Pres Rhee wld not agree to issue the proclamation, he wld be held in protective custody incommunicado and a similar proclamation wld be presented to Prime Min Chang Taek-Sang.

e. It is believed here that Prime Min wld agree. However, if he does not, it wld then be neces to take further steps approaching a UNC interim govt.

f. In the event that either Rhee or Chang agree statements wld be released to the press to the eff that it had been neces for mil rsns and (if appropriate) at the rqst of the nations participating in the conflict for the UNC to step in and remove certain individuals who had been taking illegal actions which interfered with the United Nations Mission. These statements wld stress the fact that the ROK Govt was taking the action and was being assisted by the UNC.

7. Since 10 of the Assemblymen have been released and since the Natl Assembly passed a compromise constitutional amendment last night, it is consd here that the polit sit in the Rep of Korea will shortly return to normal. In order to be prepared for any eventuality, gen plan

refd to in para 1 and plan outlined in para 6 above will be completed and filed here for future use if neces.

695A.0024/7-552: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, July 5, 1952—4 p. m.

36. Eyes only Armstrong-R. Re Deptel 992, June 23.[1] Tel from Manhard:

Presume purpose "voluntary repatriation" fundamentally Free World attempt provide asylum to political refugees from Commie control. This presupposes objective criteria to determine bona fide anti-Commies. Final decision shld be ours, not refugees.

In Korea polling actually appeared as choice between two political allegiances for POW's from divided countries. Polling procedure superimposed on background of extreme coercion and intimidation over long period of both pro and anti-Commie leaders Korean compounds, anti-Commie leaders Chi compounds. Physical safety all POW's immed before and during polling process not guaranteed due lack internal control of compounds by UN guards. Honest naiveté polling questions resulted in involuntary repatriates and many involuntary non-repatriates, choice being made in atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. Simple, direct polling under these conditions invited Commie infiltration anti-repatriation groups and enabled ambitious POW leaders both factions attempt deliver vote in best wardheeling manner to gain favor political superiors.

In view continuing influence previous pro and anti-Commie POW leaders plus resumption CI and E reorientation activities in present anti-repatriation camps, further polling by same method under similar conditions will probably produce little if any numerical shift.

If repolling Chi POW's contemplated, recommend separate detention all previous POW's leaders now in power anti-repatriation compounds, official proclamation Commie amnesty for POW's regardless of tattooing competitions, etc., if such announcement available. Alert all alleged anti-repatriate Chi POW's minus former leaders, trustees, and those screened out voluntarily by intelligence agencies, for return mainland. Provide sanctuary for all who subsequently attempt escape. Then announce new plan Chi POW's, immed reclassify remainder as political defectors from communism, no longer POW's. We thus formulate principle that we recognize right bona fide POW's to be repatriated to give controlling forces from which captured and right bona fide political refugees to receive asylum from Commie control, whether found in combat zone or elsewhere.

MUCCIO

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 360.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, July 7, 1952—7:20 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 51489. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

1. Re C 51435 [1] which is HNC 1370. Since the Communists have introduced the question of numbers and appear to be interested in a new accounting of POWs, I intend, in the next two or three days, unless you have contrary views, to authorize the UNC Delegation to present to the Communists a round number of persons to be repatriated to the Communists, plus those to be released in South Korea. This will be introduced as a total of 121,000, broken down as follows: (*Note:* Parenthetical figures in subparas *a* and *b* below, are for your info only. Do not contemplate giving this info to Communists at this time.)

a. Koreans who are to be repatriated to Communist control—76,500 (62,000 NK POWs plus 4,500 SK POWs who desire to go to NK plus 10,000 civilian internees who desire to go to NK);
b. Koreans whose homes are in SK and who are to be released to return directly to their homes—38,100 (11,700 SK POWs plus 26,400 CIs currently being released);
c. Chinese People's Volunteers to be repatriated to Communist control—6,400.

2. Concurrent with the presentation of the new figure, the following points will be stressed:

a. Emphasis on the care with which the final figure has been prepared.
b. Request for a similar accounting of the UNC prisoners in Communist custody, with a reminder that they have never given us a satisfactory accounting of the prisoners they admitted having captured but who were never reported to us on any prisoner of war list.
c. Request for a date to be set for the exchange of lists, in accordance with Article 51 of the Armistice Agreement, indicating that we will have our list by 1 August.
d. Reiteration of our previous proposals to permit individual interviews of NK and CCF non-repatriates by a bilaterally acceptable neutral organization, or joint teams with or without military representation; such interviewing to take place after the signing of the armistice with both sides agreeing to abide by the results of the free expression of choice by each individual interviewed. (It may be feasible to restrict the

---

[1] In this telegram, dated July 6, Clark relayed to the JCS Harrison's report of the meeting at Panmunjom of that same day during which the Communist Delegate insisted *inter alia* that the only solution to the POW impasse was for the UNC to return the 20,000 captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

offer of these interviews to non-repatriated Chinese POWs only. This course of action could be defended on the basis that the release by our side in South Korea of the North Korean non-repatriates parallels the unilateral action, admitted by the NK Communists, of releasing from a POW status SK captured personnel, most of whom were converted to members of the NK Army.)

3. If, as we expect, the Communists continue to reject the rescreening of non-repatriates after an armistice and have not made any proposal as to the disposition of the non-repatriates that would be in accord with the principles of both sides, I believe we should ask them by direct questioning for their solution on the disposition of the Chinese and NK non-repatriates.

Part 2.

1. If we fail to secure an armistice as the result of the action set forth in Part 1 I feel that we should be prepared to present a reasonable solution to the disposition of the Chinese and NK non-repatriates. In C 51435 the Communists have stated in quite clear terms that the principal issue remaining to be solved prior to securing an armistice is the ultimate disposition of the Chinese Communist POWs. It should not be inferred that I am ignoring the disposition of the NK non-repatriates; this remains an important issue however, I believe a solution acceptable to the Chinese Communists will be accepted by the North Koreans. In addition they have left us a loop hole whereby at least a small portion of North Korean non-repatriates may be released in accordance with their stated position that all captured military personnel must be released and allowed to return home. The homes of a portion of these personnel lie north of the 38th Parallel but south of the present front lines and might therefore not have to be repatriated.

2. The Communists have also stated that any unilateral action on our part with regard to the POWs held in our custody would undermine the entire basis of the present armistice discussions.

3. In view of their previously announced opposition to screening or rescreening, I feel that a new proposal must be developed and presented to the Communists. Such proposal should not include any rescreening or require unilateral action on our part. It should be made as attractive to the Chinese Communists as possible and still not require any deviation from our firm position of no forced repatriation. I believe the solution proposed below embodies these necessary characteristics. In brief, this solution to which I believe we should give very serious consideration is as follows:

a. An armistice would be signed on presently agreed terms except for several paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to repatriation of POWs.

b. These few paragraphs would be so modified as to permit the following:

(1) Repatriation and release upon the armistice becoming effective of all POWs who expressed a desire to be repatriated or who can be released to proceed directly to their homes.

(2) Upon signing the armistice the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination as to the ultimate disposition (see (3)) of all POWs of both sides who have not been previously repatriated or released would be passed to a group of neutral nations.

(3) Both sides would agree in the armistice to abide by the decision of such neutral group as to disposition of non-repatriates with the stipulation that no CCF POWs would be permitted to proceed to the control of the Nationalist Chinese. (The Communists have been adamant in their stand that they would never consent to having any CCF POW turned over to the Chinese Nationalists.) Subject to this stipulation, personal preference of the individual would be the primary factor in determining ultimate disposition of non-repatriates.

(4) Ultimate disposition of POWs to be determined within a specified period of time.

(5) Under supervision of neutral nations, both sides would be given an opportunity to persuade non-repatriates of their respective sides in custody of the group of neutral nations to return to their control and proceed to their homes and lead peaceful lives.

(6) Both sides would deliver to each prisoner in dispute a duly authenticated amnesty agreement to insure safety of the individual and his family.

4. The Communists may attempt to retain some of our own POWs in status of non-repatriates, in fact, hostages. Any proposal in the nature of that discussed above would thus have to insure that any United Nations POWs retained by the Communists would also be placed under custody of such a neutral group.

5. I am in no position to properly evaluate the political and international aspects of this proposal nor the effect on my Government or the United Nations were this proposal to be adopted. If the political and international aspects do not appear insurmountable and any adverse effects on my Government or the United Nations is acceptable, I recommend that I be authorized, to propose to the Communists, the foregoing as an honorable solution to the disputed question of repatriation of prisoners of war if action set forth in Part 1 above fails to produce an armistice.

795.00/7-752

The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1952.

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR GROSS

DEAR ERNIE: The conversation with Zinchenko which you reported in your telegram 986, June 30,[2] bears some interesting parallels to reports of a conversation between Chou En-lai and Panikkar shortly prior to the latter's departure from Peking. The details of that conversation are summarized in the attached copies of a telegram from the Embassy at London and memoranda of conversations with the British here. There is also attached as a useful summary an "Eyes Only" telegram to Bowles at New Delhi on the subject.[3]

---

[1] Copies of this letter, drafted by Johnson and cleared by Matthews and Bohlen, were sent to Lovett and Foster of Defense and Bradley of the JCS.

Although we have pursued the Panikkar-Chou En-lai conversation, there have been no new developments there. Recent developments in Panmunjom also do not clearly indicate that they are moving in a direction indicated by the Panikkar-Chou En-lai conversation. We have decided, therefore, that, without terminating the approach through New Delhi, you should also follow up the Zinchenko conversation. Please see him and as casually as possible talk to him along the following lines:

> Referring to your conversation with him of June 27 and, without specifically mentioning either the Indians or Chou En-lai, state that we have recently learned that the Chinese Foreign Office is alleged to have informed a diplomat of a third country that the Chinese are willing to consider two alternative proposals for solution to the prisoner-of-war question. You would then outline to him the two alternatives as reported by Panikkar. Commenting on these two alternatives, you would state that the first alternative obviously offers no solution to the question since it would involve the forcible return of large numbers of Chinese, to which the UNC could not possibly agree. However, alternative B has interesting possibilities and, if the other side really wants an armistice, might provide a reasonable basis for its achievement, although many details, of course, require clarification. In view of the fact that this alternative in its general outlines bears some resemblance to suggestions made by Zinchenko in his conversation with you, you wonder whether that alternative is the kind of plan which Zinchenko had in mind as a possible solution to the impasse.

Your purpose in this conversation should be: (*a*) to determine, if possible, whether Zinchenko was making a specific suggestion on behalf of the Communists; (*b*) to determine whether this suggestion is the same as that reported by Panikkar or in what respects it differs; (*c*) an additional purpose would be to indicate to the Communists that we are not disinterested in the Zinchenko approach. You should not give Zinchenko the impression that we are attempting to open up a channel of communication through him. If Zinchenko tends to confirm accuracy of Panikkar's report of alternative B you may, in your discretion, ask for Zinchenko's views as to whether this possibility for a solution should better be explored at Panmunjom or through some other channel. In the unlikely event that he suggests any Soviet channel, you should indicate that the United States would prefer to have Ambassador Kennan at Moscow discuss the matter with appropriate Soviet officials.

---

[2] *Ante*, p. 364.

[3] These papers were not filed with the source text. They included a memorandum of conversation by Hickerson, June 19, 1952, p. 344; a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, June 25, 1952, not printed, in which he discussed with Campbell of the Canadian Embassy developments since the Panikkar-Chou conversation (795.00/6-2552); a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, July 2, 1952, not printed, in which Greenhill of the British Embassy relayed a Foreign Office suggestion that the Zinchenko channel, where the machinery of communication already existed, was worthy of pursuit and in which Johnson pressed Greenhill for more information on the course of the Indian-Chinese discussions (795.00/7-252); telegram 5789 from London, June 18, 1952, not printed, in which the Embassy in London reported the existence of the Panikkar-Chou discussions to the Department of State (795.00/6-1852); and finally telegram 2938 to New Dehli, June 26, 1952, not printed, in which the Department brought Ambassador Bowles, absent from India at the time of the Panikkar-Chou conversations, up to date. (795.00/6-2652)

Sincerely yours, JOHN D. HICKERSON

795.00/7-952

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, July 9, 1952.

EYES ONLY FOR MR. HICKERSON

DEAR JACK: You will undoubtedly wish to have this report for your record in response to your letter of July 7[1] regarding the follow-up on the Zinchenko conversation of June 27.

As I reported to you on the telephone, my efforts to see him were not successful. When I ascertained that he was not planning to attend the Security Council meeting, I asked Jack Ross to phone him to say that I would like to say good-bye to him and have a few words with him. This request, which was an unprecedented one on my part, undoubtedly was sufficient to tip him off that I had something in mind to talk to him about and he should have realized at once what the subject was.

After telling Jack Ross that he was very busy preparing for his departure from New York, he sent word to me later in the afternoon via Dr. Protitch that he was very sorry that he had been unable to see me, but he had had to rush away.

I think it is clear that if he had wished to pursue the matter, he could easily have found a few minutes to do so. Why he did not wish to do so is purely a matter of speculation.

You may want to consider the possible desirability of my following up with Malik. I shall, of course, not do anything in that direction unless and until I hear further from you.

Sincerely yours, ERNIE

---

[1] *Supra.*

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1952.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING PART II, CX 51489[1]

1. Who are the neutral nations envisaged in paragraph 3*b*(2)? We should, if at all possible, find a formula that does not require the four "neutrals", Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, to engage in operations or reach decisions. The recent careful staff study[2] given to the operation of the neutral supervisory commission in conjunction with the Swiss and the Swedes reinforces the belief that this four-nation group will find it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in operations which require decisions by the group as a whole.

2. As presently phrased, paragraph 3*b*(2) envisages responsibility for guarding and handling of non-repatriates being turned over to the "group of neutral nations". Such a group, whatever its composition, cannot be expected to have the forces and facilities for handling POWs and, as presently phrased, it would seem that this concept is not realistic. How, exactly, does Clark envisage that this concept would work in practice?

3. It is anticipated that, at the least, the Swedes and the Swiss will show a marked lack of enthusiasm for undertaking additional responsibilities concerning prisoners of war. They are already unhappy over the role of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, feeling that many of the provisions of the armistice agreement relating to the Commission may be unworkable and that the US will expect them to do much more on the Commission than in fact the terms of the armistice agreement permit. They are also very skittish in their reactions to the President's proposal for a five-nation observation group of conditions on Koje. We should not, without prior consultation with them, initiate any proposal which gives them a still additional role in Korea.

4. While it may be correct that ultimately some commitment not to send Chinese POWs to Formosa may be required to obtain an armistice, the difficulties of carrying out such a commitment are so great that it should not be proposed by us at this stage. In this connection it should be noted that Chou En-lai's Alternative B makes no mention of any such commitment. Therefore, the stipulation mentioned in paragraph 3*b*(3) should be eliminated from any proposal made by us to the Communists at this time. However, we should reach a decision as to

---

[1] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[2] Not printed (795.00/6–952).

whether we are prepared to undertake such a commitment if required by development of negotiations.[3]

---

[3] Johnson wrote the following at the bottom of the source text: "Copy given to Gen. Collins who took [it] to Japan & discussed with Gen. Clark."

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 9, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Negotiations in Korea

General Bradley: I was talking to you yesterday on the phone, Doc, and thought it might be useful to talk here about negotiations. We told Clark we had the second part of his message[2] under study. We also said the Commie proposal discussed in Part 1 was close to one of Chou En-lai's alternatives. It might be a first step toward agreement. (General Bradley then read a draft message[3] to Clark on this matter.)

The question is should not we discuss Part 2 and Chou En-lai's alternative B now. Also, one of your experts ought to read over this message from Clark[4] to see if there is any hidden meaning in the Commie language.

Mr. Bohlen: I have read it over with a fine-tooth comb and I see nothing new. I don't know why they put forward something they have been saying for months.

General Bradley: We cannot find anything new.

Mr. Bohlen: The subsequent remarks in the first statement might be read as saying that we could reclassify the Chinese and North Koreans, but the next part says they don't mean that.

General Bradley: Do you think Nam Il will come up with alternative B soon?

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chief General Twining. Matthews headed up the Department of State contingent; Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense. In all 20 persons were present. In addition to Korea, the Middle East Command and Yugoslavia were discussed at this meeting.

[2] The reference was to telegram CX 51489, Clark to JCS, July 7, p. 380.

[3] Presumably the message which Bradley read was JCS 912998 to Clark, July 8, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128). If this is the case, it had already been sent the day before the State–JCS meeting and it was incorrectly described as a "draft".

[4] The reference was to telegram C 51435, Clark to JCS, July 6, 1952, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 380.

Mr. Johnson: Harrison thinks he won't and thinks he is waiting for us.

General Bradley: If we thought they were coming up with alternative B we should wait. If we propose something like B they would probably turn it down. Is there anything to be gained by our proposing something?

Mr. Matthews: We have discussed that this morning and we don't know.

Mr. Nitze: There are dangers in a proposal. You start with the principle that every prisoner is presumed to desire repatriation and then add an exception. They might accept the principle and not the exception.

General Collins: That worries me. They suggest moving the prisoners without guards, which is utterly impracticable.

Mr. Johnson: Could you do it in small groups?

General Bradley: Yes, you could do it in small groups.

Mr. Hickerson: If you had an agreement I think those difficulties could be handled.

General Collins: Well, we had to shoot some who were trying to get out of the new compound.

Mr. Matthews: If that were the only problem I think we could find some way to handle it.

General Collins: As far as I am concerned, if you could get them up in the north somewhere and they all decided to go back it would suit me.

Mr. Matthews: If the first group did that you would have difficulty with the next group.

General Bradley: If some took off across country, you would have trouble catching them.

Mr. Johnson: We did not understand that Clark was saying he would turn them over to neutrals.

General Collins: I will discuss that with Clark and Billy Harrison in Korea.

General Bradley: We talked some about using the Indians. That may be where Clark got the idea.

General Collins: Could you get any neutrals to accept this job? I doubt it.

Mr. Matthews: There were some questions on Part II which we have listed.

(Mr. Matthews handed General Bradley a copy of Mr. Johnson's paper, which General Bradley read. Attached.)[5]

Mr. Nitze: We have discussed the possibility of turning the Chinese over to the Indians and letting the Indians deal with all of them.

---

[5] The paper was not attached to the source text; for its text, see *supra.*

General Collins: The only thing in the message they are trying to make clear is that they want all of the Chinese back.

General Bradley: Couldn't we list all the people with Chinese names so that on the surface it would look like 20,000? We don't have to publish the list and we don't have to separate the Chinese from the North Koreans. It is a little dirty pool but I am beginning to think in terms of dirty pool. We can have Collins ask the question and send a message back.

General Collins: The other matter is whether we should submit alternative B.

Mr. Nitze: I thought we ought to be clear in our own minds whether we should work out something that would be acceptable to us. Do you take the prisoners up to the tent. Do you just explain and let the POWs make the choice so that there is no need for judgment on the part of the neutral supervisors. And there is the question of how you get them up north and what you do in the camps before hand.

General Bradley: There is still another thing that might fit in. Suppose you say that they can come down and get them and we will have neutral observers there. We can give them an LST to take them back. We would say we would not let them use force and take anybody back. That is a slight variation of alternative B.

General Collins: Even an LST wouldn't carry them all.

General Bradley: You wouldn't want to do it all in one trip.

Mr. Bohlen: You would only be dealing with those that said they didn't want to go back, so the number would not be very large.

General Collins: That's a possibility. Another suggestion would be to take off fifty at a time. We could put that many on a plane—C–47—and fly them to a field near Panmunjom and have them checked there. Those who didn't want to go back could get on a plane and fly south.

General Twining: I am afraid they would run back and forth in the planes in a riot.

General Bradley: I don't know what the advantage of a plane is.

General Collins: Well, it is easy to take small numbers at a time that way.

General Bradley: There must be some way you could figure out an alternative of B.

Mr. Johnson: We have done some work on that. (A draft memorandum on this subject is attached.[6]) We ought to know what we would like to see done.

General Collins: It would be far simpler for them to come down to the camps.

Mr. Nitze: I feel there would be difficulties on their side in coming down.

---

[6] The draft memorandum was not attached to the source text; for its text, see *infra.*

General Collins: There is no railroad line to Panmunjom. How do you march them up there without a guard?

General Bradley: They would all escape.

Mr. Nitze: You could have some kind of neutral guard.

Mr. Hickerson: If you took a group up and an appreciable number said they did not want to go back to the Commies and you returned them to the camps you would have less trouble with later groups.

Mr. Johnson: The difficulty is, who is the "somebody" to whom we would turn them over at Panmunjom.

Mr. Nitze: You would need some kind of guards. Maybe joint patrols as in Vienna for the mile or so they would have to travel.

General Collins: It is more than a mile or so.

Mr. Johnson: They were building a railroad to Panmunjom when we were out there.

General Bradley: You could get them within marching distance.

Mr. Matthews: We were thinking of the possibility of using the Indians.

General Collins: They don't want to check on the screening on Koje-Do.

Mr. Hickerson: They would feel differently about this. We don't think we would want to use the Neutral Armistice Commission. We would prefer a different group.

Mr. Nitze: If the Commies agreed, the Indians would certainly do it.

Colonel Matthews: You have a joint guard in Panmunjom right now. You might use that.

Mr. Johnson: Then you could have them interviewed by the Indians, say, with Red Cross observers from both sides.

Mr. Nitze: You want to set it up so that the interview would be just an explanation, so the prisoners would have a free choice. The Indians would not have to decide anything.

General Bradley: Is this something that Collins should talk over when he is out there?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, it would be useful.

General Collins: I would be glad to.

General Bradley: I doubt whether the Commies would accept that. It gives the POWs a choice.

Mr. Hickerson: We have had only one indication on this matter.

Mr. Matthews: Well, we had some indication from Zinchenko also.

Mr. Bohlen: Zinchenko wasn't as specific as Chou En-lai.

Mr. Matthews: We have tried to have Gross see Zinchenko but we don't know whether he will be able to.

Colonel Matthews: We assume we have no problem with South Koreans. We could say we agree on the Koreans, so we are only in dispute about the fifteen or sixteen thousand Chinese, and only these really need to be subject to further checking. That makes it more manageable.

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Colonel Matthews: I don't know whether we want to separate the Chinese and the Koreans that way.

General Bradley: Is that desirable?

General Collins: I have assumed that is what we were doing. Even thirteen thousand would take a hell of a long time.

Mr. Nitze: Taking five hundred a day, it would take a month.

General Bradley: You could increase the number in the groups after the first ones came back.

Mr. Bohlen: What I don't know is whether Chou was giving a solid position. The only supporting event is this Zinchenko thing which is not so clear. What is going on in the tent seems to indicate that it is not yet the line. If it is firm, I don't think the details will be too hard to work out. I persist in thinking that Panmunjom is not so important if they accept the idea of the prisoners having a choice. If they make a choice in the neutral zone, it is a worse black eye. If they come and get them they can fuzz the matter up. I think the agreement giving prisoners a choice has only a slim chance.

General Bradley: Didn't Harrison ask the Commies how they suggested we do this.

Mr. Johnson: We told him to say that, but I don't know whether he has asked it or not.

General Bradley: Yes he did ask, but he got no clear answer.

[Here follows a short discussion on the advisability of publicizing for propaganda purposes early treaties signed by the Soviet Union, including the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on repatriation of prisoners. Bohlen was opposed to using them at Panmunjom.]

Mr. Bohlen: I wonder if the time is getting close when Kennan ought to talk to the Russians. We are worried about the Indians. It can be dangerous to have the Indians interpret the U.S. Government views.

Mr. Hickerson: It is clear that Zinchenko didn't want to be used. Shouldn't we consider whether we want to propose something like Chou En-lai's alternative B? Kennan might do it with the Russians along with the point about the Russian treaties.

Mr. Bohlen: There are a lot of different ways of doing these things. The Secretary gets back today and we would want to discuss the matter with him.

General Bradley: Don't wait until Saturday night to do it.

Is there anything else?

Mr. Johnson: Well, with respect to Part I of the message, if Clark comes back and says he wants to do this shall we wait until General Collins gets there to talk to him?

General Bradley: A lot can be accomplished by sitting down and discussing a subject. Chip and I learned that when we were out there.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, that is certainly right.

Mr. Matthews: I think the Commies would regard this as giving something new away.

Mr. Bohlen: Well, if you follow the gambit of separating the Koreans and Chinese, you might mention a number.

Mr. Stelle: You might mention the number of North Koreans who would be returned.

Mr. Hickerson: I don't think we will advance it much here.

Mr. Johnson: I think we should not authorize a new number pending General Collins' talk with him.

General Collins: I thoroughly agree. You would be throwing in the last card and weakening the position. I will be in Tokyo on Saturday and I am going to Korea Sunday. I think it inadvisable to call Harrison back to talk. Clark will probably go to Korea with me, but it will be hard to have Harrison meet with us without knowledge of it getting out in the press.

Mr. Bohlen: That would be perfectly normal anyway, as I understand it. Then if something comes in from Clark we should reply that General Collins will discuss it.

. . . .

695A.0024/7-1752

Draft Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1952.

SOLUTION TO PRISONERS-OF-WAR QUESTION ALONG LINES OF CHOU EN-LAI'S "ALTERNATIVE B"

Assuming that the Panikkar report of his conversation with Chou En-lai is generally accurate, and that the Communists will in time be prepared to agree to a solution of the prisoners-of-war question along the lines of "alternative B", we will face the following problems:

1. *Forum for reaching agreement.*

Should the question be pursued at Panmunjom or elsewhere? We have now two additional channels in differing stages of development (India and Zinchenko). There is also the possibility that the Communists might move towards this position at Panmunjom; they have now in effect offered us "alternative A", and they may go on to "alternative B" at a later stage, or we might seek to direct them there. If the Communists indicate a preference for some other channel there is no objection to using such other acceptable channel. At the same time we should instruct General Harrison to explore whether the Communists are prepared to deal with this alternative at Panmunjom. (Actually, the plan of action which General Clark has recently proposed is in its general outlines not unlike "alternative B".)

2. *Text of the proposed agreement.*

There are attached a copy of "alternative B" as well as a version of "alternative B", in a form as close as possible to the Communist position and acceptable to us.

The text leaves open the character of the commission to hear the expression of views by prisoners-of-war. It would be desirable in the first instance to seek to get Communist agreement to having a truly impartial body determine the wishes of the prisoners-of-war. It might be difficult for them to refuse a body consisting for example of India, Indonesia and perhaps an Arab State. From our point of view such a body would be satisfactory for the narrow purpose of accepting custody of prisoners-of-war for interrogation and for determining their attitude towards repatriation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Communists have suggested would include the Poles and the Czechs, an arrangement which offers opportunity for "sabotage", might result in divided determinations as to what is the wish of a particular prisoner-of-war, and may lead to complete breakdown of the procedure.

We should therefore suggest an impartial commission rather than the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Nevertheless, if the Communists insist, we should agree to using the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for this purpose. We would do so on the assumption that if the Communists really want this to work, it will; if they don't the entire procedure would break down at an early stage, but, as indicated below, this would not necessarily leave us in a disadvantageous position. Further, since our basic concern is for those who would truly resist repatriation, these would in any interview make their refusal to return clear, emphatic and unequivocal and it would be difficult for the Communists to insist that the person does wish to be repatriated.

In regard to place of interview, it is important that if any of our own prisoners-of-war are said not to wish to return, they should be interviewed not in some prison camp, but rather in neutral territory and neutral custody. While there would be practical problems in making similar arrangements for the large numbers of prisoners-of-war we hold, it can be worked out, as indicated below. Panmunjom which is the exchange point under paragraph 55 of the agreement, and which "alternative B" apparently contemplates, appears the most practicable site for the interviewing. (Some other point in the neutral zone would do also.)

3. *Incorporation in armistice agreement.*

It would be preferable to have acceptable language along the lines of the attached formula inserted in the text of the armistice agreement. If the Communists prefer however it would be acceptable to us to leave the draft armistice agreement much as it is (including the present paragraph 51), provided that there is a written understanding along the lines of the above formula. This understanding could be described as a "gloss" in paragraph 51. While the lists contemplated by paragraph 51 would include the names of the persons opposing repatriation, both sides will be held to have fulfilled paragraph 51 if they offer repatriation to all persons listed, deliver those willing to go to the other side, and deliver those refusing repatriation to the Commission for interviewing in accordance with the agreed formula.

4. *How this program could be implemented.*

We would envisage implementation of the program in the following steps:

a) As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect the exchange of prisoners-of-war would begin on the basis of Article III of the draft armistice agreement and the above formula. We should, of course, seek to get as many of our 12,000 back as possible, while delivering 83,000 to the Communists, before the interviewing of the non-repatriates begins. Under paragraph 54 of the agreement, these exchanges would have to be completed within two months, but presumably it could be done more quickly if the Communists were willing. The interviewing of many thousands would take longer but the two month period could be considered modified to this extent.

The Communists however will probably refuse to return all of our prisoners-of-war before the interviewing of non-repatriates begins, but may insist on phasing the two processes. (They could always say that a number of our POWs refuse repatriation and must be interviewed.) We could live with such an arrangement if we are persuaded that the Communists will abide by their agreement.

b) When the interviewing is to begin, we would bring a small group—perhaps 50—to the demilitarized zone and give them into the custody of the guards provided by the impartial commission. (In order to make the job manageable the Commission might set up a number of teams, each including representatives of all the Commission's members, as well as Red Cross personnel, to interview simultaneously and speed the process.) The Commission would proceed, in individual interviews, to inquire whether the prisoner-of-war wishes to be repatriated (in a sense, "alternative B" gets us back into "voluntary repatriation" instead of "non-forcible repatriation", but that is inherent in "alternative B"; in fact, of course, the persons submitting to interview would be those who have already persuaded us that they would forcibly resist repatriation.) Those who change their minds and want to go home will be repatriated by the Commission. Those who continue to assert that they do not desire repatriation would be released by the Commission. They would go back to our side, but no longer be in prisoner-of-war status. Provision would be made under Red Cross supervision for their continued care in quasi-refugee status until they are settled in available destinations of their own choice.

c) So long as the procedure works, individuals are given an impartial hearing and are disposed of in accordance with their true wishes, we would continue the procedure by bringing up small groups and handing them over to the custody of the Commission. (As the early groups of non-repatriates return to our custody, those still to be interviewed will be less fearful and more cooperative.) If at any time it becomes clear that the Communists are not living up to their agreement, we would discontinue sending groups to the neutral zone and the procedure might break down. We would then claim a violation of the agreement, to be determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission or by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; if the dispute can be settled through that machinery the process would continue.

It is important to ensure that if the Communists refuse to live up to the letter and spirit of the above formula, our position is not prejudiced. If by that time we will have regained all or virtually all the UNC prisoners-of-war, the break down would not damage our position, since we will have an armistice and our prisoners-of-war back. If, however, the breakdown comes at a stage when the Communists have not yet returned substantial numbers of our own prisoners-of-war, we may find ourselves with an armistice in effect, and only limited means for putting pressure on the Communists to return our remaining prisoners-of-war. It does not appear possible that we could resume military pressure as a way of getting the Communists to live up to the armistice agreement in this respect.

In the circumstances it seems that to some extent we must rely on the Communists living up to an agreement along the lines indicated. We will have machinery for trying to settle existing disagreements, and the pressures of world opinion. Also, of course, we would continue to have large numbers of Communist prisoners-of-war (whom we would be returning in phase with the return of our prisoners-of-war to us), as a bargaining counter.

[Attachment 1]

Copy of Chou En-lai "Alternative B"

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 9, 1952.]

"UNC would accept in principle that all prisoners of war on conclusion of armistice could return to their homes; those who elected otherwise could be brought to Panmunjom, not under military escort, and interviewed there by Committee from 'neutral states agreed upon' plus Red Cross from both sides. Chinese and North Koreans would abide by views of prisoners of war as expressed in these interviews. Chou would discuss such a proposal if U.S. (assumably UNC) agreed that prima facie all prisoners of war must be assumed desire repatriation and only those who oppose, after being freed of military influence and control of KMT and Rhee agents, should be interviewed by independent body."

Another report of this conversation also includes in alternative B that there must be agreement in principle on the provisions of the Geneva Convention, with the proposed procedure described as being in implementation of these provisions. This other report also contains no mention of Red Cross, speaks of "neutral place" instead of mentioning Panmunjom specifically as the place for interviewing prisoners of war not desiring repatriation, and speaks in terms of recommendations by neutral Committee instead of determination by Committee of desires of prisoners of war.

[Attachment 2]

New Version of Alternative B

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1952.

The UNC would accept in principle all POWs on conclusion of armistice could return to their homes; those who elected otherwise would be brought to Panmunjom in small groups. Upon arrival at Panmunjom each group would be transferred to the control of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The detaining side would, upon the request of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, provide for the logistic support, transportation and such other assistance as requested by the Commission. Representatives of Red Cross Societies from both sides would be given full access to all such prisoners and would be permitted to assist prisoners in any way approved by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Under the observation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and Red Cross Societies of both sides each prisoner would be interviewed by personnel selected by the Government of India. Both sides would agree to accept as binding the views of each POW as expressed in these interviews—that is, if it is determined by the interviewer that the personnel will accept repatriation he will proceed immediately and directly to the other side and if it is determined that he will not accept repatriation he will be returned immediately and directly to the custody of the detaining side.

795.00/7-952

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1952.

Subject: Recent Developments in Korea

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson.

Armistice Negotiations

No progress has been made following the entry into executive sessions which began on July 4 at the request of the Communists. The Communists have made it unmistakably clear that their position is: (1) All the 20,000 Chinese held by the UNC must be returned; (2) The figure of Koreans to be repatriated must be "realistic" although there is obviously considerable flexibility in their position on this.

This, of course, represents no change in their position which has been adroitly and carefully explored by Harrison. In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to understand why they asked for the executive sessions. One possible explanation is that they wrongly interpreted Harrison's carefully phrased and temperate statement of July 1 as foreshadowing a change in the UNC position or, as Harrison believes, they are waiting for us to come forward with a counter-proposal.

Harrison and Clark recommended that the UNC Delegation now inform the Communists of final results of the UNC screening which has been completed. (These results are approximately 86,000 non-repatriates—72,000 Koreans and 14,000 Chinese—and 83,000 available for repatriation—77,000 Koreans and 6,000 Chinese.) This failing to achieve agreement, Harrison and Clark have recommended they be authorized to propose a plan at Panmunjom under which non-repatriates would, upon conclusion of an armistice, be turned over to a "group of neutral nations" for control and supervision and the conducting of interviews to determine the prisoners' desires. Their proposal would also embody a commitment by the UNC not to permit Chinese non-repatriates to proceed to Formosa.

We consider that it would not be wise for the UNC Delegation to introduce the figure on the results of the completion of the screening at this time—the Communists have made it clear that the revised figure would not be acceptable and our raising the figure from 70,000 to 83,000 following the Communist mention of the 110,000 figure may give them the impression that we are prepared to bargain on the figure. We also have some serious doubts on the practicability of Clark's proposal for turning the prisoners over to a group of neutrals. We discussed the whole subject with the JCS on July 9.[2] The JCS is in general agreement, and General Collins, who leaves for a visit to Tokyo and Korea the morning of July 10, is to discuss the matter with General Clark and General Harrison and submit his recommendations, probably about July 13 or 14.

---

[2] For a memorandum of the discussion at this meeting, see p. 386.

Panikkar-Chou En-lai Proposals

There have been no further developments through this channel. It now appears doubtful whether Menon even transmitted to New Delhi the text of our reply to Chou En-lai's Alternative B which we discussed with the UK Embassy June 20 and which was subsequently discussed by the UK Foreign Office with Menon. We have also not been able to determine what instructions were actually sent by the Government of India to the Indian Chargé at Peking. (Panikkar has now departed from Peking.) We are greatly concerned that the Chinese may be obtaining a very incomplete and inaccurate concept of our views. All we know is that instructions of some kind were sent to the Indian Chargé and that, being unsuccessful in seeing Chou En-lai, he saw the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs about two weeks ago. We have told the UK Embassy that this matter is too vital to be left to the vagaries and uncertainties of Menon's reporting and strongly suggested that, as a means of removing one weak link in the channel of communication, the Foreign Office consider having the UK High Commissioner at New Delhi deal directly with Nehru or the Indian Foreign Office on the question. We have also urged on the British the great importance of determining what in fact the Indian Chargé at Peking has said to the Chinese.

Zinchenko Approach to Gross

As Zinchenko's statements to Gross at the Security Council dinner on June 27 [3] appeared to bear some similarities to Chou En-lai's Alternative B and as no results were being achieved through the Indian channel, Gross was instructed on July 8 to attempt casually to see Zinchenko prior to the latter's departure for the Soviet Union July 9, outlining to him Chou En-lai's Alternative B without indicating its source. Gross was to ask Zinchenko if this was the type of thing which Zinchenko had in mind in his previous conversation, in order (1) to determine, if possible, whether Zinchenko was making a specific suggestion on behalf of the Communists; (2) to determine whether this suggestion was the same as that reported by Panikkar or in what respects it differed; and (3) to indicate to the Communists that we were not disinterested in the Zinchenko approach. However, Zinchenko refused to see Gross, saying that he was "too busy with packing".

Korean Internal Situation

With the passage by the Assembly on July 4 of the compromise constitutional amendment, the Korean internal crisis appears to have resolved itself, at least for the time being. However, we do not yet have any word that martial law has been lifted in Pusan although Rhee has ordered a new trial for the Assemblyman sentenced to death by court martial for the murder of an Army captain. Censorship has been lifted from the local press and the relay of VOA restored.

---

[3] Regarding this conversation, see telegram 986, p. 364.

The compromise amendment appears to be a sensible and, from our standpoint, acceptable solution to the crisis. Briefly it provides: (1) popular election of the President; (2) a bicameral legislature, both houses of which to be popularly elected; (3) a greater degree of Cabinet responsibility to the Assembly.

795.00/7–1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LONDON, July 11, 1952—6 p.m.

206. Embtel 161, July 10,[2] rptd Moscow 6, New Delhi 7.

1. In discussion with Lloyd this morning, Krishna Menon stated he had seen Panikkar in New Delhi, who had reported:

(*a*) Chi do not want Peiping continue to be center of substantive discussions which shld be transferred back to Panmunjom.

(*b*) Apropos Chou En-lai's alternative proposal (B), Chi wish avoid appearance of being sponsors. Inference was they wld be willing consider it if advanced by UN negoters.

(*c*) In clarification alternative (B), Chou's thought was not that POW's shld be taken to Panmunjom under milit escort, but rather that they be freed from milit restraint after arrival Panmunjom.

2. Borrowing from proposal apparently under consideration by Harrison, Lloyd suggested to Krishna Menon that in order simplify procedure, Chi POW's shld be taken to near-by neutralized island, and there screeened by neutral body, both parties accepting in advance results such screening.

3. UKHC being instructed discreetly check with Panikkar.

GIFFORD

---

[1] This telegram was repeated to Moscow and New Delhi.

[2] In the reference telegram the Embassy in London reported that it had discussed with members of the British Foreign Office the problem of distinguishing personal views and comments of Indian diplomats such as Krishna Menon and Panikkar from their factual reporting. In response to the U.S. suggestion that the British handle the Indian-Chinese contact through their Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi rather than the Indian High Commissioner in London, the Foreign Office pointed out that their man did not have ready access to top Indian officials and that Menon had previously objected strenuously to attempts to bypass him (795.00/7–1052).

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOYKO, July 11, 1952—7:04 p. m.[1]

C 51780. Ref: A. JCS 912998;[2] B. JCS 911932;[3] C. CX 51489;[4] D. JCS 910484.[5]

1. I concur that Communists proposal may be alternative *a* as reptd in ref B. The Communists freq interpretation of Para 52, draft armistice agreement, made in recent plenary sessions to the effect that POWs be permitted to rtn home and lead a peaceful life in accordance with the agreement may be an indication that they are approaching alternative *b* as set forth in ref B. This may be their way of attempting to secure our agreement to the gen principle that all POWs desire to go home.

2. In arriving at my decision to inform the Communists at an early date of the new figure to be repatriated, as set forth in Part 1, ref C, I considered the folg factors favored early release of this info:

a. The Communists have indicated specific nbr of Chinese Communist Force POWs which must be on the list to be repatriated. They have indicated a desire to discuss nbrs. It was my opinion that we should let the Communists know the extent of the differences existing between us and proceed to develop their solution, if any, as to the disposition of Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates.

b. I am of the firm opinion that the press knows the close aprx figure of all pers we can repatriate in accordance with our principle of no forced repatriation. There is the constant danger that this new figure may be prematurely exposed.

c. I consider the withholding of the new firm figure from the Communists as grounds on which the Communists and our allies might justifiably accuse us of failure to negotiate in good faith. Ref D indicated that public and allied spt for our psn in negotiations might be weakening. I do not know the evaluation of this spt at this time.

d. The Communists in recent days have shown a desire to negotiate. I consider that informing them of the new figure of pers to be repatriated and, at the same time or shortly thereafter asking them for their solution to this remaining difference, might aid in contg the Communists present attitude towards negotiations. Since entering Exec Session the Communists have avoided making false charges pertaining to our actions in Korea.

e. The manner in which opinions must be exchanged to effect any progress towards the solution stated in ref B, indicates that dev of this solution and its effect on negotiations will be slow and uncertain. Recent progress, if any, is unknown to me.

---

[1] Because of the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram, sent at 7:04 p.m. Tokyo time July 11, was received in Washington the morning of the same day. The reply was sent in telegram JCS 913383 to Clark, July 11, 1952, at 5:47 p.m. EST, *infra.*

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to the memorandum of the State–JCS discussion, p. 386.

[3] Dated June 23, p. 347.

[4] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[5] Dated June 5, p. 310.

f. Presentation of the figure represents the continuation of effort to obtain an armistice agreement based on the present wording of Paras 51 and 52 of such agreement. I feel that in view of the aprx nature of the prev figure given to them that we are in many ways obligated to inform them of the new figure recently determined. Failure to do so gives them uncertain grounds on which to evaluate their psn.

g. Presentation of the new figure at this time even though accompanied by a firm statement to the contrary might be construed by the Communists, particularly for purposes of propaganda to their own people, as indicating a concession on our part. This might put the Communists in a psn whereby they could justify to their own pers the acceptance of our figure or any subsequent proposal.

h. The new figures have little bearing on other courses of action being considered.

3. Views of the UNC Delegation sptg early release to the Communists of the new figure of POWs to be repatriated are quoted in part below:

a. "The longer we sit on the 83,000 figure the more explosive it becomes. It is not disclosure by the UN press which is to be feared, but disclosure by the Communists themselves. It is very possible that the Communists have a fairly accurate idea of the present nbr to be repatriated to their control. They have efficient intel, and our re-segregation of POWs has undoubtedly assisted them in evaluating the nbrs earmarked for rtn to their control. There is always the possibility that the Communists on their own initiative might announce that they have good evidence that for some time the UNC has attempted to hide the fact that appreciably more than the original round nbr of 70,000 persons have indicated willingness to rtn to Communist control. We would be forced to admit the truth of the accusation. The Communists could charge us with apparent intent to withhold the true figures and to falsify the results of screening for our own nefarious purposes. The impact of such an atk on our spt both at home and abroad is obvious. This possibility has been a matter of concern to the UNC Delegation for some time.

b. The Communists have come to the meetings since 1 July with the probable expectation that we have something new to offer; they probably expect us to furnish the final results of screening, since we implied as early as April, when we gave them the 70,000 round figure, that the precise total would be furnd when we had had suf time to obtain it. The exec sessions would give them the opportunity to digest in private the new totals, since the news would still be bad from their point of view. In order to bring something to the meeting they made their present proposal. They must have been reasonably certain we would reject it, and we have done so, but they probably also expected that we would counter with our proposal. It is illogical that we should now reject their proposal as unacceptable and yet not be able to lay on the table what we would accept. This is a particularly awkward sit in view of the fact that we are prepd, and are actually morally obligated, to inform them that our terms are now more fav than before. If we refuse to reveal the 83,000 figure we imply that our stand is still on 70,000, which it is not.

c. The enemy has made his proposal very clear, and I have no basis for further exploration of the meaning of his words. If I cont to explore, it is a definite indication of weakness and indecision on our part. I must take a firm stand on either 70,000 or 83,000. For the reasons stated above, it should be on 83,000."

4. I considered that the advantages, as set forth in para 2 above, for early release of the new firm figure of those POWs who can be repatriated in accordance with our psn far outweighed the possible disadvantages. I have no recent info on the progress being made along the lines indicated in ref B. Unless extremely good progress is being made along such lines, I still consider that we should inform the Communists of the new firm figure at the earliest possible date. I consider that we must make every effort to at least retain the present spt of the public and our allies for our psn. Delay in presenting the new figure affords them opportunity to charge us with failure to negotiate in good faith. If the Communists should raise the point of our failure to inform them of the new firm figure, I have no doubt that some of our allies would immediately make charges along the lines indicated.

5. Prior to informing you of my intentions to authorize the UNC Delegation to present to the Communists a round nbr of persons to be repatriated, I carefully considered any possible advantages which might accrue to us were we to withhold this info. I realized that if we were able to combine a new proposal with the info as to the new figure to be repatriated, the new proposal might be more palatable to the Communists. I realized the Communists might interpret the new figure as a weakening of our present firm psn and expect further concessions on our part; this might delay the presentation of any new solution they may be considering. However, in presenting the new figure I intend to emphasize the fact that this new figure represents our best effort to reach an agreement on the armistice in accordance with the provisions of para 51; that this represents no concession and is an accurate figure which was heretofore not available.

6. Unless positive action towards the solution indicated in ref B can be taken in 2 or 3 days I, for reasons expressed above, strongly recommend I be authorized to inform the Communists of the round nbr of persons to be repatriated as outlined in part 1 of ref C, stressing that this is no recession from our present psn.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1952—5:47 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 913383. From JCS.

1. Action you propose in para 6 C 51780[1] is approved with understanding that method of presentation to Communists of new round number of persons to be repatriated as outlined in part 1 CX 51489[2] should be modified as follows:

A. Number of persons in each category should be presented only as factual tabulation of results of completed UN screening. FYI this approach will keep open possibility that there may be some increase in total repatriated as result of some form of post armistice interrogation.
B. In reiterating proposals to permit individual interviews of nonrepatriates ref should be made to an "impartial" rather than to a "neutral" agency because of precedent established by our having accepted Poland and Czechoslovakia as "neutrals" in Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Use of word "impartial" would appear give us greater negotiating latitude in arriving at an agency or group of countries more acceptable to us for this purpose than one in which there is satellite participation.

2. Decision on part 2 CX 51489 is being withheld pending development of Communist reaction to foregoing presentation and outcome of discussions between you and Gen Collins.

3. There have been no further significant developments through channels[3] referred to in JCS 911932.[4]

---

[1] *Supra.*
[2] Dated July 7, p. 380.
[3] The reference is to Government of India-People's Republic of China channels.
[4] Dated June 23, p. 347.

795.00/7-1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Department of State

SECRET PUSAN, July 12, 1952—7 p. m.

68. Rptd info CINCUNC (for Gen Clark), EUSAK Advance (for Gen Van Fleet), Major Gen Herren DIP 36 by other means.

Initial reaction here to passage constitutional amendment was one of relief on all sides. Relaxation of almost intolerable tension during past month-and-half welcomed by everyone, including even "hardcore" of Rhee's opposition. Though universally recognized that compromise actually victory for Rhee, most non-Rhee elements reluctantly accepted it as best bargain possible under circumstances, and meanwhile hoped without much conviction that Rhee might be sufficiently mellowed by victory to lift martial law, restore measure of "free atmosphere", and perhaps make other magnanimous gestures to his chastened opposition.

During first few days after passage amendment opposition as well as "neutral" polit leaders seemed uncertain, bewildered, and inclined take fatalistic view nothing they cld do wld influence course of events, which wld be determined by Rhee and Rhee alone. This fatalism apparently shared by majority non-polit bureaucrats and other articulate groups, many of whom bitter and cynical at Assemblymen for backing down under pressure, and to lesser extent at US–UN for not taking stronger action.

As of today (one week after amendment passed) Rhee seems be making no new moves, as yet to give any public indication he prepared to let by-gones be by-gones. Conciliatory gestures in period immediately before and after passage amendment—abandonment press censorship, coercive public demonstrations, and poster campaign against Assembly and for intervention, conditional releases seven Assemblymen to permit them attend Assembly meetings and return homes and unconditional release three others held without trial—have not been followed up by further moves to test (normalcy) martial law still in effect, with no hint when it will be lifted; conspiracy trial rapidly degenerating into legal farce still continues, and atmosphere, though considerably relaxed, still anything but "free". On other hand Rhee has thus far avoided vindictive reprisals against those who opposed him during struggle of past month-and-half: No new arrests have been made, and the ROKA General Staff, despite its refusal to cooperate in campaign of Pres and his martial law commander, has not been molested.

As for opposition, though cowed and pretty well disorganized at first, it shows signs coming to life to extent of continuing rear-guard action to salvage whatever possible out of defeat. Efforts of opposition as well as polit neutrals appear to be focused on Yi Pom-Sok, who is cordially disliked and distrusted in almost all Korean polit circles and regarded as principal villain of piece. Yi is considered Rhee's logical choice as running mate and despite his unpopularity it is believed that if he runs on same ticket with Rhee and has backing Liberal Party and Rhee's own polit apparatus he is certain to be elected. Too early to say whether behind scenes efforts by various individuals to turn Pres against Yi will achieve objective, though Rhee's disparaging remarks about Yi in recent conversations with me and fact Yi has been put in place several times in Cabinet meetings suggest campaign having measure of success.

Meanwhile within Assembly, where Govt-proposed election bill now under consideration, effort being made to incorporate in it provision requiring all govt officials except Pres, Vice Pres, and members local and provincial councils to resign from office before announcing candidacy for Pres or Vice Pres—a move obviously directed at Home Min Yi. At same time, other group reportedly working to block efforts of three men to gain Cabinet posts as reward for loyal efforts in behalf of Pres.

Best I make of confused situation comes down to something like this. Rhee still holds most of cards, and can play them any way he sees fit. Key to future trend of govt in ROK is calibre of Prime Min selected and status of Yi clique. If good Prime Min emerges and Yi and other more unscrupulous members President's circle can be removed, prospects reasonably good for progress towards more enlightened, efficient, and durable admin in ROK.

While opposition weakened by defeat and less likely put up stalwart fight than in past, it is far from dead and will probably gradually recover energy. Stories of maneuvers by never-say-die Chough Byong-Ok [1] and others to form new party embracing DNP and other unspecified oppositionists may introduce new element into picture.

MUCCIO

---

[1] Chough Byong-Ok had been an early leader of the Korean independence movement and he remained throughout the Rhee years an opponent of the President.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Harrison) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)

TOP SECRET MUNSAN-NI, 14 July 1952.

Subject: State Department Paper on Solution to Prisoner of War Question, 9 July 1952, Copy 4 [1]

1. The following are United Nations Command Delegation comments on Chou En-lai's "Alternative B".

2. *a.* Since we are already committed to rescreening after the Armistice if the enemy desires it, we feel that the United Nations Command could accept the suggested plan, provided we can insure certain safeguards. In view of past Communist actions it is our opinion that at the rescreening the Communists will use every possible expedient to persuade or intimidate prisoners to return to their side. Therefore the administration and handling of the prisoners in the neutral area and during rescreening must be such that no man is coerced by physical force or threats of physical force. It is essential that the integrity of the United States be maintained above reproach.

b. Although the particular form, place, time and procedure are subject to negotiatory agreement, the details should not be difficult to work out. Pan Mun Jom is a suitable site for rescreening. Before starting to Pan Mun Jom all prisoners to be rescreened should be fully informed as to the purpose of the trip, given assurances that they will be allowed to make their own decision, and promised that they will not be turned over to the Communists by force. We feel that these prisoners must be brought to Pan Mun Jom under guard. Regardless of our explanations, many of them will be extremely fearful that they are being turned over to the Communists and may try to escape.

---

[1] See the draft memorandum by Johnson, p. 391.

c. We should not accept Chou's allegations that these prisoners are now under the influence of Kuomintang or Rhee agents, as implied by the wording of his proposal. We must not accept the presumption that all prisoners, prima facie, want to be repatriated, but rather that any person who has previously indicated he would resist repatriation will be brought to the rescreening point and allowed to make his own decision.

d. Since the Communists have never claimed that any of our people have refused to return to our control and have repeatedly insisted that it is their intention to return all of the approximately 12,000 United Nations Command prisoners of war, we should insist on the full exchange of our 12,000 for the 83,000 prior to initiation of rescreening. (We would, of course, carefully check the lists and require an accounting for the many United Nations Command prisoners of war whom they have failed to include.)

3. As an over-all comment, there will be opportunities for the Communists to argue, cavil, and delay, if they desire. Whereas the Armistice Agreement requires complete exchange of prisoners of war within sixty days, it is possible that the addition of this rescreening may provide opportunities for the Communists to cause extended delays beyond that period of time. They may hold out some of our prisoners of war until the rescreening is completed. Meanwhile they will enjoy the benefits of an armistice. If this plan is adopted I see no alternative but to enter into it in good faith with the hope that the Communists will do the same.

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1952.

Reference is made to the President's instructions to the Department of Defense for inviting Sweden, Switzerland, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia to send military representatives to observe conditions in United Nations prisoner-of-war camps on Koje Island.[2]

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson.

[2] For information on these instructions, see the editorial note, p. 319.

The matter was immediately discussed with the Embassies of those countries along the lines of the attached memorandum.[3]

Except for Pakistan, which promptly accepted, the matter has in the interim again been discussed with each of the other four countries with a view of clarifying certain questions they raised and obtaining their favorable responses. The situation may now be summarized as follows:

Pakistan accepted promptly and unconditionally.

India's slightly equivocal reply can be interpreted only as a refusal to participate.

Indonesia unequivocally rejected participation.

Sweden accepted on the condition that the three Asiatic states invited also participate. In the event the three Asiatic states did not participate Sweden desired to reconsider.

Switzerland considers it particularly important that the three Asiatic states take part in the inquiry if it is to be made and defers its final reply until it is informed of the replies of the three Asiatic states.

Thus, if formal invitations were issued under present circumstances, it appears that only one country, Pakistan, would be likely to accept and even Pakistan might well consider that its acceptance was based upon the assumption that the other four countries would also accept. It is thought that this matter can best be concluded by the Secretary of Defense transmitting to the President a letter, suitable for public release by the White House, setting forth the situation in such general terms as not to put any single country "on the spot". The letter could also carry the implication that the simple making of the proposal has served a useful purpose and that the suggestion has largely been overtaken by events. A draft letter, copy of which is attached,[4] along these lines has been informally discussed with the Department of Defense.

It is recommended that:

(1) You approve the attached draft letter from the Secretary of Defense to the President.

(2) At such time as the letter is approved by the Secretary of Defense you, possibly together with Mr. Lovett, discuss the matter with the President, fully explaining the situation and obtaining his views concerning transmission to him by Mr. Lovett of the suggested letter.

---

[3] The memorandum, which was attached to the source text, is not printed.

[4] The draft letter, which was not attached to the source text, was never sent. Secretary Lovett and the Armed Forces Policy Council discussed the letter and reached the conclusion that it should not be sent to the President, but rather Lovett should discuss the matter orally with Truman. When asked his opinion of this arrangement by Admiral Smith, Johnson agreed and noted that in view of the passage of time and loss of interest in the subject, he hoped that the issue would be closed without any further publicity; memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Aug. 7, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 14, 1952—6 p. m.
PRIORITY

241. Embtel 225, July 12,[2] rptd New Delhi 9.

1. Tel dated July 14 from acting UKHC Delhi reports as follows:

(*a*) In reply to rptd requests for clarification Chi Commie proposals, CPG has now addressed note to Indian Emb Peiping in substance it no longer willing negot on basis alternative (B); it now only interested in alternative (A).

(*b*) Kaul[3] has been instructed express to CPG his govt's disappointment and regret over this development, and add GOI does not consider door closed to negots and Indian good offices still at disposal both parties.

(*c*) Previous to Chi note nothing had ever been put in writing by CPG or Indian Emb, on subject Chou's proposals as given Panikkar.

(*d*) In view GOI, no course open other than await outcome further negots Panmunjom.

2. Tentative thinking in FonOff is cannot allow negots rest on this note. It will be necessary request further clarification from GOI. Perhaps Kaul cld reopen question with CPG pointing out unacceptability of alternative (A) which wld be not only degrading to UN but also damaging to CPG as their refusal to accept rescreening would have to be publicized.

GIFFORD

---

[1] This telegram was repeated to New Delhi for the information of the Embassy.

[2] In this telegram the Embassy in London informed the Department of State that because Krishna Menon was due to hand over his office of Indian High Commissioner immediately, the British Foreign Office would probably work through the British Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi in exploring further the Chinese channel (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[3] T. N. Kaul, Indian Chargé at Peking.

795.00/7-1452: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT NEW DELHI, July 14, 1952—6 p.m.

170. This morning in discussions with Pillai I expressed disappointment over apparent unwillingness Commies at Panmunjom to discuss second approach to prisoner question suggested to Panikkar by Chi Comm Foreign Office in Peking. I stated that instead of exploring with us various methods of assuring uninfluenced neutral screening of prison-

---

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

ers who express unwillingness return, Commies still determined all Chinese must be sent back regardless their wishes.

Pillai said this bears out msg received from Peking Saturday [2] which reported that under persistent further questioning by GOI Chargé d' Affaires, Chi Foreign Office without explanation had reversed completely its position on second approach previously suggested to Panikkar.

As result, . . . Nehru called mtg Sunday a.m., at which he and Panikkar were present. Nehru expressed his extreme displeasure and embarrassment, asked Panikkar for explanation. Panikkar stated that Chou En-lai had evidently been reversed by Mao Tse-tung.

Pillai stated GOI disturbed and annoyed but not discouraged; that still felt Comm Chi want truce; maybe they determined exhaust all possibilities first approach before taking up second. I agreed this possible, but suggested flatness Commie statements would make it increasingly difficult for them modify their position in future even though might wish do so.

Pillai expressed hope of his govt we would continue maintain patience and continue refrain from any statement which might lessen whatever hope may still exist.

Bowles

---

[2] July 12.

III. JULY 16–OCTOBER 8, 1952: DEADLOCK ACKNOWLEDGED, RECESS AT PANMUNJOM

CONSIDERATION OF RETURN OF REPATRIATE POWS AND RELEGATION OF ISSUE OF NON-REPATRIATES TO A POSTARMISTICE CONFERENCE; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND CINCUNC OPPOSITION; TRUMAN'S DECISION; UNC FINAL OFFER; REJECTION AND RECESS AT PANMUNJOM

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1952—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: A few days ago the President asked me when I was over at the White House whether I had any ideas as to a new proposal which we might make to the Communists and which might offer a way out of the deadlock. I told him about the following idea which we have kicked around some here in the JCS. We might tell the Communists that the Chinese Communist prisoners are all theirs and that they can come and get them. We would of course tell them that they could not use force. In that way, we would avoid a violation of our principle. The President thought that the idea had some merit, and he asked me to send him a paper on it. The Staff prepared a paper[2] which was sent over to him in my absence. Apparently the President thinks the idea has some propaganda value. When he gets well I am sure that he will want to discuss it with Secretary Acheson.

Mr. Matthews: Will this appeal to the Chinese Communists? Personally, my first reaction is that it can't do us any harm. I do have doubts, however, about the timing. I don't think it would be wise to make such a proposal at this time while the discussions are going forward on the present basis.

General Bradley: I agree that the timing would not be good right now. This is something we might do later if we run into a deadlock.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Chairman of the JCS General Bradley, and Vice Chiefs Generals Hull and Twining and Admiral Duncan attended for the JCS; Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC. In all, 23 persons were present. In addition to Korea, the following topics were discussed at this meeting: Southeast Asia, the Middle East Command, Trieste, and Japan.

[2] Not printed.

Mr. Hickerson: If the Chinese Communists were unarmed, would it not be likely that there would be a hell of a rhubarb when they tried to interview the prisoners?

General Bradley: There might be. For that reason we would want to insist on neutral observers, perhaps including India, to make sure that no force was employed.

Mr. Matthews: Does this proposal have any facesaving value for the Chinese Communists?

Mr. Bohlen: Not much, I think. One thing that concerns me about this proposal is that the first announcement, unless it was very carefully worded, might have very bad effects in this country if we announced that the prisoners were all theirs and that they could come and get them. I think our people would feel that we have really yielded to the Communist position.

General Bradley: Of course it involves no real change in our position.

Mr. Bohlen: I think the proposal should be stated somewhat differently than the way you outlined it to us. I think we would have to say that the Chinese Communist prisoners are all in our hands and that the Chinese Communists can come down and participate in a re-screening.

General Bradley: We would merely be saying to them that they could take back with them all the prisoners that they could persuade to return.

Mr. Hickerson: We have always agreed that any who could be persuaded to change their minds were free to return. Under this proposal, however, unless we are very careful, the Chinese Communists will be able to use a rather different kind of persuasion than we have had in mind. They might go to the prisoners and say that they have a list of all their relatives in China, and that all of these people would be killed unless the prisoners returned. We have to be careful to avoid any such situation as that.

General Bradley: Our position has been that there must be no forced repatriation but that there could be a re-screening. The only difference between this position and the proposal I have outlined is that heretofore we have insisted on re-screening by a neutral body. Perhaps this is a change of some importance.

Mr. Hickerson: I think that does represent a considerable change. We know what kind of screening the Communists did in Germany after World War II.

Mr. Matthews: I see no reason why we cannot forward this proposal to General Clark and ask his opinion of it.

General Bradley: We do not have a paper in the right form to send out to General Clark. All we really have is a basis from which we could work. Would it be helpful if Mr. Johnson and one of our people worked up a message to General Clark, using our paper as a basis?

Mr. Matthews: That would be fine with us. Have you received any explanation why the Communists have requested a new recess?

General Hull: No. They made a request and made no explanation of it.

General Bradley: Colonel Carns will work on this message[3] with Mr. Johnson.

(At this point Colonel Carns and Mr. Johnson left the meeting.)

. . . .

---

[3] The message was transmitted as JCS 913758 to Clark, July 17, 1952; for its text, see *infra.*

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 17, 1952—12:02 p.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 913758. From JCS.

1. In discussing here part 2 ur CX 51489[2] and possible other alternative plans to resolve POW issue the fol suggestion has been made:

A. We would offer to release all Chi POWs in accord with procedure whereby Commies would send reptvs to UN POW enclosures to seek to effect repatriation. It would be stipulated that Commies could not use force effect such repatriation. This procedure would be carried out under observation of reptvs of non-participating nation such as India. Those not repatriated would assume some such status as that of refugees or DPs pending their ultimate disposition.

B. Detailed arrangements to incl logistic assistance to be given by UN would be at ur discretion. As to UN prisoners in Commie hands we would be willing either to fol same procedure in Commie-held territory or accept delivery by Commies to UN-held territory provided all were made available to US.

2. Foregoing is based on assumption that problem of Korean POWs can be resolved separately by what now appears to be Commie concurrence to liberal interpretation of UNC of "home" of Koreans not desiring repatriation. If this assumption does not prove to be valid, foregoing proposal re Chinese could be applied all POWs.

3. Even if not accepted by Commies the making of such offer by the UNC and its rejection by Commies would place them in an increasingly weak propaganda position by refusing to accept challenge to their charges of forcible retention. Further objective would be to place Commies in position of being required to offer an alternative solution ac-

---

[1] This telegram, drafted during the State-JCS meeting on July 16 (see *supra*), was concurred in by the Department of State. The Naval Aide to the President advised General Bradley that President Truman approved the plan in principle as one to be sent to CINCFE for his comments. (Memorandum by Carns to Bolté, July 17, 1952; JCS files, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

[2] Dated July 7, p. 380.

ceptable to UNC or unmistakably demonstrate their lack of desire for armistice.

4. Request ur comments.[3]

---

[3] For Clark's comments, see CX 52284, p. 415.

795.00/7–2652: Telegram

The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1952—5:46 p.m.

DA 913958. From G–3 signed Jenkins.[1] In further discussions here of plans to resolve POW issue suggestion has been made that UNC suspend release of CIs and increase number of persons to be repatriated by balance of CIs still in UNC custody. New total figure would then more closely aprx round number desired by Communists, and might provide face-saving device for them. Upon coming into effect of armistice, CIs could be released to return directly to their homes under principle already accepted by Communists for POWs whose homes are in UNC territory.

G–3 has been asked to request your comments.[2]

---

[1] Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3.
[2] For Clark's comments, see C 52204, *infra.*

795.00/7–2652: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, July 19, 1952—1:57 p. m.

C 52204. Re DA 913958.[2]

1. I do not concur with any action that would disrupt the planned release of civilian internees now under way, and which is progressing satisfactorily.

2. While there are many reasons for continuing the present release program of those civilian internees who elected not to return to Communist control, I believe the fol are most pertinent:

a. As evidenced in executive sessions during the past several days, the key to a successful armistice has rather definitely been resolved to be the disposition of the 20,000 CCF POWs we now hold.

b. The advantages outlined in CX 69687[3] accruing to the UNC by releasing civilian internees, approved by you in your JCS 910811,[4] are still valid. About 10,000 CIs have been released to date and by mid-August the remainder of the 27,000, except for those hospitalized in Pusan, will be freed. Any attempt to cancel or delay this program which we announced publicly, and to which we gave our full support, would cause an instant revulsion from ROK; destroy completely the favorable support received from ROK; provide the Communists with an excellent propaganda weapon; and probably most important from our point of view—there would certainly be incidents of riots among those civilian internees not yet released that we could not control without violence and bloodshed. Consideration must also be given to the possible reaction of the people of the nations of the free world.

---

[1] Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram, which was for G–3.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Dated June 5, p. 314.
[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 316.

c. If the Communists are seeking any face-saving device by increasing the total round nbr which they can claim have been returned to them or released to proceed to their homes in South Korea, it would be simple for them to include the 27,000 total in their announcement of final results.

3. In view of the above, I plan to follow the original release program without change.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, July 19, 1952—4:58 p.m.

C 52205. Ref C 52147.[1]

1. Gen Harrison's comments on the armistice session, 18 Jul, as reptd in ref, were genly as fols:

a. The Communist statement is no different in substance from what they have been saying since 2 May.

b. The enemy's actions in negotiations since the latter part of March appear to have been dird towards an armistice provd the terms are acptable.

c. The Communists may be bluffing at this time because they think they see indications of weakness or indecision on our part.

d. Firmness is essential if we are to convince them that we are not wavering from our psn of no forced repatriation.

2. Gen Harrison proposed making a strong statement reiterating our psn and indicating our intention of going out of exec sessions unless the Communists could present a convincing reason for retaining the exec nature of the session. I do not concur with our initiating action to change the nature of the sessions at this time for the folg reasons:

---

[1] In this telegram, dated July 18, Clark transmitted to the JCS the substantive record of the executive session of that date. The gist of the meeting was the complete rejection by the Communist Delegate of the round figure of 83,000 (76,000 Korean and 6,400 Chinese) POWs desiring repatriation on the grounds that it was "unrealistic" and failed to include 20,000 captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers (FE files, lot 55 D 128). The UNC had presented the 83,000 figure on July 13 along with a proposal that both sides prepare up-to-date lists of POWs. The Communist Delegation had asked for a recess to study the figure and the proposal and then gave their answer on July 18 (Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* p. 274).

a. Communists presumably proposed the exec sessions for some specific purpose, the intent of which is not as yet apparent. Their reasons may be:

(1) To ultimately present a solution to the armistice disagreement after feeling out our psn on minor changes to their previous proposal.
(2) A psychological move to raise the hopes of the free world for an early agreement.
(3) Tied in with the Chinese Communists expressed contention of recognizing the Geneva Convention with certain reservations.
(4) To direct the attn of the free world to Pan Mun Jom, thus diverting attn from Communist actions in other parts of the world.

b. The four day recess rqstd by the Communists was undoubtedly for the purpose of securing instructions or a decision as to their future actions after our submission of the new figure of POWs to be repatriated. If the Communists operate in their normal manner, I doubt whether they would introduce their new proposal, if any, in the initial session after rec such instructions.

3. I have dird Gen Harrison to initiate no action to go out of exec session; however, should the Communists initiate such action, he is authorized to concur with their proposal. I have also suggested that, in addition to statement reiterating our psn, he question the Communists in a manner designed to clarify their proposals and endeavor to determine if there is a hidden meaning contained in them which we have not as yet detected.

795B.00/6–3052

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1952.
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

DEAR JOHN: Thanks for your letter of June 30 [1] which I now hope has been entirely overtaken by events. As you saw from a telegram [2] addressed to you and Clark on planning for intervention, the JCS and ourselves thoroughly agree that it was most important that you fully participate and I am very disappointed that Tokyo did not see fit to carry out those instructions. You can be sure that we would not have approved anything here unless and until we were satisfied that you also concurred. Hensey seems determined to get a military government setup established in Korea in one way or another, but he most definitely does not have any support in Defense here.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 368.

[2] Presumably, Johnson was referring to telegram JCS 912098 to Clark and then passed to Muccio, June 25, 1952; for its text, see p. 358.

It seems to me that the crisis probably resolved itself the best that could be expected. Nevertheless the result will be greatly to complicate our ability to inspire enthusiasm among our friends for helping Korea, particularly in the economic field. If and when we ever get into any political talks it will also make it exceedingly difficult to obtain all-out support from our friends for the ROK. I hope that Rhee thoroughly appreciates this.

I am greatly discouraged over the lack of any progress at Panmunjom. Two weeks ago there seemed to be a few rays of light trying to break through the dark clouds, but those now seem to have disappeared, although everyone keeps hoping that some magic formula will resolve the issue.

We are working hard on your replacement and I am hopeful that a decision can be reached within the next week so that you will be able to shake the dust of Pusan from your feet in exchange for the soot and sidewalks of New York.

I am seeing that your friend, Paul Douglas', assertions concerning his role in Korea are brought to the President's attention.[3] I hope that we can do something about him, but you can fully appreciate the difficulties.

Pat joins me in sending our very best.

Sincerely yours,

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

---

[3] Dr. Paul Douglas was President of American University and unofficial adviser to President Rhee. Presumably he was representing himself as a special, unofficial envoy of President Truman. When Secretary Acheson brought this matter to the President's attention on July 21, 1952, Truman declared, in Acheson's words, that he "does not know Dr. Douglas, has had nothing whatever to do with him and states most emphatically he does not represent the President in any way whatever." The complete record of Acheson's conversations with Truman on July 21 can be found in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238.

795.00/7-2652: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, July 21, 1952—4:06 p. m.

CX 52284. References: A. CX 51489.[2] B. JCS 913758.[3]

1. I have carefully analyzed the suggestion as set forth in Reference B and while I have serious doubts as to its feasibility, I am willing to try any approach that may produce an honorable armistice. At this time it appears doubtful that the Communists will accept any solution to the POW problem which does not assure them of the return of the bulk of the Chinese Communist POWs. At various times throughout the negotiations we have offered them numerous choices whereby the POWs

---

[1] The following names were handwritten on the source text: Nagle (S/S), Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson. Presumably they received copies of the telegram.

[2] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[3] Dated July 17, p. 411.

who have elected not to be repatriated would be afforded an opportunity to state their desires to representatives of neutral nations, impartial nations, and the ICRC or Joint Red Cross teams, the foregoing to be with or without the participation of mil forces of both sides or under the obsn of mil forces of both sides. They have consistently rejected all such solutions. If proposal as set forth in Reference B can be interpreted by the Communists as an opportunity to conduct unrestricted political reindoctrination without our camps prior to final determination of the desires of the POWs concerned, it may have some attraction for them and thus be acceptable.

2. In commenting on your suggestion, I visualize that it would be accomplished genly along the fol'ng lines:

a. The UNC would continue administrative and logistical support of non-repatriates including nec security to prevent escape.

b. A pre-determined nr of Communist representatives under the obsn of representatives of some non-participating nation would be afforded access to the POW incls containing non-repatriates. While in such incls, they would be allowed complete opportunity, excluding forceful means, to persuade non-repatriates to return to Communist control.

c. Non-repatriates who, after a course of reindoctrination in Communist doctrine, decide to acpt return to Communist control would so inform the representatives of the non-participating nation or the camp official.

d. POWs having thus announced their desires would then, under the obsn of representatives of the non-participating nation and accompanied by Communist and UNC representatives, be moved to a selected repatriation pnt. Representatives of the non-participating nation would insure that no force is employed against the repatriates. Representatives of the UNC would insure that any indiv who changes his mind enroute to the repatriation pnt is not allowed to escape from mil control and would effect his return to POW incls.

3. To be acceptable and to enable us to execute the suggestion along the lines indicated above would, in my opinion, require that:

a. It be predicated on the foling:

(1) Reindoctrination to be accomplished after an armistice is effective and concurrent with the repatriation of those POWs who have prevly stated they desire to be repatriated. (This should permit completion of reindoctrination prior to the convening of the political conference.)

(2) Theory of reindoctrination be applied to non-repatriated POWs held by either side and under the same condition.

(3) Upon termination of the pd during which indoctrination could be accomplished, the remaining POWs would become wards of the retaining side to be relocated insofar as possible in accordance with the desires of the POWs. (An assurance on our part that the remaining Chinese POWs could not be permitted to proceed to Nationalist China might aid in securing agreement to this pnt.)

b. Agreement be secured with the Communists on the following pnts:

(1) That we would continue present admin of our POW camps and maintain armed guards at or in the immediate vicinity of POW incls.

(2) A specific limit on the pd of time during which this program of indoctrination would be contd.

(3) A specific limit on the nr of representatives to be employed in reindoctrination and to be permitted access to POW incls.

(4) Routes and manner of mvmt behind the front lines of the respective sides.

(5) The manner in which, or the agency to whom, POWs would make known their desires to be repatriated.

(6) The manner and conditions under which POWs who have expressed a desire to return to their homes would be moved to repatriation pnts.

(7) Freedom of the press in observing the entire procedure.

c. We give no assurances of immunity against atk by POWs while the representatives employed in the reindoctrination program are within the POW incls. (This pnt could involve many complications. If we allowed armed guards to accompany these representatives while engaged in reindoctrination, Communists could accuse us of intimidating the pris and interfering with such program. If the representatives are allowed to enter the compounds unarmed and unaccompanied by guards, we can expect many of the POWs to violently resist the reindoctrination program. The Communists would then accuse us of having ordered our paid spies and agents within the compounds to attack their representatives. I believe however the last alternative listed above is the best solution provided it is previously announced and well known.)

4. Your proposal involves a procedure of repatriation similar to that employed to effect the repatriation of displaced persons in Austria following WW II. As you are well aware, I was directed to grant repatriation teams of the Soviet Union access to camps of displaced persons, in order to allow these representatives to "persuade" the inmates of the camps to return to their homes. The Communists used every subversive means aval to intimidate and terrorize these displaced persons. They engaged in espionage and other similar activities throughout the area to which they were allowed access. Their arrival at camps occasioned waves of violence and suicide. I was finally forced to order these repatriation teams out of the US Zone. Should the suggestion which you have advd be adopted, I can foresee a repetition of the foregoing incidents. In addition, even though prior agreement has been made on the pnts listed in Para 3 above, we must anticipate that the Communists will endeavor to employ nrs in excess of those agreed upon; that they will insist that the pd of time allowed to accomplish the reindoctrination should be extended, that they will maintain that our armed guards necessary to insure the scty of the POW camps are in effect intimidating the POWs and preventing proper reindoctrination; and, should the Communists succeed in coercing, intimidating, or otherwise persuading

the majority of the Chinese Communist POWs to return to Red China, there may well be innumerable charges and counter-charges pertaining to POW activities involving the UNC, Nationalist China, Red China, the non-participating or neutral nation, and the US. Should the Communists insist, and the non-participating nation agree, that the preponderance of the Chinese Communist POWs desire to be repatriated, it might well result in many POWs figuratively and literally being repatriated at the pnt of a gun. Should the press of both sides be allowed free access to all activities, and such force be used, we would be in a position of publicly abandoning the principle for which we stood so firmly.

5. It is considered that your suggestion has two possible advantages over that as set forth in Part 2 of Ref A. These are:

a. It should be more appealing to the Communists.

b. It places no responsibility for determing ultimate disposition of any remaining POWs on any country or groups of countries. As such, it may be easier to secure agreement of some non-participating country to supervise this opn.

6. If we are to continue developing proposals to present to the Communists in hopes of thus inducing them to reduce their terms for an armistice, I feel that the procedure set forth in Part 2 of Ref A should be attempted prior to presenting the proposal contained in Ref B. By presenting them in this order, suggestion contained in Ref B could be construed by the Communists as a concession on the part of the UNC.

7. India's previous efforts to aid in arriving at a solution to the armistice may imply that she would be willing to compromise our principle of no forced repatriation in order to achieve an early settlement. Thus it might be desirable to obtain the services of some other nation to effect supervision of the reindoctrination and observation of the repatriation of those individuals who may change their minds.

8. I feel that the difficulties and possible repercussions inherent in your suggestion indicate that all other possible solutions should be thoroughly investigated prior to introducing it in negotiations. If it is decided that this is the only feasible means of achieving an armistice and still attempt to maintain our firm psn pertaining to no forced repatriation, I will make every effort to secure Communist agreement to such a proposal and to reduce to the min the possible difficulties and complications which I feel certain will dev.

795.00/7-2352: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 23, 1952—8 p.m.

426. Rptd info Delhi 14. Embtel 332,[1] July 17, rptd Delhi 13. Fol reported by UKHC Delhi in tel dated 22nd.

1. Kaul reported he had seen Chang Han-fu, expressing disappointment his govt over turn of events which had caused it considerable embarrassment; nevertheless, GOI willing continue good offices if required.

2. Chang in reply expressed CPG appreciation GOI efforts and stated CPG wished retain its contacts with GOI this question. Chang made it clear, however, CPG would insist repatriation all Chi POWs and screening of whatever nature unacceptable. Chang abused UNC violently re Yalu bombing and more recent air attacks, but characterized these actions as "19th century gun boat tactics" which would have no effect whatever on Chi and North Koreans.

3. In circumstances, Nehru believes it would be useless make further approach this subj for present.

HOLMES

---

[1] This telegram contained: 1) a message from Eden through the UKHC to Nehru expressing concern that the People's Republic of China refused to pursue the Chou proposal; 2) the Indian response to Eden's message; and 3) speculation by Indian and British diplomats as to the effect the Yalu bombing had on the Chinese attitude (795.00/7-1752).

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 25, 1952—5:59 p.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 914523. From JCS reur C 52493[1] and C 52553.[2]

1. JCS-State have noted termination of executive sessions and Communists proposal to initiate staff ofcr mtgs concurrent with open plenary sessions. This development necessitates reappraisal of our position. Feeling here is that Communists probably aim to extract some propaganda advantage from this move; in fact, timing of it on eve of Red Cross Convention opening in Toronto 26 July[3] suggests that it may be part of broader Communist propaganda plan. We neither desire to pro-

---

[1] In this telegram, dated July 25, Clark transmitted to the JCS Harrison's brief report that the Communist Delegation had proposed to go out of executive sessions and that he had agreed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[2] In this telegram, dated July 25, Clark transmitted to the JCS the substantive record of the meeting in which the Communist Delegation proposed ending executive sessions and in which the UNC Delegation agreed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[3] Among the official delegations to the International Red Cross meeting in Toronto were the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Members of the Department of State expected that these delegations would use the meeting for propaganda purposes (memorandum by Sargeant to Acheson, July 18, 1952, not printed; FE files, lot 55 D 128).

vide Communists another propaganda forum at this time nor do we wish to see negots return to propaganda level if it can be avoided. We recognize that Communists will probably make strong propaganda statement at first open session. This statement may well require reply by UNC in similar vein; however, we consider it preferable from overall viewpoint that any UNC statement be factual and dispassionate résumé of UNC position. Assuming that question of Chinese POWs constitutes major issue, we consider it desirable to avoid giving undue prominence to it. We realize that some propaganda value might be gained from exploiting facts in this case; however, such exploitation can only make it more difficult for Communists ultimately to accept or to acquiesce in non-repatriation of some Chinese POWs. Accordingly, unless specific point is raised by Communists, we consider it desirable in public statements for UNC to speak in terms of overall 83,000 figure and avoid breakdown of figures as between Chinese and Koreans.

2. While we have no objection to resumption of open plenary sessions, we see no useful purpose in holding plenary sessions on daily basis at this time. To do so would probably result in negots reverting to propaganda level. At same time recess will probably cause some concern among Communists as to our intentions and may contribute to convincing them of firmness of principle on which we stand. Moreover, it will give us time we need to develop fully our next move. On other hand, daily staff ofcr mtgs will serve to refute possible Communist charges that by recessing UNC seeks to disrupt or terminate negots.

3. In view of foregoing, but subj to considerations that may develop within conference and any comments you may wish to make, JCS–State:

a. Have no objection to return to open plenary sessions and initiation of staff ofcr mtgs.

b. Desire that initial UNC statements in open plenary session be factual and dispassionate and avoid reference to Chinese POW issue. This should not be construed as restricting UNC in rebutting Communist charges.

c. Authorize you at an appropriate but early time (at first open session if you desire) to propose a 7-day recess in plenary sessions. If Communists reject this proposal, you are authorized unilaterally to recess for same period. It would be understood that staff ofcr mtgs would continue.

4. This msg transmitted to CINCUNC Adv for info in order to expedite handling at your end.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State (Meloy)

[Extract] [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1952.

Subject: 9:30 Meeting in the Secretary's Office

Participants:	Mr. Acheson	Mr. McFall
	Mr. Matthews	Mr. Howe
	Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Martin
	Mr. Jessup	Mr. Kitchen
	Mr. Sargeant	Mr. Meloy
	Mr. Nitze	

. . . .

Item 2. *Neutral Observers for POW's in Korea*

The Secretary discussed with Mr. Matthews a letter to Secretary Lovett which was before him for signature.[2] His only criticism was that the letter made it look as though we had not very seriously tried to do what the President had told us to do in the matter of obtaining neutral observers to inspect the prisoners-of-war camps in Korea. He left the letter in Mr. Matthews' hands and asked that it be revised.

Item 3. *Briefing*

Mr. Howe reported on the truce negotiations in Korea, on the situation in Germany and on Soviet press treatment of the situations in Egypt and Iran.

Item 4. *Approach to Soviets on Korea*

Mr. Matthews said that the problem of a possible approach to the Soviets on Korea had been under discussion in the Department. A new telegram [3] had been worked out asking for Kennan's comments. Should an approach be desirable we did not know whether we should talk to Vyshinski or to Stalin. If Kennan agrees that an approach would be useful, we would then consult some of our trusted allies before making the approach. The Secretary agreed to read the draft telegram.

Item 5. *Red Cross Meeting in Toronto*

Mr. Sargeant brought up the matter of whether or not we should use the 13 treaties [4] in the Red Cross meeting in Toronto in light of the

---

[1] The following additional topics were discussed: ANZUS military, Egypt, wheat for Pakistan, money for Israel, and consultation with Congress.

[2] The letter is not printed, but see the memorandum by Allison to the Secretary of State, July 14, p. 405, for more information.

[3] For the text of this telegram, which was sent later on July 25 as telegram 92 to Moscow, see *infra.*

[4] In a State–JCS meeting July 9, 1952 (see p. 386), the question of using for propaganda purposes early treaties, signed by the Soviet Union and embodying the principle of non-

Continued

contemplated approach to the Soviets. How should we tie this in with the proposed approach? Mr. Matthews stated his view that it had been agreed that use of the 13 treaties in Toronto would not preclude an approach to the Soviets in Moscow. Mr. Bohlen thought that in light of the approach it would be better to use the treaties in Toronto but not in the Korean armistice negotiations. Mr. Matthews pointed out, however, that it was our intention to follow up in Korea any use of the 13 treaties in Toronto. Mr. Nitze felt that it would be better to tell Toronto to hold off on any use of the 13 treaties until further word from the Department. The Secretary said that after he reads the proposed telegram to Kennan he will then talk to the other interested officers, as to instructions on the use of the treaties. The Secretary stated that he feels we should not hesitate to do what we have to do, and that the results of any approach to the Soviets are so uncertain that we should not hamper our movements elsewhere for fear of compromising these problematical results. He will discuss the matter.

. . . .

FRANCIS E. MELOY, JR.

---

forcible repatriation, was discussed. In a summary of the "facts" about the POW issue, prepared by Johnson in connection with telegram 92 to Kennan, the treaties were listed. They included Brest-Litovsk and others signed between 1918 and 1921. This summary, which was attached to a memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, July 25, 1952, is not printed. (795.00/7-2552)

795.00/7-2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 25, 1952—7:30 p. m.

92. Part I. USG has been giving careful thought to present status Korean armistice negotiations and where we go from here. For a while there were encouraging signs leading us to hope that Commies may be preparing to make necessary concessions to achieve armistice; e.g., Panikkar–Chou conversation June 15, Zinchenko conversations with Rafael and Gross, as well as Commie requests in Panmunjom for executive sessions and for four-day recess during week July 14. Since then, howev-

---

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tokyo as telegram 268, "eyes only" for Murphy and for Clark's information.

The drafting history of this telegram is substantial. On July 24 it was redrafted in light of a discussion among Matthews, Bohlen, Nitze, Bonbright, Hickerson, Johnson, and Barbour on July 23; memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, *et al.*, July 24, 1952, not printed (795.00/7-2452). Secretary Acheson wrote on this memorandum, to which was attached a draft of the telegram, the following: "Gave Matthews my views on this, July 25, 1952." A memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, July 25, 1952, not printed, probably provided an accurate reflection of Acheson's views. They were that the telegram should include a concrete spelling out of the proposal to be made to the Soviet Union and a clear indication that it was only tentative as Clark's view had yet to be solicited. When both Clark and Kennan presented their observations, the U.S. Government could take a final position (795.00/7-2552). These suggestions were incorporated in a new draft. Barbour and other members of EUR/EE made minor revisions and successfully pressed the argument that the approach did not merit being put to Stalin (memorandum by Barbour to Johnson, July 24, 1952, not printed; 795.00/7-2452).

er, Peiping's disavowal of its "Alternative B", and Zinchenko's refusal to see Gross were discouraging signs; at Panmunjom, Commie attitude since recess has been complete intransigence with no promise of change.

Dept has been considering desirability of having UNC negotiators propose at Panmunjom some variant on Panikkar's "Alternative B". We have decided, however, that at present such a step wld not be desirable, since it wld almost surely be rejected and might give impression that we were weakening on our firm position. We are inclined to feel time has come for strong effort to determine whether Commies do or do not desire an armistice. We are, therefore, considering whether it is now desirable to reopen Korean question with Sov Union, making clear that our position on principle of non-forcible repatriation of PWs is firm and final, and put it up to Commies whether there will be peace in Korea or not. We visualize this step as in nature probing action as well as stimulant to exertion Sov influence on Chi and NKs, which might at least elicit possible indications of Sov attitude toward armistice or continuance hostilities this time.

However, before reaching a decision on this matter we wld appreciate your views as to: (1) likelihood that an approach to Sovs at this time cld exert any favorable effect on armistice negotiations or indicate Sov attitudes toward continuation hostilities in Korea; (2) to whom such an approach shld be made, we assume Vishinsky, but we wld like your views on whether approach shld possibly be made to Stalin; and (3) nature of approach. With regard to last point, we particularly have in mind question of whether approach shld be confined to generalities in an effort to have Sovs exert their influence on NKs and Chi to resolve issue at Panmunjom, or whether we shld put to Sovs a specific formula for resolution of issue, possibly along gen lines of Chou En-lai's Alternative "B". We also recognize that nature of approach wld vary considerably dependent on whether it is made to Vishinsky or Stalin.

It is our thought that in making any such approach it wld be important to avoid giving impression of overeagerness or weakening on our part, and, while stressing seriousness of failure of armistice negotiations, avoiding anything which might be construed as a threat. (In this regard you will recall Kirk–Vishinsky talks, Oct. 1951; Deptel 249 Oct. 3 and Embtel 586 Oct. 5.)[2] We wld also consider it desirable that while, particularly if talk is with Vishinsky, it might be well to leave an entirely informal text of your remarks, there shld be no formal communication to Sov Govt.

Part II. There is given below for your comment our preliminary views on content of such approach.

---

[2] For the text of these telegrams, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 987 and 1001, respectively.

You might open by stating that it is now more than one year since Malik made his public suggestion concerning an armistice in Korea and Kirk obtained from Gromyko clarification of Sov views in this regard. US Govt considers that UNC armistice negotiators have displayed unprecedented patience in dealing with Chi and NK negotiators. In spite of difficulties, slow progress has been made and agreement has been reached on all substantive portions of armistice except question of whether UNC wld be under obligation to use force to repatriate prisoners violently opposed to being returned to Chi or NKs. This question has now been in issue for seven months. Although NK and Chi Commie negotiators have refused to be explicit, it appears that they may be willing resolve Korean POW problem by accepting 76,000 Koreans who UNC has indicated are available for repatriation. If this is actually case, only question holding up realization of armistice in Korea is Chi insistence that UNC be required to use force to repatriate the approximately 14,000 Chi "Volunteers" who have indicated to UNC they wld violently oppose being returned. UNC has made every effort to reach agreement, but Chi and NK negotiators have remained intransigent.

Sovs will understand US position on this subj. It long ago became evident that some POWs captured by UNC consider themselves deserters from Chi and NK armies or political refugees and that they wld violently resist being repatriated. In circumstances, public opinion US and other countries participating in Korean action wld react most strongly against use of force by UNC troops to send such persons back to NK and Chi. US Govt and other participating govts are entirely in accord on this matter and peoples of these countries are virtually unanimous in insisting on this position.

You wld make it clear that question is basic and no compromise possible on fundamental problem of whether force is to be used against prisoners resisting return. Neither US nor other countries have slightest desire to retain a single prisoner. There is no desire or intention to enroll them in any country's mil forces, or make any other particular disposition of them. Indeed UNC inability to return these POWs will leave us with serious problem as to what to do with them.

As UNC has made it clear in negotiations, we have made every effort to encourage maximum possible number of POWs to return. Interviewing process was designed to assure return of maximum possible number, and UNC has made clear its entire willingness to return any others who change their minds and indicate a desire to return. UNC has also made clear its willingness to have POWs interviewed again by impartial body in presence of observers of both sides and to agree to the return of any additional POWs who in such interview indicate they will not resist repatriation. In fact, as we have indicated, so long as it wld not involve use of force to repatriate prisoners resisting return, UNC willing to consider any arrangements or procedures for interviewing or disposition of POWs.

US is discussing this matter frankly with Sov Govt as it hopes that Sov Govt, in view of attitude it has expressed in past on this subj, will fully understand US position. USG has noted that at end World War I Sov Govt entered into some 15 internatl agreements which explicitly provided that return of POWs wld be conditional upon their willingness to go back to their homeland (list of treaties set forth in immed fol tel [3] not repeated to Tokyo). In World War II also it has come to our attention USSR has on several occasions assured enemy soldiers that they wld be repatriated or sent to another destination of their choice. In Korea itself, Commie negotiators have admitted that they released large numbers POWs during hostilities and even incorporated them into their own armed forces, instead of keeping them available for repatriation.

US desires to see end of fighting in Korea and has made patient and persistent efforts to negotiate armistice to this end. It has gone as far as it can or will go. Failure to achieve armistice in Korea wld aggravate explosive situation which cannot but cast heavy shadow over prospects of restoring peaceful conditions in FE and elsewhere. Without achievement armistice in Korea there is little if any prospect for any real solution other problems besetting our two Govts throughout world. You might conclude by inquiring whether Sov Govt will use influence with Chi Commies and NKs to end that they will take positive steps toward solution POW problem, in order that conclusion armistice in Korea may no longer be delayed.

Alternatively, instead of inviting Sov suggestions, you cld propose that a possible solution to question, which UNC is prepared to put forward at Panmunjom if Soviets think it worthwhile, would lie in NKs and Chi agreeing to accept the more than 83,000 prisoners which UNC is able immed to return in exchange for the approximately 12,000 they hold. Chi (and if Commies insist, Korean) POWs who have indicated to UNC they wld violently resist repatriation cld be brought to the demilitarized zone in small groups where they cld be released from UNC mil custody into custody of reps of impartial country such as India. Reps of such an impartial country wld arrange conditions under which prisoners cld in presence of Natl Red Cross Societies of both sides individually express his attitude with regard to repatriation in an entirely free atmosphere without even possibility of coercion or pressure of any kind from either side. Those who did not express an intent violently to resist repatriation wld be free immed to return to NK or Chi control and the others wld be returned to UNC side whereupon they wld immed be released from POW status. If Soviets turn this down we might still ask them for counter-suggestions.

---

[3] The reference was to telegram 93 to Moscow, July 25, 1952, not printed (398.571 TO/7-2552).

Foregoing concrete proposal possibly to be put to Sovs reps only tentative US Govt thinking. A proposal of this kind is subj to numerous variants which might be acceptable to US Govt. Your suggestions with regard to details this concrete proposal wld be appreciated. Clark's views are also being requested.

Part III. While Dept believes you have some background info re POW question immed fol tel (not repeated to Tokyo) contains summary of facts this queston for your info and, if it is decided to make an approach such use as you consider appropriate. If you desire additional info, not contained therein or in Depcirtels on Korean briefing mtgs, Dept will supply it.

ACHESON

795.00/7-2952: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET   MOSCOW, July 29, 1952—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

201. Have given careful thought Deptel 92, July 25 [1] re Korean armistice. My views on specific questions raised by Dept follow:

1. Do not think it likely approach to Sovs at this time would exert any favorable effect on armistice negots unless we could demonstrate to Sov Govt by actions as well as words that alternative to prompt action by Sov Govt to bring about armistice wld be one having serious disadvantages for Kremlin.

2. Do not think any overt approach to Sov authorities would be apt produce much info on Sov attitudes toward continuation hostilities in Korea, unless it were one which, as per above, were backed up by some real means of pressure.

3. Not only do I feel such approach wld not be useful for purposes Dept has mentioned, but think it might actually have unfortunate and dangerous effect on general pattern of Sov-West relations unless, again, it were backed up by some real means of pressure.

4. Should it nevertheless be decided to make an approach, I think it should not be addressed to Vyshinsky. It would appear as a repetition of Kirk's approach last November and fact that Kirk's warnings of that time had proved as yet unsubstantial would not incline Vyshinsky and those who stand behind him to respect any warnings I might utter.

5. While deploring approach to Stalin now for general reasons, thinking it even uncertain whether I wld be received, I would consider this preferable to approaching Vyshinsky. In case of approach to Stalin

---

[1] *Supra.*

would recommend that instead of confining discussion to Korea and making empty-handed plea for Sov help there an effort be made to discuss entire spectrum of US-Sov relations with him in such manner as to give grounds to hope that Korean question might eventually fall into place as part of general pattern. However, I reiterate I mention this only as something preferable to trying to talk about Korea alone, and do not consider that it wld be wise, on balance, for us to approach Stalin at all now.

6. Doubt very much, in any case, that any progress could be made in this matter by any overt approaches at official level. They would be bound, it seems to me, to become known abroad if not here and to put both Rus and Chi on spot. In fact, consider that such approaches might actually nullify whatever possibility might otherwise exist for inducing Soviet by quieter means to use authority in interests of achieving armistice.

KENNAN

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, July 30, 1952—4:33 p. m.

C 52788 Refs: A. Deptar 914536.[1] B. State msg 268, 25 July.[2] C. CX 51489.[3] D. C 69351.[4] E. CX 52284.[5]

1. In commenting on the gen aspects of the proposal as set forth in ref B, I do not believe that, under the circumstances which exist at this time in Korea and at Panmunjom, Russia would see fit to intercede to cause these countries to agree to our terms for an armistice so long as there remains the remote possibility that additional concessions may be secured from the UN.

2. I agree that the time has arrived for us to determine if the Communists do indeed desire an armistice. Since no one doubts Soviet control of the Korean war, a dir referral to either Vishinsky or Stalin, preferably the latter, might bring an ans to the question. However, considering the sit which now exists in Korea, I believe the diplomatic approach as set forth in ref B is premature, and:

a. Would be construed as an indication of weakness on the part of our government to refer to the Soviets what up to now has been a purely mil negotiation, without first exhausting every possible effort at

---

[1] In this telegram, July 26, the Chief of Staff of the Army requested CINCFE's comments on the approach outlined in telegram 92 to Moscow. (DOD files)

[2] Printed as telegram 92 to Moscow, p. 422.

[3] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[4] Dated May 31, p. 270.

[5] Dated July 21, p. 415.

Panmunjom. Being construed as a weakness, the Communists would cont their efforts to secure additional concessions, thus causing more delay.

b. If they so desire, the Soviets can, by stalling on an ans, cont delay of an armistice indefinitely.

c. Our approach to the Soviet government would be used as a strong propaganda wpn by them. They could claim, with credibility, that the UNC openly admits its inability to secure an armistice through mil means, and must turn to the good offices of the Soviet Union to solve its problems.

d. I do not consider it advisable to present through diplomatic channels the alternate proposal contained in second to last para, ref B. Since this is detailed procedure and mechs of exchange, it can more aproply be presented at the armistice conf.

3. As indicated above, I feel the gen approach you outline in ref B is premature. We have not yet exhausted positive action which we can take at Panmunjom toward realizing an armistice. The effectiveness of dir governmental intervention would probably be increased and be more acceptable to our allies if it were plainly evident that our negotiators had reached an absolute impasse. It logically fols that we should first introduce the proposals outlined in part 2, ref B, and part 2 of ref C. Failure to achieve sat results would then bring us to unilateral recess as set forth in para 6 *c,* ref D.

4. I believe it to be essential that at this time we avoid all actions which might be construed by the Communists as a weakening of our psn and those which indicate to the Communists that it may be vital for us to achieve an armistice in Korea. To accomplish the foregoing it is nec that we be firm on the battlefield, with contd emphasis on aerial atk of North Korean mil tgts, firm in our statements and firm in our actions at Panmunjom, and that this firmness be fully supported by aprop statements and actions taken at governmental level both by ourselves and more particularly by our allies.

5. While I cannot fully evaluate here the use of the diplomatic approach, I have grave doubts if any approach to the Soviet Union will produce worthwhile results. One similar to that set forth in ref B might possibly be of ultimate value only if properly timed and presented at a high level in a clear, forceful, and non-conciliatory manner. The presentation of such a proposal should be made after all efforts at Panmunjom have failed, and possibly in conjunction with the unilateral recess of negotiations, ref D. By presenting it at that time we would increase the effectiveness of the recess and reduce any inference of weakness. I feel that the approach should be based on the concept of one dominant world power approaching another on equal footing. It must be assumed that the USSR is fully acquainted with the details of all of our proposals during the armistice negotiations. We should strongly imply that we are fully aware that there would have been no Korean war without

Soviet sponsorship, and that it could not have contd without their active support. A simple and dir presentation of the Korean impasse to the USSR, properly timed and without much hope of making progress, would however strengthen our case worldwide, merit western support, and would reduce the likelihood of the Soviets capitalizing on inferred weakness. A dir approach can be made either formally or informally—that is, Kennan to Vishinsky, or the United States government to the USSR, preferably the latter, stressing that:

a. United States Government fully realizes the dir influence which the Soviets have exercised in Korea.
b. Months of negotiating make it clear that the only place to obtain a dir ans is through representatives of the Soviet Union.
c. Through mil negotiations, agreement cannot be reached, obviously because Soviet support for continuation of the war has not been withdrawn.

6. In presenting our case we should ask the Soviets if they have any solution to the question of the Chinese pris that will be acceptable to both sides. We should make clear that we are willing to cooperate in any reasonable approach, but cannot agree to forcibly repatriate any POWs. If we receive no ans, or if it is plainly indicated the USSR will not assist in obtaining a solution for an hon armistice, we might then inform that we have reached a point at which it appears we have no recourse but to refer the Korean sit to the United Nations. This could be accompanied by whatever implied threats and pressures which our government could make.

7. I believe the alternate proposal as set forth in next to last para of Part 2, reference B, has merit if presented at Panmunjom. It may be more acceptable to the Communists and less final in nature than the one contained in Part 2, ref C. I consider that the thought expressed in para 7 of ref E remains applicable.

8. In view of the foregoing, I feel that the diplomatic approach to determine if the Communists do desire an armistice as set forth in ref B should be held in abeyance pending future devs. Based on the above analysis and the facts aval to me here, I recm that I be auth to introduce the alternate proposal contained in Part 2 of ref B. If this does not produce favorable reaction, I further recm that I be auth, at a time of my choosing, to present the proposal outlined in Part 2, ref C. I have discussed this subject at length with Bob Murphy who is in complete agreement with the gen views expressed herein.

795.00/7-3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, July 30, 1952—midnight.

208. Kentel. Deptel 101, July 29.[2] Immed sitn Korea is, of course, for Russia two-edged sword. Advantages to them as means of tying up our forces and draining our strength are obvious. But it has disadvantages as well. Holds Amer forces in undesirable proximity to Vladivostok. Gives excuse for our maintaining larger forces in vicinity Japan than wld otherwise be necessary. Diverts Chi Commies from Formosa and other objectives. Continues to build up Chi claim to future voice in Kor affairs, which can scarcely be agreeable to Moscow. Finally has given major boost to US rearmament.

However, we must assume sitn of past few months has been on balance satis to Sov interests, or at least sufficiently so that it has not been worth their while as yet to put major pressure on Chi to come to agrmt about armistice. After all, if what Russians were worried about one year ago was that momentum of our mil operation might carry us again into north of peninsula, the sitn that has existed in past year of fruitless negots, marked as it has been by virtual standstill of land operations, has probably suited them just as well as actual cease-fire by agrmt, if not better. Only way we cld have contrived to keep Sovs interested in success of negots wld have been to keep pushing Commies periodically in such way as to threaten renewed UN advance. Fact that operation actually came to near standstill and Chi and North Koreans were successful meanwhile in increasing their strength probably made it unnecessary on balance for Sovs to press for actual agrmt. However, balance must be for Sovs a fairly close one, and present sitn cld change at any moment.

Sovs are probably less interested in formal armistice than in polit arrangement which wld cause both Amers and Chi to leave Korea. Their desire for such solution is surely aimed at Chi no less than US. Think it possible Sovs might be inclined to help US in pressing for any agrmt which wld provide for gen removal of fon troops. But mere armistice agrmt itself probably does not serve Russian interests any better—indeed may be thought by them to serve them worse—than continuation of present sitn. It wld get neither Amers nor Chi immed out of Korea and wld merely mean that we cld presumably do with somewhat fewer forces there and wld suffer less bleeding.

As for POW question, Sov leaders have no reason to be pleased with our position. If impression were to become established that POWs are not to be forced by US to return to country of origin upon completion hostilities, considerable portion of Sov Armed Forces might become unreliable in event future war.

---

[1] Copies of this telegram were provided to Matthews, Bohlen, and Barbour.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

This is particularly sensitive point with Sov Secret Police who lost face and suffered major defeat in their own special purposes by defections from Red Army in recent war. They wld like to see it demonstrated in Korean War that Amers do return prisoners of war by force. They wld then see to it this became widely known in Sov Army where it wld serve as an excellent protection not only against defection but even against failure of troops to fight to bitter end in possible future war.

Cannot see that there shld be any reason for Sovs to help US out in Kor armistice beyond limit already dictated to them by their own analysis of their own interest. If reason had already existed for Sov influence to be exercised in major way, this wld presumably already have been done. An approach from US adds nothing to their assessment of their own interest and only serves to make them suspicious. Wld have been easier for Sovs to use their influence and make it effective if not approached overtly by US, than after being so approached. If approach is made and becomes known, they cannot exert influence successfully on Chi without (1) appearing to yield to Western pressure, which they wld regard as demonstration of weakness, and (2) giving impression that Chinese were yielding to Sov pressure, impression neither Chi nor Sovs wld care to give. Thus overt Amer approach on dipl level wld probably damage, rather than improve, possibility for exertion of Sov influence to bring about cease-fire.

To enhance Sov interest in promoting cease-fire at this time it would be necessary to find some means for convincing them failure achieve cease-fire wld again jeopardize their interests. Space does not permit exhaustive discussion this point here, nor am I in position to weigh all factors involved, but my personal opinion is best line of approach to creation such sitn wld be measures designed make it evident that if cease-fire not soon achieved we wld consider failure of Chi to agree cease-fire, added to their original offense in entering Korea and their shameless spreading malicious falsehoods through their propaganda machine, as evidence of intolerably hostile and provocative attitude toward US, freeing our hands for whatever action against them we might find it desirable to take. Movement in this direction wld involve a number of progressive steps. These wld have to be so ordered and determined as to preserve due flexibility and make it possible to halt process if and when Russians concluded cease-fire desirable and began to use their influence accordingly. Important avoid abrupt overt mil steps on our part, particularly in Manchurian area, which cld bring about invocation Chi-Sov alliance. What I have in mind are steps in nature of blockading and harassing operations along China coast, hit-and-run raids, gradual introduction of selective strategic bombing in central and southern areas, etc. Also these shld be carefully coordinated, designed to weary Chi, to throw them off balance, over-strain their economy and transport. All shld be accomplished in such manner as to avoid (1) unhealthy polit commitments to Chiang, (2) suffering to Chi civilian population as direct effect our action, and (3) any unwise attempts at penetration on land which cld result in getting finger caught in door.

So much for examination of possible approach from standpoint of Korean situation itself. Feel such approach wld also have implications and consequences from gen standpoint Sov-Amer relations and that these cannot be ignored.

Every evidence decisive power exercised today within Sov regime by group heavily committed to policy which has been not only bitterly hostile to all non-Commie govts (this is after all only basic Bolshevik ideology) but has not hesitated to abandon or neglect respectable ties to West on scale never before attempted in Sov practices and to burn bridges over which there might be possible retreat from existing arrogant and provocative tactics in case they shld be unsuccessful. These people have obviously taken position there wld never be another time when Kremlin wld have need even to pretend to deal respectfully with non-Commie regimes abroad, that this was dependable and safe conclusion, and that one cld confidently accept whatever risks might be involved in a totally arrogant and defiant policy, attaching no value to reactions of non-Commie govts themselves, denying Sov Govt had anything either to gain or to fear from their reactions.

In order that this attitude may be understood, two things must be borne in mind. First, Sov policy has consistently been to eliminate every situation by which non-Commie govts cld bring any pressure to bear on Kremlin by any means short of war. This has been largely successful, and too, there is little we cld do to these people short of war that wld make any impression on them. When Molotov was withdrawn as FonMin, relatively powerless and uninformed cut-out inserted in his place, regime of total isolation established over dipl corps and similar adjustments made in other channels of contact with outside world, this amounted in effect to severance dipl relations with major Western countries without Sov Govt having to accept onus for actual break. Attitude of Sov leaders has been that if we chose to continue maintain dipl mission here despite fact that all opportunities for legitimate activity in this city had been withdrawn, they wld not object. This meant in their view mission maintained only for intelligence and espionage purposes, since no other purposes cld be served by its maintenance. Two cld play, they figured, at this game. But this brand of dipl relations means little to them. They are remaining in UN only because peace movement is not yet strong enough, in their view, to provide hopeful competitor to UN. Accordingly, they might be slightly disturbed at any developments or possibilities with respect to dipl relations with Western countries which might threaten their premature expulsion from UN. But anything short of that holds no terrors for them. And they do not think we will break relations, for they consider our thirst for such shreds of intelligence as we can collect by remaining in Moscow sufficient to override any reactions of irritation or resentment we might occasionally feel over their general dipl behavior.

Secondly, they are not afraid of mil threats because they feel our mil plans depend on ripening of our own mil preparations rather than on anything they may do short of actual attack on US. In other words, just as they have made themselves immune to presssure from US by any means short of war, so they assume we also will not be provoked into war until our defense preparations have advanced much further than they have today. And for reasons too extended to go into here, they are not too easily scared with prospect of war generally. They realize many of its dangers and disadvantages and wld like at this time to avoid it. But they do not fear it, particularly in sphere of strategic bombing, as much as we might think they ought to. In any case such fear as they may have, together with their calculation of our intentions, is at present not sufficient to cause them to modify arrogant and defiant policies they have been following in world at large, and we must not over-rate price they wld pay to avoid war, particularly if forced to act under threat.

This, I repeat, appears to me to have been situation prevailing roughly since withdrawal Molotov as FonMin.

Believe major sponsors this line of policy to be Malenkov and Beria, probably with support certain other minor Politburo members. Unquestionably this line has had Stalin's approval, and suits in most respects his gen temperament and cast of mind. It is based of course on analysis of world situation which portrays Western world as caught up in series of dilemmas and weaknesses which, together with unrelenting pressure that will continue to be brought upon it by Commie Parties and front groups, will weaken it progressively to point where any mil effort it cld eventually put up against Commie forces wld be extensively and significantly undermined.

Believe I see signs that this policy, which after all represents reckless and over-confident commitment to single line of analysis and calculation, has been coming under increasing strain here in Moscow. Strain has set in precisely at point of greatest vulnerability, which is estimate of world situation and degree of capitalist weakness. Logic wld indicate there must be misgiving in Sov circles over very considerable errors that have already become clear in official view of "crisis of capitalism" and over gen implications of any policy so lacking in traditional dialectical ambivalence, so deeply committed to single line of advance, so devoid of strategic flexibility and avenue of retreat. These misgivings must tie in with stubborn remnants pro-Amer feeling in intellectual circles and population at large, of which we see frequent indications. Believe they have also been supported in minor way by my own arrival here, interpreted by critics of present policy as indication that alternative does exist, that Western world wld not hesitate to provide tolerable channels for restoration of overt relations if Kremlin wished to take advantage of them. Believe these sentiments have found support in manful reserve, dignity, and independence of US policy generally in recent months, i.e., by our refraining from attempts at high level approach, by our not doing things which appeared to assume community of aims between ourselves and Sov leaders, by our sticking to our knitting in strengthening Western world while leaving Sov leaders strictly alone. This sort of confident reserve and dignity of bearing is well-qualified to strain nerves of people committed to thesis we are slipping, and to encourage critics of their policy.

One angle which must not be forgotten in this connection is probability that such differences as may exist today over problems fon policy are interfused with struggle for power in Politburo under shadow of coming crisis of succession. Suspect center of disaffection concerning fon pol may today be in entourage Molotov. (It is vitally important, incidentally, there be no talk about this in Western circles that can be traced to reporting from this Embassy, and preferably no talk at all.)

Beria and Malenkov hold between them police and party apparatuses. Molotov has no comparable weapon. Source of his authority and prestige in Politburo during period World War II probably arose from fact of his control over negots with capitalist govts, then considered important to vital Sov interests. With virtual breaking of relations, with West and his withdrawal from Fon Ministry, think it likely he lost large portion of his influence. Suspect he might welcome restoration of overt negots with West as only means of restoring himself to position importance and influence.

Consider it of greatest importance we do nothing this juncture that might affect these possible Sov differences in manner unfavorable to our own interests. To my mind it is plainly essential that men responsible for extreme Sov policies of recent years and for contemptuous attitude toward reactions Western Govts in particular shld be discredited by course of events at this juncture and that hand of those be strengthened who may have misgivings with regard such policies. Last fall Sovs gave Vishinsky warning about unfavorable consequences that wld flow from failure to achieve Korean armistice. Nothing more has been said on that subj. Since my arrival here I have left Sov Govt strictly alone except to make to Vishinsky one serious expression of concern about anti-Amer campaign. Feel instinctively that this reserve on part our govt in gen, and of myself in particular, is having beneficial effects here and shld by all means be continued. In particular, am convinced it has been wise decision our part that I shld not ask for interview with Stalin. We have taken initiative too many times, and he has taken it too few, in such contacts. In my opinion he is not likely to be worth talking to unless and until initiative comes at least half way from him. It is our business to create situation in which it will be in his interests to take such initiative.

If I go down now either to Vishinsky or Stalin with empty-handed appeal for their help re Korea, feel this will surely be seized upon by group now in authority as vindication their policy in general, and of violently anti-Amer line in particular. They will say in effect "You see, it is just as we told you: the Amers do not dare take any of this very seriously; their position is too weak; you can treat them any way you please and they will be back on your doorstep in few months with requests for your help". This would be particularly unfortunate in present peril of electoral . . . at home.[3] Ruling group here have probably nurtured hopes that in turmoil of elections, or change admin, rifts wld appear in firm structure our policy of which they cld take advantage but if this does not occur, and if we maintain firm attitude of determination and silence until new admin firmly in saddle at home, think there is good reason to hope signs will then begin to appear of more cautious and tractable attitude of Sov regime in its dealings with us. But is precisely this that might be disturbed, and misleading impressions created here, if I were to go to Sov Govt now with any requests to them concerning Korea not backed by tangible means of pressure by which we cld force them to see things our way.

Admittedly, much of above rests on intuition rather than demonstrable proof. But I know no other way in which we are apt to arrive at useful appreciations about major Sov political realities. I think past appreciations founded on intuitive judgments, where these were backed by all we could muster in way of experience and seriousness of interest, have generally proven close enough to realities to warrant us in continuing to treat them with respect.

KENNAN

---

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

INR-NIE files

National Intelligence Estimate [1]

TOP SECRET
NIE–55/1

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1952.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA [2]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through mid-1953.

ASSUMPTION

The hostilities in Korea are not expanded on UN initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist military potential in Korea has been substantially strengthened since the beginning of the cease-fire negotiations. Troop strength has approximately doubled. Jet fighter strength has more than doubled. Combat effectiveness has improved and is now believed to be good to excellent.

2. The enemy is capable of launching a major ground and/or air attack with little or no warning. However, there are no current indications of Communist intent to launch large-scale ground or air operations in the near future.

3. There are indications that Soviet participation in enemy air operations is so extensive that a *de facto* air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR. The USSR almost certainly believes that additional commitments of Soviet air power could, under methods presently employed, be made in North Korea and Manchuria without serious risk of expanded hostilities. However, it is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned aircraft could be committed over UN-held territory without a grave risk of global war.

4. The Communists now possess the capability of seriously challenging the UN air effort in Northwest Korea as far south as the Chong-

---

[1] National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups, coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

[2] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 28 July 1952."

chon River and of expanding their air operations southward into forward UN-held territory and adjacent waters.

5. We believe that, during the period of this estimate, the Communists could not drive UN forces from Korea unless a major Soviet effort were applied. We do not believe the USSR will be willing to accept the grave risk of global war which such a commitment would entail.

6. The Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding global war over the Korean issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice.

7. Despite the capability to continue the war in Korea, we believe that internal economic and political considerations are probably exerting pressure on the Chinese Communists to conclude hostilities.

8. The Communists in Korea appear to be prepared for either a resumption of full-scale hostilities, an indefinite military stalemate, or an armistice. Although the possibility of a renewal of full-scale hostilities by the Communists cannot be ignored, we believe that the Communists will continue to negotiate and will not take the initiative to break the present military stalemate.

9. We believe it probable that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, we believe that the Communists will protract the negotiations so long as they consider that they can win advantages from the POW or any other issue, and so long as they estimate that a continuation of the Korean war does not entail grave risk of global war.*

10. If an armistice is concluded, we believe that the negotiation of a political settlement will be complicated by Communist injection of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea.

11. Whether or not a political settlement is achieved, we believe the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. The Communists will proceed to redevelop North Korea as a militant and armed Satellite, and to subject South Korea to subversion, sabotage, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.

DISCUSSION

I. The Military Situation in the Korean Area

Communist Military Forces in the Korean Area

12. *Ground Forces.* Enemy ground forces in the Korean area have

---

*The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, concurs in the conclusion that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, he finds that this paragraph carries two inferences which are not warranted by available intelligence:

a. That the Communists would give in on the POW issue if the UN stands firm; and,

b. That the Communists might accept UN cease-fire terms if the UN were to threaten an expansion of the Korean war.

Although the intelligence available does not deny, it equally does not support, these inferences. [Footnote in the source text.]

almost doubled in personnel strength during the year since the truce negotiations began:

Strength of Enemy Ground Forces in Korea

	July 1951	*July 1952*
North Korean	232,000	267,000
Chinese Communist	277,000	680,000
Total	509,000	947,000

In addition to the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) now in Korea, approximately 300,000 reserves from all areas of China could be committed provided that Peiping does not initiate hostilities elsewhere in Asia. A further 200,000 troops could be committed provided the Communists were willing to reduce their garrisons in China proper.

13. Fire power of the Communist armies has been substantially increased by a major program of reorganization and re-equipment and reinforcement. North Korean (NK) armored units have been brought up to strength in equipment and new units have been organized. The CCF has introduced new artillery units into Korea and has provided some organic artillery for tactical units. Enemy antiaircraft artillery units have increased and the employment of fire control radar has made their antiaircraft fire more effective.†

14. Extensive training programs have overcome the serious losses of trained personnel incurred by the Communists in the spring offensives of 1951. These programs have placed particular emphasis on small-unit tactics, leadership courses for noncommissioned and company grade officers, and political indoctrination. Most officers of the grade of regimental commander and higher have had combat experience in Korea and they are firmly indoctrinated Communists. Morale throughout the Communist forces is excellent. Combat effectiveness is considered to be good to excellent.

15. The Communist logistic position has been improved in the long period of fairly static operations. A year ago Communist supplies had

---

†As an example of the improvement in Communist fire power, the enemy fired an estimated total of 8,000 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition in July 1951. During the month of June 1952, the Communists fired an estimated 187,000 rounds—the highest total of enemy artillery and mortar fire recorded during any one month of the war. In comparison of rates of fire, the UN forces fired over 1,100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition alone during the month of November 1951. Greater UN capability in ammunition resupply is the primary reason for its superiority. Normally, the ammunition resupply capability of the Communists is only about 7 percent that of the UN. By conserving and stockpiling ammunition during the lull in hostilities, however, it is believed that this resupply capability has been increased to about 50 percent of that of the UN, but this rate probably could be maintained only for a limited period of time, especially in offensive operations. This capability probably would be reduced in the event of an extensive movement of enemy artillery. [Footnote in the source text.]

been depleted and critical shortages existed in most classes of supply. There are now sufficient supplies in forward supply points to support a major sustained offensive of from 5 to 10 days, and there are no known shortages of major items.

16. *Air Forces.* The Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) ‡ is estimated to have available a total of approximately 2,100 combat aircraft of various types and some 200 small piston-type trainers. Included in the total combat figure are approximately 1,300 jet fighters. Approximately 1,300 combat aircraft (including 850 jet fighters) are believed to be in Manchuria and the remainder based in China proper, primarily around Peiping, Shanghai, and Canton.§

17. By US criteria the Communist air force in the Korean-Manchurian-China area is believed to be reaching a fairly high standard. Since there are strong indications of extensive participation of Soviet personnel in actual combat flying, however, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the continuing improvement in combat effectiveness reflects increased proficiency of Chinese Communist pilots. Since April 1952 the sortie rate has substantially decreased. Communist fighter pilots who have been encountered have: (a) displayed willingness to engage F-86's; (b) demonstrated varying degrees of combat proficiency; (c) intermittently harassed UN fighter bombers in the Chongju-Sunchon area; (d) occasionally launched attacks from cloud cover and used overcast for evasion; and (e) launched frequent night attacks on UN light and medium bombers.

18. Airfield construction and repair has been underway in North Korea since June 1950. At present there are approximately 33 airfields in North Korea which are or could become suitable for military operations. Of these there are two, close to the Yalu River, which are operational for jet operations. In addition, six others, if repaired, could handle sustained jet operations. Since the UN/US air forces have repeatedly bombed most these airfields, their serviceability varies from time to time depending on the rate of repair and the frequency of UN/US attacks. It is believed, however, that all these fields could be repaired and made operational within a short period of time if UN attacks on them were curtailed.

19. Within Communist China an intensive airfield repair and facilities build-up has produced a good system of airfields capable of handling all types of aircraft now or potentially available to the CCAF. In Manchuria eight jet airfields are now being used operationally. The recently developed air facilities in Manchuria are so located as to provide excellent

---

‡North Korean air units and the Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communists are included with the CCAF in this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

§See Tab "A" and Tab "B" for a tabular and graphic presentation of Communist air strength since the outbreak of the Korean war, together with a strength forecast through the period of this estimate. See Tab "C" for CCAF aircraft performance characteristics. [Footnote in the source text.]

bases for the air defense of Manchuria; some are also so located as to permit Communist jets to range over North Korea and immediately behind UN lines.

20. The CCAF is wholly dependent upon Soviet aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and technical personnel. Most supplies received from the USSR, including POL, must be sent via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to transshipment points on the Manchurian border, and thence distributed over Chinese rail nets to Manchuria and China proper. A portion of the petroleum products supplied by the USSR is shipped by tanker from Vladivostok, Dairen, and the Black Sea area to Chinese ports, principally Tsingtao. We have almost no information concerning the size and location of aviation POL stockpiles, but we believe that CCAF operations at the present time are not hampered by a shortage of POL. (See Tab "D" for estimated CCAF POL requirements.)

21. There are indications that Soviet participation in enemy air operations is so extensive that a *de facto* air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR. The USSR almost certainly believes that additional commitments of Soviet air power could, under methods presently employed, be made in North Korea and Manchuria without risk of expanded hostilities. However, it is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned aircraft could be committed over UN-held territory without grave risk of global war.

22. *Naval Forces.* The small prewar North Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in the Korean war. In recent months, however, utilizing a miscellaneous collection of sampans, junks, and fishing craft, the North Korean Navy has conducted several successful small-scale amphibious operations against UN-held offshore islands. It has also conducted mining operations in coastal and harbor waters and manned an increasing number of coastal defense batteries.

23. The Chinese Communist Navy is not an effective fighting force. In the unlikely event of its entry into the Korean war, its activities would be limited to surprise raids on UN surface vessels by motor torpedo boats, mine warfare, and small-scale amphibious raids.

Communist Military Capabilities

24. *Ground Force.* The Communist ground forces in Korea are capable of the following courses of action:

a. A large-scale offensive with little or no warning;
b. Offensives to obtain limited objectives;
c. Defense in depth for a prolonged period of time;
d. Defense on successive positions;
e. Limited guerrilla operations in South Korea.

Each of these ground force capabilities could be greatly enhanced by an all-out air offensive. We do not believe, however, that such an air offensive would improve enemy capabilities to the extent necessary to force a UN withdrawal from Korea.

25. If hostilities continue on the present scale, we believe that Communist capabilities will continue gradually to improve during the period of this estimate. There will doubtless be improvement in fire power and logistic capability; the development of air support techniques for close support of Communist ground forces may accompany increases in Communist air strength and effectiveness.

26. The Communists now possess the capability of seriously challenging the UN air effort in Northwest Korea as far south as the Chongchon River and of expanding their air operations southward into forward UN-held territory and adjacent waters. Specifically, at the present time, the Communist air force in the Korean area has the capability to carry out the following operations:

a. Large-scale day interception in Northwest Korea;
b. Night interception under good visibility conditions in Northwest Korea;
c. Air-to-air battle of attrition with UN/US air forces in an effort to eliminate UN/US F-86 aircraft;
d. Limited fighter attacks against UN/US ground forces, forward airfields, and other forward installations;
e. TU-2 bombing of targets in South Korea and adjacent waters. (The range of these attacks would be limited if the Communists considered jet escort necessary.)

27. The assignment of jet bombardment aircraft to the Korean area would greatly enhance these capabilities.

28. Air defense has a high priority in Communist China. With Soviet assistance, and possibly direct participation, the Chinese Communists have established a visual observer and radar air warning net which gives almost complete coverage from Hainan Island northward along the coast, through Manchuria to the Soviet frontier as well as some coverage in the interior. In addition, there are Soviet-trained, and possibly Soviet-operated, antiaircraft defense units along the coasts for the protection of industrial areas, harbor facilities, airfields, and communications and supply network. Some important inland industrial and military installations are likewise defended. In Manchuria, where there is a concentration of enemy jets, vigorous day fighter defense, and an active night fighter defense under conditions of good visibility, could be anticipated. Elsewhere in China, the CCAF may be able to deploy enough aircraft to defend a selected specific area against air attack, but the present available forces are too sparsely deployed for effective defense against simultaneous attacks against several areas.

29. We believe that the CCAF will probably be built up to a total of at least 2,500 aircraft by July 1953 irrespective of the outcome of the cease-fire negotiations. (See Tab "A" for projected strength of the

CCAF.) Furthermore, the over-all air defense capabilities of the Chinese Communists with regard to early warning, ground-controlled interception and antiaircraft capabilities will probably continue to increase.

30. *Naval Capabilities.* Chinese Communists and North Korean naval capabilities will probably continue to be negligible during the period of this estimate. (See paragraphs 22 and 23 above.)

II. Factors Affecting Communist Courses of Action in Korea

Soviet Global Interests

31. Whether the Kremlin estimates that Soviet interests in the Far East can be advanced by a prolongation or by a termination of the war in Korea depends in large degree on Soviet world-wide strategy. If, as we believe probable, the Kremlin would prefer to move toward the attainment of its objectives by means short of global war, the Kremlin would avoid courses of action in Korea which would entail increased risks of global war. While the Communist aggression in Korea has involved, throughout, an inherent risk of global war, the Kremlin has sought to limit its own role in the Korean war and has not sought to use the war as an excuse for initiating broader hostilities. The Kremlin thus appears desirous of avoiding global war over the Korean issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice.

32. On the other hand, if present Soviet strategy envisages an early global war, which we believe is less likely, the Kremlin would probably seek to keep US military forces tied down in Korea regardless of the risk of global war.

Sino-Soviet Relations

33. The Korean war must already have raised the problem of the distribution of its burdens between Peiping and Moscow. Although there is no evidence that this problem has yet weakened the Sino-Soviet partnership, a prolonged Korean war might produce friction between the two governments. It is highly unlikely, however, that such frictions will, within the period of this estimate, create major divergences in the policies of the two powers with regard to Korea.

The Internal Situation in Communist China

34. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean war the political and economic prospects of the Peiping regime were favorable. Internal control had been largely established; the regime enjoyed a considerable amount of popular support; fiscal stability appeared assured; and the government had announced its intention to devote its attention to a long-range program of economic development. Although the war in Korea stimulated national consciousness and intensified anti-foreign sentiment, the postponement of domestic reconstruction programs in order to finance the war greatly reduced the prospects of economic improve-

ment, and tightening of police measures decreased the regime's popular support. The Chinese Communist Government has had sharply to increase its mobilization and expenditure of human and material resources. Political, economic, and social strains have developed which, while not reducing the current capability of the Chinese Communists to carry on the war, will increasingly affect the long-term political and military capabilities of the regime.

35. The burden of the Korean war has been heavy. Available evidence, although extremely fragmentary, indicates that Chinese Communist Government military expenditures probably doubled in 1951 over 1950. Austerity has been keynoted by the regime during the past year. Western trade restrictions have undoubtedly added to the economic difficulties of the Chinese Communist regime. The operation of the existing productive plant at near capacity levels has created serious maintenance problems, notably in the vital railways and power plants. The requirements of the armed services and a rapidly expanding bureaucracy have confronted the regime with severe shortages of administrative and technical personnel.

36. The Chinese Communists have undertaken drastic measures to meet the requirements of the war as well as to solidify their political power. Taxes have been increased, and irregular levies have become more frequent. Propaganda activities have been greatly expanded to eliminate potential opposition and to increase the centralization of authority and the popular support of the war effort. Organized programs of terror have sought to purge the government administration and eliminate the power of the business and bourgeois classes.

37. The Chinese Communists probably have the capability, with continuing Soviet assistance, to support their war effort at current or expanded levels for at least the next year. Current production of consumer goods is likely to be maintained and crop prospects both in China proper and in Manchuria are favorable. However, the regime almost certainly estimates that indefinite prolongation of the war will seriously retard its domestic development program and will increase popular disillusionment with the regime. Despite the capability to continue the war in Korea, we believe that internal economic and political considerations are probably exerting pressure on the Chinese Communists to conclude hostilities.

The Internal Situation in North Korea

38. Increasingly severe food shortages, continued destruction of industrial facilities and power plants, and vanishing prospects of unification have caused deterioration of civilian morale in North Korea. Serious unrest has been prevented by shipments of consumer goods, principally food, from the USSR and Communist China, and by Communist control measures.

39. The highly effective apparatus of control developed by the North Korean regime prior to the outbreak of hostilities remains basically intact. There is no evidence of serious deterioration in the effectiveness of the police, or of the presence of subversives in the armed forces and administration. In addition, the North Korean propaganda organization, for a time badly disrupted, has been strengthened during the current military lull.

40. Even though a prolongation of the war will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on internal conditions in North Korea, this will probably have little bearing on Communist courses of action in Korea. Since the North Korean regime is controlled by the USSR, its interests will be subordinated to the global or regional interests of the USSR. However, Soviet policies in Korea will presumably be influenced to some extent by the Soviet desire to restore North Korea as a "model" Satellite of the USSR and by the fear of increasing Chinese Communist influence in the internal affairs of North Korea.

Political Developments in South Korea

41. The recent political crisis between Syngman Rhee and the Assembly ended in a substantial victory for Rhee. There continues, however, to be conflict among Rhee, some of his supporters in his recent actions against the Assembly, and the Assembly. The constitutional changes effected as a solution to the political crisis will probably foster increasing friction among President, Prime Minister, and Assembly. In view of US pressure as well as international disapproval, however, it is probable that Rhee will be disposed to refrain from further openly unconstitutional actions and flagrant acts of intimidation. The security of the UN forces has been maintained as a result of the ROK political settlement, but over a period of time the efficiency of the South Korean military forces may be weakened by the appointment of political supporters of Rhee to high command.

42. Communist propaganda concerning the political conflict in South Korea has treated the conflict as evidence of the unpopularity and deterioration of the Rhee regime. However, political developments in South Korea, unless they seriously weaken the UN military position, will probably have only minor influence on Communist actions in the area.

III. Indications of Communist Intentions

Military Indications

43. Communist military activities in Korea or elsewhere provide no conclusive indications of Communist intentions. Despite the great strengthening of Communist military ground force capabilities since the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Communists have maintained a generally defensive posture. The ever-increasing Communist air potential is not in itself an indication of an imminent expansion of the enemy air effort over Korea. However, the military strength and

disposition of the Communist forces are such that an offensive could be launched with little or no warning.

Propaganda Indications

44. Communist propaganda has reflected continued intransigence on the POW issue in the armistice negotiations, and has stressed Communist determination not to be intimidated by military pressure. At the same time the propaganda has stressed the Communist desire to continue the truce negotiations.

45. However, there have been some indications in Communist propaganda which can be interpreted as preparations for a cessation of the Korean war. There has been a growing tendency in the last six months to discuss the war in the past tense and to emphasize the benefits which the Communists have achieved from the war. The domestic propaganda of the Chinese Communists has emphasized the regime's internal program. North Korean propaganda has also given less attention to the war and more to "normal" propaganda themes such as North Korean economic problems, attacks on the Syngman Rhee government, and guerrilla activities in South Korea.

Indications from the Truce Negotiations

46. During the course of the negotiations the Communists have clearly revealed two attitudes: first, that they are in no hurry to reach an agreement, and second, that they wish to place the onus on the UN for any breakdown in negotiations, and for any resumption of offensive operations. The negotiations have been narrowed in the last few months to the single issue of repatriation of POW's.

Indications from Communist Diplomatic Moves

47. On the diplomatic front, there have been a number of indications, from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist sources, of a desire to find a solution for the POW issue. For example, Indian efforts to break the Panmunjom deadlock met with temporary encouragement in Peiping. The USSR for its part has put out feelers at the UN.

IV. Probable Communist Courses of Action

48. During the past year the Communists have substantially increased their military strength in the Korean area. At the same time they have continued negotiations for an armistice at Panmunjom, permitting differences over truce issues to be narrowed to the single issue of POW exchange. These negotiations have recently been supplemented by Communist diplomatic moves. Communist propaganda, while making capital of the armistice issues, has not closed the door to a negotiated settlement and may, in its broader perspectives, anticipate such a settlement.

49. The Communists in Korea appear to be prepared either for a resumption of full-scale hostilities, and indefinite military stalemate, or an armistice. Although the possibility of a renewal of full-scale hostilities

by the Communists cannot be ignored, we believe that the Communists will continue to negotiate and will not take the initiative to break the present military stalemate.

50. We believe it probable that the Communists wish to conclude an armistice. However, we believe that the Communists will protract the negotiations so long as they consider that they can win advantages from the POW or any other issue and so long as they estimate that a continuation of the Korean war does not entail grave risk of global war.||

51. If an armistice is concluded, we believe that the negotiation of a political settlement will be complicated by Communist injection of Far Eastern issues unrelated to Korea.

52. Whether or not a political settlement is achieved, we believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. The Communists will proceed to redevelop North Korea as a militant and armed Satellite, and to subject South Korea to subversion, sabotage, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.

[Here follow four charts: Tab A, "Estimated Chinese Communist Air Force AOB for the period July 1950 through mid-53"; Tab B, a graphic representation of Tab A; Tab C, "CCAF Aircraft Technical Capabilities"; and Tab D, "Estimated CCAF POL Requirements".]

|| See comment of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State on page 2. [Footnote in the source text. The comment referred to is in footnote * above.]

795.00/7-3152:Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TOKYO, July 31, 1952—5 p. m.

428. Eyes only for Allison. Deptel 268 or 92 to Moscow.[1] Clark and I have discussed reftel and he is telegraphing views to Defense with statement that broad lines his suggestions are also in accord with my views. We are of course as yet ignorant of Kennan's reaction and we realize that there may be important factors about which we have no knowledge. Based on what we know about situation we earnestly hope Kennan will find suggested approach inadvisable at this time.

Clark is apprehensive that his rejection of idea would be wrongly interpreted as undue belligerence or brashness his part. He wants it understood that he is sincerely striving for cessation of hostilities.

Sentence in second paragraph Deptel that "we are inclined to feel time has come for strong effort to determine whether Commies do or do not desire armistice" leaves us cold because we are convinced that if opponents really desire armistice they have had for months ample material on which agreement could be based. We feel that manifestation by UN of less eagerness to bid for truce coupled with success of relentless attacks should be conducive to better terms. Premise in Deptel that we do not want to give impression that we are weakening on our firm position seems to be belied by very nature of approach to Vishinsky and/or Stalin which is suggested. We doubt seriously that it could or would be interpreted as anything but a weakening of our attitude. In light of history of these negotiations beginning with Malik's public statement[2] Soviet authorities have had more than ample opportunity to contribute to satisfactory solution. They have not only failed to do so but have used every conceivable opportunity to defeat our purposes.

---

[1] Dated July 25, p. 422.

It would seem to us here reasonable to assume that for American representative in Moscow, hat in hand, at this stage to approach Vishinsky or Stalin wld be to court, if not a rebuff, at least cynical exploitation by Soviet authorities of gratis opportunity.

At risk of demonstrating ignorance and volunteering, may I inquire whether possibility of a personal approach to Mao Tse-tung would not be preferable and whether that idea has been thoroughly explored? No doubt it has. What I have in mind is question whether suggested approach to Russians would not also exercise undesirable effect on Chinese.

MURPHY

---

[2] The reference was presumably to Malik's radio speech of June 23, 1951, "The Price of Peace", the thirteenth in a series sponsored by the United Nations. For more details, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 546.

795.00/7-3152

The First Secretary in the United Kingdom (Ringwalt) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

LONDON, July 31, 1952.

DEAR JOHNNIE: During the past few days, I have been reviewing the sad history of the two alternative proposals for a solution of the prisoner of war question in Korea allegedly advanced by Chou En-lai in the course of a farewell conversation with Panikkar on June 15 (Embassy's telegram 5798, June 18).[1] These proposals, you will recall, were communicated to the Foreign Office through the Indian High Commissioner, Krishna Menon. Proposal (a) was that the Unified Command would agree to the repatriation of, say, 100,000 prisoners of war, including 20,000 Chinese. Proposal (b) was to the effect that those prisoners of war who did not elect to return to their homes could be brought to Panmunjom and there interviewed by an agreed committee from neutral states.

Under prompting from the Foreign Office, Krishna Menon had attempted to obtain "clarification" from Panikkar, the results of which, as reported in the Embassy's telegram 206 of July 11,[2] modified the original proposals quite substantially without any apparent reference to the Chinese authorities. One rather striking "clarifying" clause was subparagraph (*a*) of paragraph 1, which stated that the Chinese wished the center of substantive discussions to be transferred back to Panmunjom. Subparagraph (*b*) was a suggestion that the Chinese wished to avoid appearance of being sponsors of alternative (b). In an effort to obtain further "clarification" through the Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi, the Foreign Office learned that the Indian Embassy in Peiping had finally received a written communication on this subject which in substance stated that the Chinese were no longer willing to negotiate on the basis of alternative (b).

---

[1] The telegram under reference, which was the Embassy's report of the Chou-Panikkar conversation of June 15, is not printed (795.00/6-1852).

In a conversation at the Foreign Office yesterday with Scott, I reviewed the above and related telegrams and suggested that there seem to be a number of explanations why the proposals made by Chou En-lai had proved abortive. . . . But, I added that I was beginning to doubt the authenticity of the original proposals and wondered whether, in fact, Chou had ever made them in the first place.

Scott replied that he and Garner, the Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi, had exchanged personal letters on this very subject and that they had come to a similar conclusion. As Garner pictures it, Panikkar may have himself broached a similar solution to Chou, who, for reasons of his own, was noncommittal and later repudiated it when the diplomatic flurry it had caused had run its course. There is, indeed, some doubt in the Foreign Office whether a written reply was ever made to the Indian Embassy in Peiping, ... In this connection, the Foreign Office, after waiting in vain for a copy of the alleged Chinese Communist reply, has now wired New Delhi asking Garner to approach the Indian Government direct asking for the text of the communication.

If the facts are as stated, they only serve to underscore the difficulties we face in attempting to use the Indian channel as a means of communication. . . .

. . . .

Sincerely yours, ARTHUR

---

[2] *Ante*, p. 398.

795.00/7-2952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 1, 1952—7:26 p. m.

113. In view urtel 201 [2] and Clark opinion [3] that we have not yet exhausted all possibilities at Panmunjom and shld do so before considering Sov approach, Dept has decided not to pursue matter at this time.

BRUCE

---

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Johnson and Henkin and cleared by Thurston, Hickerson, and Matthews, was repeated for information to London and Tokyo.

[2] Dated July 29, p. 426.

[3] Clark's opinion was contained in his telegram C 52788 to JCS, July 30, p. 427.

695A.0026/8-2652

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1952.

Subject: Trial of POWs for Crimes of Violence.

Conclusion

NA has reviewed CINCUNC's telegram CX 52443, dated July 24,[1] recommending that a military commission be appointed to try Communist POWs accused of crimes of violence. On balance, NA believes the disadvantages outweigh any possible reasons for holding such trials. NA shares CINCUNC's concern, expressed in paragraph two of subject telegram, that the initiation of such trials might: (a) lead to further propaganda attacks which might have an adverse effect on the armistice talks at a crucial time; (b) since trials necessitate counsel of POWs choosing, they themselves would provide an additional propaganda forum; and most importantly, (c) result in reprisals against UNC prisoners.

Reprisal Inevitable

The latter possibility is of particular concern to NA as the safety of our own POWs has been one of the principal criteria governing our position with respect to the POW issue. It should be pointed out that the only thing deterring the Communists from initiating trials of POWs may be fear of retaliation by the UNC. The Communists do not know whether we have 100,000 or 5,000 POWs subject to trial, and there would seem little value in providing them with this information unless it appears absolutely necessary. Although it is recognized that the Communists can, at any time, act unilaterally against UNC POWs, initiation of trials by the UNC might well provoke them into taking similar action. It would appear also that, from a psychological and propaganda point of view, it would be more effective to utilize trials of Communist POWs as means of retaliation in case the Communists resort to such action than to permit trials by the UNC to serve as a reason for Communist retaliation.

---

[1] The telegram under reference reported that preliminary evidence indicated that in addition to the Dodd incident, approximately 52 cases (almost evenly divided between Communist and anti-Communist POWs) would be tried, in most cases, for murder of fellow POWs. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)

In the event that the Communists do try our POWs, it is extremely unlikely that they will abide by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. They have already refused to accede to the request made by the U.N. Secretary-General in November 1951 that they appoint a Protecting Power acceptable to the UNC, preferably the Swiss Federation or the ICRC. At most, therefore, they would render nominal compliance with the Convention, perhaps naming some such "neutral state" as Poland as Protecting Power. In that case, the trials would be nothing more than a "slaughter of the innocents". Without some means of retaliating against such action on their part, we would be in a most unenviable position both tactically and propagandawise.

Justification Needed

In light of the very strong likelihood of retaliation, NA believes that CINCUNC should provide greater justification for trying accused POWs at this time than that set forth in paragraph two [*3*] of the subject telegram, i.e., "the reinforcement and maintenance of discipline". It is NA's impression that discipline over the POWs has greatly improved since segregation of POWs and better control over enclosures have been instituted and that these measures have reduced crimes of violence. If this is so, it is doubtful whether the trial and punishments of some 100 POWs would have an important effect on further reducing the number of incidents. If, however, JCS and CINCUNC concur that POW discipline cannot adequately be maintained without the institution of trials and if this problem of discipline is greater than that which would be posed by the possible danger of reprisal against UNC POWs, and if there is no possibility that the trials could be prevented or impeded by legal technicalities the considerations set forth above would be outweighed and trials could be begun.

Prior to final determination on the proposed courses of action it is suggested that the JCS be asked for their views and that CINCUNC be asked to explain more fully the importance of the trials as a disciplinary measure and to estimate the probable effect of these trials on the POWs, particularly with regard to the possibility of their resulting in further riots.

The Question of Justice and Punishment

As a general matter I am inclined to question the appropriateness of applying a natural and correct standard of punishing the perpetrators of serious crimes and violations of discipline under the provisions of the Geneva Convention in the case of Chinese and Korean prisoners of war. It seems to me that we would be stretching a judicial process beyond a practical point. I realize fully that the crime of murder or in effect an atrocity should be paid for. I recognize that such trials might help maintain future discipline in the prisoner-of-war camps. On the other hand two considerations make me pause. First, we are dealing with approximately 100 individuals who have never been exposed to Western concepts of justice and who have been brought up in brutal surroundings in which force and cruelty are standard. These POWs were not acting any differently than Koreans and Chinese ordinarily do in such circumstances. Secondly, the conditions in those camps were to a great extent responsible for those crimes and lack of discipline. I am not trying to absolve the 100 prisoners from whatever crimes they may have committed. Certainly the killings and beatings that previously went on in the prison camps were horrible, but the fact remains that such crimes and lack of discipline never would have occurred under competent administration. Open trials will only serve up the whole Koje mess that might become interminable.

Coordination

NA has discussed this fully with L which has no enthusiasm for the proposal. It is further suggested that a copy of CINCUNC's message be pouched to Mr. Yingling [2] at Toronto for his views in light of the possible legal complexities which may be involved. Mr. Yingling should be asked, for example, what effect a Communist demand that Poland, or some other neutral state, serve as Protecting Power in place of the ICRC would have on the trials. Would the UNC have to accept Poland? Does the appointment of a Protecting Power require the agreement of both Parties or may the UNC name the ICRC as Protecting Power despite Communist objections? If the latter is so the Communists would have the same privilege of appointment in trying UN POWs to their obvious disadvantage.

---

[2] Raymund T. Yingling was Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs and had been vice-chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the diplomatic conference which established the Geneva Conventions in 1949.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET   WASHINGTON, August 8, 1952—3:50 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 915579. From JCS.

---

[1] The Department of State concurred in the drafting of this telegram. (Memorandum by Army Chief of Staff, undated; JCS files)

1. In light of ur comments and those of Kennan, dec has been reached that approach shld not be made to USSR at this time. Particular note has been taken of ur view expressed in para three of C 52788 [2] that we have not yet exhausted positive action which can be taken at Panmunjom toward realizing an armistice. We concur with view expressed in para 4 on particular necessity of firmness at this stage of negot. At same time, while we consider it probable that Communists wish to conclude armistice, we see little or no indication that various factors exerting pressure on Communists are sufficient to make armistice matter of urgency for them.

2. In view foregoing we see little advantage to be gained in UNC putting forth any new substantive proposals in near future. It is our view that in absence any proposal from Communists that offers hope of resolving POW issue, UNC shld continue present tactics for next four weeks, that is, put forward no new proposals and meet not more often than once a week, recessing unilaterally if necessary to accomplish this purpose.

3. Meanwhile, you shld continue, within existing directives, to make max practicable use available air str in attacks upon all mil targets in NK. In doing this, it is considered important to avoid pub statements ascribing high level of air activity as bringing pressure on Communists to agree to armistice, so that Communist prestige is not so seriously engaged as to make more difficult ultimate Communist agreement to acceptable armistice. Rather this high level of activity shld be treated routinely in press briefings and, if pub statements re this are necessary, justification for air attacks shld be based upon solely mil grounds. Similar position being taken here.

4. Action to be taken at end of four week period now under consideration. Our views in this regard will be transmitted shortly for ur consideration.

5. Considered this msg also answers ur C 53314.[3]

---

[2] Dated July 30, p. 427.

[3] In the telegram under reference, dated Aug. 8, 1952, Clark informed the JCS that he believed that a return to 2- or 3-day recesses after the initial 7-day recess by the UNC would be viewed as a sign of weakness at Panmunjom. Clark asked for authority to authorize Harrison to recess the plenary sessions for periods of 6 to 8 days, when in his opinion such a procedure would aid in maintaining the UNC's firm negotiating position. Clark noted that contact with the Communist Delegation would still be maintained through liaison officers (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

795.00/8-1452

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1952.

Subject: General Assembly Action in the Event of Continued Inconclusive Armistice Negotiations in Korea.

Participants:

Mr. F. S. Tomlinson—British Embassy
Mr. John D. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson—FE
Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR
Mr. David H. Popper—UNP

Mr. Tomlinson came in at my request. I handed him copies of the Working Paper on General Assembly Action in the Event of Continued Inconclusive Armistice Negotiations in Korea, explaining that this was a staff paper not yet seen by the Secretary, although the Secretary was familiar with its general nature. I stressed our desire to consult with the United Kingdom, the four Dominions with troops in Korea, and the French on this subject [2] before our position was firmed up, in order that we could have the benefit of their views at the earliest possible stage. I also emphasized the importance of not mentioning the contents of this paper to representatives of other countries until, at a later date, we were able to extend the scope of our preliminary negotiations.

I pointed out that we had concluded that if we did not ourselves take the initiative in bringing up the Korean problem at the forthcoming Assembly session, the Soviets would undoubtedly do so. We therefore thought that we should propose action along the lines covered by this paper. We were not proposing in the paper that anything be done which went beyond what we have ourselves already put into effect. We could not pretend that the steps proposed in the paper would in themselves produce an armistice, but they might constitute an increment of pressure upon the Communists which would help to tip the balance in favor of an armistice.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that he would transmit the paper at once to London and that he would prefer to reserve detailed comment until he had his Foreign Office's views. He could forecast, however, one reaction: that London would feel that the preservation of Hong Kong was of greatest importance to the free world and that the steps indicated in the paper would place Hong Kong in an untenable position, unable to carry on the trade with China necessary to provide foodstuffs for the one million Chinese refugees in the Colony. We agreed that this was one of the problems which must be faced.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Popper.

[2] Reports of these consultations can be found in memoranda of conversation by Hickerson, Aug. 14 and 15, 1952, not printed (795.00/8-1452 and 795.00/8-1552, respectively).

I told Mr. Tomlinson that, in the absence of Mr. Johnson and myself on leave, Mr. Sandifer and other officers would be glad to discuss the British comments on this paper. Early next week we expected to give the same group of six states another paper based on the assumption that an armistice would be concluded by the time the General Assembly meets.[3]

JH

[Attachment 1]

Working Paper on United Nations General Assembly Action in the Event of Continued Inconclusive Armistice Negotiations

Recommendations

1. The General Assembly should take action early in the Seventh Session along the following lines:

a. The first step should be to seek passage of a General Assembly resolution which would:

> i. Express the full support of the General Assembly for the gallant efforts of the United Nations troops in Korea;
> ii. Express full confidence in and approval of the conduct of the armistice negotiations by the United Nations Command;
> iii. Approve the position taken by the United Nations Command in regard to the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and call upon the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities to accept an honorable armistice which recognizes the principle of non-forcible repatriation;
> iv. Request the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities and to report to the General Assembly within —— days on any reply received or on the absence of such a reply.

b. Upon receipt of a negative report from the President of the General Assembly the Additional Measures Committee should meet immediately for the purpose of recommending additional measures to the General Assembly. The Additional Measures Committee should recommend the imposition of a total embargo. (For detailed recommendations see annex.)

c. After the Additional Measures Committee has made its recommendation to the General Assembly, the Assembly should adopt a resolution which:

> i. Condemns the aggressors in Korea for their continued refusal to accept an honorable armistice in accordance with United Nations principles;
> ii. Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area;

---

[3] A copy of this paper, which is not printed, was attached to a memorandum of conversation by Sandifer, Aug. 25, 1952, not printed (795.00/8–2552).

iii. Urges upon all states the need to increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea and in particular to contribute additional forces to the Unified Command;

iv. Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any further assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

v. Recommends that all states sever, limit or refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the aggressors in Korea;

vi. Approves the report and recommendations of the Additional Measures Committee;

vii. Recommends that all states take the following action recommended by the Additional Measures Committee. (For detailed recommendations see annex 1, Economic Embargo.);

viii. Requests that Member States and other cooperating states report to the Additional Measures Committee within 30 days on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

ix. Directs the Additional Measures Committee to report to the General Assembly with recommendations as appropriate, and, at its discretion when the General Assembly is not in session, to the members, on the manner in which these states are implementing the measures recommended;

x. Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means.

2. Obviously an agreement should be reached on the plan outlined in recommendation 1 above in its entirety, before General Assembly consideration of the first phase of that plan.

3. If at the time of the opening of the Seventh Session there are clear and immediate prospects of agreement upon an armistice in the immediate future and negotiations are at such a stage that discussion in the General Assembly might prejudice the outcome, the General Assembly should postpone the consideration of the Korean question until a more propitious time.

Annex 1

Recommendation for Action by Additional Measures Committee on an Economic Embargo

The General Assembly might recommend that every state prohibit all direct or indirect exports, re-exports, trans-shipments to, and imports from, Communist China and North Korea, and impose the following ancillary controls:

1. Prohibit vessels and aircraft of its registry from proceeding to Communist China or North Korea.

2. Prohibit the use of free ports within its territorial jurisdiction for the trans-shipment of any goods to or from Communist China or North Korea.

3. Prohibit the sale or charter of vessels and aircraft to the Chinese Communist regime or to the North Korean authorities, or to their nationals, or to any person or entity acting for them.

4. Deny bunkering and port facilities to vessels owned or controlled by the Chinese Communists or North Koreans, and to vessels of any nationality believed to be proceeeding to or from Communist China or North Korean ports.

5. Prohibit the insurance or reinsurance within its territorial jurisdiction of vessels included in paragraph 4 and of all cargoes destined to or proceeding from Communist China or North Korea.

6. Block all assets and sterilize all gold resources of the Communist Chinese and North Korean regimes and of persons subject to their control; suspend all payments to these regimes or to persons subject to their control; prohibit loans, credits, and capital flotations likely to benefit these regimes or persons subject to their control.

795.00/8-3052: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, August 25, 1952—4:51 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 54177. 1. The UNC has in its custody approximately 16,000 South Korean prisoners of war. Of this group approximately 11,000 during screening, elected not to return to Communist control. They were segregated and moved to Camp nbr 12, Masan, on the Korean mainland. In my opinion the further retention of this group of anti-Communists can no longer be justified. This conclusion is based on the following considerations:

a. These are bona fide Nationals of the Republic of Korea who should be permitted to return to their home country.

b. All have elected not to return to Communist control.

c. Insufficient information on the background of many of these POWs did not permit their reclassification as civilian internees. However, there is strong reason to believe that in this group are ex-ROK soldiers, civilians who had been impressed by the NK Army, and others who had been swept up in the security dragnet when the UNC was threatened by large numbers of enemy infiltrators in civilian clothing. Insufficient evidence exists today to justify the continued detention of these individuals as bona fide prisoners of war.

d. The ROK Govt has already made strong appeals for the release of this group.

e. The Communist Armistice Delegation has in the past few months relaxed its demands for the return of SKs in our custody; however, this has been conditional on our agreement to repatriate all the NKs and Chinese.

---

[1] The following names were handwritten on the source text: Nagle, Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson; presumably they received copies.

f. Such release would materially decrease our requirements for administrative and logistical support of our POW-CI population, and would release urgently needed security forces for other high priority missions.

g. Of even greater importance than the above, the release of the SK POWs at this time would impress upon the Communists the firmness of our stand at the conference table.

h. Continued retention by the UNC of South Korean natls who have already renounced allegiance to the Communists regardless of the manner in which they were brought into our custody can only work to our disadvantage and may in fact, encourage them to lean toward Communism.

2. It appears here that article 5 of the Geneva POW Convention of 1949 affords a practicable legal basis for releasing SK POWs at this time. Application of the provisions of article 5 involves determination by a "competent tribunal" that these persons have been held as "doubtful" POWs and that screening conducted by the tribunal has resolved the doubt against POW status under article 4. A "competent tribunal" as contemplated by this article would, I believe, have to be organized and operated similar to a screening board. Procedure along these lines differs from that by which SK POWs were reclassified to "civilian internees" and subsequently released, since under article 5 release from POW status is not contingent upon a finding by the screening board that the individuals concerned are properly "civilian internees." The basic determination is simply that investigation has disclosed that the individual is not in fact a POW, and should not be detained further by the UNC.

3. We consider that the tribunal should be composed of at least representatives of the US and ROK. If you consider it necessary we can attempt to secure additional representation from other UN combatant forces in Korea. To avoid excessive legal and administrative procedures, we believe that the mission of the screening tribunal should be simple and should be limited to determining the qualifications of each individual for release, using the following criteria:

a. The POW concerned is a South Korean.

b. As a result of previous screening he elected not to return to Communist control.

c. He professes allegiance to the Sovereign State of the Republic of Korea.

4. Actual release and resettlement within the Republic of Korea would be acomplished in coordination with appropriate agencies of the UNC and ROK following a procedure similar to that used in the disposition of civilian internees released from our custody.

5. Total time to complete release after notification of approval, estimated at 70 days. Screening of personnel, review of questionnaires by tribunal, and a rostering by province of origin will take approximately

25 days. Actual release can be completed in 45 days, based on ROK ability to receive released personnel.

6. We cannot estimate here what retaliatory measures, if any, might be taken by the Communists against the UNC prisoners they now hold. Anticipating the impact which this release might have in the armistice negotiations I intend, and Gen Harrison concurs, to adopt a procedure similar to that used in the release of CIs. Concurrent with actual release of the initial group, a factual press release would be made. Should the Communists attempt to propagandize on the release in armistice negotiations, as they probably will, our delegation would dismiss their charges as being invalid since the individuals concerned are loyal nationals of the ROK and as such we recognize no Communist claim on their disposition.

7. Appropriate notification would be made through normal channels to the ICRC indicating that the UNC had released from its custody certain persons erroneously retained as POWs.

8. Request your early consideration of course of action indicated above.

795.00/8-2652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1952.

Subject: General Clark's Request to Bomb Targets in Korea near Manchurian and Soviet Borders

Participants: F. S. Tomlinson—Counselor, British Embassy
John M. Allison—Assistant Secretary of State

(In his C 54180 of August 25 [1] General Clark requests approval of UN air attacks on military targets in the northeast corner of Korea at a distance of some 4.6 miles from the Manchurian border and 10.7 miles from USSR territory. The targets are stated by General Clark to be worthwhile from the military point of view. After discussion among Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, Bonbright and Allison, it was agreed that State would interpose no objection to these attacks, if the JCS desired to give approval, on condition that there be no inordinate publicity, that approval not be taken to mean rescinding of previous instructions not to undertake military operations within 12 miles of USSR territory, and that the British be informed two or three days prior to the actual attack so that they would have an opportunity to protest if they saw fit. The JCS agreed with State's conditions and approval was obtained from the President for dispatch of instructions to General Clark.[2] It was agreed that General Clark would inform the appropriate British military officers at his headquarters and that the Department of State would inform the British in Washington.)

---

[1] Not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

In accordance with the above, I called in Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor of the British Embassy, this afternoon and gave him information roughly along the above lines but with specific details as to the type of targets to be attacked and their location. I told him that while no deadline had been set as to the date of the attacks it was anticipated they would not take place before August 28 or 29. Mr. Tomlinson's only comments were "they look like good military targets" and "Mr. Churchill will know about it in the morning".

---

[2] Clark received authorization in telegram JCS 916925, Aug. 26, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

On Sept. 1, in the largest naval air attack of the war, aircraft from the carriers *Essex, Boxer,* and *Princeton* struck industrial targets at Munsan, Hoeam-dong, and Aoji. Regarding these UNC naval air operations, see Field, *United States Naval Operations, Korea,* p. 440, and Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953,* pp. 488–490.

695A.0026/8-2652

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1952.

Subject: General Clark's Requests for (a) Release of 16,000 South Korean Prisoners of War,[2] to be discussed at State–JCS Meeting,[3] and (b) Trials of Prisoners of War in United Nations Command Compounds.[4]

I recommend that we take the following positions on these two requests.

As to (a):

There appears to be no legal objection to proceeding under Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war with the reclassification of this category. The United Nations Command has already released 37,000 civilian internees, after consultation with other interested governments. The category of 16,000 is a similar case.

The chief difficulty arises from the probability that such an act would appear as an arbitrary and unilateral *fait accompli.* It might interfere with any means for working out the prisoner-of-war issue. State and Defense are now considering a draft radio to CINCUNC on the armistice negotiations which would put into effect our next move following the four weeks of weekly meetings. If the steps proposed in that draft radio fail, our next step may be the unilateral release of all prisoners of war who would resist return to Communist control. Perhaps the release of the 16,000 South Koreans should not take place until we have reached the period of release of all non-repatriates, or we could make the release of the 16,000 when both sides at Panmunjom are considering the various proposals contained in the current draft radio. General Clark has estimated that it will take 25 days to prepare these 16,000 for release, and a total elapsed time of 70 days before they have all returned to their homes. Therefore, the beginning of such a release would not take place until the last week of September.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young.

[2] See telegram CX 54177, Aug. 25, p. 456.

[3] For this discussion, see the memorandum, *infra.*

[4] For a discussion of Clark's request, see the memorandum by Young to Johnson, Aug. 5, p. 449.

I recommend that we consult with our principal allies on this problem and take the position that the United States Government is inclined to approve the release in principle. Timing of the release is the main problem. You might suggest at the State–JCS meeting that General Clark be authorized to make this release only after (a) we have consulted with our principal allies and (b) we have decided that the Panmunjom negotiations will produce no resolution on the prisoner-of-war issue and that it is necessary to release all non-repatriates.

We should also consider L's opinion that the tribunal to be set up under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners-of-war should have at least three members.

As to (b):

There is attached a proposed reply to General Clark which NA has drafted.[5] It would (a) authorize General Clark to set up military commissions as part of his effort to assure uncontested control over prisoners of war and (b) seal off the political repercussions of reopening the Dodd incident and former conditions in the camps. The proposed reply would do this by separating post-capture offenses into (1) those committed after July 1, 1952, for which General Clark would be authorized now to set up commissions and proceed with trials, and (2) post-capture offenses prior to July 1, 1952, for which he would not be authorized at this time to proceed until each case is thoroughly documented and until Washington felt that the timing for such trials was not so disadvantageous to the overall position of the United States. That date has no paricular meaning; it merely separates the Koje period from the subsequent period. It might possibly be better to start with September 1, or whenever authorization is sent to Clark.

I am not at all convinced that the Unified Command requires military ommissions to assure "uncontested control" over the compounds. There appears to be conflicting evidence over the recent and current egree of control. Embassy Tokyo mentions daily incidents of a grave ature, often resulting in loss of life, and persistent and flagrant violaons of discipline. Embassy Pusan speaks of a great improvement in esablishing internal order since General Boatner assumed command. A civilian official of the Department of the Army who recently visited Koje-Do described to me in glowing terms the complete control which General Boatner has established over the Korean prisoners in the compounds on Koje-Do. The prisoner-of-war situation reports from CINCUNC do not indicate any threat of a breakdown in control. Yet, the Department of State is not in a position to dispute the military judgment of CINCUNC when he declares that the establishment of military commissions is essential.

---

[5] The draft reply, which was attached to the source text, is not printed.

At the same time, the Department of State should strongly assert the political implications of the initiation of trials at this time and the grave consequences that the United States would suffer if the Communists seize on such trials to propagandize conditions in the camps prior to the establishment of control. Therefore, I believe that the attached proposed reply is a reasonable response to the military requirement of General Clark and the political requirements of the Department of State.

State-JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 27, 1952—3 p. m.

General Collins: We have a message from Clark [2] suggesting that he set up a commission to release the South Korean non-repatriates. He believes that releasing the South Koreans would firm up our position against the Commies and would also be of convenience logistically and in cutting down the number of guards that are required.

Mr. Matthews: We have seen the message and as yet have no definite reactions. From our point of view there are two questions we would have to think about. First would be consultation with the Allies and second the question of timing. With Chou En-lai and all his staff in Moscow,[3] we think that something important is up. We don't know whether this is good or bad, but we do know something is up.

Mr. Allison: We also have to consider the question of facing the Commies with a *fait accompli* and also the question of the relationship of this to possible difficulities we might get into on North Korean non-repatriates.

General Vandenberg: I should think the *fait accompli* would be the only right way to find out what the Commies are going to do.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed a five-man Department of State contingent, and Generals Lee and Lemnitzer and Nash represented the Department of Defense. The entire meeting was concerned with Korea.

[2] The message under reference was telegram CX 54177, Clark to JCS, Aug. 25, p. 456.

[3] On Aug. 17, a mission from the People's Republic of China, headed by Chou En-lai, arrived in Moscow to discuss political and economic questions. Discussions were held through Sept. 15, and on Aug. 20 Stalin received Chou En-lai. Kennan's preliminary assessment of the significance of this meeting for Korea can be found in telegram 315 from Moscow, Aug. 18, 1952, not printed (661.93/8-1852).

General Collins: I think this is really 90 per cent a State matter. We certainly would be willing to take State's advice on timing.

Mr. Matthews: How long would it take Clark to go through with this.

General Collins: He says he could complete preparations in 70 days. But he doesn't say how long it would take to set up a commission or tribunal. Do you have any estimate how long Chou En-lai's conference will go on?

Admiral Fechteler: Does Kennan have any information?

Mr. Matthews: He thinks it is an important development and he is inclined to think the Chinese are taking the initiative but doesn't prophesy any outcome.

General Lee: Hasn't he suggested we increase pressure on the Communists?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, but we haven't been able to see how we could step up pressure.

General Collins: Our bombings are doing that to some degree.

Admiral Fechteler: I think Clark's arguments are convincing, particularly the one where he says the releasing of South Koreans would impress the Commies with the firmness of our position. I think this would be along the lines Kennan advocates.

Mr. Matthews: It might be useful to ask Kennan's views on timing.

General Collins: We can tell Clark we have the question under consideration. Why don't we do that? You wire Kennan about timing [4] and we will tell Clark we have the question under consideration.

Mr. Matthews: There is one other related question and that is the question of holding trials at the Koje Camps.

General Collins: What is the status of that over here?

General Lemnitzer: It is under consideration.

General Collins: I personally think it is OK, but again I think it is a question of timing.

Mr. Nitze: We wondered whether it would be possible to put it on a disciplinary basis and say from now on out prisoners would be disciplined without getting into the difficulties of going through all past disciplinary cases.

Mr. Matthews: We have some question about how far you can go in disciplinary matters under the Geneva Convention.

General Lemnitzer: That is a real problem.

General Collins: We are shooting them now when they make trouble. The important thing is not to have a setback and let camps get out of control. Clark is confident he can handle the situation.

---

[4] Kennan saw no objection to the release, but felt it was better not to do it during the present stage of Chinese-Soviet discussions in Moscow (telegram 384 from Moscow, Aug. 28, 1952; 695A.0024/8-2852).

Mr. Matthews: There is one other thing that we want to discuss. We don't want any decision on it but just want to put it forward for discussion.

Mr. Nitze: The *Daily Worker* and the other Communist papers are plugging every day the thesis that there should be a cease-fire and the POW issue should be left for later negotiation. We have thought of the possibility of putting forward a counter proposal. It would call for a cease-fire with the articles that are already agreed going into effect and also those prisoners which each side has agreed to repatriate being exchanged. In other words we would agree to exchange 83,000 prisoners and they would agree to exchange our 12,000 prisoners. This might give the Communists the opportunity of agreeing to figures without agreeing to the principle of non-forcible repatriation. This draft statement that we have here is along that line.

General Vandenberg: My first reaction is that I am scared of anything to do with a cease-fire.

Mr. Nitze: It really would be a cease-fire which would include precisely the same terms as an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: There is, however, a difference between a cease-fire and an armistice.

General Collins: It certainly would be useful to have the word armistice in. Can we have copies to discuss in our Services?

Mr. Matthews: I would like to emphasize again that our Secretary has not approved this and we are just putting it forward for discussion.

795.00/8-2752: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 27, 1952—6:29 p. m.

206. For Kennan from Matthews. Some consideration is being given in Dept to suggesting that Pres issue statement along lines quoted below. Its purpose is to give Commies a face saving device to permit them to accept Korean armistice on our terms without accepting our principle of non-forcible repatriation of POWs and, if they reject proposal, to provide good propaganda position for us. There is no thought here that as result of the "subsequent negots" we wld in fact agree to any forcible return of remaining Commie POWs.

Wld appreciate ur early comments both as to desirability issuance of some such statement and timing thereof, i.e., if you favor idea, shd statement be made while Chou En-lai and company are still in Moscow or shd we wait outcome Soviet-Chinese Commie talks.

Proposed statement follows:

---

[1] This telegram was drafted and cleared by Matthews.

"I am told that the official Soviet newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, have printed the text of an appeal by the Progressive Party candidate for Pres [2] in this country, addressed to Gen Eisenhower and Mr. Stevenson. This appeal urges that these gentlemen join in requesting 'to propose to our reps conducting negots in Korea to conclude an immediate cease-fire on the already agreed upon demarcation line, postponing the question of the prisoners of war for resolution by civilian reps of both sides until after the cessation of hostilities.' I am also informed that public spokesmen of the Commie Party in the US, in supporting this request, have argued that, since agreement has been reached on many thorny issues in the negots at Panmunjom, there shld be a cease fire based on the area of agreement that already exists.

"This Govt, and the other members of the UN with which it is associated, are sincere in their desire to see an armistice concluded in Korea. It is true that a large area of agreement has now been established in the armistice negots. The two sides have agreed on armistice provisions for all questions except those concerning prisoners of war. The fact is, moreover, that even on this question, each side has declared its readiness to return given numbers of prisoners of war. The Commies have frequently declared that they were prepared to return to the UN 12,000 UN prisoners. Reps of UN have frequently stated that we are prepared to return some 83,000 prisoners of war whom we hold. The only outstanding issue relates to those prisoners whose status is in dispute.

"As agent of UN for Unified Command in Korea, I therefore propose that the opposing sides mutually undertake to carry out all the arts that have been agreed to by the negotiators, and to take those actions which each side has already declared itself ready to take by way of returning prisoners to the control of other side. This wld mean that UN wld return 83,000 prisoners to Commie control; that Commies wld return 12,000 prisoners to UN control; that there then be an immediate cease-fire and armistice in Korea; and that question of what to do with those prisoners whose status remains in dispute after cease-fire be subj of subsequent negots. If Commies share our desire to bring an end to fighting in Korea, the way is open."

Bruce

---

[2] The Progressive Party's candidate for President in the 1952 election was Vincent W. Hallinan.

795.00/8-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET Moscow, August 28, 1952—5 p. m.

385. For Matthews from Kennan. In proposal submitted Deptel 206, Aug 27 [1] concerning possible presidential statement on Kor armistice, assume Dept has taken into account question of effect on those POW's not exchanged and that due regard has been given this factor. From all other viewpoints, I consider move excellent one and recommend it be carried out at once, if at all. Seems to me it wld be hard for Sovs to

---

[1] *Supra.*

wiggle out of it without letting down Amer Commies badly. It wld be apt to arouse divergent and possibly conflicting reactions in Sov and Chi Commie camps and coming suddenly and unexpectedly in midst of Chi-Sov discussions here, might well have useful effect. Wld consider that Chi-Sov negots must be now at something approaching their most difficult and delicate stage; hence reason for promptness if we are to make this move at all.

Release S Kor prisoners, as proposed in Deptel 204, Aug 27,[2] should not in my opinion be undertaken at this time, if we are going to make move discussed above. In any case, we shld wait to see what effects of pres statement wld be. My reply to Deptel 204 is reflection this view.

KENNAN

---

[2] In this telegram the Department of State asked for Kennan's comments on the "wisdom" of releasing these POWs and the timing (695A.0024/8-2752). For Kennan's response, see footnote 4, p. 462.

795.00/8-2852

Memorandum by the Assistant Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Harris) [1] *to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1952.

Subject: Deptel 206 August 27 to Moscow (Kennan from Matthews) [2]

The essence of the face-saving device to permit the Commies to accept a Korean armistice proposed in the reference telegram—that we offer the Communists a cease-fire now on the basis of an exchange of all the UN prisoners in their hands for the 83,000 repatriates whom we hold with the question of the non-repatriates in our custody to be discussed later—seems to me worthy of serious consideration. Obviously the question is one for high-level decision. From the propaganda standpoint, I offer the following comment.

I am of the opinion that there is at least one very serious objection to the method of publicizing the scheme proposed in the telegram. For the President to make the proposal in a public announcement, tying it specifically to Hallinan, *Daily Worker* and Moscow initiative for "cease-fire now", would be to lend the full weight of presidential prestige to the impression that the Commies had led the way in finding a peaceful solution in Korea. I recall the free ride on the peace band wagon which the Soviets got as a result of Malik's statement last year which the Commies were able to represent as having led to the armistice negotiations.

I suggest that the proper channel for any proposals of the kind under consideration is our armistice delegation at Panmunjom. If the proposal is approved, it should be offered at Panmunjom as coming from us on our own initiative and without any reference to the apparent Commie propaganda feelers in this direction of the last week.

---

[1] George L. Harris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 463.

I do not believe that the likelihood of Communist acceptance of such a proposal would be in any way enhanced by its having been offered publicly by the President rather than by our negotiators at Panmunjom. I do think that the offer by the President would give the Commies an excellent propaganda opportunity to represent themselves before the world as the real protagonists of peace.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

SECRET TOKYO, September 1, 1952—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

777. Personal for Matthews. Clark and I have discussed Deptel 605,[1] and he is sending two messages to JCS[2] today in one of which he expressed certain reservations re wisdom of President making statement under circumstances mentioned Deptel and in other an outline of procedure he suggests for Panmunjom.

It seems to us that appeal by Progressive Party candidate in line with *Daily Worker* article shld arouse greatest suspicions that Presidential statement wld gratify Commie purpose. Character of source wld seem to condemn appeal per se. When we respond to this type of indirect irresponsible proposal, we are usually thrown back for a loss.

I hestitate to volunteer unasked for suggestion but I wld like to make the point that the devastating effect on North Korean and Chinese morale of the fact weeks of heavy bombardment is operating to provide a far better basis for UN truce negots than ever before. This is borne out by current intelligence which is being reported by Clark. I am convinced that Hallinan appeal and *Daily Worker* article are direct reflection of this improved condition. I am not certain everyone fully aware extent this favorable solution. Clark is emphasizing it in his two messages to JCS today.

If actual developments on field are running in our favor as heavily as I believe they are, wld it not be wiser to await proposal from an official Commie source than to display overeagerness responsive to an appeal from a discredited Commie sympathizer just released from prison?[3]

---

[1] The telegram under reference, Aug. 29, sent to Tokyo, repeated telegrams 206 to Moscow and 385 from Moscow, pp. 463 and 464, respectively.

[2] The messages were C 54495, *infra*, and C 54499, p. 470.

[3] Hallinan, nominated to be the Progressive Party's Presidential Candidate at the Party's convention in Chicago, July 4–6, 1952, was released on Aug. 17, 1952 from Federal penitentiary where he had served 5 months for contempt of court. The Progressive Party's candidates were also endorsed by the Communist Party of the United States.

I am sure you have many facts before you not available to me and I hope you will understand my interjecting the reference to one feature which seems of such importance here.

MURPHY

795.00/9-3052: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, September 1, 1952—7:06 p. m.

C 54495. Ref JCS 917260.[2]

1. I am fully in accord with any proposal which will achieve an honorable armistice, does not compromise the principle on which we stand and does not jeopardize the security of UN forces. In many respects, the proposal contained in ref msg appears to parallel previous courses of action which have been submitted to you for your consideration, particularly that outlined in part 2, CX 51489.[3] The essential difference between your proposal in ref msg and my recommendation is the fact that your proposal does not solve the ques of the disposition of the nonrepatriates but leaves it open to "subsequent negotiations". Whether these negotiations are to be a part of the political conference agreed to as agenda item 5 and which is to fol the armistice is not clear. I interpreted the agreement reached in agenda item 5 to be such that only the United Nations and Communist dominated nations involved in the war in Korea will be represented at the political conf. I also assume that representatives to the political conf from the United Nations will be other than mil pers. This need not necessarily be true for the representatives of the Communist nations as their political advisers have a definite connection with the mil. I consider that the inclusion of the POW ques in the agenda of the political conf would provide the Communists with another means to force the UNC to:

a. Retreat from its announced psn of no forced repatriation, or

b. Concede to Communists demands on other important issues in order to secure Communists agreement to the UN psn on no forced repatriation, or

c. Continue the political conf indefinitely while the Communists mil capability increases due primarily to his immunity to atk.

---

[1] The following names were handwritten on the source text: Nagle, Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson; presumably they received copies.

[2] Dated Aug. 29, 1952, not printed. In this telegram the JCS requested Clark's comment on the tentative text of the proposed Presidential statement, then under consideration in the Department of State, which had been sent to Kennan in Moscow for comment in telegram 206, p. 463. In addition to the text of the proposed statement, the JCS quoted Kennan's comments in telegram 385 from Moscow, p. 464. The JCS informed Clark that "There is no thought here that as a result of the 'subsequent negots' we wld in fact agree to any forcible return of remaining Commies POWs." (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[3] Dated July 7, p. 380.

2. I consider it far preferable that subsequent negotiations to determine ultimate disposition of non-repatriates be accomplished by a group of representatives from impartial nations, separate and distinct from those nations to be represented at the political conf. To accomplish this the armistice should specify:

a. Both sides agree to abide by the decision of the impartial group as to the disposition of non-repatriates.
b. The decision as to the disposition of a non-repatriate must be in consonance with the individuals choice.
c. The disposition of non-repatriates be accomplished within a specified time limit. Inclusion of the above provision in the armistice would clarify the procedure as to disposition of non-repatriates and lessen the likelihood of the impartial group arriving at a decision which would compromise our psn on no forced repatriation.

3. Having no knowledge as to the form of the subsequent negotiations considered, it is extremely difficult for me to comment on the manner in which the Communists acceptance of the proposal would affect the mil posture of our forces in Korea. If the Communists accept the proposal without change, we would recover practically all our POWs while retaining in our custody a large nbr of the enemies, particularly the controversial CCF POWs numbering approx 14,000. It is therefore likely that the Communists would make a counter-proposal insisting that a percentage exchange take place in order that they might hold some of our POWs as hostages. This counter-proposal would be extremely difficult for the UNC to reject; however, acceptance of this possible counter-proposal would subj us to severe criticism by the American public and by our allies if prisoners would be held as hostages for an indefinite period. In this connection, it should be noted that US POWs now reported by the enemy closely approach the nbr which might be retained by the Communists for an indefinite period of time, if exchange is accepted on a percentage basis. I consider that we should accept no Communist counter-proposal which would allow them to retain any reported UNC POWs. If they are permitted to retain any POWs after an Armistice is signed, we have no means of insuring their ultimate return. With the restriction on const of aflds deleted from the armistice agreement it must be considered that immediately upon signing an armistice the Communists will initiate extensive const of such flds. This, combined with the release from mil pressure now upon them, particularly the heavy bombing program in progress, would place the Communists in an advantageous psn to oppose indefinitely in subsequent negotiations any solution which would not assure them the return of all Communists POWs. This might develop into such a major disagreement that the Communists, having achieved an overwhelming mil capability, would use such controversy as a basis for resuming hostilities.

4. Recent agent report, identified as CC RAK nr J-750 with source evaluation of B, indicates that the heavy bombing program is having a material effect on the civilian morale in North Korea. Report is quoted herein for your info.

> "1. Civilian morale in North Korean cities and towns which have been subjected to UN air attacks is bordering on panic. Great nrs of civilians, who earlier in the war had left the farms and villages because of food and job shortages and because of conscription in labor battalions, are now deserting their jobs and retd to their farms and villages.
>
> "2. Civilian opinion of air attacks in the cities is that the UN is going to launch a gen offensive and end the war once and for all.
>
> "3. There is some concern in North Korean government quarters that, because of the air attacks, many civilians will join the remnants of the UN guerrillas still operating in North Korea."

5. From alleged sources of original proposal as stated in ref, it would appear that the Communists, including Soviet Russia, have extended an open but indirect invitation for us to propose that we refer the solution of the POW issue to some other form of subsequent negotiations. I am of the firm opinion that the aggression in Korea in 1950 was initiated with Russia's concurrence. There can be no doubt but that it continues only because of their support. I consider that an armistice will be effected only when the Soviets consider that the cause of Communism will be further advanced as a result of such an armistice or, that mil pressure is of such a magnitude as to engender a possibility of defeat. Thus, it appears that in Russia's opinion the course of Communism will be furthered by achieving an armistice which refers the unresolved POW ques to future negotiations. I consider that we should avoid falling into what appears to be an obvious trap. The risk involved is not justified by the optimistic hope of arousing divergent and possible conflicting reaction in Soviet and Chinese camps. In fact, if this is a trap and, in view of the sources and the support given by the Communist party, it may well be, I consider that none of the possible advantages set forth by Kennan in ref would accrue to the UN.

6. Considering the nebulous advantage which might be achieved by issuing the proposed statement at this time, the indefinite conditions under which subsequent negotiations would be conducted and the very plausible Communist reaction to same as set forth herein, I sincerely ques the advisability of issuing the proposed statement at this time. In any event, I strongly recommend delay in the issuance of the statement until we better determine the progress of negotiations now being conducted between Russia and China and until the armistice del has endeavored to secure Communist agreement to an armistice folg the course of action outlined in a msg being dispatched this date; meanwhile, continuing the heavy bombing to which the Communists are being subjected and which is apparently undermining morale of the

people of North Korea and their ability to wage and support a war. This recommended course of action has been under intensive study here and represents in our opinion the most effective procedure for negotiating at this time.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, September 1, 1952—8:57 p. m.

C 54499. Refs: A. C 52788.[1] B. CX 51489.[2] C. JCS 915579.[3] D. State msg 268, 25 Jul.[4] E. C 69351.[5]

1. As set forth in ref A, I feel that we have not as yet exhausted the positive action which we can take at Panmunjom to achieve an honorable armistice. The del and myself are of the opinion that a continued display of firmness is essential to securing an armistice; that this display of firmness must be supported at all levels and by all elements of our Government; that, insofar as actions at Panmunjom are concerned, this firmness can best be displayed by continued unilateral recesses of plenary sessions; this firmness in negotiations to be supported militarily by continued heavy bombing attacks. Upon receipt of ref D, I initiated study of possible courses of action which might not only result in an armistice, but which might also lead to a determination of whether the Communists do in fact desire one.[6] After a thorough analysis of the situation to date I have developed an overall course of action which I recm be given careful consideration in determining the action to be taken as outlined in para 4 of ref C.

2. In developing this course of action, it was assumed that the UN would not retreat from the principle of no forced repatriation, and careful consideration was given to the folg:

a. Securing and maintaining public and international spt for our firm psn. View here is that, to achieve and maintain spt for any unilateral action in event we fail to achieve an armistice, such unilateral action should be immediately preceded by a maximum effort on our part to achieve an armistice.

b. Maintaining firmness of our psn. Recent alternate proposals developed here and at governmental level to solve the question of nonrepatriates are, for the most part, either identical to or modifications of proposals which the del have previously made, have discussed in detail, and have been rejected by the Communists. The end result has been an apparent impasse at the conf table, and, I am afraid, has resulted in unwarranted faith being placed in the value of a series of alternate proposals. To continue introducing additional proposals periodically for an indeterminate length of time while still maintaining our firm stand on no forced repatriation can only be interpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness and holds out to them the hope that we have not presented our final psn.

---

[1] Dated July 30, p. 427.

[2] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[3] Dated Aug. 8, p. 451.

[4] This telegram to Tokyo was a repeat of telegram 92 to Moscow, July 25, p. 422.

[5] Dated May 31, p. 270.

[6] See Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, p. 278 for a discussion of the UNC staff studies of possible courses of action.

3. The main points of this course of action which I feel you should consider are outlined in the succeeding paras.

4. Step nr 1, to be accomplished at one plenary session: Gen Harrison would present a carefully prepared statement constructed along the folg lines:

a. The Communists are fully aware of the objectivity and sincerity with which the UNC del has attempted to find a solution on non-repatriated POWs that would be sat to both sides.

b. Compare the blatant admission of the Communists that they have converted from POW status thousands of UNC pers and impressed them into their armed forces with the UNC efforts to achieve a mutually agreeable solution for the disposition of those pers who have stated they would forcibly resist repatriation. Point out the freedom of action accorded International Committee of Red Cross pers by the UNC as compared with the Communists refusal to allow such pers access to Communist POW camps.

c. The disposition of about 14,000 CCF POWs appears to be the principal obstacle to an armistice, yet these persons are alleged by the Communists to be members of a volunteer force having no direct political connection with any sovereign government. The Communists strongly support the right of these individuals to volunteer in the Korean venture but now adopt an inconsistent psn that these same individuals in the custody of the UNC have no right to transfer to the control of a power other than the one under which they were serving at the time of their capture.

d. The past year of negotiations has produced a mass of material which neither the public nor the press can easily digest or remember. The extensive efforts which our del have made during this long period have probably been forgotten. At this point in Gen Harrison's presentation he should recapitulate the various alternative solutions which we have previously offered and which the Communists have summarily rejected. These are:

(1) Admittance of joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without mil observers of both sides, to the POW camps of both sides to verify the fact that the non-repatriates would forcibly resist rtn to the side from which they came.

(2) All POWs of both sides to be delivered in grps of approp size to the demilitarized zone (D/Z) and given the opportunity to express their pref on repatriation. The screening to be done by one or a combination of the folg:

(*a*) ICRC.
(*b*) Teams from impartial nations.

(*c*) Joint teams of mil observers.
(*d*) Red Cross representatives from each side.

e. After Gen Harrison has reviewed proposals already made, we believe he shld then, as part of the same statement, present all of the alternatives acceptable to our government which have not previously been discussed at Panmunjom. There are listed below those proposals which I feel have merit. They wld be presented to the Commies as representing our best efforts to produce final agreement, *all contingent on first signing an armistice.*

(1) Delivery of non-repatriated in grps of approp size to the D/Z where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be released from mil control and, without interview or screening, be free to go to the side of their choice. This to be accomplished, if desired, with or without mil representation from each side, under the observation of one or combination of the folg:

(*a*) ICRC.
(*b*) Joint Red Cross teams.
(*c*) Observers from impartial nations.
(*d*) Joint mil teams.

Discussion: These alternatives are a modification of original rescreening proposals and eliminate the actual screening interview, but allow the indiv to express his free choice on repatriation by moving from a neutral location in the D/Z to the side of his choice. One of the agencies selected from the list above will be required to check POWs against list to insure that all POWs entered the neutral zone. Within the neutral zone there will be established UNC and Commie receiving pnts. Without coercion each POW will be shown where the receiving pnts are and those POWs reporting to the Commie receiving pnts will be taken to Commie-controlled territory, and those reporting to UNC receiving pnts will be taken to UNC-controlled territory.

General: *This discussion applies equally to proposals subpara (2), subpara (3), subpara (4) and subpara (5) that fol.* All POWs who expressed a desire to be repatriated or who can be released to proceed directly to their homes in accordance with oft repeated Communists proposals will be released or repatriated when the armistice becomes eff. Both sides wld agree to abide by the decision of the impartial nations as to the disposition of the remainder of the POWs. Adequate safeguards to include freedom of press wld, of necessity, be placed on the impartial nations to insure that personal preference of the indiv wld be the primary factor in determining the ultimate disposition of non-repatriates; thus the impartial nations wld be unable to compromise the UN psn of no forced repatriation. The ultimate disposition of the POWs wld be determined within a specified prd of time.

(2) Delivery to the D/Z of non-repatriates where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and responsibility for their disposition be turned over to representatives of impartial nations, with both sides agreeing to abide by the decision of such impartial nation.

Discussion: The main advantage I see in this proposal is that it removes UNC-sponsored rescreening to which the Commies have objected so violently. This, however, wld be an exceedingly difficult procedure to implement because we cannot guarantee our non-repatriates contd custody by the UNC and ultimate disposition according to an established procedure. In order to avoid violence in mvmt to the D/Z we wld first have to convince the indivs concerned that they wld get fair and equitable treatment from the impartial nations.

> (3) Both sides agree that upon signing the armistice the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination as to the ultimate disposition of all POWs of both sides who have not been previously repatriated or released wld be passed to a grp of impartial nations.

Discussion: (See part 2, CX 51489.)

> (4) Both sides agree to sign an armistice, to retain all non-repatriates in protective custody until a grp of mutually acceptable impartial nations decides on the ultimate disposition of these non-repatriates.

Discussion: This delays the decision on the non-repatriates for an indefinite prd and may result in unrest and increased violence among the non-repatriates because of the long prd of confinement. This proposal is simple and easily implemented.

> (5) Delivery by each side of non-repatriates to the custody of a body of mutually agreeable impartial nations at an acceptable location, either inside or outside of Korea, with each side agreeing to abide by the decision of such body as to the eventual disposition of the non-repatriates.

Discussion: This generally fols the proposal discussed by India with the Chinese fgn ministers. The main difficulty we foresee here is, again, in convincing non-repatriates prior to mvmt that we are acting in good faith, and that they will not be arbitrarily rtd to Commie control.

f. I firmly believe that a primary requisite to the four new proposals is that the prd of time allowed to determine ultimate disposition on non-repatriates be kept to a min. I believe that proposals subparas (1), (2), (3) and (4) may be accomplished prior to convening of the political conference. Location of the spot selected for the delivery of non-repatriated wld affect time required for accomplishment of new proposal subpara (5).

g. After presenting the above proposals, Gen Harrison wld then emphasize that they represent the widest selection of choices which the UNC offer. Each of them will produce an armistice. Each of them will expedite the final disposition of non-repatriates. Upon the completion of his presentation, Gen Harrison wld close with a statement that he hopes the Commies will give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. He will then recess (bilaterally or unilaterally) for a prd of about 10 days for the announced purpose of allowing the Commies adequate time to analyze all of our proposals. He wld inform them that staff offs wld be aval at any time during the recess to ans questions on any of the numerous proposals.

5. The above procedure must be carefully prepared in adv. Copies of Gen Harrison's statement wld be released to the press immed after the

conf and shld be fold ASAP, and continued throughout the prd of recess. By approp, strong supporting public statements of allied and US leaders at the highest governmental levels, emphasizing that the UNC had offered 13 possible solutions which cld obtain an honorable armistice. This procedure shld secure the max national and international public support for any subsequent action the UNC may be required to take.

6. Step nr 2: If, upon reconvening the next plenary session, the Commies refuse to accept any of the proposals or to offer a satisfactory counter-proposal, it shld then be apparent that the Commies do not desire an armistice on terms acceptable to the UNC. At this time the UNC wld be in a most favorable psn to recess unilaterally for an indef prd and Gen Harrison shld be authorized to so recess at this time in accordance with conditions as stated. If we recess unilaterally, we wld agree to reconvene plenary sessions only after the enemy submitted in writing the text of any further proposals. This unilateral recess I consider essential if we are to retain the dignity and firmness of our psn.

7. At the time we recess unilaterally, it is my firm conviction that, for all practical purposes, the mil aspects of the negotiations will have been completed. Further discussion on a mil basis by the UNC wld be pointless and wld in fact further contribute to the serious loss of prestige which we have already suffered in dealing with the minor forces of Red China and North Korea, on an assumed equal footing. Unless mil force in excess of that now aval to me were to be applied to secure agreement to our armistice terms, it might then be logical to remove the ques of peace in Korea from the hands of the UNC.

8. This summarizes my eval of our psn today. I realize there are many factors which must be considered at governmental level with which I am not thoroughly familiar. However, I am convinced we must abandon our piecemeal efforts in favor of a carefully prepared, overall plan of action. I strongly recom that the foregoing course of action be given serious consideration and submit that it is highly preferable to that outlined in State msg 268 of 25 July 1952, on which I commented in my msg C 52788, for determining if the Commies really desire an armistice. I also consider it preferable to the course of action proposed in JCS 917260.[7]

---

[7] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 467.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1952.

Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement regarding Korean Armistice Negotiations.

The reactions of Ambassador Murphy [1] and General Clark [2] take up the two aspects of the proposed statement: form and substance.

As for form, I fully share Murphy's reservations regarding the wisdom of having the President base a statement on such dubious sources as the Progressive Party and the New York *Daily Worker.* I felt last week, and I still feel, that the form of the message should be changed; whether the substance of the proposal could not be made in the armistice negotiations, either in a public session or executive.

As to the effect of the heavy bombardment program, I think we should ask the intelligence agencies to make a quick analysis. I have not seen anything yet to bear out Clark and Murphy in terms of influencing the armistice negotiations.

My comments on General Clark's telegram are as follows:

(1) I seriously question whether inclusion of the POW question in a political conference would force the UNC to give in on this issue or result in concessions to Communist demands.

(2) I think his sub-paragraphs *a, b,* and *c* should be proposed by the UNC for an *ad hoc* political conference, including other representatives.

(3) The President's proposal, wherever made, probably will produce a counter proposal or result in the Communists holding American prisoners as hostages. This seems to me the real difficult issue to be negotiated in this proposal. Perhaps we could get the Communists to accept the proposal if we used the right channel. General Clark has omitted any reference to the Greater Sanction Statement which disposes of his argument in this paragraph. In any event, we should accept no counter proposal from the Communists.

(4) One ancient report [3] is not sufficient basis for evaluating the effect of civilian morale in North Korea. Let's have a full study of this.

(5) I do not see a trap.

(6) I agree on the inadvisability of the proposed statement. However, I do not think that General Clark has correctly analyzed the substance of this proposal as a way of getting out of the impasse on the POW issue. However, his other telegram,[4] which I have not seen, may do that.

---

[1] For Murphy's reactions, see telegram 777 from Tokyo, Sept. 1, p. 466.

[2] For Clark's reactions, see telegram C 54495 to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 467.

[3] Young's reference was to an intelligence report quoted in Clark's telegram C 54495 to JCS.

[4] Clark's other telegram was C 54499 to JCS, Sept. 1, 1952; for its text, see *supra.*

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1952.

Subject: Exchange of Prisoner's Problem in Korea

Participants: Dean Acheson—Secretary of State
Senor Don Rafael de la Colina—Ambassador of Mexico
Senor Don Rafael Nieto—Minister Counselor of Embassy of Mexico
Thomas C. Mann—Deputy Assistant Secretary (ARA)
John M. Allison—Assistant Secretary (FE)

The Mexican Ambassador called at his request to leave with the Secretary a copy of a communication delivered today to the Secretary General of the United Nations by the permanent Mexican Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo. The note[1] in substance suggests that each member of the United Nations that signifies its approval of this plan would pledge itself to receive in its territory those prisoners of war who did not desire to be returned to their former countries. While the proposal is not entirely clear, apparently the prisoners of war held by either party who are willing to be exchanged would be exchanged without delay under this plan and the remaining prisoners would then go as political refugees to the various United Nations members who accept the plan.

Ambassador de la Colina stated that he assumed that the Secretary General of the United Nations would transmit this suggestion officially to the United States Government as agent of the Unified Command. He went on to say that after there had been an opportunity to study the proposal and if the Unified Command believed it had merit there would obviously be the necessity of working out the details and perhaps modifying it in some form or another. However, the Mexican Government believed it important that the general proposition be put forward for consideration.

The Secretary asked whether or not there would be any time limit on the stay of the prisoners of war in the various countries and whether they would be at some time forced to return to any particular place. Ambassador de la Colina said it was his understanding that there would be no forcible ejection of prisoners nor would they be forcibly required to return to any particular country. The Secretary also pointed out that Nationalist China was a member of the United Nations and that it might offer to take all the Chinese prisoners, in which case there would undoubtedly be certain difficulties. Ambassador de la Colina again emphasized that this proposal was in general terms only and that obviously it would need refining before it was put into operation.

---

[1] A copy of the note and a draft translation, neither printed, were attached to the source text. For the text of the Mexican proposal, see telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485.

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for making a copy of the proposal available and said it would receive earnest consideration by the Department.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 2, 1952—4 p. m.

Draft Statement Proposing Korean Armistice on Basis of Agreed Items (See tele. to Moscow 206, August 27, 1952)[2]

Mr. Matthews: We have read the messages from Clark[3] and Murphy[4] and we think that perhaps in the light of their views we should not pursue the idea of a presidential statement at this time.

General Bradley: Most of our people thought that it would show weakness at this time.

Mr. Matthews: That certainly wasn't the intention. I am not sure that Clark understood this was merely to provide a face-saving device for the Communists, but as a result of his views we have been giving consideration to avoiding a presidential statement. We have been considering throwing something like this into the Panmunjom negotiations. It was not our thought at any time to weaken on the principle of nonforcible repatriation. We would, of course, not give that up in any later negotiations on prisoners. We have also looked at Clark's long cable in which he sets forth several proposals that might be made. (Cable No. C 54499 from Tokyo.)[5]

Mr. Nitze: I had some difficulty following Clark's reasoning. The main point he seemed to be making was that if the Commies came back with a counter-proposal offering only part of our prisoners for part of theirs which we hold, we would have difficulty with it. I don't think we would have difficulty turning down something that would not give us back all our prisoners.

General Collins: I think his basic objection was that prior to passing to the political field we should do everything we can at Panmunjom.

Mr. Nitze: We would be inclined to go along with that idea.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the JCS, Generals Bradley, Collins, Vandenberg, and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed a five-man Department of State contingent and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. In all, 16 persons attended. With the exception of an extremely brief discussion at the conclusion of the meeting about NATO operations, the discussion concerned Korea.

[2] *Ante*, p. 463.

[3] Clark's message was telegram C 54495 to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 467.

[4] Murphy's message was telegram 777 from Tokyo, Sept. 1, p. 466.

[5] Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.

General Bradley: What would happen if they accept our proposal? We would still have 45,000 or so prisoners who would stay with us. Do we go back and fight if the negotiations fail?

Mr. Matthews: No, you would have an armistice, but you would be stuck with the prisoners.

General Bradley: Wouldn't you have to go back and fight?

Mr. Nitze: Not if you signed up on this basis. One of the armistice terms is that it will stay in effect until superseded.

Mr. Allison: If they want an armistice you are all right. If they want an armistice they can forget about these additional prisoners later.

General Bradley: We have always been afraid of a cease fire before you get an armistice.

Mr. Nitze: You would have an armistice here on all of the agreed terms; that includes the provision that it will continue in force.

General Collins: Clark points out that they would build up their air fields, but they could do that under any of these arrangements.

Mr. Allison: Yes.

General Bradley: Well, this just gives them one more excuse for breaking the armistice.

Mr. Nitze: We agree to that but there are a lot of other things they could use as a pretext for breaking the armistice if they wanted to.

General Collins: You feel now that it would not be a good idea to propose this?

Mr. Matthews: That's right. We are against a presidential statement, but we are inclined to favor at least putting up to Clark the idea of proposing this at Panmunjom.

Mr. Allison: If it were put up at Panmunjom we would take off the first paragraph about *Izvestiya.*

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

General Collins: Clark has now come in with five proposals. This might be fitted in as a sixth method.

General Bradley: We haven't finished studying Clark's message. Personally, I rather like the idea of giving them something and then saying no more talk until they have something to say. I don't like some of the five specific proposals too much.

The first is something that Bill Fechteler has been talking about for months.

The second is difficult; you would just turn them loose and lose control of them.

The third is difficult because these other people don't have guards so you couldn't turn them over to their control.

In the fourth, the word that struck me was the word "decides". Suppose there is a stalemate. Of course, he puts a time limit on it.

These five proposals require careful study. Maybe this thing that you suggested should be included as a sixth.

Mr. Matthews: May I ask about the paragraph in which Clark says that after five days you would recess unilaterally and the military aspects of the matter would in effect be completed. Do you have any idea what he visualizes after that?

General Bradley: I assume that he means that unless they come back with a proposal there wouldn't be an armistice. The last sentence is unclear to me too.

General Collins: I took it, it would be removed entirely to the political plane—through our Ambassador in Moscow or some other place, but there would be no further military efforts to secure an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: Then he doesn't contemplate further military steps?

General Collins: Not unless he gets additional forces. I don't see what more the military could do about an armistice.

Mr. Nitze: Then we would really be in a box. You have a UN meeting coming up and then the things Clark worries about could really happen.

General Collins: I don't see why. I assume any diplomatic efforts would include a demand for the return of our POWs. But we have tried everything.

Admiral Fechteler: He says he thinks the military will have exhausted the possibilities after making these proposals.

General Collins: Paul, you say we will be in a box. We haven't gotten anywhere for two years.

Mr. Matthews: Well, I take it Clark doesn't mean there is some magic by which to get an armistice.

General Bradley: No, I think we ought to study his message further.

Mr. Matthews: Yes, I think we should.

Mr. Nitze: If you were to make this proposal we have suggested, it would be better to do it not in conjunction with the other five Clark suggests.

General Collins: Yes, I think it should be separate.

Mr. Matthews: Could we send you a rewording of the proposal?

General Bradley: I suggest the people who have been working on this try to come up with a draft.

General Collins: I think Clark is trying to put up a lot of proposals to show how far we are prepared to go and then if they reject all of them we will have a basis for breaking off.

Mr. Matthews: Have you seen any other reports to indicate our military pressure on North Korea is creating a panic.

General Collins: I haven't personally seen any.

General Bradley: I have just seen indications they are being hurt, but nothing to indicate panic.

General Collins: One thing that struck me while I was in Korea was how little of the front is held by North Koreans. At least 75 percent of the front is held by the Chinese.

General Bradley: When I was there a year ago the North Koreans were full of vinegar. I suspect they have gotten tired of it and have just quit.

Mr. Matthews: It looks like the Chou En-lai talks will end soon.

General Collins: One thing we have talked about was Kennan's idea of finding some way to throw a monkey wrench in. If we could get agreement on Clark's suggestions, maybe they could be thrown in. We would have to act fast.

Mr. Matthews: We have no idea what will come out of the meetings in Moscow, but Korea has probably played a part.

General Bradley: On the subject of Clark's proposals, what chance do we have of getting a group of countries to do some of these things for us, starting out with the worst one, the fifth, where the Indians would take over the remaining prisoners, and coming up to the others?

General Collins: We have approached some of these nations on other things and they have shown great reluctance.

Mr. Matthews: They don't like to do these things, but you remember they agreed to serve on the inspection teams.

General Bradley: Is there any chance of doing anything along the lines of Kennan's suggestion of throwing something between the Russians and the Chinese?

Mr. Nitze: Frankly, I think all of Clark's proposals will be turned down, and there will be no disagreement over them between the Chinese and the Soviets.

Mr. Allison: I agree.

General Collins: What about this other proposal you have suggested?

Mr. Allison: I think it is the only thing that has any chance of being accepted. It may not be good from that point of view, but at least they don't have to accept the principle of non-repatriation.

General Vandenberg: Suppose they turn down all of Clark's proposals. Wouldn't that mean they don't want an armistice, and wouldn't it be good for us to know that?

Mr. Allison: I think if they turn down this other one you would know better.

Mr. Matthews: Do you mean we know whether there was a split between the Soviets and the Chinese?

General Vandenberg: No. I just meant the sooner we know whether they want an armistice the better. There has been no real thought as to what we should do if this thing is going on indefinitely. You have to have a new tack sometime.

Mr. Matthews: That was one aspect of it we wanted to talk about. We wanted to know whether you had any idea what you would want to do if the talks broke off. If we knew that, it would be easier to know whether the negotiations should be broken off.

Mr. Nitze: I thought we had been through that in connection with Southeast Asia.

General Vandenberg: I don't think so. The American people feel differently about Korea where their troops are fighting.

Mr. Nitze: Is there more drastic action you would advise taking?

Mr. Matthews: Is there something you would do this year?

General Vandenberg: No, but you would prepare for it.

General Bradley: I think we should limit ourselves to what we would recommend from the military point of view. You might, on that basis, say it is better to stay 15 years. The public might demand something different.

General Vandenberg: My point is that the people and we here are still hoping for an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: But the difficulty is that if you don't know what you are going to do, and you break off the negotiations, you may get pressure for something you don't want to do.

General Bradley: I think we have said a long time ago that we were trying to win this by a limited war in Korea. We wanted to give it a fair try.

Mr. Nitze: I think we have always worried about what we would do to meet a new situation. The question is how you can get a bigger build-up there. It is hard to do in the election campaign.

General Bradley: We can't do it now. You will have to let it ride.

General Collins: This question also affects the 1954 budget we are working on now.

General Vandenberg: The people in Michigan and Ohio and out there across the country where I have been are red-headed about this. They want something done. The people here in Washington don't realize that. It is going to affect the elections.

General Bradley: The people have been sold on the MacArthur line that attacking Manchuria will bring the Commies around. We know that may not happen.

General Vandenberg: Well, the lid will blow off.

General Bradley: Then, Doc, is it your idea that the proposal you were suggesting should not be added to Clark's five proposals and that it has a better chance than his?

General Collins: You mean you'd try this one first?

Mr. Nitze: Yes, I would.

General Collins: That would throw out Clark's five proposals.

General Bradley: No, it would postpone them.

General Collins: You said you thought this proposal of yours was the only one with a chance of acceptance. In paragraph 3 on page 5 of Clark's message isn't that also a proposal that would save face for them?

Mr. Allison: If you read back to the message that paragraph refers to you would find other conditions that would be specified.

General Collins: No, I think this is a separate thing.

Mr. Allison: Yes, I guess that is right. The conditions don't apply here.

General Collins: This proposal seems to me to offer as much chance of acceptance as the one we have been talking about. The other four all require them to agree ahead of time to free determination by individuals.

General Bradley: The proposal number 4 does not differ much from the one you suggested the President make. It turns the matter over to impartial nations instead of having us negotiate it. But suppose those nations did go along with the idea of forced repatriation.

Mr. Nitze: Part of my concern, and we haven't studied this message fully, is the use of the word "non-repatriation".

General Collins: I think you are right about that. It is a difficult thing. I thought you might say the remaining prisoners.

General Bradley: You could say those whose disposition is in dispute. What do you do if the impartial nations decide in favor of returning the prisoners?

Mr. Nitze: That worries us because you would be giving the decision on the principle of no forcible repatriation to others.

Mr. Matthews: In our proposal we would keep control of the matter.

General Collins: I think we'll have to study these.

General Bradley: Yes, we ought to study them along with your proposal. I don't think we could put the present one up after Clark's proposals are made.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

Trials of POWs

General Bradley: Do you want to discuss the other thing we had up last Friday?

Mr. Matthews: You mean the trials in the prison camps?

General Bradley: Yes. The deputies[6] passed on it Friday and I believe State has not concurred. Admiral Dennison said the President had seen one message on this and didn't like it.

Mr. Matthews: When you told me that I stopped studying it.

General Bradley: I don't think this is a good time for the trials. You start hanging them and you give propaganda to the Commies.

Admiral Fechteler: This proposal would give them fair trials.

General Vandenberg: We are shooting the troublemakers now.

General Collins: The difficulty is that the people who get shot now aren't the ones who are really responsible.

General Bradley: He ought to dig out the ones responsible.

---

[6] Operations Deputies, JCS.

Should we defer consideration on this, or take it to the President and get it turned down, or what should we do?

Mr. Matthews: Aren't they doing pretty well in the camp?

General Collins: They are taking direct action now. Of course, this proposal is also for past offenses and any new ones. He wants to know whether he can start with the new ones and then pick up the old ones. The President doesn't think it is a good time to do this. The Commies will probably cook up charges against General Dean or someone else.

General Bradley: Does everyone agree that we should suspend action?

General Vandenberg: I think we should tell him to go ahead as he is now.

Release of South Korean POWs

General Bradley: Do you also want to discuss the release of the 16,000 South Korean prisoners?

Mr. Nitze: Mr. Kennan said in his wire [7] that we shouldn't do anything on that if we were going to make a proposal.

General Vandenberg: We'll always be in the same boat if we keep postponing it. Can I put in a plea that if this other proposal isn't made we go ahead and clean this matter up.

Mr. Nitze: Is there anything he can be doing for the preparation of their release?

Mr. Matthews: I gather there is not.

Mr. Allison: Is there anything we can be doing with the allies?

General Bradley: Shouldn't we send an interim reply to Clark.

General Cabell: He has one already.

Mr. Allison: There is one legal question we could work on; that is, how you work out this release under the Geneva Convention.

General Collins: Anything you can do to clear the decks would be fine.

[Here follows a brief discussion of NATO matters.]

---

[7] The reference was to telegram 385 from Moscow, Aug. 28, p. 464.

795.00/9–352

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Phillips) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Public Affairs (MacKnight) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1952.

Subject: Truce Negotiations

I have read the telegrams from Tokyo and Pusan saying that everything possible already is being done to induce the Chinese to make panicky demands on the Russians.[2] Here are some further suggestions which have Departmental approval:

1. A covert operation to spread rumors in Korea, Japan and China that an amphibious operation is being prepared.
2. Spread the following rumor through covert channels so that it would get circulation in Korea and Japan and China, if possible:

> The U.S. has consistently refused to accept prohibitions on the atomic weapons. The reason for this is that the atomic bomb is our real ace in the hole in Korea, but the U.S. Government has been against their use. But pressure from some elements in the U.S. is intense to use them. The present saturation bombings in Korea have been launched in an effort to restrain these elements by satisfying them that we are taking vigorous action. But the saturation bombing obviously is not going to be decisive. A Presidential campaign is on and already one party is demanding more decisive action. As the Presidential campaign grows, this pressure will get much greater. The Government probably will not be able to resist it. There is one way to prevent the use of atomic weapons in Korea. This is to get an armistice without delay. If that is not done and atomic weapons are used, they may not prove decisive since they have never been tried on troops in the field. If that happens, then the same pressure undoubtedly will be exerted to extend the bombings to China, using atomic weapons.

---

[1] This memorandum was sent to Richard Umstead of the CIA with a request in a covering memorandum that the CIA undertake implementation on an urgent basis. It was also noted in the covering memorandum that the project had the approval of Matthews (memorandum by MacKnight to Umstead, Sept. 3, 1952; 795.00/9–352).

[2] The reference was to telegrams 260 from Pusan and 729 from Tokyo, both Aug. 27, 1952, neither printed (both 795.00/8–2752). These cables were in response to a suggestion made by Kennan that the arrival of a PRC Delegation in Moscow in mid-August offered a "unique opportunity" to frighten the Chinese and increase supply demands on the Soviet Union. Kennan suggested "something in nature of increased milit[ary] threat or feint" balanced by "some sort of conciliatory gesture" to the Soviet Union indicating that the United States was prepared to move to a cease-fire (telegram 321 from Moscow, Aug. 19, 1952; 795.00/8–1952).

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 3, 1952—12:18 p. m.

202. Re: Korea POW issue. Following communication and enclosure received yesterday from SYG Lie:

Verbatim Text:

"I have the honour to enclose herewith a communication from His Excellency Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, permanent representative of Mexico to the United Nations. I should be grateful to you for bringing this letter to the attention of the proper authorities in the Unified Command."

Enclosure:

"Mr. Secretary General:

"I have the honor to inform you that His Excellency Miguel Aleman, President of the United Mexican States, voicing the sentiments of the people of Mexico, who deplore the necessity of prolonging the military campaign in Korea, has instructed me through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to transmit to you a plan which in the view of my government may contribute to remove an issue that, so far as we have been able to determine, is the obstacle to the signing of a truce in that region, namely, the exchange of prisoners of war.

"My government's proposal, reduced to its essential terms but susceptible of being modified in the light of the opinions of the other members of the United Nations might follow the general lines set forth below:

"The prisoners of war held by either party who may have voluntarily expressed their wish to be repatriated would be exchanged without delay.

"As regards the others, each member of the United Nations that signifies its approval of this plan would pledge itself to receive in its territory a number of said prisoners in the ratio that might be agreed upon with the understanding that, once in the country of temporary asylum, the corresponding authorities would grant them an immigration status that would allow them to find work so as not to become public charges.

"As soon as normalcy returns to said part of the Asiatic Continent, the government of their respective countries of origin would grant the prisoner the facilities and assurances that might be required for their immediate repatriation. Said governments would proceed in a similar way in the case of those prisoners that, without the fulfilment of the condition stated above, would later express their willingness to return to their countries of origin, in which case the United Nations would afford them the necessary means to carry out their wishes.

"The Mexican Government is not unmindful of the fact that should this plan be accepted, the States approving it would bind themselves to make certain sacrifices; but these certainly would not be excessive if, through them, a firm step could be taken to facilitate the suspension of hostilities.

"To the foregoing objectives, which by themselves are sufficiently important to warrant their careful consideration, another should be added, namely, that of raising the social status of the prisoners by restoring to them the dignity that only free labor can bestow. At the same time, a contribution to the progress of international law might be made by reaffirming the principle that prisoners of war are not to be treated as just a conglomeration of human beings whose fate the authorities may decide at will, but on the contrary, that man's inalienable right to freely work out his own destiny should prevail. Finally, if the plan herein submitted leads to an effective agreement, it would strengthen the confidence of the peoples of the world—including the prisoners of war in Korea who have refused repatriation—in the universal scope of the cause of the United Nations and in the solidarity of the members of this organization.

"I shall, therefore, sincerely appreciate your transmitting this plan to the competent organ of the United Nations.

"I avail myself, (etc.) . . ." [1] Sgd. Padilla Nervo.

End Verbatim Text.

Mexican note had previously been handed to Gross by Padilla Nervo who said he was giving it shortly to SYG Lie. He said he gave it to us in advance on theory SYG would forward it to US as UC. Padilla said same text being handed to Secretary in Washington by Mex Amb.

We wld appreciate Dept's views as to response to SYG [2] and to Padilla Nervo.

AUSTIN

---

[1] Ellipsis in the source text

[2] In telegram 119 to New York, Sept. 17, 1952, the Department of State instructed the U.S. Mission at the United Nations to inform the Secretary-General that the U.S. Government welcomed the Mexican proposal, which was designed to help bring about an armistice in accordance with UN principles. The Department of State also suggested that the mission privately inform Padilla Nervo that the U.S. Government was pleased to note that the Mexican proposal supported the basic UNC position against forcible repatriation of prisoners of war, and that it would give the proposal serious consideration (695A.0024/9-352).

PPS files, lot 64 D 653, "Korea"

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1952.

Subject: Korean Armistice Proposal

In the Panmunjom negotiations the UNC has already indicated that it is prepared to return 83,000 odd prisoners of war in exchange for the 12,000 UN prisoners the custody of which the Communists have admitted. The UNC has further proposed that an armistice be concluded on the basis of such an exchange and that the remaining prisoners in our hands be rescreened thereafter, provided the Communists agree to abide by the results of such rescreening.

In recent weeks the Communist press in the United States has been proposing a cease fire in Korea and the later political negotiation of the problem of prisoners of war. This proposal, voiced also by the Progressive Party presidential candidate, has been carried by the official press in the Soviet Union.

The UNC can obviously not accept a cease fire except as part of an armistice and it obviously cannot conclude an armistice that would leave UN prisoners in the Communists' hands. However, since the UNC is prepared to conclude an armistice if it can secure the return of UN prisoners and if it is only required to return those who have indicated their willingness to go back to the Communists, it may be possible to take the initiative in seeking a conclusion of the hostilities in Korea without altering the stand on non-forcible repatriation by agreeing to undertake future negotiations concerning those prisoners who have not indicated a willingness to be repatriated.

Up to the present time the UNC proposals have been such as to require the Communists to agree in principle to non-forcible repatriation. If the Communists desire an armistice but cannot bring themselves to conclude one at the cost of loss of face, the previous proposal of the UNC could be amended so as not to require prior agreement by the Communists to abide by the results of the rescreening but merely to agree to continue to negotiate about the matter.

If the UNC proposal, so modified, is introduced at Panmunjom it probably will be treated as no more than reiteration of the previous proposal, since the principle of non-forcible repatriation has been so consistently emphasized in the negotiations. For such a modified proposal to provide that degree of face-saving that might conceivably permit an armistice to be concluded, it would appear much better to put it in a different context. This could be done by having the proposal made by the President.

The Mexican Government has just transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a Mexican proposal for dealing with the prisoners of war who have indicated they would resist repatriation.[1] The Mexican proposal is probably not a particularly useful way of dealing with the outstanding issue in the negotiations but it would provide the President with an opportunity to make the approach suggested above without appearing to be doing so in response to the urging of the Progressive Party of the New York *Daily Worker.*

It is, of course, true that leaving one of the armistice issues unsettled for later negotiations might provide a pretext to the Communists for renewing hostilities if at a later time they were inclined to do so. However, there will doubtless be any number of equally good pretexts under the agreed armistice provisions as, for example, those relating to the limitations on military buildup, the rights of inspection teams and the questions left for future political settlement such as the withdrawal of foreign forces. The only protection that an agreement can provide against a renewal of hostilities is already provided by the agreed article to the effect that the armistice, once concluded, will remain in force until superseded by another agreement.

---

[1] For text of the Mexico proposal, see telegram 202, *supra.*

If the President makes such a statement, the negotiators at Panmunjom might at the same time indicate to the Communists that we are prepared to deal with the outstanding issue in several ways, either before or after an armistice. The negotiators could, for instance, suggest an approach similar to that in Chou En-lai's alternative B and, as General Clark has suggested, that we would be prepared to agree not to send the remaining prisoners of war to Formosa but that we would be willing to request some impartial country, such as India, to take control of them.

We might also have Ambassador Kennan discuss the President's statement with the Russians and indicate that this should provide a means of terminating hostilities in Korea, the continuation of which is not without risk to both sides.

If the above approach is decided upon, General Clark could be told that his suggestion for putting forward a variety of proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is a matter that could be considered at a later date, after we have received indications as to whether or not the proposals described above provide an acceptable basis for concluding an armistice.

Attached is a draft presidential statement for consideration.

PAUL H. NITZE

[Attachment]

Draft Presidential Statement

The President of Mexico, Mr. Aleman, has transmitted to the United Nations a proposal which his Government has made in an effort to remove the remaining obstacle to an armistice in Korea.

The proposal of the Mexican Government takes account of the fact that agreement has been reached between the two sides in Korea on all of the provisions of an armistice with the exception of those articles dealing with prisoners of war. Even in this respect, as the Mexican Government has noted, there is a large measure of agreement. The Communists have declared that they were prepared to return to the United Nations 12,000 United Nations' prisoners and representatives of the United Nations have frequently stated that we are prepared to return 83,000 prisoners of war whom we hold. The only outstanding issue in the armistice negotiations relates to persons not included in these numbers.

The Mexican Government has proposed that the prisoners of war each side has already offered to return to the other be immediately exchanged, and has suggested a way of dealing with the remaining outstanding issue so that an armistice need not await the final disposition of this question.

This Government, and the other members of the United Nations with which it is associated are sincere in their desire to see an armistice completed in Korea. It is true, as the Mexican Government states, that a large area of agreement has now been established in the armistice negotiations.

As agent of the United Nations for the Unified Command in Korea, I therefore propose that the opposing sides mutually undertake to carry out all the articles that have been agreed to by the negotiators dealing with matters other than prisoners of war, and to take those actions which each side has already declared itself ready to take by way of returning prisoners of war to the control of the other side. This would mean that the United Nations would return 83,000 prisoners to Communist control; that the Communists would return 12,000 prisoners to United Nations control; that there then would be an immediate ceasefire and armistice in Korea; and that the persons not included in the numbers to be exchanged would be the subject of subsequent negotiations. The Mexican Government has suggested one possible basis for such negotiations. There are other ways in which this matter could be dealt with without the use of force. If the Communists share our desire to bring an end to fighting in Korea, the way is open.

795.00/9-852: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, September 8, 1952—10:58 a.m.

218. Re Lie's proposed trip to Europe. Trygve Lie informed me in strict confidence last night he has decided to make a quick trip to London and Paris this week to discuss Korea with Eden (and Churchill, if possible) and with Schuman. He inquired again concerning our "working paper" on Korea and told me frankly he had been informed of such paper by both the UK and Fr dels in separate conversations here. He seemed to be aware of its contents. I replied to him in the sense suggested by Messrs. Sandifer and Popper in telecon with them Sept 2.[1] Lie said he would like to see the paper before leaving for Europe. I was non-committal.

---

[1] In response to a request by UN Secretary-General Lie for information on the U.S. working paper, Gross was authorized to inform Lie orally that the working paper did exist and to outline for him its contents. Furthermore, he was to tell Lie that the paper was now under consideration at the Department of State and that it has been communicated to certain governments to get their reactions. The Secretary-General would understand, Sandifer and Popper continued, that the Department of State could not provide him with copies of such working documents (memorandum of conversation, by Popper, Sept. 2, 1952; 795.00/9-252).

Lie went on to elaborate his own views which he hoped to discuss in London and Paris as follows: He does not believe broader economic measures or political measures will be agreed to by British and French nor that they would be of great practical value even if adopted by a bare two-thirds majority of the assembly. He feels Korea is "the one big UN issue" and that the future of the UN is heavily involved in what happens next. On the assumption of no armistice prior to the GA, he feels it would be necessary and desirable to discuss the Korean question in the Assembly.

In his view, the only action which will have any meaning from the point of view of maintaining UN solidarity as well as impressing the Commies would be the provision of additional forces in Korea. He wants to press this point with the Brit and Fr Govts, urging them to take an initiative to provide more forces and to urge other West Eur countries to do likewise. Lie will undertake to do what he can to persuade Belgians, Dutch and Scandinavians to increase troop contributions. He would point out that the continuing stalemate in the armistice talks causes profound concern in American public opinion which is already strongly critical of the failure of other UN members to contribute a fair share of fighting forces in Korea. Moreover, he would argue that such action is the only language the Commies understand and would be more likely than anything else to induce them to agree to an armistice. He believes it is wholly unrealistic for the Brit and Fr to oppose additional economic or political measures unless they come forward with an alternative, and the provision of more troops is the only practical alternative which Lie sees.

I told Lie I would like to have an opportunity to talk with him further on Tuesday, Sept 9, after obtaining guidance from the Dept. I outlined the arguments in favor of seeking GA action on economic and political measures, particularly in the event Commies should reject a preliminary GA resolution calling for a Korean armistice.

We agreed to meet Tuesday, Sept 9, at 11:00 a.m. I would appreciate urgent advice from Dept.[2]

GROSS

---

[2] See telegram 109, *infra*.

795.00/9–852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952—7:41 p.m.

109. Re Lie's proposed trip to Eur (urtel 218).[2] While we have some doubt re polit wisdom Lie visit to London and Paris, we feel we are

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Popper and Wainhouse and cleared with Sandifer, Bonbright, Johnson, and Matthews.

[2] *Supra.*

not in position interpose any objection, since idea was first broached to us in form of decision already taken.

In ur conversation with Lie, suggest you stress fol points:

1. Lie will appreciate importance avoiding any implication to Brit and Fr he is in any way acting as agent of U.S.

2. It wld nevertheless be appropriate for Lie to stress to Brit and Fr seriousness with which U.S. Govt and public opinion regard current status Kor problem. While armis negots are virtually stalled, U.S. continues bear brunt of Kor mil effort, with steady drain of life and resources. Difficult for U.S. to sympathize with those who advocate limitation our efforts at forthcoming GA merely to hortatory res calling on Commies to accept an armis, while we wait patiently for something new to turn up. U.S. therefore strongly believes additional measures shld be taken by forthcoming GA, as soon as it is clear Commies will not agree to acceptable armis terms.

3. We consider GA recommendations for additional measures thoroughly warranted for a number of reasons. First, insofar as they will equalize burden borne by U.S. and other UN members, or induce other members adopt embargo and other arrangements now applied by U.S., they are matter of simple equity to U.S. people. Second, GA failure take action signalizing UN intention to persevere in and even strengthen resistance to Commie aggression in Kor will redouble Commie intransigence, hampering armis negots, and in long run tending sap vitality of UN. Third, it is possible additional measures of type we envisage, even if their immed effect on Commies is not decisive, may tip delicate bal of forces motivating Commies so as to induce them to reach agreement at Panmunjom.

4. We are not prepd accept Lie's estimate of practical value of econ and polit measures we are now contemplating. Nor are we convinced additional measures will not in proper circumstances be voted by large GA majority. At same time, we are as eager as we have ever been to obtain additional UN forces for Kor. We shall welcome anything Lie can do to obtain such forces. However, without wishing discourage Lie we doubt either Fr or U.K. in position furnish additional forces now and greater emphasis might be placed on obtaining forces from countries which have not yet made mil contributions. If they were to be forthcoming in significant quantity, effect from standpoint both U.S. and UN wld be most salutary.

Since Lie already aware contents our working paper, you may show him copy if you believe it desirable, emphasizing its topsec character and extent of consultation. In doing so, however, you shld emphasize it is in fact a working doc being used as a basis for discussion and not an expression US Govt policy.

ACHESON

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952—3 p. m.

General Bradley: We have been discussing this proposed telegram to Clark,[2] and the first question we have is whether or not this represents anything different from the proposal that we discussed before and which we decided against.[3]

Mr. Nitze: There are two differences—this proposal is pegged on the Mexican statement rather than on the Communist line in the *Daily Worker* as the former one was, and also the sentence which says that there are other ways in which the matter could be dealt without the use of force gives an indication of the firmness of our position on forcible repatriation which the previous draft did not have.

General Bradley: Our feeling is that Clark will probably come back with exactly the same answers as he gave to the other proposal.[4] We also wonder whether there wasn't a possibility that some other country could make the proposal. Maybe the Mexicans or the Canadians or somebody else. Then I had a question as to whether or not this proposal that the President might make wasn't exactly the thing the *Daily Worker* and the Communists have been proposing.

Mr. Nitze: No. The *Daily Worker* has been calling for an armistice with no exchange of POW's, whereas this proposal really gets all our POW's back. This telegram also really gives the answer to some of the points that Clark made on a previous proposal, particularly in paragraphs 5 and 6, Part I.

General Bradley: In addition to feeling that this essentially is no change except in form from the other proposition, our feeling was that making this proposal would tend to weaken our position, not that we would be giving up on our stand on no forcible repatriation but that we would be making a proposal on something less than the package deal we put up before.

Mr. Johnson: In substance we would actually get the same results as we would get from the package deal. Under this proposal we really get all our POW's back and we don't give the Communists any POW's who are against being repatriated.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chief of Staff General Hull. Nitze headed a five-man Department of State contingent and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. In all, 17 persons were present. With the exception of a brief discussion at the end of the meeting on military talks with Yugoslavia, the meeting dealt entirely with Korea.

[2] The proposed telegram to Clark was drafted by Johnson on Sept. 4 and copies were circulated to the Secretary, Matthews, Nitze, Sandifer, Bonbright, Phillips, and Young as the basis for discussion with the Secretary; a copy of the draft, attached to a memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, is located in file 795.00/9–552. A slightly revised version was used as the basis for discussion at the State–JCS meeting of Sept. 8; a copy of the draft, attached to a memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, is located in file 795.00/9–552.

[3] See the memorandum of the discussion at the State–JCS meeting of Sept. 2, p. 477.

[4] See telegram C 54495, Clark to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 467.

Mr. Nitze: It seemed to us that the only real difference between this proposal and the package deal is that this does leave one issue which is not completely buttoned down with a clear procedure for resolution. This is the point that we deal with in the telegram on page 3, paragraph d,[5] where we say that leaving the issue unsettled might provide a superficial pretext to the Communists for renewing hostilities at a later time. But it is clear that paragraph 62[6] of the armistice agreement gives as much protection as you can hope to have from language alone and if the Communists did want to renew hostilities they could find plenty of other pretexts for doing so.

Mr. Allison: It seems to me that this proposal does in effect do what General Vandenberg was talking about last week. It really is a way for finding out whether the Communists do or do not want an armistice.

General Bradley: I am still worried that if we stop pounding them and they build up, they might start it all over again and we would be in a worse position to stop them.

Mr. Allison: We would be in the same position if we got a full armistice.

General Hull: Nevertheless there would be an issue unresolved. They might say that they would stop fighting and talk about the prisoner issue, but then if the prisoner issue wasn't settled to their satisfaction they could use this as a reason for starting up again.

Mr. Johnson: But this isn't a proposal for a cease-fire. This proposal calls for a full armistice.

Mr. Nitze: We were clear in our minds that we would have to have agreement to all the articles in the armistice.

General Bradley: We had worries as to whether the language of paragraph 51 would really be applicable under this proposal.

Mr. Nitze: We had the same worries and that's why on page 4[7] we pointed out the difficulty that is involved—because of the wording in the first sentence, paragraph 51.

Colonel Matthews:[8] That article was purposely drafted in vague language with the idea that it would only be agreed to after there was agreement that the lists that were exchanged would represent all the prisoners that would be exchanged.

---

[5] The reference was to numbered paragraph 5, subparagraph d, part I of the draft attached to the memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).

[6] Paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement read: "The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by a provision in an appropiate agreement for peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides." For a full text of the revised draft Armistice Agreement of Aug. 29, 1952, see UN document A/2228, Annex.

[7] The reference was to numbered paragraph 7, part I of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).

[8] Lt. Col. Jack B. Matthews was a member of G–3.

Mr. Nitze: To meet Hull's point that we don't want to leave one issue not clearly resolved in the armistice, it would really be better if we could get the Communists to agree to changed language for those paragraphs,[9] which said explicitly that certain numbers of prisoners would be exchanged and that the disposition of the remaining prisoners would be the subject of further negotiations.

General Bradley: We had some other points.

Admiral Fechteler: I was worried about one point. I don't see how we could persuade our negotiators that the statement in paragraph 5a, Part I, is true. It says there that this proposal in no way represents a retreat from the fundamental UNC position. This certainly, I think, is a retreat from our package proposal.

Mr. Allison: It is not a retreat from our position on non-repatriation.

General Bradley: It really is just putting our position on non-repatriation in new language, but I think Bill has a point and I would be happier with language which said that this in no way represented retreat from the fundamental UNC position on no forcible repatriation.

Admiral Fechteler: It still seems like a retreat to me.

Mr. Nitze: Clark's telegram put forth a number of propositions which were not in the package.

Admiral Fechteler: This still is a departure from the package deal.

General Bradley: Clark's proposals are also just a different way of spelling out our position on no forcible repatriation. But I would feel better with new language in the paragraph.

Mr. Nitze: I think the change that you have suggested makes sense.

General Bradley: We have another point. In the first sentence on page 5,[10] where it says prisoners should be entitled to release and repatriation in accordance with provisions of the Geneva Convention, is our position on POW's really in accordance with the Geneva Convention? The Commies have always been making the point that it isn't.

Mr. Johnson: Well, we have rationalized our position in a way so that we can at least say that it is in accordance with the Geneva Convention. We say that POW's have a right to release and repatriation under the Geneva Convention but they have no obligation to exercise that right and that the Geneva Convention doesn't call for the use of force to make them exercise their right. But, admittedly, the position is a little fuzzy.

---

[9] In the final text of the telegram to Clark, JCS 917910, Sept. 8, 1952, *infra*, Clark was asked to comment on whether he believed rewording of paragraphs 51 and 54 of the proposed armistice was necessary.

[10] The reference was to numbered paragraph 1, subparagraph b (1) of part II of the draft attached to the memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).

Mr. Nitze: I don't think we have any reason why we couldn't avoid the problem by just omitting language with reference to the Geneva Convention.[11]

General Bradley: I had trouble with the next sentence where it says it should be presumed all POW's decide to be repatriated. We have known damn well for eight months that they all don't want to be repatriated. Can't we say something different, maybe assumed, or something like that.

Mr. Allison: I don't see why we can't cut out that part of the sentence too.[12] It really isn't necessary.

Colonel Matthews: This language is really just a sop to the Communists because it follows what Chou En-lai was supposed to have proposed. It really is just a play on words, and if the Commies agree to it, I don't think it would cause us any trouble. But it is confusing and Chou En-lai's proposal has, after all, been pretty much discredited.

Mr. Nitze: I have a different worry about this sentence. It says that exchange of POW's should begin in accordance with provision of Article 3, which is paragraph 51 that we were talking about. But this makes no mention of lists of prisoners which is the only saving provision in paragraph 51.

General Bradley: We have given them a list of the 132,000 but this brings up still another point. Clark wants to turn loose the South Korean POW's that he has.[13] If we are going to make this proposal, shouldn't we tell him to turn them loose right away. If the Commies agree to this proposal and the South Koreans haven't been released, they will be a subject of further negotiations and we might have them on our hands indefinitely.

Mr. Johnson: There is one thing to consider. If we release the South Koreans now, we may make it difficult in the future to fuzz the question of the North Korean prisoners who don't want to go back by claiming these North Koreans are really South Koreans.

General Hull: But if we make this proposal and they do accept, we are frozen on the South Koreans.

Mr. Nitze: We were concerned about the timing. According to Clark's message, it would take 70 days to get the South Koreans released.

Colonel Matthews: That could be streamlined considerably even under Clark's proposal. The actual time for releasing the South Koreans could be shortened to 25 days.

---

[11] In the telegram sent to Clark, *infra*, reference to the Geneva Convention was omitted.

[12] In the telegram to Clark, the first part of the sentence, "It shall be presumed that all prisoners of war in the custody of each side desire to be repatriated," was omitted.

[13] Clark made this request in telegram CX 54177 to JCS, Aug. 25, p. 456.

Mr. Johnson: But even 25 days would be too long. We were thinking of this proposal being made as soon as possible and preferably at one of the next two meetings.

General Hull: I should think that Clark could just announce that he was turning loose the whole gang, then do the screening afterwards.

Mr. Ferguson: Couldn't Clark just say that he was continuing to screen out the civilians?

General Bradley: Another question I had was in paragraph 4, page 6,[14] where it says prisoners who are not exchanged will be sent to places willing to receive them which may be agreed upon by both sides. I just don't see how this will work. This really means you have to get four different people to agree on where they are going. We have to agree, the Commies have to agree, the country that they are going to has to agree, and after all the prisoners themselves have to agree.

Mr. Johnson: This is really just a backhanded way of saying that we won't send them to Formosa.

General Bradley: We will have them on our hands forever.

Mr. Ferguson: This is essentially General Clark's proposal.

General Bradley: I realize this is Clark's proposal, but wouldn't it be simpler just to say that we won't send them to Formosa.

Mr. Allison: We might put it in the negative and say that they won't be sent to any place to which either side objects.

Mr. Ferguson: The positive statement ties better into the Mexican proposal.[15]

Admiral Fechteler: Has the Mexican proposal actually been made, and if so what has the Communist reaction been?

Mr. Johnson: It has been made but it is still being kept confidential by Trygve Lie.

General Bradley: That was one question we had. Why not let the Mexicans make this proposal?

Mr. Johnson: The proposal that we are making here goes well beyond what the Mexicans are actually proposing.

General Bradley: What about Allison's suggestion of putting the language into the negative.[16]

Colonel Matthews: It does make it very much clearer that you were saying you won't send them to Formosa, and I should imagine that you might have some trouble with quite a few congressmen if you make it that clear.

---

[14] The reference was to numbered paragraph 1, subparagraph b (4), part II in the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9–552).

[15] For the text of the Mexican proposal, see telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485.

[16] In the telegram to Clark, *infra,* the language which General Bradley questioned was retained.

General Bradley: I realize that we might be in some difficulty over it. I have another question. Top of page 7 [17] it says that further negotiations might be handled through discussion by the same delegations now discussing the armistice. I don't see why we would have to have the same people talking. They wouldn't get anywhere. I have some question as to whether this should even be discussed by the MAC.

Mr. Nitze: I think I am responsible for the suggestion that the question be discussed in the MAC. We thought that since the political conference wouldn't be held for 90 days, we ought to have some forum where we could settle the issue right away if the Communists were ready to agree. I do agree though that Alternative A should be omitted.[18]

General Bradley: Another question we had was the last sentence paragraph 4 on page 7 [19] which calls for a recess of not more than three weeks if the Communists reject the proposal and for subsequent meetings at intervals of 2 to 3 weeks. We rather liked Clark's position on this. In his telegram [20] he said that if the Communists reject the proposal it would be essential to demonstrate firmness in our position by unilaterally declaring a definite recess.

Mr. Nitze: I think we should look at this a little differently. If we had some alternative course of action that we wanted to pursue if the Communists reject our proposals, some new line of military action, then I think we would agree that the proposals should be put up on some kind of take it or leave it basis. But since we don't have any alternative course of action that we really want to pursue and since the military situation will continue to be the same even if the Communists reject this proposal, it wouldn't seem to us that we should not invite the pressures on us to do something different which might come out of calling off the talks. We would certainly be under pressure from our Allies, if the talks at Panmunjom are called off, to discuss Korea in what might prove to be more dangerous forums, such as the UN. It is difficult to keep from talking about things in the UN that other people want to talk about, and we can't tell if the armistice question is transferred to the UN what pressures we would be under from our Allies or from people like the Indians to give up more of our position than we are willing to concede.

Mr. Johnson: The UN would probably try to set up a good offices committee, which would be difficult to handle.

---

[17] The reference was to paragraph 1, subparagraph *b* (5), part II of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9-552).

[18] In the telegram to Clark, *infra*, alternative (*a*), paragraph 1, subparagraph *b* (5), part II was not omitted.

[19] The reference was to paragraph 3, part II of the draft attached to memorandum by Ferguson to Matthews, Sept. 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/9-552).

[20] The telegram under reference was C 54499, Clark to JCS, Sept. 1, p. 470.

General White: But doesn't our willingness to meet them again, even after they have rejected our proposal, indicate to them that we are weak on our position.

Mr. Nitze: I don't think that by this time they can have any doubt about the firmness of our position on forcible repatriation.

General White: To my mind this is a question of Oriental bargaining and anywhere in the Orient if you really want to make a purchase at your price you start walking out of the door after you have made your final offer. If the merchant wants to sell, he'll run after you and grab you.

Mr. Allison: But if we did stop the talks, how long could we stay in that posture without doing something else.

General Hull: There isn't anything else that we can do but we can at least make it clear that this is our final proposal by not going to meetings unless they have something to offer.

General Bradley: I think that sums up the questions we had on the telegram. I haven't yet had reaction from Mr. Lovett since we just got this today.

Mr. Nitze: Let's see if I can recapitulate your questions. First, how do we deal with articles 51 and 54 and second, the question of the Geneva Convention and the word "presume" and third, the Formosa problem and finally the question of indefinite recess or continued meetings.

General Bradley: On paragraphs 51 and 54 it seems to me that we might add a sentence to paragraph 7 on page 4 to the effect that on this question we would particularly like Clark's views since after all he and his people have been closest to the actual working out of the armistice language.

Mr. Nitze: And we might add that if he thought the language in paragraphs 51 and 54 should be changed, we would hope that he would suggest language which would be desirable.[21] There is a further question which you raised of releasing 16,000 South Koreans.

General Bradley: It seems to me this is purely a question of timing. If we are going to make this proposal, I should think it would be essential that Clark go ahead with releasing the South Koreans before we make the proposal.

Mr. Nitze: There might also be the question of the impact on the Communists of releasing the South Koreans and whether or not that would prejudice the possibilities of their accepting the President's proposal.

General Hull: I don't think that would have any effect on the Communists. It's been clear all along that they weren't interested in the South Koreans.

---

[21] This language was incorporated in the telegram to Clark; for its text, see *infra.*

Mr. Allison: Why don't we work out a draft telegram and see if it's possible to get the South Koreans released in a short enough period of time.

General Bradley: Since this telegram is really just for the purpose of getting Clark's views, I think we should get it out as quickly as possible. It really doesn't involve any final decisions. I will have to check it with Mr. Lovett and the President.

[Here follows a brief discussion on preparations for military talks with Yugoslavia.]

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952—6:59 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 917910. From JCS. Refs: A. JCS 917260,[1] B. C 54495,[2] C. C 54499,[3] D. Statetel 627 to AmEmbassy Tokyo for info CINCUNC.[4]

Part I.

1. As stated in JCS 917569,[5] decision was reached not to recommend proposed presidential statement as set forth ref A.

2. However, it is considered that Mex proposal (ref D), while probably not in itself offering a clear resolution of the POW issue in the negots, would, when contemplated publicity is given thereto, provide the Pres with an excellent opportunity to make statement containing the substance of the last 2 paras of draft statement included in para 1, ref A. Draft of the proposed revised statement by the Pres is being transmitted by immediately following radio.[6]

3. It is considered here that up to the present time, UNC proposals have been such as to require Commies to greater or lesser degree to accept publicly principle of nonforcible repatriation. If Commies are seriously concerned with effect on their mil capabilities and civ morale in NK of heavy bombing program as reported in para 4, ref B, they should now be receptive to UNC proposal which offers them opportu-

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 467.

[2] Dated Sept. 1, *ibid.*

[3] Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.

[4] The reference telegram, dated Sept. 4, was a repeat of telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485, with minor changes. The final sentence of the USUN cable was omitted and another sentence, "Copy above communication left with Secy by Mexican Amb Sep 2", added (695A.0024/9-352).

[5] In the telegram under reference, dated Sept. 4, the JCS informed Clark that his course of action recommended in C 54499, Sept. 1, was under study and pending a JCS-State decision he was authorized to continue current tactics. Clark was also informed that the Presidential statement would not be made, but consideration was being given to putting forth the substance of the proposal by another method. As for the release of 11,000 South Korean POWs, the JCS informed Clark that the matter was still under consideration (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[6] JCS 917927 to Clark, Sept. 9, 1952, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128) For a similar statement, see the attachment to the memorandum by Nitze to Matthews, Sept. 3, p. 488.

nity to bring armistice into effect without being required to accept in advance and publicly the principle of nonforcible repatriation, but rather only to agree to continue negotiating about the matter after an armistice with the possibility that they could allow issue to fade out or resolve it without appearing to do so under mil pressure.

4. It is considered that in order to have max impact upon Commie leadership and to provide that degree of face-saving which might conceivably permit armistice to be concluded, it wld be desirable to remove proposal from context of simply another item thrown on table at Panmunjom, and instead to present it in formal statement by Pres. At same time, in order avoid any implication that we desire to remove locus of negots from Panmunjom, it is considered that President's statement shld immediately be followed by presentation by UNC delegation at Panmunjom in executive session as set forth in part II hereof. We believe exec session at Panmunjom wld reinforce serious nature of President's proposal and give opportunity for non-propaganda discussion.

5. Re substance of proposal contained in the President's draft statement, believed here foll reasons argue for its presentation to Commies in some form:

a. Proposal is plausible and reasonable resolution of present impasse on POW question while in no way representing retreat from fundamental UNC position on nonforcible repatriation.

b. Even if rejected by Commies, making of such proposal at this time shortly prior to opening UNGA (scheduled for Oct 14) will enhance support and endorsement UNC position in armistice negots which it is now contemplated will be sought of GA shortly after opening of session.

c. Failure to specify forum for "further negots" ref disposition of non-repatriates considered advantage in that it gives Commies opportunity to propose modification prior to acceptance by counter-proposal in which this point could be more specific. Also, even if Commies do not accept proposal, they might be led into exploring UNC views ref forum for or probable position in "further negots". If Commies could be brought to discuss question of disposition of non-repatriates, we wld have moved them toward accepting concept non-forcible repatriation which wld advance and improve UNC negotiating position.

d. It is, of course, true that leaving this issue unsettled for later negots might provide a superficial pretext to Commies for renewing hostilities at later time. However, if they determine to renew hostilities in clear violation of paragraph 62[7] of armistice agreement, there are many other ways in which they could fabricate a pretext quite apart from POW question. Also, if Commies were to renew hostilities in violation of armistice agreement, the "greater sanctions" statement set forth in JCS 91602 [8] wld become operative.

---

[7] See footnote 6, p. 493.

6. Ref para 3 of ref B, any counter proposal by Commies for a percentage exchange in order that they might hold some of our POW as hostages wld, of course, be entirely unacceptable. We do not believe it probable that Commies wld make such counter-proposal in face of UNC willingness to return all POW not forcibly resisting repatriation and absence thus far of any Commie allegations that any UNC POWs held by them included in their lists are opposed to repatriation. It is considered more likely that Commie counter-proposal wld take form of proposition that armistice enter into effect without any exchange or agreement on POWs. This wld, of course, be unacceptable and we wld make vigorous reply by pointing out senselessness and inhumanity of preventing immediate return to their homes of prisoners held by both sides admittedly desiring such return. Commies can, of course, make such proposal whether or not proposal envisaged by this message is made by the Pres and UNC del as already indicated by Commie press. We wld be in much more advantageous position to counter such a Commie proposal if we had already taken initiative along lines of proposal discussed herein.

7. Shld presidential proposal envisaged by this msg be accepted by Commies, care wld have to be taken re manner of including its terms in an armistice agreement. We are thinking particularly of present agreed wording of paragraphs 51 and 54 of draft armistice agreement, which might leave UNC open to charge of violating agreement by failure to repatriate all POWs in accordance first sentence of para 51. If you think change in wording necessary suggest you submit your proposed rewording and your comments.[9]

8. While there is, of course, no intent by US Govt in any way to compromise basic position on non-forcible repatriation in any subsequent negots and it is not perceived here how Commies cld force such compromise, it wld be important that particularly during period between representation of proposals envisaged herein and Commie reply thereto no public statements in this regard shld be made in order not to destroy face-saving aspect and jeopardize possibilities Commie acceptance.

Part II.

1. It is considered that UNC del presentation of proposal at Panmunjom might be along following lines:

---

[8] The telegram under reference, dated Jan. 10, 1952, contained a text of the "Greater Sanctions Statement"; see p. 14.

[9] Essentially the concern was that the Presidential proposal for partial return of POWs wishing repatriation would mean that not all POWs would be released as soon as possible after the Armistice Agreement became effective and not even within the 2-month time limit envisioned in paragraph 54. CINCUNC's revised language for paragraphs 51 and 54 can be found in telegram C 55297, Clark to JCS, Sept. 17, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

a. Presentation by Harrison such as set forth in para 4, *a, b, c,* and *d,* ref C.

b. After Harrison has reviewed previous proposals along foregoing lines, he cld then present foll additional alternatives acceptable to this Govt.

(1) Alternative (1) as set forth in para 4 *e,* ref C. In order to put this alternative into form which wld be more palatable to Commies, it is suggested that it might be presented along foll lines:

> "As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all POWs in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of POWs shall begin in accordance with the provisions of Art III of the armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate POWs shall be fulfilled by having each POW brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The POW shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed lists of POWs, if desired in the presence of 1 or a combination of the ICRC, jt Red Cross teams or jt mil teams. The POW shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any POW who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to side by which he had been detained shall be immediately allowed to do so. Such former POW shall thereupon go into the custody of side to which he wishes to go, which shall provide him with transportation from demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual shall, of course, not be detained as POW but shall assume civ status, and, in accordance with Art 52 of the armistice agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict."

(2) Delivery to demilitarized zone of non-repatriates in small groups where, at mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from mil control of both sides and interviewed by reps of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities; such persons being free to go to side of their choice as indicated by such interview. This to be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side, under the observation of 1 or combination of foll:

(*a*) ICRC;
(*b*) Jt Red Cross teams;
(*c*) Jt Mil teams.

(3) Gen Harrison cld then state that UNC is prepared immediately to resolve POW issue upon basis of any of foregoing bases and immediately enter into an armistice. However, if Commies are unwilling to resolve POW issue at this time, UNC is willing to postpone issue of nonrepatriates and immediately enter into an armistice, as suggested by Pres, upon basis of immediate exchange of the 12,000 UNC POWs held by Commies for the 83,000 POWs held by UNC. Question of remaining persons not included in numbers to be exchanged to be subj of further negots.

(4) In accordance with suggestions made in paragraph 3 *b* (3) part II of ur CX 51489 [10] concerning disposition of Chi non-repatriates, Gen Harrison cld then be authorized to state that if the Commies were prepared immediately to enter into an armistice upon basis of any of the foregoing proposals, UNC wld be prepared to agree that upon signing of armistice, those persons who are not exchanged under armistice and who are not Koreans will be sent to any place or places outside of Korea willing to receive them which may be agreed upon by both sides.

(5) If questioned by Commies concerning forum for the "further negots" mentioned in President's statement and to be included in Gen Harrison's presentation, Gen Harrison's reply shld indicate flexibility on this point while indicating that possible alternatives acceptable to UNC wld be:

(*a*) Discussions by MAC or sub-group thereof.

(*b*) Alternatively, or if agreement by MAC not reached at time of convening of pol conf provided for under para 60, that conference cld consider methods whereby such negots cld be carried out.

2. Having submitted foregoing proposals, UNC wld suggest recess of 10 days to 2 weeks to allow Commies ample opportunity for consideration. If Commies do not agree to recess and give no evidence of desire to negotiate acceptable settlement of POW issue, UNC wld unilaterally declare recess of same period.

3. It is considered possible that alternatives of (2), (3), (4), (5) of paragraph 4 *e,* ref C, all of which involve willingness by UNC to accept decision of another nation or nations on disposition of non-repatriates, might be misunderstood to be retreat from our fundamental position of nonrepatriation. It is therefore felt that these alternatives shld not be presented at this time.

4. If Commies reject proposals envisaged in this radio,[11] UNC dels posture wld be one of willingness to negotiate but inability to do so in face of Commie unwillingness to put forward constructive proposals for resolution POW issue and at discretion of UNC del, recess of not more than 3 weeks, declared unilaterally if necessary, might be considered foll receipt of Commie rejection. Subsequent meetings of dels cld also be scheduled at intervals of 2–3 weeks.

Part III.

Request your comment on parts I and II.

---

[10] Dated July 7, p. 380.

[11] Radio telegram.

795.00/9–952: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 9, 1952—6:57 p. m.

228. From Gross. Re Lie's trip to Europe. Lie has now made arrangements to see Eden [1] in London Thurs, Sept 11; also Pearson, who will be in London at same time.

I conveyed to Lie general substance and emphasis of Deptel 109, Sept 8.[2] He seemed impressed by reasons for supporting additional measures of sort tentatively envisaged. He added that he had been advised by unspecified UK sources that US Govt was "not really very interested in embargo."

I replied in strongest terms that this was not the case and could not understand why any Brit source should be confused about our position.

Major concern expressed by Lie is that UN would greatly suffer unless some "positive and affirmative action" is taken. Unless there are increased troop contributions and possibly other measures as well, Commies "would have won the second round" and neither US public opinion would tolerate such result nor would UN survive it. He wants to impress upon Eden and Pearson importance of UK and Canad Govts taking initiative to contribute or obtain twenty or thirty thousand additional troops and to drop any idea that UN should "sit by and see what happens". He thinks he can persuade Eden more readily than Pearson, adding that he considers latter to be "weaker of the two".

AUSTIN

---

[1] In telegram 1467 from London, dated Sept. 12, 1952, the Embassy reported information received from a British Foreign Office official who had been present at the Lie–Eden meeting on Sept. 11. Eden was unable to offer additional British forces for Korea; no mention was made of additional measures against the People's Republic of China; and Lie said that he hoped nations which had not so far contributed forces could be persuaded to do so. Lie spoke of Brazil in this connection. (795.00/9–1252)

[2] *Ante*, p. 490.

PPS files, lot 64 D 653, "Korea"

Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Nitze)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1952.

Subject: UNA Working Paper, August 14, UN General Assembly Action in the Event of Continued Inconclusive Armistice Negotiations.

1. This UNA Working Paper [1] calls for the U.S. Delegation to seek passage of a GA resolution which would express GA support for the efforts of UN troops; express confidence in the conduct of armistice ne-

---

[1] For text of the paper, see attachment 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Hickerson, Aug. 14, p. 454.

gotiations by the UNC; approve the position taken by the UNC in regard to the question of prisoners of war and call upon the Communists to accept an armistice which recognizes the principle of nonforcible repatriation; and would request the President of the GA to transmit the resolution to the Communist authorities and to report within a specified period on any reply received or on the absence of such a reply.

If no reply, or a negative reply is received from the Communists the Working Paper calls for convening of the Additional Measures Committee and attempts on the part of the U.S. Delegation to secure recommendation of the imposition of a total embargo against Communist China and North Korea.

The Working Paper then proposes that after a recommendation has been made to the GA by the Additional Measures Committee, the Delegation should attempt to secure passage of a further GA resolution which would among other things call for intensification of assistance to the UN action, recommend that all states sever, limit or refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the aggressors, and recommend that all states take the actions recommended by the Additional Measures Committee.

2. This Working Paper has been informally discussed with the Commonwealth Governments, all of whom have objected to the proposal for a full embargo, and to various elements of the proposed second GA resolution.

3. At this stage of the Korean affair it would be highly inadvisable to follow the procedure proposed in the Working Paper for the following reasons:

a. With possibility that the negotiations at Panmunjom may be entering a delicate phase in view of the proposed Presidential *démarche* or other proposals now under consideration, it would be unwise to undertake any actions in the UN which might tend to lead toward transfer of negotiations from the manageable Panmunjom forum to the unwieldy UN Assembly.

b. If the Presidential and accompanying proposals are unsuccessful, and if the negotiations should take on something approaching the character of an indefinite recess, it would continue to be to our interest to keep the negotiations out of the UN forum, rather than to follow a course of action which might be calculated to encourage UN intervention.

c. The proposed Presidential statement and other proposals under consideration are designed to enable the Communists to conclude an armistice without publicly accepting the principle of non-forcible repatriation. It is hardly the time for a UN resolution which calls on the Communists to publicly accept that principle.

d. The prospects of securing GA approval of the line of action proposed in the Working Paper are very dim, and such approval could at best only be secured by a narrow margin and by considerable U.S. hectoring of our Allies.

4. What we want at the UN at this stage is an action which will meet the parliamentary situation arising from the fact that Korea will be on the agenda; an action which is not calculated to get the UN involved in the actual negotiations, and an action which will be willingly approved by the greatest possible number of UN members.

5. It is proposed, therefore, that the U.S. Delegation be instructed to undertake no further efforts in support of the position outlined in the Working Paper and limit its efforts to encouraging passage of a General Assembly resolution which would:

a. Express the full support of the General Assembly for the gallant efforts of the United Nations troops in Korea;
b. Approve the position taken by the United Nations Command in the negotiations at Panmunjom;
c. Call upon the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities to conclude an honorable armistice of the nature of that proposed by the United Nations Command;
d. Pending the conclusion of such an armistice, urge upon all states the need to increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea and in particular to contribute additional forces to the Unified Command.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, September 11, 1952—2:35 p. m.

CX 55003. Refs: A. JCS 917910.[1] B. C 54499.[2] C. JCS 917927.[3] D. C 54495.[4]

1. My primary objective has at all times been to secure an hon armistice which would prov for the scty of UN Forces in Korea and would assure the UNC of return of the preponderance of POWs now held by the Communists. I am in full accord with any proposal which will achieve such an armistice; does not compromise the principle of no-forced repatriation; and which does not result in only a temporary advantage for the UN, and which we would subsequently regret.

2. I have prevly pointed out the dangers which I consider inherent in having the ques of disposition of non-repatriates remaining unresolved for an indefinite period and being referred to the political conf as a form of "subsequent negotiations". I feel that to achieve an armistice which would release the Communists from the pressure of present mil opns, particularly hv air and naval bombardment and at the same time leave a major issue unresolved has many disadvantages from a mil point of view. There are increasing indications that the cumulative effects of

---

[1] Dated Sept. 8, p. 499.
[2] Dated Sept. 1, p. 470.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 499.
[4] Dated Sept. 1, p. 467.

our air opns are having increasingly severe results on the enemy; they can be expected to multiply as the intensity of our atks remains unabated. I believe that to leave the decision as to disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations may well result in an armistice which would ultimately prove to our disadvantage.

3. If it be the decision to proceed genly along the lines indicated in ref A, I concur with the proposed presidential statement. I strongly recm that the proposal to leave the disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations, including the President's statement, be presented to the Communists only after they have rejected those portions of ref B of which you have indicated gen approval in ref A. My reasons for this are:

a. We should endeavor to achieve an armistice which includes agreement to ultimate disposition of non-repatriates. The proposal as set forth in ref B, if acptd by the Communists, would achieve this.

b. A proposal to leave disposition of non-repatriates to subsequent negotiations may well be more palatable to the Communists than that proposed in subpara A above and probably would be acptd by them without considering the proposal set forth in ref B.

c. I believe that the max support will be generated for United States as exec agent of the UN in discussion of the Korean ques in the UNGA if the UNC over a short period of time has presented several distinct separate solutions any one of which might achieve an armistice.

4. In view of the foregoing, I recm that the proposal as set forth in ref A be presented to the Communists in the folg sequence with the initial presentation to be accomplished on or about 20 September:

a. Gen Harrison presents in one session that portion of ref B tentatively approved in ref A, modified in accordance with paras 6, 7 and 8, this msg.

b. Upon completion of presentation of *a* above, Gen Harrison would, if he deemed aprop, recess with or without Communist concurrence for a min length of time to allow the Communists opportunity to study the proposal as made that day.

c. Should the Communists categorically reject our proposal in the same session in which it is made, Gen Harrison would still insist upon the recess for the announced purpose of affording them the opportunity to study the proposal and to prov adequate time for issuance of presidential statement. Should they categorically reject the proposal in the session subsequent to the one in which it was presented, Gen Harrison would insist upon again recessing to allow them additional time for study, and to prov adequate time for issuance of the presidential statement.

d. At the conclusion of session in which Gen Harrison presents the proposal in support of presidential statement, he will recess with or without Communist concurrence for a pd of aprxly 1 week or 10 days to allow the Communists opportunity to consider our offer.

e. Should the Communists reject General Harrison's proposal in support of the presidential statement, I believe that we should then unilaterally recess as outlined in para 10 of this msg.

5. Modification of pertinent agreed paras of the armistice agreement will, of course, depend upon the proposals presented and Communist acceptance of same. I have, however, dird that paras 51, 52, and 54 be redrafted as nec in order to include each of the alternatives contained in part II, para 1*b* (1), (2), and (3), of ref A. Proposed redrafted paras will be transmitted to you ASAP.[5]

6. Re part II, ref A, the alternative contained in para 1*b* (2) which involves the dlvr to the demilitarized zone of non-repatriates where they would be freed from mil control and interviewed has already been made, and is included in para 4*d* (2) ref B which you have approved. Since it is not a new proposal, it appears more desirable to retain it as that part of Gen Harrison's statement which reviews all proposals made to date.

7. If, as indicated in para 3, ref A, you consider that any plan which involves turning over responsibility for POWs to a neutral body has over-riding disadvantages, it appears then that we may make only one new proposal as outlined in para 4*e* (1), ref B. The alternative you include in part 2, para 1*b* (1), ref A, requires the POW, at the time of ident, to state his preference. Since this so closely parallels screening or interviewing, it is essentially the same as proposals already made. Hence, I consider it more desirable to offer a plan to the Communists along the folg lines:

> As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective all POW who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. As soon as possible thereafter, and concurrently, if log capability permits, those POW who have prevly expressed their objections to repatriation will (after prior orientation for purposes of mvmt to the demilitarized zone) be dlvrd in groups of aprop size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the mil control of both sides, and without questioning, interview, or screening, each indiv so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this mvmt and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the obsn of one or a combination of the ICRC, joint teams of mil observers, or Red Cross reps from both sides.

8. I consider that a shift to the exec form of plenary sessions as indicated in para 4 of ref A would have grave disadvantages that far outweigh the possible gains envisioned. I believe that the serious nature of a proposal emanating from the President of the US cannot possibly be reinforced, or detracted from, by action originating at this level; and that although exec sessions permit the opportunity for nonpropaganda discussion, there is no assurance that the enemy will not engage in propaganda statements. My objections to a shift to exec session is based on the recurrent pattern of Communist behavior which has circumvented the usefulness of this negotiatory device repeatedly in the past and

---

[5] The revised language was transmitted to the JCS in telegram CX 55297, Sept. 17, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

which has resulted in positive setbacks to the UNC psn with respect to the support of US and fgn pub opinion. Despite our hopes, no mat progress has been achieved in the negotiations by resorting to exec sessions. On the contrary, they have raised unwarranted hope in the minds of the free world for an early armistice. It is equally true that the Communists have invariably violated the exec nature of the sessions by "leaking" info and disseminating their views which have been picked up by our own news media as the sole source of info. By this means the Communists have succeeded in presenting to the world a distorted picture of the progress of negotiations. One of the most important considerations in the issuance of a presidential statement, and in offering our detailed proposals at Pan Mun Jom, is to present to the world a correct picture of the armistice sit and thereby retain and encourage strong US and allied support for our conduct of the armistice negotiations. Entry into exec session will almost certainly destroy any hope of achieving these ends. I therefore strongly urge that the entire presentation be made in open plenary session.

9. As pertains to the form of subsequent negotiations as set forth in para 1B (5) of part 2, ref A, I consider it undesirable for resolution of the ques of disposition of non-repatriates to be referred to the MAC:

a. Mil pers would still be required to resolve a problem which had not been solved even with the Communists under mil pressure. It would be a temp expedient and place upon the MAC an unwarranted problem which would detract from the attn which they should devote to the missions asgd to them under the approved paras of the draft armistice agreement. I consider this to be a full-time job for the orgn.

b. With a maj unresolved ques referred to the MAC, I consider that the Communists would designate present members of their negotiatory team as members of the MAC. I do not consider this desirable from the UN viewpoint and this procedure, if adopted by the Communists, would place UN members of the MAC at a distinct disadvantage.

10. With respect to the type of recess proposed in para 4 of part 2 of ref A, I strongly recm that I be authorized to recess unilaterally for an indefinite period, maintaining contact through liaison offs. Gen Harrison would upon recessing notify the Communists that we would agree to reconvene plenary sessions only after they submitted in writing any further proposal they might desire to offer. It is my strong personal conviction, shared by the UNC del, that such a unilateral recess is absolutely essential to the firmness and dignity of the UN and US psns.

795.00/9–1152: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State

SECRET PUSAN, September 11, 1952—5 p. m.

303. Rptd info CINCUNC, KCOMZ, Admiral Hanlon[1] DIP 131 by other means. During the Ambassador's farewell call[2] on Pres Rhee Sept 7 Pres revealed his present thinking on several matters. While his views are generally not new they illustrate how his mind is presently working.

Rhee mentioned his appreciation for optimistic tone Ambassador's remarks on accepting degree from Seoul University day before, particularly with respect to econ situation. Rhee said he felt Amb was probably right but then said he continued to be perturbed slow progress rehabilitation and continuing rise in cost of living. He referred to previous changes in official dollar-won exchange rate, each of which had been based on theory establishing more realistic rate. Instead of curbing inflation only noticeable effect had been to increase black market exchange rate proportionately. Now "people" were again talking about more realistic rate and Pres wondered why they cld not learn from experience of the past that net effect wld only be to increase black market rate to higher levels. Cost of living wld go up still higher and no one wld benefit.

First thing that had to be done, according to Rhee, was provide ROK with sound currency in which everyone wld have full confidence. This wld be easy if Amb cld convince Dept that ROK shld have loan of $300,000,000—mere pittance to US. Loan wld be converted into interest-bearing bonds that wld remain on deposit in US with sole function of providing backing to new ROK currency to be called "whan". Old won wld be withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for whan at rate to be agreed upon.

(It will be recalled that Rhee has been advocating some such plan for many months and that all arguments to convince him that inflationary situation shld be stabilized before undertaking a currency conversion have fallen on deaf ears. On other hand, the FinMin appears to have more orthodox view on this.)

In reply to the Ambassador's comments on the importance of sending a strong ROK delegation to the forthcoming UNGA Rhee mentioned he had great confidence in Col Limb and Amb Yang,[3] who he felt wld well represent his views, but that he did plan to send possibly one other person from Pusan to assist them. He had not yet decided whom he wld send. He then referred to fighting spirit of ROKA and need to build up forces still more. He spoke of determination of the troops as well as of all ROK citizens to press the fight until Korea liberated; maybe not to Yalu but at least to the waist of peninsula; suggested ROKA spearhead attack, moving UN Forces to rear as reserves. He felt drive wld be successful and wld not provoke world war that UN feared.

---

[1] Rear Admiral Byron H. Hanlon, USN, was appointed CINCUNC representative on the Combined Economic Board in Korea in August 1952.

[2] Muccio left Korea on Sept. 8.

[3] Colonel B. C. Limb and Ambassador Y. C. Yang were the ROK observers at the United Nations. South Korea was a nonmember state.

When conversation turned to polit situation Amb hoped it wld remain stabilized so that full attn cld be focused on solving many problems needing attn. Rhee responded that unfortunately he was surrounded by traitors, many of whom were in pay of either Communists or Japs; that elements of the old Heungsa-dan [4] with connections in North Korea were still influential and that many of the wealthy businessmen were working for selfish interests and in league with traitors. These groups were still powerful in the Natl Assembly and Rhee cld not take chance of permitting them to become stronger and perhaps eventually take over the Govt. He was therefore going ahead with his plan to introduce a new series of constitutional amendments which wld safeguard peoples rights and country's security. He knew it wld be difficult put them through Assembly but he felt need was so urgent he wld have to take necessary steps get them adopted.

(Rhee gave no inkling as to his timing on forcing this issue. Newspapers full of speculation on this but have not linked question with effect, it wld have on discussion of Korean prog in UNGA. Rhee surely must realize it wld not help Korean case if it were discussed during period of polit turmoil in Korea. The foregoing consideration wld not necessarily delay submission of amendments to Natl Assembly but might postpone for a while resort to unconstitutional methods to force passage.)

Rhee covered much same ground and additional matters in long rambling conversation Sept 8 with Justice Douglas [5] (at one point he expressed inability understand why US Govt had failed to act on his requests for a security pledge or pact. He said he realized that earlier ROK views favoring Pacific pact along lines of NATO were probably unrealistic since several Asiatic countries were not anti-Communist. Jap was notable example as it had not outlawed CP, was full of Commies, wanted trade with Iron Curtain countries and definitely was becoming more dangerous every day. The US had made a pact with its ex-enemy Jap but still refused to give similar assurance to its friend the ROK.). Douglas passed this on to me and I remarked that I understood American Govt was not opposed in principle to widening scope of its security arrangements in the Pacific but that a greater community of interest among participating powers was required before such a pack cld wisely be contemplated. As far as bilateral pact was concerned I said I assumed principal objective of any security pact was to assure military support by one party to other party if either attacked; the US even without such pact had come to defense of ROK and was still here fighting. Under the circumstances with ROK now receiving full benefits of a security pact need for formalizing such pact hardly seemed urgent.

---

[4] Heungsa-dan translates "Young Korea Academy" which was a cultural group bound to An Chang-ho, a democratic independence leader and rival to Rhee. The group joined the Korean Democratic Party in opposition to Rhee in 1952 (Henderson, *Korea, The Politics of the Vortex*, p. 300).

[5] William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

(Justice Douglas summing up his impression of Rhee afterwards remarked that anyway he must have been a fine revolutionary leader in his long struggle against the Jap.)

LIGHTNER

JCS files, CS 091 Korea (15 Sep 52)

Memorandum for the Record, Prepared by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 15, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with the President on Korean situation.

The President asked the Secretaries of the three Military Departments, the Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary and myself to meet with him this afternoon at 3:30 to discuss the status of the Korean truce negotiations, the possibilities of an armistice, certain means of increasing military pressure in Korea and other related matters. The subjects were related to the recent exchange of messages [1] with General Clark on the subject of the proposal to leave certain parts of the prisoner-of-war question for settlement after the armistice and to have the President make a public statement including an offer somewhat along the lines attributed to President Aleman of Mexico. (The original suggestion along these lines was made by Hallinan, nominee for President of the Progressive Party, and the *Daily Worker.*)

Those who attended the meeting were as follows: Messrs. Lovett, Foster, Kimball, Bendetsen, Gilpatric; General Vandenberg, Admiral Fechteler, General Hull, Admirals Libby and Dennison.

The President stated that he wanted to discuss the prospects of an armistice, get the views of those present as to the likelihood of getting one, and get any expression of opinion on what might happen to public opinion if and when an armistice were obtained. His question was framed in the general area of the exchange of views with General Clark in Tokyo and the proposals advanced by State for a modification of the "Package deal" we have previously made.

---

[1] The most recent exchanges were telegrams CX 55003, Sept. 11, p. 506; JCS 917910, Sept. 8, p. 499; and C 54499, Sept. 1, p. 470.

Lovett outlined briefly to the President the discussion between State and Defense which had narrowed their differences of opinion to two points:

First, State felt that we should offer to exchange 83,000 prisoners we hold for 12,000 of ours they hold, leaving the approximately 15,000 Chinese Commie prisoners to be independently re-screened after this armistice was signed.

Second, State recommended a statement by the President making such a proposal.

Lovett stated that it was the unanimous feeling of the three Secretaries, the three Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy and himself that the suggestion made by State was unwise and they unanimously supported the position taken by General Clark. Lovett added that he felt particularly strongly that the President should not, in any event, make such a proposal. He felt that we would get nowhere by making such an offer, that it would be considered a sign of weakness, that it would un-do much of the advantage currently being gained by increased military pressure, and that no considerations of fairness would move the Communist negotiators since their judgment was influenced solely by force.

The President discussed various aspects of the situation regarding various forms of military pressure with General Vandenberg, and inquired about the possibilities of a naval blockade and received from Admiral Fechteler a report on the large amount of shipping going into China with the major proportion under British flag. He discussed matters pertaining to the Army with General Hull, with particular reference to the training and increased use of South Korean manpower. He was told by General Hull that trained South Korean troops were coming out at the rate of 600 to 700 a day, and that properly led, they made very good soldiers, as was shown in the recent fighting.

It was pointed out to the President that any sign of weakness on our part and any evidence of willingness to negotiate indefinitely merely convinced the Commies that we would make further concessions and in so doing remove even further the possibility of arriving at an agreed armistice. The matter of the use of Chinese troops on Formosa was discussed, as was the virtually inevitable demand to "bring the boys back home" if by chance an armistice were obtained. Admiral Libby confirmed that in his seven months experience in the negotiations it was amply proven that we were trying to negotiate with people who merely had the quality of talking animals and that equitable compromises or concessions were not to be expected.

The President said that he agreed with the positions of the military and civilian advisers in the Department of Defense; that he saw no real prospect of getting an armistice other than to persist in our present course of action and increase the military pressure in so far as possible; that he would not make any such proposal as advised and that we should do our best to see if additional military effort would force the Commies to accept the reasonable proposals heretofore made to them.

Admiral Fechteler called the President's attention to the fact that General Harrison was now operating under instructions which required him, when proposing a recess, to likewise propose a subsequent meeting. He pointed out that this had the effect of leaving in the Commies' mind the distinct impression that our side was then going to come up with some further concessions at the subsequent meeting. He stated that General Clark had asked that General Harrison be given authority to lay the proposals outlined in Clark's most recent dispatch on the table and then to get up and walk out with no suggestion for a subsequent meeting other than to say that when they had something to offer they would notify him through liaison officers that they desired another meeting, and that they had something substantive to offer.

Following Admiral Fechteler's statement as outlined above, Admiral Libby confirmed the soundness of his conclusions. Both Admirals Fechteler and Libby urged that Harrison, through Clark, be given the authority to walk out under the conditions outlined above. The President agreed thereto.

The President authorized the dispatch of the message [2] agreed on between State, JCS, and SecDef in connection with the release of certain South Korean POW's pressed into North Korean service.

LOVETT

---

[2] Not further identified.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 64 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 16, 1952—3 p. m.

Admiral Fechteler: At a meeting yesterday with the Secretary of Defense [2]—Mr. Lovett, the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries found themselves in complete agreement with General Clark on the question of the next move in the Panmunjom negotiations. In brief, we are opposed to any Presidential proposal, and we are opposed to deferring resolution of the question of non-repatriation until after an armistice. We favor permitting General Harrison to lay it on the line at Panmunjom and then if the Communists do not accept, to propose an indefinite recess without a date for resumption unless the Communists, through the liaison officers, ask for a meeting and provide a written indication that they have something of substance to present.

Mr. Johnson: What will you propose that General Harrison should lay on the line?

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, Admiral Fechteler attended as did Vice Chief Twining. Hickerson headed a five-man contingent from the Department of State and General Lemnitzer attended for the Department of Defense. The entire meeting was concerned with Korea.

[2] Presumably a reference to the meeting described in the memorandum, *supra.*

Admiral Fechteler: The course of action proposed in Clark's last telegram.[3]

Mr. Johnson: The last part of that telegram really sets forth what we should do if it is decided to go ahead with the President's statement.

Admiral Fechteler: What we agreed was that we should go ahead as stated in that telegram except that there would be no Presidential statement.

Mr. Johnson: That means the alternatives that we have approved here but not those for turning the problem over to neutrals. (At this point Admiral Fechteler distributed the Defense version of a draft JCS telegram[4] which included instructions for General Harrison to make a general summary of previous proposals, to present three "new" alternative proposals, to present a statement on our willingness to make disposition of non-repatriates contingent on mutual agreement and which provided for indefinite recess if the Communists do not agree to these proposals.)

Mr. Johnson: If you include the statement on not sending the non-repatriates anywhere without mutual agreement, there is actually not much difference substantively between this telegram and that which would call for the Presidential statement. This proposal really says that we will continue to negotiate after the armistice about the disposition of Chinese non-repatriates because we will be committing ourselves not to send them anywhere without Communist agreement. All the President's proposal says is that we will negotiate about all non-repatriates after the Armistice, which would presumably include the Koreans as well.

Admiral Fechteler: The package proposal of the 28th of April made a resolution of the problem of non-repatriation a part of the armistice. The President's statement would take this question completely out of the armistice.

Mr. Johnson: The President's statement doesn't take the principle of non-repatriation out of the armistice. The President's proposal says that we will exchange the prisoners we are willing to return for the prisoners of ours that they hold and that we will negotiate after the conclusion of an armistice about such disposition of the remaining prisoners as may be made "without the force". What the present proposal says is really that we will continue to negotiate about the disposition of the non-Korean non-repatriates after an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: (At this point Admiral Fechteler read the draft of the President's proposal and the State draft telegram.[5]) You can't get away from the statement "The armistice need not await the final disposition of the question" as meaning that this question would be put outside of the armistice. This is what the Chiefs disagree with. We believe that the principle of non-forcible repatriation must be an integral part of the package.

---

[3] The reference was to CX 55003, Sept. 11, p. 506.

[4] Not printed.

[5] The draft has not been located in Department of State files.

Mr. Nitze: But your proposal also calls for negotiating about a question which is not finally disposed of by an armistice. Under either proposal the issue of what disposition is made of the non-repatriates remains unresolved.

General Lemnitzer: The difference I see between the two positions is that the Chiefs don't want to leave any question hanging which would be open to Communist veto.

Colonel Matthews: The easiest thing to say would be to state openly that we undertake not to send the Chinese non-repatriates to Formosa. This obviously would invite some rough handling by U.S. public opinion.

Admiral Fechteler: It's my understanding that if the Communists don't agree to your proposal you don't want General Harrison to proclaim an indefinite recess.

Mr. Johnson: On the contrary—both drafts have instructions in the same language for General Harrison to go into indefinite recess if the Communists do not accept the proposals.

Mr. Nitze: We originally had some doubts about the wisdom of an indefinite recess but in view of Clark's comments we tried to meet his position on the issue.

Admiral Fechteler: I think the main point is that the Chiefs are opposed to leaving the POW issue unresolved after an armistice and therefore are opposed to the Presidential statement.

Mr. Hickerson: Your proposal leaves the POW issue unresolved also. The only real difference is that you seem to be opposed to a Presidential statement.

Admiral Fechteler: Where do you find that in our proposal?

Mr. Johnson: Essentially the disposition of the Chinese POW's is left subject to agreement after the armistice by your paragraph 1 (3). There is really not much substantive difference between us. It seems to be only a question of whether the President should make a statement.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that there is a good deal of difference. The Chiefs feel that if you leave the POW question unresolved you would have a pseudo armistice and the Commies would go ahead and build airfields and strengthen themselves and we would be in a bad position.

Mr. Johnson: How would it be a pseudo armistice? All the other articles about buildup and inspection would be exactly the same.

Mr. Nitze: It would really be exactly the same kind of armistice under either course of action. In either case we would have to keep the non-repatriated POW's, or at least part of them, in camp sometime after an armistice.

General Cabell: Wouldn't the solution be to take out the proposal which would make us keep the Chinese non-repatriates in escrow.

Mr. Nitze: General Clark felt that the only bait that we might offer the Communists was a proposal that we would agree not to send the Chinese to Formosa.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me the next step is to get together on a re-editing of these two drafts. The Chiefs are firm that the principle of non-repatriation should remain in the package proposal.

Mr. Nitze: We feel that the inclusion of the principle of non-forcible repatriation is perfectly clear in the President's proposal. That proposal essentially calls only for negotiating such disposition of the non-repatriates as could be made without the use of force. There is no thought of deviating from that position now or in the future.

General Lemnitzer: But the President's proposal still leaves the question open for post-armistice negotiations that would give the Communists pretext for violation of the armistice.

Mr. Nitze: If they want to violate the armistice they could find any number of pretexts—the question of withdrawal of foreign forces, claims of UN violation of air space, claims that we were violating the rotation or build-up clauses of the armistice, or any one of a thousand other claims or pretexts if they really wanted to violate an armistice.

General Lemnitzer: But they couldn't use the issue of non-forcible repatriation of prisoners as a pretext.

Mr. Nitze: They couldn't use the principle as an issue under the President's proposal and particularly if Clark comes up with a revision of articles 51 and 54 and we secure Communist agreement to the revision; the armistice agreement itself would be clear cut.

General Cabell: But if we commit ourselves to negotiate on the disposition of the prisoners in due course of time because of the fact that we will have to retain them, our stand on non-forcible repatriation would become a posture of forced retention.

Admiral Fechteler: What effect would holding prisoners in escrow have on the issuance of the greater sanction statement?

Mr. Hickerson: It would have no effect at all. We would go right ahead and issue the greater sanction statement as soon as there was an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that we should hold with non-forcible repatriation as a part of the package. Your telegram seems to me to be walking right back on our package proposal.

Mr. Nitze: Actually the Communists would be retreating from their principle and in practice accepting the principle of non-forcible repatriation because they wouldn't be getting all their prisoners back.

General Lemnitzer: But we would be committed to further negotiations about the prisoners that we didn't send back.

Mr. Nitze: Your draft telegram also really commits us to negotiating about the disposition of Chinese prisoners we don't send back.

General Lemnitzer: I guess the only thing is to strike out that part of the telegram.

Mr. Nitze: If you do strike it out this takes out the only real bait for the Commies and also by not making the kind of proposal that we recommended the President make, would tend to take out any effect on our Allies.

General Lemnitzer: We would, however, be giving some ground.

Mr. Nitze: We are quite willing to admit that our proposal does in effect give some ground, but the only ground it gives is to leave the disposition of the non-repatriates for further negotiation after the armistice. Our proposal holds to all the armistice agreements that have been made and it holds to the principle of non-forcible repatriation.

Mr. Hickerson: There is also no question that it holds to the idea of a greater sanction statement.

Mr. Nitze: The virtues of our proposal are that it gives the maximum possibility that there might be Communist agreement to an armistice and at the same time persuades our Allies that we have exhausted every possible scheme for securing an armistice. If the Communists should refuse the proposal, we would have the best possible platform for an indefinite suspension. We had also thought that if there were an indefinite suspension after we made this proposal and it was refused, we would then be in the best position to unilaterally dispose of those Korean and Chinese prisoners who said they don't want to go back and then maybe come back to the Communists with the problem, in effect, liquidated.

Admiral Fechteler: The Chiefs feel that we should stick by the package proposals, reiterate our propositions in the way the Clark proposal says and then have General Harrison walk out of the tent and then put military pressure on to see if the Communists will come up with a proposal.

Mr. Johnson: What additional military pressure can we put on?

Admiral Fechteler: We are already putting on military pressure by stepping up our air raids.

Mr. Johnson: We were somewhat perturbed by the intelligence that Communist artillery and mortar have fired more rounds in the past month than ever before.

General Cabell: The more artillery they have the more targets we have. In any case military pressure is merely a function of time. The longer our air raids last, the more they are hurt, and now that winter is coming up the foliage will disappear and the need for shelter will increase and our targets will be easier to find.

General Twining: They must be hurting now. We are continuing to shoot down MIG's and if they weren't hurting they wouldn't send the MIG's down.

Admiral Fechteler: I think there is evidence they are running out of competent pilots. The other day a MIG was shot down by one of our Marine planes.

Mr. Nitze: Is there any new evidence as to the percentage of Russian pilots that are in combat.

Admiral Fechteler: No, I don't think so.

Mr. Nitze: I thought our people felt that about 75 per cent of the pilots that they were meeting in combat were Russians.

Admiral Fechteler: There is no real way of telling.

Mr. Johnson: What are the possibilities of stepping up pressure by commando raids on the coast?

Admiral Fechteler: We are already doing that on the West Coast all the time.

General Lemnitzer: Our strikes on their power supply stations must be hurting them. I remember what a job we had getting our power facilities in operation.

Admiral Fechteler: Do you have anything on the results of the Moscow Conference? [6]

Mr. Johnson: Nothing really aside from what is in the press. It may be from the fact that there is no mention of economic assistance that the Chinese may not have gotten everything that they wanted and there might be, if this is the case, a possibility that they might be somewhat more in the mood for an armistice now. But we don't have anything really to go on and we should avoid wishful thinking.

Mr. Nitze: There is the fact that the Russian-Chinese Agreement on Port Arthur [7] makes it more difficult for us to impose a blockade. The Chinese may not be too unhappy about that Agreement. Going back to Korea, one could make the argument that this would not be a good time for us to have an armistice, that our military posture is such that continuation of hostilities does more harm to the Communists than it does to us. On the other hand one could make out a good case that we do want an armistice both to stop casualties and to improve the pattern of deployment of our forces. If we do want an armistice, the degree to which we want one is important in determining the kind of proposals we should make or whether we should make any proposals at all. We thought that the President's proposal does not retreat from the important principle on which we are standing. It does leave part of the POW question open to negotiation. It does leave one additional pretext for

---

[6] The reference was to the talks between a Delegation from the People's Republic of China, headed by Chou En-lai, and officials of the Soviet Union, which took place Aug. 17–Sept. 15.

[7] The agreement provided for the maintenance of troops of the Soviet Union at Port Arthur.

Communist violation of an armistice. We didn't think these two points weighed very heavily against whatever increase the proposal might bring in the possibility for an armistice or against our improved position with our Allies or against the platform that the proposal would give us for future action.

Admiral Fechteler: What would you think of telling them to take it or leave it on the present basis, calling off the negotiations, putting on military pressure, and then making them come up with a proposal.

Mr. Johnson: That is why we asked about the prospects of military pressure.

Mr. Nitze: What has worried all of us around this table has been the question of whether we could go on with this indefinitely. I think we would all agree that public opinion has supported a continuation of the present type of hostilities surprisingly well. There probably is little question that it might support us another winter, but there is real question as to whether it won't build up sometime to a dangerous point.

Admiral Fechteler: I think the main difficulty is that we have kept on going back to the tent and I think we should stop it.

Mr. Nitze: Under your proposal you're going back to the tent again.

General Lemnitzer: The main thing is that your draft would postpone one question for further negotiation.

Mr. Nitze: Your draft also postpones one question for further negotiation.

General Lemnitzer: I agree that we would have to change our draft. As a matter of fact I don't think the Communists would accept either proposal.

Mr. Nitze: If that is the case, the President's proposal would provide a much better platform for us to suspend the negotiations.

Colonel Matthews: That might be disputable. You are thinking about our position with our friends. I think we should think about our position with the enemy. The Communists haven't made a new proposal since April or May. We keep coming forward with new proposals. There is nothing in our military posture that should make us rather than them present a proposal. We think the contrary is true. At the last Deputies Meetings with the Russians,[8] the State Department succeeded in breaking off a series of unsuccessful meetings. The military is asking for help in breaking off this series of meetings.

Mr. Nitze: We didn't get an agreement out of breaking off the discussions at Paris.

Admiral Fechteler: (Reading Clark's message.) The Chiefs agree that the fundamental issue is that we shouldn't throw non-forcible repatriation out of the armistice negotiations because it would be providing, militarily, a dangerous armistice.

---

[8] Presumably the reference was to the Council of Foreign Ministers Deputies meetings at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951. For documentation on these meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

Mr. Nitze: (Reading the JCS reply to Clark's message.) If the Communists want to violate an armistice there will be plenty of pretexts for them to seize upon and we know they will be unscrupulous if they want to be.

Colonel Matthews: If the Communists should come back with a proposal to refer the whole POW issue to a political conference, I should think we would be in a weak position with our Allies.

Mr. Hickerson: As a matter of fact, it is surprising how firmly our friends have stood by us on the principle of non-forcible repatriation. The Mexican proposal really spells out that position and no one of our Allies has ever questioned the principle. I think we would be in a continuing strong position.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that we can't get much further in this discussion. I think you understand the position of the Chiefs and the position of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Nitze: I think that we have brought out the various views on the various issues involved. We will want to talk to Secretary Acheson and it may be that he will want to talk to Secretary Lovett. I think that is the next thing to do .

695A.0024/9-1752

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with Mr. Lovett

An additional point for your discussion with Mr. Lovett this morning[1] which I failed to mention yesterday: Last week when we were discussing with the JCS the plan for proposing to the Communists the exchange of 83,000 for 12,000, leaving non-repatriates for further negotiations,[2] the JCS pointed out that it would be wise to immediately reclassify the 11,000 remaining South Korean POWs opposed to repatriation in order that we would not be under obligation to hold these persons indefinitely in escrow if the Communists should accept our proposal. This is clearly stated in paragraph 2 of JCS 918515 (a copy of which is attached)[3] which was concurred in by the JCS, ourselves and the President.

In obtaining the understanding of the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to this proposal for reclassifying 11,000 South Korean

---

[1] For the record of that meeting, see *infra.*

[2] This discussion took place at the State–JCS meeting of Sept. 8, p. 492.

[3] JCS 918515, dated Sept. 15, was not attached to the source text; a copy of the text can be found in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.

POWs, we pointed out that we were taking action at this time on them in order to "clear the decks" if we decided to make the proposal to leave the non-repatriates for further negotiations. Therefore, these countries have every expectation that we will make such a proposal and much desire that we do so, although I have been very careful to make clear to them that no final decision thereon has yet been reached. Nevertheless, I would find it most difficult to justify and explain to them the reasons for a change of our views in this regard.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1952.

Subject: Future Tactics in Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Admiral Fechteler
Admiral Libby
FE—U. Alexis Johnson

At the meeting held today from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in the Office of the Secretary of State, the foregoing persons discussed the next step in the Korean armistice negotiations with particular references to the differences in point of view that developed yesterday in the meeting between representatives of the Department of State and the JCS.[1]

The points of view expressed may be summarized as follows:

The Secretary of Defense stated that, at the request of the President, he together with the Service Secretaries of [*and*] the JCS had met on Monday[2] with the President to reply to certain questions from the President concerning the general military situation in Korea as well as the armistice negotiations. He stated that all those present had expressed to the President complete unanimity of view (contrary to, for example, such matters as Formosa) on the strength of our military position in Korea and the undesirability of making any further concessions to the Communists in the armistice negotiations. At Mr. Lovett's request, Admiral Fechteler outlined what had been stated to the President concerning differences in point of view between State and Defense on future tactics in the armistice negotiations. Admiral Fechteler stated that (1) there was agreement between State and Defense that a unilateral indefinite recess of the negotiations should be called pending receipt of a constructive proposal from the Communists, (2) Defense did not agree with State's view that prior to the declaring of such a recess a

---

[1] Held Sept. 16; see the memorandum, p. 514.

[2] See memorandum for the record, by Lovett, Sept. 15, p. 512.

"new offer" be made to the Communists and (3) Defense did not agree with State that if such a "new offer" was to be made it should be accompanied by a statement from the President.

The JCS and the Secretary of Defense consider that the substance of the proposal contained in the draft Presidential statement transmitted to General Clark in JCS 917927[3] should not be made. On the one hand the proposal would represent such a departure from our previous "package proposal" as to indicate to the Communists a weakening in our position from the principle of non-forcible repatriation and therefore lead the Communists to expect further concessions on our part. On the other hand, if the proposal were accepted by the Communists it would be undesirable from a military point of view to leave this unresolved issue for further negotiations following an armistice as the Communists could use the period in the armistice for a buildup of their forces in overwhelming strength and then renew hostilities upon the basis of the absence of a resolution of the question with POWs, or could, in subsequent negotiations on the POW questions, extort undesirable political consequences from the US in exchange for Communist agreement on the POW question. The JCS and the Department of Defense also consider it important that the unilateral indefinite recess of the meetings at Panmunjom be declared by the UNC Delegation in order to impress the Communists with the firmness of our position. Therefore, the JCS and the Department of Defense consider that the UNC Delegation should immediately declare such a recess following conclusion of a meeting at which the UNC Delegation would present a review of the proposals that it has thus far made on the POW question and several additional variants thereon, on which the Departments of State and Defense are in agreement. It is the opinion of the JCS and the Department of Defense that this action, coupled with continuation of present and increasing military pressures, offer the best hope of forcing the Communists to accept our present position or come forward with a proposal consistent with our position on non-forcible repatriation which we could consider. Admiral Fechteler stated that the fact that one of our conventional F-4U fighters had recently succeeded in destroying a MIG in aerial combat indicated that the caliber of Communist pilots was going down and that the Communists were feeling the pinch of attrition of their pilots. The Secretary of Defense stated that our production of combat aircraft was now such that one month's production was equivalent to our total of losses of aircraft in Korea from all causes for one year. Our general military strength was rapidly improving and we could indefinitely maintain our present military pressure in Korea. Admiral Fechteler expressed the view that if the Communists did agree to an armistice upon the basis of the suggestion of the Department of State, it would be important that there be no diminution in our military strength in Korea pending a resolution of the POW question, but that there would be heavy domestic pressures for "bringing the boys home" and reducing our rearmament effort.

---

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 499.

The Secretary of State explained that we viewed the situation in much the same way as Defense and the JCS. We agreed that the problem was one of bringing additional pressure on the Communists to agree to an armistice. There were three fields in which these pressures could be brought: military, political and economic. From what he understood of the situation and from what had thus far been said he was not clear how it was possible to bring much additional military pressure. He noted that the Communists' artillery and mortar fire on the front had greatly increased during recent weeks and therefore it did not seem that the Communists were feeling a severe pinch in their supply lines to the front. He stated that in the political field there was little that could be effective and one of the few things being open was the not-likely possibility that the free nations with diplomatic representation in Peiping would be persuaded to sever such relations—it was even conceivable that the Chinese would welcome such a step. We were therefore hoping that a proper platform could be constructed from which we could endeavor to obtain additional economic pressures. The UN General Assembly would be opening the middle of October and unless it was convinced that the UNC had exhausted every reasonable effort to obtain an armistice there would be strong pressures upon us to do something more. We desired to forestall those pressures by unmistakably demonstrating that we had already taken every reasonable step. Whether we liked it or not, the Mexican proposal had been made and was the subject of wide discussion and we could expect further discussion on it at the General Assembly. The UK and Canada with the support of Australia and New Zealand were urging on us the desirability of making a proposal such as that suggested by State. State entirely concurred that it was important to disabuse the Communists of any impression that our willingness to meet periodically indicated lack of firmness on our position on the fundamental issues and therefore also entirely concurred with Defense and the JCS that a unilateral indefinite recess shortly be called. As we viewed the situation the problem was one of building the best possible platform upon which to bring about such a unilateral recess. The question was therefore whether in the overall point of view State's suggestion left us in a worse or a better position. In the contingency that the proposal was rejected by the Communists we would be in a much more favorable position in the UN General Assembly by having unmistakably demonstrated that we had exhausted every reasonable effort to obtain an armistice; unless the GA was satisfied that all reasonable proposals had been made there would be strong efforts difficult to resist to have the UNC put forward such proposals or in some manner transfer the negotiations from Panmunjom to the GA, which of course would be most undesirable; also, having taken such a step and having it rejected by the Communists would place us in a position to resolve the issue by unilaterally releasing the non-repatriates, thereby facing the Communists with a *fait accompli* incapable of further negotiation. In the contingency that the Communists accepted the proposal we did not see how the fears of JCS and Defense were justified. We would have succeeded in obtaining return of our own prisoners; if the Communists desired to renew hostilities there were many other pretexts other than the prisoner issue upon which they could do so; the armistice was not contingent upon subsequently reaching agreement upon the question of the remaining POWs and therefore if they renewed hostilities the Communists would do so in the face of "greater sanctions" statement which would have been issued; as we retain on our side the non-repatriates we are under no compulsion to obtain Communist agreement on the remaining POWs; and there were so many other questions not likely to be resolved in subsequent political negotiations that the addition thereto of the POW issue would not be a significant factor in whether or not those political negotiations succeed in reaching a definitive peace settlement.

The Secretary of State stated that he recognized that it could not be categorically said that either position was entirely right or entirely wrong and that the question was of such importance that the President should be given the opportunity to hear both points of view and reach a decision thereon. Mr. Lovett agreed and Mr. Acheson stated that he would get in touch with him later in the day concerning a meeting with the President on the matter.[4]

---

[4] For the record of this meeting with the President, see p. 532.

795.00/9–1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 19, 1952—7:29 p. m.

126. 1. As you are aware Dept has obtained reactions several govts participating in Korean action (UK, Australia, Fr, Can, New Zealand, South Africa) to preliminary Departmental thinking on handling Korean case at 7th GA. Dept has re-examined its position in light comments these govts, and will continue do so, taking into acct also developments at Panmunjom. We believe, however, that in view of press reports concerning US negots with above dels which have already reached other participating govts, and in view gen interest in Korean item by all UN membs, time has come extend negots to other friendly dels.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin and cleared with Johnson, Allen, Bonbright, Stelle, and Hickerson.

2. Suggest negots shld be undertaken first with participating govts, including those mentioned above to whom previous working paper[2] was distributed. To latter you shld indicate that Dept's present thinking has taken into acct their comments re first part working paper; US does not consider it desirable raise stage 2 with others at present. New approach does not imply that US has given up idea of further efforts at later stage in 7th GA, and we continue desire their views as to what shld be done if GA action outlined below brings no results and it becomes clear that there is no reasonable likelihood that continued patient negot will achieve armis. As you know we will be discussing this matter with UK here next week. Dept will also discuss this aspect with Fr and Commonwealth Govts listed in Wash in near future.

a. We recognize difficulty of discussing Korean question without being able report on proceedings and US plans at Panmunjom. In gen, however, you may indicate that UNC will continue exhaust every possibility for reaching agreement at Panmunjom prior to GA.

b. Fol approach is based on assumption that when Assembly convenes we will not have achieved armis in Panmunjom, and there will be no increased likelihood achieving such armis at that time. On this assumption, we believe that situation at Panmunjom will be such as to show that UNC has made every effort achieve honorable armis, and that achievement armis depends entirely upon Commies giving up insistence on forcible repatriation PWs.

c. In circumstances, US believes that GA shld take up Korean question at very early stage in session. Korean question was not discussed at 6th session because it was then felt that discussion wld hamper Panmunjom negots and wld not contribute to armis. At this stage, with negots reduced to one specific point and with no progress on this point in many months, discussion and appropriate GA action cannot hurt chances of armis and indeed might improve them. Further, while US continues believe that armis is mil question and that negot on specific issues shld be conducted directly by parties in field, we recognize strong UN interest in question and desire of membs to discuss it.

d. As to substance discussion: US continues desire and hope for armis and to make every effort conducive to that end; we recognize similar desire on part all non-Commie countries. Discussion and action by GA shld, therefore, be such as is calculated to help achieve an armis. US believes also that it is paramount importance to maintain and demonstrate unity and determination non-Commie UN membs on behalf early end to Korean fighting in accordance with UN principles. We believe cause of peace wld be served by firm and overwhelming stand by UN membs in support of UNC position on outstanding issue at Panmunjom and GA request to Commies to agree to armis on basis these positions.

e. We believe that position which UNC has taken on PW question is entirely right and only one UN can take. We further believe this position fully supported by free peoples throughout world. UNC has made it clear that it has no desire retain any single POW; or to send PWs to any particular country; PWs resisting repatriation wld be released from PW status and free to go to any available destination of their own choice. UNC has made it clear that it is prepared consider any possible solution for impasse on POW question consistent with basic objection to forcible repatriation. UNC has offered various alternatives to Commies, including impartial procedures for determining desires of individ POWs; proposals to save Commie face by not compelling them admit publicly that they have accepted principle of non-forcible repatriation. We have also offered them devices which wld help play down fact that number of their PWs refuse return. Commies have remained adamant. UNC recognizes that there may be additional variants on UNC proposals which cld be suggested, but it cannot see that these wld be any more acceptable to Commies. If Commies before or during GA show slightest indication of interest in exploring any particular suggestion consistent with basic principle non-forcible repatriation UNC prepared to negotiate at Panmunjom and to make all possible progress towards arms.

---

[2] For a text, see p. 454.

f. US believes that useful action which GA cld take at this stage is overwhelming vote for res along fol lines:

> "The General Assembly
>
> "*Noting* with approval the efforts of the UN negotiators to achieve a just and honorable armistice to bring an end to the fighting in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles;
>
> "*Noting* further that disagreement on one remaining issue alone has to date prevented the achievement of such an armistice;
>
> "*Endorses* the positions which the United Nations negotiators have taken on the issues on which agreement has been reached, as well as on the question still in issue;
>
> "*Calls upon* the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by responding favorably to the outstanding proposals of the UN negotiators;
>
> "*Requests* the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities and to report to the General Assembly, as soon as he deems appropriate, upon any reply received or the absence of any reply."

g. US wld also be interested views other govts as to further steps which cld be taken in event flat negative reaction by Commie above res.

4. Your comments on above requested.

ACHESON

Department of Defense files

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Radford)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 23, 1952—5:01 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 919187. From JCS.

1. JCS are considering possible future opns in Far East in event present negots fail to produce armistice. JCS recognize that it may

become advisable to recommend removal of all restrictions now currently in force except:

a. Attacks on the USSR proper.
b. Use of atomic or CW weapons other than as now authorized.

2. Courses of action being considered include:

a. Amphibious, airborne, or ground offensives to increase pressure on enemy and possibly secure the waist or other areas of Korea.
b. Air attacks on airdrome complexes.
c. Blockade of China proper with coordinated air attacks on transp centers (refers only to Para 3, Case III below).
d. Air attacks on comm centers in north and central China and in Manchuria.
e. Combinations or variations of actions outlined above.

3. CINCFE comments, coordinated with CINCPAC as appropriate, are desired on courses of action outlined above under folg three alternative assumptions as to force availability:

Case I. Forces now available to CINCFE for use in Korea.
Case II. All forces presently under CINCFE Command.
Case III. Same as Case II augmented (not before Spring 1953) as follows:

> (*a*) Ground forces: 82d Airborne Div and an addl Marine Div with its Marine Air Wing, plus addl ROK forces (2 Divs and 6 Rgts) as outlined in ur C 50459 and CX 50698.[1]
> (*b*) Air Force forces: Two MB Wings now on standby, 3 Fighter-Bomber Wings, and sufficient troop carrier aircraft to provide required airlift.
> (*c*) Naval forces: Two carriers, 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 41 destroyers, 1/3 Div amphibious lift (distribution of Naval forces between CINCFE and CINCPAC for course of action in Para 2*c* above to be determined later).

---

[1] These telegrams, dated June 19 and 23, 1952, respectively, are not printed.

795.00/9–3052: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET　　TOKYO, September 23, 1952—4:45 p. m.
PRIORITY

CX 55641. 1. For your info, there fols herewith a statement which Gen Harrison will make to the Communists in the event the proposals contained in JCS 917910,[2] or as modified by my CX 55003,[3] are approved. Part 1 is applicable regardless of whether changes suggested in

---

[1] Nagle, Matthews, Hickerson, and Johnson were handwritten on the source text; presumably they received copies of the telegram.
[2] Dated Sept. 8, p. 499.
[3] Dated Sept. 11, p. 506.

CX 55003 approved. Part 2 is for use if statement fols JCS 917910 without amendment. Part 3 is to be substituted for part 2 if changes recmd by CX 55003 are approved.

Part 1. "I have an important statement to make.

"For many weeks the pris of war issue has blocked the achievement of an Armistice in Korea. On 1 July we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the rqmts of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

"It must now be clear to you that one of the rqmts of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation. Your objections to this principle have never been consistent. You yourselves applied this principle in disposing of many United Nations Command POWs you had captd. At one time you appeared to have agreed to our use of the principle when you supd us with an amnesty declaration to be read to the prisoners prior to the screening. As you know, we used your amnesty declaration and conducted the screening in such a manner as to encourage the max no of pers to return to your side. When the results of the screening were announced, and it became apparent to you that the Communist-inspired riots in POW camps on Koje-Do did not deter large nos of your former pers from renouncing Communism, you contended that the screening was not fairly conducted. When we offered to conduct a rescreening and let you observe the process, or have it conducted by impartial nations, you suddenly announced that you would not agree to any type of screening by anybody, anywhere, under any circumstances. It is apparent you have taken this stand because you are afraid to be confronted with the incontrovertible fact that large nos of your former pers violently oppose returning to your side.

"By your process of continually raising new excuses for delaying an Armistice you have finally arrived at the indefensible psn of refusing to have anything to do with the principle of no forced repatriation. You have therefore refused to meet the rqmts of our side in any degree and have substituted as your price for an Armistice a demand that we force these hapless pris to return to your side at the point of a bayonet.

"You have attempted to camouflage the unreasonableness of your stand by associating it with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and by trying to deceive the world into believing that you are concerned with the rights and welfare of indivs. You have used these confs as a forum for the most vicious type of propaganda. You do not hesitate to use lies, half truths, and distortions to further your ends.

"In contrast to what you would have the world believe, that you are the champions of the Geneva Convention, it is well to compare your actions with your words. From the beginning of these conferences you have obstinately and inhumanly refused to agree to the immediate exchange of seriously sick and seriously wounded POWs. By your own admission you have converted from a POW status thousands of captured United Nations command pers and impressed them into your armed forces. You consistently place your POW camps near mil tgts so that you will be able to accuse us of bombing our own pers. You have refused to turn over the names of captured UNC pers to the ICRC, and you refuse to allow pers of that committee to visit your POW camps. You will not even agree to the humane action of allowing POWs in your custody to receive relief packages. Yet you are well aware that Geneva Convention expressly provides for each of these humanitarian objectives—objectives designed solely for the relief and well being of POWs held by both sides. This is your record, and it shows that while you talk loudly about the humane treatment of POWs you have not put any of this fine talk into practice.

"Another example of how inconsistent you have been in your insistence that the Chinese fighting in Korea are vols having no direct political connection with any sovereign government. You strongly support the right of these indivs to vol in the Korean venture, but now you adopt the inconsistent psn that these same indivs in the custody of the UNC have no right to transfer to the control of a power other than the one under which they were serving at the time of their capture.

"On the other hand, the UNC has made honest efforts to achieve an Armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the UNC del has attempted to find a solution to the POW question, I will restate the proposals which we have prevly offered and which you have summarily rejected.

"We proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without mil observers of both sides, be admitted to the POW camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all POWs of both sides be dlvrd in groups of aprop size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the folg:

"(A). ICRC.
"(B). Teams from impartial nations.
"(C). Joint teams of mil observers.
"(D). Red Cross representatives from each side.

"Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fears you might have had that the POWs were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an Armistice. Your summary rejection of these proposals is an indication that your so-called reasons are only excuses. It can be assumed only that you have ulterior motives for contg the war in Korea and that you are not conducting these negotiations with honesty or sincerity."

Part 2. "I now present to you 3 additional alt proposals, any one of which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an Armistice by both sides, with the disp on non-repatriates to be determined thereafter according to one of the folg procedures:

"(1). As soon as the Armistice agreement goes into effect all POWs in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of POWs shall begin in accordance with the provisions of part 3 of the Armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate POWs shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The POW shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of POWs, in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, or joint mil teams. The POW shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any POW who at the time of ident states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so. Such former POW shall thereupon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with trans from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such indiv, of course, shall not be detained as a POW but shall assume civ status, and, in accordance with article 52 of the Armistice Agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.

"(2). All non-repatriates will be dlvrd to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from mil control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without mil representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the folg:

"(A). ICRC.
"(B). Joint Red Cross teams.
"(C). Joint Mil teams.

"(3). As soon as the Armistice becomes eff there will be an immediate exchange of the aprxly 12,000 UNC POWs held by your side for the aprxly 83,000 of your former pers held by our side whom we can repatriate, with the issue of the remaining pers held by our side to be the subj of further negotiations.

"If you are prepared to enter immediately into an Armistice on the basis of any of the foregoing proposals, the UNC is prepd to agree that, upon signing of the Armistice, those persons who are not exchanged under the Armistice and who are not Koreans will be sent to any place or places outside of Korea which may be agreed upon by both sides and which are willing to accept them.

"We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the UNC can offer. Each of them will produce an Armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hrs on blank. Our staff offs will be aval at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals."

Part 3. "I now present you an alternate proposal which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I urge that you give it mature and careful consideration, for it contains the remaining avenue of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice.

"As soon as the Armistice is signed and becomes eff all POWs who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as poss thereafter, those POWs who have prevly expressed their objections to repatriation will be dlvrd in grps of aprop size to a mutually agreed-upon loc in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the mil control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each indiv so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this mvmt and disp of non-repatriates accomplished under the obsn of one or a combination of the ICRC, Joint Teams of Mil Observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.

"In order that you may have time to study our proposal I now propose a recess for 10 days and that we meet again at 1100 hours on blank. Our staff offs will be aval at any time dur the recess to ans questions."

Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–subject file

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 24, 1952.

The following summarizes the notes which I took at the meeting [1] this morning in the Cabinet Room of the White House attended by:

The President of the United States
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security
Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army
Francis P. Whitehair, Under Secretary of the Navy
Roswell L. Gilpatric, Under Secretary of the Air Force
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence

---

[1] This off-the-record meeting is also reported on in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, Sept. 24, not printed. (795.00/9–2452)

General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations
General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State
Paul H. Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Brig. General R. B. Landry, Air Force Aide to the President
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC

The President opened the meeting by explaining that this was a follow-up of a previous meeting that he had had with Defense officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding future course of action in Korea.[2]

Secretary Acheson assured the President that there was no major difference between State and Defense on this question. He said that it was agreed we should stick to the proposition of no forcible return of prisoners of war. The Communists are holding out for an all-for-all exchange. As a result the armistice negotiations have gotten nowhere and are recessing from week to week.

Secretary Acheson felt that the time had come when we should sum up our position in the negotiations; then if the Communists reject it, as is possible, we should recess until the Communists are ready to come up with something we can consider. There is some question as to how this should be done, but our people in the field feel that this will show the Communists that we are firm on our package proposal.

Secretary Acheson said we should also recognize the consequences. Such a step will accentuate the feeling in the U.N. that a commission should be set up to settle the prisoner of war issue. We will oppose that and will have to try to get our Allies to support our position that the U.N. Command has acted rightly. Domestically we are in the heat of a political campaign and it will be said that the Administration does not know what to do. It may increase suggestions that we go all out in bombing, although the tendency to support that view is decreasing throughout the country, based on recent polls.[3]

If we are to bring about a recess there is a question as to how this should be done. State and Defense are agreed that General Harrison should hold a meeting reviewing our position. This statement should cover the question of screening prisoners of war and here we might consider proposing a different method, such as taking them to a neutral zone and then letting them go north or south as they choose. Secondly, there is the question of the possible exchange of 12,000 of our prisoners for 83,000 of theirs while we continue discussions regarding the remaining prisoners. This presents real difficulties. It will give the Communists a face-saving way out but gets us into trouble everywhere. It might give the impression that we are weakening in our position and we must make it clear that we are not giving up on non-forcible return. If we make that clear, that takes away much of the face-saving value and therefore makes this proposition less useful. If it is rejected it may weaken our position. If it is accepted there is deep concern, more by the Joint Chiefs of Staff than by State, that this would leave another unresolved issue and that the armistice might later break down under conditions less favorable to us, since the Communist build-up could then go on without bombing by us. There is also the danger that the armistice might then break down on other more important issues such as the boundary line since the Communists might then go back to their desire for the 38th parallel.

---

[2] See memorandum for the record, by Lovett, Sept. 15, p. 512.

[3] The reference was to a survey, done by the Division of Public Studies of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, which is not printed; it was attached to a memorandum by Phillips to Acheson, Sept. 15, 1952 (795.00/9–1552).

Our policy is to get an armistice on the terms which we have put forward. If we get an armistice there will undoubtedly be strong pressure domestically to weaken our position in Korea while we are not certain there will be similar pressures on the Chinese Communists. If we do not get an armistice the Joint Chiefs of Staff can best tell us whether we can increase the pressure without unacceptable casualties. Secretary Acheson summed up by saying the question is whether the time has come to recess the armistice negotiations.

The President stated that the situation has arrived where a decision must be made whether we let the prisoner of war issue go over for political discussion without changing our position or whether we will do anything in the world to get an armistice. He said that he wished to be perfectly clear that he was not willing to do the latter. The only purpose of an armistice should be to try to get peace in the Pacific but not under conditions which may later enable the Communists to take over Japan or elsewhere. We have been striving to prevent World War III but this situation contains all the elements which could cause that war to come about. If and when the armistice is signed, we will find ourselves in the same position as on September 2, 1945, when we accepted the surrender of Japan and then tore up our military machine. Everyone was involved in that development and it is impossible to put the blame any one place. The President said that we cannot sit down now with the doors open and no military machine to protect us—we must build up our military strength.

Secretary Foster said he thought Secretary Acheson had made a fine summing-up. Secretary Foster said that Defense was concerned about the morale problem in Korea. There is also the rotation problem to be considered. To put over the prisoner of war issue to political discussions would be disastrous. We must have a sound military armistice that will protect our troops in the field. Even then we will have all the difficulties mentioned. Our Field Commanders believe they have the ability to increase pressures without bringing on all-out war. One possibility is the use of two Chinese Nationalist divisions in Korea.[4] In any case we can increase our pressure on the ground, including amphibious landings.

Secretary Foster said that all the people in Defense feel that the time has come to put our package proposal before the North Koreans and Chinese Communists and ask them to accept it. We have already made concessions. The airfield question involved a great concession which was made only in order to get our package proposal. Defense has come to the conclusion that the weekly meetings give the impression that we have something further to retreat to. General Harrison, not the President, should make a summary of our position, give the Communists time—say ten days—to accept as our final terms; then if they reject it, have an indefinite recess during which we increase the pressure, although not necessarily over the Yalu or by blockade. If we create the impression that we are increasing the pressures it will improve the morale of our troops there, since it is the stagnation that gets them.

General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs feel that we must not give up on our main point. If we insist on that it may deter all-out war since there is a chance of increased desertions and an easy surrender movement. Any new proposition will indicate we are giving in and will postpone the chance of an armistice. General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs felt that it is time to re-state our package proposal.

The President asked General Smith if he had any information indicating that the Chinese Communists are tired of what is taking place.

General Smith said that there are only indications that they are feeling economic pressures although this is not conclusive evidence. Subject to their other desires regarding Asia, the Communists would like to have an armistice. But even a temporary armistice should not be expected to lead to peace in Asia. General Smith said that, while he agreed generally with everything that had been said, this only makes it all the more important that we develop increasing pressures.

The President said that General Smith had shown him some startling figures regarding trade with China. This showed that the number of Communist ships were less but they were using more British shipping. The President said that he had spoken to Secretary Acheson about this and was taking it up with Mr. Churchill, who had said, when he was here, that he would stop it without placing any conditions on it.

General Smith said that there were various ways to cut the coastal shipping with sources other than our own. He thought this would have more effect than any policy statements we might make.

The President said that he was prepared to recognize and hear from anyone in the room on this important question.

---

[4] For documentation on this question, see volume XIV.

Mr. Gilpatric said that we do have greatly increased air power. Therefore if it is desired to go beyond the present limitations it is possible to do so, not on a sustained all-out effort but effectively nevertheless.

In answer to the President, Secretary Pace said that the capability of our ground forces has been affected by rotation but that this has been partially countered by the increased effectiveness of the South Koreans. Leadership and supplies are still problems. Secretary Pace pointed out that the two armies facing each other are well dug in and either side is likely to suffer heavy casualties in an offensive.

The President asked what happened to our men after they have been rotated back.

Secretary Pace said that they could always be called back into service if there was a greater emergency. Most of them go home after their period of service and are not immediately available, but they are kept on reserve status. We are, therefore, building up a pool of trained, experienced manpower. Secretary Pace again mentioned how well the South Koreans were developing.

Mr. Whitehair asked to speak about the question of the effect of stagnation on morale. He said that he had read all of the communications received in Navy from families of naval personnel. Over sixty percent of naval personnel have shipped back for a second tour of duty. However, he had noted that there is an increasing desire on the part of the people back home for a further clarity of purpose and what we mean to do. He felt that the sooner this could be cleared up the better.

In answer to the President, Admiral Fechteler said that the Navy was in good condition. In the event of increased pressures in Korea, reinforcements from the Atlantic might be required, but this could be handled all right.

The President jokingly said that during the next thirty days he would not be so interested in military decisions. However, before he left on his trip[5] he would make a decision.

Admiral Fechteler said that he would like to repeat what the President had heard from Admiral Libby, which others in the meeting might not have heard. Admiral Libby feels strongly that the Communists will not give in on repatriation when military pressures are relieved. If this question is deferred for post-armistice negotiations the Communists will put it in the category of Item 5, on which our negotiators have had a most difficult time in confining the discussion to Korea. The Communists will put in questions regarding Formosa, seating in the United Nations, the presence of the Seventh Fleet, etc. If the repatriation question is deferred we will therefore be under strong pressure to open Item 5 to other subjects than Korea, which have so far been successfully kept out.

---

[5] President Truman left Washington on Sept. 28, 1952, to begin an extended campaign tour.

The President thought that Admiral Libby was right. Unless we wipe the slate clean, an armistice will do no good. We do not want to bring on World War III in order to get victory, but we do want to get some settlement that is satisfactory to us.

Mr. Harriman said that he assumed that there was agreement to increase pressures. He personally agreed that economic pressures would be very important.

General Smith repeated that we do have assets and resources not being used with full effectiveness. He felt that building up a Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa was perfectly safe because they will be unable to go anywhere unless we release the trigger in the form of air and naval support. On the other hand, the Communists would know that we always could do that at any time.

The President noted that this question had been discussed many times but that we must take into consideration both the forthcoming U.N. meeting and our impending election. Both of these make it difficult to do this without creating a political situation which might upset the whole apple-cart.

The President stated that we should adopt the following procedure. General Harrison should put in his package proposal, give the Communists about ten days to accept it, and then be prepared to do the things that seemed necessary if they reject it. The President hoped that these things would not be necessary but we should do them if they are. The President repeated that he has been trying to prevent World War III and he would hate to end his political career by bringing it on, but we cannot give in on principles. The President said that he would always be available, if necessary, while on his projected trip.

Secretary Acheson suggested, and it was agreed, that when the ten days are up we should not say to the Communists what we plan to do. In other words, we should not issue an ultimatum—rather we should put in our proposal and then assess the situation when they reply.

Mr. Bohlen said that he had always been opposed to making any new offer in the negotiations. He also had heard no powerful military reasons for sending two Chinese Nationalist divisions to Korea. He said that the State Department does not see any psychological advantages to that step.

The President said that he was thinking about the situation on the Chinese flank. He thought that the value of the Chinese Nationalists would be the threat they posed to Shanghai and the China Coast, not their use in Korea.

Secretary Foster explained that he was suggesting that the Chinese Nationalists be armed and have them ready, but that we not cross the other bridge of their use at this point.

General Smith said that he could give a lot of psychological reasons for increasing Chinese Nationalist strength. He felt, however, that the economic situation was a more immediate problem. He felt that the Chinese coastal shipping could be interdicted without involving us, if we give the Nationalists moral and some material support.

Admiral Fechteler asked confirmation, which the President gave, that the question of non-repatriation is one to be dealt with in an armistice and that there would be no move to defer this question for political discussion.

Secretary Pace asked when, after the ten days had elapsed, would we begin to increase pressure. The President said immediately.

In answer to Mr. Harriman, Secretary Acheson said that he would propose to discuss this procedure with our Allies, but not to wait until they are firmly wedded to it.

The meeting then adjourned.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

795.00/9–2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1952.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Ambassador Gross—USUN
Mr. Hickerson—UNA

Before Ambassador Gross returned to New York today, I told him that at the Malik dinner tonight he should find an opportunity for raising casually the question of the Korean armistice negotiations. He should tell Malik that the UNC position against non-forcible repatriation of POWs is absolutely firm. We have no desire to detain a single PW, or to send him to any particular destination but we will not use force to compel him to go to the Communists. At Panmunjom we have made repeated efforts to find a solution for the impasse on this question. We have offered various proposals for impartially determining the desires of the POWs, as well as suggestions which would save the Communist face on this issue. All these have been rejected. Despite our repeated efforts to get the Communists to make their own suggestions for a solution of the impasse, none have been forthcoming. So long as the Communists continue to insist on our using force to repatriate resisting POWs there will be no armistice and the responsibility is entirely theirs.

I further told Ambassador Gross that if Malik suggests that both sides agree to an armistice now on the basis of the Geneva Convention leaving the question of those unwilling to return for subsequent negotiation, or makes any other substantive suggestions for disposing of the POW question, Ambassador Gross should listen without commenting on the substance. He should indicate that he is not sufficiently familiar with the details of the negotiations to express any judgment on any specific proposal. If Malik wants him to send any specific proposal back to the US Government, Ambassador Gross would, of course, be glad to do that. The best thing would be, however, for these suggestions to be made at Panmunjom where the UNC negotiators would give them the most careful consideration.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henkin.

I told Ambassador Gross to go ahead on the above lines unless I telephoned him with different instructions.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 25, 1952—4:08 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 919368. From JCS.

1. After careful consideration here PresUS has approved fol course of action to be followed at Panmunjom:

a. At a single plenary session UNC Del:

(1) Presents statement along lines indicated your CX 55641[1] subj to fol changes:

> (*a*) In part 1 delete all but first sentence of third para, all fourth through seventh paras and last 2 sentences of tenth (last).[2]
>
> Deleted material considered more appropriate for inclusion in statement made at subsequent session (see paras 1 *b* and 5 below).
>
> (*b*) In part 2 delete alternative 3 (first para under subpara 3) and substitute therefor proposal contained in part three. Also delete para immediately fol alternative 3 re disposition Chi nonrepatriates (second para under subpara 3). Particular care should be taken to avoid any commitment that Chi POWs will not be permitted to go to Formosa. Further suggest that term "POWs" be used in lieu of term "nonrepatriates" in third sentence part 2 in view of fact two of alternatives deal with disposition all POWs.

---

[1] Dated Sept. 23, p. 528.

[2] According to telegram DA 919497, CSUSA to CINCFE, Sept. 26, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128), a misinterpretation in Washington of paragraphing in part 1 of CX 55641 caused a misunderstanding by CINCFE of the deletions which the JCS was herein directing Clark to make. To correct this misunderstanding, the following changes were made in CINCFE telegram CX 55856 to CINCUNC Advance, Sept. 26, not printed:

"A. Delete all but first sentence of Para 2.

"B. Delete Para 3.

"C. Insert new Para 3 substantially as fol:

" '3. Within this humanitarian principle the UNC has made honest efforts to achieve an armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the UNC Del has attempted to find a solution to the POW ques, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.' "

(2) Would not accept rejection of proposals at same meeting, insisting that Commies study proposals and give reply at next mtg.

b. If at next session Commies reject all foregoing proposals and offer no constructive counter proposal, UNC Del is authorized to recess indefinitely. UNC Del posture would be one of willingness to negotiate but inability to do so in face of Commie unwillingness to put forward constructive proposals. UNC Del would be willing to reconvene plenary sessions only after Commies submitted in writing text of any further proposals. Meanwhile contact would be maintained through lsn ofcrs.

2. To back up action taken by UNC, re para 1*b*, appropriate statements would be issued here and, we hope, in Allied countries. You should be prepared to issue statement backing UNC Del. Also, within your capabilities, you should maintain unrelenting mil pressure on enemy, particularly through air action. No major ground offensive action should be contemplated at this time. Meanwhile, consideration being given here to other practicable means of bringing pressure to bear as stated in JCS 919187.[3]

3. If practicable, desire above actions be initiated in mtg 28 Sep. Request early confirmation.

4. Re proposals to be presented under 1*a* above, it is recognized that these proposals differ from each other and from proposals previously put forth in minor degree only; however, consider them sufficiently different to warrant submission as new proposals in order to emphasize the many ways in which UNC has sought to solve POW issue and, in turn, Commie unwillingness to agree to any solution.

5. Re para 1*b*, above. UNC Dels statement at time of indefinite recess requires most careful consideration in order to accomplish dual purpose of having max impact upon Commie negotiating position and avoiding domestic and international interpretation that UNC has unilaterally and irrevocably broken off negots. Also desirable to coordinate with statements that will be issued here. Therefore, request that text of Harrison's statement in this regard be submitted to JCS for approval prior to use.

6. Concur your views in para 8 of CX 55003[4] that UNC Del should not take initiative to propose executive session. However, this should not preclude UNC Del at any stage agreeing to Communist proposal for exec session if it appears possible that such action could contribute to success of negots.

7. Comments on your CX 55297[5] will fol shortly.

---

[3] Dated Sept. 23, p. 527.

[4] Dated Sept. 11, p. 506.

[5] The reference telegram, dated Sept. 17, 1952, transmitted Clark's suggested changes for paragraphs 51, 52, and 54 of the Armistice Agreement (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

795.00/9-2652: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, September 26, 1952—1:45 p. m.
PRIORITY

273. Eyes only for Hickerson (UNA). Re conversation with Malik and Zorin re Korea. On basis procedure authorized by Dept and discussed with you yesterday,[1] I talked last night following SC dinner with Malik and Zorin.

Following is summary of conversation.

While I was chatting with Malik about inconsequential matters, Zorin joined us and Malik introduced me to him with a joking comment about the many talks we had had together without persuading one another. I replied that none of us had found his speeches in SC or on the radio very persuasive and wondered whether Zorin would make the same kind of speeches, including another radio speech next June 23rd. Malik laughed and translated my question into Russian for Zorin. Malik said, "That's a long time to wait." I commented that a long time had passed since Malik had made his radio speech on June 23, 1951,[2] to which he made the expected rejoinder, "Whose fault is that"?

I expressed astonishment at his question in view of fact that our position on the one remaining issue in the armistice negots was solidly based on a principle to which the Sov Govt itself had adhered ever since 1918. I added it must be obvious to Sov Govt that we could not and would not abandon the principle and it was simply out of question to expect us to agree to forcible repatriation of POW's. I therefore professed confusion concerning the present apparent attitude of the Soviet Govt toward this question and thought it difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the Sov Govt did not really wish to see an armistice.

After making a brief disclaimer that the Sov Govt could speak for the Chinese and NK's, Malik said that "the situation in Korea is entirely different" than was the case when the Sov Govt made treaties after the first world war. He said, "at that time there were no puppet regimes like Syngman Rhee being manipulated by the USA." I said I could not understand this reply but he evaded attempts to get him to clarify. He appeared uncomfortable and unwilling to be drawn too deeply into this particular question.

At this moment someone else joined our group and it was suggested we join the other guests in the reception room. When we did so, I left Malik and Zorin in order to avoid appearance of pressing the conversation. Malik followed me, took my arm and led me to a small table in a corner where we sat down and had the remainder of our conversation. A few minutes after we began, Zorin rejoined us and, as before, listened intently without speaking. The following conversation lasted about half an hour.

---

[1] Transmitted in JCS 919368, *supra.*

[2] Regarding this speech, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 546.

Malik said, "It is clear to everybody that the US does not want an armistice and that is why the US talks about the so-called principle of non-forcible repatriation." Speaking vehemently, he repeatedly referred to Pres. Truman's statement that we would never agree to forcible repatriation. Malik asked, "Could such a public statement by the President create a condition in which an armistice is possible?" Malik went on: "Moreover, Secy Acheson says that agreements with Sov Union are not worth the paper they are written on. The US Govt and Wall Street refuse to have an armistice, as was shown by infor that immediately after my June 23rd speech, three million dollars was lost on Wall Street."

I replied that the President's statement was nothing more or less than an honest announcement which reflected the attitude of the whole American people and that I myself knew from discussions with foreign dels, including many from Asia and Africa, that there was general world-wide support for the UN refusal to repatriate prisoners forcibly. As to his statement that the US did not want an armistice, our record at Panmunjom showed this was completely false. However, I could not see the advantage of exchanging words re the motives of either side. The question was how intentions of both sides could be tested, and if the other side suggested any reasonable and fair procedures consistent with our firm intention not to surrender the principle, I was certain such proposals would be sincerely examined. Our negotiators at Panmunjom tried to make this as clear as possible, but the only reply from the other side has been propaganda attacks and refusal either to consider or suggest objective procedures consistent with the UN principle. I referred to the offers which had been made to establish any fair and impartial method for determining the true wishes of individuals and expressed the conviction that the world would judge the sincerity of both sides by their willingness or unwillingness to work out such procedures.

Malik and Zorin exchanged some comments in Russian, after which Malik asked, with an ironic tone, "How can you talk about impartial and objective procedures? No matter who was present, every prisoner would know that if he gave the wrong answer and if there were no armistice, he would remain under USA bayonets."

I replied this was an excellent illustration of what I was talking about since if this were the sort of problem worrying the other side, why did they not suggest procedures for our consideration which might eliminate such difficulties?

Malik translated my reply to Zorin but instead of responding, shifted to a different tack.

He said there is a great deal of talk now about what might be done with prisoners who are not returned. Malik scornfully referred to a conversation he had held with Padilla Nervo re the Mex suggestion. He had asked Padilla Nervo, "Who are the neutrals you are talking about? Is Mexico one of them? Is Formosa another?" Malik said that Padilla "looked nervous" and was not able to answer.

I said we had known nothing about the intention of the Mex Govt to make such a proposal but I was sure that they were sincerely anxious to find some basis on which the question could be resolved without surrendering the principle. I did not know whether their suggestion was practicable but if it were not, why did not "the other side make suggestions of their own"? Malik's only reply was that he had not said that the US knew of the Mex proposals before they were made. I said I thought the crucial point is that we would not alter our stand against forcible repatriation, and that this meant inevitably that unless the other side either accepted reasonable procedures we had suggested or proposed other procedures equally reasonable, the future looked very black. Malik replied, "That is up to you. Why not let the Chinese prisoners go home instead of killing them on Koje Island?" He proceeded to make a long and familiar tirade on the subject of "atrocities", etc., and I made the usual reply. I added that his remarks even if true, which they were not, were entirely beside the point. The point was whether the Sov Govt was prepared to suggest to the Chinese and NK's that fair procedures should be worked out which would not involve our abandoning our principle which, I repeated, had been often proclaimed also as the principle followed by the Sov Govt. Malik merely repeated, "Why not let the Chi prisoners go back home"? The conversation ended on this note.

Comment: Following reactions may be of interest.

(1) There was no indication whatever that Zorin has brought with him any new lines of policy or instruction. With obvious deliberation, he refrained from making any comment although throughout conversation and particularly when Malik paused to translate, he nodded agreement with Malik's points.

(2) Malik at no time referred to the Geneva conventions.

(3) With regard to Malik's reference to the difficulty of impartial screening because of the doubt of prisoners being interrogated as to their fate in the event no armistice resulted, my impression was that this was not a studied comment but was advanced by Malik spontaneously during the course of the discussion. However, he and Zorin appeared to listen intently to my suggestion that this was precisely the kind of problem on which the Commie negotiators might suggest procedures for consideration of UNC.

(4) As may be clear from the above summary of the conversation, neither Malik nor Zorin evidenced any real anxiety on the part of the

Sov Govt for an armistice. The contrary indication is all too clear judging at least from the tone and substance of Malik's comments.

GROSS

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The President to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1952—3:05 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

262005Z. You have received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff my approval of a course of action to be followed at Panmunjom.[2] I hope that the initial statement by our delegation can be made in meeting on 28 Sept, that it be presented with the utmost firmness and without subsequent debate, and with insistence that the Communists reply be given at a meeting to be held on or about 8 Oct.

If this latter meeting does not produce the results we seek it then must be made unmistakably clear to the Communists, first, that having made a firm proposal for a fair and just armistice, we declare an indefinite recess of the meetings; and second, that we are willing to reconvene when and if the Communists express a willingness to accept our proposal. It is essential of course that throughout this coming period the military pressure which you are so effectively applying against the enemy should not be lessened.

---

[1] This telegram, marked "personal for General Clark," was sent to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for their information.

[2] Reference is to JCS 919368, Sept. 25, p. 539.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the President [1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, September 27, 1952—2:19 p.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 55891. Ref urmsg 261925Z.[2]

1. I have recd from the JCS the course of action to be fold at Pan Mun Jom as approved by you. I wish to inform you that the initial statement will be made by the UNC Armistice Delegation at the meeting on 28 Sep 1952,[3] and that it will be presented with the utmost firmness and without subsequent debate. The Delegation will further insist that the Communists reply to our just and honorable proposal at a meeting of the Armistice Delegations on or about 8 Oct 1952.

---

[1] This telegram marked "personal from General Clark" was repeated to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for their information.

[2] *Supra;* a note on the source text indicated that telegrams 261925Z and 262005Z were identical.

[3] For a text of the statement, see telegram Z 23092, *infra.*

2. If at the later meeting the Communists reject our proposal, the UNC Armistice Delegation will make it unmistakably clear to the Communists that having made a proposal which would result in a fair and just armistice and the Communists having rejected same that we do declare an indefinite recess of the meetings. Concurrent with declaring the indefinite recess of the armistice meetings, the Delegation will inform the Communists that the UNC Delegation is willing to reconvene armistice sessions at any time that the Communists express a willingness to accept our proposal.

3. I wish to assure you that throughout this coming period the mil pressure will not be lessened. Every effort will be made to increase the pressure, principally by air action.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOKYO, September 28, 1952—4:43 p.m.

Z 23092. For info, CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNU 11-333.

"1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows.

"2. UNC: I have an important statement to make.

"For many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked the achievement of an Armistice in Korea. On 1 July we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

"It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation.

"Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command has made honest efforts to achieve an Armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United Nations Command delegation has attempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.

"We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without military observers of both sides, be admittted to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all the prisoners of war of both sides be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:

"A. International Committee of the Red Cross.

"B. Teams from impartial nations.
"C. Joint teams of military observers.
"D. Red Cross representatives from each side.

"Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fears you might have had that the prisoners of war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an Armistice.

"I now present to you three additional alternate proposals, any one of which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an Armistice by both sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to the one of the following procedures. (At General Nam Il's request, General Harrison repeated the last statement beginning with "I now present.)

"A. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance with the provisions of article three of the Armistice Agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner of war shall there upon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so. Such former prisoner of war shall there upon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status, and, in accordance with paragraph 52 of the Armistice Agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.

"B. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:

"(1) International Committee of the Red Cross.
"(2) Joint Red Cross teams.
"(3) Joint military teams.

"C. As soon as the Armistice is signed and becomes effective all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those prisoners of war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross representatives from both sides.

"We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an Armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hours on 8 October. Our Staff Officers will be available at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals."

"3. Communists: 'Your statement has been carefully noted. Now I propose to recess until 2 o'clock in the afternoon.'

"4. UNC: 'We agree.'

"5. Meeting recessed at 1128 hours.

"6. Meeting reconvened at 1400 hours.

"7. Communists: 'I have a statement to make.

" 'In line with our sincerity to make consistent efforts to achieve an Armistice in Korea on a fair and reasonable basis, we have carefully studied your statement of this morning and the 3 alternate proposals put forth by your side in that statement.

" 'I cannot but point out that we cannot find anything in any one of your 3 different proposals which in substance meets the reasonable requirements of both sides. You have only used different forms and ways to decorate the unreasonable demand upon which your side has persistently insisted.

" 'It must be pointed out that the present issue between both sides on the question of repatriation of war prisoners is definitely not to be covered up by any tricks of playing with forms and ways. No matter under what name it is disguised, the proposition of retaining war prisoners is not to be tolerated.

" 'The question of repatriation of war prisoners must be settled in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and the agreed paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement. Our principle of repatriating war prisoners home to lead a peaceful life is in full accord with the

Geneva Convention and paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

" 'In contrast to your side which has never made any substantive concession on the question of repatriation of war prisoners, our side in seeking a fair and reasonable Armistice has made a series of major efforts on the question of repatriation of war prisoners. On 18 July we presented a proposal which carries out concretely the principles of repatriating war prisoners to lead a peaceful life. I have repeated many times that our proposal of 18 July is itself a solution which in substance meets the reasonable requirements of both sides and now I repeat again it is our proposal of 18 July alone which in a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides.

" 'In the interests of an Armistice in Korea, I once again propose to your side to reconsider your basic stand. In accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and the agreed paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Draft Armistice Agreement, war prisoners must be repatriated home to lead a peaceful life. This is absolutely fair and reasonable.

" 'The Korean peoples Army and the Chinese peoples volunteers firmly maintain this absolutely fair and reasonable principle. In order that your side may reconsider your basic stand, I agree to your proposal to recess for 10 days.'

"8. UNC: 'My statement today was made only after the most careful study by the United Nations Command. We urge that you give mature and careful consideration to what we said.

" 'We will expect your considered response at the meeting on 8 October.'

"9. Communists: 'In my statement I clearly showed you our stand. I urge you that during the recess you seriously reconsider your stand. We agree to recess for 10 days.'

"10. Meeting recessed at 1415 hours. No comments. Signed Harrison."

Truman Library, Truman papers, Material from the Department of Defense Relating to the Korean War

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET TOKYO, September 29, 1952.

CX 56022. Reur 919187.[2]

1. This is an interim reply which covers my curr planning on the subject.

2. Since assumption of my present comd I have considered as one of my primary missions the attainment of an honorable mil armistice in Korea. Constantly cited as the reason for failure to achieve a mil armi-

---

[1] Repeated to CINCPAC for information.

[2] Dated Sept. 23, p. 527.

stice is the apparent impossibility of agreement on repatriation of POWs. On the surface that does seem to be the final impediment to the realization of an armistice; however, I am of the firm conviction that the basic, underlying reason for failure thus far to achieve an armistice is that we have not exerted suf mil pressure to impose the rqmt for an armistice on the enemy.

3. Our problem is, of course, difficult. We confront undemoralized enemy forces, far superior in str, who occupy excellent, extremely well-organized def psns in depth and who cont to provide themselves with suf log support. Under these conditions, it appears evident that positive aggressive action, designed to obtain mil victory and achieve an armistice on our terms, is not feasible by this comd with curr forces operating under curr restrictions. Gains that might be achieved by removal of restrictions cannot properly be exploited except by concurrent ground action which is dependent upon augmentation of forces. On the other hand, gains which might be achieved by intensified ground action with augmented forces would be purchased at highly unpalatable pers cost, if not accompanied by the advantages that would accrue from the removal of certain restrictions.

4. In consonance with my conviction that achievement of an armistice is dependent upon a degree of mil victory, I have had this subject under active study to determine the extent of aggressive action in Korea nec to establish conditions whereby the enemy will be compelled to seek or accept an armistice on our terms. This study develops the concept for a mil victory of suf magnitude to establish these conditions.

5. In development of the concept of opns in this study, 3 assumptions were made which have the force of my convictions. First, that the Communists will not accept an armistice on present terms under the present mil sit. Second, that the UNC will not recede from its stated psn re forcible repatriation of POWs. And third, that the contemplated actions will not cause the USSR to enter the hostilities, thereby possibly precipitating World War Three. The USSR has no qualms about dishonoring pledges such as may be included in the Sino-Russian mutual assistance pact. The USSR needs no excuses for her acts. In fact, the UNC has already been accused of countless alleged violations of the Manchurian border and atks on Chinese territory. I believe that World War Three will not be brought about by action on our part, that conflict will commence only when the USSR so determines on her own appraisal, unaffected by US or UNC actions, and that therefore any so-called extension of the Korean opns presents little risk insofar as precipitating World War Three is concerned.

6. In considering means that might be adopted to attain an armistice, a distinction should be made between exertion of mil pressure on the one hand and winning a mil victory on the other. It appears unwise to me to commit the resources, both human and mat, and accept the losses

inherent in offensive action or pressure that does not contemplate the destruction of hostile forces. An advance to the narrow waist of Korea (generally from Pyongyang to Wonsan) that failed to encompass a concept aimed at major destruction of enemy mat and forces could not be worth the cost and would be disadvantageous to the UNC since a battle line there, though shorter, would not be as strong for a considerable period of time as our main defensive psn as presently organized. Therefore I feel that any contemplated course of action must include provision for carrying the battle all the way to the Yalu in the event that a mil victory cannot be achieved short of that line.

7. In connection with case one and case two of your para 3, my curr studies have convinced me that no action in extension or intensification of Korean hostilities under those conditions is feasible or recommendable except for extension of the air war to suitable tgts beyond the Yalu including the Antung afld complex. Altho this is a curr capability of assigned forces and can be implemented upon order, I do not feel that it will, by itself, achieve the desired mil objective. However, in view of the fact that air atks against critical tgts in Manchuria and China and an imposition of a naval blockade against China would to a degree inflict damage, strain enemy resources, and decrease enemy capabilities, it is possible that such actions would cause the Communists to accept an armistice on curr terms. In any event, but subsequent to arrival in the theater of force augmentations, I would wish to implement this extension of the war before launching a maj ground offensive and committing maj elms to an amph assault.

8. With ref to case 3 of your para 3, preliminary est of force rqmts for our concept, which is also envisaged for implementation in the spring of 1953, deviates from those cited. It calls for additional ground forces, amph lift, and differently augmented air forces.

9. The study being developed here is now being elaborated into outline plan form if suf detail to establish concept of opns, feasibility and force rqmts. This project can be further developed and prepared for presentation in Wash by a team of staff offs from this hq on or about 20 Oct. It is visualized that enroute to Wash the team would acquaint CINCPAC with the details and coord approp matters with him. I will discuss this with Adm Radford during his contemplated visit to Tokyo on or about 6 Oct 52.

795.00/10-252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1952.

Subject: General Assembly Action on Korea in Event that Communists Fail to Agree on an Armistice

During the last six weeks we have consulted with representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa regarding action to be taken in the General Assembly in the absence of an armistice in Korea. For discussion purposes, we handed these representatives a working paper (Tab A).[2] The reaction to the first stage of Assembly proceedings envisaged in that paper—an exhortation to the Communists to conclude an armistice on United Nations terms—was favorable. The reaction to the second stage proposed in the paper, relating to subsequent action to be taken if the Communists maintained their present position, was almost wholly negative. The steps suggested in this contingency included a General Assembly resolution recommending strong additional measures among which were a complete economic embargo and interruption of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists.

We have proceeded to refine the tactics proposed for the first stage of Assembly action and have broadened our consultations on this matter to include other friendly delegations. (Telegram of instruction to the United States Mission to the United Nations—Tab B.)[3] We do not anticipate major difficulties in obtaining broad Assembly support for a resolution along these lines.

There remains the problem of determining what United Nations measures should be taken if, despite the Assembly's appeal to the Communists, the present impasse continues. The program suggested in our working paper (Tab A) in effect amounted to an attempt to induce other United Nations Members to apply the measures we ourselves have undertaken: a complete embargo on commercial, financial, and shipping relations, severance of diplomatic relations, and an increase in military participation in Korea. No action was suggested which in our view would extend the hostilities. We expressed to the six governments our belief that failure of the General Assembly to intensify the pressure upon the recalcitrant Communists would seriously impair the effectiveness of United Nations action and encourage the aggressors. We stated that General Assembly action of the type contemplated would increase the likelihood of Communists agreement to an armistice. We did not exclude the possibility of a compromise program which would involve strengthening the existing selective embargo and taking other steps to emphasize the determination of the United Nations to persist in the struggle.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

[2] Tab A, the working paper of Aug. 14, was attached to the source text, but is not printed here; for its text, see p. 454.

[3] The reference was to telegram 126 to USUN, Sept. 19, p. 525. Tab B was not attached to the source text.

The negative response of the six governments stressed the difficulties our proposals would encounter in the Assembly. The principal points made by them may be summarized as follows:

1. A total embargo would be ineffective in producing an armistice, our primary objective.
2. It might be provocative, substituting "a new drift toward the worst" for "the present relative stabilization".
3. Since it would be futile without a naval blockade, it might ultimately entail recourse to one.
4. It would split the majority upholding United Nations action, fail to gain Arab-Asian support, and heighten neutralist sentiment in the General Assembly.
5. It would mean the ruin of Hong Kong, whose position is of great importance to the free world.

There is a difference of opinion within the Department on the desirability of pursuing our "second stage" proposals in the face of strong resistance from some of our best friends in the United Nations. The seriousness of the economic or psychological effect of an embargo upon Communist China, even if faithfully applied by the free world, is open to dispute. It will take a major effort on our part to push such proposals through the Assembly; Members are loath to assume additional commitments of this type, and their resentment over our pressure tactics will be reflected in their action on other important problems.

On the other hand, the United Nations will not be exerting the utmost pressure for an armistice unless additional measures are adopted. Failure to press for them will tend to perpetuate the existing inequality of sacrifice. Inaction may impair the efficacy of the United Nations effort and stimulate frustration and resentment in the United States.

We should make a decision now among three alternative courses which might be pursued if the Communist position continues to be adamant:

1. We can press for the complete "second stage" program as set forth in the working paper and summarized above.
2. We can seek action short of that program, including an extension of the present strategic embargo and certain ancillary shipping controls. (For one possible proposal, see Tab C.)[4] Whether we can best achieve this objective by continuing now to advocate a complete embargo program and later receding, or by immediately making known what we are prepared to accept, is a question of tactics which must also be decided.
3. We can refrain from asking the General Assembly to sanction any additional economic measures for the time being. This would not pre-

---

[4] For text of Tab C, see below.

clude us from seeking a "second stage" resolution covering non-economic matters, such as an appeal for additional troops.

I recommend that a meeting[5] be held in your office to reach a decision. Those present should include Messrs. Johnson, Linder, Bonbright, Nitze, Jessup and myself.

Tab C

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXTENSION OF UNITED NATIONS SELECTIVE EMBARGO

The General Assembly might recommend that every state prohibit all direct or indirect exports, re-exports and trans-shipments to Communist China and North Korea of communications and electronics equipment, airfield and road construction equipment, chemicals and chemical equipment, electrical and power-generating equipment, metals, minerals and their manufactures, metal-working machinery, petroleum equipment, precision instruments, and general industrial equipment; and impose the following ancillary controls:

1. Prohibit vessels or aircraft of its registry from carrying from any point to Communist China or North Korea any types of goods embargoed by itself or by the country of origin of the goods.
2. Prohibit the sale or charter of vessels and aircraft to the Chinese Communist regime or to the North Korean authorities, or to their nationals, or to any person or entity acting for them.
3. Deny bunkering and port facilities to vessels owned or controlled by the Chinese Communists or North Koreans, and to vessels of any nationality believed to be carrying to Communist China or North Korea types of goods embargoed by itself or by the country of origin of the goods.
4. Prohibit the insurance or reinsurance within its territorial jurisdiction of vessels included in paragraph 3 and of cargoes included in paragraph 1.

---

[5] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. Subsequent information on the U.S. position can be found in the Position Papers of Oct. 6, 9, and Nov. 11; see footnote 2, p. 599.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1952—5:33 p. m.

JCS 920188. From JCS reur CX 56247[1] and CX 56259.[2]

---

[1] In the telegram under reference, dated Oct. 2, Clark transmitted to the JCS the texts of alternative statements which Clark believed Harrison should make in the event the Communist Delegation at Panmunjom either directly or indirectly rejected the UNC proposal of Sept. 28, 1952 (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[2] In the telegram under reference, dated Oct. 2, Clark transmitted the text of the statement he proposed to make in support of the UNC Delegation in the event it became necessary to recess the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

1. Agree Gen Harrison must be given leeway in determining if Commie reply on 8 Oct constitutes rejection and such determination is left to his discretion. Further agree that Commie statement that their posit remains unchanged from that of 28 Sep constitutes rejection. However, without restricting Gen Harrison's authy re this, it is clear that our posit on suspending negots wld be strengthened if Commies categorically rejected all UNC proposals, and, to extent practicable, Gen Harrison shld seek such rejection if this is in fact Commie posit.

2. Statements contained in ur CX 56247 and CX 56259 have recd most careful consideration here from overall view pt. This consideration has indicated desirability of certain changes in texts of statements. These changes are designed primarily to strengthen indictment of Commies for obstructing armistice, to avoid implications inherent in undue identification of POW question as sole issue, to anticipate Commie propaganda reaction, and to lessen possibility that our action is misinterpreted as termination of negots. Re this it is important that in any addnal statements which may be made these factors be in mind. While net effect our actions is indefinite suspension you shld particularly avoid use of term as such in any pub statements. Posit with respect to queries re this wld be that recess is indefinite only in sense that it is up to Commies to decide when they are prepared to meet and negotiate in good faith.

3. To avoid possibility of misunderstanding, approved texts are being transmitted in full in immedy folg msgs.[3] Rqst immed notification when statements are issued.

---

[3] The approved texts were transmitted in telegrams JCS 920223 and JCS 920224 to Clark, both Oct. 4, 1952, neither printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128). For texts of these statements, made at Tokyo and Panmunjom on Oct. 8, 1952, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1952, pp. 600-602.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOKYO, October 8, 1952—4:48 p. m.

Z 24663. For info, CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNU 11-345.

1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hrs this date. Substance of record follows.

2. Communists:

"I have a statement to make. After giving a careful study to the three (3) proposals for the repatriation of war prisoners put forth by your side on September the 28th, our side considers that in substance they are still run through by your unreasonable demand of forcible retention of war prisoners and are absolutely not proposals for the total repatriation of war prisoners in conformity with principles of the Geneva Convention and the paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement which we have already agreed upon through negotiation. Therefore, they are unacceptable. The purpose of your proposals is to disguise the substance of your insistence on the so-called voluntary repatriation by means of certain slight changes in form so as to deceive the people of the world who eagerly await an armistice in Korea, and thereby to shirk your responsibility for delaying the negotiations. But, your attempts are futile because of [*in*?] each of your proposals your side refers to the so-called war prisoners objecting to repatriation. That is, the war prisoners whom your side would forcibly retain through the activities and control of the Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek special agents. Such action of forcibly retaining war prisoners is in flagrant violation of the stipulation of the Geneva Convention and is firmly opposed by just people throughout the world. Furthermore, this unreasonable demand is exactly the only issue which prevents the ultimate achievement of the Korean armistice; if your side does not abandon this unreasonable demand, your side will never be able to escape the responsibility of delaying the negotiations. In order to receive [*deceive*] the people of the world your side put forth a proposal which in substance contains no change at all as [*in*] the retention of war prisoners. But on the other hand, your side has in disregard of our grave warnings, unilaterally disposed of our captured personnel in your custody for whom your side should be held absolutely responsible to our side. Such illegal action by your side indicates that even you yourselves are not prepared to settle the question of repatriation of war prisoners in accordance with your proposal. However, with regard to the change in form as suggested in your proposal we are willing to give them serious consideration on the basis of the principle of total repatriation of war prisoners on both sides. We consider that when the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, all of the war prisoners of each side may be sent to the agreed exchange points in the demilitarized zone to be delivered to and received by the other side. Thereafter through visits by the joint team of the Red Cross Societies [of] both sides the war prisoners will be insured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in active hostilities in Korea. Classification of the war prisoners will be carried out thereafter in accordance with our July the 18th principle of reclassification according to nationality and area. The captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the United Nations Forces must all be repatriated home. Of the captured personnel of the Korea People's Army, those whose homes are in North Korea must all be repatriated home while those whose homes are in South Korea may return to South Korea. Of the captured personnel of the South Korean Army, those whose homes are in South Korea must all be repatriated home, while the others whose homes are in North Korea may return to North Korea. These tasks of visits, classification, and repatriation can be accomplished under the observance of inspection teams of neutral nations. The above-mentioned proposal of ours is in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover it has adopted your views regarding the delivery of all war prisoners to the demilitarized zone to be exchanged. It is indeed the most reasonable solution of the question of repatriation of war prisoners which is the only question yet to be settled in the Korean Armistice Agreement. Your side should agree without delay to this proposal so as to satisfy the peaceful wishes of the world people including the American people, for a speedy termination of the Korea war."

3. UNC:

"We have listened carefully to your statement. It is our understanding that you have clearly and definitely rejected all of our proposals. It is also our understanding that you still insist on your proposal of 18 July which would require our side to repatriate all of the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war in our custody regardless of the fact that we would have to force them at bayonet point. Is our understanding correct?"

4. Communists:

"Your 28 September proposals do not present any new content for the solution of the question of repatriation or retention of war prisoners. They are devoid of any reason and constitute no new approach to a genuine solution of the question of repatriation of war prisoners. As a matter of fact, proposals similar to these had been submitted by your side as early as in February of this year and had [*been*] rejected by our side promptly. Therefore, your 28 September proposals are merely a new display of the old stuff which has been rejected long ago. To repatriate all prisoners of war after the cessation of hostilities is a stipulation in the Geneva Convention and is also an explict stipulation in the draft armistice agreement agreed upon by both sides. What is worth pointing out in particular is the fact that in the agreed paragraph 51 of the draft armistice agreement, the definition of repatriation submitted by you yourselves also explicitly stipulates that repatriation is the act of delivery of a prisoner of war from one side to the other side. The obligation to repatriate all prisoners of war as stipulated in the Geneva Convention and the agreement reached by both sides must be fulfilled. Every pretext or trick on your part in an attempt to evade or reject this obligation is untenable and will be futile. The proposal submitted by our side today is in accord with the provisions pertaining to the repatriation of war prisoners of the Geneva Convention and the draft armistice agreement. It has, moreover, adopted your views regarding the delivery of all war prisoners to the demilitarized zone to be exchanged. It provides a fair and reasonable, practical, and concrete method of fulfilling by both sides of the obligation stipulated in the above mentioned convention and stipulations. In accordance with the method the question of repatriation of war prisoners can be settled immediately, and an armistice can be realized immediately, and the thousands of war prisoners of both sides will soon be able to return home and join their families. Therefore, I again urge that your side give careful consideration to our proposal of today."

[Here follows Harrison's reading of the approved statement sent by the JCS in telegram JCS 920224, October 4, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128). At the end of his statement, Harrison and the rest of the UNC Delegation left the site and the military armistice talks at Panmunjom were in recess, although the liaison officers remained in contact.]

Editorial Note

In a press conference on October 8, Secretary Acheson stated that the duration of the recess was up to the Communists and that the United Nations Command was prepared to meet with the opposing delegates at Panmunjom when the Communists were ready to accept any of the United Nations' numerous proposals or when they made a constructive proposal of their own. For the text of Acheson's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1952, page 600.

IV. OCTOBER 17–DECEMBER 29, 1952: THE KOREAN DEBATE AT THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FIRST COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS; THE MENON PROPOSAL AND ENSUING NEGOTIATIONS; TRUMAN'S APPROVAL OF A FINAL POSITION ON THE MENON PROPOSAL; ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVISED PROPOSAL BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; REJECTION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

795B.00/10–1752

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, October 17, 1952.

Subject: Various Topics Relating to Korea

Participants: Dr. Pyun Yongtae—Korean Foreign Minister
Dr. Yang You Chan—Korean Ambassador, Washington
Col. Ben C. Limb—Permanent Korean Observer at the United Nations
The Secretary of State
Ambassador John J. Muccio
Arthur B. Emmons, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, Department of State

Dr. Pyun called on me at 4:30 this afternoon by prior appointment. In opening the conversation, Dr. Pyun expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to discuss with me various outstanding problems in relation to Korea. I told the Foreign Minister that I, too, welcomed this opportunity for an exchange of views with him and with his colleagues.

UNCURK Report

Dr. Pyun then referred to the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) which had just been issued as a United Nations Document [2] and which was scheduled as an item for discussion on the Agenda of the current General Assembly. He stated that he had not had an opportunity to read the report but that he understood it contained material, particularly with respect to the Korean political crisis of last May and June, which was adverse to the Government of the Republic of Korea. He was therefore preoccupied over the possibility that this report might be used by the Communists in the General Assembly to further their propaganda campaign against his Government and against the United Nations effort in support of it. He hoped that when the matter came before the Political Committee the Korean Observers at the United Nations would have an opportunity to defend themselves and to explain the background of the political developments during the period of crisis, since he believed that much misinformation concerning this matter existed in the minds of many of the Members of the United Nations. He sought our assistance in enabling them to do so.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Emmons.

[2] UN document A/2187.

I replied that unfortunately I had not personally had an opportunity to read the report of UNCURK but that I could assure Dr. Pyun of our appreciation of the Korean desire to present their point of view on this matter and that I would instruct the appropriate officers of the United States Delegation to keep in close touch with the Korean group in matters of mutual concern, of which this would be one.

The Korean Ambassador then remarked that his Government, not having a seat of its own in the United Nations, would look to the United States to provide support for its interests in the General Assembly, and to this end would make every effort to cooperate and work closely with the United States Delegation. I again assured the Ambassador that it was our firm intention to work as closely as possible with the Korean group.

Korean Membership in the United Nations

Dr. Pyun then referred to the fact that Korea's application for membership in the United Nations was, for the present, in abeyance and remarked that it would be most helpful to the morale of his Government and of the Korean people if the United States would again put forward the application of the Republic of Korea for admission. He recalled that in a recent "package proposal" for the admission of a certain bloc of States, Korea had been omitted and that his Government had been disturbed by this.[3] I replied that unfortunately under the present circumstances it would be entirely impossible for Korea to gain such membership in view of the absolute veto power of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, and pointed out, furthermore, that it was not the United States which had sponsored the "package proposal." I added that while no useful purpose would be served in our again putting forward the Korean application under present circumstances it was, nevertheless, the desire of the United States to see the Republic of Korea become a full-fledged Member of the United Nations, and that this would remain our policy. The Foreign Minister then expressed the hope that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists would not be permitted to come to New York and be heard by the General Assembly.

---

[3] For documentation on the admission of new members into the United Nations, see vol. III, pp. 802 ff.

Security Treaty with the United States

The Korean Foreign Minister remarked that while the war continued in Korea there was no immediate danger that the United States or the United Nations would abandon their efforts to protect Korea from Communism or from a resurgent Japanese influence in the peninsula. He stressed, however, that the Korean people and their Government feel considerable anxiety as to their future security, caught as they are between Communists on one side and an increasingly powerful Japan on the other. He hoped that the United States would view with favor the early conclusion of a security pact with the Republic of Korea which would insure the future security of his country against aggressive force from any quarter. He stressed that such a pact would have an important effect upon the morale of the Koreans, and would now be particularly significant in view of the fact that the United States had recently concluded a bilateral security pact with Japan.

I replied that the fullest measure of reassurance for the future security of the Korean Republic is to be found in the tremendous sacrifice which the United States and the United Nations had made and are now making in the defense of Korea from Communist aggression, and that nothing could be a more eloquent testimony to our resolve to continue to protect the Republic of Korea from the forces of destruction. I emphasized that such clear evidence of our concern for Korea would not be materially strengthened merely by a paper indication of such resolve, and I pointed out that, as in the case of the Philippines, the strong undercurrent of our great interest in their welfare far transcended the mere conclusion of a formal treaty on the subject; in the last analysis, the principle of collective security is vitally important to the defense of Korea, as it is to the United States, and that this principle is now being effectively demonstrated in our present actions to meet the Communist aggression in Korea.

The Problem of North Korea

Dr. Pyun stated that his Government estimated that the present population of North Korea had been reduced to approximately three million persons who were largely elderly people or youths and who could not effectively farm the available land. He emphasized that the Chinese armies in this area now comprise some one million men who depend to a great extent upon the land for their food supply; there were indications that Chinese were beginning to import farm labor to settle in North Korea, and that the ultimate result of this would be the loss of this area to China for all time. The Foreign Minister believed that this should be a matter of the gravest concern to the United Nations. When I asked him what solution he could offer to this problem, the Foreign Minister replied that he had none, but that he merely wished to call our attention to the most serious situation.

Food Supply in the Republic of Korea

Dr. Pyun then raised the question of the food supply within the Republic of Korea. He pointed out that many of the outlying areas of his country were suffering very serious food shortages and that in some cases actual starvation existed. He stated that crop forecasts indicated a very profound deficit in the forthcoming harvest and that for the current crop year the production of food might sink to a figure only 40% of normal. The Foreign Minister considered this to be a matter of grave concern and hoped that the United States would take all possible immediate steps to meet the problem.

Ambassador Muccio remarked that it was his understanding joint crop surveys by the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, in cooperation with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and with the Republic of Korea authorities are underway; the final crop estimate will not be in until next month but from the more recent information thus acquired, it would appear that the food prospects were not nearly as gloomy as they were painted by the Foreign Minister. Ambassador Muccio also pointed out that machinery had been established for coordination of economic problems through the Combined Economic Board,[4] established last May, and that he was certain that both the UNKRA and the United Nations Civil Assistance Command were most alert to the requirements for foodstuffs and were currently making adequate provisions to meet this problem.

Korean-Japanese Relations

The Foreign Minister referred to the anxiety of his Government over the deterioration of its relations with the Japanese and stressed the danger, in their view, that the Japanese Government was intent, in the long range, upon reasserting its influence in Korea. He referred to the deadlock which had been reached in the current negotiations with the Japanese, and stated that increased concern had been caused by the action of the United States in building up Japan, both economically and militarily.

Dr. Pyun then discussed at some length the various points at issue which had arisen in the course of the bilateral negotiations. He said that whereas the Japanese had urged that such difficult questions as fisheries and property claims be put off for consideration until after the conclusion of a treaty, his own Government could not accept this view, since it considered it essential that all outstanding questions between Korea and Japan be solved before a treaty could go into effect. He stressed particularly the necessity for the Japanese to withdraw their property claims in Korea before the Republic of Korea would be willing to resume the negotiations. The Korean Ambassador felt that his Government had been most fair and reasonable in its efforts to negotiate these outstanding problems, but he considered that the Japanese had not been sincere in their profession of willingness to negotiate on a similar basis.

---

[4] For a summary of the negotiations which led, *inter alia*, to the creation of the Combined Economic Board, see the letter from Meyer to Acheson, May 24, p. 238.

Dr. Pyun pointed out that the fisheries problem was creating a seriously increasing tension with Japan and referred to his Note to me of last August in this regard.[5] He remarked that he had recently discussed this problem in Tokyo with General Clark and that General Clark had stated he was having a "difficult time" with the Japanese over the fisheries problem. The Foreign Minister then stated his satisfaction over the action taken by General Clark in the establishment of a military zone in waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula. He claimed, however, that this zone did not coincide with the fishing line proclaimed by President Rhee last February[6] and that the area between that line and the military zone still presents a serious problem. He recalled that the Japanese had threatened to send large fleets of fishing boats into Korean waters and were in fact doing so, and that they had also threatened to use patrol vessels to back up this move. He felt that he should call to my attention the unreasonable attitude which the Japanese were exhibiting in this, as in other regards, and reiterated his own Government's willingness to continue negotiations with them if the Japanese would cooperate.

Ambassador Yang remarked that it had been hoped that the air might be cleared to some extent for the renewal of negotiations following the Japanese elections; however, he could not now be optimistic that this would occur, although he had requested the Korean Mission in Tokyo to keep the negotiations alive if this could be done.

Ambassador Muccio commented that these were problems which, in the nature of things, the Koreans and Japanese must work out for themselves and to their own satisfaction, and that every effort should be made to continue the negotiations in a mutual spirit of conciliation at the earliest possible time; no third party could effectively introduce formulas for a resolution of these problems which could be expected to gain the wholehearted acceptance from both sides to any given solution. The Foreign Minister and the Korean Ambassador both indicated their assent with this view.

In closing the conversation, Dr. Yang stated that he wished to express on behalf of his Government and of the people of Korea their profound gratitude to the United States for the tremendous aid and assistance which we were rendering in holding back Communist aggression. He desired particularly to emphasize the profound impression upon the Koreans created by the courageous decision of President Truman to come to the aid of Korea in June of 1950. The Foreign Minister indicated his complete concurrence with these views.

---

[5] Not printed.

[6] The proclamation was issued on Jan. 18, 1952, not in February; a text is contained in telegram 709 from Pusan, Jan. 21, 1952, not printed (795.022/1–2152).

I thanked Dr. Pyun and his colleagues for having voiced these sentiments, and assured them again of our continued desire to work closely with them in the furtherance of Korea's welfare.

DEAN ACHESON

Editorial Note

On October 23, the First Committee of the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly voted unanimously to place the Korean item, officially known as "Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea", first on its agenda. Opening debate on the same day was marked by protracted discussion as to whether North Korea should be invited to participate and a resolution to that effect introduced by the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly defeated. The Committee then proceeded to vote to invite the Republic of Korea to send to its sessions a nonvoting representative.

On the next day, Secretary Acheson made a long statement before the First Committee detailing the background of the Korean question and presenting a 21-power resolution calling upon the People's Republic of China and North Korea to agree to an armistice based on the principle of voluntary repatriation. For Acheson's assessment of the speech and the events at New York which preceded it, see his *Present at the Creation,* pages 696–699. Also of interest in Acheson's memoirs is the text of a report to President Truman by the Secretary made the day after the speech to the First Committee, *ibid.,* pages 765–767. For an excerpted version of Acheson's 4-hour speech, see Department of State *Bulletin,* November 3, 1952, pages 679–692 and *ibid.,* November 10, 1952, pages 744–751. For the text of the 21-power resolution, see *ibid.,* November 3, 1952, page 680.

795.00/10–2552

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) [1]

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 25, 1952.

Pearson telephoned Secretary tonight to congratulate him on Committee One speech.[2] Pearson then set forth idea that cease-fire in Korea should be sought after UN resolution tabled today by U.S. has been transmitted to Commies and is under consideration by them. Secretary said this would, he thought, be extremely difficult, and mentioned, in particular, adverse effect on Air Force operations. Secretary said he would, however, mention idea to Lovett and others and let Pearson know U.S. reaction. Secretary wishes this be mentioned only on need-to-know basis. He believes idea is dangerous and impractical, but that U.S. is obligated to give formal consideration and reply.

DEAN ACHESON

---

[1] The following note appeared on the source text: "Answer to D[ean] A[cheson] on Monday [October 27]. Ask Lovett & Bradley." The note was not initialed and the author is unidentified. For the answer, see the letter from Matthews to the Secretary, *infra*.

[2] The reference is to Acheson's speech on Oct. 24, 1952; see the editorial note, *supra*.

---

357 AD/10–2752

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 27, 1952.

DEAR DEAN: I called General Bradley this morning at David's [1] request with reference to your telephone conversation with Mike Pearson.[2] I emphasized to Brad the dynamite contained in Mike's suggestion should word of it get around. I emphasized that you and all of us here are fully aware of the unacceptable military dangers involved in Mike's proposal and said that you were looking for "ammunition" to be used in your reply to him. I said that Alex Johnson would be glad to work with anyone he designated on a memorandum giving reasons why we could not go along with Mike's proposal. He agreed and I am enclosing the resulting memorandum which has been cleared with Bob Lovett and General Bradley. I hope it will meet your needs in talking to Mike.[3]

Your Korean speech was really magnificent. My heartiest congratulations and best of luck in the trying days ahead.

Very sincerely,

DOC

---

[1] David K. E. Bruce, Under Secretary of State.

[2] See the memorandum by the Secretary, *supra*.

[3] Pearson noted in his *Mike, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, vol. 2, p. 316, that reaction in Washington to his idea for a "Truce of the Assembly", as he described it, "was entirely negative. The Pentagon especially thought that it was a most dangerous suggestion and would do far more harm than good if accepted."

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Johnson) [4]

SECRET

To seek a cease-fire after the proposed UN resolution on Korea has been transmitted to the Communists and is being considered by them would be fraught with the utmost danger for the military position of the UNC and actually jeopardize whatever possibilities there may be of obtaining an acceptable armistice. Aside from the serious fallacy that the Communists could be expected to reach a reasonable agreement on the POW issue in the absence of military compulsion when they have not done so under military compulsions, there are a number of other specific objections.

1. Under the assumption that this suggestion envisages the putting into effect of a simple cease-fire without any of the safeguards envisaged in the draft armistice agreement, the hostilities to be renewed if the Communists do not favorably consider the UN resolution there would be the following objections:

a. For the UNC to seek a cease-fire under such circumstances, and particularly in the face of the recent stepped-up ground action, could only be interpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness in the UNC military position, a weakness which, in fact, does not exist, and would probably lead Communists to the belief that continued intransigence on their part will result in the eventual complete and formal abandonment by UNC of its position on POWs, thus producing an armistice on Communist terms.

b. A cessation of air attacks over North Korea would remove what is probably the principal factor that might impel the Communists to agree to an acceptable armistice.

c. A cessation of air attacks would permit the Communists to repair and rebuild the air fields in North Korea so that at the end of any cease-fire period the UNC would be faced with a large and possibly even overwhelming Communist air force stationed on bases within Korea within easy striking distance of UNC forces and installations, which has not been the case thus far. This charge would subject our front line troops to air attacks with possible heavy casualties.

d. A cessation of air attacks would permit the Communists unmolested to rebuild and restore railroads, roads, bridges and other lines of communication so as to permit the transportation and support of a military force considerably larger than that which they are now able to supply and maintain in Korea.

e. A cessation of air and ground reconnaissance would enable the undetected concentration of Communist forces, thereby jeopardizing the security of the UNC. Inability of the UNC to attack such concentrations would constitute further jeopardy to the security of UNC forces.

---

[4] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this memorandum was shown to Pearson. It was drafted in the Department of the Army and by U.A. Johnson, who concurred for the Department of State. It also had the concurrence of Generals Collins and Bradley and Secretary Lovett.

f. A temporary cease-fire which does not lead to a permanent armistice would produce severe adverse psychological effect upon the UNC forces.

g. Thus, the end of any such cease-fire period could well mean that there would be a reversal of the present military situation, i.e., the Communists would have overwhelming military superiority over the UNC and the UNC would be faced with agreeing to an armistice entirely on Communist terms, or stand in danger of forcible ejection from Korea. There is, of course, the corresponding danger that such a situation would inevitably lead to an enlargement of the conflict.

2. Under the assumption that this suggestion envisages the putting into effect of all provisions in the draft armistice agreement except those pertaining to POWs, acceptance of this suggestion would in fact be a complete capitulation to the oft-repeated Communist propaganda line that an armistice be entered into without any agreement on prisoners and that question be deferred to "discussion in a calmer atmosphere". The Communists are of course confident, and perhaps with reason, that, if they succeeded in obtaining UNC agreement to such a proposition, the pressures for obtaining return of UN prisoners held by them would be so overwhelming as to cause an abandonment of the UNC position on non-forcible repatriation.

The principal factor favorable to the United Nations Command in the present situation is the air superiority which it holds over North Korea. The principal factor favorable to the Communists is the desire of the United Nations Command to obtain the return of United Nations POWs held by Communists. A cease-fire without agreement on POWs eliminates the principal factor favorable to the United Nations Command position and leaves all advantages to the Communists. Since the Communists have failed to agree to the UNC position on POWs in a situation in which the military advantage lies with the UNC, it could hardly be expected that the Communists will agree to the UNC position on POWs in a situation where that advantage has been lost.

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Korea"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 29, 1952.[2]

Subject: Korean Question

Participants: Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Dean Acheson

---

[1] For Acheson's recollections of this meeting and his view of what he describes as "the Menon cabal", see his *Present at the Creation*, p. 700.

[2] This memorandum of conversation was originally written on Oct. 28 by Acheson; it was retyped on Oct. 29 for distribution.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd called at my request for a general talk. One of the subjects that Mr. Lloyd mentioned was the Korean issue in the UN. He said that he expected to speak on Thursday[3] after Vyshinsky. He hoped to center his discussion on the question of non-forcible return, the principle of which he would strongly support. He would ask Vyshinsky a series of questions in an effort to find out whether the Russians were really sticking for the idea of repatriation by force. He thought this was an issue on which we had great support in the Assembly and was the one to push. He said that some of his delegation had felt that he should not speak until after our election since the Korean question had become involved in our political discussions. However, he did not see how he would be raising political questions if he spoke as he indicated since he saw no ground to believe that there was disagreement in the US on the question of no forcible return. I agreed with this and urged him to speak on Thursday.

He said that Mr. Menon of India was working on a proposal (and Mr. Lloyd believed that Mr. Menon was doing this in good faith in a real effort to be helpful) to support the principle of no forcible return and increase the possibilities of an armistice. He thought however that this idea was not very good because there were grave practical difficulties. Apparently Mr. Menon's thoughts were about as follows:

> That the armistice agreement on prisoners should be somewhat vague, such as an undertaking. Prisoners should be returned and repatriated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. It should provide that this should be carried out and interpreted by a protecting power which might in fact be a group of powers, say the armistice inspecting powers, with a neutral chairman. These powers having constructive possession of prisoners would then administer their disposition. Mr. Menon thought that this would produce an armistice and that if there were any disagreements about its administration they would be with the protecting powers and not with the UN Command.

I strongly opposed an approach of this sort. I said that an attempt to have vague principle which meant different things to the two sides would not succeed and would be very dangerous. It would not succeed because the Unified Command of the UN would have to make it absolutely clear that the principle of no forcible return was in effect. This would, of course, defeat the purpose which Mr. Menon had in mind and from which, in my judgment there was no escape. Mr. Lloyd agreed with this. I then said that to have a provision in the armistice which was so certain to present controversy would cause grave hazards for the Unified Command and the troops in Korea. Our defensive position would be weakened after the armistice and if a breach of the armistice occurred as a result of a dispute in so confused a manner as Mr. Menon's proposal, it would gravely undermine the idea of the greater sanction. I thought that it was clear that we could not accept any such proposal and earnestly hoped that Mr. Menon could be dissuaded from making it.

---

[3] Oct. 30. For the text of the speech, see UN document A/C.1/SR.515.

DEAN ACHESON

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Korea"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 29, 1952.[1]

Subject: Korea and Tunisia

Participants: Madame Pandit—India Delegation
Secretary Acheson—U.S. Delegation

I called upon Madame Pandit at my request. I briefly mentioned two matters.

Korea. I said that it was difficult to say much about this matter until we had heard from Mr. Vishinsky's speech.[2] She said that she agreed with that and she would like to talk with me again later on.

I said that there had been rumors attributed to members of her delegation of a plan to slur over the prisoner of war question in the armistice agreement and rely upon the fact that in administering the repatriation a neutral group would be able to exclude from repatriation those as to whom force would be necessary. I said that this was, I thought, a most dangerous idea. In the first place, the issue could not be slurred over, because public opinion in a great many countries would require its clarification, and, secondly, to have armistice terms which were unclear and which would lead to charges of bad faith and breaches of the armistice would raise the gravest questions of resumption of hostilities under circumstances which would make that most serious indeed.

Mrs. Pandit purported to know nothing of such rumors and to understand the point which I had made. She said that, if Mr. Vishinsky made a purely propaganda speech, offering no new ideas, she thought that our resolution might be one to which her delegation could agree, provided some editorial changes were made which removed an implication, which she thought was now in it; i.e., that the General Assembly was approving all actions of the Command, including all the bombings. I said that this criticism rather surprised me, but that I would look at the resolution again. I thought that it had been drafted in such a way as to permit all those who agreed with us on the principle of no forced repatriation to concur in the resolution regardless of what other differences they might have with us.

---

[1] This memorandum was typed on Oct. 30.

[2] The reference was to a speech given later in the day, see the memorandum by Popper, *infra*.

[Here follows a short discussion on the Tunisian question; for further documentation on this matter, see volume XI, Part 1, pages 665 ff.]

DEAN ACHESON

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Korea"

Memorandum by David H. Popper, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Seventh United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 30, 1952.

Subject: Korea

A meeting was held at the Secretary's request at 9:30 a.m., October 30, to discuss tactics on Korea in the light of Vyshinsky's speech.[1]

The following conclusions were reached:

1. It was decided that the Secretary should not intervene again in the general debate at this time, although he might perhaps do so next week when this stage of the discussion was nearer to its close.

2. The question was raised whether the Secretary should have a press conference. This was left open for further investigation.

3. It was agreed that a probing operation would be conducted to attempt to elicit from the Russians a clear description of the purport of their resolution. The vital issue was the question whether the commission envisaged in the resolution would go to work before or after an armistice had been completed. Questions are to be prepared designed to smoke out the Russians and are to be given to co-sponsors who will be speaking in the debate. At the same time, a suggestion that we talk quietly and directly with the Russians was made but no decision was taken.

4. A memorandum[2] will be prepared for circulation to our friends dealing with Vyshinsky's general position on prisoners of war: the issue of non-forcible repatriation, the repressive measures against Communist prisoners in the PW camps, etc.

DAVID H. POPPER

---

[1] On Oct. 29, 1952, Vyshinsky made a long statement before Committee I attempting to refute Secretary Acheson's statement of Oct. 24. Vyshinsky's speech concluded with a draft resolution calling for establishment of a commission for the settlement of the Korean question made up of the parties directly concerned as well as states which were not participating in the conflict. For a report on the speech, see UN document A/C.1/SR.514, pp. 31-38.

[2] Not printed.

320/11-152: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 1, 1952—8 p. m.

Delga 97. For the Secretary from Gross. Re Korea.

I. Developments re Mex proposal. Discussions with Padilla Nervo today developed the fol information. Pursuant to conversation I had with Padilla last week he had recommended to his govt that he be authorized to include in his statement in comite one general reference to Mex proposal and that Mex Govt withhold circulating a res until reactions had been developed in comite to Padilla's speech. Padilia told me this morning that he, Mex President, was insistent that he deposit the res with the secretariat today. At my request, Padilla telephoned his FonMin and told him that we were concerned about this move because we feared it might create confusion in the comite at a time when we were most anxious to keep clear our desire to have Vishinsky answer Lloyd's questions.[1] Padilla called me later to tell me his FonOff was unable to alter his instructions because the Mex President had already scheduled a press conference for this afternoon and was insistent upon circulating the res today. We are sending a copy of the text by telegram as soon as we receive it this afternoon. The gist of the res is that those PW's who elect repatriation shld be released for this purpose soon as possible after an armistice. Those who reject repatriation wld be disposed of in accordance with a formula to be worked out by the President of the Assembly "through appropriate channels" (which Padilla explained meant the UC), by agreements with member states willing to accept PW's and to guarantee them the right to earn their livelihood under decent conditions. The Mex res essentially reflects the plan set forth in their letter to us transmitted to Austin.

I explained to Padilla our concern lest the interjection of this proposal cut across our strong desire to maintain pressure upon Vishinsky to respond to the questions which Lloyd and others have propounded in the first comite. Padilla understands this point and agreed to meet with me Monday morning[2] to discuss tactics. He agreed not to speak on Monday in any event and to postpone decision to speak during the week until we have had a chance to discuss the timing of his statement and the substance which we think might help rather than hinder our objective.

II. Ross and I had lunch with Selwyn Lloyd and Pearson today.[3] Lloyd reported on a conversation which he had held during the morning with Krishna Menon. Menon is in close personal communication with Nehru and Lloyd believes that a possible attitude of jealousy is developing between Madame Pandit and Krishna Menon. Menon is "full of ideas." According to Lloyd they seem to center primarily upon the issues of (A) adhering to the principle of non-forcible repatriation, and (B) returning those PW's who elect repatriation and turning over to some neutral group those who do not wish to be repatriated.

---

[1] For Lloyd's and others' replies to Vyshinsky's speech, see UN document A/C.1/SR.515, pp. 39–44.

[2] Nov. 3.

[3] For Pearson's account of this meeting, see his *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 317.

Lloyd, rightly or wrongly, believes Menon is "trying to be helpful." He believes Menon more useful than Pandit at present time. This, of course, makes it necessary for us to be most careful in determining how we should best approach the Indian del. It seems clear we must keep in the closest possible touch with Madame Pandit as the leader of the Indian del, despite the fact that Menon seems to be carrying the ball on the Korean issue, at least at present.

III. Pearson, Lloyd and I had a general go-around on the tactical problems ahead of us. Lloyd would prefer to see no vote on the Korean resolutions until after the general debate has been resumed, i.e., until after Eden and Schuman have had an opportunity to make statements next week in the plenary. Pearson, on other hand, leans toward wrapping up the first step of the Korean item as soon as possible. That is to say, he inclines toward pressing to a vote on our res (with any amendments that may develop as a result of Mex or other initiative) prior to the resumption of general debate. Whether this can happen, in any event, depends upon the number of comite one meetings held next week, which from present indications will not exceed four, including Saturday.[4] Lloyd and I doubt that it will be practicable to come to a vote after only four more meetings.

With regard to the "second step," I found Pearson soft. He referred to a conversation he had had with Hickerson who told him not to forget that "we would not let him off the hook" on the second step which we contemplated. Pearson said he had replied to Hickerson that the latter might be surprised to know "how few people were on the hook." Pearson is playing with the idea, which I strongly discouraged, that after he, as President of the Assembly, reported refusal of the Commies to agree to an armistice on the basis involved in our res, we might then support proposals along the Krishna Menon line. I feel that you shld talk with Pearson as soon as possible after you return to the city.

The central point involved here is, of course, the traditional difference between Pearson and ourselves on the most practicable method of maintaining pressure upon the Commies to desire an armistice. Pearson, with considerable support from Lloyd, repeated his often expressed view that the best way to demonstrate solidarity and strength is to mobilize the fullest possible support from the Asian and African group. On our part, I attempted to stress the viewpoint that the Commies have never in the past, and are not likely now, to be impressed by what they regard as weak, divisive and diversionary attempts to find "formulae."

---

[4] Nov. 8.

IV. The situation within the Commonwealth Group itself is not, in my judgment, satisfactory. Paul Martin, who has been attending Commonwealth meetings, expressed the view that "the Australians and New Zealanders don't understand the point." On the other hand, from a conversation I had with Paul Martin at your party Friday evening I got the impression the Canadians are encouraging Krishna Menon, whereas Dick Casey and Percy Spender are actively seeking to discourage him. Although there has been some talk about a "Canadian resolution," Pearson did not give me a copy and merely made a passing reference.

V. The foregoing report confirms the opinion I expressed to you Friday that up to now it has not been possible to have definitive conversations with other dels. By the time you return to New York I believe we shall have obtained firmer indications of the attitudes of the Asian-African and LA groups with whom we shall be holding discussions during the next few days.

[GROSS] [5]

---

[5] Because he was the official head of the U.S. Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly, Acheson's signature was typed at the end of this telegram although he was in Washington at the time. The telegram is clearly from Gross to the Secretary.

795.00/11–352

Memorandum for the Record, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1952.

Participants: Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs [1]
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Subject: Matters Relating to Korea.

On Monday, November 3, Ambassador Briggs and I met with various officials in the Department of Defense to discuss practically all aspects of the Korean situation. The following paragraphs summarize the highlights of these individual conversations.

Secretary of Defense Lovett

After a considerable exchange on the situation in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Lovett turned to the Korean problem, with the remark that it seemed to him to be nearly insoluble. He listed the many issues that seem so difficult to settle: inflation, armistice negotiations, military requirements, and difficulties with the Rhee Government. The Secretary did not discuss any of these in detail. He did tell the Ambassador that he was particularly concerned over the problem of speed and efficiency of communications. The Secretary said that he has always been concerned in countries where there is political instability and military operations that United States diplomatic and military officials can communicate with each other rapidly. He appeared to be particularly concerned over this problem in Korea and hoped that the Ambassador would be able always to get in touch with General Van Fleet or General Clark in a matter of minutes. Ambassador Briggs said that he would look into this situation and thanked the Secretary for pointing up such an essential matter. Secretary Lovett said one encouraging factor in the Korean situation is the excellent relations between United States diplomatic and United States military officials in Korea. Ambassador Briggs assured the Secretary that he hoped this relationship would continue when he takes over his duties in Korea.

---

[1] Before being commissioned Ambassador to the Republic of Korea on Aug. 25, 1952, during a recess of the Senate, Briggs was Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Chief of Staff [*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*] *Bradley*

General Bradley made the following points in his discussion with Ambassador Briggs.

1. With respect to the armistice negotiations, General Bradley was convinced last fall that the Communists wanted an armistice in order to get through the winter, which is particularly hard on their forces. The armistice was not concluded, and the Communists appear to have weathered the winter without serious effect or the outbreak of major epidemics. So, in the spring, General Bradley felt that there might not be any conclusion in the negotiations, until after the American elections. Just what effect the campaign has had on the Communists' attitude towards the negotiations is hard to tell, but it may be that the campaign will have delayed things through another winter.

2. General Bradley believes that our position on the repatriation of prisoners of war is entirely correct for two reasons: first, it reflects our basic principles on individual rights which we could not compromise; and secondly, it may discourage the Communists from engaging in future "Koreas". General Bradley thinks that we have not capitalized enough on this argument. As he put it, if we get away with our stand on the POW issue, the Communists may think twice before sending Chinese soldiers into battle where they might surrender in large numbers, knowing that they would not be sent back to Communist China.

3. He said that the military authorities thought the POW situation was well in hand. General MacArthur[2] told him that the POWs were the happiest group in Korea because they were well cared for and well fed. Then, with Van Fleet carrying on the war from Seoul and with General Ridgway in Tokyo, the handling of the POWs on the islands

---

[2] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA (retired), former CINCUNC and CINCFE.

off the coast was left to the rear echelons. It would have been better to have established more responsible control over the POW administration, but for a long while it was assumed that the armistice negotiations would be concluded and the prisoners returned. It was clear that the prisoner outbreaks came as a great surprise to our top military authorities. Thereafter, General Clark established a communications zone under General Herren in order to relieve General Van Fleet of civil affairs matters. General Bradley believes that the POW camps are under complete control and that the communications zone was a sensible move.

4. General Bradley mentioned that President Rhee and his government are trying in every possible way to return their capital to Seoul. General Bradley believes that General Van Fleet is right in opposing this move until an armistice is concluded. General Bradley wondered if there was some other place than Seoul for the Korean capital to move to, such as Taegu. Ambassador Briggs replied that he would look into that.

Secretary of the Air Force Finletter and Secretary of the Army Pace

These two officials combined their individual appointments with the Ambassador. Their discussion of the Korean situation developed a number of important points.

1. Both Secretaries affirmed in strong terms the amazing progress made in the development of ROK ground forces.

2. Secretary Finletter said that he was concerned most with the question of how to get the armistice concluded and what were the best steps for the United States Defense Department to take thereafter in Korea. He said that the United States air strength in Korea is taken from somewhere else and could be used somewhere else in the world. He would like to get it out of Korea for that reason. Both Secretaries favor token forces of various nations in critical areas. They do not see the sense in "parking" a large United States army, navy and air force in Korea after the armistice. They would prefer a token United States force. Secretary Finletter believes that the large force would be uneconomic, and that it might not be able to hold back aggression in any case. He is concerned that there is too much thinking going on, including the Department of State, of maintaining large forces in Korea for some time. He said that there were some papers circulating on this subject. He suggested that the State Department should do some real analysis about this matter. Speaking for the air force, he does not want our air strength pinned down in Korea indefinitely.

3. Secretary Finletter then turned to the problem of the Korean air force. He said that there was no reason why the Korean air force could not be built up to as much as two or three wings in conventional type fighter bombers. According to his observations and information, the Korean air force has done an excellent job. It seems to have a facility for doing the difficult and often nasty chores that only F-51's can do in close support and low speed tactical operations. He says that there is no reason why the Korean air force could not have some jets, too. Secretary Pace disagreed on the jets, but stated that he was in full accord with Secretary Finletter on the development of a conventional type Korean air force. Both Secretaries conceded that the Koreans could not

support either air or ground forces, since their economy will be a deficit one for a long time to come, but they strongly approve the concept of developing Korean forces to the greatest extent possible to maintain the defense of the ROK.

4. Secretary Finletter raised the subject of developing more publicity on Soviet participation in Korean hostilities. Secretary Pace agreed that more should be done along this line. Both Secretaries indicated that they had tried but had been rebuffed, apparently by the Department of State, on the grounds that such revelations would "offend" the Russians. They were not talking about the logistical support or tactical advice which the Russians are providing the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. Secretary Finletter specifically mentioned that he was thinking of actual combat participation of certain types of Soviet units such as anti-aircraft. He thought the American public and the world in general should know that Soviet personnel are fighting against us in one way or another. He suggested that the Ambassador look into this matter in the Department of State.

5. Secretary Pace briefly mentioned the "infinite" difficulties in carrying out relief and rehabilitation in Korea in view of the multiplicity of organizations working in this field.

Under Secretary of the Navy Whitehair; Admiral Fechteler; and Admiral Callaghan

They discussed the specific subject of Japanese technicians in Korea. They wanted the Ambassador to know the acute problem which President Rhee's opposition in this regard would cause the "Military Shipping Transport Service". If Rhee insists on the removal of the Japanese, together with the barges and the ships operated by the Japanese, a severe blow will be dealt our operation facilities in Korea. Admiral Callaghan showed the Ambassador a telegram of October 20 in which CINCFE requested measures be studied to replace the Japanese with American military or civilian technicians.[3] The naval authorities emphasized the seriousness of this situation for the Ambassador. In response to the Ambassador's statement that the one encouraging factor of the Korean situation appears to be their remarkable progress in developing fighting forces, Admiral Fechteler stated that the Korean navy was doing an excellent job. He said that Admiral Sohn, Korean Chief of Naval Operations, is coming to the United States in December at which time he, Admiral Fechteler, would try to get Admiral Sohn "out of the Rhee atmosphere" on such questions as the sea defense zone and the use of Japanese technicians for essential military requirements.

General Lemnitzer, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research

General Lemnitzer spent over an hour with the Ambassador at lunch in his office and talked in detail about many aspects of the Korean situation.

---

[3] For a fuller account of this problem, see Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu,* pp. 148–150 and Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* p. 348.

1. On the economic situation, General Lemnitzer stated in most positive terms that the United States should have quickly paid the $35 million under the Meyer Agreement and then should have paid the $4 million each month. On the basis of living up to our end of the bargain we can then press the Koreans for adequate measures of stabilization. However, General Lemnitzer believes we should not insist on too high standards of performance because the Korean Government does not have experienced personnel. In fact, he thinks it is probably one of the most inexperienced in the world. They just don't know how to operate in the modern world. The difficulty is that American officials, both military and diplomatic, usually show one of two attitudes towards the Koreans: either an attitude of expecting far too much capability, understanding and initiative on the part of the Koreans, or an attitude of writing off the Koreans entirely with contempt and antagonism. General Lemnitzer indicated that the latter attitude was particularly evident in Tokyo.

He then spoke at some length of the problem of the conversion rate. He described his experiences with the Meyer Mission on this problem, and stated that it was unfair for the American troops to have to pay the conversion rate of 6,000 to 1.

2. General Lemnitzer said that he had no patience with Rhee's attitude on the use of Japanese technicians in Korea. He understands the political and psychological background of hostility toward the Japanese but he thinks that Rhee ought to realize the military necessity involved. General Lemnitzer spoke of Rhee as a shrewd, astute, hard-bargaining, old patriot, who knows how to get what he wants and usually does.

3. With respect to the political crisis of last May and June, General Lemnitzer said that General Van Fleet and President Rhee had one or two serious and explosive meetings over Rhee's demand that two Korean divisions be moved south to execute martial law in the Pusan area. General Van Fleet refused the request for two divisions, but authorized the release of one company of ROK army troops. Apparently, this company was moved to Pusan during the period of martial law, although General Lemnitzer did not believe there was any need for it whatsoever. In this connection, he told us of the difficulties of top Korean military leaders who were caught in the crossfire between General Van Fleet on the one hand and President Rhee on the other.

4. General Lemnitzer described at some length the training program for developing ROK ground forces. He believes that the Korean divisions have made amazing progress and can now hold their own, as they have shown, against the Chinese Communists on the line. He went into the problems of organizing artillery and tank companies for each Korean division and in developing divisional and corps leadership. Both of these requirements take time, particularly the latter. He cogently pointed out the difficulties in creating an army from nothing in a country like Korea, and expressed a great deal of amazement that so much has been accomplished in such a short time.

5. With respect to the Command's proposals of last spring for a civil affairs agreement, General Lemnitzer indicated that they were out of order, unrealistic and unnecessary. He said that General Van Fleet could get anything he wanted from the Koreans, which was more than any written agreement would provide.

6. Finally, he reviewed the operational situation across the line in Korea, and showed the Ambassador his corps front. General Lemnitzer stated that in his opinion the Chinese Communists could not break through without excessive casualties.

After lunch, and the G–2 briefing, Assistant Secretary of the Army Shackleford and General Marquat, of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Army, met with the Ambassador. Mr. Shackleford said that he had reluctantly concurred in the payment of some $18 million to the Korean Government under the exchange of notes for the $4 million monthly payments, plus about $2 million for individual troop drawings of won. He emphasized over and over again his concern and unhappiness in this decision. His point was that in the future he, as the "banker" for the United States in this matter, might wish to give President Rhee "an alert" that the monthly payment might not be forthcoming because Korean performance under the Economic Coordination Agreement fell short. Mr. Shackleford said that he and the Ambassador were the two officers of the United States Government principally concerned in future decisions regarding the monthly payments. Mr. Shackleford believes that in the future each payment should be made when due if possible, but that it may be necessary to alert President Rhee as indicated above. General Marquat told the Ambassador that the Department of the Army is standardizing the procedures for this payment. There was some discussion of the Economic Coordination Agreement and exchange of notes.

Mr. Shackleford discussed the problem of the changing of the conversion rate, but did not indicate that the Army had made any decisions in this regard.

Mr. Shackleford told the Ambassador that he was greatly concerned over the activities of UNCURK and hoped that steps might be taken to do away with this body. Colonel Herriott, of Mr. Shackleford's office, referred to the "anomalous" status of UNCURK and complained that it was the only agency in Korea that had not been fully coordinated with the United Nations Command. He expressed the hope that it could be merged with UNKRA. There was no discussion of this point. Mr. Henry Carter of the Counselor's office of the State Department and Admiral Austin, OP 35, Navy, were also present at this meeting.

Following this meeting, there was some discussion with General Marquat and Colonel Hensey, of G–5, [FEC] Tokyo, on the repayment of $80 million by the United States to the ROK for won advances in 1950 and 1951.

KENNETH T. YOUNG, JR.

795.00/12-552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1952.

Subject: Korean Resolution in UN

I went over with the President the efforts which we were making to have a resolution in the UN supporting our armistice position. I said that I had the gravest doubt that I could get the GA to support this resolution in view of General Eisenhower's imminent trip [2] and their doubt as to whether the U.S. Delegation in the UN really represented the views of the United States. I spoke of the necessity for the General, if he were well advised, to make some statement setting doubts at rest regarding his support of our armistice position.[3]

We concluded that it did not seem practicable to raise this matter with General Eisenhower until he had expressed some willingness to go into the broader matter of liaison with us.

---

[1] The following names were written on the source text: Hickerson, Johnson, Matthews, and Bruce; presumably they received copies.

[2] As promised in his successful Presidential campaign, President-elect Eisenhower went to Korea. He arrived in Korea on Dec. 2 and left late on the evening of Dec. 5. For his published account of the trip, see *Mandate For Change*, pp. 93-96.

[3] On Nov. 6 Acheson sent Truman a memorandum expressing concern about the effect of Eisenhower's trip to Korea. For a text, see Truman's *Memoirs*, vol. II, pp. 510-511. Attached to the memorandum was a draft statement for Eisenhower which Acheson believed would be "most helpful"; it is not printed. (795.00/11-1052)

795B.00/11-552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1952.

Subject: Attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Toward the Handling of the Korean Item in the United Nations.

Participants:
- Rear Admiral H. P. Smith, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Mr. David Wainhouse, UNP
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
- Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, III, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs

In a meeting this afternoon with Admiral Smith, the Admiral discussed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward recent developments in the First Committee of the U.N. relating to the Korean issue.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted on Nov. 6 and cleared with Young. Copies were distributed to the members of the U.S. Delegation in New York.

The Admiral said that some concern was being experienced in the Pentagon over the rather confused series of resolutions being put forward by Mexico, Peru, Indonesia and India, and dealing with the Korean problem. He wished to stress the hope that in its approach to this situation the U.S. Delegation should keep firmly in mind the great concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following points:

(1) That any resolution adopted concerning Korea in the General Assembly should not contain provisions which would leave any substantive aspect of the armistice terms unsolved or for later negotiations. He placed great emphasis upon this.

(2) That there should be no formulation in any resolution put forward on Korea which would re-open the issues already agreed upon in the draft Armistice Agreement, or which would place in the hands of some organ of the U.N. the authority to interfere with or derogate the control of the Unified Command over the military aspects inherent in the current situation in Korea.

Beyond these two caveats, he indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not particularly concerned over the wording or formulation of resolution which would deal with the mechanics of disposing of prisoners of war.

The Admiral was assured that the United States Delegation would continue to be governed in its handling of the Korean item by the criteria set forth in the Position Paper on this subject (as amended),[2] and that the points which he mentioned as of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very much in the mind of the U.S. Delegation in New York. The Admiral appeared satisfied that the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this question was being given full attention by the Department and by the U.S. Delegation.

---

[2] The reference was to SD/A/C.1/396/Rev.1, Oct. 9, 1952, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 599.

320/11-652: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 6, 1952—4:23 p. m.

Delga 133. Re Korea: Following is del staff's listing of elements basic to US position on Korea in GA, referred to in Delga 134.[1]

I. Essential elements in regard to GA res.

A. Clear recognition that force will not be used to effect repatriation.

B. GA should call for armistice agreement consistent with this basic POW position.

---

[1] *Infra.*

C. GA President's report on Communists' reaction to such request must be submitted during present session in time for GA consideration of this report.

D. Res should not reopen questions already tentatively agreed to in Panmunjom and should not, in fact, move further negotiations from Panmunjom to Assembly.

II. Indispensable conditions re POW's.

A. General

1. Armistice agreement must assure prompt return of UNC POW's.
2. Armistice agreement must avoid leaving for further negotiations with Communists any part of POW problem.
3. Agreed arrangements re POW's must not prevent indefinitely resettlement of non-repatriates, or create major practical problems in their resettlement (e.g., moving all Koreans out of Korea).

B. GA committee on repatriation of POW's.

1. If GA is to decide on committee for repatriation of POW's this decision should be recommended to negotiators for their acceptance as well as for incorporation in an appropriate form into armistice agreement.
2. Such a committee should be so composed that it can operate impartially, quickly, and effectively without the need for unanimous decision or the possibility of deadlocking or stalling action in regard to the repatriation of POW's. The composition of the committee should be determined by the GA.
3. The committee's terms of reference should be:

    A. To insure that all listed POW's are, in fact, promptly brought from the camps to the exchange points;
    B. To observe the release and actual repatriation of those willing to be repatriated, in accordance with the provisions of the draft armistice agreement;
    C. To insure that POW's have the opportunity, free from coercion and from military control, to express their resistance to repatriation;
    D. To supervise and be responsible for the custody, care and control in civilian status of those resisting repatriation, and assure them humanitarian conditions pending their resettlement;
    E. To negotiate with other nations for the resettlement of POW's along the lines of the Mexican-Peruvian resolutions;
    F. The committee should be responsible solely to UNGA and should have discharged its function when it can be in a position to assure UNGA that all POW's in custody of either side have either been repatriated or, having freely asserted resistance to repatriation, have been released and resettled under humane conditions.

III. Indispensable elements regarding political settlement following armistice.

A. No mixing of armistice issue and post-armistice political questions.

B. No commission or conference should be created to deal with both armistice and political questions.

C. No political conference or commission should be composed or established before armistice goes into effect.

D. GA should go no further at this time than to approve holding of a political conference on Korea, as recommended in article 60 of draft armistice agreement (A/2228, Annex A). Thus, it might agree that within ninety (90) days of conclusion of armistice there should take place a political conference for the political settlement of the Korean question, with the participation of the parties directly concerned and such others as GA shall designate; such conference would take immediate steps to settle the Korean question on the basis of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea; GA may decide now that it will call special session immediately following conclusion of an armistice in order to carry out that recommendation, including the designation, at that time, of the parties to take part in this conference.

AUSTIN

320/11-652: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 6, 1952—4:24 p. m.

Delga 134. Dept will have noted that during last few days various dels have produced draft resolutions on Korea embodying number of ideas designed to facilitate attainment of Korean armistice.

Besides 21 power draft,[1] resolutions already introduced include:

(A) USSR res[2] for estab of a commission for immediate settlement Korean question;
(B) Mexican draft[3] providing for temporary resettlement of POWs unwilling return home pending a polit settlement of Korean question; and
(C) Peruvian res[4] establishing commission to work out measures for disposition of prisoners not wishing to be repatriated.

Other proposals not yet formally introduced include:

(A) Indonesian draft[5] envisaging a commission to negotiate immediate settlement of Korean problem and a committee which would supervise for an indefinite period prisoners unwilling to be repatriated;

---

[1] For the text, see UN document A/C.1/725.
[2] For the text, see UN document A/C.1/729.
[3] For the text, see UN document A/C.1/730.
[4] For the text, see UN document A/C.1/732.
[5] A text of the Indonesian draft resolution informally provided the U.S. Delegation can be found in Delga 115, Nov. 3, 1952, not printed (320/11-352).

(B) An Iraqi draft[6] calling for transfer to a neutral country of POWs unwilling to return, and for establishment of a commission for unification and rehabilitation of Korea and for the disposal of POWs unwilling to be repatriated;

(C) An Indian suggestion[7] for a good offices commission of GA presidents to facilitate a post-armistice polit conference and a commission to assume responsibility for screening and disposal of POWs; and

(D) A Cuban suggestion that the repatriation issue be referred to the ICJ.[8]

Above proposals in general reflect GA feeling that prisoners shld not be repatriated by force, and view, very widely held, that GA shld estab commissions to facilitate task of settling POW issue and to encourage political settlement of Korean question.

We believe that while additional suggestions may be made, they are likely to consist of new combinations of permutations of provisions included in proposals mentioned above.

Time is now arriving when US shld indicate to other dels what must be included in any acceptable GA res on Korea and what must not be included. Such an indication wld supply an element of cohesion which will be needed in next few days. At the moment, tactical situation is not firm, even among our friends. Brit and Canadians appear to be giving some encouragement to ideas put forward for India by Krishna Menon; there is incipient conflict between Menon's ideas and those being pushed by Palar (Indonesia). Asian-African group has not so far as we know been able to achieve any degree of unity on subject; and Latin Americans tend to look to US for firm leadership.

We have, therefore, drafted list of points included in separate tel (Delga 133)[9] which in our view constitute basic elements in our approach to problem of firming up res on Korea. If Dept approves of these points, we wld use them in exerting our leadership so as to produce a draft or drafts behind which support of great possible number of friendly dels might be mobilized. We think it highly important that we be able to speak from some such document as soon as possible. Need for urgency will be appreciated by Dept. Nov 7, 10:30 a.m. Gross is attending mtg[10] with Pearson, Lloyd and Krishna Menon, called at Lloyd's initiative.

---

[6] A text of the Iraqi draft resolution can be found in Delga 130, Nov. 5, 1952, not printed (320/11-552).

[7] For information on the Indian suggestion, see memorandum of conversation by Acheson, Oct. 29, p. 568.

[8] The Cuban suggestion was reported in a memorandum of conversation by Milton K. Wells of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly, Nov. 3, 1952, not printed (UNP files, lot 60 D 268).

[9] *Supra.*

[10] At the insistence of Gross, the meeting was postponed until Friday afternoon, Nov. 7, 1952 (Delga 144, *infra*). For a report of the meeting, see Delga 150, Nov. 8, p. 586, and Pearson, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 321.

We draw Dept's special attention to two matters covered in list of points. First, we assume Dept will appreciate need for agreeing to some type of committee or commission which wld assist in execution of armistice provisions re POWs. While no one outside Soviet bloc has challenged our basic premise that prisoners must not be returned by force, we have noted gen desire to make sure that POWs are not in any way forcibly detained by UNC and that some process be developed for ensuring their right to make a free choice and their disposition on a humanitarian basis thereafter. Sentiment for POW commission comes from so many sources that we consider it virtually impossible to oppose at this time.

Second, we draw attention to point dealing with GA action to approve the holding of a post-armistice conference and facilitate its convocation. We have included this idea because Soviet draft res has struck responsive chord among many dels which feel deeply that GA has a duty to take all possible action which might bring about peaceful settlement of Korean question. In our opinion, this sentiment which is widely shared, can best be handled not by outright opposition, but by channeling it along lines which the Communists themselves originally proposed at Panmunjom and to which both sides in Korea have agreed.

We have also had in mind our own position regarding GA role in arranging for a conference after an armistice. If formulation in list of points is not satisfactory to Dept, we hope Dept will suggest some modification with which we are able to negotiate effectively in light of tactical situation here.

AUSTIN

320/11-652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 6, 1952—4:42 p. m.

Delga 144. Re: Korea. The following are the latest developments and present status of Menon's proposals:

1. He has elaborated and refined them in the form of 10 points which wld be embodied in a res and which as points he presented orally to a Commonwealth mtg Thurs a.m. He now plans to submit a formal res on Mon Nov 10, and to speak in Comite 1 Tues p.m.

2. Menon is being actively encouraged by both UK and Canadian dels, the UK reportedly having asked him to table the res Monday in advance of Eden's speech. Only members of the Australian del have raised with Menon serious doubts about his proposals.

3. A meeting was held at 5:30 p.m. Thurs [1] with Lloyd, Jebb, Casey, Spender, Martin (Canada) and Munro [2] (N.Z.) attended by Gross, Ross and Allen. Since Menon had apparently given the impression that US would accept our acquiesce in the proposals, Gross read the full account of his previous meeting with Menon as reported Delga 131.[3] Gross also presented orally as US delegation views the indispensable elements of an acceptable arrangement as set forth Delga 133.[4] He pointed out that Menon's proposals fail to meet these conditions in important respects and raise several practical problems which are more than matters of detail. For example, the possibility of deadlock in the commission at the outset on appointment of umpire is inconsistent with the important condition that the post-armistice mechanism should be self-operating and nothing be left to post-armistice negotiation. This aspect of the proposal seems unsound. Referring to the appointment of the three ex-GA Presidents to arrange for the political conference, Gross pointed out we are uncertain as to what their task would be. They could in no event supplant the planned special GA session which would select the UN delegates and fix their terms of reference. Moreover, we dislike GA approval now of one specific article (60) of truce agreement out of context. Notwithstanding above other representatives present, except Spender, continue to be intrigued with Menon's proposals.

4. A meeting of Lloyd, Menon and Gross under the aegis of Mr. Pearson, originally proposed by Lloyd for Friday a.m. has, at Gross' insistence been postponed until late Friday afternoon.

ACHESON

---

[1] Presumably Thursday, Nov. 6, 1952. If this were the case, the meeting occurred after the telegram was sent and yet the results of the discussion were included in this cable. This telegram was not received at the Department of State until 5:25 p. m., Nov. 7, indicating that either it was misdated and should carry a dateline of Nov. 7, 4:42 p. m. or perhaps the telegram was held up prior to transmission so that the results of the 5:30 meeting could be included.

[2] Leslie Knox Munro, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United States.

[3] According to Delga 131, Nov. 6, 1952, the main elements the U.S. Government sought in any resolution were: "(*a*) adherence to the principle of nonforcible repatriation; (*b*) separation of all pre-armistice and post-armistice problems; (*c*) no proposal to establish a post-armistice commission at this time; (*d*) no mechanism for repatriation of POW's which could deadlock or stall execution of armistice agreement" (320/11–652).

[4] Dated Nov. 6, p. 579.

320/11-852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 8, 1952—1:42 p. m.

Delga 149. Re Korea. Following is approximate text of list of points developed by Menon and representing GOI position, for inclusion in GA resolution for settlement PW question:

(1) All PW's are to be released and repatriated in accordance with Geneva Convention, the established principles and practice of international law and the terms of the armistice agreement.

(2) All PW's are to be brought to or located at agreed exchange points in demilitarized zone and released from control and custody of detaining side into that of a Repatriation Commission composed of the four neutral nations (Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia) which shall function as the protecting power in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

(3) A classification of all PW's as to nationality and domicile shall be carried out by the Repatriation Commission as soon as the PW's are released to them.

(4) After classification PW's are free to return to homelands and their return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.

(5) Each side shall be permitted access to the PW's in accordance with arrangements prescribed by Repatriation Commission and be permitted to inform them of their rights.

(6) PW's shall be entitled to make representations to Comm on matters pertaining to themselves and to inform Comm of their desires.

(7) PW's shall be treated humanely in accordance with Art 13 of the Geneva Convention. Force shall not be used nor permitted to be used against PW's in any circumstance. No violence to their person nor affront to their dignity shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose, the only exception being measures necessary for the maintenance of discipline in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The Comm is entrusted with responsibility for seeing that this injunction is observed.

(8) The Comm shall take decisions by majority vote. Questions on which deadlock exists shall be settled by an Umpire in accordance with relevant articles of Geneva Convention. The Comm shall as its first task at its first mtg appoint the Umpire, prior to the coming into force of the armistice.

(9) The terms of the arrangements shall be made known to all PW's.

(10) The res shall be transmitted by the Pres to the reps of both sides as the basis for negots at Panmunjom.

(11) The GA should appoint a comm of 3 persons (Pearson, Padilla Nervo and Entezam[1]) who shall be empowered to work out, in consul-

---

[1] Nasrollah Entezam, Ambassador and Chairman of the Iranian Delegation at the Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly.

tation with the parties, the arrangements for holding the conference provided for in Art 60 of the Armistice Agreement.

ACHESON

320/11-852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 8, 1952—1:41 p. m.

Delga 150. Re Korea. Following summarizes results of several discussions Friday [1] and Saturday a.m. centering around Menon's proposals for settlement POW question, including mtg of Lloyd with Secy, Gross *et al.,* Friday a.m. and mtg of Gross, Young, and Allen with Pearson, Lloyd and Menon Friday afternoon:

1. Except for Comite 1 mtg Mon a.m. to hear Vishinsky, no further mtgs Comite 1 planned until after conclusion of Plenary debates to be resumed Mon afternoon. Thus, unlikely Comite 1 will meet before Thurs, Nov 12 at earliest. Menon states he will not table any res until Thurs at soonest.

2. Secy made clear to Lloyd and Gross to Menon that while US not unreceptive in principle to idea of giving suitably composed repatriation comm some appropriate role in connection with repatriation process, Ind proposals as outlined orally (see Delga 149, Nov 8 [2] for approximate text) are so ill-defined and raise so many problems, it is impossible decide whether any part of proposals are feasible or meet essential minimum conditions without some more definitive written text, which could be considered by Depts of Defense and State.

3. Menon, who assures us he speaks for GOI, feels that wld compromise any chances success GOI effort to give us concrete written text his proposals now without submitting text simultaneously to Chi Coms which he claims has not been done and which he is unwilling to do this stage. It is clear, however, that GOI has been in contact with Chi Coms on this matter and has at least to date recd no strong negative reaction. Assurance with which Menon predicted Chi Com reaction to certain ideas offers further confirmation this. (Although Menon dodges question GOI contact with Chi Coms, UK reports Chi Coms recently advised Indians that undoubtedly the 13,000 Chi unrepatriates include a number of Chiang Kai-shek agents and that of course Chi Coms wld not want such persons returned to Commie China.) Menon assures us that if reasonable middle-of-road proposals developed, India would probably proceed submit them to GA even in face of negative or evasive attitude Chi Coms.

---

[1] Nov. 7.

[2] *Supra.*

4. Gross made clear to Menon US views re indispensable condition of any proposals (along lines Delga 133)[3] including unacceptability indefinite detention NKs. Menon seems to understand US concerns and sticking points and remains flexible as to form and words to be employed. Nevertheless he persists in views that following are basic to his proposal:

(*a*) Avoidance of language which would force Commies openly to admit existence of unrepatriates. This includes avoidance any reference to resettlement of unrepatriates or their removal even temporarily from Asia, along lines Mexican proposal which in Menon's view would confirm worst suspicions of Chi Coms.

(*b*) Provision for intermediate release of PWs from custody of detaining powers to custody of some third body, prior their return home or other disposition.

(*c*) Agreement that this "repatriation comm" must have "balance of forces", i.e., be composed of equal number of countries Chi Coms would regard as being on their side and countries acceptable to UC, with provisions for comm to appoint an umpire. (Menon is strongly wedded to Pol, Czech, Sweden and Switz as countries both sides have accepted as having something to do with armistice.) He proposes this umpire be chosen prior to coming into force of armistice and if deadlock arises on this issue, armistice wld not come into effect. In this event we would at least have narrowed the issue. Menon is quite firm that wld be impossible obtain Chi Com agreement to any "impartial" comm (Swedes, Swiss and Indians, for example) since Chi Coms do not regard any country as "impartial".

5. In course of discussion Gross sketched out as personal idea rough outline of res along lines being sent separately to Dept. Except for strong opposition to having GA itself establish comm and fix composition, Menon seemed receptive to this general approach to form of res. Mtg ended with Menon's expressed desire continue conversations soon.

6. Pearson and Lloyd continue to offer encouragement to Menon and to indicate much greater receptiveness to his basic points outlined para 4 than USDel. They convinced of real likelihood that by incorporation some such ideas through amendment to 21-power res, overwhelming support can be obtained in GA to modified res with principle of nonforcible repatriation clearly stated.

7. In brief mtg with Lloyd at 11:00 a.m. Nov 8, Gross expressed concern lest continuation of present situation of doubt and indecision would have dividing and demoralizing effect among dels generally and expressed view that within 48 hours or so we should, at least between UK and ourselves, come to understanding on specific points. He restated our objections to PW comm including satellites. Lloyd does not share these objections on basis that comm could be composed which included satellites, but which nevertheless could operate under an

---

[3] Dated Nov. 6, p. 579.

umpire. Lloyd agreed in general with approach reflected in draft res which Gross outlined to him, but refused to leave with him. Draft res being transmitted to Dept separately.[4]

Main points are : (1) statement of repatriation principle in unambiguous form, and (2) recommendation to negotiators to establish a PW comm (without GA attempting to fix composition such comm) and to state general purpose of such comm without GA attempting to fix specific terms of reference or method of operation. Lloyd intends to discuss whole problem with Eden during course of today and will communicate with us.

Gross emphatically objected to line of reasoning of Pearson (with which Lloyd had agreed preceding mtg) that if there were to be a deadlock, it would be better to have that deadlock "over narrow issue of appointing an umpire". Gross pointed out this would have demoralizing consequence of removing clear moral issue of non-forcible repatriation now involved and generally supported and would substitute for it an apparently minor procedural issue as to which it wld be difficult to maintain moral unity and general support.

ACHESON

---

[4] See Delga 151, *infra.*

320/11–852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET . NEW YORK, November 8, 1952—3:09 p. m.

Delga 151. Following is text of draft res referred to in Delga 150,[1] which represents views of Ambassador Gross and delegation staff as to how far we can and should be prepared to go to meet views of Menon and others if tactical situation requires. Such paragraphs could be incorporated into twenty-one-power resolution by amendment, or added as supplementary or separate resolution which we could support. We have not yet had opportunity to show it to Secretary but hope to do so later today.

"The General Assembly . . .

"1. Decides in accordance with international law and practice including the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War of 1949, that promptly upon the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, all prisoners of war on both sides should be released and given an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated; no force is to be used to prevent or to compel the repatriation of any prisoner.

"2. Calls upon the negotiators at Panmunjom as a matter of urgency to conclude an armistice agreement which would:

> "A. Provide for the prompt release and repatriation of prisoners of war within an agreed fixed period and on the basis set forth in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

---

[1] *Supra.*

"B. Establish an (impartial) commission on repatriation of prisoners of war which should:

> "(1) Receive at agreed exchange points in neutral territory all prisoners of war. All prisoners of war are to be released to the commission by both sides, in groups of appropriate size.
>
> "(2) Determine the disposition of all prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the armistice agreement and of this resolution, and assure such disposition.
>
> "(3) Following the completion of the process set forth in the preceding sub-paragraph, assist both sides in assuring for all prisoners of war humanitarian care and the opportunity to return to peaceful pursuits in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

"3. Notes, from the report of the Unified Command (A/2228, Annex A),[2] that the negotiators at Panmunjom have tentatively agreed to the following recommendation:

> " 'In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, that, within three months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.'

"4. Decides that upon the coming into effect of the armistice agreement, if the General Assembly is not then in regular session, the Secretary General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly at the headquarters of the United Nations to consider the implementation of such a recommendation." (*End verbatim text*).

ACHESON

---

[2] For text, see UN document A/2228.

795.00/11-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, November 8, 1952—4 p. m.

1960. Ref Embtel 1796, Oct 29.[1] Deputy British High Commissioner informed us today in strictest confidence of further conversation Oct 31

---

[1] This telegram, not printed, contained a report that the British High Commissioner in New Delhi was told by Nehru that the Indian Ambassador had been summoned by Chou En-lai to a midnight conference in which Chou engaged in recriminations against the United States for breaking off the Panmunjom talks and claimed that a settlement must include the return of all Chinese prisoners. In the opinion of the Indian Ambassador in Peking, Chou was "feeling way toward compromise based on (1) differentiation between Chi and North Korean prisoners . . . and (2) marshalling of Chi prisoners [at] some col-

Continued

between Indian Ambassador Raghavan and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai in Peiping. Indian Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru had given information to British High Commissioner recently . . . .

Deputy British High Commissioner first reviewed substance conversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign Minister on October 18 which appears to be that touched upon in Embtel 1796. At that time Chinese Foreign Minister had indulged in recriminations against UN and particularly US for approximately one hour after which he outlined current Chinese views on truce proposals at Panmunjom. He stated all three proposals are unacceptable because all of them are based on forcible detention. He said in extremely vague terms that his government concluded that so-called "Chiang Kai-shek" agents are not, in effect, genuine Chiang Kai-shek agents. Chinese POWs would want to return home if they were in real neutral camp.

Chinese Foreign Minister advanced three points:

1. Repatriation of all POWs after armistice;
2. Specific method and procedure open to discussion;
3. Principle of no forced repatriation permeates all three UN proposals and as such they are unacceptable because POWs are under forcible military control. In spite of Chinese belief on these three points, Chinese have accepted reasonable elements in three UN proposals regarding method and procedure. However, screening in demilitarization zone is completely unacceptable. US side broke off Panmunjom negotiations not merely to detain POWs but in order to bring pressure on UN.

During Oct 31 conversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign Minister latter further developed point re Chiang Kai-shek's secret agents. Chi FonMin said if all POWs are sent to neutral zone, there are two possibilities.

1. Secret agents may not come to Communist side;
2. Secret agents may come but only for purpose of causing intimidation. Chinese Foreign Minister fully accepted possibility secret agents might not want to go back to China and since they were under orders of Chiang Kai-shek they could go back to him.

Deputy British High Commissioner stated Indian Ambassador in two conversations with Chinese Foreign Minister GOI made it clear that GOI was pleased with three UN proposals at Panmunjom (one of them as Department knows contained substance of PM Nehru's ideas). Indian Ambassador had told Chinese Foreign Minister GOI supported proposals because they considered them good and worthy of consideration. Indian Ambassador and GOI were convinced Chinese were deeply shocked when talks were broken off at Panmunjom and Chinese were now most anxious to make certain GOI did not misunderstand Chinese

---

lecting point where [they would be] assured fair treatment before being returned to homes." Nehru thought the initiative worth exploring with the British Delegate at New York. (795.00/10–2952) position. Furthermore, Indian Ambassador and GOI were convinced Chinese were quite genuinely trying to find way of continuing talks. Indian Ambassador and GOI felt reference for first time by Chinese Foreign Minister to possibility some Chinese POWs might not go back was significant and highly important development.

Deputy British High Commissioner seemed to be in agreement with GOI interpretation but indicated it was possible Chinese Foreign Minister had spoken vaguely about Chinese POWs in attempt to build-up hope of further progress at Panmunjom and thus stall UN consideration and action in New York. However, he believes Chinese Foreign Minister's remarks clearly required further clarification.

Deputy British High Commissioner believed report of October 31 conversation between Indian Ambassador and Chinese Foreign Minister had been forwarded to Madame Pandit in NY for expression her views. British informed London and NY but had as yet received no comment.

I was in Nepal when conversations took place, but hoped Nehru would open up discussion at luncheon Friday with me and Admiral Radford. However, Parliament was in session, ladies were present, and talks confined to generalities.

One possible explanation is that Chinese Foreign Minister disturbed over GOI private support of our position and is making effort to confuse situation and convince GOI of Communist good intentions. This borne out by absence of clear counterproposal.

However, we can not overlook possibility that Communists are fumbling for face-saving formula. Suggest US representatives at UN, possibly Mrs. Roosevelt, ask Mrs. Pandit's advice what to do expressing belief some solution must soon be found to avoid danger of explosion. I suggest Mrs. Roosevelt because she knows Mrs. Pandit well and because she is so greatly respected here in India among other things for moderation her views.

This conversation will be reported to Nehru who will repeat it to Chinese Communists and with Eisenhower's Korea trip it may help bring out Communist proposal if they have any serious intent. Of course, no reference shall be made to our knowledge of two recent Peiping conversations. This is crucially important.

BOWLES

795.00/11-852

Memorandum of Conversation, by Isador Lubin of the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] November 8, 1952.

Subject: Korea

Participants: Madame Pandit, Chairlady of the Indian Delegation
Ambassador Ali Yawar Jung, Indian Delegation
The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson
Isador Lubin, U. S. Delegation

Madame Pandit stated that the purpose of her visit was to continue the conversation that she had with the Secretary the other evening,[1] relative to Korea.

The Secretary said that he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss with Ambassador Gross the results of the latter's meeting on Friday with Messrs. Menon, Pearson and Lloyd.[2] He then inquired as to whether she had any specific plan for the solution of the Armistice difficulties in Korea. He said that he had some idea as to what the Indian Delegation was proposing but that he had not seen "a piece of paper" which would permit him to study the proposal in detail.

In setting up any plan for resolving the Korean situation, the Secretary commented, it was necessary that any proposal should carefully distinguish between the Commission that had been agreed to by the negotiators, namely the Commission to be made up of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden and any other body that might be created. Moreover, in visualizing the creation of any new body to handle the subject of prisoners, provision would have to be made for a clear determination of its functions. In particular, precaution should be taken to avoid giving such a body any administrative powers which such a group, by its very nature, could not perform.

As a case in point, the Secretary mentioned the fact that any Commission of a handful of people could not take over the responsibility for the prisoners who were in the process of being exchanged. The mere mechanics of moving prisoners, feeding them and getting them to an agreed point, was beyond the capacity of a Commission. Moreover, no Commission could take the responsibility for the discipline of prisoners because in the event of a riot the UN troops would not take orders from anybody but an accredited officer. He pointed these things out, he said, in order to make it clear that each of us must know just what we are doing if and when we create a body similar to that suggested by Mr. Krishna Menon.

Madame Pandit stated that Mr. Menon's ideas had been discussed by the various members of the Commonwealth and that some of those which had been incorporated in the Canadian proposal had originated in the Indian Delegation. She stated that Australia and New Zealand were not overenthusiastic about Mr. Menon's suggestions. She added that they were naturally very wary.

---

[1] Presumably, Madame Pandit was referring to her conversation with Acheson on Oct. 29, 1952; see the memorandum by Acheson, p. 568.

[2] For a summary of this meeting, see Delga 150, Nov. 8, p. 586.

She also said that she had no specific plan for the solution of the Korean armistice difficulties, that she brought no particular suggestions with her from her Government in India and that she had merely been instructed to see whether there was some way of breaking the impasse and seeing an end to the bloodshed.

The Secretary then went into a detailed analysis of some of the problems that will arise with the signing of an armistice. He said that once the air forces had ceased their activities it would be extremely difficult to know just what was going on behind the North Korean lines. He emphasized the importance of having an armistice agreement which would be exceptionally clear and insofar as humanly possible beyond misinterpretation. Otherwise one side might be in a position to accuse the other of having violated the armistice and thus use such an alleged violation as an excuse for resuming the fighting.

Madame Pandit then stated that she would have such ideas as her delegation had discussed put on paper for a later discussion. The Secretary commented that this would be very advantageous, since it would thus permit a discussion of the meaning and nuances of the ideas contained in the proposal.

He further suggested that it might be best to wait until Mr. Vyshinsky spoke on Monday before trying to formulate anything in writing. It was possible, he said, that certain leads might be secured from Mr. Vyshinsky's speech which might serve as a guide as to what should be included in any proposed plan or scheme.

Editorial Note

The editors responsible for finishing Lester Pearson's second volume of memoirs after his death recount a discussion at a meeting between Acheson and Pearson on Sunday morning, November 9, by publishing extracts of a diary which Pearson kept while President of the United Nations General Assembly. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files; for an account of that meeting, see Pearson, *Memoirs*, volume 2, page 322. Pearson wrote in his diary that Acheson was "not unsympathetic" to Menon's proposal and, if Washington agreed, he was willing to accept the Indian ideas in principle, although he stated that changes in the draft resolution would be required. Pearson urged Acheson to convince policymakers in Washington that Menon's proposal, or something close to it, would emerge from the First Committee and would probably pass in the Assembly, and emphasized the advantages of the Indians putting forward a proposal which the rest of those nations participating in the United Nations effort in Korea could accept. Even if the Communists rejected it, Pearson continued, its passage would be "a step forward" and would prevent the

Indians from later charging that the United States had sabotaged their efforts to solve the prisoner-of-war impasse.

320/11-952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 9, 1952—6:45 p. m.

Delga 156. Re Korea. For limited distribution in Department. Meeting Secretary with Eden (present Lloyd, Jebb, Jessup, Gross), discussed Korean developments in GA. Lloyd outlined UK understanding that principle of non-forcible repatriation must be kept clear and that nothing should be left for post armistice negotiation with Communists regarding repatriation. Repeated opinion that although Comms had it in power to sabotage any armistice agreement if they so desire, nevertheless agreement must be clear and self-contained so that responsibility for breach would be clear. Secretary of State stressed this point and Eden agreed. Nor did we want to risk armistice negotiations breaking down on some narrow "non-moral" procedural issue, such as how a POW repatriation commission would be composed or how it would operate.

We emphasized objections to a POW commission with Communist satellite membership. Lloyd thought the problem would be met by designating an umpire (such designation to be made prior to effective date of armistice). He believed (having talked again with Krishna Menon this morning) that Chi Comms had revealed to Indians their insistence on some Communist representation on POW commission.

Eden said he would probably include in his GA speech Tuesday reference to the two points made by Lloyd, summarized above. He stressed importance attached by both British parties to doing everything possible now to end Korean war, but on basis adherence to non-forcible repatriation principle.

Indian initiative could be useful to that end. Just prior to Eden's departure, Indian HC brought message from Nehru expressing latter's desire "to be helpful".

Secretary of State said we were urgently considering whole question, and conferring with Defense Dept whose views were essential before decisions are made on matters affecting composition and operations of repatriation commission, relationship to UNC, etc.

Following lunch, Gross phoned Johnson, FE, giving general report of above and requesting Defense–State reactions soonest.

Schuman, Eden and Secretary held brief talk on Korea, in which Secretary outlined tactical situation here and principal points at issue. Agreement reached that decisions would be suspended until after Vishinsky speaks Comite 1 Monday[1] a.m., and situation then reviewed in light of Vishinsky's speech.

During afternoon, Gross also talked at some length with Hoppenot[2] (Fr) reviewing tactical problems. Hoppenot's views not inconsistent with ours as generally outlined.

At 5:30 p.m., Johnson, FE, advised Gross by phone new draft resolution[3] had been discussed with Defense Dept with general indication of willingness to support on basis of following preferences:

Re repatriation commission:
(1) designation of impartial commission,
(2) GA designation of commission composed of equal numbers satellites, non-satellites and umpire,
(3) leaving to negotiators to designate commission of unspecified nature.

It is understood satisfactory commission would have to be composed prior to armistice in any event.

Acheson

---

[1] Nov. 10.
[2] Henri L. Hoppenot, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations.
[3] Reference was to the draft resolution contained in Delga 151, Nov. 8, p. 588.

320/11-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 10, 1952—11:04 a. m.

Delga 157. (For limited distribution in Dept.) Re Korea. Following is record of Amb. Gross conversation with Menon (India).

Menon told me "in confidence and not to be quoted—I have reason to believe Chi Commies want an armistice."

Menon appeared anxious for indications as soon as possible of our conclusions on basis discussions reported to Dept (Delgas 149 and 150, Nov 8).[1] I repeated assurances to him that we desired armistice on just terms but would not be interested in any formula which left in doubt issue of nonforcible repatriation or which left for negot after an armistice any aspect of POW question. I told him that in our view the composition of a Repatriation Comm and its functions were inseparably related and that with regard to composition, our "overwhelmingly strong preference" was for GA designation of an impartial comm, composed of one or more states not Communist-controlled. Menon repeated arguments previously made that Chi Commies would not admit that any other states were "impartial", including India. He thought they would regard Switz as "too western", and Indo or Burma as "insignificant".

I said that as very poor second alternative we might consider possibility of GA designating a bilateral comm of the Pole-Czech-Swede-

---

[1] *Ante*, pp. 585 and 586, respectively.

Swiss variety, plus an umpire fixed simultaneously by the GA, for example Norway, Brazil or India. Menon foresaw difficulties arising similar to those which would attend efforts to establish an impartial comm. I mentioned, as a third possibility, that the GA res might call upon the negotiators to set up a mixed POW comm which should agree upon an umpire within a fixed period at the end of which the GA would designate an umpire if agreement had not been reached. This seemed to appeal to Menon more than any other suggestion.

I pressed upon him the view that if the Commies persisted in objections to proposals such as these, it would simply prove their unwillingness to have an armistice. Menon referred in a general way to Chi Commies suspicions of US, and brought up the question of our crossing the 38th Parallel, which he insisted "brought the Chinese unwillingly into the war". I reminded him we had always disagreed with this assumption. Re the present situation I said we would not tolerate any formula in a GA res which could enable the Commies later to pretend they had accepted the principle of nonforcible repatriation but that we had thereafter refused to agree to a particular procedural arrangement. This seemed to strike Menon as a new idea, and he readily expressed agreement with it.

I then attempted to explain to him the necessity for considering carefully the relationship between the Repatriation Comm and the UNC. I told him we were confused by what he had in mind about the responsibilities which each would have under his scheme for the large numbers of PW's who were involved in this matter. After he made vague references to the mixed armistice comite and the POW comite set up under the armistice agreement, I pointed out that the real question was what the relationship would be between General Clark and the new POW Comm. I said we could not envisage the possibility that Gen. Clark would take orders from a comm partly composed of Commie satellites. This also seemed to strike Menon as a new problem and he said he "would like to think about that over night."

He again professed to be anxious to be as helpful as possible and asked me to see him "not later than Tues".[2] He hopes to see the Secretary and asked me to arrange a meeting as soon as possible.

ACHESON

---

[2] Nov. 11.

320/11-852: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 10, 1952—6:48 p. m.

Gadel 48. Re Korea, Delga 151, Delga 149.[2]

1. Confirming Gross-Hickerson-Johnson-Wainhouse-Henkin telecon, fol are Dept's comments on draft res Delga 151:

a. Re para 2, insert words "for Korea" after words "armistice agreement".

b. Re para 2B, Dept's strong preference is for establishment impartial comm to which GA wld name membs. US cld accept any state outside Sov bloc. However, if necessary to obtain Ind agreement, US wld accept provision for impartial comm leaving actual membership to negots at Panmunjom. If Inds maintain that Chi Commies will accept only membs Neutral Nations Supervisory Body (Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czecho), plus "umpire", US wld insist either that GA appoint in advance "umpire" envisaged by Inds, or that, if 4 membs unable agree upon umpire at first mtg, GA wld name "umpire" or possibly wld delegate responsibility to appropriate internatl official such as Pres ICJ. Preference in latter connection, however, wld be for GA designate umpire in advance, his appointment to become effective if 4 states unable agree on "umpire" at first mtg. In discussing above with Inds, GADel shld stress willingness accept impartial comm of any 3 states outside Commie bloc, membs of UN or otherwise; if Inds indicate Commies wld not accept such comm, US wld agree to 4 "neutral" states with GA naming umpire, as indicated above.

c. Re para 2B(1). Substitute word "demilitarized" for "neutral".

d. Re para 2B(3). Insert word "humanitarian" before word "principles".

2. Fol are Dept's tentative reactions to list of points developed by Menon (Delga 149):

a. Paras 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 acceptable.

b. Paras 2 and 8 raise problem composition repatriation comm on which Dept views already indicated in para 1*b* above.

c. Dept considers para 7 unhappily worded and too detailed. Strongly prefer formulation para 1 Delga 151.

d. US cld not accept para 11. However, we can accept formulation on polit conf set forth Delga 151 or provision according which GA "approves" to holding of polit conf provided for in para 60 draft armis agreement as indicated Gadel 41.[3]

BRUCE

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Brown of UNP and cleared by Wainhouse and Johnson, and with Hickerson.

[2] Both dated Nov. 8, pp. 588 and 585, respectively.

[3] In Gadel 41, dated Nov. 7, 1952, the Department of State gave its preliminary comments on the list of elements basic to the U.S. position on Korea in the General Assembly as set out in Delga 133, dated Nov. 6, p. 579, including acceptance of a political conference approved by the General Assembly, if the Secretary of State concurred (320/11-652).

320/11-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 11, 1952—9:31 p. m.

Delga 169. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Gross and members USDel today saw GA Pres Pearson, Paul Martin, J. Leger and S. F. Rae of Canadian del in effort to move ahead with negotiations on Korean res in light of impact of Vishinsky's speech.[1]

Pearson noted that although some of those who had worked out drafts—e.g., Palar,[2] Padilla Nervo and Belaunde [3]—seem to have been at least temporarily discouraged by the uncompromising character of Vishinsky's speech, Menon had been stirred to greater efforts and had prepared a new draft of his res. Pearson thought that the reaction to Vishinsky's speech was that it gave us a good opportunity to get from the GA a clear affirmation of the principle of non-forcible repatriation. With this in mind, he believed it was most important to encourage Menon, who was in contact with the ChiComs, to work out a res satisfactory to the latter even if not to Vishinsky, whose speech closed the door to agreement as far as the USSR is concerned but not necessarily from the ChiCom's viewpoint. It seemed to Pearson that an attempt to reach agreement with Menon was clearly worth a try on this basis. If Menon could not produce a res acceptable to the ChiComs, an alternative benefit would be forthcoming in that it might be possible to line up the entire non-Commie membership of the UN against the Commies on the outstanding issue in the armistice negotiations. In approaching Menon, Pearson intimated that he thought it would be far more desirable to "edit" Menon's draft than to discard it. Menon, he said, was no lawyer and had included a good deal of excess verbiage in his product.

Gross agreed that there were advantages in permitting Menon to carry the ball, but stressed fact that there are limits beyond which we cannot go in effort to reach agreement. Gross noted that we had consistently stated there must be no compromise principle of non-forcible repatriation and no provision so ambiguous and vague as to invite prolonged disputes re interpretation. As regards a possible repatriation comm, Gross followed line stated Gadel 48 [4] stressing our preference for impartial comm consisting of any states outside Soviet bloc but indicating we could if necessary accept members neutral nations supervisory body if an umpire were appointed as indicated Gadel 48. He made it clear we did not wish to create situation in which conclusion of armistice would be blocked by dispute over umpire of four-power comm rather than, as is at present the case, over clear moral issue of whether force should be used to repatriate prisoners. Pearson stated either type of comm would be acceptable if Menon would agree.

---

[1] On Nov. 10, 1952, Vyshinsky made a long statement before Committee I in which he rejected as "unacceptable" both the Mexican and Peruvian proposals. For the substance of the speech, see UN document A.C.1/SR.521. For Acheson's comments on the effect of the speech, see *Present at the Creation*, p. 701.

[2] L.N. Palar, Indonesian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

[3] Victor A. Belaúnde, Chairman of the Peruvian Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[4] *Supra.*

Pearson agreed with Gross that time has now come to push ahead with view of forming up res along acceptable lines, in order to prevent growth of restlessness among dels not now aware of these negotiations. It seems likely Comite 1 may resume meetings on Thurs, and Gross informed Pearson we wld aim for final vote on Korea in Comite 1 next week.

Later Gross saw Menon and Selwyn Lloyd at latter's apartment for further discussion latest Menon draft, which Menon on most confidential basis read out to Gross. Gross took firm line with Menon, stressing need for clarity in formulation of principle of non-forcible repatriation and absolute necessity that principle of impartiality be honored in composition of repatriation comm, either through use of impartial states or through appointment of umpire. After inconclusive discussion of matters of detail in Menon's draft, which is long, vague, and poorly drafted, Menon stated he had received instructions to table res, but wld not do so if this were not helpful. For the moment, therefore, he will take no action, and we will carry forward our conversation tomorrow.

ACHESON

IO files [1]

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly [2]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 11, 1952.
SD/A/C.1/396/Rev. 2

KOREAN QUESTION

THE PROBLEM

To determine the United States position regarding the first stage of consideration of the Korean question at the Seventh Session of the

---

[1] This paper is a copy of one retained in the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs (hereafter IO files).

[2] The source text was the second revision of a paper, SD/A/C.1/396, prepared in the Department of State on Oct. 6, 1952, not printed. (795.00/10–652) On Oct. 9, 1952, it was "modified in tone to meet the comments of the Pentagon on the original paper", according to a covering memorandum by Wainhouse to Gross which was attached to the copy of the first revision, SD/A/C.1/396/Rev. 1, located in IO files. Essentially the Pentagon's changes, as discerned by a comparison of the texts of Oct. 6 and 9, gave specific endorsement and support to the conduct of the negotiations carried out by the UNC at Panmunjom, particularly in the prisoner-of-war issue. The differences between the first and second revisions were generally minor and stylistic.

General Assembly for the purpose of gaining the support of the maximum possible number of members in the General Assembly for the efforts of the United Nations Command to repel aggression and conclude an honorable armistice in Korea. (This paper assumes that the status of armistice negotiations following the meeting in Panmunjom of October 8 has not changed, and that the Communist forces have not launched a major all-out offensive in Korea.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The objective of the United States Delegation should be (*a*) to have the General Assembly maintain and demonstrate the determination and support of the United Nations members for the UN action in Korea and (*b*) to obtain the maximum possible support from the General Assembly for the steps which the United States believes best calculated to bring the Communists to agree to an acceptable armistice in Korea. Consultations indicate that these ends can best be achieved by having the United States Delegation, in the first instance, seek the largest possible measure of support for a clear and unequivocal endorsement by the General Assembly of the conduct of negotiations by the UNC and particularly for its position on the prisoner-of-war question. The General Assembly should also call on the Communists to agree to an armistice on a basis consistent with the UNC position. If this first effort fails to bring about an armistice, the General Assembly should again consider the Korean question later in the Seventh Session.

Annex A contains a draft resolution which consultations indicate is likely to obtain the maximum possible support. This initial step will help maintain United States leadership on the Korean item and assure greater support for the kind of resolution which the United States will seek to have adopted at a subsequent stage in the General Assembly if the initial General Assembly resolution does not produce an armistice. The United States Delegation should seek to have a resolution along the lines of Annex A sponsored by all the nations participating in the Korean action and perhaps also members like India and Sweden, if they will join.

2. The United States Delegation should, at the close of the first stage of General Assembly consideration, seek to have the Korean item kept open for further consideration later in the General Assembly. The position which the United States should adopt for the second stage of General Assembly consideration will be the subject of a separate paper.[3]

3. The United States Delegation should favor early consideration of the Korean item, keeping in mind the firm intention of the United States to press for a second stage in this session of the General Assembly to consider every practical means by which the United Nations can

---

[3] For the text of this position paper, see p. 779.

bring about an end to the hostilities in Korea if the Chinese Communists and North Korean aggressors fail to respond to the above preliminary resolution calling for an armistice based on proposals of the United Nations negotiators. However, if there is widespread and strong support for postponing consideration of the Korean item until after the United States elections, the United States Delegation should not oppose such a move. On the other hand, if the Soviet Delegation presses for immediate consideration of the Korean question, the United States Delegation should adhere to its position in favor of early consideration of this item.

4. In the discussion of the Korean item, the United States Delegation should use every opportunity to:

(*a*) stress the patient and persistent efforts which the United Nations Command has made during the past fifteen months to bring about an end to hostilities and an honorable armistice in Korea;

(*b*) point out the sacrifices in lives and resources which the Korean people and members of the United Nations have made in opposing aggression in Korea for 28 months, including the fifteen months during which the UNC has been patiently attempting to negotiate an honorable armistice agreement with the Chinese Communist and North Korean aggressors;

(*c*) emphasize in particular the position which the United Nations Command has taken on the prisoner-of-war question, giving a full report on the UNC handling of prisoners of war, the reason for our prisoner-of-war position in the armistice negotiations, and the many steps which the United Nations Command has taken in an effort to achieve agreement on this question;

(*d*) point out as appropriate that the Assembly is not the best forum for negotiation of detailed solutions of the prisoner-of-war question and that if the Communists at any time show any interest in exploring any constructive proposal the United Nations Command is prepared to negotiate at Panmunjom and to make all possible progress toward an armistice. While the United States Delegation should not encourage detailed discussion of specific proposals for solving the prisoner-of-war question, it should not on the other hand discourage such detailed discussion if United States acquiescence in such discussion would increase support for the United States resolution.

5. The United States should not encourage or discourage other delegations to seek Assembly approval of particular proposals or suggestions for solution of the prisoner-of-war question which are consistent with the basic United Nations Command position against forcible repatriation. However, this position should be taken only in cases where it might increase support for the United States resolution. That is to say, in instances where such proposals are consistent with the basic United Nations Command position against forcible repatriation the United States Delegation should not discourage them if United States acquiescence will increase support for the United States resolution. The United

States should, however, seek to have such proposals worded as recommendations for consideration by the negotiators at Panmunjom.

6. The United States should discourage efforts to establish a Good Offices Committee to seek to persuade the Communists to agree to an acceptable armistice. If there is nevertheless strong pressure for such a move, the United States should not oppose it but should take the position that such a Committee should seek to get the Communists to settle the prisoner-of-war question in Panmunjom and should report back in time for consideration of its report by the General Assembly at this session.

7. The United States should strongly oppose any resolution which would:

(*a*) compromise the United States position against forcible repatriation of prisoners of war; or

(*b*) suggest an armistice on the basis of the provisions already agreed to, leaving the entire prisoner-of-war question unsettled. The United States could not agree to any armistice which leaves our own prisoners of war in Communist hands. The United States should oppose any proposal that the Assembly recommend an armistice on the basis of the agreed provisions and the immediate exchange of those prisoners of war willing to be repatriated, leaving only the disposition of non-repatriates for subsequent settlement. If such a proposal is nevertheless made, the United States Delegation should seek further instructions from the Department.

8. The United States should strongly oppose any move to link the question of a Korean armistice directly with other political questions, it should oppose any suggestion for a Far Eastern conference in which the Korean armistice might be one item, and should take the position that the place to conclude the negotiation of a Korean armistice is at Panmunjom. After the conclusion of such an armistice, the United States is fully prepared to support a political conference for the solution of the Korean problem as recommended in the draft armistice agreement. The United States will not oppose consideration of other Far Eastern questions in appropriate forums after a political settlement of the Korean problem.

9. The United States should oppose the hearing of representatives of the North Korean regime and the Chinese Communists in connection with consideration of the Korean question. If the Republic of Korea submits a request to be heard, or if a substantial number of delegations favor an invitation to it, the United States should support an invitation to the Republic of Korea to participate without a vote in the proceedings of the First Committee.

10. The position which the United States Delegation should take if before or during the Assembly an armistice should be achieved is covered in a separate paper.[4]

COMMENT

1. *Early Consideration of the Korean Item.*

At the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the United States opposed discussion of the Korean question because we felt that such discussion would hamper the negotiations at Panmunjom and would not contribute to an armistice. At the Seventh Session, however, the situation is completely changed. The United States has exhausted every effort to achieve an armistice in Korea. Agreement has been reached on all issues except that of repatriation of prisoners of war and the United States has made every effort to find a solution for that problem. Communist intransigence in insisting on forcible repatriation of prisoners of war and their persistent abuse of the armistice negotiations in recent months as a forum for propaganda attacks, will probably have led the UNC, before the General Assembly meets, to recess the negotiations until the Communists have something constructive to offer. Assembly consideration of the Korean question, therefore, not only cannot hurt the chances of an armistice but might improve them. The United States recognizes also the great interest of other members in discussing the Korean case and is prepared to submit to the judgment of the Assembly an accounting of its conduct of the armistice negotiations and to ask the Assembly to undertake steps calculated to help bring about an armistice.

In view of the importance of the Korean question, the United States believes that it should be considered early in the session. The United States also wishes to assure that there will be time for the Assembly to take another look at the Korean case later in the session, in the event that the initial efforts which the United States will recommend do not produce an armistice. Some delegations, however, are afraid that the Korean case might become embroiled in United States pre-election politics and are anxious to have the case postponed until after the United States elections. While the United States sees no need for such postponement, we would not oppose it if other friendly delegations pressed for it. On the other hand, if the Russians insist on urgent consideration, we would have to take the position that it should be considered immediately lest it appear that the Russians are more anxious to discuss Korea than we are.

---

[4] Not printed (795.00/8-2552).

2. *General Approach to Substantive Discussion.*

As indicated, the United States believes that the Assembly should take steps calculated to contribute to the achievement of an honorable armistice in Korea. In the present state of the armistice negotiations, the United States believes that this end can best be served by firm and overwhelming support by United Nations members for the basic position which the UNC has taken at Panmunjom and for a resolution calling upon the Communists to agree to an armistice on the basis of this position. The United States also believes that if the Communists flatly reject this initial request by the Assembly, the Assembly must take up the Korean question again before the end of the Seventh Session. The position which the United States Delegation should take in regard to this second stage of consideration by the Assembly will be the subject of a separate position paper.[5]

In the discussion of the Korean item, the United States should stress the efforts which it has made to bring about an armistice in Korea and in particular to solve the prisoner-of-war question on an honorable basis. The position of the UNC on prisoners of war has been fully supported by the other governments participating in the Korean action as well as generally by non-Cominform governments and public opinion throughout the world. It is believed that other governments will be persuaded that the United States has made every effort to find an acceptable solution of this question and that in general its conduct of the negotiations on this point has been commendable.

In bringing the Korean case to the General Assembly it is the purpose of the United States to have the Assembly put pressure on the Communists to adopt a constructive attitude at Panmunjom. It is not the purpose of the United States to transfer the scene of the negotiations on the prisoner-of-war question from Panmunjom to the General Assembly. The United States believes that the General Assembly is not an appropriate forum for such negotiations and that progress on this question, if any, could best be made between the negotiators who have dealt with this question before at Panmunjom. The United States recognizes that in addition to the numerous proposals for solving the prisoner-of-war question which the UNC offered, there are other variants which could be suggested. There is no reason, however, to assume that these would basically be more acceptable to the Communists. If the Communists, at any time during the General Assembly indicate interest in exploring any particular suggestion consistent with the basic principle of non-forcible repatriation, the UNC is prepared to negotiate further at Panmunjom and to take all possible progress toward an armistice.

---

[5] See footnote 3, above.

The United States Delegation should, therefore, discourage resolutions approving particular solutions for the prisoner-of-war question. It should not, however, oppose such resolutions if they are consistent with the basic UNC position against non-forcible repatriation. Instead, it should seek to have such resolutions worded as recommendations for consideration by the negotiators at Panmunjom rather than as solutions by the Assembly. The United States should strongly oppose any resolution which is inconsistent with our basic position on prisoners of war or which would call for an armistice in circumstances which leave United Nations prisoners of war in Communist hands. A suggestion along the latter lines, i.e., that there should be an armistice now, leaving the entire question for further discussion, has been made in the domestic Communist press in the United States and played up by *Pravda*; [6] this might be a Soviet approach in the Assembly. Another possible Soviet approach which the United States Delegation should oppose is a resolution calling for a conference which would deal with the Korean armistice as well as other questions.

A possible approach which has been favored by friendly delegations would call for an armistice now on the basis of the agreed provisions and the immediate exchange of those prisoners of war who wish to be repatriated, leaving for future negotiation the disposition of the non-repatriates. In private discussions, the United States should not favor such a proposal. Such a proposal might give the impression of willingness ultimately to concede on the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war; also the Communists might later use continued UNC insistence on the principle of non-forcible repatriation as a pretext for calling off the armistice. If, nevertheless, such a proposal is introduced in the Assembly, the United States Delegation should seek further instructions.

The proposal recently made by the Government of Mexico [7] may also figure in the discussion. Under this proposal, the armistice would be entered into on the basis of exchanging those prisoners of war who wish to be repatriated, while those who do not wish to be repatriated would be sent to the territories of other United Nations members where they would stay until the return of normalcy to that part of Asia. The United States has not opposed this proposal, and has informed the Secretary General as well as the Mexican Government it welcomes the proposal and considers it useful.[8] We have also indicated, however, that this proposal presupposes a willingness on the part of the Communists to accept the idea that there should be no forcible repatriation. If the Communists were prepared to proceed on that premise, the question of the disposition of the non-repatriates would not be a major obstacle. The Mexican proposal might well provide a basis for disposing in particular of the Chinese non-repatriates. So long as the Communists insist on forcible repatriation, however, the UNC saw no point in raising the Mexican proposal in Panmunjom and sees little prospect that proposing it in the Assembly would be fruitful. If, nevertheless, the proposal is raised, the United States should not oppose it.

---

[6] See telegram 206 to Moscow, Aug. 27, p. 463.

[7] The Mexican proposal is contained in telegram 202 from New York, Sept. 3, p. 485.

[8] See telegram 119 to New York, Sept. 17, 1952, not printed (695A.0024/9-352), and the letter from Austin to the UN Secretary-General, Oct. 6, 1952, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 3, 1952, pp. 696–697.

3. *Hearing for Communist Representatives.*

The Soviet Union may press for invitations to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans to participate in the Assembly's discussion of the Korean question. The United States has always opposed invitations to the North Koreans, whose status has never been recognized by either the United States or the United Nations; past efforts of the Soviet Union to have the North Koreans invited have been defeated. Representatives of the Chinese Communists were invited in 1950 in connection with accusation of aggression against the United States, not in connection with the Korean item. The United States should take the position that quite apart from the status of these regimes and the fact that they continue to engage in aggression in Korea, their participation is not called for by the kind of discussion and proposed action contemplated.

Annex A

The General Assembly

Noting with approval the efforts of the UN negotiators to achieve a just and honorable armistice to bring an end to the fighting in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles;

Noting further that disagreement on one remaining issue alone has to date prevented the achievement of such an armistice;

Endorses the positions which the United Nations negotiators have taken on the issues on which agreement has been reached, as well as on the question still in issue;

Calls upon the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by responding favorably to the outstanding proposals of the UN negotiators;

Requests the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities and to report to the General Assembly, as soon as he deems appropriate, upon any reply received or the absence of any reply.

795.00/11-1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Armistead M. Lee, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 11, 1952.[1]

Subject: Korean Resolution in GA

Participants: Mr. R. G. Casey—Australian Minister of External Affairs
Sir Percy Spender—Australian Ambassador
Mr. T. Clifton Webb—N.Z. Minister of External Affairs
Mr. L. K. Munro—N.Z. Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR—U.S. Delegation
Mr. A. M. Lee, BNA—U.S. Delegation

During the course of a conversation on other subjects, Sir Percy asked what the Secretary's views were on the present status of the 21-power resolution on Korea. The Secretary replied that he considered that Vishinsky's speech in Committee 1, although it was completely negative and "slammed the door", was actually helpful to us, as sponsors of the resolution, because it had dispelled some of the illusions of many delegates who were toying with substitute resolutions. The Secretary said that he thought that we could accept minor modifications to meet the concern of those delegates who professed to see in our resolution an implied permission to extend bombing operations beyond Korea, there could be no "fudging" of the essential point of no forcible repatriation of prisoners. Any show of weakness on this point would be quickly exploited by the Soviets. (The Australians and New Zealanders expressed agreement.) The Secretary said that the British would be talking to the Indians on this point, and that he would be conferring to the same end with the Latin American delegations.

---

[1] This memorandum was typed Nov. 12.

320/11-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 12, 1952—5:37 p. m.

Delga 176. Limited distribution. From Gross. Re Korea.

1. After dinner Nov 11 Secretary and Gross visited Eden and Lloyd for discussion tactical situation re Korea. On reading Menon's draft res, on which Lloyd had made some unsubstantial changes, Eden said he could not understand it and wld hate to have to explain it in House of Commons. Eden appeared convinced that approach reflected in Menon draft was too confusing and unmanageable. Secretary handed Eden

copy of our draft text (Delga 151 as modified by succeeding tels [1]) making it clear that if this text were introduced, we wld not do it and authorship should not be attributed to US. Eden's reaction was that it was exactly right. Eden and the Secretary agreed that Acheson wld give a copy of our language to Menon at 9 a.m. Nov. 12 and wld explain that it represented our reactions to the ideas which had been under discussion with Menon. In conversation with Lloyd and Gross, Eden agreed to follow same line at his mtg with Menon later in the morning of Nov 12.

2. At mtg with Secretary, Gross present, Menon reviewed in detail assumptions on which he was working, without adding anything new. He told Secretary specifically Indians had been in touch with Chinese Communists who had been difficult to pin down and generally evasive. Nevertheless, Indian Govt had instructed Menon within last two or three days to table a res and Menon believed he must move quickly. Menon feared that situation in Committee 1 would stimulate others to come forward with new proposals and that this wld impair the effect of the Indian initiative. He was outspokenly critical of Palar's approach, which he described as useless and unconstructive. Menon noted that he had not discussed the draft with the Asian-Africans and had limited his consultations to the Commonwealth and most closely to the UK, US and Pearson. Menon now intended to talk with Polish and Swedish dels since under his plan they wld be members of repatriation commission.

3. Menon repeated his thesis that although we might believe Chinese Communists did not want armistice, Indians believed they did. At this point Secretary stated we must assume both sides want an armistice; question is what price either side wld be willing to pay for one. Menon agreed this was a correct formulation of the problem. Menon stated it was essential for the umbrella of the Geneva convention to be placed over the situation, since both sides were talking in terms of Geneva convention. It seemed clear to him that Chinese Communists wld not accept any procedure based on screening, because they have insisted everyone wanted to go back and screening was, therefore, not necessary.

4. Menon expressed the view that repatriation commission shld include Soviet satellites because nothing else wld be acceptable to Communists. However, he said that as result of conversations with Gross he was not thinking in terms of a five member commission, adding an umpire to the previous two-for-two. He regarded this as a considerable advance.

5. Secretary then explained that our principal concern was, first, that any res include a clear and understandable affirmation of the principle

---

[1] For telegram Delga 151, dated Nov. 8, see p. 588; the principal modification of this telegram was transmitted in telegram Gadel 48, dated Nov. 10, p. 597.

of non-forcible repatriation, and second, that a POW commission which wld have executive functions be so composed that it cld accomplish its task. Most suitable composition seemed to Secretary to be one consisting of an impartial group, i.e., states not under Communist control. Secretary pointed out that we had made a concession to Menon's point of view in talking in terms of a repatriation commission with executive functions as distinguished from the supervisory functions envisaged for "committee for repatriation of prisoners of war" in article 3 of draft armistice agreement. Nevertheless, Menon reiterated that Chinese Communists wld never accept commission composed entirely of non-Communist states.

6. Secretary then handed Menon copy of our language. He said we had put our ideas on paper in order to avoid risk of misunderstanding, but that Menon wld appreciate that these are not US Govt proposals. Secretary described paper as containing thoughts which might be of help to Menon if he wished to use them. Menon said he would think them over. Off-hand he doubted Chinese Communists wld accept approach reflected therein, because it seemed to him to include another version of screening procedure and because (though it was not clearly stated) we had missed whole point of his proposal re repatriation commission. Secretary again emphasized to Menon fundamental point that commission we were now suggesting went beyond anything contemplated in draft armistice agreement up to this time.

7. Menon then commented that he thought Chinese Communists wld not accept any res which did not include details as to operations of commission. He thought Chinese Communists wld not wish to leave such details in their entirety to negots at Panmunjom. Secretary pointed out that no one in New York cld possibly know what problems wld be involved in the care, handling, disposition, and disciplining of large numbers of men. These problems cld only be worked out on the spot. Without denying this, Menon thought that elements of detail included in his draft wld not hamper Panmunjom negots.

8. Re Menon's proposal for establishment of group of three GA presidents, Secretary seriously doubted this wld be desirable or practical and suggested that text handed to Menon dealt with matter in more suitable way. Secy informed Menon we had had no doubt that armistice conference shld include Communist China, North Korean authorities and USSR if they desired to be included as well as states designated by GA from among those which had participated in the fighting and those which had not.

9. At end of conversation Secretary stated he was sure Menon knew we were very sympathetic to his efforts. Our common objective was to do everything reasonably possible to bring about an armistice. What we had handed to Menon as suggestions for use if he saw fit represented our best thinking re major points involved. However, Menon wld un-

derstand we cld not keep situation in suspense indefinitely. Our suggestions represented limit to which we cld go in meeting points in Menon's mind as we understand them. Menon appeared to grasp Secretary's meaning. He said he wld like to think over points Secretary had made and wld communicate with us later. Secretary said both he and Gross wld be glad to see Menon at any time.

10. Our view is that if Menon does not accept our suggestions by end of day, we shld call a halt to current discussions with him and proceed actively to work toward winding up consideration of Korean problem in Comite I. Tactics for doing so are under consideration here and will be transcribed for info Dept.

ACHESON

320/11-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, November 12, 1952—10:26 p. m.

Delga 183. Re Korea. USGADel advised by Commonwealth sources of following account of most recent conversation between Indian Ambassador in Peiping and Chou En-lai: Chou En-lai is reported to have said that release of PWs from American control is the important step. Chou convinced that if all PWs were released under some neutral control they would all "gradually" be repatriated. It assumed this info conveyed to Indian delegation at UN and may account in part for Menon's present instructions and his persistent determination to table some resolution Friday.

ACHESON

320/11-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 12, 1952—11:45 p. m.

Delga 180. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Selwyn Lloyd (UK) called on Secy this afternoon and handed Secy in confidence draft text reproduced below. Lloyd stated he had used our draft suggestions (Delga 151 with modifications [1]) to clarify points in Menon's text. Lloyd felt his text now reflected what we had in mind.

After reading Lloyd text, Secy stated it was indeed now almost frighteningly clear where efforts like Menon's wld lead us. Even on cursory review of text it was clear to Secy that, though we had started on basis we would not use force to repatriate prisoners, we had now reached point where if this res were passed we would be starting PWs on road to forced repatriation. We would be compelled to turn over prisoners by force to Repatriation Commission which seems to have only one alternative, i.e., to send prisoners of war home. Comm is given no guidance whatever re fate of prisoners who resist repatriation and would presumably have to hold them indefinitely, subject them to Communist haranguing until they give up and decided to go home. Under this resolution, it is even possible that Comm might request Chinese Communist troops to guard prisoners now in hands of UNC. Also, text contemplates possibility that PW question might not be finally disposed of and might be submitted to Post-Armistice Conference.

---

[1] For Delga 151, dated Nov. 8, see p. 588; the principal modification of Delga 151 was transmitted in Gadel 48, Nov. 10, p. 597.

Lloyd defended his text as designed to be acceptable to Chinese Communists and thus to produce armistice. This, he said, was the only way in which we cld avoid second phase of Korean problem in GA which we wld now have to face under new administration with unknown results. Lloyd stated he wld do nothing re his text until he heard further from us. Secy assured him we cld not ask Dept and JCS to accept anything like his draft.

Lloyd's text follows:

Verbatim Text.

The GA

1. Having received the special report of the Unified Command of Oct 18, 1952,[2] on the status of mil action and the armistice negots in Korea;

2. Noting that disagreement on the issue of release and repatriation of POWs alone prevents the achievement of an armistice on just and honorable terms and the ending of the fighting in Korea;

3. Believing that the release and repatriation of POWs shld be effected in accordance with international law and practice, including the Geneva Convention on POWs of 1949, and with the provisions of the tentative agreements already reached between the Central People's Govt of the People's Repub of China and the UNC;

4. Requests the Pres of the GA to transmit to the Central People's Govt of the People's Repub of China and to the North Korean auths the fol suggestions put forward as a basis for agreement on this sole remaining issue:

a. A commission on repatriation of POWs should be established consisting of the reps of blank or any other four states to be agreed;

b. All POWs should be released to the commission by both sides in groups of appropriate size at agreed exchange points in demilitarized territory;

c. Force shld not be used to prevent or compel the repatriation of any POW. The commission shall carry out the obligation laid upon detailing powers by Art 13 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the humane treatment of POWs;

d. POWs shld be classified by the commission according to nationality and domicile;

---

[2] For the text, see UN document A/2228.

e. Each side shld have access to the POWs when under the control of the commission to inform them of their rights and to explain to them any matters relevant to their return to their homelands;

f. Red Cross teams of both sides shld have access to the POWs as provided in the tentative armistice agreement already reached;

h. [*sic*] The terms of the armistice agreement relating to POWs shld be made known to all prisoners and in particular their right to return to their homelands;

i. The commission shld

(1) Before the armistice agreement is concluded agree upon an umpire to decide if disagreement shld arise on any issue between members of the commission;

(2) Before the armistice agreement is signed shld make arrangements with the umpire for an adequate staff;

(3) Before the armistice is signed agree with the commands on each side the location of and arrangements for any camp or camps necessary for the discharge of the commission's responsibilities;

(4) Before the armistice is signed agree with the commands on each side the size of the groups referred to in para 3 of this res and the arrangements for their transportation and administration while under the control of the commission;

(5) Have the right to request from the commands on either side or from any other state resources in personnel or material necessary for the discharge of their duties;

5. Notes, from the report of the Unified Command (A/2228, Annex A), that the negotiators at Panmunjom have tentatively agreed to the fol recommendation:

> 'In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the mil commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the govts of the countries concerned on both sides, that, with [*within*?] three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a polit conference of a higher level of both sides be held by reps appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.'

7.* Recommends that any matters relating to repatriation of POWs unsettled at the end of 3 months shld automatically be referred by the Repatriation Commission to the above conference;

8. Decides that upon the coming into effect of the armistice agreement, if the GA is not then in regular session, the SYG shall convene a special session of the GA at the headquarters of the UN to consider the implementation of such a recommendation;

(Alternative to 8) Requests the President of the GA and the two immediate past Presidents to take steps to convene within the prescribed time the polit conference referred to in para 5 of this res and to enter into negotiations with the parties concerned for this purpose, and to take into account proposals submitted by the del of the USSR on the 10th Nov."

---

*Numbered as received. [Footnote in the source text.]

Eden and Lloyd are seeing Secy this evening. Menon has asked to see us Thurs a.m. re new draft on which he is working. We are planning to consult with sponsors of 21-power res later Thurs and are disposed to take line we must for present at least stand firm on 21-power draft res.

ACHESON

795.00/11-1352

Memorandum by the Special Assistant (Kitchen) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [NEW YORK,] November 13, 1952.

Doc Matthews telephoned again. He said that the latest British proposal [2] had been shown to Chip Bohlen, David Bruce and Paul Nitze, and Alex Johnson, and that they believed it constituted almost complete capitulation, and they were unanimous in believing we could not accept it. They thought that the author was undoubtedly inspired by worry regarding what the next administration might do in connection with possible phase 2 activities. Mr. Bruce will discuss it with the President at 12:30 and we will know his views after lunch.[3] Bohlen pointed out that he thought the move was tactically very bad in the light of Vyshinsky's harsh speech the other day.[4] (This remark is consistent with his position in the staff meeting at the UN the other afternoon.) Bohlen added that he thought it would be harder for the Commies to accept a resolution which made the denial of forced repatriation vaguely acceptable than it would be to assume the posture of being outraged with regard to a "harder" resolution. Phil Jessup, who took the telephone call from Washington, says he is not impressed by this latter point, nor am I.

JCK

---

[1] Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

[2] For the British proposal and draft resolution, see Delga 180, Nov. 12, 1952, *supra.*

[3] See footnote 1, *infra.*

[4] The reference is to the Vyshinsky speech of Nov. 10 before the First Committee; see footnote 1, p. 598.

320/11–1352

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to the President [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1952.

Subject: Korean Resolution in the United Nations General Assembly

As you are aware, the United States, along with 20 other sponsors, has introduced into the General Assembly a resolution affirming and endorsing the position taken by the United Nations Command on non-forcible repatriation of prisoners of war.

The Indian Delegation to the General Assembly has been very active in attempts to formulate a substitute resolution which would be acceptable to the Chinese Communists. It appears that the Indians are maintaining contact with the Chinese Communists at Peking on the text of various proposals. While the Indians have thus far apparently supported the principle of non-forcible repatriation, they have been attempting to find a formulation acceptable to the Communists and to ourselves which would assuage the alleged Chinese Communist fears that the United Nations Command will coerce and restrain prisoners desiring to return from doing so.

The UK has now formulated a text of a resolution based on discussions with the Indians. This resolution, a copy of which is included in the attached telegram 180 of November 12 from New York,[2] in the opinion of the Secretary and the Department goes so far to meet the Communist point of view as to in fact contemplate the ultimate abandonment of the principle of no forced repatriation. The prisoner of war commission contemplated under the resolution would presumably have to hold indefinitely prisoners resisting repatriation and subject them to Communist haranguing until they give up and decide to go home. That is, the resolution provides for no disposition of the prisoners other than being held indefinitely under the control of the commission or returning to Communist control.

The Department has, in consultation with the Department of Defense, formulated an amendment to the original U.S. resolution, which is consistent with the second proposal made by General Harrison at Panmunjom on September 28 and which in the opinion of the Department goes as far as we can go in meeting the point of view of the Indians and other such delegations. A copy of this amendment (to which some minor verbal changes are being made) is included in the attached telegram number 151 of November 8 from New York.[3] If the Delegation considers that the acceptance of such an amendment would markedly increase the support for the United States resolution, it has been authorized to negotiate on the basis of this text. However, the present view of the Department and the Delegation is that unless marked increased support would thereby be obtained, it is preferable to stand firm on the original text as introduced.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson. The following note in Truman's handwriting appeared at the bottom of the source text: "Approved 11/13/52, Harry S. Truman". In a covering note attached to another copy of this memorandum (795.00/11–1352), Bruce noted that he had met with the President on Nov. 13 regarding the situation in New York.

[2] Printed *ante*, p. 610.

[3] Printed *ante*, p. 588.

The Secretary has asked that the situation be explained to you and that your views be obtained concerning the attitude the United States Delegation should take regarding the Indian and such other proposals as do not clearly affirm the principle of non-forcible repatriation.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you authorize the Department to inform the Secretary that the United States Government will strongly oppose any resolution which does not clearly affirm and support the principle of non-forcible repatriation.

DAVID BRUCE

320/11-1352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 13, 1952—10:50 p. m.

Delga 188. Limited distribution. Re Korea.

I. Fol report of meeting Secy and Gross with Krishna Menon, November 13, a.m.

Menon still without giving draft to Secy, said he had made revisions of earlier draft in light of discussions with Secy and Gross. Referring to draft suggestions we had previously given him (Delga 151)[1] Menon criticized language para 1, particularly phrase "unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated", as well as final clause this para. He said that statement of principle as embodied in para 1 had been put to ChiComs and rejected (it was not clear whether text had been sent to Commies or whether Menon was inferring Commie rejection from previous exchanges with Peiping on general question of repatriation principle). Menon said his own redraft made it clear no force would be used and that PWs would have full "freedom to return". He also discussed our suggestion for an "impartial commission" which he said would be objectionable to ChiComs but stated that he would be prepared to amend his formulation re establishing Pole-Swede-Czech-Swiss commission plus umpire by adding clause "unless otherwise agreed".

---

[1] Dated Nov. 8, p. 588.

Re our para 2(B)(2), Delga 151, he thought significance of "disposition" must be spelled out and that substance this sub-para might be added to his res "without excluding other things".

Secy then attempted to bring Menon back to first principles and pointed out importance of establishing understanding of ideas between Menon and himself, since it appeared from previous discussions and from this one that some confusion might have arisen by reason of too much discussion of words and phrases. Secy expressed view first major point on which understanding must be reached is that under the Indian proposal, as we understood it, we would be agreeing to send resisting POWs to captivity until they agreed to go back home; or alternatively they wld be turned over to peace conference. They wld for an indefinite period be under continued moral pressure and duress. Only one choice wld be open to them, to go back home, and only question would be how soon that wld happen and how long they could withstand "persuasion", education and other forms of duress of which the Commies were past masters. We on the other hand insisted that POWs must be released, not merely in name but in fact, and those who did not wish to return home would be free to go wherever they wished to go without moral or any other kind of pressure. We must be sure to avoid either physical force or mental torture.

Secy pointed out to Menon that under his plan we wld be under obligation to deliver POWs to commission by force if necessary, which we wld not do any more than we wld use force to compel them to return home or go any place they did not desire to go. It must be anticipated that PWs wld, if they understood what was happening to them, resist being put in indefinite captivity in hands commission just as much as they wld resist being forced home. This point was to assure them they had a "future".

Menon professed to understand this and said he wld "think it over".

With regard to composition of repatriation commission, Secy restated reasons why we preferred impartial commission and Menon repeated his previously expressed view that Commies would not consider any state impartial and, therefore, US position wld lead to dead end. Menon then also raised question whether repatriation commission in our suggestion wld be "screening body". If so, he said, that wld be objectionable. Secy patiently explained that whatever word was used to describe it, commission if it had any value at all, wld have to screen in sense of determining freely expressed wishes of the individual POWs.

There was then rambling and inconclusive discussions on designation of umpire in event of deadlock in four-power comm. Here again the Secy tried to lead Menon back to first principles and Menon said he would think it over.

With regard to question of post-armistice conference and Menon proposal for "three-president group", Secy explained this made no sense. Two questions really were:

(1) What countries should be members of such conference? We assumed it wld include those directly and immediately involved, NK, ChiComs, ROK and others, including US and UK, who were directly engaged in conflict, and those who were not. Secy mentioned specifically importance of having appropriate Asian representation. Menon expressed personal doubt that India wld be prepared to serve.

(2) Other question was one of procedure and we assumed that UNGA would designate members of conference to participate on behalf of the UN and that GA wld naturally expect to have something to say about results reached, probably in form of action upon recommendations made by conference.

Menon again professed understanding, but neither agreed nor disagreed with Secy's comments. At end of mtg, Menon said he wld like to meet Gross during course of day and wld advise as to time. (As of early evening, Menon had not called.)

II. Immediately upon conclusion Menon mtg, Secy joined mtg described UK minutes, Delga 187.[2] Secy gave group full report Menon conversation.

Following points by Gross supplement UK minutes this meeting:

(1) Pearson emphasized his view that it is of great importance obtain "Indian support in the peace-making process" by which he appeared to mean committing and enlisting India for first time in efforts to settle armistice on basis specific principles and procedures.

(2) Spender strongly disagreed, emphasizing importance of walking straight line and adhering to 21-power resolution with such amendments as might not do it any violence or introduce unclear language or principles. Eden reminded Spender that yesterday Casey had taken opposite line in discussion with him, and Spender said he was aware of this but "intended to take question up for governmental decision".

(3) Lloyd, in general, supported Pearson's approach, with Eden indicating dissatisfaction with Menon's draft rather than with attempt to try to meet Menon.

(4) Webb, with reservations, leaned somewhat in Pearson's direction but associated himself with Spender to point that no draft should be vague or ambiguous or unworkable.

(5) Schuman expressed himself in general terms in support of trying to make Menon proposal work and agreed with Pearson concerning importance of Asian support.

(6) Secy again stressed "first principles" and dangers to Menon course.

There followed discussion of proposal to have 21-power mtg in afternoon, with Lloyd, Pearson, and Hoppenot most unresponsive, considering it "premature" and dangerous as revealing divisions among the smaller group. Secy explained that purpose of mtg was to share info and not go into detail or precipitate an open difference of view.

---

[2] Not printed (320/11-1352).

ACHESON

320/11–1352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 13, 1952—10:43 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 189. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Reps of 21 co-sponsors of joint draft resolution on Korea met at US mission this afternoon for discussion of situation which has developed since joint draft submitted Oct 24.

Gross opened meeting by summarizing in very general terms negotiations with Menon. Gross stated Menon had advised US this morning that he had fairly firm instructions to table a resolution unilaterally possibly Nov 14. Gross stressed fact we had not seen anything in writing from Menon, but stated that from our conversations with him it seemed fairly clear Menon had in mind three basic points:

(1) There should be in some form a ref to the principle of nonforcible repatriation. We were in some doubt re question of how precisely or clearly this principle would be stated in Menon's draft. The statement would in some way be based on stipulations of Geneva convention.

(2) A Comm for repatriation of POW's would be established. Menon proposed a two-for-two composition—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland—based on his feeling that such a Comm would be acceptable to the Commies because they had already agreed on it for another purpose. Menon envisaged the appointment of an umpire by the Comm itself.

(3) The resolution would spell out the functions of the Comm, and provide for "*de jure*" repatriation of POW's through transfer of custody to Comm. It was not clear who would have responsibility for POW's thereafter. The Comm would act in some way analogous to the concept of a protecting power; it would have access to POW's, receive communications from them, and have function of facilitating their repatriation. A para would be included in the resolution to insure that no force would be used upon the POW's and there would be no affront to their dignity. This wld carry the implication of a guarantee against forcibly detaining or forcibly repatriating prisoners.

Finally, POW's not repatriated would in effect be turned over to the post-armistice peace conference which would presumably arrange their disposition.

Gross told mtg Menon planned to consider suggestions from the few persons he has consulted re his ideas and may produce a new draft this afternoon.

Gross stressed confidential basis on which we had received above information, lack of complete consistency in Menon's ideas, and desirability of considering tactics to be pursued by 21 co-sponsors in event Indian del tabled their resolution in immediate future or in event there was opportunity to modify his proposals. Speaking for US, Gross stated GA must unequivocably affirm principle of non-forcible repatriation, must define clearly functions of repatriation Comm, and must not leave POW problems outstanding for post-armistice negots. Gross pointed out co-sponsors could either adhere to their resolution, with slight modifications or amendments of substance, or could discard 21-power draft in favor of something else, known or unknown.

Jebb (UK) spoke next, repeating that as far as we know Menon has not yet produced a draft and is constantly changing his ideas, Jebb remarked that any judgment on a resolution, when one was tabled, would depend on whether it contained a clear statement on the principle of non-forcible repatriation. Jebb thought it was improbable that Peking and Moscow had different views on this subject and believed it was unlikely that the Commies would accept any part of our resolution. He thought we should aim at getting the fullest GA support for the UN position on Korea and should examine Menon's resolution very carefully in that light. Responding to a question Jebb indicated he was not willing to undertake to discourage Menon from tabling an Indian resolution immediately, but would pass this suggestion on to his superiors.

Hoppenot (France) stressed gravity and urgency of problem and stated this was last chance for solution without which serious developments might occur at the beginning of next year. As long as certain fundamental principles were met, Hoppenot was inclined to go far toward reaching a solution. He cautioned against making any decisions before the co-sponsors had seen a text. Possibly thereafter direct efforts could be made to agree on a formula which would recognize the primacy of the Geneva convention and at the same time the humanitarian principles involved in the POW question here. Hoppenot stressed the desirability of a formulation which included the concept of immed release of POW's, with no forced detention and no forced repatriation. He found a certain encouragement in the remarks included in the Polish and Czech speeches,[1] which took the line that forced repatriation was not the problem but rather forced detention. Hoppenot stated co-sponsors should have no pride of authorship and should aim at largest possible vote regardless of sponsorship. If on studying Indian text we could all rally in support of it, this would be most desirable. Hoppenot suggested the co-sponsors might select three or four of their number to meet with Menon in an attempt to bring his resolution closer to our own when he had a text.

---

[1] The references were to the speech before the First Committee by the Polish representative, Nov. 1, 1952 (see UN document A/C.1/SR.517) and by the Czech representative, Nov. 5, 1952 (see UN document A/C.1/SR.519).

Gross restated the principal points of concern to US, the principle of no forced repatriation and the question of a satisfactory formula for the structure and method of operation of a repatriation comm. He remarked that it was of the utmost concern to our military auths that no substantive problems be left for post-armistice negots, and that GA action be limited to statements of principles and objectives, with negotiators at Panmunjom working out operational details. At this point Gross emphasized that resolution must not leave open possibility that POW's should be kept indefinitely in captivity or detention. He noted that Menon's idea at present seems to envisage continued detention of POW's, whose fate would be turned over to the post-armistice peace conf with a prospect of indefinite deadlock. A POW under detention by the Repatriation Comm would in this circumstance be subject to processes of persuasion without limit of time. Gross also indicated Menon seemed to have in mind Comm which could call on any state for resources, troops and material, even theoretically including Chinese Commies, to guard and maintain POW's.

Hoppenot here noted that in his view the Repatriation Comm should retain control of the prisoners only long enough to ascertain their wishes. Thereafter it might be charged with moral protection of POW's but not with physical control. This, he felt, was a weak point in the Menon resolution, and he suggested that ideas included in the Mexican and Peruvian resolutions might be helpful here. Webb (New Zealand) and Sarper [2] (Turkey) then raised questions re possibility of deadlock in two-for-two Comm and need to face up to this problem. Gross noted undesirability of converting clear moral issue presently joined between two sides to an issue of procedure, i.e., umpire for Repatriation Comm. Hoppenot suggested an Indian umpire might be desirable. Engen [3] (Norway) then stated that he was authorized to declare that Sweden and Switzerland were not willing to serve on POW Comm unless there was a clearly agreed solution of the POW question in Panmunjom before an armistice was concluded.

Spender (Australia) then argued in favor of a policy of amending 21-power draft rather than abandoning it in favor of something produced by Menon. He hoped in this way to obtain large majority support. Kyrou [4] (Greece) spoke in support of Spender's point and particularly opposed the two-for-two concept for a Repatriation Comm.

The discussion then turned back to the principle of non-forcible repatriation. Hoppenot noted that this was not an absolute principle but that it applied only when a POW had good and sufficient reason to avoid repatriation. Gross remarked that the language we had suggested to Menon as representing our thinking was unacceptable to him, since the Chi Coms would object to any ref to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and to the concept that no force was to be used for repatriation or detention. As Menon saw it, the Chi Coms would object to the presumption in such a statement that some Commie POWs did not wish to be repatriated. Therefore Gross felt that the Menon proposal did not include a clear statement on the repatriation problem and stated frankly that our attempt to reach agreement with Menon on language seemed to have failed. Gross indicated our agreement with Spender's view that the 21-power draft was sound and should not be amended by any statement which wld modify basic principle of non-forcible repatriation.

---

[2] Selim Sarper, Turkish Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

[3] Hans Engen, Norwegian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

[4] M. Alexis Kyrou, Greek Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

After some discussion of future procedure it was agreed that there would be another meeting either of the entire group or of a working subcomite (suggestion had been made that such a group consist of US, UK, France, Australia and a Latin American co-sponsor), as soon as text was available. Meanwhile, attempts should be made to persuade Menon not to table a resolution before the group has had a chance to look at it.

It will be noted that Gross began meeting with most moderate statement in order not to reveal open difference of opinion with UK and France, who had been far from enthusiastic about meeting of co-sponsors. Thereafter Gross revealed US general attitude with increasing clarity. Aside from UK and France, consensus among those who spoke was clearly that 21-power resolution should not be abandoned but that it should probably be amended along general lines our own thinking. We did not reveal substance of US suggestions (Delga 151 with modifications)[5] at this meeting except as to para 1.

ACHESON

---

[5] For telegram Delga 151, Nov. 8, see p. 588; the modifications are in telegram Gadel 48, Nov. 10, p. 597.

795.00/11-1452

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Barbara Evans, Secretary to the Secretary of State

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 14, 1952.

Mr. Gross telephoned Secretary to say that he had heard that Menon had a further draft of the resolution on Korea, subsequent to the one handed Gross this morning, copy of which is attached hereto.[1] He had also heard a rumor that Menon was going to go ahead and circulate the newest draft. Menon had an appointment with Mr. Gross at 4:30 this afternoon.

---

[1] The Indian draft handed to Gross on the morning of Nov. 14 was not attached to the source text. A copy is located in Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459. On the same day, at 4 p.m., Menon gave the U.S. Delegation another text of his resolution, transmitted to the Department in telegram Delga 193, *infra*.

The Secretary said he had had only the briefest chance to look over the attached resolution, since there had been a delay in receiving it. But he thought it was a very dangerous document. He had noted that the paragraph about there being no forcible return is not in the proposals which will be submitted to the Chinese, although it is in the preamble. What is in the proposal to the Chinese simply involves turning the prisoners over to the political commission. The Secretary also thought from a hasty reading it seemed that if these proposals are accepted by the UN, nobody can change them, and the UN will have written the armistice.

Mr. Gross said he thought these two points were correctly stated by the Secretary, and he thought that the so-called new draft which Menon would bring in to him would not be different in these respects. He therefore was concerned about his position when he saw Menon. He was afraid that this was the breaking point, but he did not want to be in the position of telling Menon that it was, particularly as Lloyd and Pearson have given him (Menon) full encouragement on something along the line of the draft. Lloyd had told Gross that both he and Eden felt it was better to accept something along this line than to let the situation go along. Gross had said to Lloyd that he felt it was impossible from our point of view and that he felt this question would have to be resolved at the Minister level; that no further progress or talk could be had at the Gross–Lloyd level. Mr. Gross thought that after Secretary had chance to see Eden, he should see Menon this evening. The Secretary said that in point of time this was almost impossible. Eden was coming in a few minutes for another meeting, and there would be no opportunity for the Secretary to read and study the draft resolution or resolutions, and be in a position to lay the matter on the line with Eden. The Secretary thought he would just have to say he did not have the power to accept; that he did not think it would do.

Mr. Gross asked if the Secretary would authorize him to say to Menon that it will not be necessary for the latter to see the Secretary. But Gross feared that this would lead to the breaking point. The Secretary said he had to have a little time to think the matter over; actually, he could not make the decision anyway, although it seemed to him clear that the proposed resolution was not acceptable. It seemed to him the resolution created the greatest difficulties. The question of the disposition of the prisoners was still open; it seemed to the Secretary that by the resolution we would be negotiating an armistice and sending it to Clark.

Mr. Gross said he would tell Menon strongly that the matter was too important for the question to be stampeded. This is the first draft we have had from Menon; it is a matter which must be considered carefully and considered on the basis of this specific draft, which is now handed to us for the first time. Mr. Gross said he would not get into drafting suggestions with him, but at the same time would avoid giving him the impression that this was the breaking point.

The Secretary said he would like to see what the new resolution is like as soon as Mr. Gross gets it.

320/11-1452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 14, 1952—6:59 p. m.

Delga 193. Limited distribution. Verbatim text. Re Korea. Confirming telecon fol is text of draft of Menon res on Korea given to us by Menon 4 p.m., November 14:

"The GA

Having received the special report of the 13th [*18th*] Oct 1952 by the Unified Command under the US on the present status of the mil action and the armistice negots in Korea;

Noting with approval the considerable progress made by negotiation and tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question;

Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue alone prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved;

Mindful of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting;

Deeply conscious of the need to bring the hostilities to a speedy end [and] of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

Anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the polit conference as provided in art 60 of the draft armistice agreement;

Affirms that the release and repatriation of POWs shall be effected in accordance with the 'Geneva convention relative to the treatment of POWs' of 12th Aug 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement;

Affirms that force shall not be used against POWs to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva convention and with the gen spirit of the convention;

Accordingly requests the President of the GA to transmit the fol proposals to the Central People's Govt of the People's Repub of China and to the North Korean auths as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement and to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the GA during its present session and as soon as appropriate.

Proposals

1. In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of all POWs there shall be established a repatriation comm consisting of the reps of Czech, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, that is the four states constituting the neutral nations supervisory comm referred to in para 37 of the draft armistice agreement, or constituted alternatively of reps of four states, two to be nominated by each side, but excluding any permanent member of the SC.

2. POWs shall be released to the repatriation comm from mil control and from the custody of the detaining side in agreed nbrs and at agreed exchange points in agreed demilitarized zones.

3. Classification of POWs according to nationality and domicile as proposed in the ltr of Oct 16th[1] from Gen Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to Gen Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, UN Command, shall then be carried out immediately.

4. After classification, POWs shall be free to return to their homelands forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.

5. Each party to the conflict in accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose by the repatriation comm shall have freedom and facilities to explain to the POWs depending upon them their rights and to inform the POWs on any matter relating to their return to their homelands and particularly their full freedom to return.

6. Red Cross teams of both sides shall assist the repatriation comm in its work and shall have access, in accordance with the terms of the draft armistice agreement, to POWs while they are under the temporary jurisdiction of the repatriation comm.

7. POWs shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the repatriation comm and to bodies and agencies working under the repatriation comm, and to inform any or all such bodies of their desires on any matter, concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the comm.

8. Force shall not be used against the POWs and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the repatriation comm and each of its members. POWs shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva convention and with the gen spirit of that convention.

9. Notwithstanding the provisions of para 8 above, nothing in this repatriation agreement shall be construed as derogating from the auth of the repatriation comm (or its authorized reps) to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.

10. The terms of this repatriation agreement and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all POWs.

11. The repatriation comm is entitled to call upon parties to the conflict, its own govts, or the member states of the UN for such

---

[1] The text of this letter is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 10, 1952, pp. 752–754.

legitimate assistance as it may require in the carrying out of its duties and tasks; and in accordance with the decisions of the comm in this respect.

12. When the two sides have made an agreement for repatriation based on these proposals, the interpretation of the agreement shall rest with the repatriation comm. In the event of disagreement in the comm, majority decision shall prevail. When no majority decision is possible, an umpire agreed upon in accordance with the succeeding para and with art 132 of the Geneva convention of 1949 shall have the deciding vote.

13. The repatriation comm shall at its first mtg and prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint an umpire. If agreement on the appointment of an umpire cannot be reached by the comm within a period of three weeks after the date of its first mtg, this matter shall be referred to the GA.

14. The repatriation comm shall also arrange for officials to function as umpires with inspecting teams or other bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the comm or under the provisions of the draft armistice agreement, so that the completion of the return of the POWs to their homelands shall be expedited.

15. When the repatriation agreement is acceded to by the parties concerned and when an umpire has been appointed under para 13 above, the draft armistice agreement, unless otherwise altered by agreement between the parties, shall be deemed to have been accepted by them. The provisions of the draft armistice agreement shall apply except insofar as they are modified by the repatriation agreement. The arrangements for repatriation under this agreement will begin when the armistice agreement has been concluded.

16. At the end of 90 days from the signing of the armistice agreement the disposition of any POWs whose return to their homelands has not been effected in accordance with the procedure set out above shall be referred by the repatriation comm to the polit conference to be called under art 60 of the draft armistice agreement."

ACHESON

795.00/11-1452

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1952.

Subject: Developments in Korea.

1. *Internal Political Situation*

CIA Reports received in the Department on November 10 indicate the possibility of a *coup d'état* occurring in Korea some time at the end of November or early December. Two factions are reported to have recently developed in Korea and are presently plotting the overthrow of the Rhee Government. It appears that both groups fear a coup by the other and there is no indication that they might combine their efforts in their common objective.

One group is reported to be headed by John Chang, former Korean Ambassador to the United States and former Prime Minister, and by Cho Bong-Am, a converted Communist and runner-up to Rhee in the last presidential election. This group receives its support from the military headed by General Yi Chong Chan, former Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army and now attending Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

The second group, which times its *coup d'état* for early December, is headed by Chong Il-Kwon, former Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army and currently Deputy Commander of the United States[?] 8th Corps and Sin Song Mo, former Minister of National Defense.

Although CIA received these reports from a well-evaluated source, the Embassy's appraisal is to deny their veracity (Pusan's Top Secret telegram No. 628).[1] Ambassador Muccio, DRF, and Army G–2 view these reports with great scepticism. We do, too.

2. *Republic of Korea Behavior in the United Nations*

On Wednesday, November 5, Foreign Minister Pyun made a long and impassioned speech before the Political Committee,[2] in which he laid the blame for the Korean hostilities at the door of the Soviet Union. In denying Republic of Korea guilt for initiating the hostilities, he said that although his Government desired to unify Korea by force if necessary, during the period 1949–1950 the United States had denied the Government sufficient military assistance, including small arms, sufficient to accomplish the task. He likewise made it clear that it was his Government's firm and lasting desire to unify Korea under the Republic of Korea Government and that it would never condone any armistice arrangements which left the country divided. In his speech of November 10 before the Political Committee, Vishinsky found no trouble in exploiting Pyun's remarks to refute the Secretary's careful and elaborate case on Communist responsibility for the aggression of June 25, 1950.

On November 11, the Korean Delegation circulated a lengthy pamphlet (46 pages), copies of which have not yet been received by the Department, in which the Korean Government, with an accompanying fanfare of propaganda, demands arms for two million men so that they may unify Korea and condemns the armistice negotiations as a hoax and a Communist plot. Member Delegates deplored Foreign Minister Pyun's speech as being inept and inappropriate and have likewise condemned the circulation of this propaganda pamphlet. The United States

---

[1] This five-page telegram, dated Nov. 14, 1952, is not printed (795B.00/11–1452).

[2] The speech was given on Monday, Nov. 3, not Nov. 5; see UN document A/C.1/SR.518.

Delegation has asked our advice on any measures to stop the Korean end runs.

On a more helpful note, Ambassador Muccio reports that Ambassador Yang wants him to look over the draft of his (Yang) forthcoming speech before the Political Committee.

3. *UNKRA*

Kingsley's[3] meetings with General Clark were highly successful, leading to agreement in principle on joint planning and execution of programs, and that UNKRA should carry out a $70 million program during this fiscal year. Kingsley presented the program on November 10 to his United Nations Advisory Committee. He candidly recounted his difficult conversations with President Rhee, who wants full control over Korea's reconstruction and leaves a real doubt whether he wants UNKRA "in Korea" at all. This revelation has greatly disturbed the Canadians and the British. It is evident that UNKRA faces a major political hurdle in commencing the program. It is Kingsley's view, with which we tend to concur, that he should get full backing from governments and then present the program to Rhee on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is some indication that the British and Canadians would like to see agreement reached with the Republic of Korea before Advisory Committee approval. The program is to be considered again by the Advisory Committee on November 24. The interested governments are to have positions by that date. Pyun's tactics in New York and Rhee's intransigence with Kingsley have together had a discouraging impact on the Canadians and the British, who are wondering if they shouldn't "chuck" the whole UNKRA effort.

The other major UNKRA problem is whether the joint Army and UNKRA program as agreed in Tokyo can actually be carried out within the framework of stabilization. This is now being studied both in the field and here.

4. *Payments to Republic of Korea*

Eighteen million dollars was paid to the Republic of Korea on November 7, representing monthly installments due under the May 24 exchange of notes through the month of September. Before the payment was made, it was necessary for State to write a letter to Army, however, and there were once again muttered threats by the Republic of Korea to cut off won advances. We have written a further letter to Army pointing out the disadvantages to the United States of delays, and urging that during the first week of each month the installment for the previous month should be paid or else the Republic of Korea be told exactly why we are withholding payment. General Marquat is pushing in the same direction.

---

[3] J. Donald Kingsley was Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), which was established by Resolution 410 (V) of the General Assembly, Dec. 1, 1950, and which was directed by that resolution to plan, initiate, and carry out a program of relief and reconstruction in Korea with the expectation of an early peace on the Korean peninsula. Peace, of course, did not come to Korea. UNKRA therefore worked out an agreement with the UNC, which took effect on Jan. 1, 1952, allowing it to undertake relief and rehabilitation projects during the period of hostilities with the mutual agreement and cooperation of the UNC. The understanding did acknowledge, however, the UNC's primary responsibility for relief and economic aid to the ROK during the period of active hostilities and for 180 days thereafter (UN document A/2222, pp. 1–3).

(11/17/52)

Since the above was written, the Republic of Korea has informed the Command that all advances of won will cease as of December 15, 1952 "unless all outstanding dollar payments for won advances be made at once". This announcement is contained in a letter to Admiral Hanlon from the Acting Prime Minister, Paek Tu Chin (see Pusan's telegrams No. 630 and 631 of November 15).[4] Representatives of the Embassy and the Command have been meeting in Pusan to work out recommendations to Washington which should be reaching here at any time.

---

[4] Neither printed (both 795B.5 MSP/11–1552).

320/11–1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 15, 1952—12:34 a. m.

Delga 196. Re Korea. Secretary discussed with Eden and Pearson[1] situation arising from Menon's attempt to draft a resolution on Korea. Secretary said situation had now become very serious. There were three points in particular re Menon's latest draft which it was simply impossible for us to accept:

(1) The affirmation that force should not be used against PWs to prevent or effect their return to their homelands was not included in the proposals which the President of the GA was requested to transmit to the other side as a basis for armistice agreement. After some discussion Pearson and Eden agreed that this was correct and that this feature should be changed.

(2) The resolution as now drafted provided that after 90 days PWs not repatriated should be turned over to some other body (Political Conference), a fact which made a mockery of the principle of no forced return. The Secretary pointed out result might be that we would have these people in captivity indefinitely and that this continuing situation might induce PWs to forcibly resist transfer to Repatriation Commission or might produce a future crisis. He did not see what the political conference could do to solve the remaining elements of the PW question unless indeed the British, French and others should unexpectedly unite with the opposition to effect a solution against our own

---

[1] The meetings described in this telegram took place on Nov. 14.

desires. Secretary informed Eden and Pearson that in examining all possible types of solution for the PW question we had considered this particular one in Washington, that it has been turned down by unanimous decision of the JCS, and that the President had agreed with this decision.

(3) The resolution was still badly drafted: Impression was now given that numbered "proposals" would be written bodily into the armistice. Precise terms to be included in armistice must be discussed and worked out by General Clark and negotiators; it was his responsibility. Eden said he appreciated this, though Pearson at first attempted to argue that such matters should not be left to generals.

Secretary stated that British and Canadians, in encouraging Menon, were themselves running very great risks. He asked how they would like it if the US, the USSR, and some Latin Americans voted against a Menon draft resolution with the UK, Canada and a group of Asians voting in favor of it. Eden agreed this would be a very bad situation.

Secretary told Eden and Pearson reaction to latest Menon draft would have to be carefully formulated in Washington, and that it might be taken up next Tuesday in meeting with Truman and Eisenhower.[2]

Later Secretary asked Department that arrangements be made to have General Bradley, JCS and other Pentagon agencies available for work tomorrow, November 15. Department officials will discuss situation with them at that time.[3] Secretary also requested General Bradley be alerted regarding possibility his coming to New York Sunday, November 16, for conference with Secretary, Lovett, Canadians and British.[4]

While Secy was discussing situation with Eden and Pearson, Gross held long conversation with Krishna Menon (India) re latter's latest draft of res on Korea (transmitted to Dept in Delga 193)[5] which had been received at USUN few minutes before Menon's arrival.

Fol are salient points of conversation:

1. Gross made clear at outset he was not authorized to negotiate with Menon or to make any commitments whatever. Gross wished to ask Menon a few questions and did not even wish Menon to assume these were the only relevant questions re draft.

2. First substantive point raised by Gross dealt with fact that specific provision force shld not be used to prevent or effect return of PWs to their homeland was not included in proposals to be transmitted to other

---

[2] Eisenhower, accompanied by Lodge and Joseph M. Dodge, met with Truman and his principal Cabinet officers and advisers on the afternoon of Tuesday, Nov. 18, 1952, for an hour and 15 minutes. Among the matters discussed was Korea. For Truman's account of the meeting, see his *Memoirs*, vol. II, pp. 514–521. For Eisenhower's assessment of the meeting, see his *Mandate for Change*, p. 85; Acheson's *Present at the Creation*, p. 702, gives the Secretary's perspective on the portions of the meeting which dealt with the situation in New York.

[3] See the memorandum of discussion at the State–JCS meeting, Nov. 15, p. 634.

[4] For the report of this conference, see p. 637.

[5] Dated Nov. 14, p. 623.

side as basis for armistice. This was left for preamble while reference to force made in para 8 might apply to gen discipline or anything else. Menon said this was a typographical error and that para 8 shld specifically make point force shld not be used to prevent or effect return. Menon insisted there was no significance in separation of res into two parts, only one of which wld be sent to negotiators. As far as he cld see the entire res might be transmitted, but it was more convenient to send those parts which were "mechanical". After considerable discussion as to what constituted "mechanical" parts, he said he wld consider Gross suggestions but cld make no commitments.

3. In discussion re para 5 of draft res concerning freedom of parties to persuade PWs re their rights, Gross repeated point previously made to Menon by Secy that we objected to mental coercion and third degree methods as much as to any other kind of force. Menon stated it was not his purpose to permit third degree methods and that arrangements worked out by Repatriation Commission wld insure against that.

Menon stated same principle wld govern para 7 re freedom of PWs to communicate with Repatriation Comm. Gross accepted statement and pointed out this wld be placing another burden upon already heavy task confronting umpire.

4. Gross then raised basic point that we cannot accept res which confronts PWs with choice of either going back home or remaining in captivity indefinitely. Gross pointed out para 16 of Menon draft must be so construed.

5. Further, Gross emphasized two reasons why fate of PWs refusing to return shld not be remitted to Polit Conference. First PWs might resist transfer to custody of Repatriation Comm as much as they wld resist repatriation if they knew they wld continue indefinitely under constraint; and second, Polit Conference was designed to settle polit questions re Korea and PWs wld, therefore, become mere pawns in conference activities. Gross stated we did not wish to get into a situation in which we wld have to negot on repatriation after an armistice. Menon seemed somewhat impressed.

6. Menon said he thought that our objection arose from fact that para 16 seems to prohibit comm from releasing PWs and that we wished comm to be free to release them. Gross replied he did not wish to discuss drafting changes but at very least it shld be clear that comm wld be authorized to release PWs and not merely to turn them over bound hand and foot to Polit Conference. Menon thought concept that comm shld be "authorized" to release PWs was a little too positive. Gross stated he thought it wld be better to direct comm to release PWs but that bare minimum wld be to authorize such release. By "release", Gross said he meant giving PWs actual physical freedom to go where they wished provided country of destination was willing to receive

them. Menon demurred, stating PWs shld not be permitted to go to Formosa. Gross evaded detailed discussion this question.

7. In this connection, Menon said he wanted to tell Gross frankly, but not for quotation, that there wld undoubtedly be no problem re Korean PWs; that as to Chinese he had reason to believe that ChiComs wld not expect all Chinese PWs to return home. Gross asked whether Menon meant that some Chinese PWs were considered "Chiang Kai-shek agents" and Menon said "yes".

8. In discussion re release of non-repatriates, Menon referred to length of time for which each prisoner wld be in custody of Repatriation Comm. He thought this wld become a problem because of provision for delivery of PWs in agreed numbers.

Therefore, he was inclined to think that if it were possible for him to modify para 16 so as to authorize the comm eventually to release non-repatriates, he might have to change the time period to refer to a minimum of 90 days from the time any particular prisoner was transferred to the comm. Gross indicated he was disturbed by this comment because it showed that Menon considered detention period as a sort of "purge" period. This was not our view. US wish to assure PWs wld be processed as rapidly as possible and regarded time limit as maximum periods for that procedure. Gross felt that any attempt to use time limit as a minimum period of detention wld do violence to purposes for which whole procedure was being arranged.

9. In course of discussion re unacceptability present version para 16, Menon remarked it wld not help particularly if US agreed to this res. Gross asked whether Menon meant it wld help if US opposed the res; what help wld it be to Indians and UN if Commies were led to accept a bad res on ground US opposed it? Menon said this was not his meaning but that he thought it wld help if we abstained. Gross said US wld not abstain on any res it believed to be bad; either there wld be a good res or US wld vote against it. Gross then asked Menon whether he had reason to believe ChiComs wld accept this or any res. Menon replied that so far as he knew no summary or text had gone to Peking. In response to further questions, he said he had impression ChiComs might accept something along these lines, but that impression was based on "climate" and "inferences". Reverting to substance para 16, Menon said he felt Polit Conference cld reach quick decision; that it wld be so composed as to permit it to make decisions of this sort; and that in all probability UN element opposing forced repatriation wld be in majority. (Selwyn Lloyd made similar observation to Gross this morning and was probably source of Menon's idea.) Gross ended this phase of discussion by stating that as he saw it Menon's reasoning was wholly fallacious. Commies in the Polit Conference cld stall decisions easily, and conference was not intended or constructed to discuss armistice problems.

10. Conversation then turned to composition and operations of Repatriation Comm. Gross remarked that assuming an umpire cld be agreed upon, which he doubted, umpire wld be overloaded with decisions and his position wld be especially difficult if he became involved in question of fate of PWs after they were turned over to Polit Conference. Gross asked Menon whether he had any reason to believe ChiComs wld be prepared to agree to an umpire. Menon said he had not and that there might be real difficulties on this point. Hence he had included in his draft provision for referring matter to GA if Repatriation Comm did not reach agreement within three weeks.

Gross asked if Menon meant that GA wld then be expected to designate an umpire. Menon sought to evade this question and finally said this wld be a natural assumption because there wld be no one else who cld do it. Gross repeated point previously made to Menon that we wanted to be sure comm wld not deadlock on a basis which wld reduce whole problem from a moral issue clearly understood throughout the world to a technical issue on a procedural problem. Therefore, negotiators shld be given discretion and opportunity to work out arrangement which both sides felt was workable. That cld not be done in NY. Menon denied vigorously anything in present draft res tied negotiator's hands and stated he thought he had limited himself to minimum details acceptable to ChiComs.

11. In view of heavy US responsibility under UN decisions for carrying out mil operations and serious consequences of any unacceptable GA recommendations, Gross personally expressed view a great disservice wld be done to India itself, US and all our friends if Menon tabled a res prematurely. Gross referred in some detail to discussion with 21 co-sponsors. He stated they unanimously agreed it wld be very desirable if Menon wld circulate to co-sponsors a copy of his draft before he submitted it formally to GA. Menon saw great difficulties in this procedure. He said he was under great pressure; leaks were occurring; he had been under instructions for a week to submit some res. Gross commented that his objective wld not be achieved if he were to incur resentment of a group of 21 countries. Gross admitted circulating anything to so large a number wld be almost tantamount to releasing text publicly, but wld not have formal aspects of submission of res. Menon said he was giving present text to the Russians. Gross expressed regret, stating this was bad way to keep res conf. Menon replied he was not so much interested in Russian attitude. He cld tell Russians that any time res cld be changed. In his view ChiComs wld make decisions with or without consulting Russians. He realized this was not our point of view. However, we had failed to follow Indian advice. If we had not crossed 38th Parallel Chinese wld not have intervened. We had made mistake of bombing Yalu River plants just as Chinese were at point of agreeing to an armistice. Gross said he cld not go into these problems;

he did not have adequate information; but we must face situation as it exists today. Gross stressed importance of retaining maximum of solidarity in GA. Most members of GA, he pointed out, wld support 21-power draft and we were perfectly willing to go ahead with it. We might change it in some particulars but not substantially and we cld get a two-thirds majority. Menon stated that he wanted to make certain US wld not oppose his res and therefore promised, reluctantly, he wld not circulate his draft before Nov 17 or 18, promising he wld meanwhile think over this conversation.

ACHESON

795.00/11-1552

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 15, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: David Bruce has kept you informed of the serious situation which is developing here more or less (but less and less) under the surface on Korea. The Indians with help and encouragement from two of our allies are working on proposals for the prisoner of war issue which seem to us, as they say in the strike settlement lingo, to give us the words and the other side the decision. We have had some rough sessions. I have pointed out that our friends seem to be operating on General Forrest's idea: "If you can't lick 'em, jine 'em," while you are going ahead with General Grant to "fight it out on this line if it takes all summer". There are some jitters here about what may happen if there is no armistice.

Things are rapidly coming to a head and we shall soon need some instructions about our final position which require a sober review of the situation. State and Defense are working well and harmoniously together to get a recommendation for you—perhaps on Sunday or Monday. I hope to go over with Lovett and perhaps Bradley before then.

For the present I have no request to make of you.

Most respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

---

[1] This letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Actel 5, from New York. According to a note on the source text, it was seen by Bruce and then sent to the White House at 10:45 a. m.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 15, 1952—11 a. m.

Indian Resolution on Korean Armistice

Mr. Matthews explained that he had talked the day before with the Secretary in New York, and that the Secretary was having considerable difficulty with the U.K. and a number of other countries who were anxious to support something similar to the Indian resolution. Mr. Matthews said the Secretary had asked that we go over the Indian resolution and see what changes would have to be made in it to make it acceptable. Mr. Matthews also said that the Secretary has spoken very strongly against any such resolution, but felt that he must be in a position to know what the minimum was we could accept in case we found ourselves in a position in which we could not avoid wide support for something along these lines.

General Bradley said he understood the problem as outlined by Mr. Matthews and that he thought we should go through the resolution to see what changes had to be made.

General Hull: What would the political effects be of turning down the Indian resolution as opposed to seeking to amend it?

Mr. Hickerson: It is difficult to say exactly what would happen. Many of these countries are worried about what the new administration will do in Korea. Some of them think the Indian idea might bring about an armistice. Others don't believe it will be accepted but think it would put us in a good position if it were rejected.

Mr. Matthews: Suppose we insist on our own resolution. What support would we get?

Mr. Hickerson: It would probably pass. There would be lots of abstentions. However, you could probably make the British and Canadians support it.

Mr. Matthews: Menon is going to introduce some resolution on Monday. He says he is under instructions to put something in.

General Bradley: That's why I think we must see what is wrong with his present draft and change it.

General Hull: If we can find modifications that will permit us to support it, I guess that is best.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Chairman of the JCS General Bradley and Vice Chiefs General Hull and Admiral Duncan attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Admiral H. Page Smith and General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense. The entire discussion was concerned with Korea.

Mr. Johnson: I gather that what we are trying to do today is find out what we have to do in order to live with it. That was the basis on which we revised it last night.

General Bradley: Yes, I think that is it, and if we don't get the changes we think are necessary, then we would have to oppose it.

Mr. Bohlen: I think in effect we are deciding that if we can get the right modifications we would support it.

General Hull: I agree.

Mr. Matthews: We are agreeing to work out a paper for the Secretary which we could live with if he decides we have to follow this tactic.

General Bradley: Yes, I think we are trying to see what we can live with. It is up to him to decide whether to go along with something like this. I notice from the telegrams that Doc sent over to me this morning that the Secretary and Gross have taken a very firm view that we oppose Menon's resolution.

Shall we go over the resolution paragraph by paragraph?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, unless you want to go to the last paragraph first. It is the crucial one.

Mr. Johnson: I think we might take up the last paragraph.

(General Bradley then read some suggested language proposed by Mr. Johnson.)

Mr. Johnson: This is just some language I put down to raise the problem.

General Hull: Will the Repatriation Commission that is called for be able to make these arrangements with other countries to take the remaining prisoners as a practical matter?

Mr. Hickerson: It will certainly be difficult. As far as the grammar is concerned you have to say the *Commission shall* send these people to countries willing to take them.

General Hull: Then the Commission would make the arrangements with these other countries.

General Bradley: They won't be up against any more problems than we are as long as Formosa is not excluded.

Mr. Nitze: On the basis of this suggested language you can't guarantee that the possible destinations include Formosa. That would be up to the Commission.

General Bradley: It is clear that the Repatriation Commission would be responsible to the General Assembly in carrying out its duties?

Mr. Johnson: As we conceive it, the Commission would call on us and others to furnish guards and logistic support.

Admiral Duncan: Who the Commission is responsible to is important because this provides the machinery by which the Commission would do its business.

(The meeting then took up the Indian resolution and the draft amendments thereto, paragraph by paragraph, and agreed to changes that would be considered necessary if we were to accept such a resolution.)

Admiral Duncan: This resolution should address itself solely to the way of settling the POW issue. It is addressed to the North Koreans and Chinese, and it should not include all these provisions for the mechanism.

Mr. Hickerson: This resolution really means that you would set up a new screening mechanism.

General Bradley: I think that is what it boils down to.

Mr. Hickerson: I think the Indians might buy it if it contains some provision for the disposal of these POWs other than to Formosa.

Mr. Nitze: Suppose you provided that if no disposition can be agreed upon, the prisoners would be returned to those who now have custody.

Mr. Matthews: I think that might make it more difficult for the Indians.

Colonel Matthews: Under this proposal the Communists have at least two members on the Commission. Under Mr. Nitze's suggestion they would lose all voice.

Mr. Hickerson: What we must have is an alternative to the POWs staying forever in the custody of the Commission.

General Hull: Do the Indians go along with the idea of no forcible repatriation?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, technically.

Admiral Duncan: I think the Secretary should reject the Indian proposal and discuss the way this matter should be approached by the General Assembly to find a basis for settling the issue.

Mr. Bohlen: The difficulty is not just with the Indians. I think there are others who would say this does attempt to give a means of settlement of the POW problem so you can get ahead with the armistice.

Admiral Duncan: What we ought to have is a paper that addresses itself to the problem of settling the issue. This resolution is too broad. It ought to tell the Commission to do certain specific things and give them guidance. You can't get away from the fact that the armistice agreement is supposed to be a military matter.

General Hull: That is why I asked at the beginning how important it was to try to make this resolution something we can take.

Mr. Matthews: Our job is to try to make this resolution one that we can live with if it becomes necessary to offer something to avoid losing our allies in a debate.

Mr. Bohlen: If you had two resolutions—the Twenty-one Nation resolution and the Indian—we could abstain on the Indian and if the Communists accepted, we could take another look at it. If they refused, we would not be stuck with anything.

Mr. Matthews: That is a possible tactic, but I think we have to leave that with the Secretary in New York.

795.00/11-1652

Draft Memorandum of Conversation of a Meeting Held in New York, November 16, 1952 [1]

Participants: Secretary Acheson
Secretary Lovett
General Bradley
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Mr. Mike Pearson
Ambassador Gross

Secretary Acheson opened the meeting by saying it was just as well to get right down to cases on the subject at hand. He said the JCS had looked over the Menon draft proposal [2] and that Mr. Lovett and General Bradley would speak on three principal points which the JCS had indicated were essential to a consideration of the proposal. These were: (1) there should be no forcible repatriation and this should be clearly stated in the body of the resolution; (2) the umpire should be a member of the Commission and the draft should be cleaned up to indicate a definite time limit for the retention of prisoners and an alternative choice—i.e., a second door; (3) it should be understood that the resolution, if and when passed, would constitute a recommendation to General Clark and that it would be up to him to implement the details involved.

Secretary Lovett then set forth the view of the Defense Department. Mr. Lovett said the Menon proposal was unacceptable because it did not provide sufficient safeguard for the welfare of UN troops in Korea. It contained hazards which were unacceptable and left aside some of the basic commitments which we had made. It was very fuzzy on points required to provide adequate safeguards for the troops if there should be a breach of the armistice. He considered an acceptance of the Menon proposal would be an avoidance of our responsibilities and that the military judgment would be to oppose the proposal. He said there was an erroneous assumption and that was related to the fact that the prisoner of war question is not the only unresolved point. Our acceptance of several other points have been made conditional on our acceptance of the non-forcible repatriation point. He said it was a bitter task to read the messages day after day setting forth the account of the truce negotiations at Panmunjom and that we must be clear in the future course we are to follow. If the Communists want an honorable peace they can get it, but it would be unthinkable for us to make a peace possible through surrender of principles.

---

[1] The source text did not indicate the drafter, security classification, or date of the memorandum. From the context, it was probably a transcription of the actual discussion put in the third person. Acheson describes this meeting in his *Present at the Creation*, p. 701, thus: "At my request Secretary Lovett and General Bradley came to New York on November 16 for a meeting with them [the British and Pearson]. My purpose was to get away from talk about what would influence the Chinese Communists toward an armistice and to have those responsible for the Eighth Army state clearly the dangers in the field that Menon's loose plan for dealing with the prisoners would present. My colleagues did their best but the meeting was too large; the talk wandered and did not have the effect I hoped for."

An unsigned three-page memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 17, 1952, prepared by Lt. Col. Jack B. Matthews from notes he had taken at the meeting on Nov. 16 in New York, is in General Bradley's file, 091 Korea, 1952, National Archives Record Group 218.

Also present at the meeting were Jeffery Kitchen, Assistant to the Secretary of State; A.A. Duff, Private Secretary to Selwyn Lloyd; S.F. Rae of the Canadian Department of External Affairs; and Lieutenant Colonel Matthews of G-3, Department of the Army.

[2] Transmitted in Delga 193, Nov. 14, p. 623.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd asked what agreements were pending in addition to the non-forcible repatriation item. Mr. Acheson said that the matter of airfields was not mentioned in the present armistice agreement and that the question of a Soviet member of the Commission had been set aside on the understanding that it would not be made an issue if the Communists agree on non-forcible repatriation. This was the "package deal". He said he wanted to make it plain that we know that the prisoner issue created a military hazard.

Mr. Lovett said it was essential that anyone examining the problem be aware of the stages the negotiations had come through and only then could he get the full implication. He said that the Unified Command could not accept the additional jeopardy which acceptance of the Menon resolution would bring. Mr. Gross remarked that the question of our safeguards in the 21-power resolution was to put additional pressure on the Communists. Mr. Lovett said that if anyone hoped through the elimination of pressures rather than the application of additional military pressure to bring about an armistice he thought he was quite wrong. He said that it had been the experience of Admirals Joy and Libby and our unit field commanders that the position of the Communists had only changed under the application of military force and that the Communists had even complained of military force in the course of the negotiations at the time that they were conceding points to us. He said however he believed it was possible to modify the Menon proposal in an attempt to meet our major problems and without giving up our main principles.

General Bradley referred to the three objectives in the minds of the military. He said that as drafted the Menon proposal did not present a clear picture and that if it was not clear and if there was not a clear armistice, the question would then arise as to when one could invoke the greater sanction. A second point was the security of United Nations forces. He said if the Communists continue a major build-up, this would be dangerous and they would also have unlimited access for propaganda and infiltration. Conversely, we would have no pressure against them because a major factor in our favor would be eliminated when our air pressure came off. He said that he was setting forth this position not because he did not want an armistice but rather because he wanted a definite one. Once the fight had stopped, it would be hard to get our people to go back into action. With respect to the Menon proposal, if the prisoners were kept incarcerated, this amounted to forcible repatriation because after several years the probability was that they would break down and indicate a desire to return to the homeland. This was clearly not in accordance with our principle. The third military point was that the resolution should be passed in the General Assembly and then passed to Panmunjom, and would be implemented by the Unified Command as to detail. With respect to prisoners who would not accept repatriation, he thought that there should be no future General Assembly responsibility for the prisoners and that they should be disposed of, i.e., released, and that the provision in this regard was much too fuzzy.

Mr. Lovett said the attitude of the U.S. Government was not just the attitude of this administration alone. He recalled the petition which had been signed by sixty senators, led by Senator Jenner, calling upon the Government to refuse forcible repatriation. He said the Menon proposal would be forcing the marginal prisoners into a compound from which there was only one exit—to the north. Under these circumstances it was a major problem whether we could get the prisoners to the compound when they realized it was a one-way street. He wondered whose face was being saved, and made the remark that regardless of the answer to that it was our body that was being placed in jeopardy.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that the British point of view was different—that like it or not, they felt it highly desirable to get the Indian resolution passed if possible. He said that he had spent many hours with Menon and the two large points mentioned had, he thought, been agreed. The first of these was that reference to the fact that force should not be used was now contained in the body of the resolution. This point the Chinese would not like and they would turn it down. The second point as set forth in Menon's paragraph 12 as now written indicated that disagreements should go to negotiation here in the GA or in the Commission as an instrument of the GA. He said that, of course, it was the third point which was embodied in paragraph 16 and that he was not satisfied that it showed another way (i.e., a second door) out of the repatriation camp. He thought that, therefore, it was essential that tactics to get a change in this paragraph be used. Mr. Lovett interjected that the Secretary of State had had his staff look it over and that they had a formula which might be considered. Mr. Lloyd continued that Menon had said that his paragraph 16 was a way to the Mexican and Peruvian proposals. General Bradley said that it must be made clear that it was impossible to wait for a political settle-men of the prisoner of war issue and that the GA or the Commission must do this. Mr. Lloyd remarked that one way might be to transfer the body of prisoners to a real neutral. General Bradley replied that the problem is the Chinese prisoners. The North Koreans would be absorbed in South Korea but no nation could absorb 15,000 Chinese—the number estimated to be involved who could not be repatriated except by force—without upsetting its economy.

Mr. Pearson said that in one Menon draft it had been indicated that the Commission should make a recommendation to the General Assembly as to what should be done. Mr. Lovett asked why not release the prisoners after a reasonable period of time. Mr. Pearson said that Menon did not want to include this in his proposal, and he wondered what exit there could be if we did not get agreement on this point—(he implied that they would be better off under those circumstances than if there were no armistice and all prisoners had to remain incarcerated). Mr. Lovett replied that they were not in control and that we could release all those prisoners except those who wanted to go home. Mr. Pearson inquired if this might include sending some of the Chinese to Formosa and said that this could cause a very undesirable reaction. Mr. Lovett remarked that if the Indians would not buy the word "release", why could not the prisoners be "transferred" to a neutral.

Pearson said that if Menon's resolution was introduced tomorrow it could be altered in Committee, but that this would probably happen in a way which would disassociate the Indians from it. Pearson added that he was surprised with regard to what Lovett had said with regard to other points still at issue.

The Secretary said again that there was nothing in the armistice regarding the airfields or Soviet participation on the Commission, and that this was part of a package deal, the third factor in which was non-forcible repatriation. Mr. Pearson inquired whether this meant that, if there was acceptance of non-forcible repatriation, you could accept the other points. Mr. Lovett replied that everyone has assumed that the two preceding points were settled but actually they were adopted conditional to the acceptance of a third point—it was all part of a package. Mr. Pearson remarked that Menon's paragraph 8 constituted a capitulation by him, in that a reference to a non-forcible repatriation was included in the body of the resolution. In its present form it did recognize the principle of non-forcible repatriation. When Mr. Lovett said that he had not seen this, Ambassador Gross said that this had been left out in the copy telegraphed to Washington because Menon had not had it included in the draft in the first instance and when challenged regarding it had said it was through a typographical error.

Mr. Pearson said that, since there was a reference in the draft, why did the marginal prisoners create an additional hazard to that that would exist if the armistice were concluded without this being finally settled. Mr. Lovett replied that the resolution ought to be so simple that the world at large would recognize its major provisions easily. It was now far too fuzzy. He said that General Clark had over 500,000 men for whose safety he was responsible. The South Koreans were bitter enough regarding our seeking an armistice without pressing for a military decision and that incidents would easily occur. It would be hard to identify what would constitute an incident calling for the application of the greater sanction. We want a clear example of the action which will allow us to apply a greater sanction. Mr. Lloyd said that if there were bad faith in the armistice the Communists could tie us up anyhow and could attack at any time, and that we were not, in accepting Menon's solution, in his view, adding to our risk.

Mr. Lovett said that he thought the difference was not in the fact of the second door in the Menon draft but in the clarity of the existence of the second door. He said that Rhee and many other Koreans would love to cause trouble and the foggier a resolution the Unified Command had to work with, the easier this would be. Selwyn Lloyd replied that the reason that the Menon draft was not clear was that the author wanted the Chinese to agree to it. He thought the thing to do was to get the Indians to admit that the principle of the second door was necessary through some maneuver. General Bradley asked what the purpose of an armistice was. He said that in the US Joint Chiefs view it was to achieve peace and create an opportunity to pull our troops out. We had commitments for them elsewhere. We could not justify pulling them out on the basis of this fuzzy armistice. Mr. Pearson said that if under this fuzzy armistice we get the benefits we seek, haven't we achieved a lot. We would get our own men back. Secretary Acheson inquired "Do we?" He said that this is exactly the assurance that we are looking for in seeking a clear-cut armistice. If the Chinese Commander thinks there is any doubt about having us return additional prisoners, he will say he can't release men in his custody until he gets his own men back. The possibilities for confusion and deliberate torturing of the facts in this situation were readily apparent. Mr. Pearson inquired if a 90-day limit were in effect, would not they have to release all UN prisoners in their custody?

General Bradley said that with regard to the prisoners in our custody he felt strongly that if their position was not established in 90 days the UN must handle the prisoners and must arrange for their release. Lloyd said that it might be possible to negotiate Menon into accepting this principle. Lovett said that when the second door plan was set forth at Panmunjom in the form of a suggestion for a prisoner stockade with one door at the north and another at the south, the Reds screamed that they could not permit this. He added that they did not want to accept anything that gave their men freedom of choice. Lloyd said that he was impressed by the fact that we could not expect to afford the military risk unless we had at least reasonable security.

Secretary Acheson said that we had told these prisoners in honor and in conscience that we will not force them to return. Under these circumstances the prisoners when confronted with the idea of proceeding to a neutral zone for a new screening would decide to stay right where they were in the present camps. If, in accepting this agreement, we were accepting a responsibility to force them to proceed to the new Commission camp we would be at that juncture accepting a responsibility we have sworn not to carry out. This was the heart of the matter and there was little point in passing it off as "operational detail". Mr. Lloyd said that he presumed that difficulty would be eliminated if you were in a position to tell them they would be held for only 90 days and then released through a second door. Secretary Acheson then pointed out that retaining men for 90 days raised huge problems in terms of food, shelter, medicine, sanitation, et cetera, which the Commission in terms of its numbers could not hope to carry out from a physical standpoint in a very satisfactory and secure fashion. We were considering undertaking a very risky business and were talking of proposing to do so against the background that, when it came to the ultimate fate of these prisoners, the Commies would never agree to our principle. Mr. Lovett said he thought the key was the release of these prisoners on an urgent basis as soon as they had been put through the new screening. If the Indian proposal was bona fide, and if they wanted to settle this issue, they really should agree to prisoner release. The mechanics of any other course which included the detention of large numbers of prisoners for a period of 90 days was appalling. General Bradley said that he returned again to the idea that to turn them over to a UN agency was fine but there must be a specified time limit. Mr. Lovett remarked that there must be a light in the end of the tunnel or we could never get the prisoners to leave their present locations and enter the tunnel.

Mr. Lloyd said he thought that between us there was a unanimity of purpose all the way through but that there was a certain difference of opinion as to the usefulness of the Menon resolution and also as to the tactics we might employ. At this point Secretary Acheson asked "How important is Menon?" When Mr. Lloyd gave an ambiguous reply, Mr. Acheson said he thought the value of attempting to adopt Menon's principles were illusory and that he thought that they would prove completely useless if we should have to use force. Mr. Lloyd said that Menon had now agreed to the statement of the non-forceful repatriation principle early in his resolution. Mr. Lovett said it was also important what language one would use. If we were agreed on the principle, then our difference is how clearly the resolution was stated, and we did prefer it to be clear, particularly with regard to the part specifying release. As he saw it, we would not get what we like; we would not get the Indians to go along with us, and we would not get the 52 votes which Mr. Lloyd seemed to think was our objective. General Bradley inquired how many people were willing, in Mr. Lloyd's estimation, to leave this question to a political conference. The Secretary interjected that he would not be content with that under any circumstance. He felt it was essential that a definite time be specified when the prisoners must be turned loose. He said the problem was not one of disposal or of care and maintenance. He pointed out that after all, we were caring for some 750,000 Arab refugees from Palestine; 25,000 would not be a problem in Korea. The North Koreans would fade into the population and that would leave only approximately 15,000 Chinese to deal with. He said a camp could easily be established where there was no guard but where the now free men could eat and sleep and that, though they could wander away, they would return to the camp when they got hungry enough. Selwyn Lloyd asked if this might involve a promise not to go to Formosa. Mr. Acheson implied that it would not involve any such promise; that in our contract with the prisoners we had only asked them to indicate that they would in the future follow peaceful pursuits. He said they should be let go to Formosa if they wanted to. Selwyn Lloyd asked what if Chiang Kai-shek conscripted them. Secretary Acheson said he considered this another problem entirely and a similar question could be asked regarding their possible conscription into the Chinese Communist army. He went on to point out that all South East Asia has a vast population of Chinese running from Indochina, through Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma, and that absorption would not really be difficult. At the same time, he pointed out that they could not remain in any given community in Korea unless it was the wish of that community.

Mr. Lloyd said that sending them to Formosa was not what he would want. He inquired if they could not be sent to a UN camp. Mr. Acheson replied "Yes—but as free men." He thought it was imperative that the 15,000 should not stay in or near the neutral zone for long. General Bradley said that this was an important point because there would be a great temptation to the Communist Commanders to break the armistice in order to recapture or kill as many of this group as possible. The Secretary said he wished to emphasize again that although living in this camp they would do so as free men.

Mr. Lloyd said that he thought the thing to do then was to entice the Indians on to an acceptance of our principles. Secretary Acheson said he thought it was important to see who was being enticed. He said certainly no decision with regard to principles was needed. Mr. Lovett inquired whether Menon wouldn't agree on a specific release time. Mr. Gross said that at one point in his drafting Mr. Menon had said that the Commission should be under no inhibitions to release the prisoners. He thought that when Menon had presented his draft to the Soviets he had told them that of course it was always possible that he would make changes in his draft. Secretary Acheson said that in fact Menon had tied his hands. Mr. Lloyd indicated that he thought it was still possible for Menon to achieve some changes without running into too much Soviet opposition. The Secretary stated that since General Bradley and Mr. Lovett had to leave very shortly he wanted to make certain that he understood the US Government position on this matter and that it be set forth clear in front of our Canadian and UK friends. As he understood it, there must first be no forcible repatriation and, secondly, the prisoners must be turned loose in a reasonable time. Mr. Lovett replied that this was absolutely right—there must be two doors in order that the prisoners could be turned loose and that force could not be used in their repatriation. Mr. Lloyd inquired whether the camp to be established could not be described as a loose camp—that is that it would be under only casual observation. The Secretary reiterated that they would no longer be prisoners and could come and go as they wished.

The Secretary then inquired what the group thought we should do tactically. Should the 21-power resolution be overthrown? Mr. Gross said he thought it was highly desirable to stick to the 21-power resolution; that the Greeks and Turks and Colombians and others had very forcibly expressed themselves against any toying with Menon's ideas and against any concession regarding the principles set forth in the 21-power resolution. Gross said he thought that if Menon were to circulate the resolution many of the 21 sponsoring countries would say "the hell with it" and would inquire of the US when it was going to stop going up the garden path with Menon. As Mr. Gross saw it, the US had two alternatives. The first was to go back to the 21-power resolution and the second was to have somebody else introduce a "dry-cleaned" version of the Menon draft.

Mr. Lovett said that he wished to state in closing that if something were not achieved beyond a moral victory in terms of unanimity on one side and a turndown by the Communists on the other, that alternatives, although distasteful, were under consideration since it was imperative that we have a design for a future course of action. It was [not] in the tradition of this country to fight only to a military stalemate. We had established the principle of collective security and we must preserve the principle of no forceful repatriation. If, in doing this, we could not achieve an honorable armistice then, while he was not a crystal ball gazer, he saw a strong probability that the US would seek a military conclusion.

Mr. Lloyd said that of course the US carried such a major load in terms of the UN action that US judgment must be decisive. He was appreciative of the US role and felt that his own in the premise might be considered little more than recommendations and counsel but that nevertheless he hoped that they would be given fair consideration. It was Mr. Lloyd's view that a reenforcement of public opinion over the world and particularly in the UK was necessary, and that this could be achieved through a 52-nation resolution even if the 52-nation resolution was turned down. Secretary Lovett said that if any government puts forward a proposal or plan in the hope that it will be turned down, it must in all responsibility have ready a course of action and must expect that it may be accepted. To do otherwise would be most dangerous and foolish and he thought that Lloyd would agree. Mr. Lloyd said that he did, but that he was looking forward to state [*sic*] two proposals which he thought would be very difficult in terms of finding a sizeable majority. He thought from the standpoint of UK public opinion that some maneuver of the kind he had discussed would be a helpful and useful thing. Mr. Lovett said that responsibility demanded that whatever was set forth would be livable if accepted, and Secretary Acheson added it has got to be right.

At this juncture Secretary Lovett and General Bradley left the meeting, Mr. Pearson having left some 10 minutes earlier in order to participate in a telecast.

320/11-1752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

New York, November 17, 1952—10:30 p. m.

Delga 209. Re Korea. Meeting twenty-one sponsors held this morning to discuss developments and particularly Indian draft res.

Secy recalled that he and others had welcomed any suggestions consistent with fundamental principle non-forcible repatriation of PWs. Referring to various developments and suggestions, Secy stressed three essential points any proposal must meet:

(1) Clear and categorical affirmation principle non-forcible repatriation;
(2) Any commission or other machinery must be workable and designed to determine expeditiously attitudes of PWs;
(3) PW problem must be disposed of in brief period following armistice with PWs having real choice of either going home or otherwise being released.

Stressing last point in particular, Secy pointed out that in true sense there would not be forcible repatriation if only choice given to PWs were to go home or remain in indefinite captivity. If this were only choice given to PWs he noted, it would require use of force to transfer PWs to commission, which we could not agree to do. Secy also explained that disposition non-repatriates is not serious problem. Koreans, who constituted larger portion of PWs, could be assimilated in Korea;

Chinese would be free to go anywhere, with UN offering them care as refugees until they were in fact resettled. Secy cited as example Palestine refugees in which UN was caring for much larger group.

If large numbers these Chinese wanted to go to Formosa he saw no reason why they should not. Armistice agreement provides that they would not again participate in Korean conflict. If there is risk they might be enrolled in Chinese Nationalist Armies, there is far greater risk that Commies will enroll in their armies the many more thousands PWs returning to them.

Referring to tactics, Secy said that in general we have two alternatives—either to amend our own res, drawing into it useful suggestions from Indian or other proposals, or to amend Menon res to make it acceptable. He indicated preference for first course, since it would be easier to maintain and hold majority for our draft than for process of amending someone else's.

With exception of Canada, sponsors did not at this meeting dissent from Secy's analysis on essential substantive points. Canada, however, thought that it might be desirable to go along with Menon's final paragraph which would obscure disposition of non-repatriates and let time dispose of that problem. While no one else publicly supported Canada, staff believes, on basis private comments made previously, that this suggestion will probably find some support at least from France and UK.

Several other dels, notably French, following Selwyn Lloyd's lead, took line that except for final para Menon draft Indian res generally acceptable.

Denmark, however, also stressed importance of composition and workability of commission, and Norway reminded group that Sweden and Switzerland said they would not serve unless functions of commission clear and workable. Toward close of meeting Secy spoke again in reply to Canada, emphasizing that final para is heart of Menon proposal and India wld probably agree to change it. He stressed that this para entailed greatest possible danger and problem of disposition of PWs is not one which time will cure. Secy reiterated that if PWs have no future other than indefinite captivity, they will forcibly resist being sent to commission. He pointed out also that concept of indefinite retention is monstrosity creating impossible practical problems which commission of kind Menon contemplates could not possibly resolve or handle. Result will be that armistice will be worthless. For with continuing explosive PW sitn UNC will have to keep all its troops in battle position with ever present danger resumption hostilities over this quest. He stressed in strongest terms that prob is not to find words that obscure issue but to solve PW prob definitively on humanitarian basis.

On tactics majority of sponsors who referred to problem thought it would be better to make necessary amendments in Indian res than to amend and push through twenty-one power proposal. In addition to

UK, France, and Canada, countries like Turkey took view that Indian res might have better chance of being acceptable to Communists and that it would be better to have Russians vote against an Indian res than against ours.

It was decided establish working group consisting of US, UK, France, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, and Turkey to consider resolution as finally introduced by India today, and explore possibility of amendments which might make it acceptable. (Canada was added at France's suggestion.)

In general meeting disclosed strong desires most other dels to go to great lengths to meet Indian initiative, in hope that this might lead to armistice or at least to unanimous non-Communist support for GA action.

We intend in working group meeting tomorrow, Nov 18, to present as working paper revised Menon res set forth in Gadel 57[1] as revised at meeting with Johnson and Secy over weekend, with view to having working group report to sponsors on Nov 19.

ACHESON

---

[1] Not printed (320/11-1552).

Editorial Note

The 8-power subcommittee of the sponsors of the 21-power resolution (see telegram Delga 209, November 17, *supra,* for its composition) met twice on November 18 with Spender of Australia as chairman. The principal issue facing the group was whether to proceed on the basis of a modified 21-power resolution or on the basis of the Indian resolution amended to make it acceptable. Gross, who represented the United States Delegation, argued firmly for the former course of action and showed the group the kind of amendments to the 21-power resolution the United States was prepared to make (based on telegrams Delga 151, November 8, and Gadel 48, November 10, pages 588 and 597, respectively). When pressed by Spender, Gross also gave the subcommittee the changes set out in telegram Delga 212, November 18, not printed (320/11-1852), which the United States would require in the Menon resolution to make it acceptable. The subcommittee did not reach a decision on how to proceed; only the representatives of Turkey and Colombia sympathized with the United States desire to proceed with the 21-power resolution. The United Kingdom, Canada, France, and, to a lesser extent, Australia favored proceeding on the basis of the Indian resolution. These meetings were reported on in telegram Delga 219, November 19 (320/11-1952), and memorandum by Popper to the Secretary of State, November 19 (795.00/11-1952).

795.00/11-1852

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 18 November 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is attached a memorandum dated 17 November 1952 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining the military reasons why it would be undesirable to conclude an armistice in Korea on the basis that the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war be left for subsequent settlement. I fully concur in the military reasons outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.

In addition to the points outlined in the memorandum it appears to me that deferral of the question of non-repatriated prisoners of war for subsequent settlement would result, due to probable Communist delays in the final settlement of the Korean conflict, in an indefinite maintenance of at least the present level of U.S. forces in Korea, with the probability that United States forces will have to be increased if we are to maintain military strength comparable to that of the Communists. It is felt that Communist tactics would most certainly include tying up large numbers of U.S. forces in Korea. In addition, it occurs to me that subsequent to an armistice in which the question of non-repatriates is deferred to later negotiation, there would develop in the United States a substantial pressure to "bring the boys home." Such pressures would be difficult to resist and might result in considerable weakening in the U.S. military strength in Korea while the Communists would be engaged in a substantial military buildup.

I consider that deferral of the question of non-repatriated prisoners of war to a political conference, following a truce, would lead to protracted delays in which we would be faced with increasing pressures to either retreat from our announced position of no forced repatriation, or concede to Communist demands on other important issues in order to secure Communist agreement to the UN position of no forced repatriation.

In view of the foregoing it is my view that the United States position with respect to a truce in Korea must continue to be on the basis that we will not agree to any proposal that leaves the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war for subsequent settlement.

Sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

---

[1] In a covering memorandum by Johnson to Kitchen, dated Nov. 18, 1952, Johnson admitted he was not sure why Lovett had sent this communication, but he was forwarding it to the Secretary of State as requested. Johnson noted that the letter and the attached memorandum from the JCS "appear merely to confirm the discussions which we have had with the JCS [and] which the Secretary has had with General Bradley and Mr. Lovett."

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 17 November 1952.

Subject: United States Position on Korea in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum of 27 October 1952,[2] subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare a statement embodying the reasons substantiating the military point of view that it would be undesirable to conclude an armistice in Korea in which the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war (POW's) would be left for subsequent settlement.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the reasons set forth in the succeeding paragraphs provide adequate grounds for their view that it would be unwise for the United States to agree to an armistice "arranged on the basis of the agreed provisions and immediate exchange of those prisoners of war willing to be repatriated, leaving only the disposition of non-repatriates for subsequent settlement." In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that such a proposal carries the presumption that agreement to an armistice on this basis would automatically settle both the airfield question and the matter of the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which, at present, remain unresolved.

3. *a.* In their proposal of 28 April 1952[3] (the so-called "package" proposal) the United Nations Command (UNC) representatives stated unequivocally that acceptance by the UNC of the Communist proposal regarding reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields was contingent upon acceptance by the Communists of the UNC position regarding POW's and the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Moreover, the UNC representatives stated then that this was the UNC's final offer and no substantive changes in this proposal would be acceptable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this concession by the UNC with respect to the airfield question is of such importance that it would only be warranted if it resulted in a final and complete resolution of the POW problem followed by an armistice with no residual military issues remaining to be resolved. Agreement to an armistice on the basis of that set forth in paragraph 2 above would breach the "package" proposal and would constitute an unwarranted concession on this important issue, which would be extremely damaging to the prestige of the United States;

---

[2] Not printed.

[3] For text of the proposal, see telegram C 67603, Apr. 26, p. 173.

b. On 28 September 1952 the UNC representatives presented proposals[4] to the Communists relating to the POW issue which, while adhering to the principle of nonforcible repatriation of POW's, offered the Communists a wide selection of choices for a reasonable solution of this problem. The subsequent firm rejection of these proposals by the Communists is evidence that they have no present disposition to accept this principle or to agree to an armistice with such acceptance as a precondition. It appears logical to assume, therefore, that if they were to agree to a deferral of this question for later solution it would only be in the interests of serving ulterior motives;

c. The principal factor favorable to the UNC in the present military situation in Korea is the air superiority which the UNC air forces hold over North Korea. This air superiority has enabled the UNC to defeat, in large measure, the attempts by the Communists to rebuild and restore airfields, railroads, bridges, and other communication facilities. This action combined with the naval blockade of North Korea, has thus deprived the Communists of the means to transport and support military forces considerably larger than those which they are now able to supply and maintain in the combat area in Korea. This air superiority is an important element in the ability of the UN ground forces to maintain their positions in the face of the superior numbers of the enemy forces. It also constitutes the most potent means, at present available to the UNC, of maintaining the degree of military pressure which might impel the Communists to agree, finally, to acceptable armistice terms;

d. Communist air forces operating from restored bases in North Korea would be within easy striking distance of the UN front lines, lines of communications, and rear installations. At a minimum they would be in a position to harass and disrupt troop and supply movements, render close support to their ground forces, subject UN ground forces to air attack and render UN air reconnaissance and bombing missions much more costly than they are at present. They could challenge more effectively UN superiority in the air and, in time, possibly could counterbalance the UN air effort over North Korea. Under these conditions the build-up of Communist ground forces and support for those forces could proceed with comparative impunity. With the loss of UN superiority in the air, accompanied by a considerable build-up of Communist ground forces and supplies in the forward area, the security of the UN forces would be seriously jeopardized;

e. With the coming into force of an armistice the Communists could, and undoubtedly would, undertake without molestation the reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields in North Korea as well as the restoration of other communication facilities. The restored airfields could then, on short notice, become fully operational, should the Communists elect to resume hostilities. Their attainment of the increased capability referred to in subparagraph 3*d*, above, would then become a distinct possibility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that this possibility will exist whether or not unresolved issues remain after an armistice comes into effect. They recognize also that should the Communists desire to violate the armistice and to resume hostilities they could readily concoct a pretext. However, with the POW question not completely resolved, they would be presented with a "prefabricated" pretext in the likely event that post-armistice negotiations on this issue became prolonged; and

---

[4] For the text of the proposal, see telegram Z 23092, Sept. 28, p. 545.

f. In view of the refusal by the Communists in the face of military pressure to agree to the principle of no forced repatriation, it can hardly be expected that they would agree to that principle in the post-armistice negotiations. It is more likely that they would prolong their intransigent tactics while improving their military facilities in North Korea. On the other hand, with this important issue remaining unresolved and affording the Communists a ready pretext for violation of the armistice, it is probable that the United Nations representatives would come under increasing pressure for settlement of this problem on the Communist terms, in order to reduce the threat of a renewal of hostilities under conditions favorable to the Communists.

4. The foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflect and are consistent with the views on this subject held by General Clark, Commander in Chief, Far East, and the Chief of the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, Lieutenant General W. K. Harrison.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

795.00/11-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, November 18, 1952—1 p. m.

2825. Following obtained in strictest confidence from FonOff yesterday:

1. Indian Ambassador Raghavan saw Chou En-lai twice last month on or about October 16 and 31 re Korean armistice negotiations. During interviews Chou made points about as follows:

(*a*) ChiComs still want armistice.

(*b*) Although ChiComs continue to hold fast to principles of Geneva convention requiring total repatriation of POWs, no objection to "declassification" Korean POWs.

(*c*) Principle of non-forcible repatriation included in all three United States (United Nations) alternate proposals and therefore they all unacceptable. Mechanics governing repatriation POWs are however subject negotiation. Time lag between any agreement in principle to repatriate and actual repatriation all POWs may well be considerable.

2. According Raghavan, ChiComs taken aback United Nations "broke off" negotiations at Panmunjom and anxious they be reopened there.

. . . .

4. Informant said there was unmistakable indication public opinion in United Kingdom building up rapidly in favor compromise. FonOff receiving more and more letters demanding conclusion armistice at any cost, and asking why welfare Chinese POWs who had already switched allegiance first in favor ChiComs and now resisting repatriation should be valued above welfare and repatriation British POWs.

5. Embassy comment:

(*a*) According today's London *Times*, Indians propose that, after ninety days, problem of disposition of POWs who have not by that time been sent home under auspices neutral repatriation commission will be referred to Korean political conference contemplated under armistice agreement. Perhaps Indians, having in mind Chou's comment recorded in para 1(*c*) above, have made proposal in realization it leaves repatriation question open for further ChiCom propaganda on POW issue and for possible use as lever exact additional political concessions. It is assumed, however, overriding Indian consideration is achievement of armistice.

(*b*) FonOff informant speculated ChiComs anxious get negotiations back to Panmunjom because (1) they wish conduct own attendant propaganda campaign and (2) they do not entirely trust Russians. Inference is Soviets may wish irrevocable sabotage negotiations while ChiComs may wish retain initiative and strive for armistice on terms suitable to them.

GIFFORD

Editorial Note

Following the national election on November 4, 1952, the Truman administration began active cooperation with representatives of President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower to assure a smooth administrative transition. The climax of this cooperation came on November 18, 1952 when the President-elect met with President Truman at the White House. Korea was a prominent issue both in the background papers and proposals leading to the White House meeting, and during the meeting itself. For documentation on efforts to assure a smooth administrative transition regarding foreign policy, during November 1952–January 1953, see volume I, Part 1, pages 1 ff.

IO files, lot 71 D 440

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 17, 1952.
US/A/M(Chr)/250

The Secretary opened the meeting and referred to certain "corridor gossip" regarding the election of a Secretary-General. He urged an attitude of reticence upon the members of the Delegation. He said that it would be unwise to be drawn into speculation regarding this or that individual. He himself had tried to give the excuse as a means of buying more time for our preparations that perhaps Mr. Lie would not be adamant but rather would be willing to finish his term. The Secretary suggested that the members of the Delegation await the results of staff consideration of this matter before becoming involved in conversations on it.

1. *Korean Question* (Document SD/A/C.1/396/Rev.2); [2] Draft Resolutions A/C.1/725 (Twenty-one Power), A/C.1/730 (Mexican), A/C.1/732 (Peruvian), A/C.1/729/Rev.2 (Soviet).

The Secretary suggested that, since he and Ambassador Gross had been doing most of the "infighting" of the last week, he could give an adequate picture of the recent developments. He recalled that during the week, prior to Vishinsky's speech,[3] the Soviet Foreign Minister and Mr. Gromyko had been seeing the "neutralists", urging these delegations on with their various schemes for solving the Korean question. After the Soviets had stimulated a good deal of activity, Vishinsky had spoken and said, in effect, that he would not budge. This was a very familiar tactical move. Having gotten these "neutralist" delegations aroused to the point where they felt they must come forward with proposed solutions, the Soviets had then made it quite clear that they would not move from their position. The momentum thus created required an outlet which resulted in a search for some formula which would be much closer to the wishes of the Soviets. It was no longer a question of saving face for the Russians and satisfying our demands, but rather of giving the Soviets the decision and trying to save our face.

Everything had come to a head with the activities of Krishna Menon (India) who seemed to be a master of putting words together so that they conveyed no idea at all. His scheme would be to turn the prisoners of war over to some other "outfit" which would re-educate them.

---

[1] These minutes were drafted by Charles D. Cook, Adviser to the U.S. Permanent Mission at the United Nations on Nov. 19. Secretary Acheson, Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Wiley, and Ambassador Gross led the list of participants at this meeting which was attended by 42 members of the U.S. Delegation and the Permanent Staff.

[2] For text of this position paper, see p. 599.

[3] The speech of Nov. 10 before the First Committee; see footnote 1, p. 598.

He had alleged that the number of prisoners who were unwilling to be repatriated had been overestimated and that in fact, very probably, as a result of the re-education, they would all want to return.

During many conversations with Mr. Menon, the Secretary and Ambassador Gross had tried to make absolutely clear the firm proposals put forth by the Unified Command at Panmunjom: (1) No force of any kind should be used on prisoners of war; (2) Any group, whether a Commission or anything else, having the task of applying the POW provisions, must be clearly organized and completely workable. If both sides have equal representation then there must be an umpire. Otherwise a stalemate would exist. The problem of solving the ultimate disposition of prisoners of war could not be worked out in New York but only in Panmunjom by the men who knew all the related problems and complicating factors; (3) Regardless of who would be in charge of determining the wishes of the prisoners of war, there must be two exits: one for those who wish to return and the other for those who refuse. Menon had apparently been working on an idea which was tantamount to having only one exit—that which led to repatriation. His idea meant that the Unified Command would be required to use force, to turn them into "a sausage machine" from which they could only emerge as "sausage". This, of course, was completely contrary to our position. Such was the "battle which had raged" for the past few weeks.

Every deviation from our principles pointed out in Menon's draft was claimed by the Indian representative to be a "typographical error". The Secretary noted the text of the Indian resolution which was before the Delegation, and which had not, up to that moment, been tabled. In this text only the portion entitled "Proposals" was to be transmitted to the Communists. He noted that whereas the idea that force was not to be used was contained in the "inducing" paragraphs, it had been dropped out of the proposals. There was a further confusion between paragraphs 8 and 9 which literally meant that force was both in and out. This kind of operation was what made one wonder whether Menon was trying to achieve the same results as we were, said the Secretary. Furthermore, paragraph 16 referred to the turning over of unrepatriated prisoners of war to the post-armistice political conference. In simple terms this meant a continuation of the deadlock. The Secretary had told Menon that there must be two exits, one for those who wanted to go home, the other for those who would be released as free men. The Secretary had suggested that there was really no problem in connection with releasing North Koreans who did not want to go back to the Communist regime. It was like people from Connecticut being released in New Jersey where they speak the same language, have the same culture and simply live in another part of the same country. As far as the Chinese Communists, who were unwilling to return, were concerned, there were some 15,000 of them. When Menon had protested about the trouble necessitated by taking care of them, the Secretary had replied that it was certainly no worse than the problems entailed with the hundreds of thousands of Palestine refugees. Menon had then expressed concern that Chiang Kai-shek might get these men. The Secretary had pointed out that some 83,000 would be going back to the Chinese Communists and that we could be expected to do much more to live up to the armistice agreement which prohibited enlisting former prisoners of war on our side than the Communists with regard to those going back to Communist China.

Finally, the Secretary said that Menon planned to table his resolution very soon, but whether it would be better or worse than the draft we had seen was completely unknown. Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that the Indian draft resolution made no provision for a Chairman for the Commission. The Secretary recalled that paragraph 13 spoke in somewhat unclear terms of an umpire. This man would not be a member of the Commission, but would apparently only walk into the Commission Room when there was disagreement and magically solve all problems. What the Indians, or at least Menon, did not understand was that the umpire would be the sole administrative officer. No provision had been made for housing, feeding, clothing, or otherwise taking care of the prisoners of war. The Secretary said that perhaps one POW camp at a time could be declared a demilitarized zone where the Commission could take charge. He thought that perhaps General Clark might be able to work this out.

The Secretary indicated that the Indian draft had gone to Washington where the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department officers had worked on it Friday night and all day Saturday.[4] They had reworded it so as to be acceptable to the United States. General Bradley and Secretary Lovett had come to New York on Sunday and, after a meeting with the members of the Delegation, had spoken to some of the representatives of the group of twenty-one powers who had become a little weak on this matter.[5] General Bradley had pointed out to them that the Unified Command could not run the risk, if rioting should break out among the prisoners of war, of not being able to handle matters appropriately.

The group of twenty-one was to meet that morning and consider the Indian draft and our reactions to it. It might be possible to amend the twenty-one power draft resolution with the acceptable parts of the Indian draft. On the other hand, we could let Menon go ahead with his draft and seek to amend it. There was one danger in following the latter course.This was that each time a change was made we would have to be sure that all the twenty-one powers knew where we stood with regard to it. Since inertia tended to operate against rather than for amendments, it would be easier to follow the course of amending our own resolution. However, it might be necessary to go along with Menon to the extent of trying to amend his resolution. We might so amend his resolution that he would be unable to vote for it. The Secretary asked Senator Wiley if he had any comments.

---

[4] For the formal consultations between the Joint Chiefs and the Department of State, see the memorandum of discussion, Nov. 15, p. 634.

[5] For a report on the meeting with the British and Canadians, see the draft memorandum of conversation, Nov. 16, p. 637.

Senator Wiley [6] said "your wisdom is so immense that I have nothing to say". The Secretary answered that it was not wisdom, but patience which was required in this situation. Admiral Struble [7] had no comment to make. Ambassador Gross noted that he had asked Menon whether the latter had given the resolution with the "typographical error" in it to the Soviets. Menon had dismissed this by saying that he could always tell the Russians he might make changes in the text. Furthermore, Menon thought the attitude of the Chinese Communists was much more important than that of the Russians. Ambassador Gross said that he had raised this simply to illustrate the "fuzziness" in the Indians' thinking.

Mr. Charles Allen [8] referred to the press problems if Menon tabled his resolution and US comment were sought. The Secretary agreed that this was an important aspect and suggested emphasizing that he and others had pointed out our willingness to accept constructive ideas not inconsistent with our principles. Then it could be pointed out that there were certain disturbing elements in the Indian draft. Ambassador Gross felt that what was told to the twenty other sponsors would doubtless become public. He thought we should be frank both with them and with the public, which would amount to the same thing.

Mr. Sprague [9] cautioned against allowing our own public opinion to become fuzzy. He felt that we should make clear what was unacceptable without saying we were against the whole thing. Mr. Allen agreed with this.

Ambassador Jessup suggested an off-the-record or background press conference to accomplish the desired result. Mr. Charles Allen noted that this idea had been discussed and thought that the time might be at hand.

Mr. Sprague considered Korea to be the big question for the American public, and suggested that we would have to "walk warily, but in a straight line".

---

[6] Senator Alexander Wiley, U.S. Representative at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[7] Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[8] Director, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Permanent Mission at the United Nations.

[9] Charles A. Sprague, U.S. Alternate Representative at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

Ambassador Gross thought that it would be necessary for the Secretary to make another speech in the First Committee that week. He warned that U.S. statements outside the Committee Room made our friends think that we were taking the debate beyond the Assembly. He recalled an example where after Zafrulla Khan's [10] speech our opposition to his ideas had been set forth in a background conference. This position had been picked up by the paper as "a U.S. Delegate said . . .[11] etc.", and the Danish Delegation, for one, had told us they felt this to be an unfortunate way of handling the matter.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that it was important to point out the things in a document which a newspaperman might not see. Stories were often written based on a quick scanning of a document without a detailed knowledge having been applied to it. Unless they were trained to look at the implications behind the words, they might get the wrong idea entirely. Mr. Charles Allen said that this could be and had been done. He suggested that ten or twelve trusted American correspondents, who needed guidance very badly, could be given this kind of information and thereby avoid unnecessary commotion. The Secretary said that he would be glad to speak to the newsmen, but had certain time limitations. Ambassador Jessup suggested that Ambassador Gross and Mr. Charles Allen handle this if Menon introduced his resolution. Ambassador Gross reported that Menon had told a United Kingdom representative that he would table his resolution that morning. However, one never knew with Menon just what he was going to do. Mr. Charles Allen suggested making quite sure with the Indians when they would table their resolution and then quickly setting up a background conference. After this was agreed to, the meeting was adjourned.

CHARLES D. COOK

---

[10] Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Relations and Chairman of the Pakistani Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[11] Ellipsis in the source text.

320/11-1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 19, 1952—11:47 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 224. Re: Korea. Limited distribution. Secretary spoke to Eden several times today in regard to Korea.

I. At morning meeting, in reply to Eden's question whether US was unalterably opposed to Menon effort, Secretary told him that we never were opposed to his effort and do not oppose it now. What is important is that Menon effort be consistent with what we are trying to do. Secretary told Eden that situation now called for firm US UK agreement along the following lines:

1. Agreement must be reached on revision of para 17. Secretary gave Eden text [1] (telephoned to Department) to which Eden raised no objection but said he would discuss with Selwyn Lloyd.
2. If UK and US agreed on para 17 then they could proceed to agree on other proposed changes, some of which we considered essential. Secretary did not believe this should cause too much difficulty since Lloyd had indicated that our proposed changes were generally acceptable.
3. When agreement was reached on all the changes then there should be a meeting of the 21 to secure their support.
4. Thereafter we could consider the best tactics for getting the changes made.

Secretary told Eden that if UK agreed to stick firmly on above basis, US would not oppose giving precedence to Menon draft. He made it clear that if 21 powers remained firm, there would be no problem about getting revised Menon draft adopted regardless of Menon's own attitude to particular changes.

Eden stated that he understood. He was going to meet with Pearson and Menon to go over Menon's proposed speech but would like to see Secretary before that time, after he had spoken with Selwyn Lloyd. Eden suggested also a meeting of the 21 sponsors immediately following Menon speech in Committee 1 this afternoon.[2] Secretary told him that it wouldn't matter to US when the 21 sponsors met, but there was no point in holding the meeting until agreement was reached between US and UK on lines indicated above.

II. Shortly before noon, Eden returned with Selwyn Lloyd and met with Secretary, Gross and Hickerson. UK took the line that there was no hurry about reaching agreement on para 17 or other amendments and that they should wait until after Menon's speech and subsequent debate, which might clarify some of points which concerned US. Secretary insisted that it was necessary to reach agreement on para 17 in particular. It was agreed that Lloyd and Gross would meet during lunch hour to try to work out agreed text. Also, meeting of working group of 8 countries should meet after close of Committee 1 in afternoon.

III. Gross met with Lloyd, but no progress was made in gaining UK agreement to amended text of para 17.

---

[1] The U.S. text of paragraph 17 read as follows: "At the end of ninety days from the signing of the armistice agreement the Repatriation Commission shall release any prisoners of war [whose return to their homeland has] not been effected in accordance with the procedures set out above." This change was the result of a meeting among Acheson, Gross, Johnson, and the UN Mission staff; telegram Delga 212, Nov. 18, 1952 (320/11-1852).

[2] The Indian resolution (UN document A/C.1/734) was circulated in the First Committee on Nov. 17. At the next session of the Committee, Nov. 19, Menon commented point by point on it; see UN document A/C.1/SR.525.

IV. Gross went to working group meeting, therefore, without having reached agreement with UK. At meeting, he took firm stand that US would not go along with revised Menon draft unless firm agreement reached on necessary amendments. Full report this meeting in separate tel.[3]

V. Secretary seeing Eden tonight in effort to gain his agreement along lines indicated in morning conversation.

ACHESON

---

[3] *Infra.*

320/11-1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 19, 1952—11:59 p. m.[1]
PRIORITY

Delga 225. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Fol conclusion of Menon speech in Comite 1 this afternoon. 8 power subcomite (Delga 209)[2] met at UN headquarters.

Spender (Australia), in chair, opened with statement that events have forced us to consider Menon res first. He stated Australia not prepared to accept Indian res in present form, particularly as to para 17. While it was important to gain Asian support, it was at least as important that co-sponsors not reveal open differences with US. Hence subcomite task was to mold Indian res to meet essential US points.

Gross stated US was in somewhat difficult position. Its public opinion viewed Korean situation with deep emotion; it wld be disastrous to reveal differences of opinion among us. We appreciated free world public opinion desire for conclusion of armistice agreement. Question was what contribution UN cld make. US did not overlook value of gaining broad support, but Gross wondered what objective wld be served by this particular Indian initiative and what effect it wld have. The present Indian draft was unacceptable. By pushing it, Indian Govt has damaged our efforts in Korea by weakening our stance in face of intransigent Commies and by forcing those who want an armistice to negotiate with Indians, with underlying uncertainty whether Menon might not after all withdraw support for his own res when amended. By tabling draft he knew was unacceptable to US, Menon has deflected public opinion from simple, understandable and moral 21-power draft stressing an intelligible moral issue. Menon, Gross continued, did not in his speech agree that GA shld appoint umpire if 4 members of Repatriation Comm did not do so, even though he had earlier told Gross this was a "natural assumption". Menon's para 17 did not provide clearly for release of PWs unwilling to return home; it did not include a rigid time limit; and it did not include useful point that UN agency shld be able to care for released former PWs without retaining custody over them. Gross concluded by stating that if desirability of Asian support was considered to be so great we had to compromise with principles, then it was fruitless to discuss details in Indian res, since US cld not agree.

---

[1] The dateline of the file copy read 11:59 a.m., an obvious error corrected here by the editors.

[2] Dated Nov. 17, p. 645.

After Spender had repeated his belief that Menon res cld be modified if group wished to do so and that it wld be tragedy if difference over this point divided co-sponsors, Gross circulated informally among members of subcomite fol tentative redraft para 17, Menon res:

> "Within 90 days from the signing of the armistice agreement, any POW whose return to his homeland has not been effected in accordance with the procedures set out above shall be released by the Repatriation Comm.
>
> The Repatriation Comm shall assist UNKRA in caring for such persons and in arranging for their settlement and return to peaceful pursuits."

Jebb agreed it was desirable to maintain common front, but stressed importance considering UK public opinion. Jebb said Brit public wld not understand it if Menon res not taken as basis for GA action, if basic principles were safeguarded. Para 17 was not entirely satisfactory, but Menon did not exclude idea of amendment. Jebb has no doubt that after discussion and possibly another mtg of subcomite, Menon cld be persuaded on para 17. Perhaps the Americans thought a tough, firm policy wld be best means of obtaining armistice; Brit disagreed. If it was helpful to take measures to save Commie's face and to negot with Menon, that was acceptable. Jebb hoped US wld not insist on any alterations except to para 17 and possibly para 14. Re umpire, it was better to keep rest of res in "Menonese" which wld appeal to Commies.

Jebb suggested another mtg tomorrow morning.

Gross pointed out that lapse of time drove us farther and farther away from prospect of voting on present 21-power res. We had delayed in doing this and hoped Menon wld table an acceptable res. How much damage had been done through submission Menon's unacceptable draft. The matter must now be brought to a head. Unless Menon draft was properly amended we wld have to adhere to idea of priority for 21-power res. Martin (Canada) attached greatest importance to what Menon had said. Martin stated he had talked frankly with Menon over past month and latter was at almost every turn most willing to accept reasonable suggestions. Martin suggested he and Lloyd shld sit down with Menon and attempt to persuade latter to change paras 17 and 14.

Other suggestions for change shld not be carried out through formal amendment procedure but in some other informal way.

Restrepo [3] (Colombia) voiced his suspicion of the Indian res. He pointed out that lengthy conversations with Menon has not succeeded in reaching satisfactory arrangements re release of PWs and umpire. These points were still obscure in res. Colombia wld prefer to adhere to the 21-power draft but wld yield, if others desired, to acceptable Indian res.

Hoppenot (France), stressing the need for the broadest possible support for res, contended that the Menon text now met the one fundamental principle—that there shld be no use of force. We shld not now formulate new principles, such as those relating to umpire and unconditional release of PWs. It was true that some parts of the Menon res were objectionable, but nothing in it was now unacceptable. Even if suggestions for amendment of paras 14 and 17 were not adopted, he wld be disposed, subject to instructions from his govt, to vote for the present Menon draft and wld in any case vote for priority for the Menon res, since he laid great weight upon the explanatory statement made by Menon today. It seemed to him a barren procedure to go back to the 21-power res.

Amby [4] (Denmark) stressed the importance of the 21 powers standing together. If the Menon res were utilized, he said, it was essential that necessary amendments be included even if Menon did not agree. He strongly objected to going to Menon to negot with him because inevitable result wld be to cut down 21-power demands. He voiced satisfaction with formulation para 17 circulated by Gross, and closed with a sharp warning against pushing matters to point where US cld not vote for a res on Korea. Sarper (Turkey) took same gen line but less strongly. He doubted Menon res wld necessarily obtain priority in comite if stood together against that. He challenged French suggestion of voting for present Menon draft as a complete surrender. The more the 21 powers yielded, he declared, the lower wld be the point from which UN wld have to start bargaining with the Russians. Before a decision was taken on priority, he felt, group shld attempt to find out whether Menon wld accept necessary amendments.

Spender intervened again to stress inadvisability of seeking to prevent Menon res from gaining priority. He believed it was necessary to agree now on alterations which must be made in Menon draft, and wld recommend that his del not support Menon res unless it were suitably amended re paras 14 and 17. Speaking re para 17, Hoppenot stated he preferred draft suggested earlier by Selwyn Lloyd but was willing, if 21 were so disposed, to seek more substantial amendment. He did not believe we had to accept conditions from Menon, but reiterated that even if suitable amendments were not accepted that wld not affect his gen support for Menon res.

---

[3] Cipriano Restrepo, Colombian Ambassador to the United States and Representative at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[4] Kristan Amby, Member of the Danish Parliament and Representative at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

Jebb appealed for some delay to reach decisions on amendment and priority problems and for going to Menon thereafter. Gross repeated argument that passage of time prejudiced position of those who preferred priority for 21 power res and emphasized fact group shld not negot with Menon—a view echoed by Martin.

Mtg closed with suggestion of Spender that subcomite report to 21-power group at mtg which might perhaps be held Nov 20.

ACHESON

795.00/11-2052

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 20, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The situation here at the United Nations on the Korean question is continuing to develop along the lines I discussed with you Tuesday morning.[2] Because of the potential dangers of this situation, I would like to keep you in as close touch with it as possible by frequent telegraphic reports.

I think we have reached a situation in this debate in which it is no longer a question whether the draft resolution we and 20 other states sponsored is to pass or the compromise resolution introduced by Krishna Menon of India will pass. Our resolution, you will remember, was a straightforward endorsement of the UNC position in the armistice negotiations. The Indian resolution includes complex procedural arrangements for carrying out the disposition of POWs and was drafted by him in such a way as to make it as easy as possible, in his opinion, for the Communists to accept it. We have now reached a point at which the only question is whether we can lead the 20 powers to amend Menon resolution along the lines worked out with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Menon made an emotional speech today in the political committee. It was fuzzy but nevertheless seemed to exert a powerful appeal to a large number of wavering delegations.

As I mentioned to you, our basic problem has not been with Menon, but with the British, Canadians and French, who feel strongly we should accept Menon's resolution even though it waters down considerably the principles on which we have taken our stand at Panmunjom. The British, Canadians and French think such a resolution might produce an armistice. They have grave apprehensions about what the new administration may do regarding Korea, and therefore show a desperate anxiety to exhaust all possibilities for an armistice now, however remote. They argue that even if an armistice were not to result, Menon's resolution would still attract solid Asiatic support. They are very soft on our principles, particularly on our insistence that all POWs who do not wish to return home be freed within a short period of time.

---

[1] The source text was transmitted to the Department of State for the White House as telegram Actel 6, Nov. 20, 1952, 8:45 a.m., from New York.

[2] The reference was to a discussion on Tuesday morning, Nov. 18, at the White House, in preparation for the meeting with Eisenhower later in the day. Truman mentioned this morning conference in his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 513.

Following your instructions, I laid it on the line with Eden today. I said we wanted to know whether he was with us or against us. He assured me that he wanted to be with us. I told him we could not accept an arrangement for the prisoners which left them with no alternative except repatriation or continuing to rot in a POW camp, as is now provided in Menon's resolution. He agreed that they could not either, but he stressed the importance of not changing Menon's resolution so much that Menon might be unable to vote for it himself. I told Eden that he might have to choose between our vote or the Indian vote, and he said that in that case he wanted ours.

I think we may be able to work this out. It is clear that a General Assembly resolution will have to be based on the Menon draft, but I believe we shall be able to get many or most of our amendments accepted. The crucial amendment, about which we shall have the most difficulty, concerns Menon's paragraph 17, on which I told Eden that there must be an absolutely flat time limit after which POWs who resisted repatriaton would be released. The British seem to be moving in our direction, but have not yet come far enough. I believe that with patience and continued pressure we can bring them along, and this will help to assure acceptance of our amendments by the Assembly.

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

795.00/11-2152

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 21, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am able to report to you some brightening of the prospects here in the UN debate on Korea as a result of developments during the past twenty-four hours.

For one thing, the British have prepared the way for agreement with us on modifications that must be made in the Menon resolution. We were pleased to note that Eden in his speech before the Political Committee today [2] indicated a considerable measure of agreement with the considerations we had been urging upon him with some force. While endorsing the Menon resolution, Eden indicated support for major modification to provide for making the Repatriation Commission effective by strengthening the position of the umpire, and for the release of prisoners not repatriated to UNKRA or some other UN agency to care for and resettle them.

---

[1] The source text was transmitted to the Department of State for the White House as telegram Actel 7, Nov. 21, 1952, 8:37 a. m., from New York.

[2] For text of Eden's speech, see UN document A/C.1/SR.526.

The other major hopeful development is that Spender of Australia is taking a strong initiative behind the scenes to solidify support among the 21 powers for a series of modifications of the Menon resolution. During the day Friday,[3] Spender plans to put before a subcommittee of the 21 sponsors proposals to meet our main points. If there is general agreement on these propositions, he will then endeavor to get agreement on language for amendments. Spender is firm on position that Western nations must stick with these amendments, even if Menon himself should refuse to accept them.

In every respect except one, Spender's propositions embody all the amendments which we have regarded as essential. The one exception is in not providing for one armistice agreement rather than a separate repatriation agreement. There may, however, be an opportunity to introduce this and other changes which we regard as desirable, although not essential, at a later point in the debate.

Deeply appreciate your kindness in making the *Independence* available for my trip to Ottawa Friday morning.[4] I shall be returning to New York Sunday afternoon and it is my hope that debate will have advanced sufficiently so that it would be appropriate for me to speak in the committee Monday, clarifying our views on these amendments.

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

---

[3] Nov. 21.

[4] At Truman's insistence, Acheson had accepted an invitation from Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent to pay an official visit to Ottawa. Acheson arrived in Ottawa on Nov. 21 and left on Sunday, Nov. 23 (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 700–704).

320/11–2152: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 21, 1952—9:10 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 237. Dept pass Ottawa, eyes only Secretary; rptd Ottawa 2. (Limited distribution.) Re Korea. Developments re Korea in GA today not encouraging. Despite strong efforts, we failed to obtain agreement of 21 co-sponsors to stand together in support of necessary amendments to Menon res, and to give priority to it only on that condition. (See separate tels.)[1] UK and Canada succeeded in delaying decision of co-sponsors, to allow time for discussion of proposed changes with Menon. Together with New Zealand rep, they pressed for another mtg of co-sponsors Mon. Matter was left that Spender wld set date of mtg, and under our prodding he is now attempting to see if one cannot be arranged for Sun evening. We stressed problem presented by fact you are speaking Mon p.m.;[2] UK and Canadians have suggested your speech be postponed to Tues. We have given them no encouragement.

---

[1] Telegrams Delga 236 and 238, both Nov. 21, 1952, neither printed (320/11–2152).

Meanwhile we understand Pearson has discussed suggested amendments with Menon, who is "thinking them over". They meet again Sat morning.

Spender's speech in comite 1[3] today included foll:

"Therefore I suggest for the consideration of the comite that we shld adopt the course of agreeing at the appropriate time to consider first the res of the Indian del, which the comite can mould to its agreed will with suitable amendments. Until we can ascertain whether agreement in Korea can be reached on the basis of this res, other resolutions which have helped a great deal might be deferred."

Czech del concluded his statement[4] with remark his govt reserved its position re Indian res.

AUSTIN

---

[2] Nov. 24.

[3] For text of Spender's speech, see UN document A/C.1/SR.527.

[4] For text of the speech of the Representative of Czechoslovakia, Frantiesk Komzala, see UN document A/C.1/SR.527.

320/11-2252: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 22, 1952—7:29 p. m.

Delga 241. Dept pass Ottawa, eyes only for Secy. Rptd Ottawa 4. Limited distribution. From Gross. Re Korea:

After outlining to Secretary Acheson present situation here and summarizing developments at mtg of 21 co-sponsors yesterday a.m. I read to Secretary substance of points I planned to make to Eden at our mtg this afternoon (Delga 242, Nov 22).[1] Secretary approved substance of points and instructed that we shld arrange mtg of 21 Sunday evening. Secretary wished to be free Monday a.m. to prepare comite 1 statement. He also agreed that we shld not be inactive during week end but shld take steps to mobilize support behind our point of view.

---

[1] Not printed (320/11-2252).

At 3:30 mtg with Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, the three of us had a frank and friendly discussion for more than an hour.[2] No agreement was reached but believe mtg was useful for exchange of views and definition of present positions of both US and UK Govts. After I outlined substance of points mentioned above, I told Eden that we had requested mtg of 21 for Sunday evening and that Secretary of State planned to attend.

Eden then outlined his views in following sense. He himself still believed that the Indian res in the form tabled by Menon was "not too bad". He felt it to have been a large accomplishment that the Indians had recorded their support for the principle of non-forcible repatriation. Although he was not able to appreciate the full force of our objections to para 14 of the Menon draft (relating to a comm) or to para 17 (relating to disposition of non-repatriated PWs) he had attempted in his speech in comite 1 to safeguard what he understood to be the basic elements of our concern. Although he recognized the fact that we valued Indian support, as I had pointed out, he himself as well as the vast majority of Brit public felt that the Indian initiative was of "tremendous importance". Eden shared our doubts that the Commies wld accept an armistice but he attached importance to the fact that Commies wld have to accept or reject the proposals.

Eden requested me to keep in confidence that he has been seeing Menon during the past two days and has been attempting to persuade Menon "to accept the substance" of our proposals. Eden was frank to say that in so doing he felt that he was representing our points of view rather than his own, since he himself was prepared to accept the present Menon draft rather than to risk loss of Indian support. He admitted he has not discussed with Menon any amendments other than para 14 and 17.

Eden told me it was likely that Menon wld circulate his draft sometime tomorrow.

It is clear to me from Eden's remarks that he has not been endeavoring to persuade Menon to accept our amendments in the form in which we had given them to Eden.

With regard to para 14, which we discussed at some length, both Eden and Lloyd argued that it is the intended sense of Menon's draft that failing agreement by the four members of the comm or an umpire, this matter wld be referred to the Assembly and that under such circumstances the Assembly wld be expected to confine itself to discussion of this particular matter. It is in this sense that para 14 of the Menon draft intends the expression, "this matter shall be referred to the GA". I argued as I had done both in the comite of 8 and in the comite of 21 yesterday that the issue of the composition and operability of the comm was of so essential a character that no ambiguity cld be tolerated in the res.

---

[2] For Pearson's account of Eden's annoyance that Gross had informed the press of this meeting, thus giving the impression that the visit was critical and perhaps that an ultimatum was to be delivered, see Pearson's *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 329.

I also repeated the argument that it wld be running a serious risk to enable the Assembly to engage in a protracted debate upon the general question of Korea in a context in which the apparent cause of deadlock was not the moral issue of non-forcible repatriation, but a procedural issue of the appointment of an umpire.

Neither Lloyd nor Eden agreed with the logic of this point. Eden insisted that Brit public opinion wld thoroughly understand the importance of the issue and that since the Menon draft is "intended" to confine the issue in dispute to this question in the event of its coming back to the Assembly, my arguments (which he said had been made several times to him by others) did not have any real significance.

We then speculated concerning the country from which an umpire might be drawn. He felt that if the Commies did not want an armistice, they wld object to the Assembly reserving to itself the right to designate an umpire. On the other hand, if they did wish an armistice, this wld not be a breaking point. They wld probably try to get a satellite and, failing this effort, wld probably suggest or agree to a country like Indonesia. In any event, Eden concluded that although this para "could be improved" he simply cld not agree with us that it shld be made a breaking point with Menon. I took the contrary position.

With regard to para 17, we had a long discussion concerning the proposal to refer the question of the disposition of non-repatriated PWs to the peace conference. After I summarized our objections to this course, I pointed out that our formulation allowing 120 days wld in fact give to the Commies an opportunity to raise the question in the peace conference, provided it started on time. However, I said the essential distinction, in our view, was that the peace conference shld not be given any competence or jurisdiction by the Assembly to deal with this question, which was clearly not a political question concerning the future of Korea. Moreover, I repeated arguments previously made to Eden that we attached the most essential importance to disposing of the POW question prior to an armistice and that we refused to leave to the post-armistice period any problem of negot with the Commies re this issue. I reminded Eden that the Austral Govt felt just as strongly as we did on this point.

Eden and Lloyd took the contrary view. Eden said he felt it might be of value for the question to be referred to the peace conference, although he realized (as he pointed out he has said in his speech) that they cld not remain indefinitely in suspense or in captivity. Therefore, he has been urging Menon to put a "short-time period" into his res so that the peace conference wld in effect lose jurisdiction with regard to the PWs after a stipulated period. I tried without success to get from Eden specific indication of the time period he was suggesting to Menon, but he assured me it was a short one. He then added that it was not as long as six months.

With regard to releasing the PWs to the UN, Eden felt this was an important principle. He doubted that UNKRA "wld be accepted by the Commies", but he himself raised no objection to the use of UNKRA for this purpose.

We then discussed the immediate tactical situation at considerable length. I told him that our analysis was that refusal on the part of the Brit to reach agreement with us now on textual amendments cld only be explained on the basis that they wished to retain freedom to make unilateral decision as late as possible concerning their position on the amendments or else that Eden had already decided that he wld support the Ind proposal no matter how it came out. Without denying this estimate, he said I shld add a third alternative; namely, by reason of continued persuasion of Menon, the latter wld agree to "acceptable amendments". It was this purpose, after all, which Eden was attempting to accomplish and he criticized us again for underestimating its importance. With regard to the time problem, he expressed keen disappointment in our decision to have a mtg of the comite of 21 Sunday evening. He felt that if the comite were to meet, the Brit could not express agreement with our amendments which I had told him I was morally certain we wld circulate, although the Secretary of State wld have to make this decision in the light of my report to him Sunday a.m. Eden felt that if the matter were left to personal persuasion of himself and Pearson on Menon, there is at least "some chance" that Menon wld agree, but if action were taken by the group of 21, it wld make it "impossible" for Menon to accept the amendments. It was for this reason, said Eden, that he had attended yesterday's mtg of the 21 in order to urge that no decision shld be reached at that stage.

He believed that Menon had sent the changes to New Delhi and wld have to await instructions. Lloyd doubted that Menon required instructions from New Delhi, but Eden said there was no need to speculate on this point since Menon professed the necessity to receive instructions.

The conclusion of our conversation was most sincerely frank. I repeated earlier expressions of the importance we attached to maintaining solidarity between ourselves. As Eden had pointed out earlier in the conversation, the US is bearing the overwhelming share of the burden in Korea. I said, "it seems to me you must give way on this." Lloyd, in a friendly tone, asked how they cld give way if they believed as they did that a principle of great importance was on their side, namely, Indian support. I said that in a situation where judgments differed, "the jury must decide". Eden, also in the friendliest manner, said, "I assume you mean we shld leave it to a vote of the 21" and I replied, "there must be some jury", that it was impossible to have two juries decide the same question. In any event, I said we had to be free to proceed to advance our own point of view, to which we adhered with complete conviction.

I left with Eden copies of our amendments.

AUSTIN

320/11-2452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 24, 1952—2:05 a. m.

Delga 245. Re Korea. Following is summary of proceedings at meeting of 21 co-sponsors held at USUN, 6:30 p.m., November 23, 1952.

Spender (Australia), Chairman, opened meeting with suggestion group attempt reach agreement on tactics, in light of exaggerated press reports re dissension within group.[1] He hoped keep meeting limited to discussion of principles rather than details. He noted new Menon draft resolution (see separate tel for revisions)[2] had moved perceptibly toward recognition of criticism of earlier draft. In order to counteract stories in press, Spender expressed hope press could be told after this meeting that general agreement had been reached.

Secretary agreed generally with Spender's remarks. He said it was highly desirable that, if we could agree on attitude of group, we should give priority to Menon's draft resolution and work on that. He agreed that Menon's redraft was an improvement, especially as to appointment of umpire. However, he saw no improvement in para 17. First sentence that para referred to post-armistice political conference the disposition of POWs who had not returned home after 90 days. Remainder of para indicated there was no limitation of time upon this referral of power to dispose of POWs. Second sentence of para said in effect POWs were to remain under detention indefinitely with only their care and maintenance transferred to another, unspecified body.

Secretary emphasized US dislike of idea of reference this problem to political conf. There had been no agreement on it after months of discussion at Panmunjom; therefore it was not likely that political conf could reach agreement or make unanimous recommendation to govts which was only effective way of settling problem through political conf. US would much prefer not to refer matter to political conf at all. Secretary was in consultation with his government on this point. He did not wish to take adamant stand at this time. One thing, however, was clear: There must be some definite end point to power of control and disposition of POWs by political conf. This could be done in a variety of ways. It should be made clear that after a given period, POWs should be released to a civilian group, not connected with the Korean hostilities for care and resettlement. He would suggest UNKRA for this purpose, unless some other UN agency should be preferred. UNKRA had the staff and funds to carry out the job. It could not simply be turned over to "UN" under whose control POWs were after all at present. Secretary continued, he did not see why this should present any problem. He understood the importance of reaching agreement with Indians, but all we were doing here was to bring Menon's speech (Doc A/C.1/2542, pouched separately to Dept).[3] Secretary concluded by noting internal contradiction in para 5 of resolution where reference is made to Kim Il Sung letter. He suggested words "by the Repatriation Commission" be added at end of para 5 to make it absolutely clear that classification of POWs was not to be undertaken by Commies as proposed in Kim letter. He stated this might save weeks of argument at Panmunjom.

---

[1] See *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1952.

[2] Reference was to telegram Delga 246 which is Tab A to a memorandum from Bruce to the President, *infra*.

Spender then suggested that word "disposition" be substituted for "care and maintenance until end of their detention" in last sentence of para 17. He realized this would still leave open the question of specific agency to care for POWs, but felt that this would not be a practical problem since UN would set up such an agency. Secretary said he attached more importance than Spender to designation of specific UN agency.

Lloyd (UK) began his remarks by regretting press publicity. UKDel had never considered there was any difference of principle among us, but only difference on method. Lloyd stated that revised para 14 in Menon draft taken together with para 13, though not as clear as might be desired, met points laid out by Eden re umpire being chairman and having deciding vote in Repatriation Commission. Lloyd discussed what he singled out as three critical comments made by Secretary re para 17 of Menon draft.

First, re absence of any terminal date of jurisdiction of political conf. Lloyd said he thought this was a flaw in revised text.

Second, re failure to set up agency to act for UN in taking over POWs, Lloyd maintained present language of revised paragraph was important advance over earlier draft. He said 150 day period contained in para fixed a limit after which UN could ensure that moral pressure upon POWs would not continue endlessly. He agreed, however, that it was desirable that an agency should be specified.

Third, re Secretary's point that POWs might be held indefinitely, Lloyd pointed to reference to recommendation for disposition of POWs in para 17 which he thought it was clear would be made by Repatriation Commission and which gave additional assurance through inclusion of idea of target date for termination of detention. Lloyd added that UK would be willing to accept Menon draft in present revised form as basis for agreement.

---

[3] Not printed.

If resolution were to have best possible impact on Chinese, the less amendment there was by countries with forces in Korea, the better. It was important to retain Indian initiative and support for resolution; if Chinese refused to accept it while UN side did so, we would be in best possible psychological position. He hoped that group would not now reach fixed or final position. It would be a mistake to put forward amendments as a *sine qua non.* He suggested that the points we wished to have clarified should be developed in course of debate without ultimata, with effort to see if we could not obtain a further revised draft which did meet them. Above all, group should not be maneuvered into a rigid position.

Kyrou (Greece) expressed gratitude for Eden's efforts with Menon, results of which were clear in revised draft. Kyrou suggested Menon should be asked entirely to omit reference to political conference in connection with disposition of POWs so that at end of 90 days they would be turned over to UNKRA or some other UN agency for care and maintenance. Spender replied that he thought that in Menon's view any reference to UNKRA in resolution would prejudice its acceptability. Spender would himself have preferred no reference to political conf, but this did not involve so important a matter of principle as to insist over Menon's objections.

Sarper (Turkey) pointed out para 17 provided for no way of ending the detention of POWs unwilling to return home. He thought it opened the door to endless difficulties with Commies. Secretary expressed strong support for points made by Kyrou and Sarper. He stressed importance of matter. He directed attention of group to waiting period involved. We had started with 90 days and had now reached almost a half year. We would be confronted with re-establishment of Commie airfields near battle lines, and would be discussing these matters at end of period in face of increased military pressures upon US. Secretary stated we prefer total waiting period of only 120 days and a specific decision re UN agency to be involved. He had the gravest difficulty in believing that tactics suggested by Lloyd were wise. If we should take a relaxed attitude in so vital a matter and later have to vote against this para of resolution, we would be charged with having misled people in GA as to what our attitude really was. Perhaps some group or person might try to work matter out with Menon.

At this point Spender remarked that group was in agreement on giving priority to Menon resolution. There was chorus of "noes" from far end of table. Secretary interjected that priority for Menon draft was conditioned on acceptance of necessary changes.

Romulo[4] (Philippines) stated group was not in general agreement re priority. Sponsors must hold on to 21 power resolution until satisfied with provisions of Menon draft. Menon resolution at some points seemed based on assumption GA was neutral body holding even balance between UN and aggressors. He could not accept this approach.

Lloyd replied that 21 power resolution must certainly not be abandoned, but we could not tell whether Indian resolution would be acceptable until after we had debated it.

Wan[5] (Thailand) stated that the question of priority could not be considered until agreement had been reached on principle, especially re para 17. Balluseck[6] (Netherlands) stated that on the essential principle of no forced return, Indian resolution was actually clearer than 21 power draft and therefore group could give it priority. If group could agree on a definite text for para 17, he would favor such a course. Sarper replied that what Menon draft gave in para 3 re no forced return it took away in para 17 where release of prisoners not choosing to return was held up for at least 5 months and for an indefinite period thereafter. A satisfactory solution of this difficulty should be a main requirement for giving priority to the Menon resolution.

Hoppenot (France) agreed such changes would be desirable, but felt that they should be worked out in first comite and not made a condition for acceptance of the Menon resolution.

There was further discussion of para 17 of the Menon draft with Sourdis[7] (Colombia), Aklilou[8] (Ethiopia) and Carias (Honduras) supporting US general approach, Carias stressing his dissatisfaction with proposed composition of Repatriation Commission.

Kyrou then suggested it would be useful if Eden could talk with Menon re desired changes in para 17. He hoped that 21 sponsors would agree to introduce such amendments themselves if Menon were recalcitrant. He also supported the change suggested by the Secretary in para 5, and reverted to his proposal that para 17 contain no reference to political conf. Sarper thought last point desirable; Secretary thought it highly desirable.

---

[4] Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[5] Prince Wan Waithayakon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Permanent Representative at the United Nations, and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[6] D. J. von Balluseck, Permanent Rerpresentative of the Netherlands at the United Nations.

[7] Evaristo Sourdis, Chairman of the Colombian Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

[8] Ato Abte-wold Aklilou, Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

Spender then suggested group agree that certain changes in para 17 be taken up with Menon. Martin (Canada) agreed, but stressed necessity that approach be in terms of points on which group would like clarification; otherwise, he foresaw unfortunate reaction in certain elements of public opinion.

Lloyd supported Martin's point that it would be a mistake to condition question of priority on reaching of agreement with Menon re proper wording of para 17. He felt that this would be a tactical blunder. A better way would be to "generously" give priority to Menon resolution in committee and through discussion and discreet outside pressure achieve result group desired. On Secretary's suggestion, Lloyd then stated three principles on which clarification should be sought from Menon.

First, political conference should not have jurisdiction over POWs for an indefinite period. Spender noted that question had been raised whether political conference should have such jurisdiction at all. Lloyd responded he would prefer political conference have nothing to do with matter, but to produce desired result with Menon he suggested a limited period of jurisdiction for political conference.

Second principle stated by Lloyd was that some UN body must be provided to deal with POWs not returning home. Lloyd suggested that perhaps a separate resolution put in at the right moment, not at present, could be used to make this determination.

Third principle expressed by Lloyd was that POWs could not be kept in custody for an indefinite period.

Secretary agreed that Lloyd has stated broad principles. He repeated explicit reservation of United States re having political conference involved in matter in any way, as well as importance of short time limit because of possibility of construction of airfields by aggressor. Re Lloyd's second principle, Secretary considered it important that armistice agreement state either that a specific agency should be used or that UN should thereafter determine agency. On third principle, Secretary urged 120 day limit. Secretary warned against getting into prolonged negotiating with Menon. What we are doing, he said, is negotiating with ourselves, and in public. He hoped for another meeting of group very shortly. If Menon had not by then agreed, he hoped we ourselves would then move to put Menon resolution in shape.

Lloyd thought it would be a mistake to negotiate with Menon at this moment. He again remarked that best tactic was to give Menon resolution priority and carry on discussion with Menon over next few days. If we could mobilize large majority behind great neutral force represented by Menon, we would have strengthened our position very greatly. Referring to his upcoming speech, November 24, the Secretary assumed Lloyd would not object if Secretary pointed out our objections to Menon draft. Was that what Lloyd suggested we should do? Lloyd remarked he had often advised his own Foreign Minister re public statements, but it was first time he had ever been put in this position. He thought the Secretary should take line we were prepared to consider any useful means of dealing with problems before us, should welcome Menon resolution, should state there were still some matters requiring clarification, but should not get involved in precise wording of individual paragraphs. He suggested that at later stage, when First Committee was discussing specific resolutions, Secretary might intervene again to suggest alternative language of specific paragraphs.

Spender then attempted to draw the meeting to a close, stressing importance of group showing no division as it left meeting. It was agreed Spender would draft a communiqué for press indicating need for further clarification of Menon draft resolution and agreement on basic problems involved. Before adjournment it was agreed that if Entezam moved for priority of consideration for Menon draft at November 24 meeting of Committee 1, group would seek to prevent vote thereon. Spender said he would call group meeting on short notice before Committee 1 was convened if Secretary's speech was likely to be prejudiced by any move in committee re priority of voting.

ACHESON

320/11-2452

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 24, 1952.

Yesterday, November 23, the Indian Delegation introduced revisions to paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Indian resolution on Korea (see attached telegram 246 from New York, Tab A). Paragraph 14 goes a considerable way to meet the U.S. point of view, in that it provides that the umpire shall be the chairman of the repatriation commission. It does not yet specifically provide that if the repatriation commission is unable to reach agreement on the umpire he will definitely be appointed by the General Assembly, only providing that the matter will be referred to the General Assembly. However, the Indian revision clearly provides that the umpire must be appointed in some manner prior to the armistice going into effect.

The revision of paragraph 17 still provides for referral of the question of prisoners of war not returned to the political conference following the armistice, and if the political conference is unable to reach any agreement, does not make any definite provision of release of such prisoners of war but only for transfer to the "UN" of "responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention".

Another meeting [1] of the 21 sponsors of the original resolution was held last night in New York at which Secretary Acheson was present, and at which the revised Indian draft was discussed. The results of the meeting were inconclusive, there still being strong sentiment in favor of the Indian draft. It is the view of the Delegation that we should concentrate our efforts on obtaining further revision of the most objectionable portion of the Indian draft, that is, paragraph 17 regarding the disposition of prisoners not repatriated. The Delegation considers that this can best be accomplished by agreeing to the referral to the political conference of the question of unrepatriated prisoners of war but with a definite provision that if the political conference has not reached any agreement on this subject within a period of 30 days, the non-repatriated prisoners shall be released to UNKRA or some other UN body for settlement. A draft of the proposed U.S. revisions to the Indian draft along these lines is attached (Tab B).

The Delegation will continue to make efforts to amend paragraph 14 so as definitely to provide that the General Assembly will appoint the umpire in the event agreement thereon is not reached by the other four members of the repatriation commission. However, it would be prepared, if necessary, to accept the present Indian draft.

The Delegation will make strong efforts to amend paragraph 5 of the Indian proposals so as to make it clear that the classification of prisoners "according to nationality and domicile" will be carried out by the repatriation commission.

Secretary Acheson has requested that you be informed of the situation and that your approval be obtained for the U.S. redraft of paragraph 17 as attached, as well as for the general lines of action to be taken by the Delegation.

This matter has been discussed with General Bradley and the Secretary of Defense, who have indicated their general concurrence therewith.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you approve the U.S. redraft of paragraph 17 as attached and the general lines of action indicated above to be taken by the U.S. Delegation with regard to the Indian resolution.[2]

DAVID BRUCE

---

[1] Reported on in Delga 245, *supra.*

[2] At the bottom of the source text were the initials HST in Truman's handwriting indicating his approval.

[Tab A]

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [3]

PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 24, 1952—2:04 a. m.

Delga 246. Fol are texts paras 14 and 17 of revised Indian resolution on Korea. Changes other paras revised resolution are drafting changes only.

"14. The Repatriation Commission shall at its first meeting and prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint the umpire who shall at all times be available to the Commission and shall act as its chairman unless otherwise agreed. If agreement on the appointment of the umpire cannot be reached by the Commission within the period of three weeks after the date of the first meeting this matter should be referred to the GA.

17. At the end of ninety days, after the armistice agreement has been signed, the disposition of any prisoners-of-war whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target date for the termination of their detention to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further sixty days, there are any prisoners-of-war whose return to their homelands has not been effected or provided for by the political conference the responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention shall be transferred to the UN".

ACHESON

[Tab B]

Proposed United States Redraft of Paragraph 17 of Indian Resolution on Korea [4]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 24, 1952.

At the end of 90 days after the armistice agreement has been signed, the disposition, consistent with paragraph 3 of this resolution, of any PWs, whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedures set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendation to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further 30 days, there are any prisoners of war whose disposition has not been provided for by the political conference, they shall be released to UNKRA (unless prior to such date another UN agency shall have been designated for this purpose) which shall have the responsibility for their care and settlement on a humanitarian basis.

---

[3] This telegram was not found attached to the source text of the memorandum by Bruce to Truman, Nov. 24; it is a copy from file 320/11-2452.

[4] A marginal notation at the bottom of the source text read: "OK, HST" in Truman's handwriting.

320/11-2452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 24, 1952—11:54 p. m.
NIACT

Delga 252. Dept pass New Delhi niact; sent New Delhi niact 3. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Please see Nehru urgently on basis following:

1. This afternoon in UN Political Comite, shortly after Vyshinsky flatly turned down Indian resolution on Korea, Secretary made very friendly speech [1] praising India and Menon for great statesmanship. He emphasized common purpose and satisfaction that Indian proposal based on principle of no force against PW's. While noting that there are a number of problems with Indian resolution, with exception of para 17 Indian draft Secretary did not stress though he mentioned changes which US considers desirable.

2. Re para 17, Secretary made point that Menon's speech clearly indicated that his intentions were the same as those of US, but that draft resolution did not carry out these intentions. Secretary made following points:

(a) Though not absolutely adamant, US has grave doubts of desirability of sending problem of disposition of non-repatriates to political conference. Repatriation question has been subject of futile debates Panmunjom for eight months and for weeks at GA comite. It is hardly likely that political conference will make any greater progress towards agreement this subject. Stressing US has agreed to recommended political conference and has no objection to conference for purpose originally agreed, Secretary pointed out that progress toward solution of difficult problem of peaceful unification of Korea will not be aided by opening conference with bitter deadlock over PW question. Further it is difficult to see purpose of discussion this question at conference. It is not intended that conference should discuss forcible repatriation, since UN position and Indian resolution outlaw this possibility. If only question is disposition of non-repatriates, i.e., where they should be resettled, political conference is hardly best body for that purpose. That question should preferably go to UN which will have responsibility of care and resettlement.

(b) Menon draft, even as revised, makes no provision for release of non-repatriates from detention. This question is left to political conference which will probably never reach agreement. Indian revision puts care and maintenance of these persons in hands of UN, but still leaves them in indefinite captivity despite Menon's speech to effect that this should not be done.

---

[1] For text of Vyshinsky's and Acheson's speeches, see UN document A/C.1/SR.529.

(c) Keeping PW's not repatriated in indefinite captivity would violate principles of law and humanity. Indian draft obviously did not mean to do that.

(d) Repatriation Commission must dispose of PW's within brief period. If any not repatriated they must be released to and cared for by agency of UN.

3. Secretary concluded by expressing confidence that in view of common intentions and purposes, agreement on necessary changes these paras will be forthcoming and all can give blessing to Indian resolution. He stressed that despite Vyshinsky's rejection no country can long resist united moral judgment, and expressed continued hope that armistice will result.

4. US places highest value on Indian support for resolution which Assembly will adopt. To this end US prepared to support Indian version with absolute minimum of amendments. Discussions with Menon here indicate that we might be able work out some desirable amendments in various paras of resolution other than para 17. US does, however, consider essential amendments to para 17 which meet points made by Secretary above. Nehru also will appreciate need for clarity on issue para 17. We cannot agree to indefinite negotiation this subject, particularly when after armistice Commies will rebuild air fields and we might find ourselves discussing non-repatriates under pressure and threat of renewed Commie aggression.

5. You should urge in the strongest terms, therefore, that Nehru instruct Menon himself to introduce, or to accept, "clarifications" to meet above points on para 17. US feels strongly that best version of para 17 would read:

"17. Within 120 days after the armistice agreement has been signed and becomes effective, the Repatriation Commission shall release to UNKRA (unless prior to such date another United Nations agency shall have been designated for this purpose) any PWs not repatriated in accordance with the procedures set out above. UNKRA shall have the duty of care and the settlement of such persons on a voluntary basis." [2]

You should point out that in this way a conference will in fact begin at least 30 days prior to release of non-repatriates from detention and any agreements or proceedings at conference can be taken into account in disposition of PWs.

For your information we would like India to accept above text and, even if it should abstain on para, still vote for its resolution as a whole. If, however, price of Indian adherence to its own resolution is some mention of political conference in para 17, US prepared to agree to following as absolute maximum:

---

[2] According to Delga 253, sent also as niact telegram 4 from New York to New Delhi, Nov. 25, 1952, this final phrase should have read "on a humanitarian basis", a change which would "make it easier for Nehru to accept" (320/11–2552).

"17. At end of 90 days after the armistice agreement has been signed, the disposition, consistent with para 3 of this resolution, of any prisoners-of-war, whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further 30 days, there are any prisoners-of-war whose disposition has not been provided for by the political conference, they shall be released to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (unless prior to such date another United Nations agency shall have been designated for this purpose) which shall have the responsibility for their care and settlement on a humanitarian basis."

6. We hope you can persuade Nehru to instruct Menon along the lines indicated. If India will not go along with even latter version, US will, nevertheless, be forced to seek necessary amendments para 17 and will propose first text quoted above.

In your discussion with Nehru, you shld not go beyond urging first alternative text para 5 above. If Nehru insists India cld not live with resolution containing this version as final para, you may offer Nehru second version, but this shld not be done before receipt confirming tel[3] which will follow shortly.

ACHESON

---

[3] In telegram Delga 253, Nov. 25, 1952, the Ambassador in New Delhi received authorization to offer Nehru the second version of paragraph 17, if it became necessary.

320/11-2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
NIACT

NEW YORK, November 25, 1952—2:38 p. m.

Delga 256. Dept pass New Delhi. Sent New Delhi niact 5. Limited distribution. From USUN. Re Korea:

In further effort to meet Indian position, and in order to make absolute minimum changes in Indian draft, US prepared to agree to accept first sentence revised Indian version[1] as is, amending second to read:

"If, at the end of a further thirty (30) days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures, or whose future has not been provided for by the Political Conference, the responsibility for their care and disposition shall be transferred to a United Nations agency."

---

[1] The reference was to the revised version of paragraph 17; for the text, see telegram Delga 246, Nov. 24, p. 676.

We hope this will lead to success in your efforts with Nehru, Delga 252.[2]

ACHESON

---

[2] *Supra.*

320/11–2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 25, 1952—4:41 p. m.

Delga 259. Limited distribution. Re Korea: Meeting this morning of Secretary and Eden with Lloyd, Jebb, Hickerson and Gross present.

Eden stated UK sees present posture of Korean problem as major tactical and political problem in cold war transcending PW issue. Lloyd expressed feeling that we have been losing ground in cold war in past 6–8 months and while admitting that we may have regained most of it yesterday as result Vyshinsky and Acheson speeches, he thought we are in danger of re-losing it during next 2 or 3 days if not careful.

Turning to PW question Secretary restated US position. He said para 17 is not deliberately ambiguous but in fact leaves to political conference alone authority for indefinite period to make recommendations re disposition of non-repatriates. This would mean our negotiating under Commie military pressure. Secretary reviewed negotiations at Panmunjom and explained relationship of concessions made there as part of "package". In light of Menon and Eden speeches Secretary could not see any argument against making minimum essential changes we required. Nor could he see how Menon could use such changes as ground for repudiating res if we did no more than to make it agree with his own speech. Problem, therefore, was to reach agreement on language to meet this point.

Secretary said that in order to make job of bringing Menon around less difficult we would be prepared to make minimum changes in Menon's own version. After discussion, with Eden most reluctant to support any amendments, group produced text which keeps Menon's first sentence and revises second sentence to read: "If, at the end of a further 30 days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures, or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and disposition shall be transferred to a United Nations agency."

Secretary said he thought we could live with this, but we don't like it. We would accept this version if necessary to induce Menon to stick by res; otherwise we would prefer our previous amendment to 17 which did not mention political conference. If quoted text were to be adopted, we insisted on need for having some UN agency in being to do job when need arises. We said that if UNKRA is not acceptable we would have to establish another UN agency by GA res before end of 120 days from armistice.

Secretary sought from Eden firm commitment to above text, but latter took line that if UK committed themselves to this draft, they would have to tell Menon and he would complain of Anglo-American conspiracy and reject his own res. Eden said he would see Menon and work on him on basis of above text, then advise us whether British would make commitment to support it.

Lloyd asked how it would be if US and UK abstained on Indian res; or if UK abstained on Indian res as amended by US. Secretary said it is impossible for US to abstain on any res on Korea. UK abstention on res supported by US would be bad.

Eden objected to firming up text at 21 power meeting scheduled for this afternoon. This would make amendment an "American draft", would antagonize Menon and appear an ultimatum. Also, Eden took position that if 21 agreed on amendments they would leak and would become amendments of group. Hope of getting Menon acceptance would be diminished. He thought it preferable that any amendments should be put in by Menon or at least by some other power not among 21 sponsors.

Secretary stated that at 21 sponsors meeting he would call for agreement in principle on need for clarifying amendments to bring text of para 17 in line with Menon's own intentions as indicated Menon, Eden and Acheson speeches. Eden did not disclose what UK position would be at meeting. Eden and Lloyd pressed Secretary to tell 21 that we favor unconditional priority for Indian res. Secretary said he would think it over, but expressed reluctance to surrender priority for 21 power res before we were certain of UK support for necessary amendment to para 17.

ACHESON

320/11-2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 25, 1952—9:24 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 264. Re Korea. Co-sponsors of 21-power res on Korea met at 4:30 p.m. Nov 25. At end of mtg it was agreed without objection that communiqué along lines quoted below shld be handed to press and that this shld be only statement given press. Communiqué was read to press reps by Chairman Spender immediately after mtg substantially as follows: "The 21 co-sponsors of the res introduced on Oct 24 met this afternoon and unanimously reached agreement that priority in the voting shld be given to the Indian res introduced on Nov 17 as revised on Nov 23. It was also understood that necessary textual clarifications in para 17 of that res wld be sought to make it conform to the intention of the para as outlined in the statements made in the comite."

As mtg began, Spender expressed hope it cld reach agreement on unconditional priority for Menon res, both as to discussion and voting, on the understanding that amendments might be tabled if desired.

The Secy pointed out that matter of priority referred only to priority of voting (rule 130 of GA rules of procedure) not priority of consideration which was not covered by any GA rule. He indicated US favored giving priority in voting to Menon res. He said it wld be a mistake to condition this priority on an agreement, which wld perhaps not be unanimous, re specific amendments. He hoped, however, there wld be an understanding that Menon res shld be made to say what Menon and Eden had meant in their speeches. When proper time came, he was sure amendments wld evolve and be adopted in this sense.

Lloyd (UK) remarked that Vishinsky's speech had altered situation in comite. While he cld not give this as only or even most important reason for seeking priority for Menon res, he felt fortified in his belief he was right since Vishinsky had taken opposite side on this subj. UK agreed we shld support idea of priority for Menon res, and also that it wld be a mistake to impose any conditions. Lloyd agreed every del shld be free to seek clarification on points on which it had doubts.

After several dels had supported idea of priority for Menon res, Politis [1] (Greece) raised question how clarification of para 17 of Menon res wld be obtained. Spender repeated point made by Secy and expressed view that discussion of amendments among dels inside and outside Comite 1 might lead Menon to make a further modification of his res or to indicate he wld accept certain amendments. Lloyd agreed, expressing hope that ventilation of doubts, especially by states not represented in group of 21 co-sponsors, wld constitute a form of pressure on Menon. Balluseck (Netherlands) warned that if co-sponsors pressed for clarification, Menon's position wld become more difficult; he thought it preferable to entrust task of seeking clarification to countries, outside group of co-sponsors, situated in general area of India.

Martin (Canada) after praising Secy's speech in Comite 1 yesterday, noted that his del had always believed Menon res shld have priority. He expressed opinion press communiqué shld be confined to this one issue. He hoped that Menon wld not be faced with undue number of requests for clarification, remarking that we wld not wish to see Menon res under any sponsorship except its present sponsorship. Further discussion revealed a consensus that number of interventions re clarification shld not be strictly limited, but that they shld be focused on important points, notably para 17, and that Asian-African interventions wld be considered desirable.

---

[1] Athanase G. Politis, Greek Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

Secy then suggested language for press communiqué similar to that ultimately read by Spender, except that he used words "essential clarifying changes" in place of "necessary textual clarifications" finally agreed upon. Lloyd disliked words "essential clarifying changes" which he thought wld destroy effect of gesture being made to Menon; he also hoped that language wld read that each del "will be free to seek" clarifications. Secy pointed out this formulation wld indicate there was a split in comite. Lloyd also endeavored, but without success, to obtain omission of everything after word "sought" in second sentence of communiqué. Further discussion brought agreement on communiqué as finally phrased.

It was agreed on suggestion of Sarper (Turkey) that 21 co-sponsors wld continue to meet as necessary until fate of 21-power res had finally been determined.

Fol mtg, Gross, Hickerson, and Ross agreed with Selwyn Lloyd that Brit wld talk to Padilla Nervo (Mexico) and Lange [2] (Norway) in effort to induce them to make speeches in Comite 1 Nov 26 re importance of clarifying para 17 of Menon res. US will similarly approach Belaunde (Peru) and one or two others, probably including Ethiopia. Purpose wld be gently to impress upon Menon desirability incorporating in his res points made in his own speech.

USDel will seek to arrange with Entezam and Muniz for a vote in first comite Nov 26 to give priority in voting to Menon res.

ACHESON

---

[2] Halvard M. Lange, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

795.00/11-2652

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 26, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Events in the past twenty-four hours have moved swiftly here and with all the elements of an old-fashioned melodrama.

Vyshinski's speech in the Political Committee Monday [2] as you may have gathered, set everyone in the Committee on their ears. He not only rejected Menon resolution, along with all other resolutions except his own, but he attacked the whole Indian effort as a device for perpetuating the war in Korea.

---

[1] This letter was sent as telegram Actel 8, Nov. 26, 1952, 10:58 a. m., from New York to the Department of State for the White House.

[2] Nov. 24.

Why he did this is still a matter of speculation here. Our best guess is that it was done on sudden, last-minute instructions from Moscow, and probably for reasons that had little if anything to do with the tactical situation in the Assembly. There is a possibility that it may have been a move to head off incipient Chinese softening toward the Indian approaches, but there is so far no hard evidence to support this possibility.

Paradoxically, the Vyshinski speech both helped us and hurt us. It helped because we were no longer in the situation of having it said that the Russians would reject Menon's resolution if we were to add the amendments we thought necessary, since his rejection preceded our discussion of amendments. Also his intransigent tone discouraged some of the middle-ground people who had been bending as far as possible in the hope of finding a compromise the Russians might accept.

However, some of our friends, with whom we have been having trouble here, now professed to see the increased urgency of passing the Menon resolution without amendments. They argued that since there was no longer a possibility of Communist acceptance there was no need to have an entirely satisfactory plan. They urged that we must not risk driving India away from its own resolution since the propaganda importance of having unanimous non-Communist support for a resolution supporting our basic principle was paramount. We have argued against this view; first because we did not feel we could accept a resolution that we could not live with in view of the possibility, however remote, of its later acceptance; and second, because the resolution as passed would probably form the starting point of the negotiations at Panmunjom whenever they were renewed.

In my speech in the Political Committee following Vyshinski, I commended Menon warmly for his statesmanship and devotion to peace, and described our desired amendments as clarifications which would bring the text of his resolution into conformity with the speech Menon made in Committee. I also quoted with approval some of the things Eden had said in Committee in order to show that both Eden and Menon had supported in principle the elements we sought to get incorporated in the resolution. The conciliatory tone of the speech had a good effect in the Committee, coming as it did after Vyshinski's speech and after the weekend reports of disharmony among the 21 powers.

While indicating that we were firm about necessary changes in the paragraph dealing with the disposition of the nonrepatriates (Menon's paragraph 17), I suggested that we much preferred to omit the reference to a political conference. I had in mind that we could fall back if necessary to our second choice wording, which does accept reference of the issues to a political conference, but sets a time limit by which all prisoners must be released to a UN agency if they have not been repatriated. I also referred without insistence to the other changes we and the Joint Chiefs have felt would be important.

Tuesday morning, I had another session with Eden,[3] and found him reluctant to support any amendments to Menon's draft, for the reasons I have indicated. Finally, we were able to work out together a wording for paragaph 17 which provides that responsibility for the "care and disposition" of any prisoners not repatriated, or not provided for by the political conference, shall be transferred to a United Nations agency at the end of 120 days, that is 30 days after the conference begins.

I told Eden that we did not like this, but that we could live with it and would accept it if it meant that both he and Menon would support the resolution. Otherwise, we would prefer our own draft of paragraph 17 which did not mention political conference. Eden avoided firm commitment, but said he would work on Menon along these lines and advise us later of both Menon's and his own reactions. In a later telephone call, however, the British said they had not meant to leave the impression they were going to get in touch with Menon, and urged that Menon not be "crowded" at this time.

At our request, the 21 powers met Tuesday afternoon.[4] They agreed that priority in voting should be granted Menon resolution. It was also understood that "necessary textual clarifications in paragraph 17" of that resolution would be sought to make it conform to statements in Committee. We had been holding back on agreeing to the priority for Menon, as a form of pressure on him to accept our amendments, but now felt it desirable to agree to the priority on the grounds that it would be advantageous to us to vote on his resolution first, having our 21 power resolution in the background. Meeting was otherwise inconclusive, except for tactical agreement that additional speakers should be sought, particularly from among Arab-Asian group, to support need for amendment of paragraph 17.

Last night (Tuesday) as the result of a talk between Gross and Lloyd of the British delegation (Eden having left) and Menon, all three agreed to consider an amendment which Menon would either propose or accept, and which would provide that 120 days after the armistice was signed—that is, 30 days after the 90 days—the disposition of the prisoners, as well as their care and maintenance, should be transferred to the UN. This is the heart of the matter from our point of view since it terminates the jurisdiction of the political conference and terminates it one month short of the period which some have advocated here. This morning, I have authorized Gross to confirm our adherence to this settlement of the matter, provided Menon comes along.

---

[3] For a report of this meeting, see telegram Delga 259, Nov. 25, p. 680.

[4] See telegram Delga 264, *supra*.

All of us here believe that we can live with resolution, with these changes. I understand that the Joint Chiefs share this view. I understand also that Menon will amend paragraph 5 to make it clear that the classification of the prisoners will be done by the Repatriation Commission.

We shall see what the day brings forth. For the moment, we seem to be in pretty good shape.

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

795.00/11-2652

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, November 26, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a result of a combination of pressures, Menon has finally come around to a position satisfactory to us.

Tonight, Menon is circulating a revision of his resolution, which changes only the last paragraph. It now reads:

> "If at the end of a further 60 days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the UN, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law."

We did everything possible to get Menon to change the period to 30 days, but he could not get his delegation to go along with him on this point. However, we have gotten the Danes to put in an amendment to Menon's new revision, changing 60 days to 30, and Menon has agreed that he will support the resolution even if this amendment is adopted.

We may also have trouble with the last phrase of Menon's new wording of the final paragraph, since it will ensure new fights with the Soviets in some subsequent forum over whether the Geneva Convention does or does not require repatriation of all prisoners by force if necessary. But it was just not possible to get him to move any further, and we felt we had gotten most of what we needed.

We have our fingers crossed that this committee debate may be wound up tomorrow or Friday, if the Russians have exhausted their current supply of monkey wrenches.

[Here follows a paragraph of personal comments.]

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

---

[1] This letter was sent as telegram Actel 9, Nov. 26, 1952, 6:26 p. m. from New York to the Department of State for the White House.

795.00/11-2652: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, November 26, 1952—7 p. m.
NIACT

2213. Reftels 1543 [1] Delga 3 Nov 24 and Delga 4 Nov 25,[2] Delga unn [*5*] Nov 25, latter sent Dept as Delga 256.[3]

Early this morning fol receipt niact reftels, Wilkins [4] arranged appointment for me with PM at 12:30 through R. K. Nehru. At latter's request Wilkins discussed with him further clarification para 17 of Ind res in preparation for my mtg with PM.

Two principal points emerged from this prelim discussion:

1. R. K. Nehru who had just recd full text Menon's speech [5] before polit comit clarifying Ind res interpreted remarks re para 17 to mean responsibility to dispose of non-repatriates wld not pass to UN agency in event of disagreement. Latter wld merely "look after" non-repatriates.
2. Nehru concluded that in that event non-repatriates wld have status of displaced persons whom UN was maintaining and caring for.

Wilkins stressed Secty's remarks re our interpretation Menon's speech and emphasized importance of unity on res and UN step toward Kor peace. Nehru seemed agree. Although willing to tele Ind del NY, he rptd Menon virtually had free hand and again wondered if US and Ind dels cld not work out acceptable para 17. Nehru felt matter cld be further discussed during conversation with PM at 12:30.

Subsequently saw Nehru with Pillai, R. K. Nehru and Wilkins also present. I showed PriMin revised text para 17 Ind res and our suggested amplification. Without commenting on our proposal PriMin immed brought up subject Vyshinsky's speech [6] and expressed deep disappointment at Sov action. PriMin stated while it desirable secure agmt on res, our principal objective was secure Chi agmt to armistice in order to stop fighting and res was only means to that end. I was fearful at first he might say since Russians had taken this apparently adamant position, there little point passing Ind res at this time.

However, I referred to news-story in Delhi morning paper which quoted UN gossip to effect that violence Vyshinsky's statement might indicate difference of opinion had arisen with Chi Commies and that Vyshinsky may have stated publicly and vigorously his disagreement with the res in order to emphasize private advice to Peiping that Ind res shld be rejected by Chi as basis for armistice. After some thought, Nehru said this possible and since Vyshinsky normally spoke violent terms we shld perhaps not pay much attention.

---

[1] Telegram 1543 from New Delhi, Nov. 10, 1952, not printed. (991.61/10-1352)

[2] Telegram Delga 3 is printed as telegram Delga 252, p. 677; telegram Delga 4 is not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, pp. 678 and 679.

[3] *Ante,* p. 679.

[4] Fraser Wilkins, Counselor of Embassy at New Delhi.

[5] Presumably the reference was to the speech of Nov. 19; see UN document A/C.1/SR.525.

[6] The reference was to the speech of Nov. 24, 1952; see UN document A/C.1/SR.529.

Nehru asked if Sov Union had power veto this res. I stated that it is GA action and hence no veto possible. He said he assumed Sov Union and Commie Chi were together since they usually were but seemed inclined accept possibility there some disagreement. He asked what wld happen if res was passed. I stated it wld be sent by Pres of GA to Commie Chi Govt and to North Kor authorities.

I asked him if Chi Commie had expressed any view on res beyond noncommittal attitude which he described to me previously. He did not answer directly. I again pointed out Chi had everything to gain from armistice including eventually possibility broad Asian settlement and agmt, and that Sov Union seemed have every reason keep fighting going. Nehru seemed to agree.

After this discusssion he read para 17 and our amplification rather casually and stated he had no real objection our language. Said that he thought matter more less question of detail compared to importance of armistice itself, and had become even less important fol Vyshinsky's speech yesterday.

Nehru stressed fact Ind UN del have been given wide powers develop Kor res as broadly and satisfactorily as possible. He stated final decision had to be in their hands because they more familiar than he with development in UN. He emphasized, however, he had no personal objection whatsoever our wording and that he wld recommend it to his del for their consideration and discussion with US del.

It clearly evident that US and Ind have common desire achieve armistice Kor. We are virtually in agmt on UN res which is designed to achieve this objective.

Even tho Chi turn this res down, such a res in agmt with Ind and other independent nations will place us in very strong position here in Asia, and it will be clear to every one that Sov Union and Commie Chi have defied what amounts to world opinion.

However, there are only two reasons why Ind will continue to support the passage of this res on which we are working:

1. Whatever hope she may have Chi will still accept res and effect armistice despite Vyshinsky's speech.
2. Fact she has become so involved it might now be embarrassing for her to abandon her position. However, these two factors can be blown out window in next two or three days either by negative msg from Peiping or by change of heart on the part of Nehru. We shld realize Ind has gone extraordinarily long distance our direction and indeed for first time is well on way to associating herself with us in opposition Sov Union and Chi on issue of crucial importance.

Thus we believe every effort shld be made agree promptly on res and to secure its immed passage. If on top Vyshinsky's speech word shld now come from Peiping that Chi Govt definitely will not accept this res or one similar to it, there is strong possibility if not probability that Ind Govt will pull out this whole situation, return to its usual neutralist position and that opportunity will have been lost. For this reason we believe speed is of the essence.

BOWLES

320/11-2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 26, 1952—10:16 p. m.

Delga 273. Limited distribution. From Gross. Re Korea. On evening of November 25 I talked at some length with Menon, whom I found very discouraged by reason of fact we were insisting on changes in para 17, in face of Vishinsky's attack on Indian res. Menon also told me he had received word ChiComs had informed GOI that Indian res was not acceptable. Menon was therefore seriously thinking of withdrawing his res. I urged him in strongest terms not to do so, saying it wld be particularly disastrous in view of our agreement earlier in evening, in group of 21,[1] to give priority to Indian res. Menon seemed to be impressed.

Later, I talked to Selwyn Lloyd and pressed him very hard to talk with Menon as soon as possible for purpose of urging him to accept essential changes in para 17. I told Lloyd it had been my understanding at morning meeting between Secy and Eden that either Eden or Lloyd would talk with Menon during day. Lloyd said he did not think it was "wise" for him to talk with Menon for another day or so, but if I insisted he wld do so. I said I thought it was important and Lloyd then agreed to talk with Menon.

Shortly after midnight Lloyd called me at home to report on his conversation with Menon. Lloyd read to me following text which he said he "thought" Menon agreed to:

"If at the end of a further 30 days there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the UN, which in all matters relating to them shall act in accordance with international law." Lloyd also read to me the following suggested alternative text:

---

[1] For a report of this meeting, see telegram Delga 264, Nov. 25, p. 681.

"If at the end of a further 30 days there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures, or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, responsibility for them shall be transferred to the UN, which in all matters relating to them shall act in accordance with international law". I told Lloyd I did not think this would be acceptable. I raised following points concerning first version quoted above:

(1) It wld be necessary under this form of words to have it clearly understood that Assembly wld adopt a subsequent res, designating the UN agency which wld have authority to care for and dispose of non-repatriated prisoners of war. Lloyd expressed agreement with this and said he was sure Menon wld understand, but that we shld not move ahead at once with a follow-up res. I told Lloyd this wld have to be done by the Assembly in time to take on the responsibility.

(2) I felt the phrase "until the end of their detention" must come out. Lloyd said he thought he cld persuade Menon to delete these words.

(3) I inquired as to the significance of the last clause "which in all matters relating to them shall act in accordance with international law". These words seemed to me to be undesirable, since, if they meant anything they implied that when and if this question came back to UN, whole subject of non-forcible repatriation cld be re-opened on basis of arguments thrashed over during past few weeks. Lloyd explained that Menon attached great importance to these words, which for some reason, which Lloyd conceded was obscure, the language gave Menon "an excuse" to accept modifications in para 17.

I told Lloyd I cld not make any commitment whatever but wld talk to Secy Wednesday morning and wld call Lloyd before 10 a.m. Lloyd urged me do so because Jamali [2] had asked to see him at 10 to discuss amendments which Jamali had in mind tabling.

Wednesday morning I reported all of foregoing to Secy who authorized me to tell Lloyd we wld, if necessary to maintain Menon's support for his own res, accept first alternative formulation quoted above, subject, however, to deletion of phrase "until the end of their detention" and of last clause reading "which in all matters relating to them shall act in accordance with international law". However, Secy authorized me to accept text as it stood, if I considered it essential in order to avoid breaking with Menon.

I spoke with Lloyd, who agreed to see Menon as soon as possible and urge him to delete phrase relating to detention. Re deletion of last clause, Lloyd thought Menon wld find this impossible because of importance he attached to having "an umbrella" under which he cld justify his acceptance of the changes. I then suggested to Lloyd that he urge Menon to agree to insertion in the clause, following the words "in accordance with", the clause "the principles of this resolution and".

---

[2] Mohammed Fadhil Al-Jamali, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation at the Seventh UN General Assembly.

Lloyd accepted this suggestion and said he wld do his best with Menon.

I urged Lloyd to attempt to persuade Menon to circulate his revised para 17 as soon as possible today. Lloyd said he wld try to do so but that Menon had told him he felt he had to cable to New Delhi, although Lloyd personally doubted that Menon in fact had to do so. Nevertheless, Lloyd wld urge Menon to accept these changes in para 17 and to cable his revision during course of day.

ACHESON

320/11-2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 26, 1952—10:16 p. m.

Delga 274. Limited distribution. Re Korea. Following is report of mtg, Nov 26, 11 a.m., with Secy State, Gross, Lloyd, and Pearson.

Lloyd and Pearson advised Secy they had talked separately to Menon on basis of changes in para 17 read by Lloyd to Gross last night (reported Delga 273, 11/26/52).[1] This a.m., after Gross talked to Lloyd, latter had read to Menon following text: "If at the end of a further 30 days there are any POWs whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the UN, which in all matters relating to them shall act in accordance with the principles of this res and international law." Menon objected to insertion of words "principles of this res". He did not question omission of clause re detention although Lloyd felt this might have been an inadvertent acquiesence. Secy repeated objections to this clause. As to phrase "principles of this res", Secy said he did not like the whole final clause, but wld not make this a breaking point with Menon.

Pearson urged consideration of shorter alternative formulation, also read to Gross by Lloyd last night, which wld provide "responsibility for them", rather than responsibility "for care and disposition", wld be transferred to UN. Secy objected to this alternative, pointing out the necessity for "balancing" the word "disposition" in the first sentence of para 17 by a clear statement in the second sentence that UN wld have responsibility for disposition if after 30 days political conference came to no final results.

---

[1] *Supra.*

Lloyd and Pearson agreed to urge upon Menon acceptance of the longer version quoted above but with the omission of words "the principles of this res and".

There was agreement that Menon shld be pressed to move quickly and that comite shld vote as soon as possible. Pearson thought this particularly important because Menon appears to have reason to believe that ChiComs will very soon publicly take same position on Ind res as Sov Govt. (This info Menon gave Gross last night, as reported.)

Pearson, Lloyd, and Secy also agreed that we shld discourage all our friends from submitting amendments and it was hoped Jamali (Iraq) cld be persuaded to withdraw his amendment. Secy said we wld talk to LAs.

ACHESON

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korea

Memorandum by John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON?,] November 26, 1952.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Subject: The Korean War

1. It is probable that the dominant will with which we have to deal is that of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin cannot impose its will on Communist China in the same arbitrary way that it imposes its will upon Poland, Rumania, etc. Nevertheless the Chinese Communist Party accepts the dominance of the Soviet Communist Party as leader of the world proletariat.

2. If this conclusion is sound, the considerations which determine whether or not the Communists will continue the war are global considerations and not considerations limited merely to the battle line in Korea or the desires of the North Koreans or Chinese Communists. There is no doubt that Moscow looks on the Korean war as only one of many fronts. What it does there will be determined not by local considerations alone, but by other situations in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

3. From the Soviet standpoint the Korean war:

(*a*) holds a large part of the U.S. land forces on an Asian peninsula where in the case of general war they might be lost. (I do not think that the Soviet now plans a general war but the bad strategic disposition of U.S. land forces consequent on the Korean war is an advantage to Soviet Russia which no doubt they calculate weakens our resolution with respect to other actual and potential areas of conflict such, for example, as Iran.)

(*b*) absorbs large amounts of military equipment which slows down the rearming of Western Europe, of Chinese nationalists on Formosa and of native and French forces in Vietnam.

(*c*) provides an excuse for Soviet Russia to hold onto Port Arthur and to control Manchuria.

(*d*) provides a propaganda gold mine which is being exploited to the immense advantage of the Communist position throughout all of Asia.

(*e*) provides a source of serious friction between the U.S. and the other NATO powers.

(*f*) maintains a constant military threat to Japan, which builds up anxiety and neutralism there.

The foregoing factors could make the Soviet Union want to continue the war, irrespective of the prisoner-of-war issue, so long as it can get these advantages without the risks of a military defeat in Korea. That risk probably seems negligible under present circumstances because the United Nations side seems not to have the will, and perhaps not the capability, to win in Korea a victorious decision.

However, the prisoner-of-war issue is doubtless important, not primarily from the standpoint of the actual prisoners taken in the Korean war, but from the standpoint of the world-wide situation. If there is no forcible repatriation, that may encourage defections everywhere. If there is forcible repatriation, enabling the Communists to make an example of those who have been "disloyal", that will deter future desertions and facilitate consolidation of the Communist position.

J.F.D.

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Korea

Memorandum by John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON?,] November 26, 1952.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Subject: The Republic of Korea

President Syngman Rhee is old and feeble. He is highly nervous and moves from fits of great despondency to elation. His will is still powerful and he has three obsessions:

1. To continue in power;
2. To unite all of Korea under his leadership;
3. To give vent to his life-long hatred of the Japanese.

It is my recommendation that political matters be discussed as little as possible with Rhee.[1] To the extent that they have to be discussed, you might:

1. Congratulate President Rhee upon his reelection as President. This occurred last July, thanks to the amendment of the Constitution which Rhee put through when it was apparent that the Legislature would not reelect him as called for by the then Constitution.

---

[1] Secretary of State-designate Dulles is referring to President-elect Eisenhower's upcoming trip to Korea.

2. Indicate that the unity of Korea continues to be the goal of the United States in accordance with its pre-war pledges, just as the unity of Germany and unity of Austria continue to be our goals. But that does not mean that the United States is committed to precipitate a third World War in an effort to achieve these goals by force.

In this connection I may note my belief, held ever since I was in Korea in June 1950, that our objective should be to extend the effective control of the Republic of Korea up to the so-called "waist line". We could never expect a friendly Republic of Korea to hold unchallenged possession of the entire northern area since this would bring Western powers close to Port Arthur and Vladivostok and in control of an area which provides much of the power needed by the industrial complex of Manchuria.

3. Speak reassuringly of the present intentions of Japan as democratized through the occupation and new constitution. Also point out that Japanese rearmament will be so integrated with U.S. air and seapower that Japan could not alone be an offensive threat against Korea. It is vitally important from the standpoint of the entire Pacific situation, including Korea itself, that good relations be reestablished between Japan and Korea.

J.F.D.

320/11-2752

Memorandum of Conversation, by Maurice M. Bernbaum, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 27, 1952.

Subject: Latin American Caucus of November 26, 1952

The Secretary, accompanied by Amb. Gross, Messrs. Ross, Popper, Wells and Bernbaum, was invited by Dr. Carias [2] to attend the meeting of the Latin American Delegates which had already been called to discuss other matters of common interest to them. In extending the invitation to the Secretary, Dr. Carias mentioned the desirability of working out a common LA–US approach on the Korean question. He felt that such action was desirable in view of the conflicting views expressed in the various meetings of the 21 sponsorship powers and in the press.

Following a brief introduction by Dr. Carias, the Secretary described the situation leading up to the latest amendment by the Indian Delegation to its resolution providing for the transfer to the United Nations of the responsibility for the disposition, as well as care and maintenance of the POW's in the event that a solution had not been reached by the Political Conference within 60 days. He added that there had already been presented another amendment by Denmark [3] reducing the 60-day period to 30 days, and stated that the Indian resolution so amended would be satisfactory to the United States.

---

[1] Maurice M. Bernbaum was also Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State.

[2] Tiburico Carias, Representative of Honduras.

[3] For the text of this amendment, see UN document A/C.1/L.5.

The Secretary interpreted Paragraph 5 of the operative section of the Indian resolution as meaning that the screening of the prisoners would be performed by the Repatriation Commission, otherwise provided for in the resolution, and not by the contending parties. He expressed the opinion that this was the intention of the Indian Delegation despite the lack of drafting precision in Paragraph 5 and stated that he would have no objection if a clarifying amendment were presented.

The Secretary went on to say that the present satisfactory situation on the Korean item was due largely to the skillful handling of Committee 1 by Amb. Muniz [4] and to the unwavering and heartening support of the other countries in the Western Hemisphere who represented a veritable pillar of strength in contrast to the tendency of others toward weakness and compromise. He then defined the term "Western Hemisphere" as that part of the North and South American continents south of the Canadian border. This produced some laughter and applause.

The Secretary then spoke of the tactics to be followed in regard to the various resolutions now before Committee 1 on the Korean item. He hoped that all of the Latin American Delegations would find it possible to vote for the Indian resolution. While expressing the opinion that the Russian amendments [5] to this resolution were really a separate resolution, rather than amendments, he felt that there would be no point in getting into a procedural wrangle on the matter. He, therefore, suggested that these amendments come to a vote before the Indian resolution when they could be decisively defeated. He then inquired of Amb. Muniz regarding his views on the matter. Muniz agreed that it would probably be best to avoid a procedural wrangle by bringing the amendments to a vote and getting them out of the way as soon as possible.

The Secretary then went on to say that the remaining Soviet resolutions [6] could thereafter be voted down with equal facility. As regards the 21-power resolution, he expressed the opinion that it might be considered desirable after consultation with the co-sponsors to have it withdrawn. The Iraqi resolution,[7] he stated, did not constitute a problem and would not require serious consideration. Its amendment of

---

[4] João Carlos Muñiz of Brazil, Chairman of the First Committee.

[5] The effect of the Soviet amendments was to eliminate the operative paragraphs of the revised Indian draft resolution and replace them with a resolution which proposed, *inter alia*, an immediate cease-fire on the basis of the draft armistice agreement already agreed to by the belligerents and referral of the question of repatriation of POWs to a commission composed of representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and South Korea. For a text of the amendments, see UN document A/C.1/L.4.

[6] For a text, see UN documents A/C.1.729/Rev.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1/Add.1.

[7] For text, see UN document A/C.1/L.3.

Paragraph 17 had already been taken care of by the latest change in the Indian resolution while its advocacy of India as umpire of the Repatriation Commission was reliably understood to be opposed by the Indian Delegation. He felt that for these reasons it was most likely that the Iraqi resolution would be withdrawn. This then left the Mexican and Peruvian resolutions [8] which he felt could serve a most useful purpose in consideration by the body selected by the United Nations to handle the prisoners and their eventual disposition. He remarked that such a body would inevitably be faced with the problem in view of the probable failure of the Political Conference to solve it.

The meeting was then thrown open to discussion. Amb. Molino (Panama) inquired whether the 120 or 150-day period of consideration prior to reference to the United Nations would date from the target date mentioned in Paragraph 17 of the Indian resolution, and wanted to know when fighting would cease if the resolution were accepted. The Secretary replied that this period would commence upon signature of the armistice agreement and that in accordance with the draft armistice agreement fighting would cease within a few days after signature.

Amb. Londono Placios (Colombia) inquired whether Article 14 of the Indian resolution clearly provided that the selection of the umpire for the Repatriation Commission would be made by the General Assembly in the event that the Commission itself could not reach a decision. The Secretary responded that the effect of Article 14 as now drafted was to make this possible. Amb. Urquia (El Salvador) questioned the wisdom of the "new language" in the last preambular paragraph of the Indian resolution calling upon the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to make a direct response to the General Assembly on their reactions to the resolution. The Secretary stated that their reaction would be made known to the President of the General Assembly who would then inform that body. He pointed out that the President of the General Assembly was called upon to bring the proposals contained in the Indian resolution to the attention of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments, and to report back to the Assembly their responses. It was then ascertained that Urquia's query was due to an error in Spanish translation. This gave rise to a diatribe on the inadequacies of the Secretariat with regard to Spanish translation and to the corresponding necessity for making Spanish a working language. A budding debate on this subject was checked by Dr. Carias' appeal to confine comments to the Korean problem.

Urquia then inquired why the Indian resolution was to be brought to the attention only of the Chinese Communists and of the North Koreans and not of the South Koreans who were also belligerents. The Secretary responded that the position already adopted by the Syngman

---

[8] For texts, see UN documents A/C.1/730 and A/C.1/732.

Rhee Government would force it to reject the proposals. This was due to internal political factors but the Rhee Government was cooperating with and fighting under the United Nations Command. The Secretary thought it best not to place the Republic of Korea in the position of joining the Communists in turning down the Indian resolution.

Urquia also questioned the desirability of allowing the Soviets to capitalize on the propaganda value of forcing the United Nations to reject the concept of a cease-fire due to prior consideration of the Soviet amendment. He felt that such rejection would steal the headlines and lessen the moral impact of the subsequently-approved Indian resolution. He added that some delegations would find it difficult to vote against a cease-fire. Amb. Lea Plaza (Chile) agreed with Urquia and suggested that the Soviet amendment be divided into two parts for separate votes—the cease-fire could be voted upon favorably by the United Nations while provisions for the suggested commission could be decisively rejected after which the amendment as a whole could be voted down. The Secretary responded that the Communists had, since the inception of the armistice conversation, continually tried to reach agreement on a cease-fire to be followed by the negotiation of the substantive proposals involved. This he described as the core of Communist policy which had been consistently and repeatedly rejected by the UNC for the reason that such action would serve only to give the Communists time to prepare for attack if the negotiations should fail. This conflict of views had already been so highly publicized and was so well known throughout the world that the Communists could not, in the Secretary's opinion, derive any real advantages from United Nations rejection of the cease-fire amendment. Urquia agreed with the Secretary's views but suggested that whatever propaganda advantages there might be should be minimized by explanations of the adverse votes on cease-fire. The Secretary agreed on the soundness of Urquia's suggestion, and observed that the debate on the 5th preambular paragraph of the Indian resolution would offer the opportunity for such clarification since the paragraph emphasized a cease-fire.

In response to the Secretary's suggestion that the Peruvian and Mexican resolution might be withdrawn for possible later utilization in the placement of the POW's, Belaunde replied that he was "inclined" toward withdrawing his resolution. He was always ready to help and would therefore put the decision on the point in the hands of his colleagues.

Amb. Padilla Nervo (Mexico), who translated for himself, admitted that he had originally advocated support of an unamended Indian resolution in the belief that India would not accept changes and that any subchanges would damn the resolution in the eyes of the Chinese Communists. He was pleased over the manner in which the Indian Delegation had by itself amended its resolution to the satisfaction of all concerned. He remarked that he did not look upon his resolution as merely a demographic solution to the POW problem and that he preferred to let it stand as a possible basis of agreement with the Communists. He felt that its ultimate disposition could be decided by subsequent developments. The Secretary agreed. Belaunde then hedged on his original offer to withdraw the Peruvian resolution with the statement that it might be desirable to hold it in abeyance. He admitted that all but a very small part of his resolution had already been covered in the Indian resolution but felt that even the small remaining part might be of assistance in the future. The Secretary agreed.

The Secretary terminated the session by thanking the Latin American Delegates again for their cooperation. He described his relationship with some of them during his many years with the Department of State as a great experience. He said that it would probably be the last time he would meet with the Latin Americans as he expected to leave for Europe within a few days and to leave the Department of State shortly thereafter. He hoped that when visiting the various Latin American countries in the future, as a tourist, they would remember his name. There was considerable applause and handshaking.

Carias remarked, as the Secretary was leaving, that Amb. Blanco (Cuba) had been selected by the caucus as the Latin American choice for a seat on the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

320/11-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, November 28, 1952—9 p. m.
NIACT

Delga 288. Dept pls relay New Delhi niact; rptd New Delhi 7. Re Korea.

1. As reported Delga 284,[1] USDel has been trying to bring Ind res to vote as soon as possible. We hoped Menon wld speak Nov 28 p.m., and res cld come to vote immed or at latest Nov 29. Toward close of mtg Nov 28, however, Menon again asked to postpone his speech this time to Dec 1. Indonesia supported Menon and made formal motion to adjourn until Dec 1 which Vyshinsky backed. Altho US and UK voted against adjournment until Dec 1, motion carried 27–24 with number of abstensions.

2. FYI only. During lunch Nov 28, Madame Pandit spoke to Secty and later sent him note saying she had urged Menon to speak Nov 29 but he insisted on delaying to Dec 1. She stated that she was worried by delay which she thought was dangerous. Subsequently, Madame

---

[1] Not printed (320/11–2752).

Pandit informed us that although she received full clearance from New Delhi during course of afternoon, Menon had nevertheless insisted on seeking postponement his speech to Dec 1.

3. Rumor and speculation at UN as to purpose in Menon's delay included fol three possibilities: He may

a. Seek to withdraw Indian res;
b. Accept some Sov amendments particularly one calling for an immed cease fire;
c. Propose comite invite Chi Commie to get their views on Ind proposal before putting it to vote.

4. While we do not believe Menon will in fact do any of these, we are concerned he might take some step which would divert present course or at least further delay vote his res. Any such move would confuse situation in GA and jeopardize unanimous non-Communist support for basic US position which Ind res appears on verge of achieving. US wld strongly oppose adoption of Sov amendments or invitation of Chi Commies, and if Ind shld seek to withdraw its own res at this stage we wld seriously consider going ahead with this res without Ind sponsorship. End FYI.

5. You shld in your discretion again talk to Nehru, congratulating him for statesmanlike role which Ind has played in UN in rallying free world opinion behind moral principle non-forcible repatriation and specific plan to implement this principle and bring peace to Kor. Ind being about to achieve this remarkable success, it is essential that this historic Ind contribution to cause of UN and peace be quickly consummated and not be jeopardized by delay and possible divisive or dilatory Commie tactics. Earliest possible vote on Ind res wld bring to fruitful close long debate in GA and wld launch forces of world opinion which we hope Commies cannot long withstand. It is earnest US hope that Ind del will be instructed to help bring Ind res to vote immed after Menon's speech Dec 1.

ACHESON

795.00/11-3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, November 30, 1952—3 p. m.
PRIORITY

2240. Dept pass USUN. Rptd USUN. PriMin in Sanchi for Buddhist ceremony. But this morning R.K. Nehru told us categorically no change of any kind in policy and Ind wld definitely support its res. He said he had sent instructions to this effect to Ind del today Nov 30. He said delay entirely due desire Menon have more time prepare his speech and clear it with New Delhi.

R.K. Nehru said he had given out publicity appearing in New Delhi press today which stated without direct quotes that Ind again in contact Peking through diplomatic channels with view clarifying Indian res since GOI thinks some of China's objections due to misunderstanding. Statement added that India welcomes statement Chi Govt and Ind wld continue efforts achieve armistice on equal and reasonable terms. It goes on to say that India regrets Chi disapproval but GOI will continue in hope rejection by Chi conveyed through Vyshinsky [1] is not final and that Chi will give further consideration to matter. Adds Ind believes Chi honestly wishes restoration peace in Korea and GOI believes efforts being made in cooperation other countries at UN will ultimately bear fruit.

Statement suggested that there no finality about Ind res which was intended as basis for expeditious settlement Korean problem and that Ind anxious dispel Chi fears that modifications made to suit Amer or any other party involved in dispute. True certain clarifications offered to allay Amer suspicions but no radical change in original res which presumably had been under favorable consideration Peking. Subsequent statement by Chi that wld continue efforts achieve armistice on equal and reasonable basis keeps door open for Ind del to pursue policy of facilitating settlement.

As I reported yesterday there is widespread conviction here both in and out of Govt that Chi Commies were favorably disposed towards res but that Sov applied extreme pressure to prevent agreement. As result of this conviction resentment against Sov is keen and also disappointment that Chi had succumbed so easily.

Unfortunately it is said with some cynicism that US might have turned down res if Vyshinsky had not taken negative position. Ind for first time has taken clear-cut position in opposition to Commie Govts, and on this issue clearly believes us to be right and them to be wrong.

BOWLES

---

[1] Vyshinsky's announcement of Chinese rejection came in the course of debate in Committee 1 on Nov. 26, 1952, just before he introduced the Soviet Union's six amendments to the Indian resolution. For the debate, see UN document A/C.1/SR.531.

Editorial Note

On December 1, 1952, the First Committee voted on the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/734/Rev.2) approving each paragraph by considerable margins. Then, the Danish amendment (A/C.1/L.5), proposing a 30-day instead of a 60-day time limit for the political conference to dispose of the remainder of the prisoners, was adopted by a large majority. The Committee overwhelmingly rejected the amendments of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.4) to the Indian resolution; and then passed the

Indian resolution as a whole and as amended by a vote of 53 to 5, with 1 abstention. For a report of the session, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.535.

At its next meeting, on December 2, the Committee rejected the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/729/Rev.1/Corr.1 and Rev./Corr./Add.1). At this same meeting, the 21-power, Mexican, and Peruvian draft resolutions were deferred until the President of the Assembly had submitted his report in accordance with the resolution adopted. For a report of the session, see United Nations document A/C.1/SR.536.

For action on these resolutions taken in the General Assembly December 3, see footnote 1, page 702.

795.00/12-252: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, December 2, 1952—6 p. m.

2272. For Howland Sargeant. Ind Korean res clearly offers us excellent propaganda opportunity but one which must be handled with great tact and care for maximum effectiveness. Suggest the following points:

1. Ind shld be given credit, but we shld be careful not to wrap our arms around her or we may be rebuffed. In other words, while giving full credit to Ind, we shld not gloat over fact Ind took position counter to that of Sov-Chi bloc, nor shld we imply that this indicates closer Ind alignment with West.

2. As result recent developments most people this part world convinced that Chi probably was willing to accept truce, but that Sov prevented agreement. This conviction runs counter previously held view here that Commie Chi stands on own feet and basically independent of Sov control.

3. To some extent belief that Sov influenced Chi decision due conviction that while Chi has everything to gain from a truce, Sov has everything to gain from continued fighting. I have emphasized this point privately with great effectiveness, stressing that Chi has many problems that cry for solution, that Chinese soldiers are doing the dying, that truce wld probably lead to peace in Korea, and that peace in Korea might readily lead to a broad Asian settlement, which wld give all Asian countries including Chi an opportunity press forward with business of peace and raise living standards their people. I have stressed that Russia, on other hand is losing no men, is being given a free opportunity to test new weapons, and by promoting continuation conflict is keeping China tied to Russia coat-tails and also keeping Asia stirred up and keeping China from coming to understanding with the West.

4. This analysis is generally accepted and I believe it very much in our interests promote it. Although the possibility China splitting off from Russia may seem remote, this is good angle to stress in this part of world because it represents general hope and of course there is always some slight chance it might succeed. However, suggest that this not be handled too blatantly or it might make Chi Commies feel it necessary heal any breach which might possibly be in the making.

BOWLES

Resolution 610 (VII), Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, December 3, 1952 [1]

The General Assembly,

Having received the special report of the United Nations Command of 18 October 1952 on "the present status of the military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea"* and other relevant reports relating to Korea,

Noting with approval the considerable progress towards an armistice made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question,

Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved,

Mindful of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting,

Deeply conscious of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,

Anxious to expedite and facilitate the convening of the political conference as provided in article [paragraph] [2] 60 of the draft armistice agreement,†

1. *Affirms* that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the

---

[1] The source text is reprinted from *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents,* vol. II, pp. 2651–2654.

In the plenary session of the General Assembly on Dec. 3, the revised Indian draft was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The final version was identical with that approved in the First Committee, with one exception: an amendment adopted by a separate vote which added the phrase "so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected" in the paragraph requesting the President of the Assembly to communicate the proposals to the People's Republic of China and to North Korea. The Soviet representative submitted to the Assembly amendments and a draft resolution identical to those he submitted in the First Committee, but they were rejected by the Assembly by large margins. For a report of the session, see UN document A/PV.399.

*U.N. doc. A/2228, Oct. 18, 1952. [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] Brackets in the source text.

†*Ibid.,* annex A. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to Annex A of UN document A/2228.]

Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement;

2. *Affirms* that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention;

3. *Accordingly requests* the President of the General Assembly to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate:

PROPOSALS

I. In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of all prisoners of war, there shall be established a Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, that is, the four States agreed to for the constitution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and referred to in paragraph 37 of the draft armistice agreement, or constituted, alternatively, of representatives of four States not participating in hostilities, two nominated by each side, but excluding representatives of States that are permanent members of the Security Council.

II. The release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement.

III. Force shall not be used against the prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Repatriation Commission and each of its members. Prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of that Convention.

IV. All prisoners of war shall be released to the Repatriation Commission from military control and from the custody of the detaining side in agreed numbers and at agreed exchange points in agreed demilitarized zones.

V. Classification of prisoners of war according to nationality and domicile as proposed in the letter of 16 October 1952 from General Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to

General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,‡ shall then be carried out immediately.

VI. After classification, prisoners of war shall be free to return to their homelands forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.

VII. In accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose by the Repatriation Commission, each party to the conflict shall have freedom and facilities to explain to the prisoners of war "depending upon them" their rights and to inform the prisoners of war on any matter relating to their return to their homelands and particularly their full freedom to return.

VIII. Red Cross teams of both sides shall assist the Repatriation Commission in its work and shall have access, in accordance with the terms of the draft armistice agreement, to prisoners of war while they are under the temporary jurisdiction of the Repatriation Commission.

IX. Prisoners of war shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Repatriation Commission and to bodies and agencies working under the Repatriation Commission, and to inform any or all such bodies of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Commission.

X. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph III above, nothing in this Repatriation Agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Repatriation Commission (or its authorized representatives) to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.

XI. The terms of this Repatriation Agreement and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all prisoners of war.

XII. The Repatriation Commission is entitled to call upon parties to the conflict, its own member governments, or the Member States of the United Nations for such legitimate assistance as it may require in the carrying out of its duties and tasks and in accordance with the decisions of the Commission in this respect.

XIII. When the two sides have made an agreement for repatriation based on these proposals, the interpretation of that agreement shall rest with the Repatriation Commission. In the event of disagreement in the Commission, majority decisions shall prevail. When no majority decision is possible, an umpire agreed upon in accordance with the succeeding paragraph and with article 132 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 shall have the deciding vote.

XIV. The Repatriation Commission shall at its first meeting and prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint the umpire who shall at all times be available to the Commission and shall act as its

---

‡ U.N. doc. A/2230, Oct. 16, 1952, enclosure 3. [Footnote in the source text.]

Chairman unless otherwise agreed. If agreement on the appointment of the umpire cannot be reached by the Commission within the period of three weeks after the date of the first meeting this matter should be referred to the General Assembly.

XV. The Repatriation Commission shall also arrange after the armistice for officials to function as umpires with inspecting teams or other bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Commission or under the provisions of the draft armistice agreement, so that the completion of the return of prisoners of war to their homelands shall be expedited.

XVI. When the Repatriation Agreement is acceded to by the parties concerned and when an umpire has been appointed under paragraph 14 above, the draft armistice agreement, unless otherwise altered by agreement between the parties, shall be deemed to have been accepted by them. The provisions of the draft armistice agreement shall apply except in so far as they are modified by the Repatriation Agreement. Arrangements for repatriation under this agreement will begin when the armistice agreement is thus concluded.

XVII. At the end of ninety days, after the Armistice Agreement has been signed, the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target date for the termination of their detention to the political conference to be called as provided under article [paragraph] [3] 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If at the end of a further thirty days there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law.

---

[3] Brackets in the source text.

320/12–652: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, December 6, 1952—6:11 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 332. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Korea. Re UNMIS No. 107, December 6.[1]

Pearson message to Commies was not shown to us before its despatch. It strikes me as unfortunate and unwarranted attempt on Pearson's part to expound the res instead of merely transmitting it as he was requested to do. He has further weighted the balance of the res in favor of repatriation, as distinguished from "release" as, for example, by omitting from para 4 of his message any reference to the policy implicit in para 17 of the res that PW's who would forcibly resist repatriation will not remain under indefinite detention.

Furthermore, I think, he has in his 5th para reintroduced the ambiguity which gave us trouble in connection with Menon's last amendment by not making it clear that a "complete and immediate cessation of hostilities" would follow from the signing and coming into effect of the armistice agreement.

I will not protest to Pearson prior to authorization to do so but I recommend I be instructed to bring these matters to Pearson's attention[2] to avoid similar action on his part in the future.

AUSTIN

---

[1] The reference telegram contained the text of Pearson's message to the People's Republic of China and North Korea (320/12–652). For text of Pearson's message, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 74–75.

[2] In Gadel 92, Dec. 8, 1952, the Department of State agreed that Pearson's message was "slanted" in an obvious effort to appeal to the People's Republic of China and North Korea, but argued that since the damage was done, it was undesirable to make an issue of it. The U.S. Representative could at an appropriate occasion informally indicate to Pearson that the United States had some question as to the tone and emphasis of the message (320/12–652).

320/12–652: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, December 6, 1952—6:27 p. m.

Delga 334. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Korea. Re State–Defense conversations Korea December 4,[1] and as result meeting today at which Gross, Ross, Wainhouse, Emmons, Allen and Babcock present, following is our estimate situation here and possible course of action for Dept's consideration.

---

[1] No record of these conversations has been found.

We believe now necessary consider what steps, if any, should be taken by Assembly before December 23 in event Pearson reports Commie rejection proposals contained Indian res. We assume GA President will not adjourn session, but will merely adjourn final meeting December 22 or 23, leaving Seventh Session subject to call by President. It assumed, barring emergencies, President will not reconvene Assembly or first comite prior to February 1953.

December 3 res, although sponsored by India, resulted from Brit-Canad-India "coalition" developed during past few weeks and in final phases supported by Austral, New Zealand and France. We cannot safely assume this "coalition" has been dissolved nor that it may not again attempt assume further initiative.

We believe it undesirable to reopen debate on Korean item prior to December 23.

However, it is quite possible that, in event of Commie rejection December 3 res, Indians will introduce new res watering down and weakening their previous res or will attempt accomplish same result by seeking amendment 21-power res. There is also hint that Indo del might table a res, substance of which would undoubtedly be in direction of appeasing Commies. Nor should we discount possible support for moves such as appt of good offices group, which may develop. These possibilities should be considered as major factor in our immediate planning.

21-power res, along with Mex and Peru drafts, technically remain before comite. There have been hints dropped by both Canadians and British that in event Commie rejection Ind res, some pressures may develop to vote 21-power res substantially as written. As we have already advised Brit and Canads, this would be retrogressive step further delaying more positive approach.

We believe it neither desirable nor feasible prior to December 23 to attempt to press res calling for "additional measures"; considerable high-level diplomatic preparation would be necessary before this can be done with prospect of success, and undoubtedly new administration should, without advance commitment, be given opportunity fully to consider question.

From standpoint maintaining or reasserting US leadership in UN forum on Korean item, we believe that some of our colleagues should be informed, on selective basis, of our view that if any further res on Korea is introduced at this time, it should be confined to fol elements:

(*a*) Reaffirmation of principle of non-forcible retention on repatriation POW's;

(*b*) Expression of regret that Commies rejected fair and reasonable proposals set forth in Indian res;

(*c*) Affirmation of determination GA, as expressed in prior SC and GA resolutions, to take all practicable action to resist aggression and to restore international peace and security in area.

Draft res along foregoing lines would be useful as basis for discussion and could be introduced in comite if serious likelihood develops of Indian, Indo, or other initiative along lines referred to above. It could also be used to counter-pressure for action on 21-power res, if such should develop.

AUSTIN

320/12–652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1952—4:53 p. m.

Gadel 98. Re Korea, Delga 334.[2] As we see it, in event Commie rejection GA res, it wld not be desirable from US point of view to have further discussion of Korean case prior to holiday recess. Problem, therefore, is to avoid or minimize such discussion, without giving impression that GA not concerned about Commie rejection and not planning to do anything about it; also, we shld be setting stage for possible further action on Korea when GA reconvenes.

If Commie rejection does not come before GA recess, interim situation can be handled by GADel press statement alone. If, however, rejection comes before recess, it appears inevitable that something be done or said in GA to indicate continuing urgent GA interest and concern, and set stage for possible further GA consideration shld that prove desirable. Dept strongly prefers avoiding any res or discussion and wld hope that matter cld be handled by matter-of-fact Pearson statement, which wld seem to be simplest feasible method of disposing of matter. Pearson wld state GA membs, in light of Commie reply, will require time for consideration and consultation and President wld therefore suggest that Korea not be taken up again until GA reconvenes. Pearson will probably also wish to add hope that in interim Commies will reconsider rejection. (We hope that he will not go any further or send new message to Peiping.)

Suggest you discuss with Pearson along above lines, and with Lloyd if you consider desirable. Shld there be any indication that other dels will at this time introduce new res or seek other substantive action, we may have to consider other tactics to forestall such move.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin and was cleared by Hickerson, Matthews, Bohlen, and Bruce as well as with Johnson in draft.

[2] *Supra.*

Dept believes USDel shld also make press statement when Commie rejection becomes known. Such statement, along lines outlined by you to Hickerson, might include:

(1) Expression of regret and concern that Commies have rejected just, fair and reasonable proposals approved by 54 membs of UN.
(2) There can be no compromise with basic humanitarian principles embodied in GA res Dec 3.[3] Commies now have before them this GA proposal as well as 5 other proposals consistent with basic UN principles put to them by UN negotiators at Panmunjom. If Commies will accept basic UN principles, these outstanding proposals provide numerous alternative plans for settling PW question. Until Commies accept basic UN principles, new formulae or variations on outstanding plans will serve no purpose.
(3) Expression of US view that UN has shown determination to take all practicable action to end hostilities in Korea on a basis consistent with UN principles so that UN action can be terminated and UN objectives in Korea achieved by peaceful means. UN and UNC have made every possible effort to achieve honorable armis and end hostilities. Choice of peace in Korea now clearly lies with Commies and their supporters.
(4) Statement that Commies rejection poses for UN and for GA membs situation requiring careful consideration and consultation.
(5) Expression of hope Commies will recognize world opinion is unanimous against them and reconsider attitude to GA res Dec 3.

Dept wld like to consider desirability such statement in light actual text Commie reaction, and to see text proposed statement prior to release.

Bruce

---

[3] The reference was to the Indian resolution as amended which passed the General Assembly on Dec. 3, p. 702.

320/12-1352: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, December 13, 1952—5:30 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 363. Limited distribution. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Korea.

Ross and I had lunch with Pearson and Lloyd and went over with them substance of Gadel 98, Dec 12.[1] Pearson says he does not intend, at least prior to holiday recess, to send any follow-up message to Commies and appears to agree with us that it would not serve any useful purpose. Lloyd concurs.

---

[1] *Supra.*

We had long talk concerning possible steps in event Commies reject Dec 3 res prior to recess. Pearson referred to advice from New Delhi (presumably reports from Canada High Commissioner) that Ind Amb Peiping has advised GOI of his impression from conversations in Peiping that ChiCom Govt may be more inclined to continue war in Korea than is Moscow. Lloyd and Pearson are both skeptical of this interpretation of Peiping attitude, but Pearson felt it worthwhile to pass along to us for what it may be worth.

With regard to action to be taken here in event unqualified Commie rejection of Dec 3 res prior to holiday recess, in commenting upon our proposed line, Pearson urged that we consult with him immediately upon his receipt of Commie message. He promised to talk with Lloyd and myself before he issues any statement and strongly hopes we would withhold USDel statement until we talked with him. He considers it essential that he issue statement in such event and did not demur to our suggestion that it be a short, simple statement. I told him frankly we were unhappy that he had "expounded" the res rather than merely communicating it to Commies. He admitted he had deliberately done so, on basis of "attempting to clarify certain questions" which had been reported to him from his rep in New Delhi. Both Lloyd and Pearson were quite strongly opposed to any statement indicating request to Commies to reconsider rejection.

Pearson suggested possibility that Commies might not send an unqualified rejection, but might indicate desire to send a rep to NY to confer with him re clarification of res. Pearson appeared to be receptive to such an approach and I strongly opposed it. This led to a discussion of possible attitudes of new administration. I made it clear we were in no position to commit new administration to any position or attitude on this or any other matter relating to Korean developments, but I expressed strong personal view that new administration wld be at least as strongly opposed to such a course as present administration.

Pearson and Lloyd reactions to our proposed statement [2] (which I merely outlined in substance) were that it wld be desirable to express regret at Commie rejection and need for consideration and consultation of GA members in light thereof. However, both expressed view that we shld not in any statement leave room for interpretation that we wld extend or enlarge military action. I said it was not our intention to leave such an interpretation but I thought we felt it important to express clearly our firm determination to take all practicable action to continue to meet aggression in Korea in accordance with UN principles.

---

[2] The proposed statement to be issued in the event that the Chinese rejected the Indian resolution was contained in Delga 362, Dec. 13, 1952, not printed (320/12–1352). The approved text, cleared with the White House, the Department of Defense, and Bruce and Matthews of the Department of State was sent to New York as Gadel 101, Dec. 15, 1952, not printed (320/12–1552). For a text of the statement, issued on Dec. 15, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 76.

Lloyd urged that in formulating any such thought we shld "keep it at the political level" rather than to seek to convey any military implications. He stressed importance from point of view Brit public opinion to continue to create impression that "we had leaned over backwards" to take all reasonable steps looking toward armistice in Korea. Lloyd asked our views concerning next steps, presumably in Feb when he assumed the Assembly would reconvene to discuss the Korean question. I restated our inability to commit in any way the new administration on this point but expressed the personal view that we wld have to come to grips with the problem. From this point of view we thought that any action at this Assembly wld be in the nature of a "holding action" which wld not prejudice any steps which the new administration might have in mind proposing at the reconvened Assembly. In connection with GA procedures generally, Pearson agreed best course wld be for him as GA pres to recess present session of GA on Dec 22 or 23 subject to his call. In event we or other responsible members requested mtg prior to mid-Feb, Pearson feels he shld not take responsibility for rejecting such a request. However, we left this open on basis of further consultation.

I told Lloyd and Pearson frankly that we were very much concerned about Menon's public statements[3] and considered they were doing harm. Pearson said he had had two long talks with Menon during past few days and had the impression that Menon was attempting to persuade the Commies that he had not "surrendered to the US".

Pearson believed Menon is apparently actively engaged in trying to anticipate probable Commie objections to Dec 3 res and drafting changes in it to meet such objections. We repeated strongly our view that it wld be most undesirable and dangerous for any new resolutions to be put forward, particularly resolutions which weakened or modified the Dec 3 res. Lloyd and Pearson, particularly Lloyd, urged us to keep an open mind on possible changes on the understanding, of course, that there wld be no sacrifice of principles. We made it clear we wld oppose this course.

AUSTIN

---

[3] These public statements, reported in telegram 1677 to New Delhi, Dec. 8, 1952, were to the effect that if the Chinese rejected the resolution, the General Assembly should make further efforts to compromise; that the bombing of the Yalu power plants came at a tragic time—just when peace was attainable in Korea; and that India did not consider China an aggressor in Korea (795.00/12-852).

Editorial Note

On December 14, 1952, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, rejected the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 3, which had been transmitted to his government by Pearson on December 5. Three days later, the Foreign Minister of North Korea also rejected the resolution. Both replies followed similar arguments: the resolution had been adopted without the participation of China or North Korea; there were no legitimate Chinese or Korean prisoners of war held by the United Nations who refused to return home; and the plan by which the United Nations had the final authority to appoint an umpire in the process of disposing of nonrepatriated prisoners was a ploy to facilitate the United States scheme for forced retention of prisoners. In their communications, the Communist Foreign Ministers supported the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for an immediate cease-fire and referral of the prisoner of war question to a political commission yet to be established. See the report to the General Assembly by the President of the Assembly, December 20, 1952, United Nations document A/2354.

Editorial Note

The continuing unrest in the United Nations prisoner of war camps erupted into major violence once again on December 14, 1952. Civilian internees of Pongam-do compound, located on a tiny, hilly island of the same name not far from Koje-do, refused to discontinue military drilling in defiance of United Nations Command orders. A Republic of Korea security battalion was sent in to break up the demonstration. They fired on prisoners who were atop a hill, some in three lines with arms locked to form a human shield for others who were hurling rocks and debris on the security troops. When the firing stopped, 85 prisoners were killed and 113 were hospitalized, while only 4 Republic of Korea personnel were seriously wounded. Regarding this incident, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 405–407; a detailed account of the incident made available to the Department of State by the UNC for briefing purposes is located in FE files, lot 55 D 128.

In a letter dated December 20, 1952, the Soviet Union successfully requested that the General Committee of the General Assembly recommend inclusion on its agenda of an item, entitled "The mass murder of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war by United States military authorities on the island of Pongam-do" before the suspension of the work of the session. On December 22, the Assembly considered the item and an accompanying draft resolution by the Soviet Union and then rejected it by a vote of 45 to 5 with 10 abstentions. For Ambassador Jessup's statement in conjunction with the incident made before the First Committee and for the statement of Ambassador Gross before the General Assembly, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1953, pages 16–20.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Korea"

Paper Prepared by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1952.

Disposition of anti-Communist POW's

Problem: To determine US policy with regard to disposition of those Chinese and North Korean POW's in Korea who have indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation to Communist control.

Discussion:

1. Further search for a formula, mutually agreeable to the enemy and ourselves, for disposition of those Chinese and North Korean POW's who have indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation, has now been clearly demonstrated to be hopeless. The Indian resolution, passed by the General Assembly, constitutes the furthest that this Government can go in the way of compromise on the mechanics of settlement of the POW issue without actual surrender on the issue itself. Rejection of that resolution by both the USSR and the Chinese Communist regime demonstrates that under present circumstances there is no possibility that the USSR and the Chinese Communists will agree to any formula which holds to our basic principle of no forcible repatriation.

2. In this situation it appears that we should seriously consider what we can usefully do to dispose of the POW issue. The obvious course of action which offers itself is for the UNC immediately to reclassify as political refugees those Korean and Chinese prisoners who will not be repatriated, to hand over the Koreans to the control of the Government of the Republic of Korea, and to transfer the Chinese to their choice of whatever countries may be willing to receive them, with the expectation that practically all of them would go to Formosa.

3. The advantages of such a course of action would be:

---

[1] In a covering memorandum to Nitze, Dec. 22, 1952, Matthews indicated that he had discussed this paper with Bruce, who did not disagree with the recommendation of the *fait accompli* solution, but did believe that the implications and possibilities of the repercussions (particularly on American POWs) were so important that nothing should be initiated by the Truman administration during its last weeks. Evidently, Bruce did come around to agreeing with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff "that something on this order might be passed on to Mr. Dulles", according to a note from Matthews to Bruce, Dec. 29, attached to a slightly revised version of this paper submitted by Johnson to Matthews on Dec. 24. In this note, however, Matthews suggested that Bruce might want to raise the issue with Acheson because it was an important step (695A.0024/12–2452). On another copy of this memorandum, dated Dec. 24, Johnson indicated that the matter had not been discussed with Dulles (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

a. To forestall the possibility of further divisive debate among the Free World countries on formulae for settlement of the POW issue.

b. To remove the POW issue from any possibility of negotiation and thus to present the Communists with the possibility, if they should eventually come to desire an armistice, of accepting a *fait accompli* without explicit surrender of their own principle.

c. To provide the basis for effective exploitation of the propaganda and political warfare values inherent in the UN position of no forcible repatriation.

d. To remove any doubts that the Communists may still entertain as to the possibility of our compromising on this issue.

4. The disadvantages of such a course of action would be:

a. The difficulties we might encounter in persuading our allies of the utility of such unilateral disposition of the POW question.

b. The possibility that we would present the Communists with an opportunity and an incentive to undertake some form of retaliation against the UN prisoners whom they now hold.

5. In terms of timing, the present situation appears to be propitious for a unilateral disposition of the POW issue. We have clearly demonstrated our willingness to accept any formula which does not violate our principle. The Communists have clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to accept any such formula. The formula which the Communists have rejected has had the full sanction of the overwhelming majority of the members of the UN. The difficulties which we may expect in securing Allied acceptance of this course of action at the present time will probably be less, and certainly no greater than might be expected at any foreseeable time in the future. The possibility of Communist retaliation against our own prisoners may be precipitated, but this possibility has always existed, and could not be completely avoided under any formula for an armistice which squared with our principle of no forcible repatriation. With armistice negotiations at Panmunjom indefinitely recessed, there is little need to consider repercussions on those negotiations. Perhaps equally important in terms of timing is the probability that the sponsoring of such a course of action by the present US administration, even though undertaken with the obvious approval of the incoming administration, would be less unsettling to the members of our coalition than the early sponsorship of such a course of action by the incoming US administration.

6. The advantages of undertaking the suggested course of action appear to outweigh the disadvantages, and in terms of timing, immediate action appears advantageous.

Recommendation:

1. The Department should secure US Governmental concurrence to the following course of action:

a. Immediate reclassification as political refugees of those Korean and Chinese POW's who have indicated they would forcibly resist repatriation—such reclassification to take place after interviews in the presence of International Red Cross observers indicate that the POW's have not changed their views;

b. Transfer of such Korean POW's to the control of the Government of the Republic of Korea;

c. Transfer of such Chinese POW's to their choice of the countries willing to receive them;

d. Similar disposition of all POW's we may capture in the future who express themselves as unwilling to return to Communist control.

2. Approval should be sought from the incoming administration for such a course of action.

3. The US should then attempt to gain acquiescence of our principal Allies to the immediate undertaking of this course of action.

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Phillips) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1952.

Subject: Disposition of Anti-Communist POWs

In considering the memorandum under this title by Mr. Stelle dated December 16,[1] the following points are worth keeping in mind:

(1) Domestic reaction to such a move would be conditioned to a great extent by the threat or fact of retaliation against American POWs. No public opinion surveys and very little editorial opinion has yet faced squarely up to this eventuality. Editorial opinion has been almost unanimously in favor of the UN position. However, there has been a constant under-current of privately circulated petitions demanding the return of our prisoners as a first concern. One such petition, started some months ago by the parents of a prisoner and with no known Communist inspiration, is believed to have gathered about 250,000 signatures. At present the Department has received about 12,000 petitions or form messages calling for a cease-fire and a large proportion of them demanding the return of our prisoners. Most of these are addressed to the President and forwarded to the Department by the White House.

(2) Public opinion strongly backed the Korean trip of General Eisenhower. Although opinion was less certain that any decisive results would come of the trip, there is no question but that any final disposition of anti-Communist POWs by this Administration which did not have the open backing of the new Administration would be open to very severe public criticism.

---

[1] *Supra.*

(3) Obviously the prospect of unfavorable domestic reaction to the contemplated move would be lessened if it were taken in conjunction with increased military activities no matter which side initiated them.

(4) As an argument in the other direction, our position on POWs in Korea and on defectors in Europe are both under pressure at this time. Having publicly attached a great deal of importance to the moral principles involved, great benefit probably would be achieved in the long run by positive action showing that we will not waive from the established principles.

In the light of the above it is evident that such a move would run the risk of an overwhelmingly unfavorable domestic reaction unless it had the open support of the new Administration or unless it were taken in conjunction with a military offensive.

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army [1]

SECRET
ROUTINE

TOKYO, December 22, 1952—8:47 a.m.

CX 60418. 1. According to an AP dispatch of 14 Dec dateline Geneva, National Red Cross societies voted favorably on an Indian resolution for both sides in the Korean war to immediately exchange sick and wounded. As you are aware, this proposal was made previously by UNC negotiators and rejected by the Communists.

2. We have had under consideration here a plan to reopen this subject through liaison officers, but since this Red Cross proposal parallels generally our plan, the following analysis is submitted for whatever action you may care to take at Washington level.

a. A survey completed a short time ago indicated that, in our pro-Communist camps, there are about 6,900 POWs who may be considered under the provisions of the first para, Art 110, Geneva Convention relative to treatment of POWs.

b. There is no info avail on the nbr of UNC POWs held by the Communists who are in this category.

c. The possibility of Communist acceptance of such an exchange proposal is remote, but the fact of our supporting such exchange has obvious wide psychological and publicity advantages.

d. Should the Communists accept this proposal, we would benefit, only insofar as they desire, by the return of our own sick and wounded. However, we would have to be prepared, by full public coverage of the details of exchange at every command level, to counter exploitation by the Communists of the patients we turn over to them. In all probability, they would use many of these unfortunates, especially amputees and napalm-burn cases, as examples of UNC savagery, despite the fact that we have accomplished medical miracles in saving the lives of scores of these people.

---

[1] This telegram was for G-3.

e. It would have to be made clear that the total nbr of POWs and CIs returned to the Communists under this program would be deducted from the 83,000 previously reported.

3. Rqst we be kept informed of any action taken on the above.

695A.0024/12-2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, December 25, 1952—7 p. m.
PRIORITY

792. Department pass Tokyo, rptd info Tokyo 177 (Tokyo please pass) CINCUNC as DIP 307.

We have studied Department's summary of CINCUNC proposal to try prisoner of war post-capture offenders but are still doubtful desirability doing so. Public trial would inevitably be target for Commie propaganda in which issue of maintaining order in camps could readily be obscured or distorted, trial thus becoming forum from which all sorts of false charges and accusations could be trumpeted to listening world. In short trial might be turned into Commie propaganda bonanza.

Secondly we question whether threat even of capital punishment would effectively deter professional agitators from fomenting trouble.

To recommend against public trials is not however to favor maintenance *status quo* in handling POWs or silence on political issue presented by Commie propaganda to date.

Question of POW trials is part of larger problem of conduct and strategy of Korean war. On surface problem is one of discipline in POW camps; beyond that we face important Commie political drive conducted in area political warfare. Fact that in recent UNGA vote the Asiatic powers abstained from voting on POW issue should give us small cause for rejoicing.[1] Any time Commies can swap 80 POWs for 10 Asia Assembly votes, we would do well to examine our position. What I suggest therefore is that whole subject POWs be restudied not only with respect prevailing camp conditions and problem maintaining discipline and order, but POW problem in relation our political strategy and political objectives.

For example, if we estimate prospects obtaining armistice are now remote, consideration might be given to separate solution for non-repatriate (anti-Commie) prisoners, or of moving POWs out of Korea altogether and relocating them in areas where control conditions less difficult.

---

[1] The reference was to the vote on the Indian resolution in the General Assembly on Dec. 3; see footnote 1, p. 702.

It is furthermore my opinion that whole question merits highest and most urgent attention.

BRIGGS

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1952.

Subject: Handling of Pro-Communist POWs

The recent Pongam incident[1] probably marked the beginning of a decline in support of our position on non-forcible repatriation which reached its climax with the passage of the Indian resolution in the GA. We must recognize the great propaganda success which, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists achieved by this incident. On the basis of conversations with our Allies, I am satisfied that although they are very restrained in their comments, the incident served to a degree to shake confidence in our handling of POWs which had been slowly reestablished since the earlier Koje incidents. While the Arab-Asian abstention on the December 21[2] Soviet resolution on Pongam can be explained on broad political grounds, doubts concerning our handling of the Pongam incident undoubtedly was a factor in their attitude. This could hardly help but be the case in view of even the U.S. publicity on the subject. Clark's immediate statement[3] regarding the incident was good and as persuasive as possible. However, since then photographs of bedraggled, dispirited-looking POWs, huddled between barbed wire or staggering down a line of American bayonets under the weight of their wounded, has greatly dispelled the effect of Clark's release. (In addition to the still pictures, last week I saw a U.S. newsreel along these lines that could not help but raise some of the traditional American sympathy for the underdog—the effect abroad of such photographs would of course be infinitely greater.)

I do not, however, believe that the problem is entirely one of propaganda handling, serious though that be, because whatever the circumstances the picture that remains is of U.S. troops and troops under U.S. command shooting unarmed prisoners inside their compounds who for some incomprehensible reason insist on singing and marching. This is not to say that the action of U.S. officers at Pongam was not entirely reasonable and justified. I have carefully studied the detailed report [4] we received from the UNC on the incident and given the resources and means at his disposal and the situation with which he was confronted I feel that the action taken by the U.S. officer in charge was probably entirely correct. (We still have to receive a detailed report on the October 1 incident at Cheju-do.) [5] However, it nevertheless played well into the Communist hand and they can be expected to exploit their success to the maximum in similar incidents in the future.

---

[1] See the second editorial note, p. 712.

[2] Ten nations abstained on the vote defeating the Soviet resolution condemning "mass murder" at Pongam-do.

[3] A text of Clark's statement can be found in telegram C 60412 to the Department of the Army, Dec. 21, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128).

Public relations handling is only a small part of the answer. The largest part of the answer must be found in making available to the men on the spot techniques and resources which will enable them to handle incidents such as those at Pongam and Cheju-do without inflicting major loss of life upon the POWs. I do not know what those techniques or resources could be, but it seems to me that they should not be beyond the bounds of ingenuity of this Government. We must recognize that we are probably in for a long pull, during which our handling of POWs is going to continue to be a major factor in the entire Korean situation and we must be prepared to treat it as such.

I suggest that at the earliest opportunity we frankly and fully discuss the situation with the JCS, probably somewhat along the foregoing lines, with a view of stimulating their attention and interest in the problem.[6]

---

[4] Not printed, but see the second editorial note, p. 712.

[5] The incident at Cheju-do was similar to that at Pongam-do. Chinese POWs refused to stop demonstrating and attacked U.S. troops sent in to restore order with rocks and makeshift weapons. The U.S. troops opened fire on the POWs killing 45 and hospitalizing 75. Only 2 U.S. personnel were injured, and they only slightly (telegram CX 56181, Clark to JCS, Oct. 1, 1952; FE files, lot 55 D 128).

[6] At the bottom of the source text the following note was written by Matthews: "Jan. 6. Mr. Johnson and I discussed this problem today with General Bradley. He well understands it and will study with JCS possible ways and means to remedy the situation. HFM"

695A.0024/12-2952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 29, 1952.

Subject: Korea: Prisoners of War.

Participants: Mr. John Foster Dulles
Mr. David W. Wainhouse

---

[1] Copies of this memorandum went to Bruce, Matthews, Hickerson, Allison, Johnson, and Henkin.

In a conversation the other day which I had with Mr. Dulles, he referred to a visit paid him in New York by Mr. Krishna Menon of the Indian Delegation. Mr. Dulles said that Mr. Menon sought to secure concessions from him on the American stand on the prisoner of war question. Mr. Dulles said that he gave no encouragement whatsoever to Mr. Menon on this matter.

David W. Wainhouse

V. JANUARY 3-APRIL 26, 1953: NEW LOOK AT KOREA UNDER THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

REQUEST BY CLARK FOR AUTHORITY TO TRY POWS AND TO COUNTER INCREASED MILITARY THREAT; SETTLEMENT OF THE WON CURRENCY ADVANCES QUESTION; POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA, NSC 147; OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH AND THE CHOU EN-LAI PROPOSAL

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET　　　　TOKYO, January 3, 1953—5:11 p. m.
ROUTINE

CX 60809. 1. I contemplate notifying the Communist Del through the ln offs that the immunity granted to convoys between Pyongyang and Kaesong, granted unilaterally on 25 Nov 51 by the UNC Ln Off, will be rescinded until such time as the armistice negots are resumed. This will not affect the curr bilateral security agreement covering Kaesong, Panmunjom and Munsan-Ni. At the present time there appears to be no need for tvl between Pyongyang and Kaesong of the Communist Del mbrs, and certainly a daily convoy in both directions is not required for the log spt of the Communist Del under curr circumstances. Intel considered to be reliable indicates that the Communists have taken advantage of the immunity to atk of the Kaesong restricted area by basing major hq and a very substantial sup cen in the area. It appears obvious that the Communists are using the daily protected convoys for courier svc and in spt of other activities which they have centered at Kaesong.

2. I realize that the Communists will immediately charge that we are attempting to force them to terminate armistice negots by preventing the log spt of their armistice del, however I feel that the contemplated action is fully justified to deny the Communists a very considerable mil advantage. If complete withdrawal of convoy immunity is considered too drastic, I could limit their protected opns to one day a week in order to counter the anticipated charges and still obtain most of the desired effect.

3. In light of the US Govt policy set forth in JCS 920838,[1] NOTAL, rqst your comments and/or concurrence.

---

[1] In this telegram, dated Oct. 11, 1952, the JCS instructed Clark to ensure that the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom should carefully avoid presenting the implication that the UNC considered it desirable that the negotiations should be transferred to another forum. It was the U.S. Government's position that if the armistice negotiations were to continue, they should do so at Panmunjom. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

TOKYO, January 5, 1953—5:01 p.m.

CX 60821. 1. AmEmb Tokyo passed to this hqs for info a copy of telegram number 177, 25 Dec 52, sent by AmEmb Pusan to Dept of State with notation that AmEmb Tokyo "has not been rqstd to comment on the inclosed telegram, but would appreciate receiving any views CINCUNC might care to express". Text of telegram No 177 fols:

[Here follows the text of telegram 177, printed as telegram 792 from Pusan, page 717.]

2. While I have expressed my views clearly on this subject in CX 52443, CX 53582 and CX 59981,[1] I believe, in view of Amb Briggs statements, certain additional points should be considered:

a. I recognize that trial of Communist prisoners can be exploited by Communist propaganda agencies. However, by careful control of the method of holding trials, and by using every means at our disposal to insure that such trials are conducted in a dignified manner, we can counter most of the enemy attacks.

b. I agree that the threat of capital punishment may not deter professional agitators from fomenting trouble. A review of previous incidents clearly indicates that professional or fanatical Communist agitators represent only a small portion of the total number of personnel involved in any given incident. The fact that we intend to try prisoners for defiance of legal regulations will, I believe, have a very definite effect on the mass of the population at each of the UNC camps.

c. While the opinions contained in the last 3 paragraphs of AmEmb Pusan msg may be valid, I do not believe they are pertinent to the subject of appointment of a military commission. For our own immediate purposes, recurring incidents of violence presents a continuing problem and a constant threat to the reputation of the UNC and our government. Long range political and strategic concepts can be undertaken without being affected by what amounts, in this case, to a limited objective.

3. The POW sitreps submitted to DeptAr during the past several months establish beyond doubt that the problem of controlling strong

---

[1] In these three telegrams, dated July 24, Aug. 18, and Dec. 11, 1952, respectively, Clark argued that violence in the POW camps was encouraged by the UNC's lack of judicial machinery to try and discipline offenders (copies attached to memorandum by the JCS to Lovett, Jan. 9, 1953, enclosed in a letter from Lovett to Acheson, Jan. 19, 1953, 695A.0024/1-1953).

Communist elements necessitates using every legal means at our disposal. Without authority for proper juridical action and with only limited disciplinary punishments aval to each camp commander, it is almost impossible for camp authorities to impose standard punishment effectively. The pro-Communist prisoners know this and as have previously stated, I believe it stimulates their enthusiasms to incite incidents.

4. According to the latest report received from CGKCOMZ, there are about 35 cases ready for trial. 27 of these cases involve charges of murder, 1 involves mutiny, 2 involve riot, and 5 involve aggravated assault. The 35 cases concern approx 289 accused, incl both Communists and anti-Communists. A number of other cases involving similar offenses are now under investigation. As you know, substantive and procedural rules were promulgated by this commander over a year ago and the commanders in Korea of 10 combatant nations have informally advised me of their readiness to provide members for the commission. It is believed that the first commission could be convened approximately 30 days from the receipt of your approval of my recommendation. This period includes the required 3 weeks notification to the delegate of the ICRC.

5. In summary, I firmly believe that while the trial of post-capture POW and CI offenders may be considered a limited objective in the long range political and strategic aims which our government and our allies have in Korea, it represents a concrete aid to us, and a strong weapon which we can use now to combat the vicious and unprincipled Communist activity that continues to stand as a real source of trouble and an irritant to the UNC.

6. I again urgently recommend that favorable consideration be given to my recommendation for the appointment of a military commission as soon as possible to try post-capture POW and civilian internee offenders.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1953—4:23 p. m.

JCS 928097. From JCS.

1. Concur that immunity granted daily convoys between Pyongyang and Kaesong excessive for present conditions. However, in order reduce Commie propaganda exploitation while same time accomplishing greater part of objective preventing abuse by Commies, believe limitation convoy immunity to 1 day a week as suggested para 2, CX

---

[1] A notation on the JCS copy of this telegram indicated that U.A. Johnson cleared this in draft with UNA and P. (JCS records, 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

60809 [2] more appropriate and desirable this time than rescinding all immunity.

2. You are therefore authorized notify Commie del through lsn ofcrs [3] that immunity will be granted 1 convoy each way once a week not exceeding size present daily convoys (understood here to be 6 trucks and 3 jeeps).

3. Restrict ur msg to Commies to mil considerations carefully avoid use any statement which might imply that UNC considers armistice negots have terminated or that ur action is designed to provoke Commies into breaking off negots. Msg cld expressly or by implication indicate that UNC wld reconsider scope immunity needed for Commie del convoys at such time as negots might be resumed accordance UNC del 8 Oct posit.

4. Assume you plan advise press of action taken, emphasizing fact that agreement covering Kaesong–Panmunjom–Munsan Ni is not affected by this action and further that there has never been any similar immunity granted us for our roads south of Munsan Ni.

---

[2] Dated Jan. 3, p. 721.

[3] In telegram CX 60931, Jan. 14, 1953, Clark provided Harrison with a statement notifying the Communist delegates at Panmunjom that the UNC would only grant immunity to one convoy a week and instructed him to deliver it to the Communist Delegation. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

695A.0024/1-1953

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 19 January 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is attached a memorandum dated 9 January 1953 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the trial of Communist prisoners of war in Korea who are charged with having committed post-capture offenses.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, has recommended that he be given authority to try prisoners of war who have committed offenses while in the custody of the United Nations Command in Korea. It is CINCUNC's view that he must have such authority to enable him to maintain necessary discipline and control of prisoners of war in Korea, and in order to deal more effectively with incidents of violence in the prisoner of war camps.

In their memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the present situation with respect to prisoners of war in Korea necessitates a complete review of the problem in its broadest aspects. With the continuing stalemate in Korea and the probability that the prisoners being held by the United Nations Command might remain in custody for an indefinite period, a U.S. Government position on the handling of the prisoner of war problem should be determined. I agree with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this matter and recommend that a committee, consisting of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, be established to develop a U.S. Government position covering the prisoner of war problem. If you concur in the establishment of such a committee, Mr. Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs, will represent the Department of Defense on the committee.

Sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 9 January 1953.

Subject: Trial of Prisoners of War for Post-Capture Offenses

1. The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), has urgently recommended that early favorable consideration be given to his request for authority to establish a United Nations Military Commission for the purpose of trying prisoners of war charged with having committed post-capture offenses (see Appendices "A" and "B").[1] This recommendation is a reiteration of earlier requests for this authority (see Appendices "C" and "D").[2] At the time of these earlier requests, it was not considered propitious to initiate such trials. Accordingly, the authority requested by CINCUNC was withheld.

2. It now appears that the measures taken to regain control following the Koje-Do incident of last May are proving inadequate on a long-term basis. As you know, there continue to be numerous incidents of violence in the camps. A major incident such as that which occurred on Pongam-Do on 14 December 1952 only serves to emphasize the magnitude of the problem confronting the United Nations Command. Under such conditions it is important that CINCUNC be granted such authority as will enable him to maintain the necessary discipline and control of the prisoners. CINCUNC's request for authority to establish a United Nations Military Commission is one additional measure that might be undertaken.

3. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not wish to prejudice favorable consideration of CINCUNC's request, they are of the opinion that the present situation dictates a complete review of the prisoner of war

---

[1] Appendix "A", telegram C 59981, Clark to Collins, Dec. 11, 1952, is not printed. For Appendix "B", telegram CX 60821, Clark to JCS, Jan. 5, 1953, see p. 722.

[2] Appendix "C", telegram CX 52443, Clark to Pace, July 24, 1952, and Appendix "D", telegram CX 53852, Clark to the Department of the Army, Aug. 18, 1952 are not printed; Appendices A–D were found attached to the source text.

problem in its broadest aspects. Armistice negotiations have been at a standstill since 8 October 1952, with no indications that the Communists will agree to the United Nations Command position on prisoner exchange. Therefore it appears probable that thousands of Communist prisoners of war will remain in United Nations custody for an indefinite period. Also it appears certain that the Communists will continue their efforts to exploit to their advantage the present situation with respect to prisoners of war. Under such circumstances the mere initiation of trials of prisoners may not be sufficient as a long-term means of handling the prisoner of war problem.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the specific question of prisoner of war trials as well as the broader question of reviewing the entire prisoner of war problem involve legal and political implications beyond their purview. They believe that these are questions of sufficient importance to United States policy to warrant earliest study at the highest levels of government. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the President be asked to appoint a high-level committee composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, and such other agencies as may be appropriate, to study this problem in its broadest aspects and to make appropriate recommendations thereon to the President through the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

HOYT S. VANDENBERG

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

695A.0024/1-1953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 23, 1953.

Subject: Joint State–Defense Committee Concerning Prisoners of War in Korea

There is attached a proposed reply from you [2] to the Secretary of Defense to a letter from Mr. Lovett of January 19, 1953 [3] concerning the handling of the problem of the prisoners of war in Korea.

As pointed out in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense enclosed with Mr. Lovett's letter, the measures taken to regain control of the pro-Communist prisoners of war following the Koje-do incident of last May are proving inadequate on a long-term basis. There continue to be numerous incidents of violence in the camps, the last major incident being that on Pongam-do, December 14, 1952, in which approximately 82 prisoners were killed and 120 wounded by rifle and machine gun fire from American guards. These incidents are fomented by the Communists who utilize them to the maximum for propaganda and to shake the confidence of our Allies in our handling of POWs. Unless additional measures are taken, it appears that similar incidents can be expected in the future.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson. As of Jan. 21, 1953, John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.

[2] In the attached letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson, which is not printed, Dulles entirely concurred with Lovett's proposal for a committee made up of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense to develop a policy covering the POW problem in Korea. Johnson was to represent the Department of State. (695A.0024/1-1953)

[3] *Supra.*

It seems clear that we must recognize that handling of particularly the pro-Communist POWs is probably going to be a long-term problem constituting a major factor in the entire Korean situation and that we must devise more effective methods for handling the problem than has heretofore been the case. Mr. Matthews and Mr. Johnson discussed the problem on January 6 with General Bradley, who fully appreciated its importance and stated that, after discussion with other members of the JCS, State would be consulted. Mr. Lovett's letter of January 19 apparently resulted from that discussion.

The Department of Defense contemplates that an interdepartmental committee be established to work on this problem. It is our view and apparently that of the Department of Defense that the committee would primarily concern itself with the problem of handling the pro-Communist POWs, which constitute the major problem in discipline, control and propaganda. It would be expected that the disposition of POWs not desiring repatriation, which was the subject of my memorandum to you of January 23,[4] would be handled by the usual channels of communication between State and Defense. However, if it appeared desirable that the Committee also concern itself with this problem, I would perceive no objection thereto.

Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached letter to the Secretary of Defense.[5]

---

[4] *Infra.*

[5] Marginal notation on the source text indicated that Dulles signed the attached letter on Jan. 28, 1953.

795.00/1-2353

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1953.

Subject: Disposition of Anti-Communist POWs

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson.

Problem:

To determine U.S. policy concerning the disposition of those Chinese and North Korean POWs held by the UNC who have indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation to Communist control (non-repatriates).

Discussion:

1. At the time the decision was reached to insist upon the principle of non-forcible repatriation of POWs held by UNC in the Korean armistice negotiations, it was fully recognized that the chances of Communist agreement to this principle were not good. However, apart from other considerations it was considered important to do all possible to obtain Communist agreement in order to reduce the possibilities of retaliation against UNC prisoners held by the Communists. Nevertheless it was also recognized that once the prisoners held by the UNC had been screened to determine their attitudes toward repatriation, failing Communist agreement to the principle, whatever possibilities existed of obtaining an armistice would probably be increased if the UNC were unilaterally to release those POWs who had indicated they would oppose repatriation, thus facing the Communists with a *fait accompli.* This would face the Communists with a situation in which there was clearly no possibility of negotiation, and which would enable the Communists to agree to an armistice without the necessity of agreeing to the principle of non-forcible repatriation. It would in effect be a maximum negotiating tactic.

2. It has now been clearly demonstrated that further search for a formula, mutually agreeable to the enemy and ourselves, for the disposition of non-repatriates, is hopeless. FE considers that the Indian resolution, passed by the General Assembly, constitutes the furthest that this Government could go in the way of a compromise on the mechanics of a settlement of the POW issue consistent with the principle of non-forcible repatriation. The rejection of the resolution, and the terms in which those rejections were expressed, makes it clear that there is no possibility that the USSR and the Chinese Communists will, under present circumstances, agree to any formula consistent with the principle of non-forcible repatriation. This fact is now at the point of maximum clarity to world opinion, and free world opinion is probably at its maximum point of unity on the question. Therefore, the next few weeks probably represent the optimum period in which to obtain Allied agreement to, and announce the decision to carry out a unilateral release of non-repatriates. If such an announcement cannot be made prior to the reconvening of the General Assembly, it may be desirable that it be postponed until the Assembly has adjourned.

3. While it would require at least a month or two to complete the release in an orderly manner and with due regard for security considerations, it would be desirable to make a public statement with regard thereto as soon as the process was initiated. The number of non-repatriates involved is in the order of 34,000 Koreans and 14,000 Chinese. The ROK Government has indicated its willingness to accept the Koreans, and the Chinese Nationalist Government the Chinese, subject to security screening.

4. I would suggest that as the first step in reaching a decision on this matter it would be desirable to consult with General Clark and the JCS concerning the military aspects, whereupon definitive recommendations would be made to you and be submitted to the President for his approval. It would thereupon be necessary to consult with our Allies to obtain their concurrence or acquiescence. Congressional consultation would also be desirable. In the meanwhile, considerable planning and preparations in the field would be required to carry out the operation and at an appropriate time consultation with the ROK and Chinese National Governments would also be required.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you approve the undertaking of preliminary discussions with the JCS and consultation with General Clark along the foregoing lines.[2] Upon the completion of such discussions, definitive recommendations will be submitted to you.

---

[2] A memorandum from Dulles to Allison returning this memorandum read as follows: "This idea has merit and I think deserves exploration. The principal danger is the possibility of reprisals against United States and ROK prisoners of war."

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 4, 1953—6:45 p.m.

CX 61134. It is considered timely to rept to you the curr facts and circumstances relating to mvmt of the ROK Govt to Seoul. Part 1 of this msg summarizes the salient points set forth in ref A which reflected the sit as of the end of Aug 52. Part 2 presents dev since that date.

Ref: A. My msg C 54344 dtd 28 Aug 52.[1] B. Msg AmEmb Pusan nr 300710 Jan (DIP 365) to Secy of State.[2]

---

[1] Not printed.

[2] In this cable, sent to the Department of State as telegram 934 from Pusan, Jan. 28, 1953, Briggs reported the gist of a conversation with the British Minister to Korea on the problem of conducting diplomatic business in Pusan when Rhee spent most of his time in

Continued

Part 1. As indicated in my msg, ref A, while the mvmt of the ROK Govt back to Seoul would have provided Pres Rhee with a psychological and polit victory and dmstd to the Communists confidence of our ability to repel any further aggression north of the capital city, there was basically important mil, orgnl, civ affairs and econ considerations against such mvmt. The principal considerations were: There was not any prospect of an armistice in the near future and the Communist forces in Korea were capable of launching a major attack with very little warning. The reestab of the polit capital in Seoul would increase the possibility that Seoul might become a mil objective of any future Communist attack. Furthermore the return of thousands of former Seoul residents would clog the roads and slow down mil mvmts, which might prove crucial in the event of a major Communist offensive. From a civ affairs pnt of view, comms between KCOMZ and the ROK Govt would become more difficult and the Eighth Army would tend to become involved in functions in this sphere which would have nullified my decision to relieve the CG Eighth Army from civ, polit and econ affairs matters which I desired to be the responsibility of CG KCOMZ. Financially, it was est that the reestab of Seoul as the capital would cost many millions of dollars. Such a project would require the use of UNKRA funds and there was opposition of the UNKRA Advisory Committee to the use of such funds for the rehab of ROK Govt bldgs. In addition, elements of Eighth Army Hqs and Fifth Air Force Hqs probably would have to be located elsewhere. The expenditure of large amts for these proposals was considered unjustified under the circumstances. The foregoing was the sit in Aug 52.

Part 2. During Sept and Oct the agitation for the return to Seoul died down somewhat. In fact, early in Sept, I was informed that, based upon the opinions of Amb Muccio, Pri Min Chang, and Pres Advisor Vicecour, there was no evidence that ROK officials were planning to reoccupy Seoul in the imm future. By the middle of Nov, rumors revived and we were informed that the mvmt was underway, in spite of the denial of certain govt officials, and would continue until completed. Pres Rhee has spent most of his time in Seoul since his inauguration last Aug and it has become clear that he will continue his residence there indefinitely. Consequently, high ROK officials have spent much of their time in Seoul. This has made it increasingly difficult for the dip representatives at Pusan to transact their normal business as ref B indicates. In the past few mos, thousands of Koreans have reentered Seoul, and I attribute this largely to the fact that Pres Rhee has maintained his residence there and has carried on some govt functions from Seoul.

Seoul. The British Minister told Briggs that his government was considering moving its Legation to Seoul; Briggs reiterated the reasons for U.S. opposition to the return to Seoul movement. (601.0095/1–2853)

The mvmt of the ROK Govt back to Seoul has thus been intensified by actual devs and has also continued to be agitated by Korean officials as well as the Korean press since my msg cited in ref A above. The view expressed in this msg which motivated me to use my influence to delay the mvmt has not only remained substantially unchanged but has rather been strengthened. I have tried to discourage the restoration of Seoul as capital by not approving rehab projects in Seoul and I have also turned down rqsts to turn fac such as comm and utilities which are not aval, for instance an expanded telephone switchboard. Similarly, repeated rqsts for trans by mil acft for ROK officials from Pusan to Seoul were refused on the grounds of lack of aval of trans. Such action has not precluded, however, assistance to projects of normal rehab and repairs of damaged bldgs, now under way.

From mil pnt of view I continue to regard the mvmt with concern. The proximity of Seoul to the front line might cause it again to become the objective of any new Communist offensive. The mvmt of the ROK Govt and of all agencies associated therewith might even provoke such attack. On previous occasion, Communist offensive action has forced evac of Seoul with attendant confusion and destruction of govt functions. Even during the curr pd of a relative stalemate, where mvmt is confined to our own troops, a large influx of civ pers into the combat zone places an additional burden upon the combat comdr, such as problems involving security, tfc control, civ affairs matters, and reduction of shelter otherwise aval to troops. We have successfully organized to relieve the Eighth Army of noncombat activities by dividing Korea into two zones, combat and comm, for the express purpose of giving the combat comdr greater freedom of action and an area in which to maneuver. A govt move to Seoul with the nec ensuing transfer into the Eighth Army area of part of KCOMZ activities would undo a large part of the benefits achieved by the creation of KCOMZ as the agency in charge of civ, polit and econ affairs. In addition, the restoration of Seoul as capital would nec the mvmt into the combat zone of the various dip missions in addition to offices of UNCACK, UNCURK, UNKRA and the Combined Econ Board.

I will continue to recm strongly against the mvmt of ROK Govt to Seoul at this time.

Your full spt of my psn is rqstd.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of Army

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 4, 1953—8:13 p. m.

CX 61135. Re JCS 928298,[1] CX 60821 [2] and C 59981.[3]

1. The course of action outlined in JCS 928298 may be of benefit in considering long range strategic and polit concepts, but from my point of view as a mil comdr charged with ultra-sensitive problems in guarding and admin 132,000 POW and civ internees, I am convinced that the ques of trials for post-capture offenders demands separate and immed consideration. Since my original proposal was submitted to you, and in addition to the factors outlined in my C 59981 and CX 60821, recent dev have accentuated the need for adequate judicial machinery being aval to camp auths.

a. The publication of our recent study [4] on the use Communists are making of their captured pers held by the unclas part of their overall mil effort has raised the ques by the press, and certainly in the minds of our troops, as to why we cannot take disciplinary actions against clearcut murderers.

b. The incident reported to you in para 2*b*, CX 61076,[5] is an example of vicious and premeditated murder for which we can only use solitary confinement as punishment.

c. It is obvious that incidents of violence, riots and open defiance of our auth, including deliberate attacks against UNC security forces, are plotted and follow a definite pattern. That this problem will cont is indicated by late intel repts that pris at Koje-Do are planning demonstrations on 8 Feb in celebration of an NKA anniversary, and that other celebrations are planned for Communist holidays including May Day.

2. Our cont failure to exercise proper disciplinary measures against fanatical Communists is embarrassing to me and unexplainable to our trps and the public. This is true particularly when I insist on the highest standards of discipline among FEC trps and the prompt admin of mil justice for much less serious offenses.

3. I again urgently rqst that I be auth as a matter of highest priority to convene a UNC commission for the trial of POW and civ internee post-capture offenders. I am particularly desirous, in view of the in-

---

[1] Dated Jan. 9, 1953, to CINCFE. In this telegram the JCS informed Clark that they had recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the President be asked to appoint an interdepartmental committee to study the entire POW problem and submit recommendations through the National Security Council. The JCS advised him that they concurred in the measures Clark was taking to maintain control over the POWs. (JCS records, CCS 000.5 (5–12–49))

[2] Dated Jan. 5, p. 722.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*

[4] The study was entitled *The Communist War at POW Camps*, and was published by the UNC in late January 1953.

[5] This telegram, dated Jan. 30, 1953, is not printed.

creasing freq of attacks against members of the UNC scty forces, to bring to prompt trial and punishment those responsible for attacks such as that which occurred only last week, resulting in the death of an American soldier.

795.00/2-553: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

SECRET NEW YORK, February 5, 1953—6:56 p. m.

484. Re Korea.

1. Korea is first item on resumed GA agenda.[1] We see little prospect of altering Chinese Communist opposition to armistice through any recommendation which GA might make. On other hand, pressures outside of GA may well affect in time Chinese Communist attitude toward armistice.

2. General strategy of USDel in resumed GA session should be, therefore, as outlined in Deptel 2161,[2] January 30 to New Delhi, to stand on approval and support of Indian resolution to oppose any variations or changes in it which would result simply in flowering of divisive debate, the weakening of our position, and not in any change in Communist position.

More particularly, we see some likelihood that Indian or perhaps Indonesian initiative might be in direction of invitation to Chinese Communists to come and be heard by GA. This would be position which we would expect strongly to oppose considering the continuing aggression by Chinese Communist regime and their contempt for all efforts to settle Korean case by negotiation.

3. Procedural situation in Assembly involves 21-power resolution, Mexican resolution and Peruvian resolution on table and technically before GA. As second part of Korean item, UNKRA report will be up for consideration.

There is also possibility of Indonesian initiative along lines suggested ourtel 411,[3] January 12, for establishment of commission along lines suggested by USSR and immediate cease-fire with POW item to be negotiated later.

4. As an effective means of carrying out policy summarized in paragraphs 1 and 2, we see certain advantages in stimulating or proposing resolution which might contain following ideas:

---

[1] The UN General Assembly resumed on Feb. 24, 1953.

[2] Not printed. (795.00/1-2853)

[3] Not printed. (795.00/1-1253)

(*a*) General affirmation of UN support for Indian resolution and statement of GA determination to stand on principles involved and to continue vigorously to resist aggression;

(*b*) An economic clause to be given co-equal publicity and treatment which would recognize concern of UN and UNKRA with all problems of Korean economy and which specifically would urge Agent General to present to 8th GA long-term program of two to five years duration, together with his views on practically possible budget or over-all figure. Such program would be developed in consultation with and coordinated with Unified Command and ROK and would involve procurement of capital goods having a direct effect on restoration and improvement of civilian economy. Around elements (*a*) and (*b*) general argument by US and our friends would include points such as following:

> (*a*) Importance of improvement in economy to morale and creation of larger ROK military forces. It would show an intent to balance increased ROK contribution with increased UN concern for economy which must support it.
>
> (*b*) Such initiative on economic side would indicate to Asians and Latin Americans that humanitarian action is being pressed, its effectiveness to depend in part on their own contributions. This plan, by providing constructive alternative, would also render more manageable initiatives undesired by US on political side as suggested by Indonesians. We realize that proposals of this sort involve risk of unrealistic and gigantic financial demands by ROK and possibly very substantial demands by Kingsley as suggested Pusan's 937,[4] January 30. We believe political advantages of this course warrant its serious consideration.
>
> (*c*) Reaffirmation of principles of Indian resolution would make it difficult for Indians, Indonesians, or others to urge weakening changes in that resolution. So long as Menon is at UN headquarters we see real risk of tendency in that direction. Indians might attempt weakening amendments to type of resolution we suggest, but we think this approach could be checked because US would start with an affirmative position and GA program. This would involve careful diplomatic preparation.
>
> (*d*) Presence of resolution containing these two principles would make it simpler for Mexicans and Peruvians to refrain from pressing for vote on their own draft resolutions.
>
> (*e*) Debate on political side could cover tentative UK suggestion of exchange of wounded prisoners of war pursuant to Article 109, of Geneva Convention. It would enable us as well to make a vigorous statement emphasizing our determination to abide by our commitments in Korea, and to place in proper perspective President's recent orders to Seventh Fleet.[5]

---

[4] In this telegram, the Embassy reported statements made by Kingsley and picked up by newspapers that the amount of dollar aid required to stop inflation in Korea would be over $1 billion during the next five-year period and that, furthermore, $2 billion would be the price of making Korea independent of foreign aid over the same period of time. (357.AD/1-3053)

[5] In his "State of the Union" speech to Congress on Feb. 2, 1953, Eisenhower stated that he was reversing the decision of June 1950 which ordered the Seventh Fleet to both

5. In short, above tactical suggestion would give us strong, flexible basis for standing on Indian resolution. It would make it possible effectively to discourage initiatives in other directions without US appearing to be negative. It would give us basis in our statements and negotiations for showing that in face of Chinese Communists' opposition we are willing to fight on in Korea. As part of our tactics we can conceive of letting USSR representatives know indirectly, through some deliberate indiscretion, our strong attitude on continuing hostilities. If we indicate a strong position and willingness to continue hostilities and not exhibit an anxiety to settle, we may well be able to develop some element of willingness in Chinese Communists to settle that would not otherwise exist.

LODGE

---

prevent an attack on Taiwan and also to insure that Taiwan not be used as a base of operations against the mainland. Because of the Chinese Communist invasion of Korea and because of their rejections of UN armistice proposals, the President was "issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China". (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 16–17)

695A.0024/2-553

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1953.

Subject: Trials of Communist POWs

Participants: Mr. Sullivan, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
NA—Mr. Treumann

Mr. Sullivan, at his request, came to see me to ascertain our present thinking about the trial of Communist POWs who have committed post-capture offenses. He referred to Army message CX 61135 [2] in which General Clark had again urged that immediate trial machinery be established to try POW offenders. Mr. Sullivan stated that this subject would probably be discussed at the JCS meeting of February 6.

In acquainting Mr. Sullivan with our thinking, I briefly outlined the entire POW situation. I stated that problems concerning POWs could roughly be divided into three categories: 1) UN POWs and their treatment by the Communists, 2) Non-repatriable POWs under UNC control, and 3) Repatriable POWs under UNC control. With regard to this latter group, the following issues have to be resolved: 1) The advisability of trials, 2) The propaganda and publicity problems caused by POW riots, 3) The control of POWs, i.e. the use of new type weapons; segregation of fanatics; etc., and 4) The political problem as to whether other countries, such as the UK, should participate in the control of POWs. I added that I felt that these issues might well be studied by the newly established State–Defense Committee of which Mr. Nash and I are to be members, while the problem of non-repatriable POWs might well be handled through the usual State–JCS channels.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

[2] Dated Feb. 4, p. 732.

I then outlined my thoughts about the advisability of trials for post-capture offenders. I stated that POW offenders can be divided into two groups: 1) POWs who have instigated and taken part in riots, demonstrations and acts against other POWs, 2) individual POWs who have engaged in recent, flagrant attacks against members of the UNC security forces. With regard to trials of the first group, I stated that I had reached no definite decision but that I was not certain that they would provide the necessary deterrent against future riots. I stated that regardless of trials, remedial measures, such as solitary confinement, are available to the United Nations Command and that the only more severe penalty that a criminal trial verdict can impose is the death penalty. The imposition of the death penalty would entail additional political, legal, and publicity problems, might make martyrs out of the offenders, and therefore provide incentives for additional riots. Moreover, the question of reprisals against UNC POWs in Communist hands must also be considered.

Different considerations apply to the second group, whose offenses are of such serious import that immediate action, such as trials, might be required.

I then stated that perhaps the solution to the problem of POW riots lies in the proper identification and classification of prisoners and the segregation of possible offenders and fanatics, since riots can be averted only after the relatively small group of trouble-makers is physically separated from the vast majority of pliable POWs. Control measures such as the application of the new type of vomit-gas, which is being used with great success by the UNC, might provide further deterrents against POW riots.

Mr. Sullivan indicated that he was in substantial agreement with the foregoing.

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1953—11:45 a. m.

Mr. Bohlen: We thought it would be useful to discuss this draft of a suggested message to Clark asking for his views on action we might take to deal with those Prisoners of War who have said they did not want to be repatriated. The main point of such action would be to clearly remove the POW's from the field of negotiations.

General Bradley: We haven't yet had a chance to discuss that question here. The point on POW's that we wanted to bring up is related to Clark's strong recommendation [2] that he now be permitted to establish a commission to try POW's for war crimes. In looking into this, our information is that when we last discussed the question of POW's it was decided that we would have a committee look into it. Perhaps Frank Nash can tell us what stage the discussions are in.

Mr. Nash: We have passed on to the State Department the views of the JCS expressed in your memorandum of January 9.[3] We thought that a departmental committee should be set up which should include a representative from Justice. Clark's latest message which you have mentioned really deals with only one piece of the general problem. Your January 9 memorandum asks for a study of the whole question of dealing with POW's.

General Bradley: Your question on the reclassification of POW's who don't want to go back is also one part of the general problem.

Mr. Bohlen: Which points would you care to discuss first?

Mr. Nash: I think it would be useful to discuss Clark's last message. I believe that the State Department views which I have heard from various officers should be known to the Chiefs and might be helpful.

Mr. Johnson: Our view is that the central question is how much of a deterrent to further disorders a formal commission and trial of POW's for war crimes would present. We have some question as to how much formal trials would aid in the way of a deterrent. It seemed to us that there were three distinct categories of difficulties with POW's. The first was the pre-Chejudo riots, which primarily arose from a lack of firm control over the prison camps. The second was the post-Chejudo riots where it seemed to us Clark's main problem was in identifying the leaders of the riots. The third category was the recent incidents in which

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins; Admiral Fechteler; plus Commandant of the Marine Corps Shepherd—attended this meeting. Bohlen headed the Department of State contingent, Gleason represented the NSC, and Nash the Department of Defense. In all 21 persons attended.

[2] See telegram CX 61135, Clark to Department of the Army, Feb. 4, p. 732.

[3] For a text of the JCS memorandum of Jan. 9, see p. 725.

American and other U.N. guards have been attacked. As we understand it, if Clark is able to identify the criminals, he now has authority to remove them and confine them. The additional authority which he would secure by his requested authorization would presumably be that of execution. We have some question as to whether this additional authority would be a major deterrent to further disturbances.

General Vandenberg: It would certainly help to raise the morale of the guards if they knew that drastic action was going to be taken against any POW who attacked them.

General Collins: Even though Clark now has authority to isolate the criminals, the real question is what do you do to those that are isolated. It is not just a question of prisoners who have killed guards, there is this recent case in the prison hospital where a South Korean guard was severely mauled.

Mr. Johnson: Have you considered the possibility of reprisals against our own prisoners if we should undertake trials for war crimes.

General Bradley: Yes we have, and we came to the conclusion that we couldn't keep the Communists from doing whatever they wanted to with our prisoners.

Mr. Bohlen: It seems to me that the Communists from their point of view have whatever material they might think they needed for reprisals and that our action would not really add greatly in the way of a provocation. As long as setting up trials for crimes is fully consistent with international law, as I understand it is, and as long as this is a measure which seems to be necessary to assist in protecting our guards and maintaining order, I don't think we should shy away from it on the grounds of possible adverse propaganda.

Mr. Johnson: Can we separate out the different categories?

General Collins: Yes, we can and I think we should. I am personally quite leery about having trials for pre-Chejudo offenses, but I do think we ought to authorize Clark to take action against the attacks on U.S. or U.N. guards.

General Bradley: I think that would be the best course to follow, just to authorize Clark to take this specific kind of action against this one category of attack against U.N. guards and tell him that other questions will be considered by the committtee on the general problem.

General Collins: Then why don't we get together with Johnson and get up a draft telegram agreeable to both of us.[4]

General Bradley: Should we discuss this other question of reclassifying POW's?

Mr. Bohlen: It should be clear that there has been no decision in our Department on this question. The possibility has been presented to the Secretary and he has authorized us to discuss it with you, but no Departmental position has been established. It would seem to us, however, that Vishinsky in his statement in the U.N. has made it very clear that the Russians will not be willing to accept the principle of non-forcible repatriation and that, therefore, it it highly probable that we just will not get Chinese Communist acceptance of this principle as a basis for an armistice. The thought is that possibly if we should reclassify the non-repatriates and then disband them and physically remove them from UNC control, that we would, in fact, remove the issue. The Communists would of course yell about our action, but we could then say, and quite accurately, that these people were no longer under our control, that there was just no point in negotiating about them any further and that we would be willing to reach an agreement on the basis of an all for all exchange of prisoners.

---

[4] The draft was transmitted as JCS 931969 to Clark, Feb. 20, p. 790.

General Vandenberg: Surely if we are going to do it this is the time to do it, before any resumption of armistice talks.

Mr. Bohlen: There is one point of timing and that is that it probably would not be a good thing to try this before the General Assembly opened.

Mr. Hickerson: We would have to talk with some of our Allies and this might take a matter of 30 to 60 days. With the Assembly opening the 24th of February, we don't think it is practicable or advisable.

Mr. Bohlen: In addition to the difficulty of carrying out consultations with our Allies before the General Assembly opens, there is the added difficulty that if we should start talking with them before the Assembly opens and if, as is quite possible, there should be a leak, we might stir up just the kind of action on Korea in the General Assembly which we now hope to avoid. There is the further question of reprisals. We are keenly conscious of the danger that, if we undertook this action, there would be a possibility that the Communists might suddenly announce that they have received petitions signed by 3,000 American prisoners, saying that these prisoners did not want to return to U.S. control. It would obviously be a phony, but the Communists would be quite capable of doing it and of running it through their propaganda mill. We realize that the worst situation would be for us to take the action of reclassifying the POW's and then to have the Communists take a similar action in reprisal and end up in a further deadlock.

General Vandenberg: Can't we do it under some sort of neutral supervision?

General Bradley: I should think that it might be useful if we asked the ICRC or some neutrals to participate in screening the POW's to demonstrate that their choice is really voluntary.

General Collins: If in view of the timing of the General Assembly we don't want to take this action for five or six weeks, it seems to me dangerous to send this message out now. I would be very much worried about a leak.

Mr. Bohlen: I think Collins has a point. We have been very much concerned about secrecy on this, particularly since if there should be a leak before we actually take the action the Commies might well, in reaction to the leak, get frozen on a position which they would find it impossible to abandon.

Mr. Johnson: How long would it actually take Clark to carry out such a reclassification?

General Collins: It would depend on the type of screening and whether shipping was available for the Chinese and on whether arrangements had been made for reception centers. The Koreans might not present such a problem and Clark might be able to handle them in two or three weeks.

Mr. Bohlen: As far as the armistice negotiations go, we will really have made our point merely by the announcement that these people are no longer POW's and the question of the time it might take to physically remove them doesn't seem to me to be particularly relevant.

General Bradley: If there is a security danger in this message going out now, shouldn't we leave this question for the committee that we talked about to consider?

Mr. Bohlen: When the question is considered on the top level, wouldn't the President and his advisors want Clark's views?

General Bradley: I am sure they would.

General Collins: Perhaps the best thing to do would be to have one member of the committee go out and talk with Clark when the time is ripe.

Mr. Bohlen: I think that might be the best way to handle it and I think we should have a special injunction of secrecy on this question.

General Collins: There is one other point that we wanted to discuss. Clark is very concerned about the piecemeal shifting of the Korean Capital from Pusan to Seoul and wonders if you cannot give us some help in combatting it.

Mr. Johnson: Has Clark discussed with Rhee the military inadvisability of attracting enemy attack on Seoul by moving the capital?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, he has and Rhee does not seem to be in any way moved by this argument.

Mr. Johnson: Holding up our rehabilitation on Seoul has not proved to be persuasive or useful.

Mr. Allison: There is no question we are all agreed that it is a bad thing for the Koreans to move to Seoul. The question is what can we do to stop it.

Mr. Bohlen: Isn't the real question what methods of persuasion can we devise.

Mr. Allison: Is this the kind of thing that is important enough to bring the President into?

Mr. Bohlen: I think we would want to think it over very carefully and see what might usefully be done.

[Here follows a brief discussion on increased aid to France for Indochina.]

795.00/2-553: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1953—7:53 p. m.

292. Re Korea, urtel 484.[2]

1. Department agrees entirely with aims and general strategy outlined paragraphs 1 and 2 reftel. As you indicate our goal in present circumstance is to stand on GA resolution Dec. 3 and to avoid whittling away at substance that resolution, and at unanimity of support for UNC position among GA members.

2. We believe that these objectives could best be achieved by avoidance any further GA resolutions at this time. It is extremely unlikely that any resolution acceptable to us could command same measure of support as achieved by Indian resolution. "Neutrals" would probably be reluctant to support even mere reaffirmation Indian resolution and in light of their apparent embarrassment over their identification with West on Dec. 3 resolution, might seek to find some pretext for abstaining on new proposal. There appears little point in struggling to obtain their reluctant concurrence in reaffirmation, and risking obtaining a lesser vote for principle which obtained 54 votes in Dec. Further, any resolution introduced runs danger of amendment, particularly by Asians anxious to achieve some compromise, which might result in less acceptable resolution or at least in additional abstentions.

3. Department recognizes propensity among GA delegates to propose resolutions and particularly desire of Asians and others to do something which might lead to peace in Korea. If further Asian efforts were in fact forthcoming, a resolution acceptable to us might become tactically desirable to forestall these efforts. We are hopeful, however, that in present instance it might be possible to persuade Asians not to press other resolutions; our own willingness not to seek condemnatory resolution should be strong bargaining counter. You will have noted favorable Indian reaction to our preliminary thinking that no resolution might be necessary (New Delhi's 3085 Feb. 2 [3]). Indonesians also might perhaps be persuaded desirability this posture, particularly if US makes it

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin and cleared by Allen (EUR), Hickerson, McClurkin, Bacon, and Wainhouse.

[2] Dated Feb. 5, p. 733.

[3] Not printed (795.00/2-253).

clear we are not pressing for GA action. Perhaps Indians and other Asians could help persuade Indonesians that efforts along lines Palar has tentatively indicated would be counter-productive. We do not believe there would be serious problem in avoiding vote on 21 power, Mexican or Peruvian resolutions, and we would expect that LA delegates would not press new proposals in face US objection.

4. In general, therefore, we are inclined to see disadvantages in proposing or stimulating any resolution at all at this time. We recognize, however, that consultations might reveal that tactical situation, which US Delegation will best be able to judge makes necessary some affirmative step in order to forestall undesirable efforts by other Dels. In those circumstances, points indicated your paragraph 4(*a*) seem entirely reasonable and Department will be sending you shortly draft position paper [4] which will include also draft such possible resolution.

5. As to desirability of linking economic measures with such a political resolution, and, in any event, substance of GA action re Korean Reconstruction, Department's comments will follow in separate telegram.[5]

MATTHEWS

---

[4] The draft position paper is not printed; for text of the position paper, Feb. 13, see p. 779.

[5] See telegram 301 to New York Feb. 13, p. 777.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 417: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 7, 1953—3:12 p. m.

CX 61160. Ref: A. CX 55523, DTG 211043 Oct 51.[1] B. CX 60809,

---

[1] In this telegram, addressed to Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, Advance; Commander, Naval Forces, Far East; and Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, CINCFE informed his commanders of the new agreement made by the Communists and the UNC superseding previous security arrangements and directed their compliance.

The agreement provided that no hostile act by forces under their control would be made within the following areas: (1) a circular area having a radius of 3 miles centered on the traffic circle in Kaesong; (2) the camp area of the UNC Delegation within a circular zone of 3 miles centered at CS 060930; (3) the conference site area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered at BT 951033 in Panmunjom; and (4) the Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni road and an area extending 200 meters on each side of the road. Except for military police detachments of 2 officers and 15 men from each side armed with small arms only, no armed personnel of either side were to be permitted in the conference site area.

CINCFE directed that UNC military aircraft, except under weather and technical conditions beyond control, should not fly over the conference area at Panmunjom, over the Kaesong area described in (1) above, or that portion of the road described in (4) above, between Kaesong and the conference site. Both delegations and their parties were to have free access to and free movement within the conference site area. (JCS files)

DTG 030811 Jan 53.[2] C. JCS 920838, DTG 112047 Oct 52.[3] D. CX 61157, DTG 070515Z.[4] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. a. As stated in ref D, the recent enemy buildup affords him an offensive capability which is a source of ever-increasing concern. As indicated briefly in para 1 of ref B, I have reliable intelligence to prove that the enemy has converted Kaesong into a major advance military base. Numerous intelligence reports, verified by photo interpretation, confirm Communist use of Kaesong as a staging and resupply area for the entire western front. The area also serves as an espionage center for the training, dispatching and debriefing of undercover agents to South Korea. The restricted area in Kaesong now affords sanctuary to large concentrations of troops, supplies, artillery, armor, specialized units (espionage, guard and security), government officials and their families, high-ranking CCF–NKA officers, and command posts of the CCF 63 and 65 Armies, and CCF rear svc supply headquarters. Intense trp activity indicates the possibility of an unidentified army in the area. Aerial photography of 16 Jan 53 provides the folg summary of Communist military activities in the Kaesong area:

(1) Many newly-prepared defensive trenches, anti-tank ditches, weapon sites, bunkers and supply revetments were observed. Extremely large numbers of CCF personnel are in the area, constructing and manning new positions. Trps, artillery, and armor are moved into the area in the daytime for protection against UNC air strikes.

(2) Approx 200 trucks and numerous other vehicles were counted, which indicate the presence of still greater numbers. There are many camouflaged truck and tank revetments with heavy track activity in the area.

(3) Numerous camouflaged supply shelters and reveted warehouses, and large concentrations of supply stacks in the open indicate that Kaesong is the logistic base supporting all Communist units on the western front.

(4) Enemy artillery emplaced within the Kaesong restricted area and immune to our counter battery is firing on UNC frontline positions.

(5) Large groups of enemy personnel are observed on roads, at construction projects, and in the vicinity of the supply centers.

b. This immune base in such close proximity to the battle line constitutes a serious threat to the security of Eighth Army and greatly increases the enemy's already dangerous capability for launching a major surprise offensive.

---

[2] Dated Jan. 3, p. 721.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*

[4] In telegram CX 61157, Feb. 7, 1953, Clark expressed his concern to the JCS over the progressive buildup of Communist ground and air forces—specifically the 1–3 additional Chinese armies en route or already in Korea, 28 more IL–28 jet bombers, additional early warning ground-controlled interception units, and a ground-controlled approach system (increasing interception and all-weather operational capabilities). Although Clark had no firm indication that the Communists intended an attack in the immediate future, such a buildup made an offensive a possibility. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

c. In our own restricted area at Munsan, we admittedly derive certain minor advantages. The First Marine Div Command Post, railhead, supply depot, equipment pools, hospital and other supporting units are located in the Munsan perimeter. However, the UNC derives no military and psychological advantages from the restricted area at Munsan-Ni in anyway comparable to the enemy's.

Part 2. a. The 22 Oct 51 security agreement for the conduct of armistice negotiations, ratified by both delegations, stipulated that the armed forces of both sides would refrain from hostile acts against the areas included in circles of 3-mile radius centered at Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, and a 400-meter strip covering the road from the 2 delegation camp sites to the neutral conference site encompassed by the 1,000 yard circle at Pan Mun Jom. By deliberate intention on the part of UNC, no restriction was placed upon the activities of either side within the area of its own camp site, or the 400 meter strip covering the road from its own camp site to the neutral conference site at Pan Mun Jom. This policy was adopted because any agreement to neutralize the 6-mile diameter of the camp sites would leave a gap in UNC defensive lines at Munsan-Ni that would imperil Seoul in the event of a Communist major offensive on the western front. The 28-square mile restricted area around Kaesong was agreed to as a compromise with the Communists insistence upon a 79-square mile neutral area. Ref A summarized the agreements accurately except that the word "within" in Part 2 *a* should be changed to "against".

b. In spite of UNC precautionary measures and safety margins, occasional military violations of agreement by UNC forces do occur. In every instance the Communists have raised a protest about these incidents and sought to embarrass the UNC delegation with charges of bad faith and attempting to wreck the armistice negotiations. By means of propaganda exploitation of these charges, the Communists derived a very substantial psychological advantage throughout the course of negotiations. Now, with the negotiations in recess, the enemy misses no opportunity to exploit propaganda charges made through the liaison machinery at Pan Mun Jom, in order to create disunity among our allies, and insure continuation of the immunity to attack which he now enjoys in the Kaesong–Pan Mun Jom area.

Part 3. a. After careful deliberation I am convinced that action must be taken to deprive the enemy of the military and psychological advantages he obtains from the immunity to attack of the Kaesong area. In view of the grave threat to the western end of the UNC lines which Kaesong now poses, I shall consider that the enemy has automatically abrogated the 22 Oct 51 security agreements in the event he initiates an offensive in the general vicinity of the Kaesong–Munsan area employing one or more divs against the UNC. Accordingly, I intend to employ all available weapons against the enemy within the Kaesong–

Pan Mun Jom area and the road between Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, should the Communists commit one or more divisions to an offensive in that area.

b. While I am fully cognizant of the provisions of ref C, I can no longer ignore the growing threat of an enemy offensive, particularly in the Kaesong area. Therefore, strongly recommend that I be given authority, at once, to abrogate the security agreements for the conduct of armistice negotiations at Pan Mun Jom at such time as I become convinced that a major Communist offensive is imminent. If under such authorization, abrogation becomes necessary, I intend to attack immediately after giving the enemy written advance notice that I have abrogated the security agreements of 22 Oct 51. The proposed text of the letter of notification follows by separate message.[5]

---

[5] The text was transmitted in telegram CX 61173, Clark to JCS, Feb. 9, 1953. Clark proposed a statement to the effect that by the installation of an enormous military complex in the Kaesong restricted area, the Communists had violated the spirit of the agreement which was designed to provide a safe place for delegates to the Panmunjom talks; therefore, the UNC would no longer feel bound by the provisions of the agreement. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795B.02/2-753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

PUSAN, February 7, 1953—6 p. m.

984. Dept pass Tokyo; rptd info Tokyo 244. Regarding Deptel 496, Feb 6.[1] While it is gratifying that Department, JCS, CINCUNC and Embassy are all in agreement on unwisdom of return of Korean Government to Seoul, that unanimity lacks significance so long as President Rhee continues unconvinced. He is now fully unconvinced; in fact he is in process of moving his government back to Seoul in spite of us. Neither arguments nor obstacles placed in his way have thus far deterred him to announce shortly "government has returned". As alternative to our maintaining present type of opposition (which is failing to interrupt process of piecemeal return) or of intensifying it by adopting get tough attitude forbidding return and physically blocking it (with serious implications on general US-Korean relations) I suggest new approach by General Clark to President Rhee, seeking put problem on broader basis and thereby enlist Rhee's understanding and support.

In such approach to Rhee, following might be considered:

---

[1] In this telegram the Department of State expressed willingness to support the opposition of CINCUNC to the return of the ROK Government to Seoul and instructed the Embassy to continue to support CINCUNC's position in conversations with ROK officials. The Department of State also requested Briggs' views whether a personal communication from the Secretary of State to Rhee regarding this question would be effective and desirable. (795B.02/2-653)

1. US must accept President's continuing spend most of his time in Seoul and can agree to his moving limited number specified key offices there, while leaving balance and numerically larger part in Pusan.

2. In conversation with General Clark on Jan 16 I suggested one way to handle back-to-Seoul movement would be for our government start effective program sanitation, road repairs, etc., in Pusan, so conditions here would be more endurable for Korean Government and people. Offer along that line could be made to Rhee, together with offer immediately rehabilitation one or two buildings in Pusan in which Korean Government now housed. (There are many buildings in Pusan now occupied by various US and UN offices, each one of which is better than any Korean Government Building in Pusan.)

3. Further step on our part with favorable effect on Korean people including Rhee would be to start transferring civil affairs functions for Korea from Tokyo to Korea and establish them in Taegu (seat of communications zone headquarters—KCOMZ) or in Pusan. By operating from Tokyo with respect to Korean civil affairs, we support suspicions of Rhee and his associates that Korea is incidental to our primary concern which is Japan. If those Korean civil affairs functions could be moved from Tokyo to Korea it would be source of satisfaction to ROK people. If they were established in Taegu or Pusan that might constitute added reason for Korean Government's deferring return to Seoul.

4. Present CINCUNC veto on rehabilitation and building repair projects in Seoul appears irritating to President. (Please see memorandum of conversation with Rhee on Jan 31, copy accompanying letter of Feb 1 to Allison.)[2] I suggest that instead of talk he offer make joint study through combined economic board for example) of reconstruction plans for Seoul, meanwhile agreeing to approve initiation of work on one or two buildings in which President especially interested.

Since US opposition to re-establishment Korean Government in Seoul has military basis, I doubt whether suggested personal communication to President Rhee from Secretary of State desirable at this juncture. However, should suggested approach by General Clark to Rhee be decided upon and should Department desire to have me participate, I should of course be happy to do so.

Every day lost in settling foregoing matter renders handling it more difficult. For example, Pusan banks are now letting it be known they expect to return to Seoul in April.

BRIGGS

---

[2] The letter and attached memorandum, both dated Feb. 1, 1953, are not printed. (795B.02/2-153)

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the National Security Council[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, [February 9, 1953].

1. The Republic of Korea is contending that since the outbreak of hostilities it has advanced to United States forces Korean currency (won) having a total dollar value of approximately $171 million.

2. To date the United States has paid a total of $74 million on account for such currency advances. Although it has been estimated that a total payment of $119 million could represent settlement on a realistic basis as provided for in the exchange of notes which stemmed from the Meyer Agreement, the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command recently was authorized to negotiate with the Republic of Korea for settlement in the total amount of $139 million involving payment of an additional $65 million for won advances up to December 15, 1952. This authorization was granted in an effort to reach an early and satisfactory settlement with the ROK and took into consideration the lack of preciseness of day to day variations in realistic exchange rates during the period covered.

3. The difference between the Republic of Korea position and the United States position amounts to $32 million. General Clark has indicated that he believes the Republic of Korea would reduce its claim by $10 million, in recognition of a Republic of Korea contribution contemplated in the Meyer Agreement, to a net difference of $22 million.

4. The Republic of Korea claim is based on an exchange rate of 6,000 won to the dollar established in March 1951. Since that time realistic won values have decreased sharply to a point where for several months a realistic rate of exchange would be 18,000 or more to the dollar.

5. The Republic of Korea Government has informed the United States that currency advances would be discontinued, as of 6 February 1953, unless full settlement was made for won advances. If won advances are discontinued, United States forces will be left with two alternatives:

a. Dollar procurement of won from the Bank of Korea at a 6,000 to 1 rate (present minimum realistic rate 18,000 to 1).
b. Payment for goods and services in United States dollars.

6. Payment in final settlement of outstanding obligations at an amount higher than an additional $65 million, which the Republic of Korea has rejected, and which represents a liberal payment for won advances, would involve the use of Department of Army appropriations for a purpose other than that intended by the Congress, namely, general eco-

---

[1] This memorandum with attachments was transmitted to the NSC under a covering memorandum by Lay, Feb. 9, 1953.

nomic assistance in the form of some contribution to stabilization of the won.

7. CINCUNC has urgent need of instructions as to the amount he may offer in settlement. Two possible courses of action are listed below:

a. Insistence by the United States that the Republic of Korea accept the $65 million previously offered. In the event the Republic of Korea refuses to accept this offer and refuses to continue won advances, CINCUNC may be instructed to procure won at the official rate of exchange or procure goods and services for United States dollars until satisfactory arrangements are made.

b. Authority to pay up to $87 million, in exchange for a new agreement providing payment at a realistic rate for future won advances, in which case the source of the amount in excess of $65 million requires determination by the National Security Council. If military appropriations are determined to be the desirable source of funds, Congressional clearance may be necessary for any sums in excess of $65 million.

There is attached a Statement of the Problem, with background information.

[Attachment]

Statement of the Problem

To determine United States policy to be followed in reimbursing the Republic of Korea for Korean currencies furnished to the United States Forces. This problem needs to be resolved in the light of the over-all economic rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea, including the division of responsibility within the United States Government and its relationship to the responsibilities of the UN in this matter.

Background Information

On 28 July 1950, the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into an agreement whereby Korean currency (won) would be furnished to United States Forces without concurrent reimbursement, such currency to be used for military requirements and for sales to United States troops for their personal needs. The agreement provided for settlement to be made by the United States at a subsequent time mutually agreeable to both Governments. This provision was consistent with United States practice and policy established in World War II in similar circumstances.

The United States thereupon established an account in the U.S. Treasury, to which was deposited the sums clearly adequate to cover the value of Korean currency actually used from month to month. In the absence of a firm international rate of exchange for the won, the conversion rate at which such deposits were made was determined by the United States in the light of the then current economic conditions in Korea. The first rate used was 1,800 Korean won to one U.S. dollar. Subsequent adjustments have been made from time to time, resulting in a current rate of 6,000 to 1. The same rate used for deposit purposes into the Treasury account has also been used consistently for sales of currency to U.S. troops. Sales to U.S. troops have amounted to approximately five percent of total sales, the remainder has been used to pay for goods and services. Because of Korean allegations that the raising of the United States rate of exchange contributed to inflation, the Command recommended continuance of the 6,000 to 1 rate. Therefore, no adjustments were made in the rate after March 1951, although it is estimated that a more realistic rate would be 18,000 to 1 at the present time.

Early in 1952, the Korean Government, in a letter to the U.S. Ambassador,[2] alleged that the won expenditures of our forces were further aggravating the inflation in Korea, and that it would be necessary to discontinue advances of currency under the 1950 agreement. Because such a move would interfere seriously with military operations, a mission headed by Mr. Clarence E. Meyer was dispatched to Korea to negotiate a new agreement. As a result, on 24 May 1952, an agreement was consummated entitled "Agreement on Economic Coordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command" (commonly known as the Meyer Agreement). While this agreement dealt mainly with the economic considerations, an exchange of notes was consummated on the same date pursuant to the agreement, which dealt with the manner of reimbursement for won drawings by U.S. Forces *at realistic rates of exchange.* (A copy of the Meyer Agreement and the exchange of notes are enclosed as Tab A.* Also attached as Tab B is a "Summary of U.S. Commitment to Reimburse the Republic of Korea for currency advanced to the United States Forces" which outlines the effects of the exchange of notes covered by Tab A.)

Up to that time there had been no thought of the U.S. reimbursing Korea for all won drawings until a later time, possibly after hostilities, when the total effect of our aid to Korea could be evaluated and perhaps set off against any debt remaining from won drawings. Thus the exchange of notes specified that settlement for won withdrawn prior to 1 January 1952 would be made at a future unspecified time.

Notwithstanding the terms of the 1950 agreement and the exchange of notes, which called for settlement *at realistic rates of exchange,* the Republic of Korea, on 15 December 1952, terminated any further advances of currencies on the stated grounds that it would be impossible to continue to provide for United Nations requirements in the manner agreed to, because of the resultant inflationary effects of a constantly increasing currency issue. Subsequent to December the Republic of Korea, through an interim arrangement, has continued to advance won. The Republic of Korea has threatened to discontinue this arrangement immediately.

---

[2] The text of the letter is in telegram 707 from Pusan, Jan. 19, 1952, not printed. (895B.13/1-1952)

*Not attached hereto. Available upon request to the Executive Secretary, NSC. [Footnote in the source text.]

On 3 December 1952, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) advised the Department of the Army that in his opinion satisfactory arrangements for future currency drawings could be made only as part of a "package deal," encompassing payment for most, if not all, of the currency advance to the U.S. since the beginning of Korean hostilities for which payment has not already been made. Authorization was thereupon granted to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to negotiate a new exchange of notes on the basis of which the United States would pay $65 million which, together with payments made previously by the United States, would be in full and final settlement for all Korean currency credits advanced to the United States Forces prior to 15 December 1952. As a *quid pro quo* for the settlement, the Korean Government was to agree to a new conversion rate of 18,000 to 1 with adjustments to be made in the future in accordance with changes in the Pusan Wholesale Price Index. This, in effect, was the agreement the Koreans had given the United States under the terms of the Meyer Agreement.

On 24 January 1953, CINCUNC reported that the Korean Government had rejected the U.S. settlement offer of $65 million and was demanding a settlement payment of approximately $97 million, making the Korean total of $171 million as compared to the $139 million regarded by the United States as the maximum amount owed. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, considers the $97 million figure could probably be reduced by negotiation by approximately $10 million, and has requested authority to negotiate on the basis of a final settlement totalling up to $87 million, in addition to the $74 million already paid. CINCUNC stated that it is of paramount importance to reach an agreement which will provide for a realistic future rate of exchange and assure continued availability of currency.

CINCUNC's request for authority to negotiate for a settlement figure of up to $87 million raises anew the question of the extent to which the political, economic, and military factors should be considered as overriding. In addition to CINCUNC's judgment as to the "paramount importance" of receiving immediate authority to negotiate for a settlement which will provide an assured future supply of won at a realistic rate to avoid disruption to the military effort, the following factors are important:

a. CINCUNC has indicated that continued use of won is the only satisfactory method of meeting the military requirements for acquisition of labor and materials in Korea. The Republic of Korea has indicated that the only alternative to settlement and negotiation of a realistic rate is to buy won directly from the Bank of Korea at a rate of 6,000 to 1.

b. The Republic of Korea has indicated that coincidental with a settlement of past won drawings it would be willing to settle for approximately 53 billion won drawn in January and early February at a "realistic rate." If no settlement is reached and it is necessary to pay for these drawings at the 6,000 rate, current Army appropriations would need to be charged for an additional several millions of dollars.

c. The United States Ambassador to Korea pointed out in a recent radio supporting fully CINCUNC's request for further negotiating authority that the total United States contribution to the joint undertaking in the Korean theater "runs to many hundreds of millions of dollars a year in military and economic aid." Even if the United States were to save given number of dollars in negotiations for settlement of outstanding won drawings, he pointed out, the ROK dollar deficit would be increased by that amount and the United States would be faced with a recommendation for increasing United States economic assistance by the same amount.

d. CINCUNC's responsibilities, as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UN Security Council, include responsibility for assistance to the civil economy of Korea, particularly to the extent required to prevent development of conditions prejudicial to the success of military operations. CINCUNC has indicated that U.S. failure to settle for past won drawings has been widely publicized as a major cause of the present rampant inflation in the Republic of Korea.

At the present time there is a definite plan on the part of the Korean Government to effect a currency reform by issuing a new series of won with a specified conversion factor for exchanging present holdings into the new issue. Any dollars paid to the Korean Government at this time would probably aid in stabilizing this new currency issue and thereby aid the economy of the country.

[Tab B]

SUMMARY OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO REIMBURSE THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR CURRENCY ADVANCED TO UNITED STATES FORCES

A. Korean Currency Sold to U.S. Personnel

(1) Settlement for all Korean currency sold to U.S. personnel will be effected at the rate at which the currency was sold.

(2) Full and final settlement for all Korean currency sold to U.S. personnel through 30 April 1952 will be effected as promptly as possible.

(3) Monthly settlement for Korean currency sold to U.S. personnel after 30 April 1952 will be effected within 60 days after the month in which the currency was sold.

B. Korean Currency Expended for U.S. Military Requirements

(1) Settlement for Korean currency, expended for U.S. military requirements during the period, from the beginning of hostilities through 31 December 1951, will be deferred to a future unspecified time.

(2) Settlement for Korean currency expended for U.S. military requirements during the period 1 January 1952 through 31 May 1952 will be accomplished by reimbursement to the Korean Government as promptly as possible. This reimbursement is to be effected at the rate of 6000 to 1, less 10% which will be deducted as a charge against the Korean Government for expenditures covering projects of benefit solely to that Government.

(3) Final settlement for Korean currency expended for U.S. military requirements during the period 1 June 1952 through 31 March 1953 will be effected as soon after the end of the period as possible, taking into account the 10% deduction covered in B (2) above as well as all relevant factors in determining a rate to be used for settlement purposes. However, a four million dollar per month payment on account will be made during this period to be applied against the over-all obligation. Such payment to be subject to modification in event of a significant change in either the amount of Korean currency advanced to the U.S. or other pertinent factors.

(4) Settlement for Korean currency expended for military requirements after 31 March 1953 will be effected on a yearly basis similar to that outlined in (3) above.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1953.

Subject: Consideration by the National Security Council of Settlement of Republic of Korea Advances of Korean Currency to United States Forces.

Decisions Required

Upon instructions of the President, the above question has been submitted to National Security Council by memorandum of the Department of Defense. There are a number of related questions, discussed below, which are relevant.

Won Advances

Discussion

In November 1952, the Republic of Korea informed the United Nations Command that it would no longer make local currency available to the United Nations forces against future settlement, and requested settlement for all won advances heretofore made. After a number of conferences with the Republic of Korea and cable exchanges with Washington, CINCUNC was authorized in January to offer $65 million in settlement for won previously received by the United States forces, and to agree to purchase won thereafter at a realistic exchange rate. CINCUNC actually offered only $62 million. This offer was rejected by the Republic of Korea, which demanded settlement at the conversion rate in effect when won were drawn, or approximately $96 million. CINCUNC concluded that a settlement of $87 million would satisfy the Republic of Korea and requested authority to negotiate a settlement at the best figure obtainable up to $87 million, stating that he considered the securing of a satisfactory arrangement for meeting local currency requirements at a definitely agreed realistic rate to be of paramount importance. The United States Ambassador to Korea has strongly supported CINCUNC's recommendation, pointing out that in view of Korea's total aid requirements the amount of settlement is much less important than satisfactory arrangements for the future.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Hemmendinger and cleared by McClurkin, Johnson, and the Office of Financial and Development Policy (OFD) of the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

A proposed exchange of notes with the Republic of Korea would provide for monthly payments in the future at a conversion rate bearing the same ratio to the wholesale index as existed in March 1951, and for periodic adjustments of the conversion rate. An instruction to the Command tentatively agreed between the Department of State and the Department of the Army provides that the arrangements for acquistion of and settlement for Korean currency on the part of the United Nations forces other than those of the United States will not be affected. It is not certain that the Republic of Korea will accept this condition.

The amount of settlement is the main issue. Two possible courses of action are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Defense memorandum.[2]

(*a*) Insistence that the Republic of Korea accept the $65 million previously offered. (In fact, only $62 million was offered.) Consideration only of the price levels during the period in question would result in the conclusion that even less than $50 million should be paid. This course could not be expected to result in satisfactory arrangements for the future, and would probably require continued purchase of won at the unrealistic rate of 6,000 to 1. The cost to the United States would soon make up the difference between $87 million and $65 million. Maintenance of the unrealistic rate would also be unfair to United States troops and would impede the whole counter-inflationary attack in Korea. It would be impossible to work out an intelligible aid program.

(*b*) Authority to pay up to $87 million in return for an undertaking to make won available at a realistic rate. This presents the only basis for aceptable future arrangements. The amount paid can and should be taken into account in consideration of Korea's total aid requirements.

---

[2] *Supra.*

No new United States appropriations are involved, since military appropriations have been debited from time to time at the current conversion rate, and the dollars paid into a suspense account in the United States Treasury. There are now over $93 million in the suspense account. The Judge Advocate General of the Department of the Army has given opinion that up to $90 million can legally be paid in settlement. Any amount in the suspense account not paid out in final settlement will go to miscellaneous receipts of the United States Treasury.

The Defense statement under paragraph 7 (*b*) is misleading in indicating that a decision to settle for more than $65 million requires special decision on the source of the funds or Congressional clearance. Strictly from the standpoint of sound financial procedures, the settlement should be at conversion rates corresponding to the real value of the won during the various periods involved, but in the absence of any agreement with the Republic of Korea on the rates to be applied, there is no legal or fiscal impropriety in settling at the conversion rate actually in effect. The funds are in hand and the decision is within the discretion of the United States Executive, taking all considerations into account. It would be appropriate to inform the interested committees of the Congress, as has been done in connection with prior settlements.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you strongly support a decision to offer the Republic of Korea $87 million in full settlement for won advances prior to December 16, 1952, and that the best United States offer be made at the outset of renewed negotiations. Further delay in a satisfactory resolution of this problem will not only exacerbate relations with the Republic of Korea, but will cost us even more because of the necessity of continuing to buy won at three times their real value.

Visit of Acting Prime Minister Paik Tu Chin

Discussion

President Rhee has requested through both Ambassador Briggs and General Clark that he be permitted to send a mission to the United States headed by Paik Tu Chin, Acting Prime Minister and Finance Minister to discuss Korea's needs for economic assistance.

When the interest of the Republic of Korea in such a mission was first reported, the Department of State instructed the Ambassador to discourage a mission at this time, because the present administration was not yet prepared to receive foreign dignitaries and because it will need further data from the Command on Korea's economic capabilities and requirements before entering into any negotiations with the Korean Government. It would be reasonable to adhere to this line and to discourage a visit for the next month or so, at the end of which time more information on Korea's needs should be available.

Both General Clark and Ambassador Briggs have recommended that an invitation be extended, however, and there would be some advantages to permitting Mr. Paik to proceed to Washington soon. First, if President Rhee is going to be any easier to deal with in the future than he has been in the past, it is desirable for the new United States Administration to get off to a good start with him. Holding off the proposed visit would strike Rhee as a demonstration of an unsympathetic attitude toward the economic plight of the Republic of Korea. Second, if Mr. Paik came soon it could be made clear in the invitation that he should not expect immediate answers to his requests. If such a mission is delayed, on the other hand, Korean expectations of immediate fruits would be heightened.

If Paik is allowed to come soon, it will be necessary to decide who is the proper United States spokeman with whom he should deal and to organize effective staff work involving Defense, State, and Treasury.

Recommendation

It is recommended that a decision be made to extend an invitation promptly to President Rhee to send Acting Prime Minister Paik to Washington with a limited number of advisers as soon as the present negotiations for won advances are concluded. The invitation should point out clearly that we will not be in a position to reach final decisions during his visit. A draft message to be sent to Ambassador Briggs is attached (Tab A).[3]

Korean Economic Aid Requirements

Discussion

Data presently available do not permit a conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the economic support for the Republic of Korea which is presently programmed. Present programs are not based upon a comprehensive analysis of requirements for necessary relief, adequate support of defense forces, adequate support of normal governmental functions, and some rehabilitation. The Republic of Korea budget for their fiscal year commencing April 1 is designed to present ROK expenditures more realistically, and a Budget Review Group consisting of representatives of the ROK, the Command, and UNKRA has made a report on a comprehensive budget taking into account all expenditures and resources. The Group did not go into policies or controversial questions. The UNC is now completing a survey of its own which will probably be based heavily upon the report of the Budget Review Group.

The report of the Budget Review Group is not considered reliable because the basic data were not critically analyzed and because of a number of arbitrary assumptions. Depending on the assumptions applied, possible conclusions from its data range from the conclusion that aid presently in sight (including a payment of $87 million) would be adequate to close the budgetary gap, to the conclusion that about $150 million additional will be required. It appears likely that the UNC will recommend supplementary assistance of this order of magnitude.

---

[3] Tab A was not attached to the source text.

The ROK budget for the coming fiscal year is based upon an army of 600,000 men, as compared with presently authorized forces of 507,000. It is understood from the Department of Army that 20 ROK divisions would represent approximately 680,000 men but no indication has been given when it would be expected to reach this level. Information presently available does not indicate how much of total Korean budgetary requirements are attributable to the number of men under arms. A manpower problem could be largely avoided by selective draft policies, but whether they can practically be applied is uncertain.

It would appear from the report of the Budget Review Group that to obtain these various objectives, imports to Korea of the order of $450–500 million a year are required. Experience to date raises serious question whether imports of this magnitude, in addition to purely military imports, can in fact be imported into Korea and effectively distributed in view of limitations of physical facilities and administrative skills. Inability to do so, however, implies to that extent a failure of the effort to achieve economic strength.

The stability of the ROK economy is of such importance that such failure should not be assumed. Instead, efforts should be focused upon means of strengthening techniques of administration. United States planning should be based on the assumption that the amount required can be used, but arrangements should be such that a lag in the program will simply result in the non-expenditure of appropriated funds.

Recommendation

No decision on increased assistance to the Republic of Korea should be made until the report of the Command has been received and adequate analysis made by the United States agencies concerned. If a prompt settlement is made for the won advances, dollars in the hands of the Republic of Korea in addition to CRIK and UNKRA programs will be adequate to meet *present* needs.

Measures to Strengthen Administration of Economic Assistance

Discussion

The record of the United States for the administration of *relief* in Korea is on the whole good, but it is not good with respect to coordinated attack upon *economic problems.* Even prior to June 1950, the efforts under the Economic Coordination Administration to make the Republic of Korea self-supporting were faced with serious obstacles of inflation and administrative backwardness. When the destruction and dis-organization of war were superimposed upon previously existing difficulties, the tasks of creating adequate standards of living, supporting defense forces, commencing reconstruction, and preserving fiscal stability called for superhuman efforts. While there have been many deficiencies on the Korean side, the measures taken by this Government have also been seriously deficient. Everything possible must be done to give the economic task in Korea the best leadership of which this Government is capable, and to remove unnecessary obstacles. There are now in Korea no men representing the United States Government with broad economic experience and the channels for Washington action are unduly cumbersome. The present won negotiations, which commenced in November, could well be taken as a case study of the delay and frustration which have surrounded the most important economic questions in Korea.

Action responsibility on most economic matters is presently assigned to the Office of the Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Department of the Army, but action on financial matters is ordinarily assigned to the Comptroller of the Department of the Army. The Comptroller is properly concerned primarily with the United States fiscal interest, rather than the achievement of United States objectives in Korea, and CA/MG does not have sufficient standing in the Pentagon to obtain decisions without frustrating delays and harmful compromises. There has not been strong leadership from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On both theoretical and practical grounds it would seem that CA/MG matters belong in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendations

1. Immediate consideration should be given to the appointment of a highly qualified civilian, preferably with military experience, to represent the Unified Command in the Combined Economic Board and to serve as adviser on economic matters to General Clark.

2. The focus for economic responsibilities in the field should be moved from Tokyo to Korea so that reports and recommendations can proceed directly from the authorities working with the Republic of Korea to this Government. Responsibility in Washington should be focused in an office in the Department of Defense having sufficient standing to obtain rapid decisions.

Agencies and Appropriations

Discussion

At present United States aid to Korea, other than the dollars paid the ROK for won, are found in the contribution to the UNKRA (a part of the Mutual Security Program) and the appropriations to the Department of Defense for Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK). The UNKRA is proceeding during the United States fiscal year with a $70 million program and plans to complete the balance of its initial program of $250 million during United States fiscal year 1954. United States contributions are 65 percent. The CRIK program is based upon physical needs for relief and sustaining imports. In terms of types of imports, there is now no clear distinction among these three programs, (including ROK imports) because each includes consumer goods. It is clear that if additional assistance is required, it should not be allowed to compound this difficulty. In principle, such additional aid would be defense support, which is ordinarily provided for by this Government through the Mutual Security Program. Given the responsibilities of this Army in Korea, however, any additional aid required should be sought through appropriations to the Department of Defense. It would be well, however, to provide more liberal methods of administration so that, for instance, some part of the commodities could be purchased in private trade, perhaps by adapting procedures applicable to the Mutual Security Agency.

Recommendation

Any additional assistance for Korea above the present programs should be sought by redefining the CRIK appropriation to the Department of Defense to include the concept of defense support. Consideration should be given to authorizing the use of procedures applicable under the Mutual Security legislation.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, February 9, 1953—6:33 p. m.
PRIORITY

CX 61172. Ref msg CX 61157.[1]

1. There is a strong possibility that any enemy offensive will be covered by large scale air action.

2. My est of the enemy air capabilities if atk is limited to Korea fol:

a. The enemy has a broad air capability which he has not yet exploited. He can launch a major air atk in Korea. This atk could be launched purely as an air effort or in coordination with a ground offensive. It is assumed that only China and Manchuria based acft would be used in an atk limited to Korea, and that the major threat would be from Manchurian based acft. It is not believed that the enemy will operate from Russian bases.

b. As presently disposed, the Communists have 830 jet ftrs, 250 piston ftrs, 220 piston light bombers, and an est 100 jet bombers which have the range capability of atking UNC Korean bases or could be easily staged into such a range. In addition, there are 105 ground atk acft which could be utililized if more fwd flds became serviceable. It is est that the enemy in an initial atk could launch 90 percent of these acft—aprx 750 jet ftrs, 225 piston ftrs, 200 piston light bombers, and aprx 90 jet light bombers. However, with a max effort the percentage maintained in com should fall to 50 percent within one week, by which time the Communists would have either gained air superiority over Korea, or retired to rear bases in China and Manchuria.

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 743.

c. Possibly the most dangerous employment, and therefore, that which the UNC must be prep to withstand or counter is as fol:

(1) A low level night or first light atk by a limited nr IL-28 jet bombers attempting to obtain surprise at intcpr bases, thereby immobilizing the F-86's. This might be fol by an atk by at least 50 IL-28's and 400 escorting and strafing MIGs to destroy the immobilized F-86's and any other UNC craft abn at this time. The enemy would then attempt to repair a suf nr of North Korean bases under protection of a MIG screen to extend their opns into the Pyongyang area, from which they could bring all South Korean Bases under atk.

(2) Piston ftr bombers and ground atk planes would then be used to support a ground offensive, atk UNC bases, sup lines, concentrations, ports, shipping, etc. Some of these piston planes could be based at Tsingtao or Shanghai areas. This type of atk, in which the enemy risks only a portion of his forces and from which he can withdraw at any stage, is more in consonance with his past policy than an all-out fight which might end in the destruction of his forces.

3. To counter such an enemy offensive, it is mandatory that, prior to its launching, action be taken towards reducing the enemy capabilities to atk UNC forces or psn as well as his ability to protect his own installations. To accomplish this max effort atk would be required against air bases in Manchuria.

4. Accordingly, I recm that I be auth to atk Chinese Communist air bases in Manchuria with US Air Forces when in my judgment the scale of enemy air opn threatens the scty of UNC forces in Korea.[2]

---

[2] The JCS on Feb. 18, 1953, in telegram JCS 931744 informed CINCFE as follows: "JCS agree with ur evaluation of threat posed by CCAF but desire to be informed of facts of immed sit prior to authorizing attack Chi air bases in Manchuria. Accordingly the fol directive will apply: 'When Chi Commie scale of air opns threatens security of UN Forces in Korea, and in ur judgment this threat should be eliminated by immed air attacks against CCAF bases outside Korea, you will report immediately facts, together with ur recommended action, to JCS.' " (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-14-45))

795.00/2-1053

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1953.

I am told by Army that General Bradley may decide to bring up at tomorrow's NSC [1] the question of the Communist buildup around Kaesong.

In the meanwhile I presume that you have seen Clark's CX 61172 [2] which we received today regarding the air buildup. I do not yet have any firm Pentagon reactions regarding this latter message. While paragraph 4 of that message is not too clear taken within the context of the message as a whole, particularly paragraph 3, and his existing instructions, I presume that he is asking for authority to attack without specific and prior authorization by the President (as now provided in paragraph 2b(4) of NSC 118/2 [3]) if there is no enemy massive air attack, but the "scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area". This, of course, is a much more portentous decision than that involved in the question of Kaesong. I presume that if General Bradley brings up the Kaesong question he would also bring up this latter one as well.

---

[1] For a report of that meeting, see the memorandum of discussion of the 131st NSC meeting, Feb. 11, p. 769.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For text of NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

795.00/2-1053

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1953.

Subject: Military Assistance of UN Members to Collective Action in Korea.

I. *General*

Support of Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, was expressed by fifty-three members of the United Nations shortly after the beginning of the Korean hostilities. In order better to utilize the various offers of assistance and to unify operations in defense of the Republic of Korea, the Security Council requested Member States to provide military forces and other assistance to a Unified Command under the United States.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Sisco and cleared by Wainhouse.

The following memorandum gives a factual account of the military contributions which have been made by member nations to the United Nations collective effort and includes a classified list of the present status of UN offers of military assistance in Korea. (copy attached) The memorandum also gives a brief analysis of the factors which have tended to limit the extent and number of military contributions. These include: (*a*) the general development of the military campaign; (*b*) the prior commitments of UN Members for regional defense; (*c*) technical problems of integration and coordination of forces from different countries; (*d*) the inability of certain countries to reimburse the United States for logistic support rendered and their inability to assume the heavy economic burden involved in making armed forces available; (*e*) our inability to utilize volunteers in an international army; and (*f*) the political insularity of a number of countries whose public opinions would not support the sacrifice of their manpower in an action not directly affecting their national security.

II. *Contributions Made by UN Members*

In total, forty-two member nations and five non-members have made offers of a military or non-military nature, or both in a number of cases in support of the military and relief operations in Korea. Contributions include ground troops, naval units, air units, medical supplies, hospital units, shipping, food and money.

In addition to the United States and the Republic of Korea, the following fifteen nations have fighting forces in Korea: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa. Five other countries have contributed hospital units: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, India and Italy.

III. *Why Have There Not Been More Contributions of Armed Forces by Other UN Members for Korea?*

A. *Influence of the General Development of the Military Campaign*

The general development of the military campaign in Korea had an important effect on efforts to obtain commitments of military assistance from members of the United Nations. In early November, 1950, the improved military situation was given as the primary reason by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, for recommending a general reduction of forces of UN member nations deployed in Korea. Efforts to obtain additional troops were suspended for six weeks as a result of the above recommendation.

With the extensive intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea having been confirmed by late November, 1950, the efforts to obtain additional forces were renewed. The Department of State made diplomatic approaches to all other UN members that appeared to be in a position to make initial contributions or to increase existing contributions. Such efforts have been maintained on a continuing basis to the present day.

During the first half of 1951, due to the need to move ahead rapidly in the defensive preparations for the NATO area, the Department of State at the request of the Department of Defense withheld making further representations to the NATO countries for additional manpower contributions for Korea. This limitation was lifted (except for France) on August 16, 1951, to the extent that the Department of Defense felt further contributions for Korea would be desirable from the NATO countries if this could be accomplished without interfering with NATO schedules.

On July 10, 1951 the truce negotiations between the United Nations and the Communist authorities were initiated. The Department of State continued its negotiations to get more troops for Korea on the assumption that a strong military position would have to be maintained for an indefinite period, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. However, we found that because truce negotiations were being conducted the sense of urgency among other UN members had been blunted. Therefore, the Department's bilateral efforts, its initiation of a public Secretary General appeal for troops in June, 1951, on behalf of the Unified Command, and our frequent references to the need for more assistance during the debates at the General Assembly were successful in getting only small increases in certain contingents, and more important, in preventing premature withdrawals among some of the present participants in Korea.

B. *Commitments to Other Regional Areas*

The question of collective military action against aggression is global in nature. The Communist aggression in Korea is one part of the worldwide strategy of the USSR to dominate the world. Korea is one of the many fronts where we must be strong. To withdraw troops from certain areas of the world in order to send them to Korea might well be an invitation to the Kremlin to embark on an aggressive venture elsewhere.

1. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).* Since the North Atlantic community has been called upon to achieve a level of military preparation greater than that which existed, it was recognized by the United States Government that the North Atlantic community could take on only limited additional commitments in support of the Korean action. Nevertheless, of the 17 fighting nations in Korea, 11 are members of NATO or the British Commonwealth. It was further recognized that a number of members of the North Atlantic community have forces elsewhere. Specifically, Great Britain has troops on the European continent, in Africa, the Middle East, in Hong Kong and in Malaya. In addition to its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

tion, France has the bulk of its army fighting in Indochina. Belgium and the Netherlands have only small armies, most of which are needed for the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. *Latin American States.* In general, two factors are operative within the Latin American states which have limited contributions from this area. First, since a number of Latin American states lacked equipment with which to make an offer, economic assistance was needed in order to purchase equipment and to defray the expense of training units to the required minimum before committing them for United Nations action. Secondly, the preoccupation of the Latin American Republics with regional commitments of hemispheric defense has made for some Latin American reluctance to become involved in the security problems and actions of the United Nations.

3. *Middle East.* Existing tension in the area makes the states in the area reluctant to spare forces for the Korean effort. Secondly, the few troops available in Arab countries are needed in support of internal law and order.

4. *Far East.* In the Far East the need of troops for maintenance of internal order against dissident groups at home and for strengthening the defense of the area as a whole has been one of the factors tending to limit contributions to Korea. Other factors are: (*a*) the limited adaptability of troops from tropical or semi-tropical regions for service under rigorous climatic conditions in Korea; (*b*) the necessity for the US to train and equip for conditions of formal warfare, troops whose chief training and equipment has been for guerrilla type activities in tropical or semi-tropical climates; (*c*) the economic drain on resources of new countries with fragile economies; and (*d*) the political consequences for unstable governments in new countries whose public desires an "independent" policy with respect to the Korean conflict.

C. *Problems of Integration and Coordination*

The collective military action in Korea is without precedent. The problem of integration and coordination of the various military forces offered perhaps constituted, particularly during the first year of the campaign, another factor in limiting contributions. In order to deal with such problems as logistics, it was necessary to integrate the forces of other UN members into the US pipeline. This meant that, to be of any use militarily, units had to meet certain criteria established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These criteria include: the military desirability of having contingents not smaller than regimental combat teams or brigades (smaller contingents were accepted by the Unified Command primarily on the ground of political considerations rather than their military feasibility); and specific previous training before being sent to Korea in order to avoid jeopardizing the security of our forces.

D. *Economic Incapacity*

The economic burden involved in making armed forces available to Korea has prevented a number of the smaller countries from making military contributions. Countries are expected to reimburse the US in full for the logistic support, assistance, and equipment furnished to them. The US was asked to train, equip, transport, and maintain forces at our expense in a limited number of instances, a responsibility the US did not assume.

E. *Problem of Utilizing Volunteers*

Early in the Korean operation, there was a source of manpower which was available and which was not utilized, namely, volunteers willing to serve either in the United States Army or in an international army on behalf of the United Nations. Our records show that a total of approximately 10,000 men individually came to our embassies in Latin America at the outbreak of the Korean aggression to volunteer their services in the United States Army or in a possible Inter-American Volunteer Legion. The position taken by the United States Government was: (*a*) Non-American citizens living in the United States might volunteer for enlistment in the United States Army, but non-American citizens living abroad could not; (*b*) That there was no suitable or practical method whereby the services of many individuals who had volunteered for action in Korea might be utilized. The latter position was taken by the Department of Defense in response to a suggestion by the Department of State that there should be developed a plan for the creation of a Latin American Force in which volunteers from any Latin American country could enlist. It is an open question whether such volunteers are available today for such a plan.

F. *Political Insularity of Certain Nations*

The political insularity of a number of countries has prevented more extensive contributions of manpower. Countries in Latin America, for example, look upon the United States as a shield against possible aggression in the same fashion as we looked upon Great Britain and its fleet as a shield from European quarrels during the 19th century. For the past two years, the Department of State has been the prime mover behind the progressive development of the Uniting for Peace program with a view to broadening the horizons of most of the countries of the world. Our purpose has been to get countries to assume greater responsibility and to look beyond their own regional commitments. Such educative devices are, unfortunately, all too slow in the light of the fact that we are carrying the disproportionate share of the sacrifices in Korea.

IV. *Organization of the Department of State to Secure Additional Assistance*

The Department of State has had in operation since the beginning of the Korean action a Committee on the Coordination of Military Assistance in Korea whose task it has been to apply continuing and steady pressure on nations with a view to getting them to increase the size of their units in Korea or to make initial military contributions. All members of the United Nations were sent a communiqué by the Secretary General on behalf of the Unified Command, which included an appeal for troops, in June of 1950. A second appeal was made pursuant to our suggestion in June, 1951. In addition, all members of the United Nations have been asked at least once, and in many cases, frequently to make contributions. The details of the negotiations conducted by the Department are far too detailed to include in this memorandum. It is our view that these efforts should be continued.

V. *Suggestions*

UNA has reviewed recently the entire question of military assistance for Korea with a view to determining any additional steps which might be taken to increase contributions of troops for Korea. We concluded that perhaps the following two steps may be feasible at the present time which might result in slight increases of armed forces from other UN members. However, in light of the limiting factors which have been discussed in this memorandum, substantial increases from other UN members are not to be expected. I should like to discuss with you the following:

1. The Department could reinitiate the question of a UN Legion with a view to determining whether the volunteers which were present in 1950 are still available for possible formation of an Inter-American Volunteer unit. Before such a project could be undertaken, however, there would have to be a re-evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of its position with regard to the military feasibility of organizing such a unit.

2. The United States might adopt a policy of training, equipping, and maintaining the forces of the other UN members who may be willing to contribute such forces on this basis. Under the present policy, all countries are obligated to pay in full for the logistic support rendered to them by the United States. This policy could be changed in a number of ways, including: (*a*) A State–Defense memorandum to the President requesting presidential authorization for individual exceptions to payment in full for logistic support in cases where certain countries could not otherwise provide forces for the Korean operation. Such an arrangement might possibly help to induce contributions from countries in Latin America or in the Middle East which heretofore have not provided military assistance, without proclaiming a principle of "free-ride" tending to compromise in entirety our reimbursement negotiations with present participants in Korea who may be able to pay their own way. The present policy that countries are required to pay in full for logistic support is incorporated in the directive of the Department of Defense, dated September 1, 1950, concurred in by the Departments of State and Treasury. A presidential authorization would permit the Department of Defense to train, equip, and maintain forces at United States expense; (*b*) An amendment to the Mutual Security Act for purposes of providing grant funds to train, equip, and maintain forces of offering countries in Korea; and (*c*) Alternatively, an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act which would be directed toward the same objective.

I would like to make clear that the above two suggestions emanate from UNA, and while other Bureaus in the Department have been apprised of UNA's views informally, thorough discussions would be necessary with them and with representatives from the Department of Defense in order to determine the political and military feasibility of the suggestions made.[2]

JOHN D. HICKERSON

[Attachment]

STATUS OF OFFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND FOR KOREA

	Country	*Offer*	*Status*
1.	Australia	Naval Vessels	In action
		1 RAAF Squadron	In action
		1 Battalion from Australian Infantry Forces in Japan	In action
		Additional Battalion of Troops	In action
2.	Belgium	Air transport	Available
		Infantry Battalion	In action
		Reinforcements	In action
3.	Bolivia	30 Officers	Acceptance deferred
4.	Canada	3 Naval Vessels	In action
		1 RCAF Squadron	In action
		Brigade Group	In action
		Canadian-Pacific Airlines (Commerical Facilities)	In action
		10,000-ton Dry Cargo Vessels	In action
5.	China	3 Infantry Divisions and 20 C–47s	Acceptance deferred
6.	Colombia	1 Frigate	In operation
		1 Infantry Battalion	In action
7.	Costa Rica	Sea and air Bases	Accepted
		Volunteers	Acceptance deferred
8.	Cuba	1 Infantry Company	Accepted
9.	Denmark	Hospital Ship *Jutlandia*	In Korea
		Motorship *Bella Dan*	Acceptance deferred
10.	El Salvador	Volunteers if US will train and equip	Acceptance deferred
11.	Ethopia	1069 Ground Forces	In action
12.	France	1 Patrol Gunboat	Withdrawn
		Infantry Battalion	In action
13.	Greece	7 RHAF Dakota Transport Aircraft	In action
		Ground Forces	In action
		Additional Unit of Land Forces	Pending
14.	India	Field Ambulance Unit	In action
15.	Luxembourg	Infantry Company (Integrated into Belgian Forces)	In action
16.	Netherlands	1 Destroyer	In action
		Infantry Battalion	In action
17.	New Zealand	2 Frigates	In action
		Combat Unit	In action

---

[2] The following note was written by Allison at the bottom of the source text: "The J.C.S. are adamantly opposed to the whole idea of a UN Legion. I do not agree with them but have not been able to shake their opposition. JMA"

	Country	*Offer*	*Status*
18.	Norway	Merchant Ship Tonnage	In action
		Surgical Hospital Unit	In Korea
19.	Panama	Contingent Volunteers; Bases for Training	Acceptance deferred
		Use of Merchant Marine	Accepted
		Free Use of Highways	Accepted
		Farmhands to Supply Troops	Pending
20.	Philippines	17 Sherman Tanks	In action
		1 Tank Destroyer	In action
		Regimental Combat Team	In action
21.	Sweden	Field Hospital Unit	In action
22.	Thailand	1 Infantry Combat Team	In action
		2 Corvettes and Navy Transport	In action (one Corvette destroyed after grounding)
		Air Transport	In operation
23.	Turkey	1 Infantry Combat Team	In action
24.	Union of South Africa	1 Fighter Squadron	In action
25.	United Kingdom	Ground Troops; 2 Brigades	In action
		Naval Forces; 1 Aircraft Carrier; 2 Cruisers; 8 Destroyers; 1 Hospital ship; 1 Survey Ship; 7 Supply Vessels	In action
		Air Elements	In action
26.	United States	Ground Forces; 3 Army Corps and 1 Marine Division with supporting elements	In action
		Naval Forces: Carrier Task Group with Blockade and Escort Forces; Amphibious Force; Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare Units; Supporting Ships	In action
		Air Force: 1 Tactical Air Force; 1 Bombardment Command; 1 Combat Cargo Command; all with supporting elements in action	In action
27.	Italy	Hospital Unit	In operation

695A.0024/2-1653

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 11 February 1953.

Subject: Trial of Prisoners of War for Post-Capture Offenses.

---

[1] This memorandum was transmitted to Allison under a letter from Nash, Feb. 16, 1953, in which Nash requested comments and clearance of a proposed JCS message to Clark authorizing trials by UNC military commissions of those prisoners charged with postcapture acts of violence against members of the UNC security forces. For a text of the JCS authorization as it was transmitted to Clark, see telegram JCS 931969, Feb. 20, p. 790.

1. Reference is made to memorandum to you, dated 9 January 1953,[2] subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to the request of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, for authority to establish a United Nations Military Commission for the purpose of trying prisoners of war and recommended that a study of this question, as well as the broader aspects of the prisoner of war problem, be undertaken by a high level interdepartmental committee with a view to making appropriate recommendations thereon to the President.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now in receipt of another message from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, (Appendix B) [3] in which he expresses the conviction that the question of trials for post-capture offenders demands separate and immediate consideration and requests that he be authorized as a matter of highest priority to convene a United Nations Military Commission for the conduct of such trials. He is particularly desirous, in view of the increasing frequency of attacks against members of the United Nations Command security forces assigned to the prisoner of war camps, to bring to prompt trial and punishment those prisoners of war charged with attacks upon security personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that the over-all question of prisoners of war trials can best be assessed in connection with a broad review of the entire prisoner of war problem as indicated in their memorandum to you of 9 January 1953. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that acts of violence against security personnel may be considered distinct from cases involving riots, demonstrations, acts against other prisoners, etc. They further consider that such acts are of such serious import that immediate action is required.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve, and obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State in the dispatch of the attached draft message to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Appendix "A").[4]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

---

[2] For the text of this memorandum, see p. 725.

[3] The reference was to an attached copy of telegram CX 61135, Clark to the Department of the Army, Feb. 4, p. 732.

[4] A draft copy of JCS 931969, Feb. 20, was attached to the source text.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 11, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 131st meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

1. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows an intelligence briefing by Allen Dulles, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, in which he commented, *inter alia,* on the recent appearance of three new Chinese armies in Korea, which he deemed to be chiefly replacements and not to be indicative of any notable increase in overall Chinese strength. He also touched on the very high incidence of MIG flights over Korea in January.]

2. *The Situation in Korea*

General Bradley's briefing on this subject was sharply pointed to two messages from General Clark.[2] The first of these stated that the so-called "Kaesong sanctuary", which had been created through the armistice negotiations and had an area of approximately 28 square miles, was now chock full of troops and matériel. General Clark believed that the Communists were using this area to build up for an attack on the UN. He therefore was requesting permission himself to attack as soon as he believes that the Communist attack is imminent. He also desires that steps be taken to end the immunity which has thus far prevailed within the Kaesong area. General Bradley stated that the Joint Chiefs were not of the opinion that such permissions should be given.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the others present did not believe that the time had come when we should indeed end those arrangements in Korea which had been originally designed to facilitate armistice negotiations which were now defunct. He pointed out, however, that we would need some time to prepare our friends for this step. In his view the sooner these arrangements were terminated the better.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Feb. 12.

[2] The references were to telegrams CX 61160, Clark to JCS, Feb. 7, and CX 61172, Clark to JCS, Feb. 9, pp. 742 and 758, respectively.

There followed a discussion of the timing of notice to the Communists of our intention to abrogate these arrangements.

The President stated his desire that the Secretary of State begin prompt consideration of this matter with our friends and to determine their reaction to this proposal. He then expressed the view that we should consider the use of tactical atomic weapons on the Kaesong area, which provided a good target for this type of weapon. In any case, the President added, we could not go on the way we were indefinitely.

General Bradley thought it desirable to begin talking with our allies regarding an end of the sanctuary, but thought it unwise to broach the subject yet of possible use of atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles discussed the moral problem and the inhibitions on the use of the A-bomb, and Soviet success to date in setting atomic weapons apart from all other weapons as being in a special category. It was his opinion that we should try to break down this false distinction.

The President added that we should certainly start on diplomatic negotiations with our allies. To him, it seemed that our self respect and theirs was involved, and if they objected to the use of atomic weapons we might well ask them to supply three or more divisions needed to drive the Communists back, in lieu of use of atomic weapons. In conclusion, however, the President ruled against any discussion with our allies of military plans or weapons of attack.

General Bradley turned to the other message from General Clark, which concerned the latter's anxiety over the possibility of a surprise air attack on the UN forces and air fields from Manchuria. General Clark believed that he was vulnerable to a surprise attack at low level as a result of the considerable build-up of Communist aircraft on Manchurian fields. He therefore desired permission to attack these fields when he feared that a Communist attack was actually imminent. The Joint Chiefs, said General Bradley, were not inclined to grant such permission to General Clark.

The President inquired as to the nature of any advance information that General Clark might obtain, and expressed doubts as to its validity. Furthermore, the President expressed himself as opposed to giving General Clark the authority he sought, and that the authority already in General Clark's hands as a result of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message of April 28, 1951,[3] concerning actual attack, was sufficient. Nevertheless, the President stated that he had never been able to understand why the UN command had ever abandoned its rights of hot pursuit of enemy aircraft to the bases, wherever they were, from which the aircraft had risen to attack.

---

[3] The reference was to a telegram from the JCS to Ridgway; for the text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 386.

The National Security Council: [4]

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted the President's desire that the Secretary of State undertake promptly* to secure the agreement of our allies to termination of the existing arrangements in Korea connected with the armistice negotiations.

Note: The action in *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on item 3. "The European Situation", and item 4. "The Use of Radio as a Medium for Psychological Operations and the Impact of Its Use on National Security".]

5. *Settlement of Republic of Korea Advances of Korean Currency (Won) to United States Forces* (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 9, 1953) [5]

The details of the problem were explained at some length by Mr. Cutler and by Mr. Dodge. The latter was not sure that this issue properly belonged on the NSC agenda, but no matter who investigated it, Mr. Dodge thought it would be necessary to face the facts, and the facts seemed to be that there was absolutely no use making new won exchange rate agreements when Syngman Rhee had already abrogated two past agreements.

Mr. Stassen said that what was needed was a new coordinated economic approach to the Korean Government, with perhaps a high commissioner to take charge of the matter.

Secretary Wilson expressed sympathy for the ROK position and noted that our refusal to pay thus far had contributed seriously to the heavy inflation now afflicting Korea. He expressed agreement with Mr. Stassen's proposal. Mr. Dodge pointed out that settlement at either the $65 or $85 million figure was bound to be unrealistic, and that it amounted to cancelled aid in any case. If these funds came out of Army appropriations and the Congress found out about it, it might prove very embarrassing.

The President stated that we had had similar problems for many years with many other countries. War was just naturally an expensive affair. But we ought to get together with the Koreans, he added, to work out a scheme which isn't too expensive.

The National Security Council: [6]

---

[4] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 708.

*In approving this record of action on the following day, the President directed the inclusion of an explanatory note to the effect that intelligence from Korea received from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, after the close of the meeting indicates the advisability of proceeding deliberately rather than promptly. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] The reference was to the covering memorandum transmitting the memorandum and attachments from the Secretary of Defense to the NSC, Feb. 9, p. 747.

[6] The following paragraph and Note constituted NSC Action No. 711; a record copy of NSC Action No. 711 is located in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

Discussed the problem, and noted the President's desire that it be referred for solution, unless recourse to the Congress proves necessary, to a committee consisting of representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury (chairman), the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of the Treasury, State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on item 6. "Review of Basic National Security Policies" and item 7. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

795B.5 MSP/2-1253

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1953.

Subject: Settlement for Won Advances from the Republic of Korea

At your direction I met on February 12 in the Cabinet Room with the subcommittee appointed by the National Security Council[2] to consider the question of settlement for the won advances made to the United Nations forces in Korea by the Republic of Korea. Mr. Humphrey served as Chairman, and the others present were Mr. Stassen, Mr. McNeil, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Dodge and I. Although Mr. Dodge and I argued the case for an immediate settlement with the Republic of Korea on the terms which, except for the precise amount, have already been negotiated, the others present concluded that this dollar settlement represents the best bargaining weapon which we have in trying to get a satisfactory economic arrangement with the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the sense of the meeting was that the following actions should be taken:

1. A civilian with adequate authority should be appointed at once to be responsible for the United States interest in getting the Korean economy on a satisfactory footing. He should be sent by the President, representing the Unified Command, but should also be responsible to General Clark as the United Nations Commander. His position would thus be somewhat comparable to that formerly held by Mr. Dodge in Japan. It was clearly understood that this requires a complete change in the present arrangements in the Command in both Japan and Korea for handling economic matters, and that the new man should be given adequate authority. It was also agreed that the headquarters of the man appointed would be in Korea. Defense and Treasury are to agree on

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum, which was drafted by McClurkin.

[2] For a report of the NSC meeting of Feb. 11, in which the subcommittee was set up, see *supra.*

the person. The first choice of those present is Clarence Meyer, who negotiated the Economic Agreement last May, if he is satisfactory to General Clark and the Koreans. The second choice is Mr. Szymczak, a member of the Federal Reserve Board.

2. The individual selected should go to the field as soon as possible and conclude satisfactory arrangements with the Republic of Korea, using the dollar settlement as bargaining leverage. The meeting was not clear as to what these "satisfactory arrangements" would be.

3. Mr. Stassen will under present authority, after consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress, make available additional funds for assistance to the Republic of Korea if the civilian appointed determines that they are necessary. Mr. Stassen also expressed willingness to request appropriations for the next fiscal year if it is considered necessary.

4. UNKRA should be relieved of all responsibility except for long-range planning, and the Department of State, perhaps through Mr. Lodge, should secure the agreement of other interested governments to this arrangement.

The portion of the decision which affected UNKRA received very little discussion, and I am somewhat concerned about the effects of this sudden shift of policy. I will see what can be done in working out the details of the foregoing arrangement to get an appropriate modification with respect to UNKRA.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korean Neutralized Zone

General Bradley: I was supposed to brief the NSC on this telegram to Clark.[2] When we discussed this the other day [3] I asked why we were making a show of carrying on negotiations and maintaining the neutralized zone from Kaesong to Munsan. There was a question whether we should end the whole thing. If there was a real threat of attack we should do something right now. The intelligence reports that came in yesterday show these forces moving in to be replacements. I told the President that the question of timing was something we could work out and that on the basis of this new report it was probably not a rush job. That is where the matter stands now. I think everybody agrees you could not give Clark the authority over there to attack when he wants to.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, General Ruffner represented the Department of Defense, and Lay and Gleason the NSC. In all, 21 persons were present. Southeast Asia was also discussed at this meeting.

[2] The reference was to a draft of telegram JCS 931311, to Clark, Feb. 13, 1953; for the text as it was transmitted, see *infra*.

[3] Presumably reference was to the NSC meeting of Feb. 11; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 769.

There is a problem of whether you call off the whole business relating to the neutralized zone or just the neutralization of Kaesong and Munsan. The question now is whether we should wait for a *fait accompli* with respect to the POWs. So many times we have seemed to be on the verge of getting something and then something has happened—maybe this would be just too much and would spoil the *fait accompli* and spoil a truce.

We talked to our Secretary after the meeting at the White House and pointed out that the General Assembly was about to meet and that there would be a problem with our allies. We felt that if we could protect ourselves militarily in the Kaesong area and still maintain the thin thread at Panmunjom it would be better. This telegram would maintain Panmunjom itself as a demilitarized zone.

Mr. Matthews: We talked to our Secretary and he said he would go along.

Mr. Nitze: Where would you have negotiations after carrying out the *fait accompli* with respect to the POWs?

Mr. Matthews: Under this proposal you could still have them at Panmunjom. You could not have negotiations in the UN on this.

General Bradley: From the military point of view, we think we should go ahead with the *fait accompli* and do it now, but we leave the timing to you.

Mr. Johnson: We think it should follow closely on the General Assembly.

General Bradley: Around the first of April?

Mr. Johnson: About then.

Mr. Matthews: The Assembly might end earlier, but Vishinsky is coming over and he could go on talking indefinitely. I gather you decided last week not to send the message to Clark requesting his views on the *fait accompli.*

General Bradley: No, we decided not to let the matter go out of this room for the time being.

Mr. Johnson: That is right.

General Bradley: Then is this message to Clark on the neutralized zone all right with you? (Message attached)[4]

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

---

[4] The message was not attached to the source text, but see footnote 2, above.

General Bradley: There is one question of wording—whether a "now" should go in the seventh line. I think it should.

Did you want to discuss the timing of the *fait accompli* any further today?

Mr. Nitze: I think we should have someone go out and talk to Clark as early as possible, as we agreed last week.

General Bradley: We did not think the message should go out now. But the question is whether someone should make a trip there. Are any of the Chiefs going over soon?

General Vandenberg: General White is going on the 24th of February.

General Bradley: We could have White do it.

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

General Bradley: Vandenberg, will you talk to White?

General Vandenberg: Yes, and I will have him talk to you Brad and to Johnson.

General Lemnitzer: I think Colonel Matthews should be in this too; he is following the thing.

General Bradley: All right. Anything more?

Mr. Matthews: Not on this.

. . . .

Economic Situation in Korea

General Collins: Have you gotten in on the over-all economic business in Korea?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

General Collins: Clark is very concerned. Stevens and I may discuss it with the Secretary after lunch today. There is the immediate problem and the long-range one on how we handle economic matters and rehabilitation in Korea. The NSC discussed this the other day and appointed a committee of Humphrey, Dodge, the Secretary of the Navy and McNeil.[5] They suggested sending a single representative of the President and the Defense Department who would operate under CINCUNC on all these problems. I am very much concerned with what will happen behind the front lines. Clark's point is that we should let him settle immediately the back payment of won—he can settle it on the basis of 84 million. If it is settled, they will agree on a new exchange rate with an escalator clause.

Mr. Johnson: We have consistently supported Clark's position.

General Collins: I am glad to know that. The fellow who goes out, however good he is, isn't going to settle this in a month. In three months we will have lost more than we would lose by a settlement now.

---

[5] Wilfred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Mr. Matthews: We are supporting you in this position.

. . . .

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1953—1:16 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 931311. From JCS reur CX 61160[1] and CX 61168.[2]

1. Careful consideration has been given to sit outlined in ur CX 61160 and ur recommended action. JCS concur ur view part 3*a* that enemy offensive div size or larger in Kaesong-Munsan area and clearly supported from Kaesong restricted area will be interpreted as abrogation security agreement and ur action set forth in part 3*a*. You should submit to JCS now proposed public statement to be issued should this contingency materialize.[3] Re part 3*b* JCS conclude it impossible at this time obtain higher level dec grant you authy requested. JCS appreciate ur concern; however, consider that if such offensive should become imminent you can request and receive JCS dec in sufficient time enable you take action indicated. JCS prepared act immediately and have alerted higher authy possible need for expeditious dec in this matter.

2. As alternative ur proposal in part 3*b*, another approach to problem being considered here is that UNC would in near future notify Commies that as of specified date UNC would no longer consider itself bound by provisions security agreement of 22 Oct 51, insofar as they pertain to Kaesong and Munsan. In other words, remove immunity presently accorded area around these 2 locations, but retain neutrality Panmunjom and immunity accorded area bounding roads to Panmunjom from Munsan and Kaesong. Thought has been advanced that this approach would immediately alleviate adverse mil sit confronting UNC re Kaesong area while at same time lessening adverse polit implications inherent in complete abrogation, particularly those arising from fact UNGA reconvenes 24 Feb. Not only would this be less likely to [be] misinterpreted as complete breakoff of negots by UNC, but sit would be more conducive to possible resumption of negots if Commies change present attitude toward armistice. We recognize that such approach may present certain practical disadvantages from ur viewpoint.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 7, p. 742.

[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram C 61283, Clark to JCS, Feb. 19, 1953, Clark submitted the text of a proposed public statement to be issued in the event of a Communist attack of a division or larger supported from Kaesong. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

3. Request ur views,[4] on foregoing proposal, including practicability of arrangements that might result from its implementation. Further request you forward JCS proposed text ltr you would submit to Commies should dec be made to adopt this course of action.[5]

4. Nec dipl consultation with UK on this matter would be greatly facilitated if UK had been apprised of facts re Commie buildup in Kaesong and threat it poses to UNC, including Commonwealth Div that general sector, through their own mil channels from Tokyo. Accordingly, suggest you discreetly have such facts made available to appropriate UK ofcr in Tokyo.

---

[4] In telegram C 61283 Clark strongly agreed with the JCS views expressed in paragraph 2 of this telegram and stated that he favored the course of action suggested.

[5] Clark also submitted the text of the proposed letter he would give to the Communists in telegram C 61283.

795.00/2-553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1953—5:25 p. m.

301. Re Korea urtel 484 and Deptel 292.[2]

1. Even if there should be resolution on political part Korean item, we question desirability of mixing consideration political and economic aspects Korean item and joining two subjects in one resolution. Consideration both aspects together can only reduce support which US could otherwise expect for either part by itself. Union of South Africa for example would not vote for any resolution on UNKRA because in its view this would imply commitment to contribute; other dels may have similar feeling. Similarly Asian countries who ordinarily take active interest in UNKRA might be impelled to withhold support proposed resolution if it involves reaffirmation Indian resolution at this time or other political action they do not consider necessary or desirable in present circumstances.

2. With respect to substance of economic proposal in urtel even if contained in a separate resolution under UNKRA agenda item, Department believes resolution should be limited to urging governments to complete payments on existing pledges and to make additional pledges and payments required to produce $250 million budgetary amount previously authorized by GA. Such a draft resolution will be sent soon for your consideration.[3] Department believes that determination of desir-

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin and Graham R. Hall, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary Hickerson, and cleared with Otis E. Mulliken of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, and with Hemmendinger, Emmons, and Hickerson.

[2] Dated Feb. 5 and 6, pp. 733 and 741, respectively.

[3] The resolution was contained in Annex A to a position paper entitled "Korea: Report of the Agent General for Korean Reconstruction" and dated Feb. 25, 1953, not printed (IO files, lot 71 D 440, "Position Papers, 2nd Part of 7th General Assembly Session").

ability of Agent General presenting to Eighth GA a long-term program of two to five years duration together with his views on practically possible budget or over-all figure can better be made at a later time but still in advance Eighth GA. Department's reasons for these views are:

(A) A resolution calling for Agent General to report plan for long-range program of UNKRA would, in contrast with limited resolution recommended above, tend to produce extensive debate of a nature which would probably reveal both UNKRA and US in a vulnerable position. Up to this time, UNKRA has not engaged in extensive implementation of projects of economic aid. The major reason has been refusal of US military authorities, until they recently agreed to $70 million program, to permit UNKRA to implement projects. Even with respect to $70 million progam, Department has just been informed confidentially by Agent General of unforeseen restrictions and delays which US military authorities appear to have imposed recently against UNKRA's actually going forward with implementation of projects in that program. However, Department of Army is working most earnestly in conjunction with CINCUNC to develop with ROK and UNKRA as rapidly as possible and presumably well in advance of Eighth GA an integrated ROK–UNC–UNKRA program based upon evaluation of total resources and total needs, which should result in categories of projects assigned to UNKRA for relatively free and satisfactory implementation. At the same time, Nathan Survey for UNKRA [4] is going forward and it should be completed within six months. Department expects that Agent General will make report to GA in advance of Eighth Session based upon above-mentioned integrated program and Nathan Survey and recommending a program for UNKRA. At time when such report is made, UNKRA will presumably have had a better record of implementation of projects; and, consequently, US can then better determine its views on increased scale and longer term implementation of UNKRA program.

(B) Any two to five year program for UNKRA would have to be based either on assumption that hostilities continued or on assumption that hostilities ceased. First assumption as publicly recognized basis for plan would appear unacceptable from political point of view; but even if acceptable politically, it does not seem likely that UC could make public projection of magnitude and categories of civilian relief it planned to furnish over same period. Without such projection by UC, it would not be feasible for UNKRA to make a complementary projection of its program and the budget therefor. Second assumption would require much larger UNKRA funds than would be the case under first assumption where during continued hostilities CRIK funds would presumably be providing major part of emergency civilian relief category as at present. Therefore, it would appear difficult for Agent General to present a program for two to five years financing until cessation of hostilities has resulted in transferring to UNKRA that responsibility for civilian relief which is now exercised by UC.

---

[4] Nathan Associates had already prepared for UNKRA a study entitled "Preliminary Report on Reconstruction of Korea" which attempted to estimate the gross requirements of Korea in the 1953-1954 ROK fiscal year. It was the conclusion of the study that about $450 million in resources from abroad would be needed to provide a GNP sufficient to permit an availability of resources per capita, including those going into military uses, to equal that of the year immediately prior to the outbreak of war in Korea. More information on this study and the general question of economic aid to Korea can be found in a paper prepared by E. C. Hutchinson of OFD on Feb. 13, 1953, entitled "Economic Aid to Korea", not printed. (795B.5 MSP/2–1353)

(C) Moreover, under present circumstances, it appears to Department that it would be too optimistic to hope that Congress would approve US pledge to UNKRA of perhaps $600 million which, for example, would represent $200 million per year for three years as 80% of a total annual amount of $250 million; and yet experience to date has not indicated a positive basis for expecting more than $50 million per year from governments other than US. In above example, the $250 million annual figure is used merely because the present $250 million budgetary amount was originally considered as being designed to cover approximately one year of full-scale operations by UNKRA. If US sponsored a resolution of the nature proposed urtel and Agent General, acting pursuant to such resolution, recommended a program of the size set forth in above example, US would probably find itself unable to pledge the amount which would be required to achieve such total goal. Although two or three year pledging is highly desirable for efficiency of UNKRA operations, it does not appear practicable under present circumstances.

DULLES

IO files, lot 71 D 440, "2nd Part of 7th Session, Position Papers"

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1953.
SD/A/C.1/407

KOREAN QUESTION

THE PROBLEM

What should be the position of the United States in regard to the Korean problem at the second part of the seventh session of the General Assembly?

---

[1] A covering memorandum attached to a draft of this paper indicated that Hickerson, Allison, and Johnson met with Dulles on the afternoon of Feb. 13, 1953, to go over the recommendations in this paper and that Dulles approved them. (795.00/2-1353)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation should seek to avoid any further General Assembly resolutions on the political and military aspects of the Korean question at the second part of the seventh session, with the possible exception of an appropriate, non-controversial resolution on the report of UNCURK.

2. In the absence of developments indicating a change in the Communist position, the United States Delegation should strongly discourage any further resolutions at this time seeking new formulae or making concessions to the Communists on the question of PWs and calling for a cease-fire, on the ground that they are futile and not calculated to achieve the objectives of the United Nations as set forth in previous resolutions, including the resolution of December 3, 1952.

3. The United States Delegation should not introduce any resolution of the Korean question. If, however, it appears necessary, as a tactical matter, to introduce a proposal in order to forestall other resolutions which the United States would not consider desirable, the United States Delegation should propose a resolution along the lines set forth in Annex A.

4. In the event that other Delegations raise questions in regard to the recent Presidential order concerning the mission of the Seventh Fleet in Formosa waters, the United States Delegation should explain the United States position along the lines set forth in the final paragraph of the discussion below. (A further elaboration of the United States position in the event the USSR proposes the inclusion of a separate item on this matter is contained in a separate paper.) [2]

DISCUSSION

1. The Korean item is again on the Agenda for the second part of the seventh session. At that time the General Assembly will continue the discussion of this question in the light of the report of the President of the General Assembly on the Communist rejection of the General Assembly Resolution of December 3 (UN Doc. A/2354, Dec. 20, 1952) and any further report from the President which might be forthcoming, or other developments. There will be before the First Committee the 21-Power Resolution and the Mexican and Peruvian Resolutions introduced during the first part of the seventh session; these were not voted upon, and it was agreed that they would be considered as technically still before the Committee.

2. There appears to be little prospect of Communist agreement to an acceptable armistice in the near future. Even assuming that the PW question remains the major obstacle to peace in Korea, the Communists

---

[2] Not printed. (IO files, lot 71 D 440, "2nd Part of 7th Session, Position Papers")

do not appear to be prepared to make any concessions on this question that would make possible an agreement acceptable to the United States and to the United Nations. In the circumstances there appears little more that the General Assembly can usefully do to help bring about an early armistice in Korea.

3. At the same time there continues to be a strong desire on the part of other members to make further efforts to achieve an armistice. Some countries are particularly anxious to see an immediate end to the Korean fighting, especially since they fear that the United States might take measures which would result instead in extending the scope of hostilities. This anxiety will probably be increased by fears on the part of some delegations that the recent Presidential announcement concerning the Seventh Fleet portends further steps which would have the effect of enlarging the conflict. Also countries like India, Indonesia, and Burma are probably somewhat embarrassed to find themselves, as a result of the vote on the December 3 resolution, strongly aligned with the West on a major aspect of the Korean question. They may wish to resume an attitude of greater "neutrality" by sponsoring some proposal more acceptable to the Communists and less so to the United States, perhaps in the form of a revision of the resolution of December 3, or some "composite" resolution incorporating ideas from the Soviet proposal defeated by the General Assembly in December.

4. The United States Delegation should take the position that further efforts by the General Assembly at this time would be futile in the absence of a clear indication from the Communists that they are interested in an armistice which the United Nations can accept. The United States Delegation should take the position that nothing is gained by negotiating with ourselves in public; in such circumstances every concession made brings no concessions in return from the Communists, who remain uncommitted while the United Nations has whittled away at its own position. If after Communist rejection of the December 3 resolution new concessions are made the Communists would assume that further rejection will lead to further concession. If the United Nations gives the appearance of being over-anxious, it only makes Communist agreement to an armistice less likely. If, through diplomatic channels or at Panmunjom the Communists make it clear that they are prepared to accept as a basis for agreement some plan consistent with the principles of the United Nations including the December 3 resolution, progress could be made towards an armistice. At that time it could be decided whether it was necessary or desirable to seek Assembly approval.

5. The United States should therefore discourage strongly any effort to press to a vote either the 21-Power Resolution, the Mexican and Peruvian Resolutions, or any similar resolutions, which can only be futile gestures, and evidence of helplessness on the part of the United Nations and lack of determination. Further, none of these resolutions would

obtain the kind of majority achieved for the December 3 resolution and it would be best to leave that resolution as the General Assembly's last word on the Korean question at this time.

6. At the same time, there is little more that the General Assembly could do to aid the United Nations Command in prosecution of the military action in Korea. Additional troops are always desired, of course, but it is hardly likely that an Assembly resolution calling for such troops would bring in substantial contributions. Similarly, while certain additional measures to supplement the existing United Nations embargo might be of slight aid to the United Nations effort in Korea it is not believed that these would be of sufficient effect to warrant seeking such action at the present General Assembly. Such further military measures as the United Nations Command might desire to undertake should be rested on the authority of existing resolutions. To seek explicit authority for new measures might well imply unwarranted limitations in existing authority or even lead to efforts to diminish the authority of the Unified Command.

7. If, however, other delegations insist on pressing efforts, which the United States considers undesirable, to compromise further with the Communists in an effort to bring about an early armistice, the United States Delegation may decide that it is desirable to forestall such efforts by some counter-resolution. For this purpose the Delegation might propose an exhortatory resolution, noting with regret the Communist rejection of the December 3 resolution, and calling for further support of the Unified Command in a more energetic prosecution of the Korean action. Such a resolution might also establish a negotiating committee to obtain additional contributions of men and matériel towards the United Nations effort.

8. If other delegations should attack the United States or raise questions in regard to the Presidential order concerning the Seventh Fleet, the United States Delegation should reply along the following lines:

> When aggression in Korea took place and the United Nations went to the assistance of the Republic of Korea to repel this aggression and restore peace and security in the area, the United States Government considered it necessary to take measures to protect the flank of United Nations forces in Korea, and to prevent an additional outbreak of hostilities in the area, which might become involved with the Korean action and lead to full-scale hostilities in the Far East. For that reason the President of the United States ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to assume the mission of preventing hostilities between the National Government of China on Formosa and the Communist Chinese forces on the mainland. This action, however, was taken by this Government before it was designated as the Unified Command by the Security Council.

Since the time of this action by the United States, the Chinese Communists have intervened in Korea and compounded the original aggression by the North Koreans. They have persisted in this aggression and to this day continue to refuse to give up their aggression and to enter into an honorable armistice consistent with United Nations principles.

The recent Presidential order concerning the fleet in Formosan waters implies no aggressive intent on our part.

Annex A

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Noting with grave concern that, in rejecting the General Assembly Resolution of December 3, 1952, the Chinese People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities have prevented the conclusion of an armistice in Korea;

Reaffirming the principles embodied in that Resolution as an acceptable and honorable basis for a settlement of the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war;

Calls upon the Communists to avert further bloodshed by accepting forthwith the resolution of December 3, 1952, or otherwise agreeing to an armistice based on the principles of the United Nations;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles and to achieve United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means;

Appeals to all members, pending the agreement of the Chinese People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities to an honorable armistice consistent with United Nations principles, to continue and intensify their efforts in support of the United Nations action in Korea and in particular to furnish assistance, including additional troops, to the United Nations Command, pursuant to the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950 and General Assembly Resolution 376 (V), of October 7, 1950.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 14, 1953—10:45 a. m.

CX 61225. Ref mymsg CX 61134 dtd 4 Feb,[2] Dept of State msg 496, 6 Feb[3] AmEmb Pusan msg 984, 7 Feb.[4]

---

[1] This message was sent to Murphy and Briggs for their information.

[2] *Ante*, p. 729.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 745.

[4] *Ante*, p. 745.

1. Mr Murphy has furn me with copy Dept of State msg 496, 6 Feb, regarding return ROK Govt to Seoul expressing willingness to give full support to my psn. He also furn me copy Mr Briggs reply msg 984, 7 Feb. Above ref State Dept msgs are being passed to you separately.[5]

2. Note upon ref to ltr 1 Feb to Mr Allison on this same subj that Mr Briggs implies that since no obstacles are apparently stopping Rhee, all agencies might just as well recog fact and move to Seoul without further ado. His present msg seems to carry the same views. Do not share those views. We must not adopt attitude that everyone is obliged to fol Rhee in this mat. Movement of ROK Govt and of all agencies assoc therewith to Seoul might even encourage an attack. From purely mil point of view I cont to regard the movement with concern.

3. Fol comments apply to Briggs numbered proposals in his msg 984.

(1) Movement of key pers to Seoul should not be on basis of Rhee's residence but on operational rqmts basis, based upon mil stn and other pol and econ factors. All United States and UN agencies should adopt this attitude and emphasize it in all discussion with Rhee.

(2) There are neither mil funds nor mil pers available for purpose of rehab Pusan as an inducement to stop back to Seoul movement, and, until growing inflation in Korea is stopped, it is inapprop to cons any large scale public bldg program anywhere in Korea. While certain funds are aval to UNKRA for reconstruction projects the UN Advisory Committee for UNKRA matters has been opposed to use of funds for rehab of ROK Govt bldgs.

(3) Do not understand what additional pers Briggs could be ref to when he recomm trans of civil affairs functions from Tokyo to Korea. KCOMZ with G–5 Sec was created to give on the scene supervision. Have an entire org in Korea to perform civ affairs and civil assist functions namely United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea. Combined Econ Bd is located in Korea and am designating Gen Hamblen to be my pers repr on Board. He has been located in Korea for some time and will remain there. Made the sugg to Mr Rhee and he accepted. Streamlined UNKRA–UNC relations have been effected so that coord, plans and procedures are developed in Korea with ROK repr participating. All such activities are centered in Pusan in Comm Zone to be close to seat of ROK Govt. Rhee on other hand seems to be intent upon moving his govt into battle zone away from orgn created to render his people civ assist. Without doubt his motives are primarily political. All pers handling civ affairs and civil assist matters are now permanently located in Korea except myself and my J–5 and his staff who advise and assist me on civ affairs matters for entire Far East.

(4) Briggs refers to my veto on rehab and bldg repair proj in Seoul and suggests that I offer to make joint study through Comb Econ Bd. Comb Econ Bd was set up as result of negot by pres mission along lines of terms of ref expressing US psn. One of important concepts of agreement creating Comb Econ Bd was to combat inflation. Any

---

[5] In telegram C 61226, Clark to JCS, Feb. 14, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

money expended in Korea in rehab bldgs or any other undertaking which if not immediately productive increases inflation and worsens condition of ill fed and ill clothed Korean pop. Have not objected to normal repair and rehab of housing or other facs which contribute to comfort and relief of Korean people but I disagree that mil supplies and relief supplies should be diverted and used for rehab of govt bldgs in Seoul or for rehab or housing for govt offls there.

4. Briggs states in msg 984 "Since US opposition to reestab of Korean Govt in Seoul has mil basis, doubt whether suggested pers comm to Pres Rhee from Sec of State desirable at this juncture". Altho my psn has been supported 100% by State (see State msg 496) for which I am grateful, believe ltr from Sec of State to Pres Rhee indicating that my Govt concurs and is supporting my views will help immeasurably. If Rhee is convinced of US psn in this matter he may reduce his efforts to effect large scale move. Therefore I recom as being timely and approp pers comm from Sec State to Pres Rhee regarding this ques.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 18, 1953—5:30 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 931724. From JCS.

1. State has received info that cited resolution (text in msg to fol) [2] or substance thereof might be raised at UNGA which reconvenes 24 Feb. State considers it would be to polit advantage of United States again to propose to Commies prior that date an immed exchange of sick and wounded POWs. JCS concur in this view. In reaching this dec consideration has been given to factors cited in ur CX 60418,[3] and it has been concluded that at this time advantages of making offer outweigh risks involved.

2. Accordingly, unless you perceive serious objections thereto, you shld, at earliest practicable time and in any event prior to 24 Feb, transmit letter to Commie cdrs substantially as fols:

"Exec Cmte of League of Red Cross Societies, in resolution adopted in Geneva on Dec 13, 52, called on both sides in Korean conflict gesture of good will in first instance to take immed action in implementing Geneva Convs, by repatriating sick and wounded POWs in accordance with appropriate arts of Geneva Conv.

"As has been repeatedly stated to you in course of negots at Panmunjom UNC has from beginning been prepared to carry out provisions of

---

[1] A notation in Bradley's handwriting on the draft of telegram JCS 931724 in JCS files read: "Approved by President 1630 hrs Feb 18/52 [*53*] ONB."

[2] See telegram JCS 931742, *infra.*

[3] Dated Dec. 22, 1952, p. 716.

Geneva Conv in regard sick and wounded POWs. In particular UNC remains ready immediately to repatriate seriously wounded and seriously sick POWs who are fit to travel in accordance with provisions of Art 109 of Conv.

"I wish to be informed whether you are prepared, for your part, to proceed immediately with repatriation of seriously sick and wounded POWs of UNC who are in ur hands. UNC ln ofcrs will be prepared meet your ln ofcrs to make necessary arrangements for impartial verification of the condition and for mutual exchange of such seriously sick and wounded, in accordance with provisions of Art 109 of Geneva Conv."

3. Exact text ur communication and time of its transmission should be reported Wash so that press treatment can be coordinated.

4. You will note that Art 109 imposes obligation on each side to repatriate sick and wounded; presumably this obligation not necessarily contingent on similar action by other side. Any statement issued therefore should not state explicitly that we will not repatriate sick and wounded unless Commies do likewise. You might further note that same Art expressly provides that no sick or injured POW may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1953—5:34 p. m.

JCS 931742. From JCS re JCS 931724.[1] Fol is text of resolution on POWs adopted by Executive Comte League of Red Cross (RC) Societies, 13 Dec 52. Subj resolution introduced by Indian RC approved by 15 to 2 Soviet and Chi Commies dels opposed: "Whereas RC stands for world peace and whereas it is pledged work for international good will and understanding by means of humanitarian service, mbers of Exec Comte of League of RC Societies assembled Geneva regret greatly that hostilities still continue Korea, causing untold devastation, suffering and sorrow. They appeal again to countries concerned not to rest content until ways and means are found which would bring about cessation of hostilities. The services of League are, as always, at disposal of world in field of service to mankind which is so specially theirs. They ask belligerents as goodwill gesture in first instance take immed action implementing Geneva convs, by repatriating sick and wounded POWs in accordance with appropriate arts of Geneva convs."

---

[1] *Supra.*

320/2-1853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs (Allen)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1953.

Subject: U.K. Views on GA Action on Korea

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, U.K. Embassy
Mr. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Wainhouse, UNP
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR

Mr. Tomlinson showed us an instruction from Mr. Eden which the Foreign Office wanted discussed with the State Department despite the fact it had crossed with a telegram from the Embassy reporting the latest US views. Its substance follows:

Mr. Eden recalled that at his February 4 meeting with Mr. Dulles,[1] agreement was reached on the course of action to be followed on Korea at the GA, i.e., that we should "try not to take any major political initiative but seek to maintain intact the unity of opinion achieved over the successful passage of the Indian Resolution" and avoid controversial debate. At the same time, in Mr. Eden's view, "it will be necessary for the GA to take note formally" of the Chinese Commie and NK rejection of the Indian plan. We may also need to forestall other initiatives (i.e., Indonesian or Latin) "not entirely in accordance with our own views." It would thus be good to have a draft resolution ready and Eden suggests one covering the following points which would have broad humanitarian appeal:

(*a*) The GA would "take note" of the rejection of the GA Resolution of December 3.

(*b*) The GA would appeal for an immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded PW's.

The Resolution might also include other points such as a reaffirmation of the UN's desire for an early armistice and confirmation that the offers of September 28 at Panmunjom and the December 3rd Resolution still remain open.

Mr. Hickerson replied that as Mr. Tomlinson was aware, we have long been favorably disposed to re-making our previous proposals for the exchange of sick and wounded, but prefer to do so directly by the UC rather than through a GA resolution. He recalled that Mr. K. Menon (India) had suggested this be done directly, in the course of his last GA speech. Mr. Johnson reported that a telegram directing General Clark to make such a proposal before the GA convenes was transmitted this afternoon.[2] While we did not agree that some formal resolution noting Commie refusal of the December 3 Resolution was "necessary", we are willing to predict that tactically some counter-resolution will be desirable and Mr. Hickerson indicated we would have no objection to including in it a general GA blessing of the exchange proposal which by then will have been made. In this context our previous objection, that it would stimulate undesirable initiatives from others, would not be valid. In discussing the possible counter-resolution, Mr. Hickerson indicated that we have now dropped at least for the present the idea of a special negotiating committee to stimulate further contributions, although that does not mean a lessened interest in getting more troops. As to Mr. Eden's suggestion of also including confirmation that the previous peace offers remain open, Mr. Hickerson suggested it might be better to do so indirectly, after noting with grave concern Commie rejection, by expressing the hope that they would reconsider and accept either the December 3 proposal or one of the others made in September at Panmunjom.

---

[1] For a report of this meeting, held at London, see telegram 3654 from Bonn, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1564.

It was agreed that UK thinking generally parallels our own, except that the UK puts more emphasis on a broadly humanitarian, non-contentious resolution which would get 54 votes, and we feel that is impossible in any event.

JDH

---

[2] The reference was to telegram JCS 931724, Feb. 18, p. 785.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army

SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 19, 1953—5:35 p. m.

CX 61281. Re JCS 931724.[1]

1. In accordance with instructions contained in ref message, I propose to transmit following letter to Communist Commanders through Liaison Officers at Panmunjom at 221100I Feb:

"To: Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

The Executive Committee of The League of Red Cross Societies, in a resolution adopted in Geneva, Switzerland, on 13 Dec 1952, called on both sides in the Korean conflict as a gesture of good will to take immediate action in implementing the humanitarian provisions of the

---

[1] Dated Feb. 18, p. 785.

Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention.

As has been repeatedly stated to you in the course of negotiations at Panmunjom, the United Nations Command has from the very beginning adhered scrupulously to the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention and in particular has been prepared to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in regard to the sick and wounded prisoners in its custody. The United Nations Command remains ready immediately to repatriate those seriously sick and seriously wounded captured personnel who are fit to travel in accordance with provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

I wish to be informed whether you are prepared for your part to proceed immediately with the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured personnel of the United Nations Command who are in your hands. The United Nations Command Liaison Officers will be prepared to meet your Liaison Officers to make necessary arrangements for impartial verification of the condition and for the mutual exchange of such seriously sick and wounded in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

Mark W. Clark
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command"

While I have serious doubt that the Communists would agree to any such proposal, there are certain factors which I believe must be emphasized:

a. In order to provide for "impartial verification of the condition . . . of seriously sick and seriously wounded . . .", considered here that ICRC delegates to conduct impartial investigation on both sides would offer us best psychological advantages. However, because of Communist attitude toward this organization, they might insist on military observers of both sides or on representatives of the neutral nations previously agreed upon in Armistice Negotiations. While we probably would have to accept either of the last 2 named, any Communist representation could be expected to provide material for extensive propaganda attacks.

b. The Communists might use this as an excuse to demand convening plenary sessions on the basis that it represents a change to the existing Draft Armistice Agreement, Article 53 which provides in part that "seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war shall be repatriated with priority." Should such proposal be made, I intend to refuse it without reservation on the grounds that this offer to exchange the sick and wounded captured personnel is a humane one which does not affect the military capacity of either side, cannot be considered a part of armistice negotiation, and is one for which logistic arrangements can be adequately made through Liaison Officers.

c. Should such proposal be accepted, I believe it advisable to demand that point of exchange be Panmunjom in order to take advantage of neutral areas already agreed upon.

d. While I am not prepared at this time to estimate the exact time such an exchange would require, we would obviously have to set a definite termination date to prevent Communists from using usual delaying tactics.

3. You will note the text of my letter in Para 1 above uses phrase "captured personnel". Also text has been revised to indicate our observance of convention from beginning for all captured personnel, not just the sick and wounded.

4. You will be notified by Operational Immediate radio direct from CINCUNC (Adv) with info to this headquarters, immediately after communication is handed to Communist Liaison Officers. With receipt of such notification here, I intend to release text to press and presume you will do likewise in Washington.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1953—5:27 p. m.

JCS 931969. From JCS reur CX 61135.[2]

1. We recognize problems confronting you in maintaining discipline POWs and share fully your concern. As you know overall question of trials involves serious polit and legal implications which up to this time have not been resolved. It was felt that clear solution of problem might be effected if it were studied as part of overall review of POW problem. It is still our intention to proceed with this review and overall decn on trial of POWs must await its conclusion. However, we consider that recent flagrant attacks on mbrs UNC security forces such as that reported in ur CX 61076 [3] are of such serious import that immediate action is required. We consider that such cases can be considered distinct from cases involving riots, demonstrations, acts against other POWs, etc.

2. Accordingly, United States, in its capacity as unified cmd (pursuant to SC resolution of 7 Jul 50), authorizes you appoint UNC mil commission or commissions using to max extent practicable psnl from various natl contingents under your cmd, for purpose of bringing to trial those POWs in UNC custody charged with post-capture acts of violence against mbrs of UNC security forces of general character indicated in para 2B ur CX 61076 and EX 11636. [4]

---

[1] According to a covering memorandum by Johnson to Matthews, Feb. 16, 1953, attached to a draft of this telegram, both UNA and P had cleared it and suggestions made by L had been taken into consideration. Allison did not think that clearance by Dulles was necessary. (695A.00/2-1653)

[2] Dated Feb. 4, p. 732.

[3] This telegram, dated Jan. 20, 1953, not printed, reported on the premeditated murder of a member of the UNC security force by prisoners of war.

[4] Dated Feb. 4, 1953, not printed.

3. Trials will be conducted in strict accord with humanitarian principles of Geneva Conv. As contemplated by Art 99 of conv there will be prosecution only for acts clearly recognized as crimes under laws of United States, of other nations participating in Korean action, or forbidden by international law. Trials will be conducted in accordance with highest standards of civilized nations; pertinent provisions of Geneva Conv will be observed. Since United States Govt has authy of unified cmd, by virtue of SC resolution of July 7, 50, procedures followed in trials will conform to high standards provided for trial of United States mil psnl for similar crimes.

4. You are authorized, therefore, to promulgate rules of procedure for conduct of proposed trials in accordance with principles set forth in previous para. For this you are authorized to adopt, with exception of sect 5, rules of procedure promulgated by CINCFE on 12 Oct 51 and rules of evidence prescribed by MCM 1951. In order that appellate provisions will constitute legally sufficient compliance with Art 106 of Geneva POW Conv of 1949, folg shld be incorporated in sect 5 of rules of procedure:

A. All records of trials conducted general mil commissions shld be sent by convening authy direct to JA UNC for reference to board of review to be convened by CINCUNC. Generally, boards of review shld have powers similar to those conferred under Art 66 (C) and (D) of Uniform Code of Mil Justice (UCMJ), as well as power to commute and mitigate. Action by board shld be final except where death penalty is involved. When death penalty is involved, confirmation by CINCUNC shld be required upon receipt of advice and recommendations JA UNC.

B. Boards of review shld be composed of not less than 3 mbrs who are legally qualified mil or civ lawyers, preferably selected from various countries represented in UNC. Qualified counsel shld be provided automatically for all accused persons during trial and appeal, and in so doing care shld be exercised not to impair rights of POWs under Art 105 of POW Conv. Boards shld be permitted to go outside record in decisions involving jurisdiction and sanity. Boards shld be empowered to affirm sentence without necessity of affirming finding of every specification.

C. Review of cases tried by spec mil commissions shld conform in general to review of special courts martial cases under UCMJ.

D. Records of trial shld indicate that proceedings and review were conducted under UNC auspices. Completed records of trial shld be filed at Hq UNC with info copy to DeptAr.

E. In view foregoing changes in appellate provs of rules of procedure, you shld amend rules of procedure concerning new trials to conform therewith.

5. Tenor this action shld be that of routine legal proceedings authorized by Geneva Conv. Efforts shld be made to avoid undue prominence or significance being attached to these trials in pub info media, while at same time not unduly restricting press activity or curbing otherwise

worthwhile broad coverage and dissemination. Believe this can be accomplished in considerable degree through appropriate prior understanding between UNC and press. In view polit implications this action request you transmit to Wash prior to release text proposed publ announcement re these trials.

6. No objection to ur planned action with respect to ICRC as indicated in ur CX 52443.[5]

---

[5] In telegram CX 52443, Clark to Department of the Army, July 24, 1952, the Commander in Chief had suggested that the ICRC be invited to witness the trials and to participate in the proceedings in accordance with the Geneva Convention. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 23, 1953—4:49 p. m.

C 61314. Subj is Interim Report Current Status ROK Financial Negot.

1. On 21 Feb Pres Rhee accepted proposed UNC note drafted along lines previous msgs. Agmt apparently reached settlement $82,800,000 for United States oblig prior to 16 Dec 52. This figure rep compromise to our initial offer of $79,739,187.88. Rhee directed Paik verbally in presence my rep to accept UNC proposal. Conversations with Paik on 22 Feb proceeded satis. Believe solution can be reached on escalator clause. No apparent objection use of Pusan wholesale price index to determine initial mil conversion rate and for subsequent periodic adjustments; initial rate calculation will be keyed to Pusan wholesale price index-mil conversion rate relationship of Apr 51. Ques of drawings heretofore made subsequent to 16 Dec unsettled at this point in negot.

2. Paik proposed that formal agmt be signed 25 Feb. UNC proposes to make the 25 Feb agmt effective 26 Feb in order to convenience our funding and finance people by avoiding a split day.

3. New subj: Indications Paik will present draft of new law to assembly near future for rationing of essentials. Apparently ROK Govt gaining confidence.

4. Further info of significance will be forwarded as avail.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, February 24, 1953—4:05 p. m.

CX 61323. Re DA [*JCS*] 931969.[1]

1. I appreciate the auth granted by ref radio and ppsd initial action as indicated below. However, there is a possibility that the concluding para of my CX 61135[2] may have misleadingly focused attn on only a segment of the problem confronting me and have created a misconception of the auth I desired. I am vitally concerned with all crimes of violence and reference to the murder of a mbr of the UNC security forces was only to emphasize the growing seriousness of the problem of violence in its entirety as presented by my CX 52443,[3] CX 53852, C 59981[4] and CX 60821.[5] I believe that the imposed restriction of trials, to postcapture acts of violence against mbrs of UNC security forces only, involves serious disadvantages hereinafter enumerated which should be considered before full implementation here.

2. In order to ascertain the max extent practicable to which pers from the various national contingents under my command may be utilized on the commission, I plan, unless otherwise directed by you to confer on or about 5 March with the senior liaison offs of all United Nations which have furn mil forces (excludes Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Italy which have furn only non mil hospital contingents). I shall acquaint them with the extent of auth granted me and rqst their nominations for appointments to the commission. Since prev assents and nominations mentioned in my CX 60821 and CX 52443 were predicated upon representations of unrestricted trials, I anticipate that each will desire to communicate with his government before replying. Under restricted trial auth it is possible that some of the UN nations having forces in Korea will not be willing to participate. As a matter of interest, we now have indications that the UK may be reluctant to join a commission under any conditions. I shall keep you informed of individual reactions.

3. Under auth of ref, CG KCOMZ, would be directed to appoint a UNC Mil Commission for the purpose of bringing to trial only those POWs in UNC custody charged with postcapture acts of violence against mbrs of UNC security forces. Auth to appoint has been heretofore delegated to CG KCOMZ, by para 6a, amended 29 Sept 52, of the

---

[1] Dated Feb. 20, p. 790.

[2] Dated Feb. 4, p. 732.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 792.

[4] These telegrams, dated Aug. 18 and Dec. 11, 1952, respectively, are not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)

[5] Dated Jan. 5, p. 722.

Rules of Procedure of 12 Oct 51 mentioned in para 4 of ref. Since these rules were promulgated by CINCUNC in the first instance, no necessity is perceived for new promulgation. The rules of evidence prescribed by MCM, 1951, are prescribed by rule 33 of the mentioned rules. Rule 18 requires the proceedings of trial to conform generally to that prescribed for general courts-martial in the armed forces of the nation of the convening auth. As indicated in para 4, subparas A to E incl, of ref msg, rules will be amended to incorporate changes, but otherwise will remain unchanged.

4. A proposed press release is now in preparation and will be transmitted to you within the next few days.[6]

5. I can see the following disadvantages in the limited scope of prosecution auth:

a. As indicated by my original rad (CX 52443), in the majority of postcapture crimes of violence the victims have been fellow prisoners of war. These cases present no less flagrant defiance of disciplinary authority than the proportionately smaller number of incidents of acts of violence against members of the UNC forces. So long as the former are permitted to continue unpunished, they furn a stimulant for further challenge of auth.

b. In light of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war, a distinction between acts of violence against mbrs of the UNC forces and the same type of acts against fellow prisoners of war appears extremely difficult to defend. To invoke the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention for the governance of trials inaugurated for the prosecution of prisoners for crimes of violence against mbrs of the UNC security forces, without concurrent extension of the same course of action to murder of any aggravated assaults upon, fellow prisoners of war, appears to risk placing the UNC (not only in the view of the ICRC but also in the eyes of the world) in the position of attaching only secondary importance to defending from violence those whom the convention is designed primarily to protect.

c. Omission to prosecute prisoners for murder and maiming of fellow prisoners cannot be reconciled with the obligations imposed by articles 13 and 121 of the Geneva Convention.

d. The numerical disproportion of cases involving crimes of violence against mbrs of the UNC security forces in relation to the vastly greater number of cases in which the victims have been fellow prisoners of war will emphasize the disparity of treatment. Of the 35 cases referred to in para 4, CX 60821, one case involved assault against mbr of the UNC security forces, in contrast to 27 cases of murder of, and 4 cases of assault upon, nonmembers of the UNC forces. Since that report, there are to be added 1 case of murder of, and 2 cases of assault upon mbrs of the UNC security forces, which are ready for trial, and one case presently under investigation which involves potential charges of assault upon UNC security personnel.

---

[6] The text of the proposed press release was transmitted by Clark to the JCS in telegram CX 61394, Mar. 3, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

3[*e*]. Non prosecution of crimes of violence against fellow prisoners will inevitably dishearten both the anti-Communists and the merely apathetic among the Communist prisoners of war.

6. It is recognized that cases involving riots, demonstrations, and other similar derelictions against discipline, chiefly of political significance and not involving acts of violence to persons, may be considered in a category for separate treatment and that consideration of prosecutions therefor may await overall review of POW problems. It is also recognized, however, that prosecutions restricted to perpetrators of acts of violence against mbrs of the UNC security forces may cause criticism by friendly powers and the ICRC, arouse a sense of betrayal among the anti-Communist and orderly elements of prisoners of war, and furnish fuel for the inevitable Communist propaganda agencies, which is likely to be provoked by conspicuous omission to give full effect to the humanitarian principles which we have invoked.

7. In spite of the above considerations, it is my intention, unless otherwise directed, to implement the auth which has been granted.

795B.5/2-2453

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State [1]

NEW YORK, February 24, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: On September 12, 1950, the Secretary of Defense (in a letter classified Secret [2]) wrote to the Secretary of State that the acceptance of foreign troops for service in Korea would have to be contingent upon their providing their own financing and supplies.

On September 30, 1950 (in a letter classified Secret [3]) he wrote to the Secretary of State again: ". . . that the Department of Defense attaches great importance to preserving this principle of reimbursement", adding that: "it would appear undesirable to establish any general principle that U.S. military supplies, services or equipment will be donated without creating any obligation on the part of their recipients.

On September 27, 1952, the Secretary of Defense (in a letter classified Secret [4]) wrote to the Secretary of State: "The Korean operation is now more than two years old and any further offer of forces that might be forthcoming *would not be made in the atmosphere of urgency that prevailed in 1950 and early 1951"*. (Underlining is mine.)[5]

---

[1] According to a note attached to the source text, Dulles asked O'Connor to discuss with Hickerson the advisability of raising the reimbursement question with the Department of Defense. This issue was treated in NSC 147 of Apr. 2 and discussed at the NSC meeting on Apr. 8. For a text of the relevant sections of the NSC paper, see paragraphs 179 and 180, pp. 853 and 857; for a report of the NSC meeting, see p. 892. According to another attached note, Lodge was to be reminded that if he quoted from classified material, he must classify his letters.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 649.

[3] For text, see *ibid.*, p. 666.

[4] Not printed. (795B.5/9-2752)

I would like to interpolate at this point that one of the same criticisms levelled at the previous Administration in 1952 was that it had indeed lost a sense of urgency about Korea.

The letter of September 27, 1952 continues: "Under present conditions there is no compelling reason for postponing discussions of financial considerations, and a failure on the part of the U.S. to be more specific concerning reimbursement for logistic support could be expected to be misunderstood."

Underlying all this verbiage is the clear inference that foreign troops for Korea will not be accepted unless the nation furnishing the manpower is also able to furnish the financial and logistic support. This may not always be spelled out with unequivocal clearness, but it is implied so clearly that it is the view of our position held by many foreign officials.

I had thought that it was generally agreed among Americans that the U.S., not having inexhaustible manpower resources, would be performing an act of statesmanship to provide military material to those countries which in turn would furnish their young manpower in a common cause. I had thought that the calling into service of young foreign soldiers who would help our young people bear the burden of the battle was not a price which could be calculated in dollars.

This attitude on the part of the Defense Department has greatly damaged the U.N., because criticism is directed at the United Nations on the grounds that the member nations have not produced manpower for Korea in proportion to population. The facts cited above indicate that one of the reasons for this is not that the member nations are slackers, but that the attitude of the Defense Department imposes logistic and financial obligations which they cannot meet. The attitude of the Defense Department not being known to the American public, the United Nations is blamed.

One of the major arguments made by General Eisenhower in 1952 and which received overwhelming public acclaim was that every practicable step should be taken so that our young men would not have to bear such an overwhelmingly large portion of the load of combat.

It is apparent that the Defense Department's policy, as cited here, as it has been in effect during the previous Administration, stands squarely in the way of obtaining the largest possible amount of young foreign manpower to help us in the struggle. I hope, therefore, that the Defense Department will change this policy so that all militarily effective young men will be welcomed whether they come from countries which can afford to finance them or not.

---

[5] Printed here as italics.

I hope that the "atmosphere of urgency" which the previous Administration thought had decreased will be revived in this instance.

I am giving a memorandum on this subject to Bobby Cutler at the White House.[6]

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.
Ambassador

---

[6] Lodge sent Cutler an identical letter on Feb. 23. Included with this letter was the following postscript in Lodge's writing: "I fear this is another case of 'ritualistic' military thinking! If you can be the instrument of Providence which develops foreign manpower to help our boys, future generations will arise and call you blessed!" (Eisenhower Library, White House Office records, "Project 'Clean Up' ")

Editorial Note

On February 25 the won settlement negotiations were ostensibly concluded. The total amount agreed upon was $85,800,000 in payment for all won drawings through February 6, 1953 ($82,800,000 for won drawings prior to December 16, 1952, and $3 million for drawings since that time up to February 6 at the rate of 18,000 won to the dollar). As of February 26, the Republic of Korea converted its currency from won to hwan. Beginning February 25, the United Nations Command bought hwan at the rate of 180 to the dollar, and under the terms of the agreement, the rate would be adjusted April 30 and every three months thereafter based upon changes in the Pusan wholesale price index. (Memorandum by McClurkin, February 25, 1953; 895B.131/2-2553)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Trials of the POWs

Mr. Matthews: I gather Clark has come in for broader authority to try prisoners. Our people have had a new look at the subject and are somewhat impressed by his arguments.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals Vandenberg and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense and Lay and Gleason the NSC. In all, 20 persons attended. The question of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma was also discussed.

Mr. Johnson: We have worked on a message with the Army, but I have not seen the draft. (The draft was circulated to the meeting and is attached as Annex A.)[2]

General Collins: Are the British likely to make difficulties?

Mr. Johnson: On a show-down, I doubt it. They have some lawyers in their army who are worried. I have urged the British to get straightened away by March 5.

Admiral Fechteler: The message is all right with me.

General Vandenberg: It is all right with me as far as it goes. We have come to a pretty pass when the Commander can't take action on riots.

General Collins: We have taken plenty of action. It is difficult, however, to determine the ring-leaders in order to try them.

General Vandenberg: What is the objection to court-martialing rioters?

General Collins: It has been an agreed State–Defense position for some time that the effect on our prisoners in Communist hands might be pretty bad.

Mr. Matthews: This message gives him all the authority he has asked for, does it not?

Mr. Johnson: He draws a distinction in his own message between individual acts of violence and riots. The thinking in the Army and in the State Department is that raking up the pre-Koje period would give the Communists a propaganda platform. We could amend the message to refer to past riots in the camp when we withhold authority.

General Vandenberg: I would concur with that. I think the riots in the camps now are serious.

Mr. Matthews: Let's put in the word "past".

General Lemnitzer: Wouldn't you have to change the first paragraph?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, you would.

General Collins: We ought to be clear that he has authority to prosecute further riots and past cases of violence.

Mr. Bohlen: Would he be going back to past cases of violence involving anti-communists before the prisoners were separated?

General Collins: Some of them are in that category.

Mr. Bohlen: Does he go back to the period before the prisoners were screened? In the past the guards perhaps were not adequate to protect the camps and you might run into the Geneva Convention which says the holding power would provide adequate protection. You might get a boomerang on it.

---

[2] The draft was not attached to the source text, but was transmitted in final form as telegram JCS 932476 to Clark, Feb. 27; for the text, see p. 801.

General Collins: This doesn't meet the question you raised, Chip, but it would meet Van's point.

General Vandenberg: How can we get Chip's point in?

General Collins: I think we had better do it in paragraph 3, or perhaps with another sentence at the end of paragraph 1, such as: "It is felt you should not go back to the period before segregation." Couldn't Johnny and the Army get together on the amendment? We don't want him to go back to the pre-Kojedo period so far as riots are concerned or before segregation in the case of individual acts of violence.

Mr. Bohlen: If you say "since segregation" you would not have to make the distinction between riots and acts of violence.

General Collins: I think we should spell it out. Is that all right with you Van?

General Vandenberg: Yes.

Movement of ROK Government to Seoul (A draft message was circulated and is attached as Annex B.)[3]

General Collins: This draft message has been worked out informally with the State Department.

Mr. Johnson: Paragraph 2 can be changed to read that the State Department "has" urged the action.

General Collins: The more specific things you throw on Clark and ask him to put the squeeze on Rhee without the clear support of the Government back home, the more you affect the relationship between Clark and Rhee. The old guy may blow up and make it difficult for Clark to do business with him on even more important problems.

Mr. Matthews: I think there is a lot in that, but the only thing that will be effective will be to scare him on military grounds.

Mr. Bohlen: Could you send General Taylor and Ambassador Briggs to see him? Taylor could give the military arguments as the man on the spot.

General Collins: We deliberately got the Field Commander out of this game.

Mr. Johnson: Taylor has just arrived.

General Collins: I think it would be bad to involve him.

General Vandenberg: I think Clark is going to have to do it.

Neutralization of Kaesong (A draft message was distributed and is attached as Annex C.)[4]

General Collins: I have made some changes in the proposed message which I will read.

---

[3] The draft was not attached to the source text. It was transmitted as telegram JCS 932503 to Clark, Feb. 27; for the text, see p. 802.

[4] The draft was not attached to the source text. It was transmitted as telegram JCS 932457 to Clark, Feb. 27, 1953; for the text, see *infra*.

On Part 1, our general feeling was that to make an announcement now that we were going to call off the Kaesong sanctuary in the middle of the UN General Assembly meeting was bad, but we have given him authority to act if necessary. We have simply withheld authority to make the statement at this time.

On Part 2, the problem has to do with notifying other nations. It occurred to me that photographs alone would not be very useful, and it would be better to get appropriate interpretative notations from the field indicating the location and nature of the military facilities. I would like to add that.

On Part 3, which deals with the text of the public statement in case he is attacked, the White House has suggested two deletions, and we agree with them.

General Cabell: We [*With*] respect to the photographs, don't we want to say "oblique" aerial photographs, so we won't appear to have violated the sanctuary ourselves?

General Collins: A good suggestion.

Mr. Johnson: We can label the photographs "oblique".

General Vandenberg: Why don't we get this thing wound up? Why do we withhold comment on Part 1?

Mr. Johnson: That came from your boys here, and I think they just had not had time for a full study. We could say comment on the statement is under consideration.

General Collins: It might well be that when you decide to make the announcement you would want to add something.

Mr. Johnson: I think that was the reason.

General Vandenberg: It is just one of those things that will take a long time to be cleared.

General Collins: It would have to be cleared at the time by the President anyway.

General Vandenberg: O.K. That sounds good enough to me. I withdraw my objection.

. . . .

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1953—3:54 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 932457. From JCS reur C 61283.[1]

---

[1] In this telegram, Feb. 19, 1953, Clark concurred with the views of the JCS as set forth in paragraph 2 of JCS 931311, Feb. 13, p. 776, and included a proposed letter announcing to the Communists his intention to remove the immunity of the Kaesong and Munsan-ni restricted areas, should that decision be made in Washington. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

1. Re part 1. Comment on statement withheld pending final dec to implement course of action outlined in para 2 of JCS 931311.[2]

2. Re part 2. To facilitate diplomatic consultation State has queried JCS re possibility obtaining pertinent oblique aerial photos of Kaesong area as documentation for charges of Commie buildup. If you have available oblique photos with appropriate interpretive notations indicating location of mil facilities that would be useful this purpose, request they be provided ASAP.

3. Re part 3. Statement approved subject to deletion first sentence para E and words "tolerated this military buildup and" in second sentence of same para.

---

[2] See footnote 1, above.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1953—4:28 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 932476. From JCS reur CX 61323.[1]

1. Authy granted you in JCS 931969 [2] extended to include authy bring to trial POWs charged with acts of violence against other POWs, taking place subsequent to POW segregation and relocation. You also authorized try POWs who foment or participate in riots or demonstrations which take place subsequent to receipt this msg. Authy re cases involving past riots or demonstrations continues to be withheld.

2. No objection ur proposal confer with ofcrs re nominations to comsn. State advised govts concerned in order assist obtaining full cooperation.

3. In view of extension authy granted herein careful consideration shld be given to order in which cases are brought trial. In order create more favorable polit atmosphere it has been suggested trials rotate among cases involving acts against UNC psnl, acts committed by Commies and acts committed by anti-Commies against fellow POWs. However, order of trials left to ur discretion.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 24, p. 793.

[2] Dated Feb. 20, p. 790.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1953—5:17 p. m.

JCS 932503. From JCS.

1. Reur CX 61225.[1] Practical steps that might be taken to forestall large scale move still under consideration. You will be advised of developments.

2. Reur C 61276.[2] State has urged govts and UN agencies concerned to support United States posn in matter.

3. Reur C 61318.[3] In view of Rhee's apparently strong determination move govt to Seoul, it doubtful that ltr either from Sec State or you would dissuade him from his intended course. View here is mil consideration involved must be presented Rhee in such strong terms that he recognizes that they outweigh his own polit considerations. Believe it more desirable and effective do this orally rather than writing. Accordingly, unless you have strong objection thereto, suggest you meet with Rhee and explain in strongest possible terms mil dangers and disadvantages of moving govt to Seoul and ur concern this regard. You may clearly indicate to him that ur views are view of United States Govt and that you are speaking under instructions. To reinforce ur posit State is asking Amb Briggs be prepared accompany you.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 14, p. 783.

[2] In this telegram to the JCS, dated Feb. 19, 1953, Clark requested support from the Department of State in convincing UN agencies and diplomatic missions in Korea to present a "common front" in opposing the move of the ROK Government back to Seoul. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[3] In this telegram to the JCS, dated Feb. 24, 1953, Clark urged that Dulles write to Rhee indicating strong support for UNC opposition to the ROK Government's move to Seoul. If it was decided that such a letter should not be written by the Secretary, Clark wished to be informed so that he could write to Rhee himself in a similar vein. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

695A.0024/3–253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

PUSAN, March 2, 1953—noon.

1092. Subject: Anti-Communist Korean POW's and Relevance Thereof to Psychological Warfare and to Development of Defector Program.

Please read immediately following message[1] in connection with my telegram sent Saturday night, February 28[2] to Secretary State through CIA channels in Seoul, in which I urged early consideration of POW project developed by our military authorities in Seoul and referred by them to Tokyo on February 27. I also refer to my telegram 792 of December 25 from Pusan,[3] discussing this general subject; although I have had no reply to telegram 792, word reaching me indirectly is that views expressed therein have merited consideration.

---

[1] *Infra.*

[2] Not printed.

Purpose of this and following telegram is to urge that now is time to take action to exploit non-Communist POW's, without which action defector program together with substantial part psychological war activities have been handicapped if not shackled.

If my information correct, groundwork and planning in Washington and on appropriate levels of High Command already well-advanced. Lacking are policy decisions rather than detailed plans, and once decisions taken, implementation should follow promptly.

In order obtain maximum capital from decision to release non-Communist Korean prisoners, believe announcement from highest possible source desirable.

BRIGGS

---

[3] *Ante*, p. 717.

695A.0024/3-253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PUSAN, March 2, 1953—noon.
PRIORITY

1093. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.[1] On August 8, 1952 shortly before his inauguration, President Rhee issued statement extending hand of friendship to ex-Communists in Korea. On that occasion Rhee said: "I have no animosity toward any one. Even my bitterest Communist enemy can become my good friend if he changes his views and turns toward cause of freedom of mankind".

When I reminded Rhee of this statement yesterday, he immediately connected it with today's POW issue declaring it is high time steps be taken to get anti-Communist prisoners out from behind barbed wire and back into productive life of country. He referred with emotion to recent petition signed in blood by more than 7,000 Nanking anti-Communist prisoners, and asked what could be done to help signers and also to take advantage of this "unique and wonderful opportunity". Rhee declared himself confident that vast majority of signers sincere and added that at time when Korea desperately needs every able-bodied man, there can no longer be any justification for continuing to treat anti-Communists "same as pro-Communist prisoners".

---

[1] *Supra.*

When I volunteered to look into situation, President expressed satisfaction and asked to be informed whenever I had any information to impart.

I believe Rhee would gladly go along with any practical procedure giving effect to release of anti-Communist North Koreans, including appropriate declaration at opportune moment. Rhee also stated that time presses and maximum benefit obtainable only if prompt action can be taken.

Briggs

695A.0024/3–453

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] March 4, 1953.

Subject: Representation to Eden Concerning U.K. Participation in Trials of POWs in Korea

General Clark has recently been authorized to hold trials, as provided under the Geneva Convention, of POWs in Korea for offenses involving attacks upon and murder of UN guards or other POWs as well as for fomenting or participating in riots and demonstrations. It has been the desire of General Clark as well as State and Defense that these trials have a multi-lateral UN character rather than be strictly a unilateral United States matter. To this end Clark has asked that the Commanders of the other UN contingents in Korea make available qualified personnel to serve with United States personnel on the military commissions holding such trials. The Legal Adviser's Office and the Legal Adviser of the Department of Defense consider the proposed procedures to be entirely consistent with our announced purpose of abiding by the spirit and principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.

The Department has supported General Clark by discussing the matter with representatives in Washington of the 15 nations concerned [2] and asked their cooperation in granting any necessary authorization to their Commanders in Korea to comply with the request of General Clark. None of the countries has expressed any objection except the United Kingdom.

During the past two weeks discussions have been proceeding with the U.K. Embassy here and all of the numerous requests for further information and details which the Embassy received from London have been promptly fulfilled. The U.K. Embassy has this afternoon confidentially informed us that Eden has received here a long message from London soliciting his views and apparently indicating an intent to put the matter before the British Cabinet for a decision. The tone of the message is said to be unfavorable to U.K. participation in these trials, the objections apparently being based upon a very technical legal interpretation of the letter of the 1949 Geneva Convention. This interpretation holds that the United States, acting on behalf of the UN, is the sole "detaining power" under the Geneva Convention and is therefore obliged to hold the trials under strictly United States procedures, any attempt to multilateralize the trials in order to give them a UN rather than a United States character being legally unjustifiable and undesirable from the policy standpoint of protecting U.K. troops captured by an enemy in any future conflict.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson.

[2] Johnson raised the subject at the weekly briefing of nations participating in the UN effort in Korea, held at Washington on Feb. 24, 1953; memorandum of conversation, not printed. (795.00/2–2453)

Whether or not Mr. Eden raises this question with you,[3] it is recommended that you briefly express to him the hope that the U.K. will find it possible to authorize its personnel to participate in the military commissions as presently envisaged by the United States.[4]

---

[3] The reference was to the discussions held among British Foreign Secretary Eden, Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler, Secretary Dulles, and Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Mar. 4–7, 1953. For more information on these talks, which were both political and financial in content, see volume VI.

[4] The following note was written on the source text in Dulles' handwriting: "Allison, I spoke to Eden who said he would follow up sympathetically. JFD."

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, [March 6, 1953].

In the talks on March 5 with Mr. Eden,[2] the Secretary of State outlined the general thinking of the United States with respect to the overall strategic situation in Asia. He stressed the unity of the whole front extending from Korea to Indo-China and pointed out the necessity of creating a threat of pressures in the center (mainland China) to the end that it would make it less likely that the Chinese Communists would send increased forces to help the Communist rebels in Indo-China or to send additional forces into Korea. Mr. Dulles stated, in response to a question from Mr. Eden, that the United States Government had not as yet made any decisions with respect to specific courses of action to be taken in the Far East but that it was studying the problem from all angles.

---

[1] A copy of this memorandum located in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 139, indicated that it was drafted by Allison and signed by the Secretary of State.

[2] This memorandum is a summary of a discussion between Dulles and Eden; for a more complete account, see volume VI.

With respect to Korea, Mr. Dulles stated that it had long been his personal opinion that it probably was neither wise nor feasible to try to hold the line of the Yalu. However, he did believe, and this had been confirmed to him by General Van Fleet, that there was a definite morale problem with the soldiers and people of the Republic of Korea. It would be difficult for them to continue to suffer great losses if they had no hope of creating an eventually economically and politically viable country. If the territory of the Republic of Korea could be increased so that it included territory up to the waist, that would mean some 85% of the population of Korea would be within Republic of Korea boundaries and the industrial complex above the 38th parallel would be part of the Republic's economy. This would make possible an economically viable country and a one-third shorter line at the waist, which would be easier for the South Koreans to defend. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he did not know what the military cost of such an operation would be and that it might be determined that this cost was excessive. This was a matter for the military. The Secretary emphasized that even an operation designed to push the line north of the waist might require, as an incident, air action in Manchuria. He did not wish to exclude this possibility.

Mr. Eden seemed to agree with the general lines taken by the Secretary but the only statement he made was that he hoped that before any major action was taken his government would be consulted. He said he did not necessarily want to impose a veto on any action but merely wanted to insure that the British not be taken by surprise.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 6, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Unilateral Action on the Release of Non-Repatriate POWs

General Bradley: We asked General White to talk to Clark about the *fait accompli* on the prisoners and Clark wired us that he would like to send a staff officer over, and one has just arrived this morning.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants." Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chiefs Generals Hull and Twining. Nitze headed the Department of State contingent. Nash represented the Department of Defense and Gleason the NSC. Colonel Arthur W. Kogstad made a presentation on behalf of General Clark. In all, 22 persons attended. Discussion also took place on matters relating to China and Spain.

(At this point General Bradley introduced Colonel Kogstad from General Clark's staff.)

These gentlemen all know what this matter is about and we have asked you to come to give us Clark's views.

Colonel Kogstad: At the present time the U.N. Command has about 132,000 POWs in custody. About 83,000 of these were classified as pro-communist as a result of the screening. The 83,000 would be repatriated; they are now settled at island camps on Kojedo and several other islands. Of the remaining 50,000, 35,000 are North Koreans who will not be repatriated. All of the North Koreans are on the Korean mainland in a scattering of camps. The last 15,000 are non-repatriate Chinese who are in camps on the south part of the Cheju Do (?) where there is also a camp of Chinese Communists.

When General White came over, General Clark had a plan drawn up which he had considered sending. General White read it. This plan has been worked on for several months. It began to get maximum attention after October 8, when the truce talks receded. I brought a short message describing the plan, which has been worked over by General Clark's staff and by him. I would like to read it:

> The United Nations Command had been holding in custody for over eighteen months 35,000 North Korean and 15,000 Chinese prisoners who, as the result of the screening, have been segregated and will forcibly resist return. I realize the disposition of the non-repatriated Chinese has political complications at the highest level. However, the release of the 35,000 North Koreans appears feasible and relative easy of accomplishment. In view of the stand of our Government on repatriation and the lack of communist interest in our proposals, retention of this group serves no useful purpose.
>
> The following is a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of releasing the North Korean anti-communist POWs:
>
> First the disadvantages: (1) The communists might develop a propaganda attack on our unilateral action as constituting a final break-off of negotiations. I do not believe this action would affect the course they are following.
>
> (2) There is the possibility of retaliation against UN POWs. This is a potential danger but we would retain many POWs in our hands and reprisals would be difficult for them to justify. They might claim they had released an equivalent percentage of their UN prisoners, but this possibility exists anyway. They have already admitted they have released 50,000 POWs which gives a propaganda basis for our action.
>
> (3) The release of North Korean prisoners and not the Chinese might be taken as showing that we are not firm with respect to the Chinese.
>
> (4) When the inmates of the pro-communist camps learn the Koreans are being released, some may claim they have also defected and we

might have to offer an asylum to prisoners in the 83,000 group whom we have reported as available for return. We should be able to keep the number to a minimum by screening. Also, there may be some in the North Korean non-repatriate group who are communist plants, and if released would join subversive elements, but the police system of the ROK is very effective. General Clark believes the ROK authorities could keep a close watch.

(5) Those of our allies who have not fully supported the principle of non-forcible repatriation might view this action with alarm.

The following are the advantages: (1) It would provide further evidence of the finality of the UNC position.

(2) The orderly and peaceful integration of North Koreans into the civilian population of South Korea would establish the propriety of the UNC position and might increase defections.

(3) The POW issue would be reduced to limits which, on the surface, it has had for many months. The communist negotiators have indicated the disposition of the Chinese is the primary sticking point and the release of the North Koreans might lay a foundation for some kind of settlement, either by release or by some agreed disposition.

(4) We would be relieved of the logistic burden and would save men and dollars. South Korea is willing to receive the North Korean non-repatriates. The ROK is aware that their absorption will add strength to the political stand that all of Korea should be under a single sovereignty.

General Clark goes on to say that in appraising the advisability of the action, he cannot evaluate its effect on other courses of action now being developed by the Government, but if we intend to abide by the principle of non-forcible repatriation, then he sees no obstacle to further developments. In implementing the release of the POWs he would follow in general the plan used for releasing 37,000 civilian internees. He would stress the voluntary nature of the procedure and the release covers only prisoners who have expressed a desire to be released in South Korea. The International Red Cross would be invited to witness the procedures, and reports would be made to Geneva.

In summary, General Clark believes that the proposal is feasible, that it gives an excellent publicity position and constitutes a saving, and will have no appreciable effect on the prospects for an armistice.

After the message I have just read was prepared, General Clark wanted to emphasize certain other things. His main concern in the release of POWs has been the fear of reprisals. He feels this proposed action won't make any change in that danger. He recognizes that this might set a dangerous precedent in future wars but he still favors the principle.

He feels, however, that the first step should be the release of North Korean non-repatriates because—

(1) They can be released locally.

(2) South Korea is willing to receive them.

(3) The ROK is unwilling to receive the non-repatriate Chinese.

(4) The Chinese prisoners present political implications.

(5) We can begin the release of North Koreans on the same basis as civilian internees.

(6) If the Chinese non-repatriates are to be released, there should be some appropriate destination for them, agreed to in advance. Otherwise, they would have to be held under military guard and subject to military discipline on Cheju Do.

General Clark's last thought is that in our press policy the public announcement should be worded so that it does not indicate what plans we have for the Chinese, so the communists might interpret it as part of a program which would include the Chinese eventually.

General Bradley: Thank you very much. That was a clear and fine presentation. The last part makes it clear that Clark thinks this should be done in two steps. A decision might be made to release all the POWs, including the Chinese, after arrangements had been completed to shift the Chinese some place. Would General Clark still think it should be done in two steps?

Colonel Kogstad: If the decision were made, sir, he might be prepared to do them both at once.

General Bradley: Releasing the North Koreans is the easiest thing to do, but it does not answer the question because you can't go to the bastards and offer an all-for-all exchange. So the question is whether he proposes doing it all in one step if the necessary arrangements are made for the Chinese.

Colonel Kogstad: I think he would still prefer two steps.

Mr. Allison: It would raise some political questions not to release the Chinese now. We would be asked whether we mean business on the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: I think an announcement that makes it clear you aren't disposing of the Chinese would put you in a position you would be unable to hold. You would have to take a position.

General Hull: I don't think you can leave it open, as Clark suggests.

Admiral Fechteler: So, before the release of the North Koreans you would have to have definite plans for the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: Exactly.

Mr. Johnson: I think so.

General Bradley: I don't think Clark's statement could leave it open.

Mr. Bohlen: If you could hold it, there would be practical advantages in doing it in two bites.

Mr. Nitze: I am not so sure you couldn't hold on to the Chinese.

Mr. Bohlen: You would have to make it clear your stand on the principle of non-repatriation was firm.

Mr. Johnson: You might call the North Koreans something else, as we did in the case of the civilian internees.

Mr. Bohlen: You might declassify the whole bunch from their status as POWs and then release the North Koreans first. The object is to be in a position to present the communists with an all-for-all list. What you do with them after reclassification is none of the communists' business.

Mr. Nitze: Would any of the Chinese change their minds about going back?

Colonel Kogstad: I think the 15,000 Chinese on Cheju Do are good nationalists.

Mr. Nitze: Do you think they would want to go to Formosa?

Colonel Kogstad: I can't answer that.

General Bradley: I think that is where the decision really comes. If he had to go to Formosa a POW might choose to go home.

Mr. Bohlen: The death of Stalin[2] may have changed this, when we had thought about this in the past we thought you might be able to safeguard yourself somewhat by going to Stalin and telling him that this was going to be done and that any reprisals against UN prisoners would be regarded as absolute proof there would be no armistice. At least you would make them think seriously about the problem. Now I don't know whether that angle would be useful or not.

General Bradley: There is a point not mentioned in this discussion so far. If you release the North Koreans and keep the Chinese for a second step, then the resolution in the UN to take over the disposition of the prisoners would be aimed at a small group and that would make it easier for the UN to assume responsibility and might result in the passage of the resolution.

Mr. Bohlen: It is difficult to know what some of the fellows up there would do. They probably would not want to take unilateral action to deal with these prisoners. The worst position for the U.S. would be to have no armistice, reprisals against our prisoners and everything else remaining in *status quo*. You would get quite a roar in this country.

Mr. Nitze: The danger of reprisals is much less on the first step than the second. Does General Clark have any views on this?

Colonel Kogstad: You would have a sampling when you released the North Koreans.

Mr. Nitze: That would not really raise the issue or give you much of an indication.

Mr. Bohlen: They have already admitted they have done the same thing with the South Koreans they captured.

Mr. Johnson: They tend to equate the Chinese with the non-Korean UN prisoners.

Mr. Bohlen: It would be hard to proceed further before we see what is going to happen in Moscow. At present it is a bad moment to put something like this into operation.

---

[2] Stalin died on Mar. 5, 1953.

Mr. Nitze: Even the first step?

Mr. Bohlen: Well, it is arguable. They will be concerned with unity and showing no sign of weakness in the immediate coming weeks. It is difficult to come to a firm conclusion.

Mr. Nitze: There is one possible counter-argument. In the month after the funeral I think they might be reluctant to take dangerous actions.

Mr. Bohlen: They would be cautious on military action but I am not so sure on reprisals.

Mr. Nitze: I see what you mean.

General Bradley: It is Paul's idea that if you are going to do it, you have less chance of reprisals now than later.

Mr. Nitze: I was just advancing another line of thought.

Mr. Bohlen: It's worth considering.

Mr. Johnson: We had not contemplated carrying this out until the General Assembly adjourns.

Mr. Nitze: When will that be?

Mr. Johnson: I think it will be earlier as the result of Stalin's death and Vishinsky's departure.

Mr. Nitze: Could we get from Clark an analysis on the Chinese similar to the one we have had this morning on North Koreans, on the assumption that we would take a position as to where to send the Chinese?

Colonel Kogstad: I don't think General Clark could be of much help on that.

General Bradley: Your Secretary will want to consider this problem.

Mr. Bohlen: Yes, the best thing is for us to discuss this with the Secretary and General Smith. I take it this is not a matter of days with Clark.

General Bradley: Colonel Kogstad, do you have authority to let us have copies of the message you read?

Colonel Kogstad: I was instructed to give you this copy.

General Bradley: Fine. Admiral Lalor will make the proper distribution.

Mr. Johnson: We will need only one copy.

General Bradley: The Army will need one and we will keep one here.

Mr. Nitze: We can return our copy.

Mr. Johnson: Colonel Kogstad, we appreciate your coming over.

Mr. Nitze: It has been very helpful to us.

Mr. Johnson: There are some operating problems I would like to explore with the Colonel while he is here.

General Bradley: You will be here a few days?

Colonel Kogstad: Yes sir, I'd like to be.

General Bradley: Well, we will arrange it and you can get together with Mr. Johnson and Colonel Matthews.

. . . .

795.02/3–753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PUSAN, March 7, 1953—noon.

1116. Pass Tokyo; repeated information Tokyo 292 CINCUNC Tokyo DIP 428. Please pass to JCS. Yesterday afternoon I accompanied General Clark to call on President Rhee with reference to latter's back to Seoul movement. General Taylor and Acting Prime Minister Paik also present. Clark explained our government's position, based on military considerations, which would render imprudent return by Korean Government to Seoul at this time. After listening to Clark's exposition, Rhee agreed that for the present government as such would not officially return to Seoul. He said certain key officials would set up shop in Seoul in order to transact business with him, but that their Ministries would stay in Pusan. Other Ministries (he mentioned Public Health, Agriculture and Education and one or two others) would remain in Pusan 100 percent.

President then bespoke General Clark's support for rehabilitation of three or four buildings (specifically including Banto), declaring that government could not afford to wait until end of war to start repairing buildings for use when government finally does move back. General Clark expressed sympathy with this point of view and it was left that Prime Minister and General Hamblen (new CINCUNC member of Combined Economic Board) would discuss such matters as what buildings and how repairs could be financed, matériel obtained, et cetera.

General Clark has seen this and concurs.

BRIGGS

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) to the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1953.

The following is a very brief report on the activities of the Committee to which I was appointed Chairman to arrange for the settlement by the Army for wons in Korea.[2]

Immediately after my appointment to the Committee the following representatives met.

Secretary Stevens—Army
General Collins—Army
Harold Stassen—MSA
Joseph Dodge—Budget
Robert Macy—Budget
Wilford J. McNeil—Defense
John M. Allison—State
Secretary Humphrey—Treasury

The result of that meeting is set forth in the attached memorandum, copy of which was sent to each member. Settlement was made by the Army as authorized except that it was all for cash, nothing in kind and the money has been paid.

There was some confusion about the appointment of an economic adviser. Some delay ensued, but Mr. Tasca has now been appointed for the job and will report to General Clark. It is suggested that we be very sure that Mr. Tasca's position and authority be very fully understood by every one concerned so that he will have the best opportunity to do a good job without confusion. This should also be cleared with Mr. P.H. Shinicky, Chairman, National Assembly Republic of Korea, in accordance with letter to the President dated January 30, 1953, copy sent to me with copy of memorandum to the Secretary of State on March 2, 1953.[3] Ambassador Lodge feels that there is some doubt as to just what Tasca's position with U.N. can be, but will advise further in that connection later.

G. M. HUMPHREY

---

[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the NSC for its information under a separate covering memorandum by Lay, Mar. 10, 1953.

[2] For the authorization to settle the problem of ROK currency advances to U.S. forces, see memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Feb. 11, item 5 on p. 771.

[3] Neither printed.

[Attachment]

Memorandum for the Members of the Interagency Committee for the Settlement of Republic of Korea Currency Advances to United States Forces

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1953.

It is my understanding that it was the consensus of opinion at the meeting this morning that General Clark's request should be granted, that he be permitted to effect the present settlement for $87,000,000 because he has gone so far with it that his situation might be seriously prejudiced by further delay and the imposition of new negotiations under new auspices. The settlement, however, was to be made upon the following conditions:

1. That henceforth the exchange rate would be 18,000 won to the dollar.
2. That this rate would be reviewed and revised on a suitable basis each thirty, sixty or ninety days, never longer than quarterly—preferably on a thirty-day basis.
3. That as much of the settlement as possible, subject to negotiations by General Clark, would be paid in kind of a kind most helpful to Korean economy.
4. That henceforth, and as soon as possible, economic affairs in Korea would be put in the hands of a new appointee who would be subordinate to and report to General Clark, and superior to everyone else in the economic field. He would be a representative of the President and given as much power as possible from each of the following: State, Defense, MSA, Treasury, and Budget, and would have full authority over such funds as might be designated by them respectively. He would be an officer of UN, with such authority as might be obtained over UNKRA funds.
5. Mr. Stassen will alert Mr. Tasca for the job, if he is agreeable to General Clark, with request that he go to Korea as soon as possible and report on the authority and program in detail that he would prefer. We will undertake to obtain all necessary authority as early as possible in accordance with his wishes.

Secretary Stevens and General Collins will communicate with General Clark and advise the Committee at the earliest possible time.

We will each investigate the formalities required to accomplish our respective undertakings.

Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson records

Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1953.

This morning I discussed with the President the attached memorandum of a talk I had with Senator Flanders [1] on March nineteenth.

The President was interested in what Senator Flanders had to say. He asked me to pass Senator Flanders' ideas to Emmet Hughes, who as you know is working on some speech material for him. He went on to extemporize as to whether it might not be best to extend the neutral zone idea throughout the whole world. Then he talked generally about building United Nations strength in order to deliver a massive blow and reach the waist of Korea—perhaps adding two American divisions (one Army and one Marine), building up to twenty ROK divisions, and getting a British brigade from Suez when that situation is settled.

He then asked me to request you to study what it would cost to conduct a successful campaign in Korea which would:

(1) Do the maximum damage to the Chinese forces, and
(2) Reach and hold firmly the waist line.

He wanted specifically to know whether this could be done without bombing the enemy's Manchurian airfields. He indicated that the use of atomic weapons in such a campaign should depend on military judgment as to the advantage of their use on military targets.

It is my understanding that in the NSC Planning Board's current study of Far Eastern policy papers, including a paper on Korea, the Planning Board will receive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff information along the very line requested by the President.[2] We now anticipate receiving this information by March twenty-fifth. It is our plan to present the Far Eastern policy papers, including Korea, at the April eighth Council Meeting. Therefore, I should think it would be sufficient if you make sure with General Bradley that the points which the President wishes covered will indeed be covered in the work now being brought to a conclusion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ROBERT CUTLER

---

[1] Senator Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont.

[2] The references were to NSC 147 and an attached estimate, dated Mar. 27, prepared by the JCS. For NSC 147, Apr. 2, see p. 838; the estimate is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series)

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters (Cutler)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1953.

Senator Flanders asked me to come to his office this afternoon and he talked to me for half an hour on his ideas about the Korean War.

Flanders has continuously believed and now believes:

(1) the U.S. cannot safely continue an indefinite military stalemate in Korea.
(2) the American people want to see the Korean War brought to a victorious end, even at a cost.
(3) the American people elected the Eisenhower Administration to do something about corruption, Korea, and taxes.
(4) the American people expect the Eisenhower Administration to take the initiative.

Flanders was most cordial and friendly. He has made many speeches on this subject. His last speech was in the Senate on March 6, 1953. He believes that the U.S. should take the initiative in making a peace offer either

(a) as a basis for obtaining a peace settlement from Communist China, or
(b) as necessary condition precedent to taking intensified military action in Korea, looking towards a victory by force.

Flanders believes that the main points of the U.S. proposal for settling the conflict by a *peace* (note—*not* a *truce*) should be:

(1) offer to Communist China a neutral zone along the Yalu River, to be inspected and administered by a commission made up wholly of Asiatic neutrals; and broadcast this to the Communist troops.
(2) offer to rebuild in usable form housing, transportation, and industries in North and South Korea.
(3) offer to hold free elections under UN auspices in the reunited country.

As Flanders says: "here is a project which is based on the well-being of people rather than the aggrandizement of power."

Flanders says he presented these views early last fall to the President and to Dulles and they both thought very well of them. Later, Dulles advised him that the plan would involve getting too many people to agree. He now has undertaken to mention it to me because he feels he is right and wants to advance his idea again.

Incidentally, he said that when he brought the idea up to President Truman and Secretary Acheson last year, their only reply was that the Russians don't understand anything but military force.

ROBERT CUTLER

P.S. Flanders feels that the difficult issue (repatriation of prisoners) which the Communists have used to stymie truce negotiations might have a better chance to get settled in a new and different setting—peace instead of truce.

State-JCS Meeting, lot 61 D 413

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 27, 1953—11:30 a. m.

. . . .

General Collins: In the new paper on alternative courses of action in Korea that we have just sent forward,[2] we had a section which indicated that consideration should be given to use of atomic weapons. Personally, I am very skeptical about the value of using atomic weapons tactically in Korea. The Communists are dug into positions in depth over a front of one hundred fifty miles, and they are very thoroughly dug in. Our tests last week proved that men can be very close to the explosion and not be hurt if they are well dug in. . . .

Mr. Nitze: The question of the use of atomic weapons in Korea was raised at length with us by the seven consultants.[3] They seem to have the attitude that we had gone to great expense to develop these weapons, we have tested them only in such tests as we could conduct ourselves, and we could certainly test them better under combat conditions. Their question was why should the State Department object to their use in Korea. We replied that there was no unshakeable policy barrier to use of atomic weapons, but the real question was whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. We had to assess whether or not atomic weapons could be effective under Korean conditions. If they were not effective, we would have to be concerned with the question as to whether this would not depreciate the value of our stockpile. We had to weigh the political difficulties with our allies, which would arise from employment of atomic weapons, and these difficulties would be magnified if the weapons were not in fact effective.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended. Nitze headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and Admiral Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 16 persons attended. China and Panama were also discussed at the meeting.

[2] Presumably the reference was to JCS estimate, "Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea", Mar. 27, 1953, not printed, which was Appendix "B" to NSC 147. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series)

[3] The reference was to an *ad hoc* committee of civilian consultants established on Feb. 25, 1953 to study and advise the NSC on basic national security policies and programs in relation to their costs. (NSC Action No. 726–*c*, S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95)

And the further question had to be considered as to whether the U.S.S.R. would not be faced with a decision and whether or not in that case they might not decide to retaliate in kind.

General Bradley: I think the consultants reflect the thinking of a lot of our people. Because of the casualties that will be involved in any stepped up ground action, we may find that we will be forced to use every type of weapon that we have.

General Vandenberg: I hope that if we do use them, we use them in Manchuria against the bases. They would be effective there.

General Collins: Before we use them we had better look to our air defense. Right now we present ideal targets for atomic weapons in Pusan and Inchon. An atomic weapon in Pusan harbor could do serious damage to our military position in Korea. We would again present an ideal target if we should undertake a major amphibious operation. An amphibious landing fleet would be a perfect target for an atomic weapon at the time when it was putting the troops ashore. On the other hand, the Commies, scattered over one hundred fifty miles of front, and well dug in, don't present nearly as profitable a target to us as we do to them.

. . . .

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED TOKYO, March 28, 1953—7:35 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 61670. Refs: A. JCS 931724.[1] B. CX 61281.[2] C. HNC 1600.[3] This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1. Text of ref C which contains reply to comm referred to in ref A and B is transmitted herewith for info.

"1. The folg ltr[4] was rec from the Communist Liaison Off at 1405 hours this date.

'Gen Mark W. Clark, CINC, UNC.

'We rec urltr dated February 22, 1953.

'Concerning the ques of repatriating with priority seriously sick and seriously injured POW of both sides, the del for armistice negotiations of both sides had, as a matter of fact, reached agreement, in accordance with humanitarian principles, on Para 53 of the draft Korean Armistice Agreement. It was solely because the Korean armistice negotiations were suspended that there was no way to impiement this agreed provision. In consequence, it has not been possible up to the present to repatriate seriously sick and seriously injured POW of both sides.

---

[1] Dated Feb. 18, p. 785.

[2] Dated Feb. 19, p. 788.

[3] Not printed; the substantive part of this telegram from CINCUNC (Adv) Korea was relayed in CX 61670.

[4] This letter was printed in the Department of State *Bulletin,* Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 494–495 along with a text of Clark's letter of Feb. 22, 1953, and a statement by Dulles.

'Since your side now expresses readiness to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention to sick and injured POW in the custody of both sides, our side, as an expression of the similar intent, fully agrees to your side's proposal to exchange sick and injured POW of both sides during the period of hostilities. This proposal should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. At the same time, we consider that the reasonable settlement of the ques of exchanging sick and injured POW of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire ques of POW, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing. Therefore our side proposes that the delegates for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the negotiations at Panmunjom. Furthermore, our liaison off is prepared to meet your liaison off to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the negotiations.

'Kim Il Sung, Supreme Com of the Korean Peoples Army, Peng Teh-Huai, Com of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers'.

"2. Not released to press here pending your further instr. Sgd Carlock"

Part 2. I plan to initiate nec action immediately in order to carry out the exchange of seriously sick and wounded POW. I consider that the Communist phraseology indicates that they are prepared to proceed with such an exchange independent of any resumption of negotiations at this time. My comments regarding resumption of negotiations will fol soonest.

Beyond doubt the Commies will broadcast their letter. As a result, we will have questions. Commie letter in full text is being released here referring it to my letter of Feb 22.

795.00/3-2853

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1953.

Subject: Communist Offer to Exchange Sick and Wounded

Participants: F. S. Tomlinson—Counselor, British Embassy
F. R. MacGinnis—Second Secretary, British Embassy
U. Alexis Johnson—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

---

[1] A marginal note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 4, 1953.

Mr. Tomlinson came in at his request and gave me to read a personal telegram from Foreign Secretary Eden, the substance of which read as follows:

. . . .

Mr. Tomlinson stated that this message apparently crossed the message which the Embassy had sent this morning after discussion over the telephone with me. That message had informed the Foreign Office of the general public position that we were taking and that Clark was immediately initiating necessary action to carry out the exchange of sick and wounded.

I gave to Mr. Tomlinson the text of the Secretary's statement of today's date on this subject [2] and Mr. Tomlinson agreed that the line we were taking appeared to be fully consistent with the last paragraph of Mr. Eden's message.

I stated that it seemed to me entirely too early to reach any decision on what our attitude should be toward resumption of negotiations. I pointed out the obscurity of the Communist letter as to whether they were linking the two questions. I said that if their purpose were merely to use the bait of exchange of sick and wounded to hook us to resuming negotiations without any further indication than we now have of any change of attitude on their part, I thought we should not be caught. If, on the other hand, they were quickly forthcoming on exchange of sick and wounded, it would put a somewhat different light on the resumption of negotiations. I said that as soon as the liaison officers had met regarding the exchange of sick and wounded, we should be obtaining some indication of what the Communist attitude was going to be. Therefore I did not think that we could or should now attempt to reach any firm decision on resumption of negotiations and that I would undertake to keep the Embassy informed of further developments. I pointed out to Mr. Tomlinson that we must guard against the Communists coming out with some purely symbolic offer of UNC sick and wounded in the background for the inclusion of the phrase "impartial verification" in our February 22 letter to the Communists.

Mr. Tomlinson asked that the Embassy be kept informed of any developments with regard to our decisions on resumption of negotiations. I replied that, as I had previously pointed out, I did not foresee that the decision was imminent over the weekend on this question but that I was sure that we would, as we have in the past, continue to keep them fully informed.

---

[2] Presumably the reference was to the Secretary's press release 159, dated Mar. 28, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, March 29, 1953—3:48 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 61673. Refs: A. CX 61670;[1] B. CX 61281;[2] C. JCS 921487;[3] this msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

a. On the assumption that the enemy will proceed with repatriation of seriously sick and wounded POWs independent of a resumption of negotiations, I propose to make the following reply to the Communists:

"General Kim Il Sung, Commander of the Korean People's Army.

"General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

"1. I hereby acknowledge with pleasure the rec of your ltr of 28 Mar 1953, in reply to my ltr of 22 Feb 1953, and understand that you are fully prepared to proceed immediately with the repatriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured pers on accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. Accordingly, I propose that a meeting of liaison groups headed by a Gen or Flag Off representative from each side be held at Pan Mun Jom, at your earliest covn, to make nec detailed arrangements for the exchange of these captured pers.

"2. In regard to your suggestion that the delegates of both sides resume meetings to settle the entire ques of Prisoners of War, it has been stated many times and I desire to reiterate that this has always been, and still is, the objective of the UNC, provided conditions for resuming negotiations are such as to offer a reasonable assurance of their success. In this connection I invite your attn to my ltr delivered on 20 Oct 1952. I find no indication in your ltr that you are prepd to adpt any of the UNC solutions to the POW ques, nor any constructive proposal by your side which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of delegation meetings. The United Nations psn, stated by the UNC Senior Del in his ltr of 16 Oct,[4] that the UNC Delegation was not terminating the negotiations but stood ready to meet with your delegation at any time that it is ready to adpt any one of the UNC proposals or to submit in writing a constructive proposal which would meet the reasonable reqmts of the UNC has not changed. Therefore, until one of the conditions set forth above has been met by you, I must regrettably decline your proposal that the Dels for Armistice Negotiations of both sides immediately resume negotiations.

---

[1] For the text of this telegram, which contained the Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai letter to Clark of Mar. 28, see p. 818.

[2] For the text of this telegram, which contained the Clark letter of Feb. 22, 1953 to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, see p. 788.

[3] This telegram contained the suggestions of the JCS for Clark's reply to a letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai of Oct. 16, 1952, not printed. (FE files, lot 55 D 128) For texts of the Communists' letter and Clark's reply, dated Oct. 20, 1952, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 10, 1952, pp. 752–754.

[4] For a text of this letter, see *ibid.*, p. 752.

"3. I rqst that you advise me ASAP of your decision on my proposal with regard to the time of meeting between the liaison groups of both sides to arrange for the repatriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured pers. Mark W. Clark, General, USA, CINCUNC."

Part 2.

a. My psn with regard to the resumption of negotiations is clearly set forth in the above proposed reply to the Communists, and is in consonance with para 2*b* of ref B. In the event that the Communists go along with the proposition of exchanging sick and wounded captured pers independent of a resumption of armistice negotiations, I propose to follow the principles set forth in para 2 of ref B, subj to such modifications as you may dir.

b. As I stated in ref A, the phraseology employed by the Communists indicates an intention to proceed with the exchange of seriously sick and wounded pers as an action distinct from the resumption of negotiations. However, it is my opinion that if the Communists insist [on?] a resumption of negotiations as a prerequisite to the exchange of seriously sick and wounded, their professed intention to proceed with the exchange is not sincere, but is merely calculated to obtain a resumption of negotiations. I therefore recm that no consideration be given to resuming negotiations under any such Communist-imposed condition.

c. Rqst you advise earliest as to acceptability of reply set forth in Part 1.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 29, 1953—7:50 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 935136. From JCS. Reur CX 61673.[2]

1. Your proposed reply to Communist Commanders is approved subject to following changes: Amend first sentence para 1 to read as follows: "I hereby acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of your letter of 28 March 1953, in reply to my letter of 22 February 1953, and understand that you are fully prepared in accordance with our proposal to proceed immediately with the repatriation of all seriously sick and

---

[1] The initial draft of this telegram, prepared by State and Army G–3, was concurred in by Army, Navy, and Air Force and by Bradley and Nash. Secretary Dulles discussed the draft with President Eisenhower, who approved certain changes. U. A. Johnson, who was present during the discussion, revised the draft to reflect the President's views. After Lemnitzer informed Bradley that the text was in accord with the President's views, the telegram was transmitted as telegram JCS 935136. (Memorandum from Stephens to Dwan, Apr. 1, 1953; JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–14–45)) For the message of concern to the President, see memorandum by Secretary Dulles to the President, Apr. 1, p. 833.

[2] *Supra.*

wounded captured personnel during the period of hostilities". Delete second paragraph and substitute following: "I share the hope you expressed that a conclusion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war during the period of hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly I will be prepared to instruct my liaison group as a second order of business to meet with your liaison group to arrange for a resumption of armistice negotiations by our respective delegations. We take it as implicit in your suggestion in this respect that you would be prepared to accept UN proposals or make some comparable constructive proposals of your own which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of Delegation meetings."

2. Amendments do not represent any change in substantive position set forth your draft. However, consider that your letter should proceed on public assumption that Communist letter implies willingness on their part to meet substantive UNC position if armistice negotiations are resumed, and place on them responsibility for either accepting that assumption or publicly stating that there is in fact no change in their position on repatriation all POWs.[3]

3. Re Part II para *a* your CX 61673:

Purpose of including "impartial verification" in your letter to Communists of 22 February [4] was to include in your proposal a safeguard against UNC being required to accept without recourse an unreasonably small number of UNC sick and wounded as constituting Communist implementation of UNC proposals. However, as Communists most unlikely to accept ICRC in this role behind their lines and suggestion of members of Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission also impracticable and of questionable desirability from our standpoint do not believe UNC should put forward any specific proposal in this regard pending indication from Communists of number UNC sick and wounded they are prepared exchange. Therefore, in event number to be returned by Communists appears reasonable you are authorized omit demand for verification. If, however, in your judgment number indicated by the Communists is unreasonable you should submit your comments and recommendations to the JCS as to some procedure for impartial verification.

4. Re Part II para *b* concur that prior resumption of armistice negotiations as a condition for exchange of sick and wounded is unacceptable.

---

[3] For the complete text of Clark's letter, sent Mar. 31, 1953, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 528.

[4] For text, see telegram CX 61281, Feb. 19, p. 788.

Editorial Note

On March 30, 1953, the New China News Agency broadcast a statement by Premier Chou En-lai which was also sent as a cablegram to Lester B. Pearson, President of the United Nations General Assembly, with a request that it be distributed to all member states, "except the so-called 'delegation' of the remnant Chinese Kuomintang clique." Chou En-lai, on behalf of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, proposed that negotiations should begin immediately on the exchange of sick and wounded and should then proceed to an overall settlement of the prisoner of war question. To this end, the Chinese Premier proposed "that both sides to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." For the complete text of this statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin,* April 13, 1953, pages 526–527.

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, 1951–59

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1953.

The Secretary telephoned with reference to the statement by Chou En-lai on Korea.[1] The Secretary said we think it is a little better than the Indian solution if we can get a really "neutral" party, the Indian required a committee of four, half of which was communist.

The President asked what we proposed to do, and the Secretary said we propose to do nothing, it was only a radio broadcast and while they have taken that way to speak to us in the past, the reply really should be addressed to Gen. Clark.

The President said that he had the papers on it and would see that they got to the staff.

---

[1] See the editorial note, *supra.*

695A.0024/3-3053

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 30, 1953.

Subject: Chou En-lai's proposal for turning POWs resisting repatriation over to a neutral State [2]

In connection with our consideration of this proposal, I think it interesting to recall that General Clark made a very similar suggestion in July, 1952. At that time he suggested that "upon signing the armistice the supervision, control, and responsibility for determination as to the ultimate disposition of all POWs of both sides who have not been previously repatriated or released would be passed to a group of neutral nations," both sides to abide by the decision of such group for disposition of non-repatriates.

Similar suggestions were also at various times informally considered within the Department and the Department of Defense but dismissed at the time because of the practical difficulties. However, some of these practical difficulties are, of course, lessened if there is agreement by both sides to such procedure. We are urgently working on all aspects of this matter and the foregoing is for background information only.

The full text of that portion of General Clark's telegram referred to is attached.[3]

---

[1] A marginal note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 4, 1953. It was drafted by Johnson.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 824.

[3] Attached to the source text was an excerpt (Part 2) of telegram CX 51489, Clark to JCS, July 7, 1952; for the complete text of the telegram, see p. 380.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 31, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

On Tuesday, March 31, 1953, the National Security Council met informally with the Civilian Consultants designated by NSC Action No. 726–*c*,[2] for the purpose of obtaining the reactions of the Civilian Consultants to the preliminary views of the Council members regarding basic national security policies and programs in relation to their costs, pursuant to NSC Action No. 730–*a*.[3]

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC Gleason on Apr. 7.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 817.

[3] At the 135th meeting of the NSC on Mar. 4, 1953, the Council, in NSC Action No. 730–*a*: "Agreed that the initial visit to Washington of the [Civilian] Consultants for this

Continued

Present at the meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director of Defense Mobilization; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Special Assistant to the President (for FCDA presentation only); the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Affairs; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC. The Civilian Consultants present were as follows: Messrs. Dillon Anderson, James B. Black, John Cowles, Eugene Holman, Deane W. Malott, David B. Robertson, and Charles A. Thomas.

[Here follow summaries of briefings by members of the Council and Consultants on the issues involved in reducing government expenditures consonant with national security.]

The President then spoke his mind on the Korean problem. If, he said, we decide to go up to the strength which will be necessary to achieve a sound tactical victory in Korea—for example, to get to the waist—the Russians will very quickly realize what we are doing. They would respond by increasing the Communist strength in Korea, and, as a result, we would be forced ultimately into a situation very close to general mobilization in order to get such a victory in Korea. General Bradley expressed agreement with the President's thesis.

The President then raised the question of the use of atomic weapons in the Korean war. Admittedly, he said, there were not many good tactical targets, but he felt it would be worth the cost if, through use of atomic weapons, we could (1) achieve a substantial victory over the Communist forces and (2) get to a line at the waist of Korea.

Secretary Dulles expressed the thought that it might now be possible to achieve an armistice in Korea on the basis that the previous Administration has sought in vain. Addressing his question to Mr. Robertson, Secretary Dulles asked if in the circumstances we should accept such an armistice.

Mr. Robertson avoided an explicit answer, but expressed the general belief of the group of Consultants that the American people would welcome an armistice on this basis.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Consultants if they were prepared to answer the question whether we should try for a massive victory in

---

subject [review of national security policies in relation to their costs] should be chiefly for briefing purposes, and they should be asked to return at a later date to give their reactions to the preliminary views of the Council members when more fully developed." (S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

Korea if it turned out that the Communists dragged out their current proposals for perhaps a period of three months and no real armistice was in prospect.

Mr. Robertson expressed the opinion that the American people would, under the circumstances, support an all-out effort in Korea.

[Here follows discussion of the Mutual Security Program and the view of the Consultants that it should be drastically cut. Other topics were raised and then Malott brought up the question of "public hysteria with respect to atomic weapons and the danger of atomic attack." For text of the memorandum of discussion at this meeting, see the compilation on national security policy in volume II.]

Mr. Malott argues that he nevertheless believed that we ought to use a couple of atomic weapons in Korea.

The President replied that perhaps we should, but we could not blind ourselves to the effects of such a move on our allies, which would be very serious since they feel that they will be the battleground in an atomic war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the President and Secretary Dulles were in complete agreement that somehow or other the tabu which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed. While Secretary Dulles admitted that in the present state of world opinion we could not use an A-bomb, we should make every effort now to dissipate this feeling, ...

[Here follow an informal presentation by Governor Stassen on cuts in MSA without prejudicing national security and the opinions of the other members of the Council and of the Civilian Consultants on Stassen's program.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON
Deputy Executive Secretary

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1953.

I did not see the final dispatch sent to Clark on Sunday evening.[1] However, I assume that it contained the statement that the entire process of exchanging sick and wounded was to be a completed fact before broader negotiations could be undertaken.

I think it important, also, that every responsible official in the Administration who may be called upon to speak a public word on this subject understand this particular point thoroughly.

D.D.E.

---

[1] The reference was to telegram JCS 935136 to Clark, Mar. 29, p. 822.

695A.0024/3-3153: Telegram

The Consul General in Hong Kong (Harrington) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL HONG KONG, March 31, 1953—9 p. m.

2579. Department pass London, Moscow; repeated London 227, Moscow 9. Chou En-lai proposal March 30 on repatriation of war prisoners appears on its face to be substantial concession. Whether there is catch to proposal can only be determined through resumed negotiations at Panmunjom. However, assuming Communist proposal is genuine concession, it may be useful to analyze their motives in making it only few months after flatly rejecting similar Indian proposal in UN.

There has been no discernible increase in internal pressures in China past few months. Politically, principal preoccupations are anti-bureaucratism campaign and preparations for elections. Former is being pushed methodically, not at usual frenetic pace of Chinese Communist campaigns, and does not reveal any critical weakness in political system. Preparation for elections shows Communists feel their control well enough established to be undisturbed by establishment of facade of democratic procedures. Directives on agricultural program published in *People's Daily* March 29 takes cautious approach to increasing number of agricultural cooperatives and indicates no early attempt at drastic social changes in countryside. Five year plan for industrialization probably could be considerably expanded if financial drain of Korean war were ended and particularly if armistice led to expansion of trade with Japan and Western countries. However, Chinese Communists could hardly have been less aware of this at time Indian proposal was rejected than they are today. Thus, it does not seem that dramatic apparent about-face on prisoner issue could have resulted from sharp increase in internal difficulties.

More likely to have influenced Chinese Communists are evidences stronger US policy in Far East, such as deneutralization Formosa, speed-up in formation of Asian armies, joint warning to Communists on Indochina, and tightened economic control, as well as threat of offensive in Korea and eventual rearmament of Japan with US aid. Attention paid to these matters in Chinese Communist propaganda in recent weeks indicates their concern. However, it is unlikely that such threats, disturbing though they doubtless are, could in themselves have compelled Communist leaders to alter their adamant stand on repatriation.

It seems most likely that decision reached in Moscow during Chou En-lai's visit there [2] and that it may be element in Soviet "peace offensive" designed to reduce world tensions and lower guard of Western powers during critical period of consolidation Communist bloc following Stalin's death. It is reasonable to suppose that steady economic drain of Korean war and its increasingly unprofitable character, plus prospect of greater future difficulties resulting from variety of US actions, caused Chinese Communists to make heavy demands for assistance from Russians if war was to continue at same time they were trying to carry out five year industrialization program. Faced by Chinese Communist demands and delicate situation following Stalin's death, Soviet leaders may feel disadvantages of continuation Korean war now outweigh advantages and it is better to accept tactical defeat on prisoner issue than uncertainties of prolonged war.

---

[1] Julian F. Harrington, also Minister at Hong Kong and Consul General in Macao.

[2] Chou En-lai headed the official Chinese Delegation to Stalin's funeral.

HARRINGTON

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1953—9:36 p. m.

JCS 935344. From JCS. Following is preliminary thinking here with regard to problems raised by Chou En-lai's statement reported Peiping radio March 30, and now formally submitted to President UNGA.

1. It is not clear whether attempt to negotiate on basis of proposals will be made in UN or Panmunjom. From our standpoint negotiations at Panmunjom much more desirable and likely to be productive if Communists are acting in good faith.

2. It would be desirable to place on Communists burden of putting forward as detailed a plan as possible prior to Delegations entering into any negotiations thereon. In order to accomplish this purpose as well as to encourage negotiations at Panmunjom rather than the UN, consider it desirable that at an initial or early meeting on exchange of sick and wounded, UNC should make reference to Chou En-lai's message to President UNGA stating that the UNC would be pleased to receive at as early a date as possible detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be studied while arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded are being completed. UNC should avoid making any commitment with regard to acceptance of the principle of the Chou En-lai proposal or the undertaking of its discussion by the Delegation, stating that it would like to have a clearer idea of what the Communists have in mind.[2]

---

[1] This telegram was drafted in the Department of State and cleared by Army, Navy, and Air Force and by H. P. Smith for Nash. Secretary Dulles approved the draft and expressed the view that it need not be referred to the President. Lemnitzer then cleared the draft with Bradley, who directed that it be transmitted as a JCS telegram. (Memorandum from Dwan to Steers, Apr. 1, 1953; JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

[2] According to telegram DA 935413 to Clark, Apr. 1, 1953, which clarified this telegram from the JCS, Clark was authorized to act on paragraph 2 at his discretion. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

3. If Communists show good faith in reaching and beginning to implement an agreement on exchange during hostilities of the seriously sick and wounded, and if any detailed statement from them on implementation of Chou En-lai's proposal also indicates good faith we would have no objection to proceeding immediately thereafter to discussions of Chou En-lai's proposal while agreement on sick and wounded was being implemented.[3] If Communists do not show good faith in reaching and beginning implementation of an agreement on exchange of sick and wounded we would, of course, have to reconsider whole question.

4. Do not believe that we should permit question of whether meeting to arrange repatriation of seriously sick and wounded is to be termed meeting of liaison groups or of Delegations to be built up to a serious issue, particularly if during course of preliminary discussions it appears Communists intend to discuss Chou En-lai proposal.

5. When discussion of Chou En-lai proposal undertaken believe tactics should be such as to place on Communists burden of putting forward a detailed and practical plan acceptable to UNC. Perhaps Chou En-lai proposal could best be developed along lines suggested in paragraph 3*b*, Part II your CX 51489, 7 July 1952,[4] except that it would be desirable to avoid any commitment not to permit Chinese POWs ultimately to proceed to Nationalist China.

6. For your information and comment:

It appears here that among the specific questions raised by the Chou En-lai proposal which must be resolved before a decision can be reached on the proposal are:

a. What is the "neutral state" contemplated by the Communist proposal?

Comment: A Soviet satellite, of course, is entirely unacceptable; if custody is to be taken within Korea, a state such as Sweden or Switzerland would be most desirable from our standpoint.

b. Are prisoners to be physically transported to such a state or is the state to take custody of the prisoners within Korea, or perhaps in the demilitarized zone, i.e., what is meant by "hand over" within the Chou En-lai proposal?

Comment: Physically moving prisoners from Korea to any other country clearly presents serious problems of varying degrees of seriousness dependent upon the country to which prisoners are to be moved. While we have never dismissed this possibility in its entirety, it would be difficult to accept any solution other than a "hand over" in Korea, either in present locations, in small groups in the demilitarized zone, or alternatively setting aside an island or other such area.

---

[3] According to telegram DA 935413, this suggestion to proceed to negotiate on the Chou En-lai proposal while the exchange of sick and wounded was being implemented was for Clark's comments only; no action or public statement to that effect was to be made unless otherwise instructed.

[4] *Ante*, p. 380.

c. If the prisoners are physically to be moved to a "neutral state", how is this to be done without the use of force; who will provide shipping, financing, food, camps, etc?

d. One paragraph of the Chou En-lai proposal speaks of "both parties . . .[5] to hand over the remaining POW's to a neutral state", and the following paragraph of "those captured personnel of our side . . . be handed over to a neutral state". Does this distinction imply that the Communists are prepared to return all UNC prisoners so that the provisions concerning the neutral state would in effect apply only to UNC held prisoners?

e. Is any distinction to be made between the handling of Korean and Chinese repatriates? Transporting Koreans from Korea to a "neutral state" is clearly absurd. Their prompt release in Korea would be the preferable solution, with only the Chinese being subject to whatever arrangements are agreed upon.

f. What is contemplated by the proposal for "explanations by the parties concerned"?

g. What will be terms of reference for the neutral state in determining the ultimate disposition of personnel turned over to it, i.e., will the neutral state itself determine after such "explanations" whether or not prisoner still persists in his refusal to be repatriated, and if so what disposition shall it make of him? In other words, what is a "just solution" to the question of repatriation?

---

[5] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

795.00/4-153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson—British Embassy
U. Alexis Johnson—State Department

Mr. Tomlinson called today with an instruction from the Foreign Office to the effect that Mr. Eden agreed that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war should be "the first item on the agenda" and that resumption of armistice negotiations "a second order of business." However, the instruction went on to state that Mr. Eden did not think "that we should at this stage insist rigidly on a conclusion of the exchange before resumption of the main negotiations. We should retain flexibility so as to exploit developments to our best advantage."

I told Mr. Tomlinson that I thought General Clark's letter[1] made it clear that we consider Communist performance on the exchange of sick and wounded as an important test of Communist good faith and that it was, of course, not yet possible to reach any decision as to the exact timing on entering into broader negotiations.

---

[1] For text, see CX 61281, Feb. 19, p. 788.

The instruction went on to the effect that on the assumption (yet to be proved) that progress towards an armistice is possible, there will be difficulties over the selection of a neutral power, and that thought should now be given to this. The UK would not consider any member of the Communist bloc acceptable for this purpose, but that it seemed to the UK that India is "obviously the most suitable although she may not relish the responsibility." Eden stated that if the State Department agreed to "taking soundings now in New Delhi" with a view to making sure that India will "volunteer." [*sic*]

I told Mr. Tomlinson that on the assumption that the "neutral" was to take custody of prisoners within Korea, which it seemed to us to be the only really practical plan, it was our preliminary feeling that some country such as Switzerland or Sweden would be much preferable to India. In reply to his query I stated that we were, of course, not dismissing the possibility of India but that we would not be happy over such a choice as India, as India all too often seemed to consider it necessary to be "more neutral" towards the Chinese Communists than towards the UN. I said that it was our preliminary thinking that the burden should be placed on the Communist of amplifying and detailing what is now a bare skeleton of a proposal rather than our attempting to develop it for them. I, therefore, feel that any approach to India at this time would not be desirable. Tomlinson said that he would report this to the Foreign Office. I went on to state that we would authorize Clark to have the Liaison Officers at Panmunjom at their first or an early meeting with the Communist on the subject of exchange of sick and wounded make reference to the Chou En-lai message to the President of UNGA and to state that UNC would be glad to receive a detailed statement from the Communist on suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be under study by the UNC while the exchange of sick and wounded was being discussed and carried out. I said that the Liaison Officers would simply make this offer to receive such a statement and carefully avoid entering into any discussion of the proposal. Mr. Tomlinson said that this seemed to him to be a most excellent approach.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that I assumed that the UK was in full agreement with us that discussions should be carried on only at Panmunjom and kept out of the UN. He said that while he had no instruction on the subject, he hoped this was the case.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1953.

The final despatch to Clark which we sent on Sunday [1] and which is contained in his communication to the Communists contained the following language:

> "I share the hope you expressed that a conclusion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war during the period of hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly I will be prepared to instruct my liaison group as a second order of business to meet with your liaison group for a resumption of armistice negotiations by our respective delegations. We take it as implicit in your suggestion in this respect that you would be prepared to accept UNC proposals or make some comparable constructive proposal of your own which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of Delegation meetings."

I note that you say you did not see the cable,[2] but I think that you will find that it was sent to your office by the JCS in accordance with what I understand is the normal procedure in the case of an important cable sent through this agency.

I have given word of your position to Cabot Lodge who is the only person whom I can think of who might be apt to speak publicly on this subject.

In view of the mounting pressure at the UN for a quick response on the general armistice matter, we may have to give our present position some further thought, in the meantime avoiding any public statement which would indicate inflexibility. In this connection I mention a cable from Eden [3] just in which on this point says:

> "I do not, however, think we should at this stage insist rigidly on conclusion of exchange [of sick and wounded prisoners of war] [4] before resumption of main negotiations. We should retain flexibility so as to exploit developments to our best advantage".

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

---

[1] Telegram JCS 935136 to Clark, Mar. 29, p. 822.

[2] Reference was to a memorandum from the President to Secretary Dulles, Mar. 31, p. 827.

[3] For the report on the contents of this cable, see memorandum of conversation by Johnson, *supra.*

[4] Brackets in the source text.

695A.0024/4-253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 2, 1953—7:08 p. m.

618. Part I.

For your information only, following is preliminary thinking here with regard to problems raised by Chou En-lai's proposal now formally submitted to President UNGA and to UNC at Panmunjom.

From our standpoint if negotiations are to be resumed Panmunjom much more desirable than UN. Increasing pressures for discussion Chou En-lai's proposal in UNGA can best be withstood if negotiations at Panmunjom underway or imminent.

Before decision can be reached on resuming armistice negotiations, Communists must show good faith in reaching and implementing agreement on exchange seriously sick and wounded. We will not agree to prior resumption armistice negotiations as condition for exchange sick and wounded. However, Clark has been authorized at first or early meeting on sick and wounded to have UNC liaison officers invite Communist statement their detailed suggestions on implementation Chou En-lai's proposal so that it could be studied while sick and wounded exchange being worked out. Believe burden should be placed on Communists to put forward detailed workable plan acceptable UNC.

Government presently studying the numerous specific questions raised by Chou En-lai proposal before decision even in principle can be reached thereon. Without precluding other solutions, from our standpoint, most desirable solution would be a formula which would permit prompt release of Korean non-repatriates in the ROK and "hand over" of Chinese non-repatriates in their present location to a "neutral state" such as Sweden or Switzerland with terms of reference which would permit those determined by the "neutral state" to be genuinely opposed to repatriation to proceed within a reasonable period of time to any destination available to them.

Part II.

If President Rhee at his initiative raises concern ROK Government recent armistice developments you may at your discretion reply to him that US Government has been carefully studying developments and that UNC presently proceeding along lines of Clark's March 31 letter [2] to Communists. US and UNC proceeding with utmost caution. It too early to assess Communist intentions.

You may wish state that regardless of developments US will continue have strong interest in ROK security. You may again refer to Greater Sanctions statement brought to Rhee's attention February 22, 1952.[3]

---

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Young and Johnson, was repeated to Tokyo by pouch.

[2] See telegrams CX 61673 and JCS 935136, pp. 821 and 822.

[3] For the text of the statement, see telegram JCS 91602 to Clark, Jan. 10, 1952, p. 14.

Department will keep you informed developments. If conversation takes place with Rhee please inform Department immediately.

DULLES

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1953.

Reference: Your memorandum of April first giving me the text of Clark's note to the Communists and of Eden's telegram to you.[1]

I am quite prepared to discuss further with you our position in the matter. I had assumed—possibly erroneously—that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners could be accomplished with reasonable celerity. Moreover, C. D. Jackson was insistent that unless this business was an accomplished fact *before* we actually began negotiations on the wider issue, we would encounter the same kind of frustrations that have always characterized our negotiations with the Soviets. This frustration has arisen from the fact that their practice has been to accomplish nothing until every last atom of their own contentions, sometimes in totally unrelated fields, were accepted.

As I understand it, you and I both believe we should take a lesson from these past experiences and before opening up again the long dreary process of negotiations that could easily repeat the whole history of the past year and a half, we should use this business of the sick and wounded as a sort of test of good faith on the part of the Soviets.

I do not believe that we want to put out any public statement in just this way, but if we should, after re-study, adhere to our convictions in this point, it might be well for the State Department to put out a statement in which is the clear assumption that, of course, the exchange of sick and wounded will be an accomplished fact as a preliminary to the broader negotiations.

This matter has some urgency because I am to have a press conference this afternoon. I am rushing it over to you right away, and after you have read this I hope you will give me a ring so as to determine whether or not I should answer any questions whatsoever on this subject, or whether it would be wiser for me to remain completely silent.[2]

[Here follows a brief suggestion by Eisenhower on facilitating the United States decision on the power development aspect of the St. Lawrence Seaway.]

D.D.E.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 833.

[2] For the text of the President's news conference of Apr. 2, 1953, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 147–160.

320/4–253: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, April 2, 1953—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

Delga 523. Re Korea. Menon called on me this morning and said he felt UN should not pay less attention to "outbreak of peace" than to outbreak of war. He felt function of UN was not exclusively to take action against aggressor, but should also include assistance in making peace where possible. He said he had no thought in his mind of transferring negotiations from Panmunjom to New York. Without detracting in any way from responsibility of UNC and necessity for command decisions to be taken by UNC, he said he thought it would be a bad thing to have Korea appear as just an American show. He also thought it was not in keeping with the dignity and prestige of the UN to ignore the Chou En-lai overtures.

He said that he did not think Vishinsky would make trouble for us because whatever Russian motives and objectives might be, it is apparent their policy has changed and they now want to "make peace".

On role of India he said he thought we should not allow an impression to exist that US wanted to wage war (or peace) one way and Soviet Union another while India stood for peace. He said he thought attitude should be all of us are for peace.

Coming down to particulars, Menon has urged Pearson to transmit Chou En-lai's communication to Chairman of First Committee. Menon clearly wants to take floor at outset of First Committee meeting Tuesday morning[1] presumably to make remarks along foregoing lines. Menon urged strongly that I present at same time some kind of report from General Clark on status of situation and express US Government views with regard thereto. I agreed to meet with him 10 a.m. Tuesday morning at UN Headquarters; it may be preferable for me to communicate our views to him Monday afternoon.

Muniz telephoned Ross this morning and said that some notice should be taken on phase of Korean developments. He has in mind a procedural resolution which would: (*a*) Take note of Chou En-lai's declaration and (*b*) express the hope of the GA that it would finally be possible to conclude an armistice. Muniz felt that something of this sort is essential (*a*) to establish the continuity (link) of UN interest in Korean developments and (*b*) to avoid something worse. He has in mind adoption of such resolution would help avoid discussion of POW and armistice negotiations as well as bright ideas Menon or others might get.

---

[1] Apr. 7.

Muniz is very anxious not to take any steps which would foul our lines. If we approve of foregoing idea he has in mind organizing small group of sponsors including some of his LA colleagues.

Muniz will give us later today text of type of resolution he would suggest.[2]

While close coordination with Muniz, British and others is essential, I have in mind it would be good idea unless some objection is perceived to suggest to Menon that he introduce resolution expressing hope that exchange of sick and wounded will soon be an accomplished fact.

LODGE

---

[2] This text was transmitted to the Department of State in Delga 525, Apr. 2, 1953, not printed. (320/4–253)

320/4–253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 2, 1953—6:58 p. m.

Gadel 131. Re Korea.

1. Department recognizes that Menon and perhaps other dels are encouraged by Chou En-lai statement March 30 and may wish to discuss Korea and propose GA action. We recognize also that US must avoid posture which might be interpreted as evidence US does not in fact desire armistice. Nevertheless Department continues to believe as stated Gadel 129,[2] GA consideration of detailed Korean proposals highly undesirable since GA cannot substitute itself for Panmunjom negotiations. Even if Menon cannot be dissuaded from making speech, hope most delegations can be persuaded that GA action of extended discussion premature.

2. In discussions with other delegations, and if you deem necessary in statement Committee, I suggest you take following line:

a) USG, as always eager to see peace in Korea on honorable basis. American people share hope that recent Commie statements, particularly Chou En-lai statement of March 30, offer hope that honorable peace in Korea can be achieved. Chou En-lai statement is in general terms. If ChiComs mean business they will presumably follow up statement with specific and detailed proposal, at Panmunjom.

b) ChiComs have indicated that exchange sick and wounded should lead to settlement entire PW question. General Clark similarly stated that UNC prepared to consider overall PW question as second order of business following disposition sick and wounded. Liaison officers meeting for first time on question sick and wounded April 6. In circumstances we believe it highly undesirable for GA to involve itself in delicate negotiations with any resolution or extended discussion. If as US hopes, Commies not prepared to negotiate in good faith armistice should result in near future.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Henkin and cleared by Johnson and Hickerson.

[2] Not printed. (320/3–3153)

3. If despite US Delegation efforts, overwhelming pressure builds up for some kind of resolution, GADel might accept simple resolution which would (*a*) note latest correspondence between UNC and Communists; (*b*) express satisfaction with steps being taken for prompt exchange sick and wounded in accordance Geneva Convention, and express the hope that such exchange will be promptly effected; (*c*) express hope that these developments will lead to early armistice consistent with UN objectives and reaffirm decision in resolution 507 (VI) for SYG to convene special GA session after armistice conclusion. Such resolution may also prove necessary to meet possible superficially appealing Soviet initiative. Such action could be taken under Polish item without reopening Korean item.

4. Department would like GADel appraisal of situation and views soonest.

DULLES

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET
NSC 147

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1953.

ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

References:
A. NSC 118/2 [1]
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea", dated March 30, 1953 [2]
C. NIE–80 [3]
D. SE–41 [4]

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by Reference B,[5] is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on April 8.[6] A Financial Appendix, which will cost the alternative courses of action, will be circulated separately for Council information.[7]

---

[1] For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

[2] This memorandum, not printed, transmitted the JCS estimate of Mar. 27 to the NSC which referred it to the Planning Board. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)

[3] Dated Apr. 3, p. 865.

[4] Dated Apr. 8, p. 886.

[5] The estimate prepared by the JCS was attached to the source text, but is not printed here.

[6] For a report of the discussion at this meeting as it related to Korea, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

This report does not take into consideration the March 30 radio declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities proposing resumption of armistice negotiations, or subsequent developments, since evaluation is not yet available.

The problem of reimbursement for U.S. logistical support of UN forces participating in the war in Korea, to which reference was made in the footnote on page 7 of NSC 144/1 on Latin America,[8] is discussed in paragraphs 168–180 of the enclosed report.

The NSC Planning Board[9] recommends that the Council determine the course of action the U.S. should pursue in Korea, and that it direct the Planning Board to prepare a report, based upon this determination, on U.S. objectives and courses of action in Korea to supersede NSC 118/2.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be restricted on an absolute need-to-know basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

Report by the NSC Planning Board

NSC 147

ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA[10]

Excluding resort to global war, or complete withdrawal from Korea, or yielding to the communist position on prisoners of war in the armistice negotiations, there appear to be two major alternative courses of action open to the United States in Korea. The first alternative maintains the current restrictions on military operations, the second removes these restrictions. Under each major alternative there are analyzed three possible specific courses of action, listed below in order of increasing severity.

---

[7] A chart summarizing this paper and giving an estimate in billions for the years 1954 and 1955 was attached to the source text; it was the financial appendix under reference and is printed on pp. 854–856.

[8] The reference was to the footnote in paragraph 18*d*, of NSC 144/1, Mar. 18, 1953; for text, see vol. IV, p. 6.

[9] In March 1953, the National Security Council's Senior Staff, hitherto the principal NSC unit for the formulation and transmission of policy recommendations to the Council, was reorganized as the NSC Planning Board. The Board retained the basic functions of the Senior Staff, but its personnel underwent certain changes. It was chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and its membership was comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. For additional information on the organizational structure of the NSC, see the compilation on national security policy in volume II.

[10] The following marginal note appeared on the source text presumably for the benefit of Dulles: "It is suggested that you read the material outlined in red." The next seven paragraphs were outlined in red.

Alternative I: Maintain Current Restrictions on Military Operations Against Manchuria and Communist China

Course A—Continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea.

Course B—Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the United States.

Course C—Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Alternative II: Remove Current Restrictions on Military Operations Against Manchuria and Communist China

Course D—Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E—Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist, and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F—Undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-communist Korea.

[Enclosure]

NSC Staff Study

ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA [11]

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Current Policy with Respect to Korea

1. Current national policy with respect to Korea is contained in NSC 118/2, approved December 20, 1951. [Here follows a five-paragraph summary of NSC 118/2.]

6. Although a satisfactory armistice has, of course, not been achieved, no determination has been made that armistice negotiations have failed or have been deliberately delayed; hence the courses of action provided for these contingencies—comprising stepped up military operations and increased political and economic pressures against Communist China—have not been put into effect.

Need for Review of Current Policy

7. The lapse of time (more than 15 months) since the approval of NSC 118/2, the history of the armistice negotiations, and the increase in Communist military capabilities in Korea all clearly indicate the need for a review of United States courses of action in Korea. Other considerations which make such a review inoperative include the improvement in the capabilities of ROK forces, some loss in the effectiveness of U.S. forces resulting from rotation and stalemate, the death of Stalin and transfer of power to Malenkov, further study of sea-borne commerce with Communist China, developments in atomic weapons, developments in the attitudes of our allies and in American public opinion, and the change in national administration in the United States.

Armistice Negotiations

8. Negotiations for an armistice were undertaken in June, 1951 and agreement has been reached on all major points except the question of non-forcible repatriation. A draft incorporating the agreed provisions of the armistice consisting of some 63 articles has been preliminarily approved by both sides. There is attached hereto (Appendix A) [12] a summary of the agreed provisions.

9. Discussions of the prisoner of war question were undertaken in December, 1951 and continued until October, 1952. It clearly demonstrated that under present conditions further search for a formula, agreeable to the Communists and ourselves, for the disposition of those

---

[11] At this point the following note appeared in the source text: "This staff study does not take into consideration the March 30 radio declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities proposing resumption of armistice negotiations, or subsequent developments, since evaluation is not yet available."

[12] This appendix was not attached to the source text and is not printed.

Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command opposed to repatriation is hopeless. The Communist rejection of the Indian resolution in the General Assembly, which was supported by virtually all non-Soviet bloc UN members, indicated that the Communists have been willing to face the maximum of free world political pressure rather than recede from their position on the prisoner of war issue. Whatever the Communist basic attitude towards an armistice may be, the ability of the Communists to supply and reinforce their troop strength in Korea has unquestionably reinforced their unwillingness to concede in the POW question what is possibly to them an important matter of principle and prestige striking at the roots of their system. They may well consider that agreement to any form of non-forcible repatriation so admits to the right of individual self-determination as to endanger maintenance of their concept of relations between the individual and the state. It also directly involves the question of mass defections from their armed forces in any future conflict, a matter upon which they are undoubtedly very sensitive. It is a problem in which the ideological conflict between the free and Soviet worlds is finding a focus.

10. It is out of the question for the United States to consider any abandonment of the principle of non-forcible repatriation. This position has been strongly and publicly set forth in categorical terms by this Government and has received the overwhelming support of virtually every non-Soviet bloc member of the United Nations. As set forth in the preceding paragraph, it has implications for the struggle between the free and the Soviet worlds far transcending the importance of the individuals involved. Apart from problems that would arise from the spectacle of United States forces using force against very large numbers of prisoners violently resisting return to the Communists, any abandonment of principle in this regard would in the present context constitute appeasement of the most serious sort. As the prisoners have now been screened and thus declared their attitude towards the Communists, to return those opposing repatriation would be the grossest betrayal of trust and would undoubtedly subject them to most severe reprisals. It might well also lead the Soviets to the conclusion that our desire for an armistice was so strong that they could up their price in other regards and we would find ourselves facing increasing demands from the Soviets as the cost of an armistice.

11. The course of the armistice negotiations, up to reaching the POW question, in general, indicated a tough bargaining attitude on the part of the Communists and no great sense of urgency to obtain an armistice, but could not be interpreted as an entire unwillingness to enter into an armistice. Except for the POW question, during the course of the negotiation the Communists often receded substantially from their original positions to accept the basic substantive positions of the UNC. With re-

spect to the POW question the course of the negotiations at Panmunjom made it appear possible that agreement would have been reached if the number of POW's, particularly Chinese, resisting repatriation had not been as large as turned out to be the case when screening was undertaken.

12. It is thus impossible to arrive at any categorical conclusion as to whether the armistice negotiations have clearly failed or have been deliberately delayed by the Communists because of Communist opposition to an armistice per se. This may be the case, in which event the POW issue is being used only as a pretext to avoid entering into an armistice, and if this issue were resolved another pretext would be found. On the other hand as mentioned above the POW issue may represent to them such a fundamental question as to overbalance the present cost to them of not having an armistice.

13. The agreement of all the UN nations participating in the hostilities in Korea to the issuance of the joint "greater sanctions" declaration mentioned in paragraph 2-*a*-(5) of NSC 118/2 has been obtained. This statement is to the effect that if the Communists break an armistice in Korea and the aggression in Korea is renewed, the consequences would be so great that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea. The full text of this statement and procedures for its immediate issuance following an armistice have been agreed to.

14. Whatever the Communist attitude toward an armistice has been or now is, it is clear that their ability to increase their military capabilities in Korea lessens any willingness on their part to make concessions to obtain an armistice. At the same time this increased Communist military capability makes more difficult the choice of alternative courses of action by the United States. Their increased capabilities are now reflected in the fact that the United Nations Command is confronted with enemy forces, with good morale, numerically superior in strength, with adequate logistic support, and disposed in extremely well organized defensive positions in depth. A growing air potential including jet light bombers adds to these capabilities.

Relation of Korea to Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives

[Here follows a paraphrase of the introduction of the Estimate portion of SE–41; for its text, see page 887.]

Current Restrictions on Military Operations

19. The current mission of UN military forces in Korea is to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea. In furtherance of this mission, the Commander in

Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) will, consistent with the security of UN forces, inflict maximum losses on North Korean and Chinese Communist forces operating "within the geographical boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto". At present the following restrictions apply to UN operations:

a. Air and naval operations are confined to geographical boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto.

b. Ground operations are authorized in support of the above mission to insure the safety of the UN Command and to continue to harass the enemy. Authority includes conduct of guerrilla operations and limited amphibious-airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

c. Operational Restrictions:

(1) Except with approval of higher authority in Washington, UN forces will not cross Manchuria or USSR border of Korea.

(2) Air and offensive naval surface operations should not be conducted within 12 miles to seaward of the coasts of Manchuria or of the USSR on the Asiatic mainland.

(3) Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including coastal waters, is authorized up to the Yalu River on the West Coast, but short of the Korean-Soviet international boundary on the East Coast.

(4) Only the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has authority to order or authorize preventive U.S. action against concentrations on the Chinese mainland.

(5) Employment of atomic weapons is authorized "only in the event our forces in that area would otherwise be faced with a military disaster", and upon approval of the President.

(6) Chinese National forces will not be used.

(7) Naval blockade will not be imposed against China.

d. Chemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be used by the United States except in retaliation (NSC 62, approved February 17, 1950).[13]

e. When authorized by the President, restrictions can be removed (unilaterally and on short notice as required) against attack of Chinese Communist air force bases whenever enemy air activity seriously jeopardizes the security of UN forces in the Korean area. Standing instructions to CINCUNC cover conditions where the Communists might launch massive air attacks against UN forces.

f. Specific approval from higher authority in Washington is necessary before the Yalu River power dams can be bombed.

g. In addition, CINCUNC has issued certain restrictions concerning flying over the Panmunjom truce area.

---

[13] In this NSC paper President Truman approved the JCS recommendation that in the event of war, the United States would use gas only in retaliation against its use by an enemy on the decision of the President. This was an interim decision, subject to reconsideration after technical studies were undertaken. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

Statement of Alternative Courses of Action

[Here follows the verbatim text of the Report by the NSC Planning Board, printed above.]

Use of Atomic Weapons

21. Each of the suggested courses of action (except Course A) permits but does not require employment of atomic weapons. In each case (except Course A) the use or non-use of such weapons is left open for future determination. This determination should be made only after a thorough study of the military, psychological and political implications of the use of atomic weapons has been completed, and considered by the National Security Council. A tentative statement of some of the military and political advantages and disadvantages of using atomic weapons follows.

22. *Military Advantages:*

a. Would considerably augment capabilities of U.S.-UN forces and somewhat offset the implications of developing a conventional capability to produce equivalent military effects outside Korea.
b. Would result in curtailment of Communist Chinese capability of continuing present hostilities, of threatening U.S.-UN security in Korea and Japan, or of initiating aggression elsewhere.
c. Might serve to increase the deterrent effect of our atomic capabilities on the USSR, as pertains to both global and limited war.
d. Threats to our military position in Korea could be eliminated more effectively, quickly and cheaply than by use of conventional weapons.

23. *Military Disadvantages:*

a. Unless the use of atomic weapons results in a decisive military victory, the deterrent effect might be reduced.
b. Any profitable strategic use requires extension of hostilities outside of Korea.
c. A precedent would be established, and UN forces and installations are, in general, better targets for atomic weapons than those of the enemy; for example, the ports of Inchon and Pusan, UN airfields and concentrations for amphibious operations.
d. Use of substantial numbers will reduce the U.S. stockpile and global atomic capabilities.

24. *Political Advantages:* There would be political advantages in the use of atomic weapons:

a. If their use in Korea alone was effective in achieving a military victory and thereby a political settlement in Korea, without encountering such enemy reaction as would lead to a spread of hostilities to Communist China.
b. If their use in Korea and against Communist China was effective in achieving a military victory in Korea and sufficient military results against Communist China to bring about a political settlement in Korea

and a general political settlement with Communist China, without encountering such enemy reaction as would lead to a spread of hostilities to the USSR.

c. If their use in Korea or against Communist China was clearly required in order to avoid a U.S.–UN military disaster in Korea.

25. *Political Disadvantages:* There would be political disadvantages in the use of atomic weapons:

a. If other free world nations believe that

(i.) the net effectiveness of the use of atomic weapons in Korea would be insufficient for the achievement of our military objectives there.

(ii.) the net effectiveness of the use of atomic weapons in Korea and against Communist China would be insufficient to achieve decisive military results.

(iii.) such military results as could be achieved by the use of atomic weapons either in Korea or against Communist China would be insufficient to achieve our political objectives in Korea or a general settlement with Communist China.

(iv.) the use of atomic weapons in Korea would involve the West in general hostilities with Communist China or the use of atomic weapons against Communist China would involve the West in hostilities with the USSR.

(v.) the use of atomic weapons would lead to enemy retaliation in kind against vulnerable U.S.–UN targets.

(vi.) the use of atomic weapons is not required to avert military disaster and if they believe, particularly in the light of current Communist peace offers, that our military and political objectives in Korea can be achieved without their use.

b. If such action were taken without consultation with other free world governments and without the concurrence in advance of our major allies.

c. If merely raising the question of the use of atomic weapons in Korea or against Communist China resulted in a dissipation of the support we now have from other free nations for terms of a Korean settlement acceptable to us.

26. *Estimated Communist Reaction:* We believe that if atomic weapons were employed by U.S./UN forces in any of the above alternative courses of action, the Communists would recognize the employment of these weapons as indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean war to a successful conclusion. We are unable to estimate whether this recognition would by itself lead the Communists to make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice. We believe that the Communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted.

Industrial Mobilization Implications

27. All the courses of action considered in this paper—even the first course, which contemplates the increase of ROK forces to 20 Army divisions and one Marine Brigade to 20—will require added U.S. support in weapons and military equipment. And to implement the progressive increases in force involved in each successive course suggested, the material contribution of the U.S. will become correspondingly larger. Although it is not possible to measure accurately the effect on our military deliveries to NATO countries or other areas or the changes which will have to be made in our industrial mobilization program, certain consequences in an ascending curve directly related to the degree of step-up applied in Korea can be predicted. In the discussion below of the requirements and consequences of each of the alternative courses, there are pointed out the major implications of the course on our production and supply programs. In varying degrees, some or all of the following effects can be anticipated:

a. Extension of the date by which material commitments to our NATO allies will be met. (Course A would require delay of at least a year in the delivery of certain MDAP items.)

b. Cancellation or deferral of present plans for stretch-out and shutdown of military production lines, or, alternatively reducing the reserves further below minimum safety levels.

c. Need for acceleration of military production schedules.

d. Provision of additional production lines to meet increased requirements for military end-items, particularly ammunition and bombs.

e. Increase in requirements for materials, components and machine tools needed for the production of military end-items and, as the impact of the growing military demand reaches certain proportions, extension of allocations and controls to additional items and, at some point, reinstatement of full-scale Controlled Materials Plan (CMP).

f. Acceleration of stockpile programs and development of new sources of supply to compensate for increased current consumption.

g. To meet the increased threat of general war, acceleration of mobilization base progams to increase the degree of readiness for conversion to all-out wartime production.

h. Speed-up of readiness measures for all civil defense programs, as well as related programs like the continuity of government, continuity of production, and military defense measures (radar, port security, guided missiles and jet fighter programs).

U.S. Public Opinion

28. In this connection, it should also be noted that public opinion in the United States continues to show great concern over the Korean war. Recent surveys indicate that the American people want to end the war, but only on honorable terms. Sentiment for vigorous action to achieve a settlement is widespread, but there is no strong demand for any particular course of action. If the President were to initiate a vigorous course of action, there is a strong probability of predominant

public support, particularly since surveys indicate great public confidence that the President will take the best possible steps to end the conflict. On the other hand, the stability of predominant editorial attitudes over the past two years offers a strong basis in public sentiment for continuation of a cautious policy. If the President were to conclude that more forceful action at this time is unwise, his exposition of that situation would be likely to receive predominant public acceptance.

Foreign Attitudes Toward Korean Conflict

29. In general, the support or opposition of foreign governments and foreign public opinion concerning the Alternatives I or II in Korea will depend almost entirely on whether the United Nations forces in Korea or the Communist forces take the initiative in changing the present military situation. Our principal allies and the majority opinion in the UN would favor only Course A or Alternative I out of the six courses of action proposed in this Staff Study. They might reluctantly be persuaded to accept Courses B and C, but would strongly oppose Courses D through F if initiated by the United States. On the other hand, the ROK Government will increasingly oppose Course A and in general favor Courses B through F, particularly Course E or Course F. A U.S. decision to undertake Courses D through F would severely strain and possibly break the Western alliance and would certainly alienate pro-U.S. feeling in most of Free Asia. However, if the Communists launch a large-scale ground offensive in Korea or coordinated and large-scale air attacks, the reaction of our principal allies and the majority of UN members regarding Alternative II would be quite different.

30. *Korean Attitudes:* The Government of the Republic of Korea, in particular President Rhee, has been vociferous in denouncing the entire concept of entering into an armistice short of conditions that would expel the Communists from, and establish control of the ROK over, all of Korea. It can be expected that the ROK will continue to make unification by any available means a primary national objective, and the ROK may try to obstruct the execution of any armistice agreement, especially by hindering the operations of the Neutral Supervisory Commission in ROK territory. There is a danger President Rhee might instruct ROK armed forces to break any armistice. The ROK and President Rhee in particular have a marked antipathy towards and fear of Japan which is often expressed in terms akin to their attitude towards the Communists and relations between the two countries continue to be very strained. Moreover, the ROK Government does not command much respect among our principal allies or in Free Asia.

31. *United Kingdom:* In general, the Government of the United Kingdom has supported U.S. policy in the Korean conflict, has taken an especially active interest therein, and as time has passed has been willing to take an increasingly "stiff" attitude toward the Soviet bloc in regard

thereto. However, the United Kingdom is gravely concerned that no action be taken which would: (1) markedly increase the risk of extended war with China or global conflict, (2) commit the United States or the United Nations to a course of action which will further divert United States and other military resources from Europe, and (3) seriously increase the risk of a Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong.

32. *Canada, Australia and New Zealand:* The attitudes of these countries towards Korea are motivated in varying degrees by much of the same concerns as those of the United Kingdom regarding extension of hostilities beyond Korea.

33. *France:* While sharing much the same concerns as the United Kingdom, French attitudes are modified by considerations of the possible relation between the Korean conflict and Chinese Communist support of or direct intervention in Indochina.

34. *Japan:* While there is some recognition in Japan of the importance of the conflict in Korea to the security of Japan, Japan's attitudes are conditioned by such conflicting sentiments on the one hand as "neutralist" sentiment of much of the population, fear of a global conflict, a widespread desire not to become involved in another war or in the Korean conflict, misapprehension over assumed United States intentions to use Japanese forces abroad, and, on the other hand, by the substantial economic benefits arising from United Nations Command expenditures in Japan for the Korean conflict and the satisfaction of seeing the United States take the leadership in the Far East.

35. *Other Asian:* Except for Nationalist China, the Philippines and Thailand, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, there is a tendency in much of the rest of Asia (and the Arab world) to regard the Korean conflict as a manifestation of a world power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union from which the Arab-Asian world must remain aloof. All of these countries have thus far supported the United States stand on the principle of non-forcible repatriation but would regard with varying degrees of alarm and dismay any enlargement of the hostilities.

36. While the foregoing is a correct estimate of present attitudes, there is no question but that a substantial UN military success in Korea would deflate the present Communist Chinese military prestige and influence in Asia, and enhance the position of the United States in Asia.

Use of Chinese National Forces

37. None of the above courses of action contemplates the use of Chinese National forces in Korea. The use of such forces to further U.S. strategic objectives in the Far East is covered in detail in NSC 146

(now under consideration by the National Security Council)[14] and will not be considered in this paper.

Guerrilla Operations, Sabotage and Subversion

38. Under each of these courses of action it is contemplated that guerrilla operations, sabotage, and subversion would be continued and intensified to the extent practicable.

[Here follows more detailed discussion of courses of action A through F under the following subheadings: "Timing (Military)", "Logistic and Mobilization Implications", "Military Advantages", "Political Advantages", "Military Disadvantages", "Political Disadvantages", "Estimated Communist Reaction".]

ADDITIONAL FORCES FROM OTHER UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS AND THE PROBLEM OF REIMBURSEMENT FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Background of Problem

168. As soon as the forces of other United Nations countries joined in the action in Korea the problem arose of supplying them with food, ammunition and other equipment. It would not have been practical for each country to set up its own lines of supply, and in any event only the United States, and to a lesser extent the British, were in a position initially to furnish supplies to forces in Korea, and even the British were, to some extent, dependent on United States logistic support.

169. The United States armed services furnished supplies to the services of other countries against memorandum receipt. For example, the Navy furnished fuel oil to other vessels in order that they could remain on station in Korean waters rather than make lengthy voyages to home ports.

170. It was soon apparent, in view of the volume of support furnished by the United States and the possibility that repayment might not be readily made, that there should be intergovernmental agreements concerning this support. After interdepartmental consideration a memorandum[15] (dated September 1, 1950) was prepared by the Department of Defense and approved by the President. Under this directive the military departments are authorized to provide to foreign forces, capable of effective participation in the Korean operations, necessary logistic support and supplies which the foreign governments themselves could not provide, and to maintain accounts of the costs involved, which would serve as a basis for reimbursement. The directive provides that ". . .[16] the military departments of the United States will make

---

[14] NSC 146 was not approved and it is not printed (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351). NSC 146/2, entitled "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government" and dated Nov. 6, 1953, was approved. For the text and relevant documentation, see volume XIV.

[15] Not printed. (795B.5/9–150)

[16] Ellipsis in the source text.

available necessary supplies or services on a basis of immediate reimbursement in U.S. dollars. To the extent that the foreign Government cannot make prompt reimbursement in U.S. dollars, the U.S. Government and the foreign Government will negotiate the terms of settlement." A procedure was established under this directive whereby the recognition of an obligation to reimburse the United States would constitute sufficient assurance to permit the initial furnishing of logistic support, with negotiation of the terms of reimbursement to follow.

171. The September 1, 1950 directive was identified at the time as an interim policy designed to meet an emergency situation. In the succeeding two and one-half years twenty countries, in addition to the United States and the Republic of Korea have provided forces for the United Nations in Korea. The combined contribution of these twenty countries is small. In November 1951 nations, other than the United States and the Republic of Korea, were furnishing approximately 7 percent of the United Nations ground forces and naval forces in Korea and less than 2 percent of the air forces. All of these forces were offered during the first months of the Korean action and the proportion furnished by those nations probably has not increased.

Present Status

[Here follows data on the status of United Nations participation in Korea other than by the United States.]

173. Of these countries, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and South Africa have signed agreements with the United States under which they have agreed to pay, and are paying currently for logistic support furnished to them by the United States. Canada and Denmark are currently paying for support received but have not signed a formal agreement. The Government of India has indicated that it is unwilling to make payment to the United States for supplies furnished to the Field Ambulance Unit operated by Indian personnel. The Indian Government has taken the position that the United States should look for reimbursement to the United Nations. It should also be noted that the United States has also in effect assumed responsibility for certain supplies furnished to the Indian contingent by the United Kingdom. India took the same position with regard to such supplies and after discussions with the British, the United States has agreed that supplies furnished by the British to the Indian group may be deducted from the obligation of the United Kingdom to the United States. President Truman approved these arrangements. The other countries participating are not making regular payments.

174. Through December 31, 1952 the United States had advanced approximately $200 million worth of logistic support to United Nations forces (exclusive of the Republic of Korea) in the Korean action. Approximately $40 million has been received in payment. Logistic support

is currently being furnished to these countries at a rate of approximately $7 million per month. The estimated status of the accounts as of December 31, 1952 is shown in the following tabulation.

Estimated Status of Logistical Support Obligations: December 31, 1952

(In millions of dollars)

Country	*Amount Advanced*	*Paid*	*Balance Unpaid*
Making regular payments:			
Under formal agreements:			
Netherlands	4.2	2.7	1.5
Norway	.5	.2	.3
Sweden	1.6	1.0	.6
South Africa	11.3	9.3	2.0
Without formal agreements:			
Canada	30.4	28.6	1.8
Denmark	.1	.1	*
Subtotal	48.1	41.9	6.2
Not making regular payments: ‡			
Australia	5.7	.1	5.6
Belguim-Luxembourg	1.6	*	1.6
Colombia	7.1	0.0	7.1
Ethiopia †	8.1	0.0	8.1
France	7.5	*	7.5
Greece †	7.8	0.0	7.8
Italy	.1	*	.1
New Zealand	1.9	*	1.9
Philippines	38.6	0.0	38.6
Thailand	11.1	0.0	11.1
Turkey †	25.9	0.0	25.9
United Kingdom	43.4	.3	43.1
Subtotal	158.8	.4	158.4
Grand Total §	206.9	42.3	164.6

*Less than $50,000. [Footnote in the source text.]

† No draft agreement or statement of account presented. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡ The amounts shown as paid for countries "not making regular payments" represent small sums paid to the U.S. Navy. [Footnote in the source text.]

§ The Republic of Korea is not shown on this list. [Footnote in the source text.]

Possibility of Additional Forces

175. The table below records the status as of February 5, 1953 of certain offers of assistance other than those which have been accepted and are in action.

Country	*Offer*	*Status*
Belgium	Air Transport	Available
Bolivia	30 Officers	Acceptance deferred
China	3 Infantry Divisions & 20 C-47s	Acceptance deferred
Costa Rica	Volunteers	Acceptance deferred
Denmark	Motorship *Bella Dan*	Acceptance deferred
El Salvador	Volunteers if US will train and equip	
Greece	Additional Unit of Land Forces	Pending
Panama	Contingent Volunteers; Bases for Training	Acceptance deferred
	Farmhands to Supply Troops	Pending

176. In addition to the foregoing, it is understood that the Governments of Thailand and the Philippines would be prepared to increase their contribution to the level of a regimental combat team provided that they could be relieved of the financial burden of providing logistic support. The regimental combat team is the smallest size unit which can make an effective contribution from a military point of view. As a general order of magnitude it costs about $15 million to provide original equipment for a regimental combat team and another $15 million to maintain it a year under combat conditions. Maintenance cost is reduced approximately 25 percent if not in combat.

177. A change in the United States policy would enhance the prospect of receiving assistance or augmented assistance from other countries, although no other specific possibility can be cited.

178. On the other hand, it is possible that if the United States policy is not changed the Government of Colombia might withdraw its battalion which has been in action in Korea.

Possible Methods of Meeting Reimbursement Problem

179. The procedure instituted in September 1950 with regard to reimbursement to the United States for logistic support was regarded at the time as an interim emergency procedure. As shown above, some countries have signed agreements, as contemplated in the Department of Defense memorandum, and are currently making payments in dollars for support furnished them by the United States. On the other hand, no specific arrangements have been made by certain other countries and the basis of the ultimate settlement of their accounts remains uncertain. In the case of Colombia, this uncertainty is jeopardizing the continued participation of the Colombian battalion. The question of requesting appropriate legislation from the Congress was considered in 1950 but not acted upon and reliance was placed instead upon the powers of the President.

ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA (NSC 147)

Course of Action	Objective	Timing	Build-up	Casualties	Costs (in $ billion)	Enemy Reaction	Allies' Views	Military Appraisal
A. Continue indefinately current level of military operations and build-up ROK's.	Limited redeployment of U.S. forces.	Already initiated redeployment of 4 US divisions by July 54.	20 ROK Army divisions and 1 ROK Marine brigade.	Current rate indefinitely.	54—1.5 to 1.7 55—2.1 to 2.3	Continue build-up and probably increase pressure. No Armistice concessions.	ROK opposition, most others would favor.	Least maldeployment, lowest casualty rate and minimum risk. Indnatedrain and maldeployment.
B. Step up ground operations.	More cost to enemy in hope of acceptable Armistice.	Initiated in 6 mos. with full impact by July 54.	20 ROK divisions 2 US divisions and Air and Navy lift.	UN- US-	54—2.2 to 2.4 55—3.8 to 4.0	Strong local reaction. Little risk of expanded war. Armistice possibilities unknown.	Reluctant agreement except certain Asian natives would oppose.	Higher enemy attrition and lessened offensive ability. No assured victory with undue cost. Risk of air attack. Increased maldeployment and casualties.
C. Step up ground operations, then major offensive to waist.	Maximum destruction of enemy and favorable settlement.	Initiated in 6 mos. Offensive 3 mos. later, and new line at waist in 3 more mos.	20 ROK divisions 3 US divisions and lift. 2 attack carriers. 2 bomb and 4⅓ fighter wings.	UN- US-	54—3.0 to 3.3 55—4.0 to 4.4	Strong local reaction. If unable to halt UN, probably seek Armistice, might expand war.	Allies would oppose, sharp Asian opposition.	If successful, maximum enemy casualties and matériel losses. High UN/US casualties with serious risk of air attack. Less defensible lines. War plans adversely affected.

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147)—Continued

Course of Action	Objective	Timing	Build-up	Casualties	Costs (in $ billion)	Enemy Reaction	Allies' Views	Military Appraisal
D. Air attack and naval blockade against China and, if necessary, increase ground operations.	Make so costly to enemy that favorable settlement achieved.	Air attacks at once. Blockade in 2–4 weeks.	20 ROK divisions. Naval up to 2 carrier groups. 2 bomb and 4½ fighter wings.	UN- US-	54—2.4 to 3 55—3.2 to 3.5	Probable Armistice concessions prior to initiation. Then maximum resistance, including increased Soviet participation and Chinese air attacks on UN forces and bases in Far East. If unable to counter, would sacrifice interests in Korea for end of hostilities might commit Soviet forces, but leave to UN/US question of *casus belli*.	Strong opposition, except ROK and Chinese Nationalists, unless Communists start large scale operations.	If successful, military victory without high casualties. If not, other courses still open. Less risk of general war. War plans adversely affected. General offensive may still be required.
E. Offensive to waist plus naval blockade and air and naval attacks against China.	Maximum possible destruction of enemy consistent with line at waist, to achieve favorable settlement.	Same as B, C or D if extension of these courses. If original, initiate in 9–12 mos.	20 ROK divisions 3 US divisions naval same as D plus lift, air same as D plus 1 bomb wing and 1 recon. wing plus lift.	UN- US-	54—3.2 55—4.2	Same as D.	Same as D.	If successful, defeat of enemy. Waist line ultimately more defensible by ROK's but temporarily weaker than present line. If not successful, drive to Yalu (F) may be required. War plans adversely affected. High casualties.

Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147)—Continued

Course of Action	Objective	Timing	Build-up	Casualties	Costs (in $ billion)	Enemy Reaction	Allies' Views	Military Appraisal
F. Large-scale offensive plus naval blockade and air and naval attacks against China.	Defeat and destruction enemy and unified non-communist Korea.	Same as E.	Same as E plus 2 US divisions from Japan, replaced by 4-6 Japanese divisions.	UN- US-	54—4.2 55—5.1	Same as D.	Same as D.	If successful, destruction of major enemy forces in Korea and Chinese Communist ability for early renewal of aggression, strengthen security of Japan and permit redeployment of most US forces. Maximum adverse effect on war plans. Highest casualties. Weakened defense of Japan during operations.

180. If the United States wishes to deviate from the policy of securing cash payment in dollars for logistic support in order to maintain or increase the forces of other countries in the field, the cost of the grant aid for logistic support might be charged either to appropriations for the Department of Defense or to the Mutual Security Program. If existing authority is not adequate for this purpose, it would, of course, be necessary to obtain enabling legislation.

795.00/4-353

Memorandum by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1953.

I have a memorandum from the President dated April 2 in relation to the Korean talks.[2] The President makes the point that we must take a lesson from past experience before opening up again the long and dreary process of negotiations that might easily repeat the whole history of the past year and a half. We should use the matter of exchange of the sick and wounded as a sort of test of good faith on the part of the Soviets.

This position is a matter which the President and I have discussed at some length and on which we both feel strongly. The President would prefer that the entire process of exchange be a completed fact before any broader negotiations are undertaken. However, I believe that if the exchange of prisoners was actually under way to such a degree that subsequent moves could not frustrate the exchange, it might be appropriate to open broader negotiations at that point. However, this is a point that we would have to discuss when the time came.

J.F.D.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson and O'Connor and initialed by Dulles.
[2] *Ante*, p. 835.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 3, 1953—1:35 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 61723. Ref: A. JCS 935344.[1] B. DA 935413.[2] C. CX 61707.[3] This msg in 2 parts.

---

[1] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.
[2] Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, pp. 829 and 830, respectively.
[3] This telegram from Clark to the JCS, dated Apr. 2, 1953, contained the text of a letter from Commanders Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Clark, Apr. 2, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) A text of this letter is published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 570.

Part 1.

a. Your comments in para 6*a*[4] are concurred in. It is suggested that since Norway is no longer under consideration as a member of the Neutral Nations Supv Com, it might be a better choice to perform the "Neutral State" role. It is also suggested that Mexico or India might be possible nominations as the "Neutral State" in recog of their proposals, but the extent of Indian neutrality is not considered as well defined as in the case of Mexico.

b. Regarding para 6*b*, I concur in the undesirability of trans non-repatriates to a neutral state. While trf in small groups to neutral cust in the demilitarized zone would have the advantages of permitting easy access to neutral detention camps by the orientation groups prov for in CX 51489,[5] part 2, para 3*b* (5) and the Red Cross pers of both sides, it would create needless log and admin problems, including dup of existing fac, possible friction and interference between neutral state auth and the Mil Armistice Com, the introduction of armed guards into the demilitarized zone, and undue delay in the final processing of non-repatriates. The use of existing island installations would obviate most of the serious problems anticipated if neutral detention takes place in the demilitarized zone. If the problem can be limited to Chinese non-repatriates, as now appears probable, the present location at Cheju Island would minimize anticipated difficulties. If Korean non-repatriates should be required to undergo similar processing the vacated fac of Koje Island could be used to advantage. Accordingly, I remd that we make every effort to obtain agreement to neutral cust at existing island fac.

c. In view of the purely speculative destination implied in para 6*c*, I consider it essential that the problem be limited to the 15,000 Chinese non-repatriates. I consider mvmt of these pers to Sweden, Switzerland or Norway completely unrealistic, and believe that ultimately the choice of actual mvmt would have to be between Mexico and India. Curr internal unrest is considered suff reason to drop Indonesia or Burma for consideration, and could be used as an argument against India. I consider that the log problems involved should be decided and fin by the UN with the Unified Comd cont in the role of exec agent. The need to employ force in any such mvmt of Chinese non-repatriates is considered unlikely to assume serious proportions, but could become a maj problem if these Chinese were to be moved to a "Neutral State" under an agreement that they would not be ultimately relocated in Formosa. If such a problem arises, believe it can best be met by complete orientation, and personal guarantees by the UN as to their safety and final relocation in the country of the indiv choice wherever possible.

---

[4] Reference was to JCS 935344.

[5] Dated July 7, 1952, p. 380.

d. Regarding the ques in para 6*d,* I consider that no other intrp of Chou's statement would be logical. In the intmed para Chou stated "nor do we ack the assertion . . .[6] that there are among the PW indiv who allegedly refuse repatriation."

e. As indicated above I thoroughly concur in the psn that trans Koreans to a "Neutral State" would be absurd, and that only the Chinese should be subject to "Neutral State" detention. However, if the ques of "Neutral State" cust of Korean non-repatriates should become an issue, neutral detention in Korea is considered the only acpt UNC psn to avoid serious disturbances in the ROK, and to preclude the need for employing force in conducting the mvmt. The use of vacated fac at Koje was suggested earlier in para *b.*

f. The ans to the ques in para 6*f,* I consider to be limited to the prov mentioned in para *c* above. At most, I consider that what is contemplated is prov for access to the non-repatriates "neutral cust" as set forth in proposals 7, 8, 9 and 11 of the Indian Resolution submitted to UNGA by the Indian Del.

g. In ans to ques 6*g,* I consider that the "Neutral State" must act as the court of appeal. Even the Indian Resolution visualized the Repatriation Com employing an umpire to cast a deciding vote. Prov a truly "Neutral State" can be decided upon, I consider that its decisions should be final. I further consider that pris who steadfastly oppose repatriation should be returned by the neutral state to the cust of the orign detaining power for subsequent release, and resettlement in accordance with the wishes of the indiv insofar as practicable. Considering arbitrary Communist disp of thousands of ROK pers, I consider the above proposed procedure a completely "just solution" to the problem.

Part 2.

Clarification contained in ref B most helpful.

a. My comments on para 3 of ref A, as rqst in ref B, fol. While I realize that there may be extreme pressure from our allies, the enemy, and certain sectors of the US pub to proceed immediately with a resumption of negotiations, I remain skeptical of Communist motives. After their rejection of the Indian Resolution, which covered in gen the substance of what the Communists now apparently propose, I consider that it would be completely naive on our part not to anticipate any and every form of chicanery in their apparently straightfwd proposal. Until the Communists really accede to our proposals regarding the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured pers and proceed to faithfully carry out their part of the contract, I rcmd that we refrain from discussion by liaison groups of resuming negotiations, at least until reasonable progress in repatriating seriously sick and wounded has been accomplished. I consider that such delay in discussing a resumption of negotiations is fully justified by Chou's statement "consider that subsequent upon reasonable settlement of the ques of sick and injured . . . a smooth solution to the whole ques (armistice) . . . should be achieved." In the meantime however, every effort will be made to develop the Communist psn in accordance with para 2 and 5 ref A.

---

[6] Ellipses throughout are in the source text.

b. The Communist reply passed in ref C disposes, at least temp, of the problems set forth in para 1 and 4 of ref A. My proposed instr to the senior member of the Liaison Group will therefore be as fol:

> 1. "At the initial, or an early meeting of Liaison Groups, when you deem the occasion aprop, desire that you make ref to the Communist proposal on the ques of repatriation of PW rec on 2 Apr and state that the UNC would be pleased to rec, at as early a date as possible, a detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be studied while arrangements for the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded captured pers are being completed.
> 2. Avoid making any commitment with regard to undertaking discussion of the Communist proposal by the Del or to acpt the principle of the proposal. If pressed for an ans, you should state that the UNC would like to have a clearer idea of what the Communists have in mind.
> 3. When discussion of the Communist proposal as a basis for resuming negotiations is started, your tactics will be to place on the Communists the burden of putting fwd a detailed and practical plan which the UNC can reasonably acpt. Any UNC contribution to the dev of such plans will be along the lines suggested in para 3*b*, part 2 of CX 51489 of 7 Jul 52, except that you should avoid any commitment not to permit Chinese PW ultimately to proceed to Nationalist China.
> 4. Until such time as it is clearly apparent that the Communists are carrying out our proposal for repatriating sick and wounded in good faith, I desire that you refrain from discussing a resumption of negotiations or agreeing to a particular date for the resumption of negotiations."

c. The text of my proposed reply to the Communist proposal set forth in ref C fols:

> "To: Gen Kim Il Sung, Comd of the Korean Peoples Army, Gen Peng Teh Huai, Comd of the Chinese Peoples Vol. I appreciate the courtesy of your prompt reply to my ltr of 31 Mar 53 contained in your ltr rec 2 Apr 53, and have rec the incl statements. I agree to the proposal that the Liaison Group of your side meet with the Liaison Group of our side at Pan Mun Jom on 6 Apr 53 to arrange the mat of repatriation by both sides of seriously sick and wounded captured pers. It is my understanding that subsequent to reasonable settlement of this mat, the Liaison Groups will discuss the resumption of armistice negotiations. I suggest that the time of meeting be 1000 hours, if that is convn to your side, and that the details of the actual time be left to the Liaison Off of both sides. Signed Mark W Clark, Gen USA, CINC, UNC."

d. Rqst your comments on para *b* and *c* of part 2 earliest.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

General Collins: General Bradley will not be able to come this morning so I think we had better go ahead.

Mr. Matthews: The first question which we would like to bring up is that of the recent publicity on our plans for future negotiations on the Korean issue. I have here a newspaper dispatch which goes into, at some length, U.N. plans for negotiating with the Communists on the POW issue. (At this point Mr. Matthews read the newspaper dispatch which in general stated that Clark would make exchange of sick and wounded his first order of business and that he would then seek satisfactory answers to questions raised by Chou En-lai's proposal, such as the question of who would be the neutral, how would forcible repatriation be avoided, etc.)

We have had word from our Secretary that the President does not want any talk about negotiations or any negotiations until the Communists have really put into effect the exchange of sick and wounded. We think that any publicity about our plans for future negotiations would be contrary to the expressed wishes of the President.

General Collins: I think it might be wise to send out a message to Clark in which we could refer to the report that you have read and also point out that the President made a further statement at his Press Conference [2] yesterday to the effect that we would review carefully any Communist proposal and see whether their actions demonstrated that their proposals were made in good faith. We should stress to Clark the inadvisability of Clark or anybody on his staff making any statements at this time about future negotiations and emphasize that every precaution should be taken to avoid publicity. I think the message should go out today. (At this point Mr. Matthews read the memorandum from the Secretary which described the President's wishes on the timing of negotiations.)[3]

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS General Collins and Admiral Fechteler as well as Vice Chief General Twining attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and Nash the Department of Defense. In all, 20 persons were present.

In addition to Korea, U.S. relations with the Republic of China and military aid to France for Indochina were topics at this meeting.

[2] For the text of the President's news conference of Apr. 2, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 147–160.

General Collins: Generally speaking, I think that the substance of your Secretary's memorandum is already reflected in the messages which we have sent to Clark.

Mr. Johnson: Should we take up the question of Clark's incoming message?[4]

General Collins: The Army has gone over the message but I am not sure that the other services have seen it. In general what Clark proposes to say seems to be all right to us. We have a draft message approving his proposal. There is one point on which we do have a question. Chou En-lai in his proposal always refers to the "sick and wounded". In our statements we have been saying "seriously sick and wounded". I have checked on the articles in the Geneva Convention and they actually do refer to seriously sick and seriously wounded. As a matter of fact they go into great detail on the categories of sick and wounded and how they should be handled. (At this point General Collins read Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention.)

It seems to me that we may be making a mistake in constantly repeating the word "seriously". If the Communists are willing to send back slightly sick and wounded, I should think we would have nothing to lose from playing along with them.

Mr. Nitze: It seems clear that we should try to get back as many of our own fellows as possible.

General Collins: As you agree, I think we should suggest to Clark that it is not advisable for him to refer to the sick and wounded as seriously sick and wounded. Johnson and our men over here can draft a message.

Mr. Johnson: There is another point I would like to bring up. We have instructed Clark not to raise the question of impartial verification by a neutral of the sick and wounded to be exchanged if the number that the Communists propose to exchange appears to be satisfactory. But we do feel that it would be an advantage to us on our side if we had the ICRC carry out its normal functions and help to separate the sick and wounded who don't want to be repatriated. The Red Cross could either examine the sick and wounded or could check on the procedures that we are using to select the sick and wounded who want to go back.

Mr. Matthews: I think there would probably be some advantage in at least having the ICRC observe the procedures that we use.

---

[3] Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.

[4] The reference was to telegram C 61723, Clark to JCS, Apr. 3, 1953, *supra*. Because of the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram was received in the early morning of Apr. 3.

Mr. Nitze: I should think that Clark would want to discuss with the ICRC what might be the best way of their reviewing his procedures.

General Collins: I think there would be some advantage in having the ICRC review the procedures so long as it wouldn't occasion any delay in the exchange of sick and wounded.

Mr. Johnson: We do have another question on Clark's incoming message. His message on page 4 paragraph 3,[5] has proposed instructions to Daniel as chief of the liaison group. This paragraph is, in fact, taken from the fifth paragraph of our instructions to him[6] and would call for Daniel to question the Communists about Chou En-lai's proposal. Our thought was that this would be done by the delegation and not by the liaison group. We don't want the liaison group to discuss the proposal because they could easily be drawn into negotiations on it and this we want to avoid. We think the liaison group should only ask for a detailed statement of the Chou En-lai plan so that it can be studied while the exchange of sick and wounded is taking place.

Admiral Fechteler: As Clark's instructions to Daniel stand, they really are inconsistent. They say Daniel should and shouldn't talk about negotiations.

Admiral Libby: The difficulty could be cured by omitting paragraph 3 and the last sentence on page 4.[7]

General Collins: I think, however, that Clark will need clarification on the reasons for the change. Why doesn't State draft a message and let Libby and G–3 look at it over here before we send it out.[8]

. . . .

---

[5] Reference in Clark's telegram was to Part 2, paragraph *b* 3.

[6] Telegram JCS 935344, Mar. 31, p. 829.

[7] Reference in Clark's telegram was to the sentence in the proposed reply to Communist proposal, Part 2, paragraph *c*, which read: "It is my understanding that subsequent to reasonable settlement of this mat, the Liaison Groups will discuss the resumption of armistice negotiations."

[8] For the text of the message as transmitted to Clark, see *infra*.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1953—7:13 p. m.

JCS 935741. From JCS.

Part I.

1. At his press conf 2 Apr, PresUS, in commenting on recent Commie proposals, stated that he thought we shld now take at face value every offer that was made to us until it was proved unworthy of our confidence. Accordingly, every precaution shld be taken in publ re-

marks or press releases to avoid any tone or impression contrary to the spirit of PresUS remarks. Re this, ref is made to AP Tokyo disp 3 Apr attributing to Adm Daniel statement that negotiators "want satisfactory answer from Reds to 'few questions' before they agree to hold plenary sessions on Armistice," and thereafter listing two questions.[1]

Part II. Reur [C] 61723.[2]

2. It is noted that Commies consistently refer to "sick and injured" POWs whereas we have been using the term "seriously sick and wounded" POWs. While Art 109 Geneva Convs refers to "seriously wounded and seriously sick" POWs, it is considered advisable we shld in future avoid use "seriously" in order ensure return max number UNC psnl. Accordingly, word "seriously" shld be deleted in last sent Part 2, para *b* 1 and in second sent text proposed reply to Commies, Part 2, para *c*, ur C 61723.

3. You may wish give consideration to inviting ICRC perform traditional functions re sick and wounded POWs being returned by UNC, in particular to observe UNC procedures for assuring that no POW is "repatriated against his will" according Art 109. This would be unilateral action on our part in consonance with para 3, Art 109. However, in order not to delay or complicate negots ur action shld not be mentioned to Commies who charge ICRC with bias.

4. Re Part 2 *b*: It was intent para 5, JCS 935344[3] that guidance contained therein would apply to discussions by dels, if and when negots are resumed, and not to Ln Grp. Therefore, para 3 of instructions in Part 2 *b* ur C 61723 shld be deleted.

5. Re Part 2 *c*. Third sent ur proposed reply might be interpreted by Commies as commitment that negots based on Commie proposal will be resumed whether or not satisfactory amplification their proposal is forthcoming. This sent shld therefore be deleted. Felt here that in lieu this sent request for further detailed info as outlined in para 2 JCS 935344 might appropriately be included in ur reply. If Commies do not respond, it is recognized that it may later be nec for Ln Grp attempt obtain this info from Commies by direct questioning.

6. Subj to foregoing, ur letter of instructions in Part 2, para *b*, and ur proposed reply in Part 2, para *c*, are approved.

---

[1] General Clark in telegram CX 61765, Apr. 6, 1953, not printed, informed the JCS that measures had been taken to insure compliance with the directive in this paragraph and that, after investigation, he was convinced that Rear Admiral Daniel had not at any time made the statements attributed to him in the AP dispatch of Apr. 3. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45))

[2] Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.

[3] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.

INR-NIE files

National Intelligence Estimate

TOP SECRET
NIE-80

WASHINGTON, 3 April 1953.

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA [1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through 1953.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist military potential in the Korean area has grown steadily since the initiation of cease-fire negotiations in mid-1951. Troop strength has more than doubled and logistic support has been substantially improved. Jet fighter strength has more than tripled. An estimated 100 jet light bombers have been introduced in Manchuria. Combat effectiveness of Communist military forces has improved and is now believed to range from good to excellent. A highly organized, well-integrated defensive zone extends possibly 15 to 20 miles to the rear of present battle positions. Many fortified areas have been constructed in rear of this zone and are being improved and expanded.

2. The Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC)[*] currently has the capability of seriously challenging UNC daylight air operations under conditions of good visibility over North Korea. It also has the capability of expanding CAFIC air operations into UN-held territory and adjacent waters. If the Communists supported a major ground offensive by exercising the maximum capabilities of the CAFIC over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimum success in these operations, the enemy might place the UNC forces in Korea in jeopardy.

3. The enemy is capable of launching a major ground and/or air attack with little or no warning. On balance, current Communist military, diplomatic, and propaganda activities do not indicate that the Communists intend to launch large-scale ground or air operations in the near future.

---

[1] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 26 March 1953."

[*] The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communist Air Force. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. Political and economic conditions within North Korea and Communist China are not exerting compelling pressure on the Communists to conclude an armistice in Korea.

5. We believe that during the period of this estimate Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea will not be materially reduced by frictions and conflicting interests.

6. The Communists probably estimate that the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on the Western Powers and that at least during the period of this estimate the UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time the Communists probably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the Communists.

7. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea while retaining a primarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea–Manchuria area in order to be in a position to exploit any advantage which might develop or to counter possible UN/US intensification or expansion of the war.

8. We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, the Communists are unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armistice.†

9. We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.

DISCUSSION

Capabilities of Communist Military Forces in Korea

Force Strengths

10. *Ground Forces.* Enemy ground forces in the Korean area have grown steadily in personnel strength since the initiation of armistice negotiations in mid-1951, and currently are more than double their mid-1951 strength.

---

† SE–37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China" (dated 9 March 1953), concludes that a naval blockade of Communist China, in conjunction with large-scale and sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on present UN terms. [Footnote in the source text. SE–37 is scheduled for publication in volume XIV.]

Strength of Enemy Ground Forces in Korea ‡

	July 1951	*July 1952*	*March 1953*
North Korean	230,000	267,000	294,000
Chinese Communist	272,000	680,000	836,000
Total	502,000	947,000	1,130,000

In addition to the Chinese Communist forces in Korea, there are about 255,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and 129,000 in North China. These forces could be used in Korea should a situation develop which required rapid, substantial Communist reinforcement of their current forces.

11. The combat effectiveness and morale of Communist ground units in Korea is judged to range from good to excellent. Major programs of reorganization, re-equipment, and reinforcement, particularly in armor, artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units, have resulted in substantially increased enemy fire power. In recent months, improvements have been noted in the enemy's employment of field and AA artillery and in training, as evidenced by better leadership and tactical use of troops, particularly in small unit tactics. There has been an increased emphasis on the use of fire and maneuver and less emphasis on "human sea" tactics.

12. The Communist logistic position in Korea has improved during the long semi-static period since the beginning of armistice negotiations. Although UNC operations against lines of communication in North Korea have made Communist re-supply efforts difficult, the enemy has been able, though at considerable cost in effort and equipment, to transport sufficient supplies to meet his combat requirements and to create stockpiles. It is estimated that the enemy now has stockpiled in Korea sufficient supplies to support about 35 days of offensive operations. However, because of a limited transport capability for support of his attacking echelons, the enemy probably would not be able to sustain a large-scale offensive for more than 10 to 14 days. It should be noted, however, that the enemy's build-up in military strength in North Korea has brought an accompanying increase in his logistic requirements. Thus, effective logistic support of a major sustained offensive would now necessitate, more than at any time in the past, a steady flow of supplies to forward areas.

---

‡By way of comparison, United Nations Command (UNC) ground force strength in mid-1951 was about 416,000. UNC ground force strength at present is about 513,000. [Footnote in the source text.]

13. *Air Forces.* The Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC) § has grown steadily since the initiation of truce negotiations in mid-1951. It is estimated that the enemy's jet fighter strength has more than tripled since mid-1951. In addition, CAFIC strength has been increased in recent months by the introduction of IL–28 jet light bombers, an estimated 100 of which are now in Manchuria.

Estimated CAFIC TO & E Strength||

	July 1951	*July 1952*	*February 1953*
Jet Fighter	400	1,300	1,400
Jet Light Bomber			100
Other Types	600	800	850
Total	1,000	2,100	2,350

Of the present total combat strength of 2,350, approximately 1,460 combat aircraft (including 1,000 jet fighters and the 100 IL–28 jet light bombers) are believed to be in the North Korea–Manchuria area. The remaining combat aircraft (including over 300 jet fighters) are believed to be in China proper, based primarily around Peiping, Shanghai, Canton, and Hsuchou.||

14. By US criteria, CAFIC fighter units are believed to be reaching a fairly high standard of combat efficiency. There has been a steady improvement in enemy air tactics and, although the degree of individual enemy pilots aggressiveness has fluctuated periodically, the proficiency and aggressiveness of enemy fighter pilots by US standards is considered "good" at the present time. The most serious current CAFIC weakness is its deficiency in all-weather and night-interception capability. Although the CAFIC has been able to maintain sustained air activity over the past year, the average CAFIC daily sortie rate, based on sightings by UN aircraft, appears to be only a fraction of the number of sorties possible with the total aircraft believed to be available.

---

§The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communists. [Footnote in the source text.]

|| Present actual strength of CAFIC units is not known, but most units are believed to be near their authorized strength. Table of Organization and Equipment strength is used as the basis for estimation of CAFIC strength since it is considered that prior to any deliberate Communist expansion of the air war the USSR probably would provide the CAFIC with sufficient aircraft to bring any understrength units to their full TO & E complement. See Annex A and Annex B for a tabular and graphic presentation of Communist air strength since the outbreak of the Korean war, together with a strength forecast through the period of this estimate. See Annex C for a tabular presentation of Soviet Far East air strength, and Annex D for CAFIC and Soviet Air Force aircraft performance characteristics. By way of comparison, the actual UNC air strength in mid-1951 was about 960 aircraft, the majority of which were piston type. The actual UNC air strength at present is about 1,710 aircraft, of which approximately 775 are jet fighters. [Footnote in the source text; the Annexes are not printed.]

15. Airfield construction and repair has been underway in North Korea since June 1950. At present, there are approximately 33 airfields in North Korea which are or could become suitable for military operations. Of these, there are eight airfields which could within a short time be capable of handling sustained jet operations. Within Communist China, an intensive airfield repair and facilities build-up has produced a good system of airfields capable of handling all types of aircraft now available to the CAFIC. In Manchuria, the recently developed air facilities are so located as to provide excellent bases for the air defense of Manchuria, and the ten jet airfields in the Antung/Mukden complex are so located as to permit Communist jet fighters to strafe—but not to bomb—forward UN installations.¶

16. The CAFIC is almost wholly dependent upon the USSR for logistical support, including aircraft, fuel supplies, armament, and ammunition. In addition, the USSR appears to be providing advanced pilot training within the USSR for CAFIC pilots, and Soviet personnel may be exercising operational control of the CAFIC, either directly or indirectly.

17. *Naval Forces.* The small prewar North Korean Navy was largely destroyed early in the Korean war. Except for a substantial capability of minelaying, its present effectiveness is insignificant. The operational Chinese Communist Navy consists of about 100 ships, including 42 amphibious vessels. The Chinese Communist Navy has increased its effectiveness in the past year. There has been no indication to date of Chinese Communist naval aid to North Korea.

18. The USSR is supplying the Chinese Communist Navy, and to a lesser extent, the North Korean Navy, with motor torpedo boats and other small naval vessels, as well as naval ordnance, mines, POL, radar, and deck and minesweeping gear. No Soviet submarines are known to have been transferred. The Chinese Communists and the North Koreans are probably receiving Soviet guidance and training in naval warfare and coastal defense.

Over-All Military Capabilities

19. *Ground Forces.* There are currently deployed in North Korea approximately 19 Chinese Communist armies and 5 North Korean corps. Artillery, rocket launcher, and armored units are attached to infantry divisions. Approximately 300,000 of these forces are either engaged in or immediately available for coastal defense operations. The bulk of this force is disposed in the coastal areas where amphibious operations might be anticipated. The Communists have been engaged in the strengthening of their coastal and front-line defenses since 1951. A highly organized, well-integrated defensive zone extends possibly 15 to 20 miles to the rear of present battle positions. Many fortified areas

---

¶ See attached map. [Footnote in the source text; the map is not printed.]

have been constructed in rear of this zone and are being improved and expanded. A defensive zone is believed to exist slightly to the rear of the forward fortified area and a third zone has been reported across the waist of Korea. Reports indicate extensive employment of entrenchments, wire, mines, and roadblocks in all defensive areas. Strong field fortifications have been constructed in depth along present front lines and along the east and west coasts. Logistical reserves have been substantially improved in these areas.

20. At the present time and under present conditions of limited air support, Communist ground forces in Korea have the following capabilities:

a. A large-scale offensive, with little or no warning;
b. Limited-objective offensives;
c. Defense in depth over a prolonged period;
d. Limited guerrilla operations in South Korea.

21. *Air Forces.* The CAFIC currently has the capability of seriously challenging UNC daylight air operations under conditions of good visibility over North Korea and of expanding CAFIC air operations into UN-held territory and adjacent waters. CAFIC capabilities appear to have been greatly increased during the past six months by the conversion of two light bomber regiments in Manchuria to IL–28 jet light bombers. The maximum estimated combat radius of the IL–28 is such that by staging from Southern Manchuria bases the CAFIC could launch attacks throughout South Korea and part of Japan.**

22. The CAFIC does not have the present capability, however, of challenging UNC air operations under conditions of poor visibility and has only a limited all-weather capability. CAFIC capabilities against UNC ground forces and installations are presently limited by the lack of operational jet-fighter installations in Korea from which short-range attacks, employing bombs or napalm, could be mounted. The CAFIC has not yet demonstrated the capability of carrying out either effective air-ground support operations or effective high-altitude bombing by jet aircraft.

23. Communist air defense capabilities in Korea, Manchuria, and to a lesser extent in China proper have considerably increased during the past year as a result of intensive effort. A visual observer and/or radar air warning net has been established which provides almost complete coverage along the China coast from Hainan Island through Manchuria to the Soviet frontier. An extensive radar net has been developed in the Korea–Manchuria area. However, despite the considerable progress made, present Communist radar control and communications facilities

---

**See attached map. IL–28's are believed to have a combat ceiling of 37,000 feet, approximate maximum air speed of 450 knots, and bomb-load capacity of up to 6,600 pounds. [Footnote in the source text; the map is not printed.]

are not believed capable of operating effectively against mass or saturation raids. Communist antiaircraft fire in North Korea has continued to increase in volume and accuracy over the past year and now includes some use of radar-controlled searchlights and guns. The Communists have an estimated 1,000 jet fighters in the North Korean-Manchurian area and have the capability in this area of making a vigorous fighter defense against UN air attacks under conditions of daylight and good visibility. However, these fighter defense capabilities are severely limited by darkness and poor visibility. Elsewhere in Communist China, the CAFIC may be able to deploy enough aircraft for defense of selected specific areas against air attack, but the presently available forces are too sparsely deployed and other elements of the air defense system are too weak to prevent saturation of the air defense system through simultaneous attacks against several areas. There is no indication that airborne intercept radar equipment is available to the CAFIC.

24. *Combined Air and Ground Capabilities.* If the Communists employed their maximum air capability simultaneously with a major ground force offensive but restricted their air activity to Communist-held territory, they would interfere at least initially with UNC close-support and interdiction operations. This relief from UNC air action against enemy forward elements and LOC would improve considerably the enemy's opportunities for limited success. However, under these circumstances, Communist forces would probably not have the capability to eject UNC forces from Korea. If the Communists supported a major ground offensive by surprise attacks exercising their maximum air capabilities over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC support bases,[††] the enemy would cause considerable damage to UNC jet airfield installations in the forward areas. In addition, such attacks would divert some UNC aircraft and AA weapons to purely defensive missions. Therefore, the ground force capabilities would be enhanced in that their troop movements and logistic efforts would be under considerably lighter air attacks. Although no firm estimate can be made of the situation which might ultimately develop under these circumstances, it is possible that if the Communists supported a major ground offensive by exercising their maximum air capabilities over the entire Korean theater of operations and UNC supporting bases, and achieved optimum

---

[††] Insufficient information is available on which to base a firm estimate of the maximum number of CAFIC aircraft which could be committed in the initial attack of a major air offensive. However, assuming that units in the CAFIC are assigned approximately 80 percent of their TO & E strength and that a stand-down inspection was held prior to a major air offensive, the enemy, without redeployment of aircraft, could possibly commit at present about 700 jet fighters, 120 piston fighters, 40 jet light bombers, and 25 piston light bombers. With redeployment, and with the same assumptions as above, these figures would increase to about 950 jet fighters, 150 piston fighters, 40 jet light bombers, and 150 piston light bombers. The sortie rate which could be sustained after an initial air strike is estimated to be 18 per month for each jet fighter, and 15 per month for all other types. [Footnote in the source text.]

success in these operations, the enemy might place UNC forces in jeopardy.

25. *Naval Forces.* With the exception of minelaying, North Korean naval capabilities continue to be negligible. If the Chinese Communist Navy should enter the Korean war, it would be capable of assisting the North Korean Navy as follows:

a. Motor torpedo boat surprise attacks on UN shipping in the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea.
b. Laying and sweeping naval mines.
c. Supplying up to 1,000 trained submarine personnel.
d. Providing amphibious lift for a balanced force of 3 to 4 divisions in the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea, using conventional landing craft. Control of the sea and air are necessary to conduct such operations.

26. *Likely Trends in Enemy Military Capabilities in Korea.*‡‡

a. Under continued conditions of a stalemated war in Korea. Under these circumstances Communist capabilities probably would continue gradually to improve during the period of this estimate. The Enemy is capable of continuing the augmentation of ground forces by the introduction of additional infantry, artillery, and armored units, and of continuing the improvement of fire power, tactical use of troops, and logistic support. If the USSR continued to support the CAFIC, the over-all capabilities of the Communists would probably be significantly improved and the threat to UN installations in Korea would be increased. The Chinese Communist Navy is believed capable of absorbing considerably more naval equipment, including small coastal submarines or coastal destroyers, than is now apparently being supplied them by the USSR. Whether or not such additional Soviet support is given, Chinese Communist naval capabilities for operations described in paragraph 25 would continue to increase. North Korean naval capabilities would increase to a very modest extent.

b. In the event of a cease-fire in Korea. The most significant trend likely to develop in enemy capabilities under these circumstances would be the rebuilding and re-equipping of North Korea's airfields.

Soviet Capabilities to Intervene in the Korean War

27. *Ground Forces.* If the USSR should decide to intervene openly in the Korean war, it could at the present time commit to combat within Korea an estimated 13 to 15 divisions (215,000–250,000 troops) within 30 to 60 days after a decision had been made to employ these forces. No firm estimate can be made of the Soviet forces available for use in Korea in the event of full mobilization in the Soviet Far East. The total force under such circumstances would probably be substantially in excess of 13–15 divisions.

---

‡‡The effect of certain UN/US courses of action on Communist capabilities in Korea is discussed in SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China," 9 March 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]

28. *Air Forces.* The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force consists at present of an estimated 5,600 §§ aircraft, including 1,760 jet fighters, 320 jet light bombers, 1,150 piston light bombers, and 220 TU–4 piston medium bombers. It is believed that available facilities would allow deployment into the Korean theater of less than 20 percent of the above total strength. However, the Soviet air forces could launch air strikes with approximately 150 jet light bombers, 820 piston light bombers, and 130 piston medium bombers from present bases in the Southern Maritime and Port Arthur areas against UN installations in Korea and Japan while maintaining an air defense of Soviet territory. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Force could also provide an airborne lift for 6,700 to 7,500 paratroops, or it could lift 15,000 to 18,000 paratroops in an operation extending over a 5-day period.

29. *Naval Forces.* Present Soviet naval strength in the Pacific area is estimated to be 321 surface vessels, the largest of which are two heavy cruisers and 31 destroyers; and 93 submarines, of which 64 are modern types. This force could be immediately employed in the Korean area. Soviet naval aviation in the Far East (all shore-based and included in totals given above for the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force) is estimated (TO & E) to consist of 1,540 aircraft. Utilizing their presently known number of 42 amphibious vessels, it is estimated that the Soviets could provide amphibious lift for a balanced force of 2 divisions against the east coast of Korea or Japan. Utilization of merchant vessels would afford an increased capability.

30. *Likely Trends in Soviet Military Capabilities in the Korean Area.* No major changes are expected in Soviet Far East ground force or naval capabilities during the period of this estimate. The effectiveness of the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force will probably improve through continued re-equipping of existing units with jet fighters and jet light bombers, and through increased proficiency of flying personnel with respect to formation flying, high altitude bombing, and long-range navigation under both clear and restricted visibility conditions.

Probable Communist Courses of Action in Korea

Soviet Global Interests

31. In terms of Communist global interests, the Korean war has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the war has served to tie down US military forces, has created a source of tension between the US and its allies, and has provided a useful focus and stimulus for Communist propaganda and other forms of political warfare. On the negative side, the war has been a drain on the resources of the USSR and Communist China and has provided a stimulus for main-

---

§§ TO & E strength. See Annex C. [Footnote in the source text; Annex C is not printed.]

taining the West's rearmament efforts. Moreover, the Communists probably estimate that a closing out of the war by concessions to the UN would encourage the West to maintain a firm position on other issues of the East-West conflict, would involve a loss of prestige, and might increase Communist military defections in the future.

32. Whether the Kremlin estimates that Soviet interests in the Far East can be advanced by a prolongation or by a termination of the war in Korea depends in large degree on Soviet world-wide strategy. The Kremlin probably would prefer to move toward the attainment of its objectives by means short of general war. While the Communist aggression in Korea has involved, throughout, an inherent risk of general war, the Kremlin has sought to limit its own role in the Korean war and has not sought to use the war as an excuse for initiating broader hostilities. The Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding general war over the Korean issue and for this reason would probably prefer either a continuation of the present situation or an armistice to a spread in hostilities that in its view would lead to general war.

Internal Conditions in Communist China and North Korea

33. *Communist China.* During the Korean war, Chinese Communist political controls have been intensified. Forced collection of funds has been instituted in order to finance the war and the regime's internal programs. These coercive measures have in all probability decreased the degree of willing support given the regime and the war effort. But the increasingly effective totalitarian measures of the regime are almost certainly adequate to control any resentment which may develop.

34. The economic and political strains imposed on Communist China by the Korean war are probably less at present than they were in 1950 and 1951. The rise in the industrial and agricultural output of Communist China and the strengthening of political and economic controls have increased the resources at the disposal of the regime. We therefore believe it unlikely that domestic factors, either economic or political, are placing the Chinese Communist regime under any immediate and demanding pressure to conclude an armistice in Korea. So long as the USSR continues to furnish a large share of the military equipment and supplies for the war and provides economic assistance, the Chinese Communist war effort, at current or even somewhat expanded levels, is not likely to subject the economy to serious strains.

35. *North Korea.* A critical food situation apparently exists in North Korea. Although the regime has claimed a bumper crop for 1952, food production and distribution have apparently not met civilian and military requirements, and substantial assistance from Communist China has been necessary. North Korean housing, industry, and electric power have all been severely curtailed by UNC operations. In addition, major shortages exist in consumer goods and in agricultural manpower. Ac-

cordingly, morale among the civilian population has continued to decline and there is some evidence of factionalism within the regime. However, there is no evidence that resolution of the North Korean regime or the morale of the North Korean armed forces has been substantially weakened. A prolongation of the war will almost certainly have an increasingly adverse effect on internal conditions in North Korea. However, this will probably have little influence on Communist courses of action in Korea because the interests of the North Korean regime will continue to be subordinated to the global or regional interests of the USSR.

Sino-Soviet Cooperation in Korea

36. Although there is evidence of a recent increase in Chinese Communist influence in North Korea, we believe that the USSR still dominates North Korean affairs. The question of primary influence in North Korea may eventually have an adverse effect upon Sino-Soviet relations, but it is unlikely that such rivalry will, during the period of this estimate, have any major effect upon Communist courses of action in Korea.

37. Continuation of the Korean war almost certainly creates strains in the Sino-Soviet partnership. The war undoubtedly raises the problems of the distribution of its burdens between the two powers. Furthermore, the death of Stalin has probably created some uncertainties in the Sino-Soviet relationship. In addition, Communist China's growing military and economic dependence on the USSR probably poses other difficulties which could eventually place serious strains on the Sino-Soviet relationship. However, the conflicting individual interests and the frictions, actual and potential, which may exist in the Sino-Soviet partnership have not to date hampered the enemy's effective cooperation in Korea, and there is at the present time no evidence of changes in the Korean policies of either of the two powers. Communist China probably views its security as being closely linked to that of the USSR and has demonstrated its willingness to subordinate its immediate interests to the broader objectives it shares with the USSR. Therefore, we believe that the effectiveness of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea, at least during the period of this estimate, will not be materially reduced.

Current Indications of Communist Intentions in Korea

38. *Military Indications.* Present Communist military activities in the Far East indicate a Communist intention to maintain their military commitment in Korea. While the nature of Communist military activities in Korea suggests an immediate intention to continue defensive-type operations, the continued build-up of both ground and air strength of all types appears to anticipate the possibility of the resumption of full-scale ground fighting and an extension of air warfare.

39. *Indications from Communist Diplomatic Moves.* Soviet and Chinese Communist diplomatic actions, while providing no conclusive indications of Communist courses of action, suggest an intention to continue the war in Korea. In particular, the Communists have refused to make any concessions on the POW issue. Since the indefinite suspension of truce negotiations at Panmunjom on 8 October 1952, the Communists have not indicated any readiness to compromise on their demand for "total repatriation" of POWs. This intransigence was demonstrated in the Soviet Union's violent rejection of the Menon Resolution in the UN General Assembly. The Moscow Sino-Soviet discussions and the September 1952 Sino-Soviet exchange of notes on the retention of Soviet forces in Port Arthur offer no conclusive indications of Communist intentions in Korea. However, these events do indicate a Communist desire to impress the West with the solidity of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

40. *Propaganda Indications.* Recent Communist propaganda has indicated no disposition on the part of the Communists to accept a truce on other than their own terms. The main burden of recent Communist propaganda has concerned itself with alleged US plans to extend the war and Communist ability to thwart these plans. However, there has been no indication in Communist propaganda of a major Communist offensive in Korea. Chinese Communist propaganda has stressed that its internal economic plans need not be disturbed and indeed can be stimulated by a continuation of the Korean war.

Probable Courses of Action

41. The Communists probably estimate that the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on the Western Powers and that at least during the period of this estimate the UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time the Communists probably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the Communists.

42. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea while retaining a primarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea–Manchuria area in order to be in a position to exploit any advantage which might develop or to counter possible UN/US intensification or expansion of the war.

43. We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, the Communists are unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armistice.‖ ‖

‖ ‖ SE–37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China" (Dated 9 March 1953), concludes that a naval blockade of Communist China, in conjunction with large-scale and

Continued

44. We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.

[Here follow charts and maps, none of which is printed: "Annex A, The Estimated TO & E Strength of the Communist Air Force in China"; "Annex B, The Estimated TO & E Strength of the CAFIC"; "Annex C, Estimated Soviet Far East TO & E Air Strength"; "Annex D, CCAF Aircraft Technical Capabilities"; and a map of the "Korean Theater of Operations".]

---

sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on present UN terms. [Footnote in the source text.]

795.00/4-653

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1953.

Subject: Negotiations at Panmunjom

At yesterday's meeting [2] the UNC liaison group put forward a detailed proposal for carrying out the exchange of sick and wounded. The Communists appeared to be pressing for an agreement that not only the "seriously wounded and seriously sick" personnel mentioned in Article 109 of the Geneva Convention be exchanged, but the wounded and sick "whose recovery may be expected within one year" which Article 110 of the Geneva Convention provides "may be accommodated in a neutral country." While it is possible that the Communist intent is that that the later group will be sent to a "neutral country", it appears more probable their intent is that both groups will be exchanged at Panmunjom. If this proves to be the case, there is no problem as it should insure the return of a larger number of our personnel.

At tonight's meeting, the UNC liaison group will state that we are prepared to include both groups in the exchange at Panmunjom, and will continue to press the Communists for a figure by nationality of the number they will return. The UNC liaison group is prepared at the proper time to give the figure of 5800 (5100 Korean and 700 Chinese) as covering the total of both categories of sick and wounded to be returned by the UNC. If necessary, the UNC liaison group is prepared to give a percentage breakdown between the two categories of sick and wounded, but hopes to avoid doing so.

---

[1] This memorandum was routed through Matthews; a marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

[2] Because of the 14-hour time difference between Washington and Korea, there was some ambiguity in the reference to the time and date of this meeting. The first Senior Liaison group meeting, to which Johnson referred, took place at Panmunjom at 10 a.m., Korean time, Apr. 6. An account of this meeting can be found in telegram Z 36190, Clark to JCS, Apr. 6, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

As stated to the Communists last night, the UNC is prepared to start delivery of the sick and wounded at Panmunjom within not more than seven days after agreement on exchange procedures is completed, and will deliver such personnel at the rate of approximately 500 a day. This would mean that the UNC will be able to complete delivery of all prisoners held by it, qualified for this exchange, within approximately nineteen days from the time agreement is reached.

Our allies seem to be very pleased with the way the matter is being handled. However, it is evident that it would be very difficult to obtain their acquiescence to not entering into any negotiations on the Chou En-lai proposal until after the exchange of sick and wounded has been completed, if, in fact, agreement on the sick and wounded is reached and implementation started.

As of possible interest, there is attached a copy of a memorandum of conversation with the British Embassy on this subject Saturday.[3]

No further action or instructions on our part to Clark are required at this time. The foregoing is for your information only.

---

[3] The memorandum was not attached to the source text. A memorandum of a conversation between Johnson and Tomlinson on Saturday, Apr. 4, was filed elsewhere. In it, the British Counselor passed a message from Eden to the Department of State advising flexibility and encouraging the Department to retain the initiative at Panmunjom so that UNC would not give the impression that it was lagging behind the Communists in willingness to reach an armistice. (695.0029/4–453)

795.00/4–653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 6, 1953—6:03 p. m.

624. Department distribution only. CINCFE in C 61736 April 4 [2] has informed Department Army (1) serious consequences US and UN could result from active opposition ROK Government to further armistice negotiations or agreements (2) possible course action their part could include (a) withdrawal ROK representatives UNC armistice delegation or (b) at worst attempt withdraw elements ROK Army from UN control and remove ROK Government officials from UN influence (3) plans at hand to meet emergency arising from latter contingency and all probable contingencies are under continuing study. CINCUNC recommends

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Young and Treumann.

[2] Not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

State take appropriate action influence ROK Government conform UN actions.

Department considering joint State-Defense telegram CINCUNC requesting close Embassy-CINCUNC coordination political and military implications ROK resistance armistice negotiations.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 6, 1953—12:55 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 61781. Refs: A. Z 36190 (HNU 4-1).[1] B. CX 61773.[2]

1. I consider that the ques of categories in refs to Article 110 of the Geneva Conf by the Communists, as reptd in ref A, indicates that the Communists wish to establish the category of sick and wounded to be repatriated dirly through Pan Mun Jom; and that they did not wish to exchange figures until it was clearly established which categories were to be exchanged as defined in Article 110 para 1, subparas 1, 2 and 3; and para 2, subparas 1 and 2. The ref to neutral country I consider purely academic and unconnected with the Chou En-lai refs to a "neutral state".

2. It was the impression of the liaison group that the Communists were not entirely prepared to exchange figures.

3. The preliminary est of UNC held sick and wounded pers transmitted to you by ref B included all seriously sick and wounded, fit to tvl, held by the UNC and desiring repatriation, including not only those eligible for dir repatriation under para 1 of Article 110, but those eligible for accommodation under para 2 of Article 110. An immediate breakdown into a category eligible for dir repatriation, and another category eligible for accommodation in a neutral country will be a time consuming process which must depend upon medical opinion. In order to expedite matters I intend to propose to the Communists that overall figures to include both categories, broken down by nationalities, be exchanged without delay. If the Communists insist upon a breakdown of figures by categories and sub-categories as listed in Article 110 I am initiating action now to obtain quickly percentage figures based upon the best medical opinion aval in the POW Comd. I intend to press for early ex-

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 877.

[2] In this telegram, Apr. 6, 1953, Clark informed the JCS that an estimated 5,800 sick and wounded prisoners (5,100 North Koreans and 700 Chinese) would be repatriated by the UNC, which was prepared to deliver and receive up to 500 persons a day. Clark also told the JCS that he had no indication of the number of POWs the Communists planned to repatriate. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

change of the nrs of the sick and wounded pers held by the Communists, broken down by nationalities.

4. In the second and third sentence of the second para of part 5 of the text passed to you in ref A the Communists state: "It was solely because the Korean negotiations were suspended that there was no way to implement this agreement. In consequence it has not been possible up to the present to repatriate the sick and injured pris of both sides". The inclusion of this statement is completely incongruous in view of the fact that armistice negotiations are still suspended, and may indicate some intention on their part to force a resumption of full delegation negotiations in order to reach agreement on the repatriation of sick and wounded. However, in the remainder of the para the Communists state that they are: "Now—prepared to repatriate all the sick injured—according to the provisions of—POW." In view of this latter statement I do not propose to challenge the manifest absurdity of their statement that repatriation of the sick and wounded was impossible while negotiations were in recess.

5. I note that the third para of Article 109, which precludes forcible repatriation during hostilities of those pers required to be directly repatriated in accordance with the first para of Article 110 does not apply to those pers eligible for accommodation in a neutral country as set forth in para 2 of Article 110. This point may lead to some complication in the discussion regarding those pers to be repatriated directly even though they are only eligible for accommodation in a neutral country. I therefore intend to agree immediately to repatriate all sick and wounded entitled to be directly repatriated, and to further agree to repatriate all sick and wounded eligible for accommodation in a neutral country subj to the provision that no indiv in this category shall be eligible for repatriation except in accordance with para 3 of Article 109.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 6, 1953.

Subject: Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea—NSC 147.

Discussion

The NSC Planning Board has prepared for Council decision on April 8 a long analysis of possible courses of action in Korea.[2] If the armistice negotiations fail, there appear to be two major alternative courses of action open to the United States in Korea short of initiation of global war by the United States. The first alternative would be to continue or expand military action only within Korea; while the second alternative would remove existing restrictions on military operations against Communist China and Manchuria. NSC 147 analyzes three possible specific courses of military action under each alternative, making a total of six specific courses of action presented in the order of increasing severity, and defined on pages 1-3 of NSC 147.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young and cleared with Matthews.

[2] NSC 147; for excerpts, see p. 839.

NSC 147 analyzes but does not recommend a choice of either alternative or any specific course of action under these alternatives. A long estimate of the JCS of March 30 [*27*], 1953 [3] also analyzes but does not recommend any particular course of action in Korea. NSC 147 does not take into consideration events subsequent to the recent Communist offer to exchange sick and wounded and the Chou En-lai proposal for resuming armistice negotiations.

It is desirable that on April 8 the Council decide on a military course of action for implementation if it later develops that the Communists are not acting in good faith with respect to their recent proposals.

Alternative II, authorizing military actions against Communist China and Manchuria, would create most serious political difficulties. If the United States should propose that United Nations forces in Korea initiate any one of the courses of action under Alternative II, our principal allies would immediately resist such a decision and some of them might withdraw their forces and support from the United Nations operations in Korea. Such a United States decision would put severe strains in the western alliance and would alienate much pro-United States feeling in free Asia. However, if the Communists should launch a large scale ground offensive in Korea or large scale air attacks, our principal allies would probably support retaliatory air action against Manchuria and Communist China. The Government of the Republic of Korea would prefer Alternative II and wider military actions in and near Korea if they were the only means to unify Korea.

Regardless of the intent of the United States, it must be recognized that all of the alternatives under Course II in themselves involve varying degrees of increased risk of global war as compared with any of the alternatives under Course I. This risk is, of course, increased to the degree that any of the alternatives under Course II divides the United States from its allies and leads the Soviets to the assumption that Soviet military action against the United States or its forces could be undertaken with the Allies divided from the United States. Therefore, apart from the increased military requirements for use in the Korean hostilities, it is most seriously to be questioned whether the United States should bring about a situation involving such increased risks of general war without at the same time increasing its ability to cope with such a war by markedly broadening and stepping up its entire mobilization base. Because of the terms of reference under which the Planning Board was drafting this analysis and the exigencies of the time available, the foregoing factors are not fully reflected in the analysis. It is, therefore, suggested that any final decision by the NSC to adopt one of the courses of action under Alternative II should be deferred pending an immediate study of all of its implications.

---

[3] The reference was to an attachment to NSC 147 which is not printed.

Alternative I, of course, presents fewer political problems than Alternative II. If that alternative is adopted, the question is to decide among the three courses set forth therein. From a political point of view, it would be desirable to undertake a course of action which would have the greatest immediate effects without risking major hostilities outside Korea. Course C probably best meets this test. If successful, it would enhance the prestige of the United Nations and the United States in the Far East, reduce Chinese Communist capabilities, and bring all of the most significant area of Korea under the control of the United Nations. While our allies would not propose this course of action, it is believed that with sufficient persuasion they would come to accept it, if there were no hope of concluding a successful armistice. It should be pointed out that Course C will take several months for military preparations and that it would be conducted under certain serious military disadvantages (Paragraphs 101–108).[4]

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

1. Favor Course C of Alternative I; and
2. Propose the Council recommend to the President that:

a. He authorize initiation of Course C Alternative I in sixty days if by that time the NSC advises him that there appears to be no reasonable anticipation that an armistice can be successfully and quickly concluded, and

b. The Department and agencies concerned now begin the necessary preparation within the United States Government to put Course C into effect upon the receipt of Presidential authorization. (This must, of course, include necessary budgetary preparations.)

---

[4] In paragraphs 101 to 108, which are not printed in the excerpted portion of the Staff Study attached to NSC 147, p. 841, the following military disadvantages of a major offensive to the waist of Korea were cited: 1) "Highly unpalatable personnel costs" unless restrictions upon military operations against China and Manchuria were lifted; 2) the possible necessity for attacks against Communist air forces and use of atomic weapons to ensure ultimate success; 3) high ground casualties because of strong Communist defenses; 4) a UN build-up to counter the Communist capability of reinforcing Korea with 35 divisions; 5) longer UN lines of communication; 6) the difficulty of defending the waist of Korea, thus necessitating plans to carry the war to the Yalu if a military victory short of that line could not be achieved; 7) the general military threat of China in the Far East outside of Korea; and 8) the adverse effect on the ability of U.S. armed forces to support emergency war plans.

695A.0024/4-753

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1953.

Subject: Panmunjom Negotiations

I have just received a brief telephone report on the meeting last night.[2] While progress appears to have been made, it is clear that it was not as great as represented by the press. While, as usual, the Communists' statements are surrounded by obscurities it appears that the following is the present situation:

1. They are prepared to repatriate at Panmunjom both categories of sick and wounded.
2. They "reserve the right to ask for the accommodation in a neutral country" of those sick and wounded prisoners of war in the custody of the UNC who will not be "directly" repatriated.
3. They will require one or two days to furnish us with a figure on the number of sick and wounded they will repatriate.
4. They accepted the UNC nine point proposal on arrangements for the exchange as a "basis for discussion", agreeing to some of the paragraphs and stating that the others "will have to be studied."

While the pattern has not yet clearly emerged it appears possible that the Communists may attempt to use provisions of Article 110 of the Geneva Convention concerning the accommodation in a neutral country of certain categories of prisoners as the pattern for the disposition of other prisoners held by the UNC opposing repatriation. (For your ready reference, there is attached a copy of the text of Article 110 of the Geneva Convention.)

I will inform you as soon as the full text of last night's meeting and the comments of the negotiators are received.[3]

[Attachment]

ARTICLE 110

The following shall be repatriated direct:

(1) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.

(2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year, whose condition requires treatment

---

[1] A marginal note by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

[2] The reference was to the Senior Liaison Group meeting which began at 11 a.m., Apr. 7, Korean time.

[3] The text of the Senior Liaison Group meeting minutes are found in telegrams Z 36197 and Z 36199, Clark to JCS, Apr. 7, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) For Clark's comments on the session, see telegram CX 61799, *infra.*

and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.

(3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and permanently diminished.

The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:

(1) Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.

(2) Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a threat.

The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfill in order to permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in a neutral country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:

(1) Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfill the conditions laid down for direct repatriation;

(2) Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably impaired.

If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in the Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical Commissions annexed to the present Convention.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 7, 1953—9:20 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 61799. Refs: A. Z 36197 (HNU 4–2).[1] B. Z 36199 (HNU 4–3).[2] C. CX 61782.[3] D. CX 61781.[4] E. JCS 935344 (NOTAL).[5] F. C 61723 (NOTAL).[6] G. Z 36190 (HNU 4–1).[7]

1. Liaison group repts that Communists gave every indication today that they are ready to proceed with the repatriation of sick and wounded as soon as they complete their staff work. UNC proposals of 7 Apr will be followed up on 8 Apr in order to press for an early discussion of administrative details.

2. The minor change in phraseology employed in the second para of part 2 of ref A does not conform with the text forwarded in para 2*b* of ref C, but is in accordance with the last sentence of para 5 of ref D. This change was authorized by telecon.

3. I note that constant reiteration of the phrase "sick and injured POWs", which appears many times in the Communist statement reptd in part 5 of ref A. This may be an indication that the Communists do not intend to repatriate any civil internees at this time.

4. My comments on the Communist statement in para 5 of ref A fol:

a. First para—apparently in consonance with the UNC proposed course of action.

b. Second para—no significance, merely a negative statement regarding the application of the third para of Article 109, which the UNC has already stated affirmatively.

c. Third para—no objection foreseen.

d. Fourth para—indicates the Communist intention to rqst the UNC to make arrangements for the accommodation in a neutral country of those POWs who will not be directly repatriated. This may constitute the first clue to Communist thinking on the ques set forth in para 6 *b* of ref E and should be considered in conjunction with my comment made in part 1, para *b* of ref F. I believe that this Communist statement clearly requires immediate consideration of US governmental action in an endeavor to make preliminary arrangements for the accommodation in neutral countries of POWs in UNC custody who will not be directly repatriated.[8]

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] In this telegram, dated Apr. 6, 1953, Clark transmitted to the JCS a text of the instructions he was sending CINCUNC Adv concerning the statement to be made at the first Senior Liaison Group meeting. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[4] Dated Apr. 6, p. 879.

[5] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.

[6] Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.

[7] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 877.

5. With regard to the Communist statement set forth in part 3 of ref B, the proposed agreement to which the Communists refer is the same one which was mentioned in ref G. An exact copy of the proposed agreement dlvrd to the Communists on 6 Apr will be forwarded to you by dispatch earliest. I foresee no particular difficulty arising from anything contained in the Communist statement contained in ref B, and anticipate little progress until such time as the Communists are prepared to dlvr their totals of sick and wounded, by nationality, to be repatriated, which they estimate will be completed in 1 or 2 days.

---

[8] According to a memorandum for record by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Apr. 8, Collins called the attention of Matthews and Nash to this paragraph and Clark's need for a U.S. Government position on the Communist proposal. Collins recommended, and Matthews and Nash approved, the establishment of an interdepartmental committee to follow up on telegrams received from CINCUNC. Appointed to the committee were U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State; Charles A. Sullivan, Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Lt. Col. John E. Dwan, USA, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea) 3-19-45))

INR-NIE files

Special Estimate

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 8 April 1953.
SE-41

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE UN/US MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN WAR[1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable military and political reactions of Communist China and the USSR to the following possible UN/US military courses of action with respect to the Korean war:

Course A—The UN/US to continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

Course B—The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy, in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

---

[1] According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 2 April 1953."

Course C—The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course D—The UN/US to extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increased ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E—The UN/US to undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F—The UN/US to undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

SCOPE

This estimate is directed toward the examination of probable Communist reactions to certain UN/US courses of action in Korea. Without prejudging current Communist overtures which are still to a large degree ambiguous, it is assumed for the purpose of this estimate that the Communist proposals will not result in an armistice.

ESTIMATE

Introduction: Relation of Korea to Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives

1. In order to achieve their over-all objective of weakening and destroying the Western Powers, as well as to consolidate, strengthen, and protect the bases of their power, the USSR and Communist China are united in their intention to expel the West from Asia. In Korea, they have appeared for the past year to be reconciled to the existing military stalemate, possibly estimating that the UN/US would eventually weary of the strain and that a solution could then be obtained leading ultimately to Communist control of all Korea.

2. We believe that the Communist objective eventually to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and

that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests.*

3. Communist reactions, political and military, to UN/US military initiatives in Korea will be conditioned by the following interests:

a. Retention of substantially all Korean territory north of the 38th Parallel.
b. Survival of a Communist regime in a substantial portion of North Korea.
c. Maintenance of Communist military and political prestige.
d. Security of Chinese Communist armed forces in the Korean theater.
e. Security of the Manchurian industrial complex.
f. Security of the Manchurian and Soviet borders.

4. If prior to the onset of any UN/US military course of action, the Communists recognized that they were faced with a clear choice between making the concessions necessary to reach an armistice, or accepting the likelihood that UN/US military operations would endanger the security of the Manchurian and Soviet borders, destroy the Manchurian industrial complex, or destroy the Chinese Communist armed forces, the Communists would probably agree to an armistice. However, it would be extremely difficult to present them with a clear choice of alternatives before such action was begun. Moreover, once such UN/US action was begun, Communist power and prestige would become further involved, thereby greatly increasing the difficulties of making the choice between agreeing to armistice or continuing the war.

Probable Communist Reactions to UN/US Courses of Action Which Do Not Involve Expansion of the War Beyond Korea

Course A—The UN/US to continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces, with a view to possible limited redeployment of US forces from Korea.

5. Communist China and the USSR would probably not be able initially to interpret the intent of the UN/US build-up for such a course of action. The Communists might consider that the UNC was either gradually building up for greatly intensified hostilities, or merely building up ROK strength so that the US could disengage its forces from Korea.

---

*The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"We believe that the Communist objective eventually to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe that Communist China currently desires to limit hostilities with the UN/US forces to the Korean issue and that the USSR desires to avoid any expansion of hostilities which would put at risk fundamental strengths of the Soviet Union." [Footnote in the source text.]

6. In any event, the Communists would almost certainly continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area,† and, once it became clear that the US was withdrawing forces, would probably seek to exert additional military pressure in Korea. The Communists would probably estimate that such a UN/US course of action would not threaten any of their principal interests in Korea, and therefore they would almost certainly not feel compelled thereby to make concessions to secure an armistice. Although the Communists may desire to force the US to continue to maintain the concentration of its forces in Korea, the Communists have other objectives, above all eventually to bring all of Korea under Communist control. The substitution of ROK for US forces might be regarded by the Communists as improving their chances for obtaining these other objectives.

7. Course A would probably have little or no immediate effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea.

Course B—The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the US.

Course C—The UN/US to maintain current restrictions on military operations but continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

8. The Communists would probably not be able initially to interpret UN/US intention with regard to these alternative courses of action. They would probably base their estimate on the size and composition of the UN/US build-up for these intensified military operations and on the degree of mobilization within the US. Unless there were a marked reinforcement of UN/US forces in Korea, the Communists would probably estimate that the UN/US strength and determination for these proposed alternatives would not be great enough to sustain military operations which would seriously threaten their principal interests in the Korean theater.

9. The initial Communist reaction, once such military operations had begun would be to counter vigorously. The Chinese Communists would make a maximum ground defense effort against these UNC operations, and would also launch strong counteroffensives. They would make a maximum air defense effort over Communist-held territory and would

---

†See NIE-80, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea through 1953," dated 3 April 1953, for a discussion of Communist military capabilities in Korea. [Footnote in the source text; for NIE-80, see p. 865.]

probably launch air strikes against UNC amphibious operations. We have no basis for determining whether during the first phases of the action, the Communists would or would not commit the Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC)‡ to large-scale operations over UN-held territory. They almost certainly would not commit Soviet ground forces in Korea or Soviet air forces over UN-held territory. We believe that the Communists would accept substantial losses of men and matériel in countering or containing these UNC operations. We are unable to estimate whether such losses, however great, would in themselves induce the Communists to seek an armistice.

10. If UN forces launched a general offensive, as contemplated in Course C, the Communists would probably estimate that the UN/US was determined to drive the Communist forces from all Korea. If the Communists estimated that they would be unable to halt the UN advance without expanding the war, they might accept the risks of general war involved by committing their air force unreservedly over UN-held territory or even introducing Soviet ground units to stiffen the Communist defense. Before accepting these risks, however, they would probably attempt to secure an armistice which would leave a substantial part of North Korea in Communist hands.

11. If, on the other hand, the Communists retreated without expanding the war or seeking an armistice, and UN/US forces halted at the waist, the Communists probably would reconstitute their forces and continue the war.

12. Courses B and C would probably not affect Sino-Soviet cooperation in Korea.

Probable Communist Reactions to UN/US Courses of Action Which Involve Expansion of the Korean War

Course D—If the US/UN were to extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by stages, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and, if required, increased ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean war might be achieved.

Course E—If the UN/US were to undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean war.

Course F—If the UN/US were to undertake a coordinated, large-scale offensive in Korea and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean war on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

---

‡The term CAFIC is meant to include North Korean air units and Soviet units which are believed to be operating with the Chinese Communists. [Footnote in the source text.]

13. If, prior to actual initiation of such military operations, the Communists should become convinced that the strength and determination of the UN powers were sufficient to endanger their principal interests in the Korean theater, and that these dangers could not be averted without serious risk of a general war, they would probably make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice.

14. If, as a result of Communist miscalculation of UN/US capabilities and intentions, or because the Communists were not willing to make the compromises necessary to obtain an armistice, the war were expanded to Manchuria and China proper, the Communists would almost certainly assume, particularly if UN ground forces launched large-scale attacks in Korea, that the UN/US was prepared to accept great risks in order to drive the Communists from Korea. The Communists would almost certainly assume that any UNC air attacks against Manchuria or China proper would sooner or later include air attacks against their Chinese Communist industrial complex.

15. We believe that in response to the initiation of any of these courses of action, the Communists would offer maximum resistance, including greatly increased Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchuria and China proper and CAFIC attacks on UN forces and bases in the Far East. So long as they estimated that they would be able to maintain the security of their forces in Korea, inflict serious losses on the UN air forces attacking China and Manchuria, and protect Manchurian industry, we believe the Communists would not be willing to sacrifice any of their important interests in Korea in order to obtain an armistice.§ Under these circumstances, their unwillingness to compromise their position in Korea would be strengthened if their political and psychological countermeasures appeared to have the effect of significantly reducing UN and/or US determination to sustain an expanded war in the Far East.

16. If, however, in the implementation of any of the above courses of action, the Communists were unable to counter UN/US air operations against Manchuria and if it appeared to the Communists that the Manchurian industrial complex were threatened with destruction, we believe that the Communists would be willing to sacrifice some of their interests in Korea in order to obtain a cessation of hostilities. If simulta-

---

§SE-37, "Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China," dated 9 March 1953, concludes that a large-scale and sustained air and naval bombardment of key Chinese Communist transportation lines, in conjunction with a naval blockade, would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on UN terms. [Footnote in the source text; for the text of SE-37, see volume XIV.]

neously with air attacks on Manchuria and China proper, UN/US forces were advancing in North Korea, the Communists, while seeking to negotiate an armistice that secured continued Communist control over a substantial portion of North Korea, might commit Soviet air units over UN-held territory and might introduce Soviet ground forces in Korea. The USSR would, in any event, leave to the UN/US the responsibility for recognizing the commitment of Soviet forces as a *casus belli.*

17. Although we believe these UN/US courses of action would impose strains on Sino-Soviet relations, we do not believe that these courses of action would cause the Chinese Communist leadership to alter basically its alignment with the USSR.

Employment of Atomic Weapons

18. We believe that if atomic weapons were employed by UN/US forces in any of the above alternative courses of action, the Communists would recognize the employment of these weapons as indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean war to a successful conclusion. We are unable to estimate whether this recognition would by itself lead the Communists to make the concessions necessary to reach an armistice. We believe that the Communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted.

Non-Participation of UN Powers

19. If UN powers refused to participate in these courses of action, the Communists would be encouraged to resist in the hope of further straining US relations with its Western allies and in the hope that US determination to sustain the war alone would falter. The Communists would also feel that the risks of general war would be lessened and therefore they might be less restrained in their military reactions against US operations.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, April 8, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 139th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Director of Defense

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Apr. 16.

Mobilization; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follows discussion on items: 1. "National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies", 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security", and 3. "United States Policies in the Far East".]

4. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC 147; NSC 118/2; Memo for the NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea", dated March 30, 1953; NIE-80; SE-4)[2]

Mr. Cutler then turned to the paper on Korea, and requested a discussion in the first place of page 44,[3] which dealt with the problem of reimbursement of the United States by nations having forces in Korea, for logistic and other support afforded these forces by the United States.

After a brief discussion, General Bradley suggested that the best solution for the time being was to drag our feet and go on as we had been going, since it was still important to try to secure additional forces, and it would be little less than catastrophic if any nation withdrew its forces from Korea because of our insistence on reimbursement for U.S. services performed.

With respect to the alternative courses of action in Korea, Mr. Cutler suggested that it would be premature for the Council to make a choice now, in view of the new possibility that the Communists were really prepared to enter into an armistice in Korea. He suggested, however, that the Council should now hear from the Secretary of State the latest information on the new armistice proposals and the views of the State Department on them.

In the first place, said Secretary Dulles, he desired to emphasize a point which had not, in his opinion, been adequately covered in the present report on alternatives open to us in Korea. The fact of the matter was that the United States had inherited an armistice agreement which had been complete except for the one point of the disposal of prisoners of war. In view of the changed situation and the possible desire of the Communists for an armistice, it seemed to Secretary

---

[2] For excerpts of NSC 147, see the Staff Study, p. 841; for NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1382; the memorandum of Mar. 30 is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 838; for NIE-80, Apr. 3, see p. 865; and for SE-41, Apr. 8, see *supra.*

[3] The reference was to NSC 147 and the page number reference referred to paragraph 168 of the Staff Study section of that paper. For text, see p. 850.

Dulles questionable whether we should feel bound now by the other provisions in the armistice to which we had agreed earlier. The particular point that disturbed him was that in effect this armistice would be perpetual unless one side or the other deliberately broke it or unless it was agreed by both sides to break it. This situation, if continued, would enable the Communists to sit it out indefinitely on the line which they now occupied, and refuse to go forward to any satisfactory political settlement in Korea.

Secretary Dulles stated his belief that it was now quite possible to secure a much more satisfactory settlement in Korea than a mere armistice at the 38th parallel, which would leave a divided Korea not economically viable nor politically acceptable to the South Koreans. He would himself have much preferred at the outset an armistice agreement which would have required in its wake a political settlement, in the absence of which the United States would have been permitted to call off the armistice.

The President inquired whether the United States did not now propose to look at the whole situation *de novo.* Was it now not perfectly possible to reopen all the agreed armistice provisions?

Secretary Dulles said that this would be very hard to do. Our allies were desperately anxious to see the fighting stopped. Nevertheless, he affirmed that we should certainly be able to secure a better armistice in view of our much greater power and the Soviet Union's much greater weakness currently.

The President stated his belief that it would be impossible to call off the armistice now and to go to war again in Korea. The American people would never stand for such a move.

Nevertheless, replied Secretary Dulles, our current trading position is a great deal better, and he personally would like to be able to say to the Communists that unless we could divide Korea at the waist rather than at the 38th parallel, we would call off the armistice.

Certainly, thought Secretary Wilson, if we are going to undertake a long-range settlement of Korea, the South Koreans must be "dealt in". So far they had been on the outside of plans to settle their future.

Secretary Humphrey inquired the nature of the ultimate settlement we desired in Korea.

The President explained this as a unified democratic Korea, and then inquired of General Bradley how it had happened that the armistice agreement had been worded in such a way as to carry the implication of permanence.

General Bradley was unable to answer, and the President then observed that the American negotiators should be instructed to state that in certain circumstances and on due notice the armistice could be ended.

Mr. Cutler suggested likewise that our people be instructed to state that we reserved our right to void the armistice if it turned out to be a fraud and led to no settlement.

While there was rather strong reaction in the Council against this suggestion, the President pointed out that in any case the Communists would void the armistice with impunity whenever they thought it convenient.

In that case, replied Secretary Dulles, in all likelihood global war would follow. What we really want, he continued, is a satisfactory settlement of the Korean problem, and we should be in a position to call off any armistice if it proves impossible to achieve such a permanent settlement. This must be done adroitly, however, in order not to offend our allies.

[Here follows a statement of action on item 3. "United States Policies in the Far East."]

Action on Item 4: [4]

The National Security Council:

a. Agreed that the United States should make clear, in some appropriate way, that, without revising provisions already agreed upon, the United States interprets the purpose of the armistice to be the achievement of a political settlement in Korea and that, if this purpose is not achieved within a reasonable time, the armistice may be voiced [*voided*].

b. Agreed that the current practice regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea (see paragraphs 168–180 of NSC 147) should be continued for the time being.

c. Deferred further action of the reference report on the subject (NSC 147) pending further study.

Note: The actions in *a* and *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows discussion of items: 5. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China", 6. "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan", 7. "Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to their Costs", and 8. "Status of NSC Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON
Deputy Executive Secretary

---

[4] The following paragraph and note constituted NSC Action No. 759; a record copy of this action is located in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

795.00/4–853

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1953.

Subject: Call by Korean Ambassador

We have informed the Korean Ambassador that you are seeing him at the request of the President.[2] We do not know the exact contents of his instructions from President Rhee but assume that they reiterate (1) Korean opposition to an armistice along the present lines, since it would not provide for (*a*) Korean unification, (*b*) the withdrawal of Chinese Communist armies from Korea, (*c*) disarmament of North Korean armies, (*d*) recognition of Republic of Korea sovereignty over all Korea; and (2) Korean desires for a bilateral defense pact with the United States.

During the past week Korean Government opposition to a possible resumption of the armistice negotiations has been manifested by anti-armistice parades and condemnatory public statements. General Clark is concerned by this campaign of incitement and fears that at worst the Republic of Korea Government may attempt to withdraw elements of the ROK army from United Nations control and remove ROK officials from United Nations influence. In any event, a continuation of the ROK campaign presents obvious dangers.

President Rhee probably full well realizes the impossibility of opposing any United States Government decision to enter into an armistice. However, President Rhee hopes to use this opposition to an armistice to obtain a bilateral defense pact from the United States. We must recognize that this strong desire for a defense pact is motivated not only by political considerations on the part of Rhee but also by what is a genuine, however exaggerated, fear of abandonment by the U.S. We should find some way of meeting it more successfully than we have thus far.

In the past we have attempted to meet this situation by frequent public and private reassurances to Korean leaders and by communicating confidentially in March, 1952 the substance of the "Greater Sanctions" statement to President Rhee.

A bilateral defense pact presents problems in relation to maintaining the UN character of the present action in Korea and has been strongly opposed by Defense in the light of the fact that their general war plans do not call for the defense of Korea. Therefore, I do not believe we are in any position at this time to give the Korean Government any assurance with regard to the conclusion of a defense pact. However, this is a problem upon which we have been working and upon which I hope we will be able to submit recommendations to you.

---

[1] A marginal notation on the source text by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 7, presumably in draft, if the date of the memorandum indicated when it was actually completed.

[2] For a report of the Dulles–Yang meeting, see the memorandum of conversation, *infra*.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Developments.

Participants: Secretary Dulles
Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador, Embassy of Korea
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Counselor, Embassy of Korea
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

On instructions from President Rhee, Ambassador Yang came in to see the Secretary at 5:00 o'clock today. He said that in general President Rhee is worried over the tactics of the Communists with regard to the armistice negotiations in Korea and their so-called "peace offensive". President Rhee feels that "the leopard never changes his spots", and that the Communist tactics should be viewed with great caution, since they are intended to disrupt and befuddle the free nations. According to the Ambassador, while President Rhee is glad that the United States views these recent developments with a certain skepticism, he is particularly concerned over the effect that the armistice negotiations may have on the future of Korea.

The Ambassador then asked for the Secretary's opinion on the following five points that President Rhee believes must be fulfilled to safeguard the security of the Republic of Korea if there were an armistice: (1) all of Korea must be reunited; (2) all Chinese Communists forces must be removed from Korean territory; (3) the North Korean forces must be disarmed; (4) any third party must be prevented from providing arms to the Communists in Korea; and (5) the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea must be made clear and it must have a voice in international discussions regarding the future of Korea.

The Secretary replied that we, of course, were generally in accord with his fifth point, and that the first four are desirable objectives which we all support. On point one, he noted how the United States for several years had taken the initiative in the United Nations in promoting the establishment of an independent and unified Korea. He said, however, that he was not clear as to all the implications that there might be in President Rhee's five points, particularly the second, third and fourth. He told the Ambassador that we are not obligated to use force to unify Korea or drive out the enemy, for we do not believe in using war as an instrument of foreign policy. There might be more effective ways to accomplish them than by the use of force, since there would appear to be a better chance for establishing peace in Korea than was possible two years ago. He mentioned the internal difficulties that are taking place within the Soviet Union and the probable Soviet desire to eliminate a continuing military threat to their bases in Port Arthur, Dairen and Vladivostok and to the industrial complex in Manchuria. He informed the Ambassador that, knowing the general attitude of President Rhee, he had already discussed this matter with President Eisenhower before this meeting, and that he could say that there would be no relaxation on the part of the United States to continue building the unity of the free world and in promoting our overall objectives in Korea. He asked the Ambassador if he would clarify some of the implications of the five points.

---

[1] According to notes attached to the source text, this memorandum was cleared by Robertson and then submitted to the Secretary of State, who desired changes in it. The changes were made and are reflected in the memorandum as printed. The source text did not indicate the changes Dulles suggested.

However, the Ambassador turned to the question of a mutual security pact between the United States and Korea. He said that, if there is to be an armistice, such a pact would greatly relieve the fears and anxieties of his people, who are constantly afraid that the United States and the United Nations will desert them. He asked the Secretary what opinion the United States Government had of this matter.

The Secretary replied that he had previously discussed this with officials of the Korean Government, particularly Foreign Minister Pyun when he was in New York,[2] and had pointed out the difficulties involved. He undertook to explain carefully to the Ambassador that a principal difficulty for the United States is the question of what is the territory of the Republic of Korea, since the Pacific security treaties are to be brought into effect when the territory of a signatory is attacked. As the Republic of Korea claims all of Korea as its territory, a mutual security treaty now might obligate the United States to use force to drive the enemy entirely out of Korea, and that we cannot undertake to do. On the other hand, if such a treaty covered only the present territory south of the battleline, it might give legal effect to the current division of Korea, which we do not wish to ratify. The dilemma for the United States in both the case of Korea and of China is that it is hard to give formal guarantees to governments which claim territory they do not control and which desire treaties with the United States that might obligate it to go to apply force against the Communists in both areas. The Secretary also noted that Congress might not approve such pacts now.

---

[2] A partial account of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation by O'Connor, dated Mar. 10, not printed. (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199)

Thus, the question regarding President Rhee's interest in a pact with the United States is whether or not this should be considered today or later, when the situation in Korea is stabilized. It would be better from the United States point of view to give consideration to such a pact after the political conference has worked out a peaceful settlement for Korea.

Ambassador Yang replied that he still thought a mutual security pact should be developed with the Republic of Korea as such. He apparently did not feel that the territorial question was insurmountable, although he may not have fully understood the problem. He suggested that, if a line were to be drawn along the "waist" of Korea, the area to the south could be considered the territory of the Republic of Korea for purposes of a pact. Pointing out again that one of the prime reasons for the insecurity of the Korean people was their worry over possible abandonment by the United States and the United Nations, he suggested that a statement by the United States Government that it would never desert the Korean people would be most helpful.

The Secretary replied that, of course, we had absolutely no intention of deserting the Korean people and that it is generally wise to make one's intentions clear in advance. If that had been done before June 1950, there might not have been any invasion. The problem of an advance commitment is the time and the place to make it clear. With a truncated Korea and hostilities still going on, it would be most difficult now to make a formal commitment for there must be a territorial settlement before any such guarantee could be clear. Furthermore, a military declaration by the United States now might unfavorably prejudice the attitude of the Communists against the political conference, where we hoped it would be possible to obtain their agreement to a definite settlement of peace in Korea.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador if it would help the position of his government if President Eisenhower could make a statement in the near future to the effect that the United States would not desert Korea. He replied that this would be "wonderful". The Secretary said that he would discuss such a possibility with President Eisenhower.

The Ambassador asked to see the President next week. The Secretary replied that he would try to arrange it after his return to Washington.[3]

Before leaving, Ambassador Yang said that the Korean Government was extremely concerned over the lack of adequate rations for the

---

[3] From Apr. 10–16, Dulles vacationed at Duck Island in Lake Ontario. (Princeton University, Dulles papers, Dulles Appointment Book)

Korean armed forces. He asked that the United States Government do all it could to improve this situation. The Secretary told him that the matter was under serious consideration by appropriate authorities and that we would look into it.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 8, 1953—7:15 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 936069. From JCS. References: A. JCS 935344 [1] B. C 61723 [2] C. CX 61799 [3]

Part I:

1. Reference paragraph 4*d*, reference C. We concur that Communist reservations may indicate intent to seek to establish principle of accommodation in neutral countries for non-repatriated sick and wounded in accordance with first sentence, second paragraph, Article 109, Geneva Convention. They may then seek to use this as pattern for subsequent agreement on all other non-repatriates. While Article 109 is intended to apply during hostilities they may well be seeking to establish a pattern thereunder which could be extended to post-hostilities stage.

2. You should continue to seek agreement on immediate exchange of maximum number sick and wounded repatriates, avoiding injection of question of disposition of sick and wounded non-repatriates which can only result in hold-up of completion exchange sick and wounded. While failure to take issue with Communist reservation at this time may later be cited by them as evidence of our acquiescence in it, we believe it preferable not to mention this reservation in order avoid entanglement extended discussion non-repatriates. If in light of the negotiating situation it becomes necessary to comment on reservation, suggest that you state that UNC reserves its position with regard to this reservation. If further comment becomes necessary, state that UNC does not commit itself at this time as to what rights, if any, Communists have in this regard, or what position UNC will take on these issues in any future discussions of non-repatriates.

3. If the Communists insist on discussing and settling question of disposition of sick and wounded non-repatriates as condition for agreement on exchange of sick and wounded repatriates you should state that UNC sees no reason that this question cannot and should not be resolved following disposition question sick and wounded repatriates.

---

[1] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.

[2] Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.

[3] Dated Apr. 7, p. 885.

4. Although we are considering comments contained in reference B, part 1, paragraph *a*, we do not believe that real progress can be made or decisions reached concerning the question of sending non-repatriated to neutral countries until we receive specific and detailed proposal from the Communists as requested by your letter of April 5[4] and by the UNC liaison group at the April 6 meeting.

Part II:

For your information and any comments you may wish to make, the following are preliminary State Department views on the legal aspects of the questions which thus far appear to have been raised by the Communist reservation at April 7 meeting liaison group:

A. The first paragraph of Article 109 creates an unconditional obligation to repatriate seriously wounded and seriously sick if they are fit to travel. The third paragraph of Article 109 provides that this obligation applies only to those willing to go and that the parties are forbidden to repatriate such sick and wounded against their will during hostilities.

B. Paragraph 2, Article 109, provides that throughout the duration of hostilities parties "shall endeavor . . . to make arrangements for the accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded POWs referred to in the second paragraph of the following article". As to these sick and wounded of lesser seriousness there is therefore in the nature of an obligation to seek in good faith an agreement for their accommodation with a neutral country during hostilities. There is no obligation to make any particular agreement. While Communists therefore may reserve the right to "ask" for an agreement in regard to internment in a neutral country of such sick and wounded POWs who are not repatriated, UNC will be in a position to insist on conditions (e.g. in regard to ultimate disposition, what country they shall go to, etc.).

C. The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 109 provides "They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation of internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity". The possibility exists that under this sentence the Communists may seek agreement for the internment of all non-repatriates in neutral countries. Under this sentence there is no obligation to seek agreement. In any agreement entered into, we could, of course, impose any conditions that we like.

D. Under Articles 6 and 118 both sides could enter into an agreement to permit prisoners not wishing to return to go to third countries after termination of active hostilities.

E. Nothing in Article 109 or in the succeeding related Articles or in Article 118 prevents UNC from refusing to repatriate any POWs against their will. The third paragraph of Article 109 adds a requirement that no seriously wounded or seriously sick POW may be repatriated against his will during hostilities; it leaves unimpaired the right of the detaining power to refuse to repatriate other categories of prisoners against their will. We would therefore have the right to make non-forcible repatriation a condition of any agreement to transfer sick and wounded or other POWs to neutral countries during or after hostilities.

---

[4] An excerpt from this letter is printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents,* vol. II, p. 2655. A full text is in telegram CX 61752, Clark to JCS, Apr. 4, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Editorial Note

The Senior Liaison Group met again on April 8 and General Lee Sang Cho, the chief Communist liaison officer, announced that a total of 450 Korean and 150 non-Korean sick and wounded prisoners would be repatriated to the United Nations Command. Admiral John C. Daniel, the senior liaison officer for the United Nations Command, characterized this figure as "incredibly small" and urged the Communists to be more liberal in their interpretation of sick and wounded. Daniel then informed his opposite that the United Nations Command intended to transfer 700 Chinese and 5,100 Koreans.

During the next three days the details of Operation LITTLE SWITCH, as the exchange of sick and wounded was called by the United Nations Command, were worked out. On April 11 an agreement was signed which completed the arrangements and set April 20 as the date for the beginning of the exchange.

Complete copies of telegrams to the JCS transmitting the record of these liaison meetings as well as supporting telegrams can be found in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413. For the record of the meetings of April 6 through 9, some related documents, and the text of the agreement of April 11, see the Department of State *Bulletin,* April 20, 1953, pages 570–576. See also, Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pages 414–415.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower [1]

TOP SECRET KYUNG MU DAI, April 9, 1953.

DEAR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: I have often thought of writing you, but refrained from doing so for fear of encroaching upon your valuable time. The moment has come, however, when I have to inform you of what steps we must take regarding the Korean war situation.

I know without doubt the sincerity of your determination to settle the Korean war with honor as soon as possible. I know also that the opposition to your policy on the part of foreign powers, as well as of the peace-at-any-cost circles, is so strong that any Administration might feel hampered and handicapped. Under this circumstance, the Korean people again suffer disappointment, although they are not disappointed with you but in the whole situation.

---

[1] The source text was the signed original; Sherman Adams sent a copy of this letter to President Eisenhower in Augusta, Georgia on Apr. 14, 1953.

If this situation is allowed to continue, Korea cannot survive as an independent nation and it will be made another China. Perhaps that is what some United Nations members would wish. If Korea were given to the Soviets, nonetheless, all the so-called free nations will be in grave danger of being the next victims, one by one.

At all events, either as a result of the Indian resolution or of the Communists' recent offer of peace negotiations, if they arrange a peace agreement allowing the Chinese to remain in Korea, we have to ask all the friendly nations whose armed forces are now fighting in Korea and who do not desire to join with us in our determination to defeat aggressive communism and drive up to the Yalu River, to withdraw from Korea. Any nation which will join with us in our efforts to drive the Chinese Communists out of Korean territory will be welcomed to work with us. In this we must reiterate our original announcement that we will not move one step beyond our age-old national boundary line without your request.

[Here follow two paragraphs which President Eisenhower paraphrased in *Mandate for Change*, pages 181–182.]

With prayers for your health and success,

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

Matthews files, lot 53 D 417: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 11, 1953—9:38 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 61879. Ref: A. Z 36244 (HNU 4–13).[1] B. C 61854 (HNC 1617).[2] C. CX 61752.[3] D. JCS 935741 (NOTAL).[4]

1. I feel strongly that we are in no psn to refuse to resume full del meetings sooner or later, and preferably sooner, with or without rec additional details from the Communists as to their plan for resolving the PW deadlock. Sensing here is that Communists probably want armistice. In view of Communist ltr contained in ref B, and comments made by their liaison group in ref A, I do not consider that I can arbitrarily reject their rqst to discuss resumption of plenary sessions since they have, to some degree, met the demands presented to them in my ltr of 19 Oct 52, which required either acpt of the UNC proposals or submis-

---

[1] This telegram, dated Apr. 11, 1953, transmitted to the JCS the record of the meeting of the Senior Liaison Group on Apr. 11, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] This telegram, dated Apr. 10, 1953, transmitted to the Department of the Army a letter received from the Communists on Apr. 9, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413). For a text of this letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 575–576.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 901.

[4] Dated Apr. 3, p. 863.

sion in writing of a constr counter-proposal. This, in my opinion, they have done. At the same time I cannot now acpt their proposal presented in ref A to reconvene plenary sessions since they have not sup a "detailed statement of suggestions for the implementation of the proposal for settling the entire ques of repatriating PW" as set forth in para 1*b*, ref C, and guidance in para 5 of ref D.

2. Accordingly, I plan to instr my liaison group to meet with the Communist liaison group to discuss the basis for reopening plenary sessions. This has the fol advantages:

a. We do not place ourselves in the psn of the one who refuses to meet.
b. We do not rush into a plenary session.
c. It may give us time to observe manner in which Communists implement exchange of sick and injured PW.
d. Does not maneuver us into a psn of demanding more info by ltr and being refused, a psn from which we would have to retreat.
e. At the same time it may prov us with some idea of how the Communists intend Chou En-lai proposal will be implemented. Since we undoubtedly will be forced to agree to meeting in plenary session later, it will be to our advantage to resolve, or at least ident, issues insofar as possible.

3. Rqst your comments and rcmd ASAP.[5] As soon as rec, reply to Nam Il will be prep.

---

[5] For the JCS comments, see *infra.*

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1953—5:28 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 936359. From CSUSA. References: (*a*) CX 61879[1] (*b*) JCS 935344[2] (*c*) JCS 935741[3] (*d*) DA 936349.[4] JCS have directed me to send following:

1. Concur we are not in position to refuse to resume full delegation meetings sooner or later. We would prefer that delegation meetings not be resumed until Communist good faith is demonstrated by completion exchange sick and wounded. Also, as stated in paragraph 3, reference (*b*), we would prefer that a detailed statement from the Communists on

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.

[3] Dated Apr. 3, p. 863.

[4] This telegram, Apr. 12, 1953, was an interim reply to CX 61879, in which CINCUNC was instructed to take no action on paragraphs 2 and 3 of CX 61879 until receipt of the message printed here. (Department of Defense files)

their plans for implementation of the Chou En-lai proposal be received prior to resuming delegation meetings. However, in view of the likelihood that Communists will continue to maintain positions set forth in their 9 April letter to General Harrison [5] and will amplify their proposal only in meeting of delegations, and in view length of time which will be required for completion exchange sick and wounded, it would not appear desirable to attempt to maintain position set forth two preceding sentences. This is particularly pointed up by attitudes and pressures in UN for immediate resumption armistice negotiations, and for substantive discussions armistice in UNGA. Therefore, in order not to become prematurely involved in negotiations on Chou proposal either in liaison group or delegation meetings, necessary to space UNC action, including transmittal of suggested letter, over period of time as indicated below so that we are not required to enter into delegation meetings until exchange of sick and wounded well underway.

2. Since Communists will probably not amplify their proposal until delegation meetings are resumed, and since they may be expected to employ negotiating tactics which will attempt obtain UNC agreement in principle prior to amplifying their proposal sufficiently to permit a judgment of its acceptability, further pursuit of tactics set forth paragraph 2, reference (*b*) appear to be unproductive.

3. It is believed that the initiative could now advantageously be seized by UNC in a reply to Communist letter to General Harrison of 9 April setting forth in relatively specific terms a plan for implementation of Chou En-lai's proposal which would be acceptable to the UNC, and suggesting a date for meeting of the liaison group to set the date for resumption of delegation meetings.

4. In the light of the foregoing, suggest that reply to Communist letter of 9 April and Communist request for liaison group meetings (paragraph 8d Z 36244) [6] be by letter. Letter should refer to fact that Communists have not amplified details for implementation of their proposal as invited by UNC, and to the last sentence, paragraph 2, your letter 31 March,[7] and should proceed along line that nevertheless UNC is prepared to have liaison group meet to set date for resumption delegation meetings. Letter should state that in doing so, UNC considers it implicit that when delegation meetings are resumed Communist proposals will be constructive and therefore will include reasonable and practical arrangements for implementing proposals. Letter should further state that in view of UNC the following arrangements would be reasonable and constructve and could lead to a prompt resolution of this problem:

---

[5] For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 575–576.

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

[7] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 528.

(1) That the "neutral state" be a nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind;
(2) That in the interest of practicality POWs who are not directly repatriated be released in Korea to the custody of the neutral state;
(3) That after a reasonable time has elapsed, during which representatives of the Communists would have access to the personnel in question, the neutral state will make appropriate arrangements for the disposition of those remaining.

Letter should propose a liaison group meeting date 2 or 3 days subsequent to date delivery of letter to decide on date resumption delegation meetings. Text of foregoing letter should be submitted to JCS for approval prior to delivery.

5. It is suggested foregoing letter be delivered to Communists April 14 or 15; that date of liaison group meeting be set for April 17 or 18; and at liaison group meeting date for delegation meeting be set not less than 3 days following beginning of actual exchange of sick and wounded. Foregoing procedure will give opportunity to reconsider question of delegation meetings if Communists do not undertake exchange of sick and wounded as agreed, and should also enable UNC to maintain initiative and control of situation.

795.00/4–1453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, April 14, 1953—noon.

1218. Following are joint Embassy–KCOMZ views re ROK Government attitude on armistice. Being forwarded independently through military channels to Department of Army.

ROK Government has assumed clear and unequivocal position of opposition to armistice and advocacy of national unification by force which has been expressed by Office Public Information, National Assembly, Foreign Ministry and President Rhee himself. Press comment has supported government position and campaign of mass rallies organized by government is building up. Rallies have already taken place in Seoul, Pusan and Inchon. Can be anticipated that in absence some move in direction ROK objectives, as stated in government's "five points", latter may adopt increasingly difficult attitude.

Motivation behind present ROK attitude, which reflects long-standing government position, is strong natural desire for national unification under ROK coupled with feeling of insecurity arising from (1) fact of 1950 aggression, (2) reality of political pressure of Russo-Chinese power-mass and (3) fear US may not come to ROK support in event future aggression.

Possibility exists President Rhee might take action to effect some degree of withdrawal ROK support for UNC, such as representation on armistice delegation or, as extreme, but militant use of ROK Forces, if he thought this would achieve his long-range objectives. Danger here is his general unpredictability and tendency occasionally to act without adequate prior consideration of consequences. On balance, however, we doubt he will go this far as he has shown himself in past to be political realist re strength his own position and he is undoubtedly aware such move would isolate him from only real support ROK has, namely, US–UN. We believe present campaign is essentially attempt to maximize his bargaining position vis-à-vis US with view to obtaining fullest possible US support his goals. His letter of March 21, 1952 to President Truman [1] indicates extent to which ROK opposition to armistice is for purpose obtaining formal defense assurances for future. At present time Rhee is probably in position to turn Korean "public opinion" in one way or other concerning this issue.

Recommend US Government consider urgently what measures can be taken now to satisfy ROK objectives and seek to obtain their continuing support for US–UN policy. Maximum satisfaction, short of "unification through victory," would be US Government agreement to some form of bilateral security pact with ROK, possibly together with assurances of US support for Korean unification by peaceful means and reconstruction aid, and full-fledged ROK participation in political conference following armistice. We recognize difficulties involved in security pact, as outlined to Ambassador Yang by Secretary Dulles,[2] but recommend continued effort to find way to overcome them. Second possible course would be unilateral public assurance by President that US will not desert Korea coupled with such of above-suggested supplementary measures as are feasible. We doubt, however, whether public declaration alone will satisfy Rhee sufficiently to modify his attitude on armistice.

Since ROK Government is mobilizing its resources behind campaign of opposition believe course of action should be decided soonest and decision made known to Rhee. We should also consider as matter of urgency what concessions in addition to support for armistice and US–UN policy should be asked of ROK (for example, agreement on general principles of civil affairs agreement covering UN forces) if bilateral security pact given.

BRIGGS

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 114.

[2] See the memorandum of conversation, p. 897.

795.00/4–1553

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1953.

Subject: Current Thinking about Korea's Future

May I suggest that it might be timely for the three Office Directors to meet with you in the near future to discuss some of the major issues in the Far East posed by the problem of Korea's future and current Soviet tactics. The recent National Security Council papers on the Far East need to be reviewed in terms of at least these two problems.

I am troubled by recent statement in the press that the United States should insist on the so-called "waistline" of Korea as the territorial settlement for the establishment of peace in Korea following an armistice. This concept has been developed in the editorial of the current issue of *Life*, in a recent statement made by Senator Taft, and in the views attributed to Mr. "X", who gave the background briefing last week. It is reinforced by another concept, given sanction by the National Security Council at its meeting last Wednesday,[2] that the armistice agreement will be considered void if a peaceful settlement has not been arrived at "in a reasonable time".

Both concepts may do us great harm. They contradict the fundamental political and military reality underlying the Korean hostilities, which is that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. in the present status of the world balance of power has the desire to use maximum force to gain full victory in Korea. Neither side has decided to make Korea the ultimate test of strength for imposing its will on the other.

The first concept is an illusion born more of hope than of reflection. Once an armistice agreement has been put into effect, there are limitations upon our military power in Korea over and beyond those now existing, which will prevent us from fortifying our negotiating position with the threat of superior strength. In the context of the Korean situation alone, there is now no foreseeable way in which to persuade the communists to accept at the Council table what we have not been able to compel on the battle field. It is inconceivable that Peking or Moscow would negotiate the disappearance of the Korean communist regime, the extension of ROK territory beyond the 39th parallel, and the creation of a nondescript buffer zone in between.

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Johnson. Walter S. Robertson was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on Mar. 27, 1953 and began his duties on Apr. 8, 1953.

[2] The reference is to the 139th meeting of the NSC on Apr. 8; for a report of that meeting, see the memorandum of discussion, p. 892.

When we had the power to do so in 1951, we did not take North Korea. Now that our relative strength in Korea is much less, we cannot, except at great cost and diversion of force. I believe we missed an opportunity that cannot be recreated because circumstances have greatly changed.

The United States cannot now undo the irrevocable decision made in the spring and summer of 1951 not to press for a territorial or military settlement in Korea by superior force. It was thought that our military and political interests coincided in this policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that there was no sufficient advantage to moving into North Korea much beyond the present battle line, while there were military reasons for terminating hostilities there in order to permit the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. The Department of State apparently had its political reasons for not advocating a policy that would have sought to regain control of most of Korea.

A decision to consider the armistice agreement null and void will have an even more serious consequence than an attempt to extend the territory of the ROK in a political settlement. Since the United States Government has believed during the past two years that our immediate and long-term objectives in the Far East and in the world at large were best met by the termination of hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice along the lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs, it has logically followed that a political settlement in Korea would probably not reach any satisfactory conclusion or bring about the freedom and unification of Korea. The Political Conference has been looked upon as a probable stalemate that the United States could live with indefinitely if a suitable armistice had been put into effect and remained in force. To change this concept now means that we may return to a state of belligerency or a condition of hostilities in Korea if the Political Conference does not fulfill our requirements. We might discover ourselves very much alone without our Allies to follow through such a decision. We may find such a general let-down at home and abroad after an armistice has been in operation for several months that it might be quite impossible to carry out the nullification of the armistice except as an oral gesture.

If we do not insist that the settlement in Korea be limited to Korea, but prepare ourselves to negotiate with the Chinese communists on an overall Far Eastern basis, it might be possible to work out some kind of a settlement in Korea and the Far East that might provide at least a temporary relaxation of tensions there. I firmly believe that we cannot even approach our political objectives in Korea without taking into account that Peking and Moscow will ruthlessly use Korea as a *quid pro quo* to gain communist objectives such as the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, relaxation of trade controls, disarmament of Japan and the return of Formosa. Perhaps there is some basis for believing that the Chinese communists might be induced to stay out of Southeast Asia.

795.00/4–1553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY Pusan, April 15, 1953—9 p. m.

1225. Rptd info CINCUNC eyes only Clark DIP 464. Had lengthy conversation with President Rhee yesterday with reference to Korea's attitude toward international developments especially those brought up by Ambassador Yang during conversation with Secretary on April 8,[1] including Rhee's five points and possibility of US-Korean security pact.

1. Rhee declared he does not want to rock boat and he deeply appreciates US aid without which his country would collapse but he wants peace with unification all Korea and he continues doubt whether such peace obtainable by program envisaged today by US and UN, namely (*a*) exchange sick and wounded PW's (*b*) conclusion armistice along lines last autumn's negotiations (Article 4 draft armistice agreement). President explained at length reasons for these beliefs which I gather are already largely known to Department. He was particularly emphatic regarding futility of political conference as vaguely defined in Article 4 which meeting he declares is perfect target for Commie tactics of indefinite delay while Commie efforts redoubled to subvert South Korea. Rhee continues to urge "peace through victory" failing that, Commies should be told that as earnest of good faith Chinese forces in Korea should withdraw north of Yalu, after which peace conference could convene with some prospect of success.

Turning to immediate forthcoming problems of armistice negotiations, President said he greatly preoccupied lest talks merely duplicate period July 1951 to November 1952. He declared Korean people cannot endure another interminable fruitless session.

Would it not be possible President asked for US Government give assurance that if Commies do not within few days of resumption of armistice negotiations show unmistakable evidence of real desire for peace, negotiations will be terminated? President reiterated that moral Korean people cannot support further delay although at same time he insisted ROK army eager to get on with war, even alone if necessary. He also stated he lacks confidence in good faith Commie peace initiative to which I replied it was unnecessary believe in Commie good faith as prerequisite to testing whether peace move genuine in so far Korea concerned.

---

[1] For a report on this discussion, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 897.

2. Conversation on Rhee's side punctuated with repeated complaints over alleged cavalier treatment of Korean views or ignoring of Korean views and also with references to fourth of Rhee's five points: "Official representative of ROK shall participate fully in any international conference or meeting discussing or considering any phase of Korean problem."

Without accepting foregoing at face value, Korean views nevertheless cannot altogether be dismissed. Some part of our present difficulty with Rhee may result from belief on his part that having shouted unheeded in the wilderness, he is now obliged enter market place and speak his piece there, if not regardless of embarrassment that may cause us, at least in hopes that public declaration of his views may prove more effective propellant than further unpublicized discussions. This it seems to me is more likely explanation of Rhee's attitude (based on frustration) than desire on his part deliberately to cause trouble or to make US Government role more difficult.

When I asked what Rhee would like to suggest as specific measure adopted to meet situation described President said "we don't ask anything from America except not to be taken for granted;" when I pressed for less general answer he said that although Panmunjom talks have included Korean liaison officers, latter have really been merely subordinates of UN commander, rather than representatives of ROK Government (or of President Rhee). What he would like therefore is "genuine Korean Government representative," responsible to him as ROK President, attached to UNC negotiating group. Rhee explained that by this he did not picture ROK representative at council table across from Commies arguing or disputing with UNC representative and thus disclosing division among allies, since before Commies we must always show solid front. What he has in mind Rhee said is mechanism whereby Korean point of view may be made clear to UNC negotiators before those negotiators meet Commies (for example by having ROK representative present at Munsan headquarters) together with arrangement permitting ROK representative to attend Panmunjom sessions, even though he may take little or no part in discussion.

3. With reference to Ambassador Yang's talk with Secretary on April 8, President said thus far he has received only brief telegraphic summary (which I gather is less informative than Department's telegram 634 April 11).[2] I accordingly went over points set forth Department's telegram 634 and suggested that as soon as awaited airmail summary from Ambassador Yang arrives, we have further meeting.

President Rhee then made following statement substance of which he requested I convey to Secretary Dulles and through him to President Eisenhower:

---

[2] Not printed. (795.00/4-1153)

Please say said President Rhee that our people are terribly tired. For you, with all respect, this has been a distant war, but for us all our country has been devastated and our capital city destroyed and our industries ruined. For three years we have existed on a hope. We have tried as hard as we can and you have given us wonderful support. I know you have to make very difficult world decisions; I know that to you Korea is only one of many places where Commie gangsters have to be faced. What little I have been able to do has been to hold my people together. I am old and tired, and my life—win or lose—is nearly over. My value to my people is the faith they have that all my life I have fought for Korean independence; my value to your government is that the Korean people trust me. If the American Government can give Korea security pact, that is what Korean people most need to help them continue fighting. But if American Government cannot give us security pact, then unilateral declaration would be next most helpful, even though Commies would probably try to exploit it as without any binding effect. So I say that if bilateral pact would make difficulties for us, then recognizing your problems within which Korea perhaps seems small to you, I hope at least your government can make statement saying that no matter what happens, American Government will not forget Korea. If President Eisenhower himself could make declaration on Korea's behalf, President Rhee said that would be particularly effective insofar as Korean people concerned and be especially appreciated by him.

BRIGGS

795.00/4–1553: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 15, 1953—8:30 p. m.

653. For the Ambassador. Address of President before American Society Newspaper editors April 16 1:00 p.m. EST [2] being transmitted by wireless bulletin on April 15 at 21:30. You should see President Rhee at or as soon as possible after time of delivery of speech and give him copy thereof. At time of giving speech to President Rhee you should with reference to your tel 1225 April 15 [3] in particular last paragraph thereof give to him the following personal message from the President:

---

[1] This telegram, drafted by Johnson and cleared in substance with Smith, was repeated to Tokyo as 2445 eyes only for Clark. A copy was sent to the White House for the information of Jackson and Adams.

[2] For a text of this speech, "The Chance for Peace," see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179–188.

[3] Because of the time difference between Pusan and Washington, telegram 1225, *supra*, was received in Washington before noon on Apr. 15.

"Your message,[4] sent me through Ambassdor Briggs, reached me after the speech which he is now handing to you was prepared and distributed for the world press. You will find in this speech several friendly references to Korea and to our determination to assist in bringing peace and unity to your unhappy country. The specific questions raised in your message have not yet received full consideration by my Administration, but they will be given the attention their importance deserves. Meanwhile, you may be sure, and you may say from me to the Korean people, that because of their sufferings and sacrifices in the common cause the United States will never forget Korea or cease to be concerned for its welfare and security. I will reply to your letter of April 9 shortly after my return to Washington."

I suggest that immediately upon receipt this instruction you inform Rhee that you have important personal message from the President supplementary to the speech being delivered by the President.

SMITH

---

[4] The reference was to Rhee's letter to Eisenhower, Apr. 9, which did not reach the President until Apr. 14; for the text, see p. 902.

795.00/4-1553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, April 15, 1953—7 p. m.

1226. Repeated information CINCUNC eyes only Clark DIP 465. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Conversation with President Rhee reported in detail because shows state of mind with which we have to cope. Discounting part as old stuff and even more as "Rhee act" enough nevertheless remains to hamper our peace efforts, perhaps seriously. I am not so much concerned over possibility Rhee might try to make good on his threat "to march to Yalu alone" as I am at prospect of deliberate development of his local campaign (agitating his five points[2] for example) to point where open break with armistice or peace negotiations inevitable.

In those circumstances I recommend:

1. We give early consideration to making unilateral declaration as mentioned Dulles-Yang talk[3] and if possible to permitting Rhee to comment on text before issuance.

---

[1] Dated Apr. 15, p. 910.

[2] Rhee's five points were as follows: a settlement in Korea to include withdrawal of Chinese forces; disarmament of North Korean forces, UN efforts to prevent any third country from rendering further economic or military aid to North Korea; full ROK participation in any international consideration of a settlement of Korean problems; and a prohibition on decisions which adversely affected the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

[3] See the memorandum of conversation by Young reporting on this meeting of Apr. 8, p. 897.

2. We re-examine Rhee's position with view to discovering whether consistent our own ends there may not be possibility of meeting certain important Korean requirements. Impression among Koreans is they have in past been given cavalier treatment on matters of importance to them and seems possible this may in fact have been case. If so, would it not be desirable now to recognize extent of Korean stake in common effort and go as far as possible toward taking Koreans into our confidence? For example we might immediately give ROK Government liaison representation on UN armistice delegation and in future on political conference delegation. Aim would be to avoid leaving them out of decisions bearing directly on their interests or facing them with *faits accompli* in matters of legitimate concern to them. In this connection might also be helpful give Rhee confidential statement our ideas how POW talks may go, what we might consider undue delay and views regarding Commie strategy.

3. We take fresh look at substance some of Rhee's other specific points, for example, his fear Article Four of draft armistice agreement may be booby trap. I recognize that whatever its dangers we perhaps cannot reopen Article Four at this stage. I recommend, however, we give serious consideration to possibility convening political conference earliest possible date and certainly not later than 30 days after armistice agreed. Believe also we should, either before conference or at its outset, set definite time limit its duration perhaps 60 days. I agree with Rhee's opinion Korean Government and people in their present uncertain and unhappy state will not tolerate protracted talks and have impression American public opinion likewise would not again tolerate indefinite delays. Reasonable period, such as 60 days, certainly gives ample time for Commies to demonstrate whether they intend peaceful settlement Korean problem.

BRIGGS

795.00/4-1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 17, 1953—7:01 p. m.

780. If opportunity offers to do so ostensibly casually in course general conversation possibly in talk following presentation your credentials [2] or if not then at subsequent early opportunity, Department believes desirable in your discretion you make following points to Molotov re letter General Harrison to Nam Il (Deptel 777): [3] (A) Communist side should clearly realize that UNC cannot change its substantive position on non-forcible repatriation prisoners held by it; (B) UNC however is interested in substance and not in words. Without necessarily exclud-

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson and Barbour and cleared by Smith.

[2] After heated confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles E. Bohlen was confirmed as Ambassador to the Soviet Union on Mar. 27, 1953. He presented his credentials in Moscow on Apr. 20. For Bohlen's own extensive account of these hearings, see *Witness to History*, pp. 309-336.

[3] Telegram 777 to Moscow, Apr. 16, is not printed (795.00/4-1653); for a text of Harrison's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.

ing other possibilities General Harrison's letter is considered a reasonable and practical compromise in framework Chou En-lai statement put forward by UNC with intent of expediting agreement; (C) Essential Communist side recognize that unless armistice agreement is now promptly reached at Panmunjom, reaction of American people will be strong. In US view Communists should realize seriousness of recent proposals and importance that initiative which has been taken expeditiously reach fruition in armistice.

Feel that while desirable our position this regard be made abundantly clear Soviets, appearance threat or ultimatum which might be implied in formal presentation should be avoided and foregoing informally set forth as simple statement of facts inherent in present situation.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, April 18, 1953—11:41 a. m.

C 61971. Ref: JCS 86804 DTG 130530Z, Nov 1951.[1]

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in ref, main delegations on 27 Nov 1951 ratified UN agreement which specified that both sides acptd the principle that the actual line of contact between both sides would become the mil demarcation line, and established an agreed line of mil demarcation. The agreement further provd that, if the mil armistice agreement was not signed by 27 Dec 1951, sub-delegations of both sides would revise, immediately prior to the signing of the mil armistice agreement, this agreed upon mil demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides. The revised mil demarcation line would thus coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the mil armistice agreement, and would constitute the mil demarcation line for the duration of the mil armistice.

2. The present actual line of contact, in 12 places, is 1 to 2 and ½ kilometers south of the line agreed upon on 27 Nov 1951. In only one instance does the actual line of contact extend 1 kilometer north of the agreed line. I intend to suggest to the Communists that in order to save time in concluding an armistice, the presently agreed upon line of mil demarcation and demilitarized zone be aprvd by both sides without renegotiation. However, in view of the UNC commitment outlined in para 1 above, I am in no psn to insist upon Communist acceptance of

---

[1] For the text of this telegram, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1126.

the original line. Considering the fact that Chou En-lai made specific ref in his proposal to the agreement between both sides that the actual line of contact would be made the mil demarcation line, I believe that the Communists will demand a readjustment of the mil demarcation line in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If such occurs, I intend to agree and make the nec readjustments on as favorable a basis to the UNC possible without undue delay. Your comments are rqstd.[2]

---

[2] See telegram JCS 937205 to Clark, dated Apr. 22, p. 923.

795.00/4–1853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT Moscow, April 18, 1953—2 p. m.[1]

1491. There will almost certainly be opportunity to raise with Voroshilov[2] following presentation points mentioned in Department's 780, April 18 [*17*].[3] If, as is possible, Voroshilov would indicate that this falls within competence Molotov, will seek early interview with latter. (Fact that Soviet press as reported published full and accurate translation of Harrison letter without critical or other comment would appear to indicate that main positions outlined therein are not regarded as unacceptable basis.)

While I appreciate weekend and shortness of time may make this difficult, it should be helpful if I could have Department's views on attitude I should take in event that Voroshilov, or subsequently Molotov, raise any questions such as (*a*) whether we insist on Switzerland as neutral nation or whether we have others in mind which might be equally acceptable, and (*b*) on paragraph C–3 the clarification of meaning of "peaceable disposition" of those remaining in its custody. I take this to mean those prisoners who refuse repatriations offer and "disposition" hence means resettlement and release and not repatriation in any form.

I would not raise these points of detail unless they were brought up by Soviet official but in latter event might be helpful if Soviet Government could be given clear indication of our position.

Should Voroshilov or Molotov raise any questions regarding political discussions on post-armistice question, I will merely listen and report.

BOHLEN

---

[1] This telegram was received at the Department of State on Apr. 19 at 7:06 a. m. EST; the time of dispatch was Moscow time.

[2] Marshal Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

[3] *Ante*, p. 914.

795.00/4-1853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1953—1:27 p. m.

782. You should not seek interview with Molotov for purpose making points mentioned Dept's 780 [2] but as set forth therein should do so only if opportunity offers casually in course general conversation.

Re questions raised second paragraph your 1491. [3] We consider Switzerland most logical and acceptable "neutral state" for this purpose but as indicated in Harrison's letter we do not exclude possibility of other non-Soviet bloc state able and willing conscientiously carry out proposed function. We have no other particular state in mind but such states as Sweden or Norway would be acceptable. We would not want suggest India but if custody is to be taken in Korea and terms of reference clear for ultimate disposition remaining prisoners resisting repatriation we probably would not oppose India. For your confidential information Menon has indicated to UNDel NY that "if US is friend of India" it will not suggest India for "neutral state". Do not know whether this is Indian Government view and have no other indications of Indian attitude. However, for Switzerland or any other similar small country to accept full custody all non-repatriates will present serious manpower problems requiring in the order of 6,000 officers and men. Therefore as practical matter we would hope arrangements could be worked out so that neutral state would take control of camps exercising such control through existing UNC machinery for POW camps.

Your assumption with regard meaning "peaceable disposition" correct. By "peaceable" we mean "non-forcible".

DULLES

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared by Robertson.

[2] Dated Apr. 17, p. 914.

[3] *Supra.*

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, April 18, 1953—2:08 p. m.

CX 61976. Refs: A. C 61949, 16 Apr. 1953.[2] B. DIP 464, 15 Apr

---

[1] This telegram was sent separately to General Herren and Ambassador Briggs for their information.

[2] Not printed; this telegram was substantively the same as telegram 1218 from Pusan, Apr. 14, p. 906.

1953.[3] C. DIP 465, 15 Apr 1953.[4] D. DIP 467, 16 Apr 1953.[5] This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

a. The President's msg[6] should be extremely helpful in easing the tension in connection with the psn taken by the ROK Govt with respect to overall armistice negotiations.

b. I recm no consideration be given a bilateral scty pact at this time. Such a pact, at least at this time, appears in dir conflict with my primary mission under JOEWP.

c. I do not concur having ROK Govt liaison representative on armis negots staff since these negots are purely mil. No other govt is represented by a political liaison off. It should be left to ROK Govt to communicate its views and policies through diplomatic channels. It is known that the ROK Mil Del reflects the ROK Govt psn during discussions within the delegation and staff in all planning confs. Admission of political ROK liaison off is apt to seriously hamper progress of armis negots.

d. The possibility that Rhee may make independent use of ROK forces raises again the ques of obtaining an agreement with the Republic of Korea which would provide for UNC control of ROK forces during the post-armistice period. The objections raised in JCS 902158 of 28 [*27*] Feb 1952[7] still appear valid and this may not be the optimum time to seek such an agreement. However, curr UNC authority over ROK forces was granted by Rhee personally, and exists only "during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities". In my view "the present state of hostilities" will not legally end with the execution of an armis but Rhee may interpret his agreement differently.

e. Any questions as to the unification issue, the nature and duration of future rehabilitation assistance, ROK participation in political negots after an armis, establishment of time limits for such political discussions, etc., appear to be aprop for resolution at govtl level.

Part 2.

a. On 16 April ROK National Assy passed resolution to send 6 representatives to observe actual exchange of prisoners at Pan Mun Jom and Munsan-Ni. I have agreed to permit 6 ROK representatives at Munsan-Ni to observe exchange of PWs but have denied their rqst to observe actual exchange of prisoners at Pan Mun Jom due to limited area and restrictions placed on entering. These acceptable arrangements were made on 16 April in conf between Gen McGarr with Amb Briggs present and Fgn Minister Pyun, upon instructions from me.

---

[3] The reference was to telegram 1225 from Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 910.

[4] The reference was to telegram 1226 from Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 913.

[5] The reference was to telegram 1231 from Pusan, Apr. 16, in which the Embassy reported on arrangements with the ROK vis-à-vis the exchange of sick and wounded. The telegram is accurately summarized in CX 61976. (695A.0024/4–1653)

[6] This message was transmitted in telegram 653 to Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 912.

[7] *Ante*, p. 69.

b. It was also agreed in accordance with Pyun's rqst that final ques concerning repatriation would be made in the presence of ROK representatives to successive groups of 25 prisoners each. Anyone declaring self as non-repatriate to be segregated immed from pro-Communist prisoners and given protection.

c. Info received from KCOMZ indicated the initial processing of first group of PWs completed on 16 April in accordance with para *b* above. 3 ROK representatives present and satisfied with proceedings. No defection in PWs.

695A.0024/4-2053

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1953.

Subject: Recent Developments in Korea

1. *Exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.* Under the agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded, signed April 12 [*11*], the Communists are to deliver 600 UNC personnel at the rate of 100 per day, while the UNC delivers 5,800 Communist personnel at the rate of 500 per day.

On April 19 the first POW exchange took place. The Communists received 400 North Korean and 100 Chinese sick and wounded, while the UNC received 30 US, 50 ROKs, and 20 other allied personnel. Communist staff officers stated that in the next exchange of April 20 another 35 US personnel would be included.

General Clark reported today[2] that, since the preparation of the original roster, 475 additional Koreans and 75 additional Chinese Communists have become eligible for repatriation as sick and wounded. In accordance with his recommendation, General Clark is being authorized to inform the Communists of this additional number, pointing out that under the Geneva Convention the exchange of sick and wounded is supposed to be a continuing process and reiterating the request that the Communists reexamine the prisoners held by them to determine whether there are any additional UNC POWs who could be included in the exchange.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Treumann and cleared by Young. A marginal note on the source text by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 23.

[2] In telegram HNC 1634, Clark to JCS, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

2. *Resumption of Armistice Negotiations.* On April 16 [*17*], General Harrison replied to the Communist letter of April 9 [3] suggesting the resumption of the armistice negotiations. The reply stated that an arrangement, such as the following might lead to a resolution of the POW problem: (1) That the neutral state be a nation such as Switzerland, (2) That non-repatriable POWs be released to the custody in Korea of the neutral state, (3) That after a reasonable time, such as 60 days, "during which opportunity has been afforded by the neutral state to the parties concerned to determine the attitude of individuals in its custody with respect to their status", the neutral state will make arrangements for the peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody. The reply further stated that unless an acceptable agreement is reached within a reasonable time it will be advisable to recess the meetings again.

On April 18 the liaison groups of both sides met and set 11:00 a.m., April 25, as the date for the resumption of the armistice negotiations by the Delegations.

At the meeting of the liaison officers,[4] the senior Communist delegate stated that he had instructions to make a statement including the following points: (1) The Communists have made an "obvious" concession as to the steps, time and procedure of the repatriation of prisoners of war, (2) Non-repatriable prisoners should be "handed over" to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation, (3) "Only consultation and discussion at the conference are the proper way of settling questions." Concrete suggestions of either side should be put forth at the plenary meetings.

3. *Instructions to Moscow.* Ambassador Bohlen has been instructed,[5] if the opportunity is offered to do so informally and casually, to inform the Soviets that 1) the UNC cannot change its substantive position on non-forcible repatriation, 2) General Harrison's proposal is a reasonable and practical compromise in the framework of the Chou En-lai statement, and 3) unless an armistice agreement is promptly reached at Panmunjom the reaction of the American people will be strong.

In reply to two questions by him, the Department informed Ambassador Bohlen [6] that 1) We consider Switzerland the most logical and acceptable neutral state. We do not, however, exclude the possibility of other non-Soviet bloc states, such as Sweden or Norway. We would probably not oppose India if the terms of reference are clear and custody is taken in Korea,[7] 2) By "peaceable" disposition of prisoners, General Harrison in his letter of April 16 meant "non-forcible" disposition.

---

[3] Neither printed; for text of General Harrison's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin,* Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608; the Communist Delegation letter of Apr. 9 is printed *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 575–576.

[4] The substance of the record of this liaison meeting is in telegram Z 36315, Clark to JCS, Apr. 19, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[5] In telegram 780 to Moscow, Apr. 17, p. 914.

[6] In telegram 782 to Moscow, Apr. 18, p. 917.

We will keep you currently informed by telegraph of developments in this regard.

---

[7] The following note appeared on the source text in Johnson's writing: "This will be corrected in light our conversation today. UAJ".

795.00/4-2053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY MOSCOW, April 20, 1953—noon.

1501. Will be guided by Department's wishes in this matter (Embtel 1491)[1] and will merely raise "ostensibly casually" with Voroshilov points set forth in Deptel 780.[2] Department will realize that very doubtful if any early opportunity in "general conversation" will arise to make points with Molotov. Foreign Ambassadors normally do not see Soviet Foreign Minister except on specific request or in event that he sends for them. Furthermore, having no questions of any importance to take up with Molotov, should I see him in regard to specific issues such as Soviet wives or Balashova children and even casually introduce Korean truce negotiations, latter would in Soviet eyes become obvious purpose of call. I had assumed from Deptel that Department anxious to have these points made promptly and effectively to Soviet Government in order that they might have some chance of influence Communist position at Panmunjom. It is very doubtful if Voroshilov is fully briefed on specific issues involved in POW matter and most certainly is not Soviet official with final determination in foreign policy.

I assume that Department is aware that Soviet Foreign Minister does not customarily attend ceremony of presentation and according to our information Pushkin will represent Foreign Office. While Pushkin who will be present will presumably report to Molotov, in general in matters of this nature where it is desired to create a distinct impression it is more effective to do it directly with official responsible for decisions in foreign affairs.

BOHLEN

---

[1] Dated Apr. 18, p. 916.

[2] Dated Apr. 17, p. 914.

795.00/4-2153

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 21, 1953.

DEAR BOB: We have asked you to associate yourself with Clark as Political Adviser on the forthcoming armistice negotiations. This reflects our feeling, first, that our armistice team locally should have more authority to insure prompt and decisive action. Secondly, that it is important that the political aspects be more fully represented. In this connection, you would appreciate that there is widespread feeling that these negotiations like previous ones will prove to be a booby trap, enabling increased Communist build-up to our disadvantage.

It is important that we should find out quickly whether or not the Commies really want an armistice. They have had nearly two years to think over every aspect of the problem involved and if they mean business it should be only a matter of days to come to a conclusion. Best wishes.

FOSTER

---

[1] This personal message was transmitted to Murphy in telegram 2479 to Tokyo, Apr. 21, 1953. The message was drafted by Dulles.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 22, 1953—12:23 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62022. Ref: A. JCS 935344.[1] B. CX 61977.[2] C. C 61723.[3]

1. Para 6 of ref A. was supd for info and comment. My comments were transmitted in ref B. Both of these refs were transmitted to Gen Harrison for guidance in accordance with ref C. Until further advised, I propose to proceed on the assumption that initial thinking in Wash has not changed, and that ref A constitutes suf auth for me to proceed along the lines indicated in ref B.

2. I am instrg Harrison to immediately reject a nomination by the Communists of Soviet Russia or any of her satellites as the "neutral state". It would be helpful if I could be furnd with a list of nations ac-

---

[1] Dated Mar. 31, p. 829.

[2] In this telegram, dated Apr. 18, 1953, and sent to the JCS for their information, Clark informed Harrison that he was sending him relevant JCS instructions for the conduct of the resumed delegation meetings at Panmunjom and authorized executive sessions, simultaneous subdelegation or liaison meetings, or a recess of delegation meetings to allow for subdelegation or other meetings. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[3] Dated Apr. 3, p. 857.

ceptable to the UN which might be nominated by the Communists and to which I could immediately agree.

3. From ref A I assume that I am authorized to reject immediately any Communist proposal that Korean non-repatriates be transd to the "neutral state". I strongly recm that I be authorized to adopt as my initial psn an insistence upon the release of the 34700 Korean non-repatriates within Korea, in civ status, to later return to their homes under the provisions of para 59 of the draft Armistice Agreement if they so desire.

4. In connection with the trans of the Chinese non-repatriates to the "neutral state", I recm that our initial psn be one of firm opposition and insistence upon the "neutral nation" acptg custody in Korea.

5. In view of the brief time which remains in which to perfect our negotiatory psn and planning, your decisions are rqstd earliest.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1953—7:11 p. m.

JCS 937205. From: CSUSA for CINCUNC. JCS have directed me to dispatch the following reur C 62022:[1]

1. There follows basic instructions for your guidance in conduct of armistice negotiations. It is the intent of this guidance to provide you with the general outline of the U.S. position on the basic issues. Within this framework you are accorded broad negotiating latitude in your effort to obtain an armistice. Questions should be referred to JCS for decision only when: (*a*) you consider it desirable or necessary to obtain governmental approval of a specific substantive position, or (*b*) indicated specifically within these instructions. We are prepared to handle any such matters expeditiously. Ambassador Murphy is to be available to assist you at your level in analyzing and assessing any political implications that may be involved in your action. State is issuing separate instructions to Murphy in consonance with those contained herein.[2]

2. The following are general considerations which should govern your conduct of the negotiations:

a. It is in the interests of the U.S. to obtain an acceptable armistice.
b. The U.S. stands firm on and will not compromise the principle of no forced repatriations.
c. While we have no assurance that the Chou En-lai–Kim Il-Sung proposal is advanced in good faith, our official attitude on this proposal

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] The instructions under reference were transmitted in telegram 2489, *infra.*

or similar proposals will be to take them at face value until proved to the contrary.

d. The U.S. will not countenance prolonged and inconclusive negotiations; however, no specific time limit can be set at this time. Negotiations will not be unilaterally recessed by UNC without authority from JCS.

e. We believe 16 April Harrison letter has put us in favorable position of having taken initiative and that UNC Delegation should attempt to maintain this initiative.

f. As you recall early in the negotiation it appeared Communists were less concerned about disposition of Korean non-repatriates than of Chinese. It would, therefore, appear desirable that effort be made in early stage of negotiations to attempt to confine processing of non-repatriates under Chou En-lai proposal to Chinese non-repatriates, and to reach understanding with Communists to release Korean non-repatriates in Korea without further processing.

g. Any of the solutions to the POW question previously put forward by the UNC, or, if implemented as set forth below, the Chou En-lai–Kim Il-Sung proposal provide an acceptable framework on which to base a detailed POW agreement.

3. In order for Chou En-lai proposal to be acceptable to U.S. the following elements should be incorporated therein: [3]

a. The single question of the selection of a neutral state is one in which you are not given the same discretion as in the others. You are authorized and directed to press for Switzerland or Sweden in that order. We would prefer Switzerland and believe that in most respects it is the logical country to fill the role, and we see no reason why one of these two should not be accepted. If you fail in both you must ask for further instructions. Obviously neither the Soviet Union nor a Soviet satellite can be considered.

b. The neutral state will assume custody of the non-repatriates in Korea. The physical movement of non-repatriates to the neutral state should not be considered.

c. We consider that at least the following elements must be present in some form in any terms or reference for the "neutral state".

---

[3] When these instructions were forwarded to Acting Secretary Smith in draft on Apr. 21, subparagraph 3 *a* read as follows:

"Neither the USSR nor a Soviet satellite nor India is acceptable as the 'neutral state'. While we would prefer Switzerland and believe that in most respects it is the logical country to fill the role, we would also be willing to accept Sweden or Norway. We see no reason why one of these should not be acceptable and you are not authorized to agree to any other country. Agreement should first be reached on the neutral state. Once this is done the other questions outlined below should be capable of ready resolution."

According to a telegram from Smith to Dulles, who had left Washington on Apr. 21 for NATO meetings in Paris, the JCS took exception to the exclusion of India as an acceptable neutral state and the President was disposed to accept their recommendation because of his belief that the negotiations could not be allowed to fail if the selection narrowed to India. In a meeting with Eisenhower on the afternoon of Apr. 22, Smith convinced the President to accept the alternative language as presented in the source text which, although not ruling out India, did not state its acceptability. (Memorandum by Robertson to Smith, Apr. 21, 1953; 795.00/4–2153; and Tedul 4 to Paris, Apr. 22, 1953; 695A.0024/4–2253)

(1) A specified time limit should be established during which non-repatriates would remain in custody of the "neutral state". While 60 days considered reasonable and sufficient you are authorized to agree to a period up to 90 days, if necessary to obtain agreement.

(2) Conditions under which access to non-repatriates is granted should be such as to prevent abuse of the privilege and to assure that coercion and force are not employed against non-repatriates. Any such arrangements should be reciprocal.

(3) Arrangements should be made by the neutral state promptly to repatriate any of those originally classed as non-repatriates who during period of custody indicate to the neutral state desire for repatriation. The neutral state shall be the final authority as to whether or not an individual does in fact desire repatriation.

(4) At the termination of the period of custody set forth in subpara (1) above, non-repatriates shall be free to proceed to an available destination of their choice in accordance with necessary and appropriate arrangements made by the neutral state. Terms of reference should not preclude Chinese from proceeding to Formosa or Koreans from remaining within the ROK.

4. As any neutral such as Switzerland will find it extremely difficult if not impossible to meet the manpower requirements indicated in ur C 61968[4] as being required to take full custody in Korea of both Korean and Chinese non-repatriates it would, in addition to consideration mentioned para 2 *f*, be desirable from practical point of view that processing non-repatriates be confined to Chinese, and/or provide that neutral state will exercise only technical custody.

5. In absence of practical alternative, action indicated para 2, ur C 61971,[5] is approved. Suggest that discussion of military demarcation line be deferred until agreement on POWs is obtained unless in your view negotiation advantage could be obtained from such prior discussion. Similarly view here is that discussion of any other possible subjects should be deferred until agreement POW question reached.

---

[4] In this telegram, dated Apr. 17, 1953, Clark estimated that if the neutral state had to assume full custody of nonrepatriates, with the UNC responsible only for logistical support and medical services, about 6,000 neutral representatives would be necessary. If the UNC continued to supply full logistic, administrative, and security support, however, only 220 neutral state representatives would be required. (Matthews files, lot 52 D 413)

[5] Dated Apr. 18, p. 915.

795.00/4–2253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 22, 1953—7:30 p. m.
PRIORITY

2489. Personal for Murphy. Following for your general guidance and background in carrying out your duties assist CINCUNC in analyzing and assessing political implications armistice negotiations. Basic negotiating instructions which have been approved by President are being transmitted to CINCUNC by JCS.[2] You will be guided by those instructions as supplemented by guidance contained herein. However, nothing in these or any subsequent instructions shall be construed as modifying or amending in any way basic or other instructions from JCS to CINCUNC. Normally all communications incorporating views yourself and CINCUNC with respect to negotiations should be by message from CINCUNC to JCS, which messages are promptly made available to and replies coordinated with Department. However, you are authorized your discretion communicate directly with Department on political matters, furnishing copy CINCUNC. US Ambassador ROK will continue advise CINCUNC and US on ROK political implications armistice negotiations.

Consultations with foreign governments will, as in past, be carried out by Department in Washington. Those governments will be fully informed through their representatives here upon course of negotiations.

Except that you should not at any time accompany UNC delegation to Panmunjom, your location is left to discretion yourself and Clark. Travel between Japan and Korea as required authorized.

Your assignment this duty does not in any way indicate any change in US Government position that armistice negotiations Panmunjom are essentially military in character and are solely between military commanders concerned and not proper forum for introduction or discussion of any political questions. Any necessary public relations aspects your assignment will be handled accordingly.

As stated in instructions to CINCUNC it is desired he be given broad negotiating latitude order that to maximum possible extent he may promptly reach decisions with regard conduct negotiations thus expedite their course. Thereby should be possible quickly test Communist intent good faith with regard acceptable armistice and avoid renewed involvement in inconclusive and drawn-out negotiations. As stated in President's address April 16 [3] first step toward peace such as outlined by the President must be conclusion of honorable armistice Korea. US Congressional and public opinion will not tolerate prolonged and inconclusive armistice discussions.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Young and cleared by Johnson and with Charles Sullivan, Chief, Northeast Asian Section, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

[2] The instructions under reference were transmitted in JCS 937205, *supra.*

[3] For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953,* pp. 179–188.

Except for Nationalist China which abstained, all non-Soviet bloc members of UN supported and affirmed principle non-forcible repatriation as embodied in UNGA resolution December 3, 1952.

The 15 other governments who have armed forces participating in action Korea, particular UN, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France, take a very active interest in events Korea and, particular, UNC conduct armistice negotiations. All these governments have publicly supported principle non-forcible repatriation. UK Government particularly sensitive to its small majority Parliament and opposition criticism UNC policies in armistice negotiations. Foregoing governments also sensitive opposition criticism that decisions respecting Korea taken unilaterally by US without prior consultation.

There is tendency on part most above-mentioned governments as well as foreign public opinion uncritically assume Chou En-lai statement regard prisoners represents such major concession on part Communists to UNC position non-forcible repatriation that only few details remain to be worked out Panmunjom. If in fact course negotiations indicates Communists do not have genuine intent enter into armistice acceptable UNC it will be important publicly demonstrate and bring out this fact in negotiations. This event important it be clear Chou En-lai "proposal" was simply forcible repatriation another guise. This should be accomplished to maximum possible extent by statements elicited from Communists during course negotiations.

If you need additional information or background inform Department.

Department will keep you informed on political developments and official views of 15 other governments mentioned above regarding armistice negotiations.

You should furnish CINCUNC copy these instructions which have Defense concurrence.

You should, in consultation CINCUNC, make arrangements keep Briggs[4] informed on behalf CINCUNC concerning all developments armistice negotiations bearing upon ROK attitude so that Briggs in best possible position anticipate and meet problems arising with ROK Government re armistice.

SMITH

---

[4] In telegram 633 to Pusan, personal for Briggs, dated Apr. 22, the Ambassador was informed of Murphy's appointment and told that as Ambassador to Korea he retained responsibility for U.S. relations with the ROK and for advising CINCUNC and the U.S. Government on political developments in South Korea bearing on the armistice negotiations. The Department of State emphasized that Murphy's assignment did not alter the essentially military character of the negotiations, which were not a proper forum for introduction or discussion of political questions. Briggs was to make this clear to ROK authorities when Murphy's assignment was made public. (795.00/4–2253)

795.00/4–2253

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) [1]

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, April 22, 1953.

DEAR BOBBY: The copy of NSC 147 [2] which you sent me as it relates to the problem of additional forces from other United Nations members and the question of reimbursement for logistic support is a big step forward. It, however, primarily states the problem and does not offer any clear solutions. It strengthens my view that the policy of logistic reimbursement followed by the previous Administration was unwise and had the effect of deterring other United Nations members from sending troops to Korea. It is interesting to note that the effect of this policy if continued would be practically to negate the Collective Measures resolution which Secretary Dulles carried through the General Assembly as a member of the United States Delegation.

In the one test of collective security action—Korea—governments have been deterred as much by the economic cost of participation as by the manpower cost. Yet it is clear that the United States is better able to withstand an economic loss than a manpower loss—and it is our basic policy to provide arms for other nations so that our young men will not carry the full load of combat.

Accordingly, it seems clear to me that we should take the action suggested in paragraph 180 of the Report. If we are prepared to extend training, logistic supplies and general economic assistance to our friends under the Mutual Security program as a deterrent against future aggression, we should be even more willing to offer aid when we have through the sacrifices of the lives of their men a concrete demonstration of willingness of other countries to join us in a common cause.

It is clear that the same basic standards which govern the level of our aid to the countries of the free world—their willingness to cooperate in developing defenses and their relative ability to pay for such defenses themselves—should govern the sharing of burdens in Korea. Why shouldn't we bring the negotiations on Korean logistic support into the general framework of our mutual aid relationships with these countries?

I am determined that we should have greater sharing of the manpower burdens in Korea and in whatever future collective security actions may occur. If we expect other countries to bear these burdens in relationship to the availability of their manpower, then as a corollary we must be prepared to assume a portion of the economic burden involved. We are able to carry a heavier economic burden than some of our allies while they have much greater resources of manpower. We know that the manpower of underdeveloped countries can be trained and can fight well in modern war, for we have done it ourselves in Korea and—alas!—the Soviets have done it on an immense scale.

---

[1] The source text is a copy of this letter which Lodge provided Dulles. On May 5, this letter came to the attention of Eisenhower, who was impressed with its contents and had it sent to members of, and advisers to, the NSC. (Memorandum by Cutler to Dulles, May 6, 1953; 795.00/5–653)

[2] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

One final note. I am certain you will find in the bureaucracies a tendency to say this problem no longer needs attention because of the Soviet peace overtures. I believe it is in fact more important. We should be able to move promptly, if the Soviets do not reach agreement with us in Korea, to extend the United Nations participation and to do that we need to get this economic and logistic roadblock out of the way. If, as we all hope, agreement is achieved in Korea, then we should get this mistaken and inherited policy re-examined so that it will not stand in the way of any future collective security action.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.
Ambassador

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since my return to Washington[2] I have had an opportunity carefully to study your letter of April 9.[3]

As I said in my message[4] delivered to you April 17 by Ambassador Briggs, because of their sufferings and sacrifices in the common cause the Korean people may be sure that the United States will never forget Korea or cease to be concerned for its welfare and security.

Also, as you well know, I am deeply sympathetic with the aspirations of yourself and the Korean people to bring an end to the artificial and unnatural division of your country, and to expel the Chinese aggressors from all of Korea.

However, I would be lacking in candor if I did not state that I was deeply disturbed at the implication of your letter of April 9, not only for Korea but for the efforts being made to deal with the problem of Communist aggression by the collective action of free peoples.

---

[1] The source text is a copy of the signed original which was pouched to the Embassy in Korea for direct delivery to Rhee. This letter was first sent as telegram 669 to Pusan, Apr. 23, 1953, not printed. (611.95B/4-2353) Eisenhower reprinted an excerpt of this letter in his *Mandate for Change*, pp. 185-186.

[2] From vacation in Augusta, Georgia.

[3] *Ante*, p. 902.

[4] Transmitted in telegram 653, Apr. 15, p. 912.

I think it important that we reiterate certain fundamental facts inherent in the situation.

First, the action taken by the United Nations in Korea was to assist your valiant country in repelling the armed attack directed against it initially by the North Korean regime and subsequently by the Chinese Communists. This has successfully been accomplished.

Second, the task of repelling the armed attack having been accomplished it would not be defensible to refuse to stop the fighting on an honorable basis as a prerequisite to working out the remaining issues by peaceful means.

Third, the United States and the United Nations have consistently supported the unification of Korea under conditions which would assure its freedom and independence. Neither the United States nor the United Nations has ever committed itself to resort to war to achieve this objective. To do so would be a complete negation of the basic tenets of this country and the United Nations.

Fourth, any agreement to stop the fighting on an honorable basis presupposes a willingness on the part of both sides to discuss the remaining issues and to make every reasonable effort to reach agreement thereon. As I said in my address of April 16 an honorable armistice "means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a United Korea."

If an honorable agreement is reached to stop the fighting, the United States intends to proceed promptly, vigorously and in good faith to seek by all appropriate means, in full consultation with your Government, to achieve a settlement of the problems confronting your country with the objective of achieving a true peace.

These efforts would, of course, be entirely nullified if your Government should take actions which could not be supported by this or other governments supporting the defense of your country. I am also certain that you recognize that any such action by your Government could only result in disaster for your country, obliterating all that has been gained at such sacrifice by our peoples.

I am confident that if a spirit of mutual respect, trust and confidence so essential to the accomplishment of the high task upon which our countries are engaged can be maintained, we shall be successful. However, if unhappily the objective of a true peace proves to be unattainable, sober consideration will then have to be given as to what should be done under those circumstances.

Ambassador Briggs will shortly be communicating further with you concerning the questions which you raised with him in your conversation of April 14.[5]

Sincerely, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

---

[5] For a report of that conversation, see telegram 1225 from Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 910.

795.00/4-2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, April 23, 1953—6 p. m.

1257. Pass Tokyo; repeated information Tokyo 347. Ambassador Murphy please pass General Clark.

General Clark was my overnight guest in Pusan April 20–21, visit which afforded us opportunity discuss at some length various issues involved in armistice negotiations and related matters. Our point of departure was Clark's top secret telegram CX 61976 of April 18 to Joint Chiefs of Staff,[1] in which he commented on my telegrams 1225 and 1226 of April 15 (DIP 464 and 465)[2] reporting my conversation previous day with President Rhee. Assuming Clark's telegram has been made available to Department I am tying in following observations with pertinent paragraphs of part 1 of that telegram.

Paragraph B. General Clark opposes consideration of bilateral security pact at present, stating that such pact "at least at this time" appears to conflict with his primary mission as laid down by JCS. Although Clark and Department must be in agreement on this point, I recommend question of possible bilateral security pact be explored soonest by State and Defense.

Should we assume that President Eisenhower's message of April 15[3] to President Rhee constitutes the unilateral declaration referred to by Secretary in his discussion with Ambassador Yang on April 8?[4]

Paragraph C. I told Clark I was unable agree that armistice negotiations are "purely military" although there may be details and aspects of those negotiations which are primarily of military interest (or even exclusively military interest—demarcation line for example). Nevertheless, there are many other questions involved, including over-all prisoner of war problem, not to mention proposed post-armistice political conference, which are primarily political and as such of important continuing interest to this Embassy. I added that attitude of ROK Government and heightened official and public agitation here on subject of armistice imparts an even greater political significance to entire armistice question. I therefore suggested *inter alia* to Clark that Embassy Pusan be kept closely informed regarding developments at Panmunjom. I said I was not prepared at this juncture recommend appointment of Embassy political liaison officer to serve with US delegation at Munsan-Ni but that such appointment might in due course be desirable. I indicated my principal interest at present time was to work out practical *modus operandi.* It was left that on my next visit to Seoul (beginning April 27) I shall discuss this subject with General Harrison.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 917.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 910 and 913, respectively.

[3] The message was transmitted in telegram 653 to Pusan, Apr. 15, p. 912.

[4] For a memorandum of the discussion at this meeting, see p. 897.

With respect to President Rhee's desire to have representative of his own on armistice, delegation, General Clark recognizes this problem does exist but hopes he may persuade President that Rhee's wishes in this matter can be met through ROK military liaison officer presently serving with delegation.

Paragraph D. With regard to General Clark's concern over possibility President Rhee might endeavor to make independent use of ROK military forces during armistice of post-armistice period, I said President had never raised subject with me and should he do so I proposed reply that it is military matter which could better be discussed with the UN command. In this connection, although I still doubt whether President Rhee is contemplating a step as extreme as independent use of ROK forces, both ROK Government and National Assembly are continuing to arouse public feeling against any settlement except on basis of complete withdrawal of Chinese Communists from North Korea and disarming of North Korean Communists (that is President Rhee's points 1 and 2). If we are to persuade Rhee to change his attitude before he "boxes himself in" by stirring up popular agitation to point from which he would be unable to retreat, or at least where he might run risk of losing his maneuverability, it may behoove us to get on as urgently as possible with our consideration of ways and means by which Rhee might be prevailed upon to adopt less intransigent attitude.

Paragraph E. This paragraph of General Clark's telegram reads as follows:

> "Any questions as to the unification issue, the nature and duration of future rehabilitation assistance, ROK participation in political negotiations after armistice, establishment of time limits for such political discussions, etc., appear to be appropriate for resolution at governmental level."

I commented that all these issues must be faced and dealt with now, at whatever level or levels may be appropriate, and I could see no useful purpose in trying to pretend they do not exist in order postpone consideration of them until after armistice has been completed and tidily put away. This seems more than ever true since these are all issues which ROK Government is likely to endeavor inject into armistice negotiations.

BRIGGS

795.00/4-2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1953.

Subject: Future Security of Republic of Korea.

Participants: Dr. You Chan Yang, Ambassador, Republic of Korea
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Yang came in to see me at 2:45 today by appointment. On handing me the attached *Aide-Mémoire* from his Government, he stated that President Rhee and the Korean people were extremely concerned over press reports that the United States was prepared to let Chinese Communist forces remain in Korea. He said that he wished again to express the strong opposition of his people to any such thing because it would mean in their view the death of Korea.

Since his opening remarks seemed so out of key with the recent efforts of the highest United States authorities to understand Korean anxieties, I felt called upon to speak frankly and firmly to the Ambassador. I first told him that there was nothing much for me to add, since President Eisenhower himself had communicated a personal message direct to President Rhee by letter and by instructions to Ambassador Briggs and since the Secretary of State had recently discussed this whole matter at length with the Ambassador.[2] I emphasized the great importance to Korea of the President's and the Secretary's interest and efforts to understand and be helpful in so far as they could. I also tried to impress upon Ambassador Yang that in my short time in the Department I had found nothing but complete sympathy for Korea's future security and a desire to do everything feasible to ensure it. I again assured him that we fully understood their position regarding Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the deep preoccupation of all Koreans over their future security.

Apparently the Ambassador was not familiar with the President's messages to President Rhee, for Dr. Yang remarked that such communications merely expressed friendly sentiments in general terms, while the people of Korea wanted to hear some concrete assurances. I replied that President Rhee's letter to President Eisenhower and the latter's reply were couched in anything but general and friendly sentiments. On the contrary, they expressed the record in clear and unmistakable terms.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Young.

[2] Robertson's references were to the letter of Apr. 23, the message contained in telegram 653 to Pusan, Apr. 15, and the discussion between Dulles and Yang reported in memorandum of conversation, Apr. 8, pp. 929, 912, and 897, respectively.

I told the Ambassador that the United States Government was disturbed and shocked by the incident that took place before the American Embassy in Pusan on April 23.[3] This did not seem to us to be the evidence of cooperation that was so necessary at this vital time between our two peoples. I suggested that we would greatly appreciate the best possible sort of relationship between our two Governments right now, and not the kind illustrated by that incident.

I then pointed out that we are facing an issue of the greatest complexity all over the world. The American people fully realize that the ROK and the United States face a common foe. We can never forget for a minute that Communism exists around the whole perimeter of the world, and that if it breaks out in Indochina or Korea it can break out in the rest of the world. That is what we have to consider constantly. Therefore, the President and the Secretary of State have undertaken a most difficult and even dangerous task of testing Soviet intentions and finding ways to settle the basic problem confronting the ROK, the United States and the rest of the free world. Until the basic problem is settled, many others, however important they may seem will remain unsolved.

As Ambassador Yang returned again to his statement that Chinese Communist forces can not be left under any circumstances in Korea, I replied that the solution of the basic problem is not touched by moving the line of military contact with the enemy in Korea. The basic threat remains in the USSR and Communist China, whether the line is at the Yalu, at the "waist" or where it is at present. He indicated agreement, but still maintained that the Koreans would face a most difficult situation if any Chinese forces are left in Korea, which seemed to be the probability. As evidence, he cited the recent, well-known article in the *New York Times* regarding the division of Korea at the "waist". I told him in no uncertain terms that there was absolutely nothing to that story and that he should ignore it.

Ambassador Yang then asked me what kind of settlement we were proposing to make with the Communists at Panmunjom, and whether we would agree if the Communists proposed a settlement on the basis of the present battle line, by which they would retain control in North Korea and we would maintain our position in South Korea. I replied that this question was of such complexity that I could not possibly attempt to speculate what proposals the Communists might make or how we might respond. Ambassador Yang remarked that apparently the United States and the United Nations had no plans or policies, while he and his President knew exactly what plans the Communists would have for the future of Korea. I told him that what I had said did not mean that at all, but only that I was not in a position to elaborate on a hypothetical situation.

---

[3] The reference was to an officially inspired demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Pusan where a group of marchers attempted to break into the Embassy and were stopped when a U.S. Marine guard fired a shot in the air. The demonstrators included a Korean Police band and 50 members of the Korean National Assembly. (Memorandum by Young to Robertson, Apr. 24, 1953; 795.00/4–2453)

The Ambassador then said that, while the United Nations had repelled the aggression in Korea, it was supposed to restore conditions of stability throughout Korea. However, he pointed out that the United Nations had not come through on a number of its policies with respect to Korea. He claimed, for example, that the United Nations embargo on Communist China was not working and that a large volume of strategic commodities were still flowing into Communist China, particularly from United Kingdom sources. Mr. Young and I both told him in some detail that he was completely misinformed on this subject. I also repeated to him the statement of Secretary Dulles that war is not an instrument of our foreign policy nor of the United Nations.

Ambassador Yang stated that the demonstration before the Embassy was tragic and that he, too, agreed that there must be complete cooperation between both Governments. He assured me that we could count on the full cooperation of his Government. I replied that I was most glad to have this assurance and that he must know how deeply concerned we are for Korea's security. However, I pointed out again that decisions on Korea are not unilateral ones for the United States to make alone, but involve the whole United Nations.

With that, the conversation ended abruptly. The Ambassador changed the subject.

WALTER S. ROBERTSON

[Attachment]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

I have been directed by my Government under date of a radiogram dated April 22, 1953 and received that same day at the Korean Embassy, Washington, D.C., to inform the President of the United States that President Syngman Rhee is preparing to withdraw the ROK (Republic of Korea) military forces from the UNC (United Nations Command) when, and if, the UN (United Nations) makes with the Communist aggressors any agreement which, after a cease-fire agreement, would either permit or allow Chinese Communists to remain south of the Yalu River, the Northern-most boundary of the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea land, sea, and air forces, in this eventuality, will have to fight it out alone and either to win or lose, if necessary, but in either event, with honor as free men.

95.00/4-2553

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PERSONAL TOKYO, April 25, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: I would like to refer to your personal telegram No. 2479 of April 21 [2] and tell you how much I appreciate the opportunity temporarily to work with General Clark on the Korean armistice negotiations.

This is the fourth armistice negotiation with which I have been associated—French North Africa, Italy, and Germany. The character of this one is very different from the others. There we were negotiating from the floor of military victory; in the case of French North Africa it was a cease fire under very special circumstances. In the present instance we are based on a military stalemate resulting from a desire to limit our commitment. Naturally that has its disadvantages.

For your personal information, the reason I am willing to do my best to support the present effort to obtain a cease fire in Korea is because I am convinced that continuation of the battle with its cost in human lives and its expense to our national substance under the present policy of limited commitment is futile. Were we determined on military victory, I would want nothing to do with an armistice now. In the absence of such a determination, we should close out this operation, I firmly believe.

In the light of what I have learned during the few days I have been on this assignment, I am also convinced we can obtain a cease fire. I am assuming we really want it. If that is our desire, we must have some flexibility of approach on the prisoner of war issue. I seem to detect a certain rigidity in some features of the JCS instructions which rather obscures the principal objective of obtaining a cease fire. No doubt there are sound reasons for it, I am very grateful for the support the Department has given thus far.

There is just one other point I would wish to mention—that is, an idea that we should relax the United Nations military effort on account of the negotiations. I hope you favor firm prosecution of the battle during this period. I feel that is very important and a negotiating advantage. If the Communists really want an armistice for reasons best known to themselves, aggressive military action now will not be provocative. Relaxation at this stage could easily harden the Commie stand. If they don't want an armistice, there obviously should not be relaxation of UN military effort.

---

[1] Former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Allison had been appointed Ambassador to Japan, but Murphy did not relinquish charge of the Embassy until Apr. 28, 1953.

A marginal notation on the source text by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this letter.

[2] Printed as a letter from the Secretary to Murphy, p. 922.

I hope we may achieve the result you want and with warm regards, believe me,

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT MURPHY

VI. APRIL 26–JUNE 8, 1953: PROGRESS AT PANMUNJOM AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

COMMUNIST AND UNC PROPOSALS AT PANMUNJOM; RHEE'S DESIRE FOR A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT AND HIS OPPOSITION TO AN ARMISTICE; NSC CONSIDERATION OF NSC 147; DULLES-NEHRU DISCUSSIONS ON KOREA; THE FINAL UNC PROPOSAL; CONSIDERATION OF OPERATION PLAN EVERREADY; DECISION NOT TO IMPLEMENT EVERREADY IN FAVOR OF A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT; AGREEMENT ON THE POW QUESTION AT PANMUNJOM

795.00/4-2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PUSAN, April 26, 1953—11 p. m.

1271. Department pass Tokyo; repeated information niact Tokyo 357 for Ambassador Murphy (pass General Clark). Re Deptel 669, April 24, 1953.[1]

President's letter delivered to President Rhee at his residence in Seoul today. Rhee apparently unmoved by President's communication and gave no indication of willingness dispassionately to discuss (far less recede from) his previously stated anti-armistice position. In fact yesterday Rhee made further public statement, released in Seoul today (Embtel 1267, April 26)[2] reiterating his opposition to any armistice that fails expel Chinese Communists, and declaring his intention to fight on, alone if necessary.

At outset of meeting I recalled to President Rhee our talks April 14 and 17, and delivery latter date President's interim message. Rhee then read President's April 23 letter[3] aloud, slowly and without change of expression. After pause, Rhee said: "Please convey expression my sincere thanks for attention being given by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to problems of Korea". Rhee then immediately went into his "victory or death" act which remained theme song of meeting lasting for nearly two hours. Efforts pin down Rhee evoked petulant responses. For example he repeatedly declared "Chinese Communists must withdraw or peace is no peace". I said everyone agreed with that, but said that implementation involved timing, whereas Rhee said, Chinese must withdraw "now". When I asked whether "now" meant today or tomorrow or next week or one month hence or now as element in armistice talks, Rhee declared details were irrelevant, and that anyway he would soon write personally to President Eisenhower.

---

[1] Not found in Department of State files.

[2] Not printed. (795.00/4-2653)

[3] *Ante*, p. 929.

Points in President Eisenhower's letter to which I infer Rhee takes exception are:

> Proposition that something has been accomplished by repelling armed Communist attack, so long as Chinese Communists remain in North Korea.
>
> References in third numbered paragraph to US and UN being uncommitted to unification, if unification should mean war.
>
> View that there is anything to discuss (fourth numbered paragraph of letter) except withdrawal of Communists.

It may also be remarked that whereas at previous recent talks, Rhee has made important point of consultation between United Nations Command and his government (which he alleges has not previously taken place), now that President has assured Rhee that consultation will occur (as set forth in antepenultimate paragraph) Rhee tries to belittle usefulness of such consultation, declaring "after all consultation is merely procedural matters; what counts is withdrawal Chinese Communists".

Penultimate paragraph President Eisenhower's letter dealing with possible consequences evoked remarks from Rhee along line Ambassador Yang's *aide-mémoire* (Deptel 673)[4] which was not otherwise discussed. (There seemed no point suggesting withdrawal Ambassador Yang's *aide-mémoire* since on arrival Seoul this morning I learned that Yang had repeated to press outside Department substance of statements made to Assistant Secretary Robertson inside Department.)

After approximately one hour of this unprofitable jockeying I told President Rhee as solemnly as possible that if my estimate of position is accurate he may be facing—not next week or next month, but tomorrow—decision critical in terms future history Korea; Rhee may already bestride fork in Korean road, from which no turning back possible and no second guesses allowed. I therefore urged Rhee in all earnestness to consider views of Korea's friends and allies, and to take into consideration their possibilities and capabilities of acting on Korea's behalf. I warned Rhee of limitations put by public opinion in respective countries on their range of action, having in mind that free world responds to public opinion but rejects being slave to public propaganda.

---

[4] In this telegram to Pusan, dated Apr. 24, 1953, not printed, the Department furnished Briggs with a copy of the Korean *aide-mémoire* and a summary of the Yang-Robertson talk of Apr. 24. (795.00/4–2453) For a report on this discussion, see the memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 933; the *aide-mémoire* is an attachment to the memorandum.

Our interview closed on personally amicable basis, with references by President Rhee to regret for intemperate remarks, followed by statement that "most helpful thing" President Eisenhower could do would be to issue statement that if Communists genuinely desire peace, Chinese forces now in Korea should immediately withdraw north of Yalu River.

Thus there was little to be derived from lengthy session with ROK President to indicate Rhee's determination was affected by President's letter. Today's developments have still further reduced Rhee's "area of maneuverability". Notwithstanding President Eisenhower's letter, Rhee is today closer than before to open, destructive opposition to any armistice terms that fail to include withdrawal of Chinese Communists. Furthermore Rhee is leaving himself narrower and narrower avenue of retreat, should he after having exhausted final efforts to persuade American Government to rewrite armistice terms in desired direction, decide accept modified position more nearly consonant President's letter.

Without ruling out possibility that in final showdown Rhee may not still take more realistic and practical position, today's developments have considerably diminished chances favoring that outcome.

BRIGGS

Department of Defense files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

TOP SECRET TOKYO, April 26, 1953—2:53 p. m.

C 62098. Exclusive for Gen Collins. Refs: A. DA 937410.[1] B. CX 61976.[2] C. SecState msg 2522 Apr 24.[3]

1. Bob Murphy dlvrd the *aide-mémoire* from the ROK Government late 25 Apr [4] and I have discussed the subject in detail with him.

2. The meaning of Rhee's ultimatum as to the time at which he would withdraw the ROK mil forces from the UNC is not clear. This may be due to translation, however it is further complicated by the fact that the solution of the Korean problem will be the result of two separate agreements. It is therefore difficult to determine from reading ref C as to exactly when Rhee intends to implement his threat. It is capable of two interpretations as fols:

a. That he will remove ROK forces from UNC control after an armistice, if and when provisions of political conference do not provide for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops north of the Yalu—"The northern boundary of the Republic of Korea".

---

[1] Not printed.

[2] Dated Apr. 18, p. 917.

[3] The reference was to telegram 673 to Pusan, repeated to Tokyo as 2522, not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

[4] The *aide-mémoire* is printed as an attachment to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 935.

b. That he will withdraw ROK forces from UNC control immediately folg the signing of an armistice if its terms do not prov the withdrawal of Chinese Communist trps north of the Yalu—"The northern boundary of the Republic of Korea".

3. If the first interpretation is correct, it, of course, must be solved at governmental level during the political conference to be held folg the conclusion of an armistice agreement. If Rhee intends to implement his threat only after the political conf has failed to prov for a unified Korea and for the withdrawal of all Chinese Communists to the north of the Yalu River my problem will be much easier of solution. I consider that I can arrange the logistical support folg the withdrawal from the demilitarized zone in such a manner as to prov me with an excellent control of the capabilities of the ROK Army. There are some dangers to this in that it would reduce the efficiency of the ROK Army were the Communists to renew their aggression while I was effecting this re-arrangement of the logistical support.

4. If the second interpretation is correct and Rhee takes this action immediately upon signing of an armistice, it will, of course, present by far the most dangerous sit for the UNC. In fact, if the ROK Army were to, at this time, violate the armistice agreement by launching an atk against the Communists, hostilities would be renewed and we might in fact have to defend ourselves not only against the Communists but for a short time against the ROK Army. If this second interpretation is correct there would at first appear to be two courses of action:

a. To include within the armistice agreement itself an arrangement for the withdrawal of all fgn trps from Korea within a specified pd of time. You will recall that this was one of the items the Communists desired to have included on the agenda in the early days of the armistice negotiations. They might still consider that the inclusion of provisions for the withdrawal of all fgn trps from Korea is a desirable point to be settled by the armistice agreement itself. In light of ref C, my government may consider it desirable to include such provisions which now appear to have some advantages in view of increased str of ROKA. However, attn is called to the fact that Rhee has also inferred in ref C that the northernmost boundary of the Republic of Korea is the Yalu River, to wit, a unified Korea. Therefore, the inclusion of provisions for the withdrawal of all fgn trps from Korea within the armistice agreement itself would not in itself fulfill all of Rhee's apparent demands. I consider the latter condition, which is a unified Korea, to be impracticable, if not impossible, of inclusion within the terms of a mil armistice and may rule out this course of action.

b. A second course of action is to be prepared to meet the contingency implied in ref C by drastic action on the part of the UNC. Plans to carry out such a course of action are all prepd and have been recently brought up to date. These plans cover our action under the folg conditions:

(1) ROK trps, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UNC directives.

(2) ROK Government and mil units, through ofl announcements, pub statements and other means, indicate a refusal to carry out UNC directives and a determination to proceed along an independent course of action.

(3) ROK Government, mil units and/or people are overtly hostile to UNC trps.

Note: In each of the above three conditions our plans call for progressive control and limitation of sups aval to ROKA and the concentration of UN forces other than ROK, and protection of United States supplies and installations.

(4) Establishment of an interim government in the event of breakdown of ROK Government admin. This contemplates as an initial step the placing of Rhee in protective custody.

c. In view of the present sit, I am considering postponing Gen Paik's trip to the states, as I consider the present scd [schedule] to be untimely. I will advise you further on this subject. Paik is a strong supporter of the UNC and I believe he can be depended upon under adverse conditions to remain loyal to the UNC and that he may have the ability to keep the ROK Army in hand.

5. I still believe that Rhee is bluffing and attempting to put on a dictatorial act. However, he is carrying it to extremes. Rhee made the ROK Army aval to the UNC Commander, ref part 1, para *d*, ref B. Inasmuch as this is at this time largely a UNC problem, I propose to go and see him without delay. I desire to talk to him informally, personally and alone as I have found from experience that this method produces the most fruitful results. I intend to find out exactly what he means as to the time at which he intends to implement his threat and to learn as much as I can as to his future intentions. Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will plan to see him on Mon.[5] I again wish to emphasize that I consider the command relationship of ROK to the UNC to be a UNC problem which I alone should handle at this time as the UNC Mil Commander.

6. Briggs had planned to be here today. However, last night I learned from the pilot of my plane that he had cancelled his trip. I immediately phoned him to verify this info and learned he had recd instructions to call on Rhee. He further informed me he would send me a msg as he could not discuss this subject by phone. I recd the "Eyes only" msg at 09001 this morning sent by Dept of State to Ambassador Briggs on 25 Apr directing him to dlvr a specific msg to Pres Rhee.[6]

---

[5] Apr. 27.

[6] This presumably was a reference to telegram 669 to Pusan, Apr. 24, 1953, which has not been found in Department of State files.

7. This msg probably will change the timing of my visit with Rhee as I should have prior knowledge of Rhee's reaction to the msg and if by any chance whether Briggs discussed the ques of comd relationship of the ROKA with the UNC. In this connection Ambassador Murphy and I feel that we would have been in a far better psn to have affected coordination had the "Eyes only" msg been transmitted simultaneously to Korea and Tokyo for dlvr to us yesterday. I also would have been able to have ansd ref A with more dispatch.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET TOKYO, April 28, 1953—5:06 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62136. Refs:[1] A. Z 36322. B. Z 36388. C. HNC 1634. D. CX 62041. E. CX 62035.

1. Ref A states the agreement on exchanging info regarding details of the folg day's sick and injured repatriation scd. Ref B quotes the Communist reply to a UNC rqst for such info, made from a prepd statement, to the effect that agreed repatriation of Communist-held sick and injured UNC pers was completely finished.

2. In para 4 of ref C, I stated my intention to introduce an increased figure of Communist sick and injured pers to be repatriated. In ref D I informed you of my decision to withhold such action until evaluated intel had become aval. Ref E initiated a series of intel repts regarding evidence that the Communists were withholding the return of numerous sick and injured UNC pers rightfully eligible for repatriation under the terms of the 11 Apr agreement.

3. In the next 3 to 4 days I expect to have suf evidence to fully support an unequivocal charge that the Communists are violating their 11 Apr agreement to return all sick and injured UNC and ROK pers held in their POW installations. At that time I intend to take the following actions:

a. Arrange a meeting of liaison groups.

b. Have Admiral Daniel announce that the UNC cannot acpt as ofl the 26 Apr statement of the Communist Duty Off quoted in ref B, and announce that the UNC demand ofl confirmation by the head of the Communist Liaison Group (who was the signatory to the 11 Apr agreement). Regular meetings of the liaison group will then be called and the demand rptd until the Communists either confirm or deny the statement. If Communists deny the statement was ofl, rqst will be made for immediate resumption of repatriation sick and injured.

---

[1] The following five reference telegrams are not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

c. Upon Communist confirmation, at heads of liaison group level, that they have completely finished and agreed upon repatriation of UNC sick and injured, Admiral Daniel will deliver the statements summarized below:

> (1) "Your statement that you have returned all sick and injured covered by the Geneva Convention in accordance with the 11 Apr agreement is disturbing and not in accordance with the facts in our possession.
>
> (2) "UNC has indisputable evidence that you still hold large nrs of eligible pers who are fit to tvl and desire repatriation. After partial interrogation, the UNC has sworn statements of returnees which prove conclusively that more than 150 identified UNC pers, fully eligible and fit for return in expert and impartial medical opinion, remain in your POW installations. (*Note*—The figure of 150 will be expanded to include results of interrogation of ROKA sick and injured returnees now underway; I expect to have suf info to include figures on ROKA eligibles by 30 Apr.)
>
> (3) "Direct repatriation of sick and injured is continuing obligation. UNC even now screening additional sick and injured prisoners who will be returned. UNC not only expects but demands return of its eligible pers known to be held by your side. Such Communist action is mandatory if Communists are to avoid conviction of breaking agreement at time when only an assurance of good faith, by deeds, can insure continuation of armistice negotiations."

4. If the basis evaluated intel included in the foregoing summary had been more complete, the foregoing would have been dlvrd on 27 Apr; but since I wish to have unmistakable proof of UNC charges first, and desire substantial evidence that these charges apply also to ROK pers, I withheld action. This decision to postpone action was also influenced by my desire to permit more time for a clear picture of Communist contemplated measures for implementation of the Chou proposal to emerge without confusing the issue. I now intend to take this action at the earliest aprop date.

5. In the event the Communists demand specific info regarding names of camps in which these sick and injured are being retained, the UNC would reply along the folg lines:

> "Although the evidence in this matter is incontrovertible, our grave concern for the future safety and well being of these unfortunate men held illegally by your side, and our apprehension that publication of their names at this time may adversely affect their welfare, make it advisable that we do not identify these sick and injured pers to you."

695A.0024/4-2853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1953.

Subject: Sick and Injured POWs Not Returned by Communists.

With reference to Clark's radio C 62136[2] which we have suggested be shown to you, we are concurring with the action proposed by Clark, i.e. in the next three or four days when sufficient evidence is available fully to support an unequivocal charge that Communists are violating their April 11 agreement to return sick and injured personnel, the UNC will call liaison group meeting at which the Communists will be challenged with the facts and the UNC will insist that all eligible prisoners be returned.

Except for the last sentence of paragraph C(3) [*3c*] and a few minor verbal changes we have approved the proposed statement by Admiral Daniel, Chief of the UNC liaison group.[3] It appeared to us that the last sentence carried an implication that if the Communists returned additional sick and injured, the UNC would be prepared to continue armistice negotiations regardless of positions taken by the Communists in those negotiations. We therefore suggested that the following wording be substituted:

> "If you fail to carry out in good faith the agreement of April 11 on this subject and your obligations under the Geneva Convention, the UNC can have no choice but to question your sincerity with respect to reaching and carrying out agreements on the broader questions confronting the armistice delegations."

---

[1] A marginal notation by O'Connor on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 29.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] That approval was transmitted in telegram JCS 937607 to Clark, Apr. 28, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 28, 1953[1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on Apr. 29.

Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follows discussion of these items: the recent NATO Conference in Paris; Indochina; Formosa and the National Government of China; sale of modern aircraft to Latin American nations; the Mutual Security Program in relation to its cost; and the Presidential address of April 16.]

Secretary Humphrey raised the question as to why, by way of background to this follow-up on the President's address, it wouldn't be practicable for the United States to go ahead and build up its forces as rapidly as possible in Korea. There seems to be no point, said Secretary Humphrey, to relaxing pressures and allowing the Communists to think that they can string out the negotiations.

The President answered that there was no good reason why the Defense Department couldn't promptly look into the possibilities raised by Secretary Humphrey. We might at least appear to be increasing our build-up in Korea even though we sent out only skeletonized units or headquarters units in place of the real thing.

Secretary Dulles observed that it was certainly clear to him that we were much more likely to get a suitable armistice out of the Communists in Korea if they did not calculate that we were desperately eager to obtain one

The President said that it would also be only common sense to give some kind of publicity for what we send out there. This could be done either by deliberately spreading false reports or giving up the secrecy with which we generally try to disguise such movements. It would not matter much, in any case, since the Communists would be bound to detect a real build-up.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that it might well be possible to initiate some kind of deception tactics to meet the President's point.

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that they would be considering at next week's meeting a paper from the Planning Board setting forth the various alternatives open to the United States with regard to the situation in Korea.

At the very least, Mr. Stassen added, the United States could well publicize the fact that we are about to set up the 15th and 16th Republic of Korea divisions.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the transfer of finished atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Defense.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 28, 1953—7:40 p. m.

C 62143. Refs: A. C 62098.[1] B. C 62124.[2]

1. This supplements my C 62124. I met for over one hour alone with Rhee yesterday afternoon. We discussed the contingencies which might develop as a result of the *aide-mémoire* dlvrd by Ambassador Yang to the State Dept on 22 Apr[3] and the sit which might develop as the result of any ROK action to cont the conflict alone after an armistice. Rhee was calm, dispassionate and unemotional, and his views dlvrd in a friendly manner.

2. I explained that I was coming to him as a friend to discuss the problem which might arise in the event he took drastic unilateral action. I assured him of my government's complete understanding of the difficulties which confront him and of its sympathy for the plight of the Korean people, that I had asked to see him alone and informally, and hoped we could discuss these matters on a frank, personal and friendly basis, to which he agreed.

3. I told him of my grave concern, as the United Nations Commander, privileged to include in my command his magnificent ROK Army, should he resort to unilateral, hostile and disastrous steps with no possibility of success which would divide the UN Command and leave us embarrassed before the world, encourage the Communists to action which might cause us to lose all we had gained.

4. First he gave me his est of the enemy sit, briefly, that the Chinese Communists were whipped, they wanted to go home, they had been ravaged by disease, which brought about their germ warfare charges against US; that now was the time to defeat them, and he prayed that President Eisenhower would demand that the Russians, who control the Chinese Communists' actions, withdraw Chinese Commies north of

---

[1] Dated Apr. 26, p. 940.

[2] In this telegram, dated Apr. 27, Clark provided Collins with a brief preliminary report on his conversation with Rhee which is reported on herein in greater detail. (Department of Defense files)

[3] The *aide-mémoire* is printed as an attachment to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 935.

the Yalu as an indication of their good faith in seeking an armistice. Only after that he feels should an armistice be discussed.

5. He contd to reiterate his oft-rptd psn of the Korean people with regards to a divided Korea which he felt would result from an armistice and that there were no assurances that the political conference to fol would ever reach a sat solution. He contd by stating that the Korean people had endured more than their share of this three year conflict, one year of which, he emphasized, had been devoted to fighting and two years to talking. He rptd several times that he hoped my government would not consider that his words were designed towards blackmail.

6. After he got his theme off his chest, I pointed out that he well knew the psn of my government towards a unified Korea and that actions of my government would continue to be directed toward that end. I pointed out the futility, under present conditions, of President Eisenhower demanding the withdrawal of Chinese Communists north of the Yalu, for it would only be turned down or met with a counter proposition that the UN forces similarly withdraw. I indicated the time for such action was at an aprop time after a mil armistice.

7. I made it plain that in the conduct of the armistice negotiations it was the interest of the US to obtain an acceptable and honorable armistice and I knew that he was familiar with the conditions which must be fulfilled before we would acpt such an armistice.

8. I emphasized, as the UN Commander, my great concern over the wording, ~~of h~~is government's *aide-mémoire* of 22 Apr, pointing out that perhaps as a result of faulty translation, it was not clear as to the timing of this intention to remove ROK trps from my comd. I pointed out, as I have to you in my msg C 62098, that the wording of the *aide-mémoire*, as transmitted to me, was susceptible of different interpretation as to the timing that ROK forces might be withdrawn from UN Comd. I pointed out that we had to discuss frankly this subject if he were really serious, for I could not wake up some morning and find myself in the psn of ROK forces and the remainder of the UN Comd running for opposite goals.

9. Then came the most significant statement from Rhee, to the effect that he was not now even thinking in terms of eventually withdrawing ROK forces from UN control, that if such action were taken, it would only be as a last resort, and then only after thorough and frank discussions with me.

10. I again indicated to him the futility of such action on his part, for it would be doomed to disaster, that he could not possibly support logistically a unilateral continuation of hostilities after an armistice.

11. An interesting point developed in connection with the *aide-mémoire*. Rhee stated for what it is worth that it had not been his intent to have Ambassador Yang present the psn of his government in such a

formal manner. He said he had telegraphed to Yang rqstg that the views of the ROK Government on the whole subject of armistice negotiations be made aval to the State Dept.

12. We discussed the possibility of the armistice agreement itself, including specific provisions for the withdrawal of both Chinese Communist and UN trps from Korea within a reasonable time after the signing of the armistice agreement. He felt this would be very desirable and indicated that although his people, who had developed such admiration for the Americans, would be concerned over their departure before real peace had been established. He thought he could handle that sit and explain it to his people, provided his government had been given assurance by my government that the US would fly to his assistance should the terms of the armistice agreement be violated by aggressive action on the part of the enemy.

13. I discussed other points with regards the armistice negotiations as fols:

a. That the psn of my government is to insist upon the neutral state, agree upon [?] to handle non-repatriated POWs, taking them over in Korea, that we would not be a party, as the Communists have demanded, to removing the Korean POWs to the neutral state. I emphasized this particularly true in the case of North Korean POWs whom the ROK Government had indicated its willingness to accept as its citizens. Rhee commented that his people would never permit, nor would the North Korean POWs themselves submit to removal from ROK soil. With ref to the removal of non-repatriated Chinese Communist POWs, I told him our psn initially was the same for them, but that we might be willing in their case to agree to their removal to a neutral state. I told him, however, that if it was agreed to retain them in Korea under the auth of the neutral state that I hoped his government would facilitate their contd use of Chinese POW fac on Cheju-Do. He agreed to this.

b. He felt that the armistice agreement should prov that the political conf get underway in much less than 90 days.

c. I raised with him a statement made in Ambassador Briggs' msg 1271 to State Dept and rptd to Tokyo in msg 357, of 26 Apr,[3] which was to the effect that Rhee had felt in the past there had not been adequate consultation between the UNC and his government. Rhee clarified this point by stating in the past facs did not exist by which the views of his government could be made known to the chief armistice delegate, but that now with the apt of Gen Choi he felt ROK is more adequately represented. I told him that I personally had discussed with Gen Choi his duties and obligations as a member of the armistice delegation, that first he is a UN member, secondly I expected him to rec from Rhee his views and that Gen Harrison and I would always rec them, if submitted objectively and helpfully, however without any obligation on our part to acpt them. I also pointed out that I had info that Choi had been directed to walk out of the delegation meetings should an armistice develop containing terms unacceptable to the ROK. I told him that if my info was correct, it would be a most embarrassing incident and give great comfort to the enemy. He promised me that would not happen, that if the negotiations took a course so repugnant to ROK, he would ask Choi ahead of time not to attend that meeting.

---

[3] *Ante*, p. 938.

14. In conclusion I believe that:

a. I was able to enlighten and clarify Rhee's misunderstanding of the distinction and difference between the mil armistice agreement which we are seeking to achieve and the agreement which would eventually result from the political conf.

b. Rhee has been bluffing in spite of his rptd statement that he hoped we would not consider his actions a form of blackmail.

c. Rhee will not take the unilateral action of fighting alone or withdrawing his trps from UNC without taking a good long look at the consequences of his actions and discussing the matter with me prior to such action.

d. Rhee feels definitely that the armistice agreement should prov for the withdrawal of all non-indigenous trps from Korea, and that a security pact or strong statement from the President should be made indicating US determination to support Korea militarily should the armistice be broken.

15. I saw Ambassador Briggs after my meeting and gave him the gist of my conversation. I will cont to keep in close touch with Rhee on this subject.

16. With ref to visit of Gen Paik to the United States,[4] I now feel he should carry out contemplated itinerary, for to cancel trip now would create suspicion as to our motives in the mind of Rhee.

---

[4] The possibility of Rhee sending Acting Prime Minister Paik to Washington to discuss economic matters was first broached in a conversation between Rhee and Briggs on Jan. 31, 1953. A report of that conversation is contained in a memorandum of conversation by Briggs, Feb. 1, 1953, attached to a letter from Briggs to Allison, Feb. 1, 1953, not printed. (795B.02/2–153)

795.00/4–2853: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 28, 1953—6:42 p. m.

1066. Korean Briefing Meeting, April 28. Johnson reported developments plenary session April 26–27.

At first meeting Communists submitted so-called "concrete proposal" on POW question. Proposal provided (1) repatriation all POWs willing to return within 2 months after armistice signed; (2) within 1 month thereafter, sending all non-repatriated to agreed neutral state; (3) during six months following arrival POWs in neutral state, states to which they belong to explain to them to eliminate their apprehensions and inform them of all matters related their return; (4) if after six months any non-repatriates remain their disposition be referred to political conference recommended in armistice agreement.

---

[1] This telegram, drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown of UNP and cleared by Johnson, was a summary of the Apr. 28 briefing in Washington of the 15 nations with troops participating in the UN effort in Korea. A more complete report of this meeting can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Brown, Apr. 28, 1953, not printed. (795.00/4–2853) This telegram was sent to London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Pusan, Tokyo, USUN at New York, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, The Hague, Wellington, Bogotá, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brussels, Canberra, Manila, Ottawa, and Pretoria.

UNC pointed out Communist proposal failed take account UNC April 16 letter, made no comment on nomination of neutral state, apparently insisted upon physical removal non-repatriates from Korea, and set exorbitant period six months for POWs remain neutral's custody. UNC considered Switzerland obvious choice as neutral, believed neutral could exercise adequate control POWs at suitable locations Korea and felt 60-day period afforded ample opportunity POWs express will regarding repatriation and neutral to determine it. At afternoon meeting Communists rejected Switzerland as neutral on ground disqualified by its nomination by UNC to Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

At April 27 meeting UNC repeated Communist proposal failed take account UNC's suggestions and did not form basis acceptable POW solution. Harrison repeated Switzerland is ideal choice for neutral, pointing out members NNSC had responsibility conduct selves as neutrals and represented neither side. UNC also said Communist proposal dragged on POWs' captivity endlessly contrary UNC view POWs should be released soon as possible after armistice. Communist representative replied his proposal took account UNC's April 16 letter. Said again neutral state must be agreed through consultation both sides and could not possibly be state nominated by one side alone as member Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. He also insisted proposed 6-month period was necessary and reasonable period for explanations to POWs by side concerned.

UNC recalled it agreed resume negotiations in hope Communist proposals might be developed into suitable basis leading to resolution of remaining differences. So far, however, proposals neither reasonable nor constructive and were unacceptable since appeared to constitute indirect means of coercing POWs to return to Communist control, i.e., forced repatriation which UNC rejected.

Johnson regretted apparently Commies have shown no genuine negotiating intention thus far, merely parroting previous proposals and not coming to grips with issues.

He informed group confidentially UNC carefully evaluating reports from returned PWs regarding considerable number PWs remaining in Communist camps eligible for repatriation as sick and wounded and apparently able to travel. Reports very disquieting since situation called into question Commie good faith in making exchange. Johnson said he unable now to state what action would be taken but some action would obviously be necessary.

Johnson announced designation Ambassador Murphy on temporary basis as adviser to Clark on truce negotiations, emphasizing it in no way affected strictly military character negotiations.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, April 29, 1953—10:43 a. m.

CX 62150. Refs: A. Z 36387 (HNU 4-46). B. C 62103 (HNC 1642).[1] C. C 62022.[2] D. JCS 937205.[3] E. DA 924551.[4] F. State Dept 251300S (intel) NOTAL. G. DA 379286.

1. After a careful analysis of Communist proposed manner of implementing the Chou proposal, I feel the issues are capable of resolution provd agreement can be reached by:

a. The neutral state to rec custody of non-repatriated POWs, and,
b. That NK non-repatriates held by the UNC be either released in Korea upon signing an armistice or the selected neutral state assume custody of this group in Korea.

2. Communist failure to make known their choice of neutral states may indicate that they will attempt to secure agreement on other pertinent issues prior to nominating any state. This procedure would permit them to name a state which could well be prepd to immediately assume the prevly agreed upon responsibilities. With this sit existing and the desire of the free world for peace, excessive international pressure might be brought to bear on us to acpt a "neutral state" whose rejection by us would otherwise be supported. I believe our prev experience in resolving the composition of the neutral nations supervisory com, should serve as a guide to us in this sit. In view of the foregoing, I have directed Gen Harrison to press the Communists as a mat of first business, for their nomination of the nation to be the neutral state. At the same time, he will cont to set forth the reasons why Switzerland should be selected for this psn. I consider my guidance on this to be adequate. However, as set forth in ref *c*, a list of those nations acceptable to us

---

[1] In these first two reference telegrams, dated Apr. 26, 1953, neither printed, Clark transmitted to the JCS the record of the substance of the plenary sessions of Apr. 26 at Panmunjom. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] Dated Apr. 22, p. 922.

[3] Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.

[4] The last three reference telegrams, which are summarized in CX 62150, are not printed.

which might be nominated by the Communists would be desirable, in addition, knowledge and auth to immediately reject any other nations deemed unacceptable would be of assistance in establishing the firmness of our psn. I realize the acceptability of any nation is dependent upon many factors and appreciate that the foregoing additional guidance may well be incapable of determination at this time.

3. As pertains to the mvmt of and the type of custody to be exercised by the neutral state over the non-repatriates, I consider that our psn on this subject must be divided into two parts; our psn on North Korean non-repatriates and our psn on the Chinese Communist non-repatriates. I will discuss each in turn.

a. North Korean non-repatriates. In light of ROK opposition to mvmt of this group out of Korea, ROK opposition to an armistice, Communist prev psn on this group, and rqmt upon and demands of our nominated neutral countries, I firmly believe that our initial and interim psn on this group must be one of strong insistence that they be released to civ status immediately upon an armistice becoming eff and being permitted to be returned to their home as civs in accordance with article 59 of the draft armistice agreement if they so elect. Such a psn and disposition of Korean non-repatriates would:

(1) Nullify to some extent ROK antagonism to the armistice.

(2) Largely overcome problems of ROK–neutral state relations by limiting "neutral state" detention of the Chinese to Cheju-Do, or if nec, to the demilitarized zone.

(3) Greatly reduce neutral state detention function.

(4) Permit full rather than tech "neutral state" custody of CCF non-repatriates which should be much more palatable to the Communists.

(5) Greatly reduce the need for enemy mvmt in our rear areas.

(6) Preclude the strong probability that any mvmt of UNC-held Korean non-repatriates would be violently opposed by the ROK population as well as the prisoners themselves.

(7) Be fully justified by enemy disposition of 50,000 ROKA pers for whom they have never acctd.

I consider that our final psn on this group must be one which provs for the neutral state to assume preferably only tech control, but failing in this, full control within Korea.

b. CCF non-repatriates. I plan on taking an initial and interim psn on this group which would prov for the neutral state assuming tech control, if nec, full control in Korea. As a final psn and if only the CCF non-repatriates are involved, I recm that we should accede to Communist insistence that they be physically moved to the neutral state. If other than CCF non-repatriates are involved, i.e., Korean non-repatriates not having been disposed of as above, our final psn must be the same as our initial and interim psns.

4. I consider Communist demands for six months access to non-repatriates to be excessive. I further believe that the actual length of time after an armistice is signed until final disposition of non-repatriates

cannot be determined until agreement has been reached as to location at which neutral state will exercise custody of non-repatriates. At an aprop time I propose to suggest to the Communists as our initial psn, that dlvr within Korea of non-repatriates to control of the neutral state be effected simultaneously with the direct repatriation; that this dlvr be accomplished within 30 days; and that each side be allowed access for the folg 30 days. I consider that our interim psn should allow access for a pd of two months, and that as a final psn, the pd of access should be left to my discretion, but not in any case to exceed four months.

5. *a.* I consider that our initial, interim and final psn pertaining to who determines final disposition of those non-repatriates remaining at the end of the pd of access must be the same; to wit, non-repatriates shall be free to proceed to an aval destination of their choice in accordance with nec and approp arrangements made by the neutral state.

b. I consider unacceptable the Communist proposal that final disposition of the non-repatriates, remaining at termination of the pd of access, be effected by the political conf (para 2K, ref A). In this connection, however, in order that we not lay ourselves open to charges of inconsistency, attn is invited to our various stands with respect to the Indian Resolution. Ref E stated an initial US psn in conformity with my view expressed above. Ref F, passed to CINCFE, indicated US prepd as max to agree to 30-day political conf discussion on final disposition, with all remaining non-repatriates released to UNKRA or designated UN agency if no decision reached at end 30 days. Ref G, para C 17, shows that State Dept psn (ref F) became in effect offl US psn. In spite of this compromise I still consider that our final psn should be as expressed in para 5 above.

6. At such time as it may become an issue, I will endeavor to secure Communist agreement to the presently agreed upon demarcation line. Should we fail to secure agreement to this, we will renegotiate a new line as rapidly as possible and to the best possible advantage of the UNC based on actual line of contact.

7. I consider that all positions, as set forth above, are within present guidance except as pertains to final psn set forth in paras 3*b* and 4 above. To accommodate the final positions proposed herein, I recommend that para 3*b* of ref D be changed to permit phys mvmt of Chinese non-repatriates to the neutral country, and that the time limit set forth in para 3*c* (1) of ref D be extended to 120 days.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) [1]

TOP SECRET [SEOUL,?] April 30, 1953.

MY DEAR GEN CLARK: In the course of our conversation, in the afternoon of 28 Apr 1953,[2] we discussed, among other subjects, the feasibility of a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Chinese Communists and United Nations Forces from Korea. I have turned the matter over in my mind since and certain connected ideas have crystallized, which I think it advisable to communicate to you without delay.

My personal preference is, without ques somewhat selfish, still that we retain, if we can at all, the United Nations Forces, particularly United States Forces, to the last, for the Korean morale would be better maintained and we could be more assured of log and other sup by having them alongside with us than otherwise. Furthermore, the Communist chicanery and propaganda would have less chance of getting between this hard-beleaguered nation and the rest of the free world and thereby doing fatal damage to the whole free world as well as to this country.

It is only proper that the United Nations Forces committed to the present "police action" should remain in Korea until peace is assured, irrespective of the withdrawal of the illegal Chinese Communist invaders. In the absence, however, of any other means of getting the Chinese Communists out of Korea as you suggested, the simultaneous withdrawal of both the Chinese Communist and the United Nations Forces from Korea is preferable to the remaining of the former on the Korean soil. Furthermore, it is not our desire to ask our friends to remain and fight for us more than they have done already.

I believe this simultaneous withdrawal naturally involves certain risks and even perils against which safeguards must be found. For the sake of my own nation and the free world as a whole, I do not feel prepared to agree to risk it, unless the fol points are satisfied or provided for:

1. A Korean-American mutual def pact should be concluded in adv of the withdrawal of the United States Forces from Korea.
2. A buffer strip should be created on the other side of the Korean boundary, to be supervised by the United Nations and maintained until a permanent peace is established in the Far East.
3. While no Korean force should step over the Korea boundary, no Chinese or any other foreign army should invade Korea.

---

[1] This letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information by Clark in telegram CX 62220, May 2.

[2] For a report of this conversation, see telegram C 62143, Clark to Collins, Apr. 28, p. 947.

4. No agreement should be made between the United States and the Soviet Union to the effect that the mil preparation on either side will be hampered or limited.

5. In case of the Soviet Army, Navy or Air Force attempting to invade Korea, the United States Forces shall come back immediately to help defend Korea without international negotiations or conferences for taking such a step.

6. Under no circumstances, Japanese trps shall be made to fight in the Korean theatre of action.

7. The Naval blockade around the Korean coast and air def shall cont until the peace in the Far East is firmly established and thoroughly assured.

8. The United States should cont to increase and strengthen the land, sea and air forces of Korea in order to guarantee the peace and security of the Far East.

Sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 1, 1953—11 a. m.

Instructions for Clark

Mr. Robertson: We have been discussing in the State Department the suggestion of Senator Knowland's that although Congressional opinion would, he thought, be opposed to India as the neutral to handle POW's, he wondered whether Indonesia might not be considered. In thinking it over we had just about arrived at the conclusion that by reason of the fact that Indonesia had an unstable government and would obviously be short of the requisite manpower and other resources, that country would probably not be too good as the neutral. But we just heard this morning that the Russians have approached the Indonesians with a query as to whether they would serve as the neutral. I must say it seems odd to have Senator Knowland and the Russians coming up with the same idea. We have reconsidered and it occurred to us that so long as the prisoners are held within Korea it might be possible if the Communists should suggest either India or Indonesia to have the Asian state that they nominate serve together with the Swiss as the neutrals.

---

[1] A note on the source text read as follows: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, Generals Collins and Vandenberg were present. General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense and Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Cabell represented the CIA and Gleason and General Gerhard the NSC. In all, 19 persons attended this meeting, where, in addition to Korea, Indochina was discussed.

General Vandenberg: Our objections to the original draft of the message to Clark[2] was that it really didn't give him any clear course of action and in a way left him out on a limb. I think we would be inclined to go along with any instructions that gave him a definite answer.

Mr. Robertson: May I take up the points that we have covered in this new draft of the instructions.[3] It is the strong opinion of our Secretary and Under Secretary that we should insist that the neutral be named and agreed on prior to taking up other questions in the negotiations. If the Communists are unwilling to select or agree to a suitable neutral, this might be as good an indication of their intentions as anything else. If they don't want an armistice, therefore, this would be as good a breaking point as any other. We would like to tell Clark to stick to the question of naming the neutral and if the Communists should continue to refuse to talk to the question of the neutral state we thought Clark should be told that he might recess the negotiation as pressure on them to get ahead on an agreement for a neutral state.

General Vandenberg: I think the main thing is that Clark be given clear instructions.

General Collins: I would agree with that also.

Mr. Robertson: (At this point Mr. Robertson read the remainder of the revised draft telegram which stated that in addition to Switzerland—Pakistan, Uruguay, and Brazil would be acceptable as neutrals and that if the Communists should nominate any of these the UNC was authorized to accept immediately. If the Communists should nominate India, the UNC was to propose that India serve with Switzerland or Sweden. If the Communists nominated Indonesia, the UNC was to suggest that Indonesia serve together with Switzerland. The draft telegram had a sentence to the effect that the UNC negotiators should not impugn the integrity of any country nominated by the Communists but should base their arguments against any country on lack of resources.)

General Collins: How can the negotiators stay away from impugning India if the only argument they can use is lack of resources.

Mr. Robertson: In the case of India they would just back the argument that the Indians and Swiss should act together, that the two opposing sides should agree on the primary nominee of each side.

General Vandenberg: That doesn't seem to me to be quite clear in the draft as you read it.

---

[2] Presumably Vandenberg was referring to JCS objections to instructions to Clark concerning selection of the neutral state; for more information, see footnote 3, p. 924.

[3] The draft was revised by State after the State–JCS meeting. The first paragraph of the revised draft was transmitted separately at the direction of the President as JCS 938003 on May 1. For text, see footnote 5 below. The remaining paragraphs were transmitted as DA 938041, G–3 to CINCUNC, May 2, p. 962.

Mr. Nitze: I think it would be clear enough if you just put a period after the statement about not impugning any country that the Communists should nominate.

Mr. Robertson: (At this point Mr. Robertson continued to read the remainder of the draft instruction which included the points that no consideration was to be given to physical transportation of the non-repatriates out of Korea and that Clark was authorized to agree to a period of access of up to four months.)

General Vandenberg: That period of time seems mighty long to me.

Mr. Robertson: We ourselves thought that the 90 days which we had given Clark in his original instructions was really ample time, but since Clark has specifically asked for discretion as to a longer period we could see no good reason why he shouldn't have it.

General Vandenberg: In 120 days there could be a lot of demonstrations organized and there might be real trouble.

General Collins: Clark is familiar with the situation and he will have to handle it himself so that if he feels he wants leeway on the time, I think we should give it to him.

Admiral Gardner:[4] I think we should be clear as to what the underlying motive of the Communists is. They have really put us on notice in the statement that their negotiators made. (At this point Admiral Gardner read statements that the Communists had made at Panmunjom to the effect that it was universally agreed that after an armistice both sides should return all prisoners, that they were in no way giving up this principle, and that their concession was an important one as to the steps, time, and procedures of arranging for the return of the prisoners.) This shows clearly that the Communists have not changed their position and that what they are talking about is the return of the prisoners to them in two steps rather than one.

General Vandenberg: Is it clear to Clark that the Communists' underlying motive is to have a two-step repatriation rather than one. Wouldn't it be well to point out the Communists' statement to him in connection with the part of the draft instruction which gives him authority to extend the period of access to 120 days.

Mr. Matthews: I shouldn't think there would be any objection to that.

Mr. Johnson: The really crucial thing is that there be a firm cut-off date after which a neutral will dispose of the POW's, but there is no reason why Clark's attention shouldn't be directed to the Communists' statement.

General Vandenberg: Is the telegram OK with the other Chiefs? If so, it's OK with me. (The other Chiefs raised no objections.)

---

[4] Vice Adm. Matthias B. Gardner, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

General Collins: Has anybody thought of the legal complications that might be involved in having two neutral states rather than one. Supposing the two neutrals should disagree or supposing there should be trouble with the prisoners, then which neutral does what to whom? It seems to me that we might run into a lot of difficulties and maybe a further delay. Perhaps it would be desirable for you to discuss the possible complications with your Secretary before this message actually goes out.

Mr. Johnson: It would depend primarily on the terms of reference which the neutrals received.

General Collins: I think those terms of reference will require careful thought if we are going to have two neutrals.

General Vandenberg: I think Clark should have the benefit of whatever thoughts you have on the question.

Mr. Robertson: This formula of having two neutrals was arrived at really only this morning and was primarily in response to the possibility that the Communists might nominate Indonesia or India. Indonesia would probably not be capable of performing the functions of the neutral alone and as to India there is some doubt as to how neutral it really is.

General Collins: But what about India as the neutral? Supposing the Indians would take over the POW's and then eventually let 90 per cent of them go back to China. It still would be the act of a neutral country and of an Asian country at that. I personally am one of the Chiefs who has been in favor of this position of non-forcible repatriation. I have thought that it was valuable to hold to that position but if we turn over the POW's to India and if as a neutral and an Asian country they should let them get back to China, this might be a face-saving way for us.

Mr. Robertson: We can't avoid the moral obligation that we have towards these people. To put them in a position where they would eventually be turned over to the Communists would, in effect, be to deliver them to liquidation.

General Collins: I am still bothered by the practical difficulties that we might run into with two neutral countries.

Mr. Nitze: If the two neutrals were an Asian country and Switzerland their disagreements or difficulties would probably not be about the actual housekeeping or handling of the POW's. Their only difficulties might arise on deciding as to the final disposition of the POW's. India or another Asian country would probably veto the handing over of the POW's to Formosa. The Swiss for their part would undoubtedly veto handing over POW's to Peking, so even if there were disagreement between the two neutrals, we could be sure that the prisoners would not be forcibly returned to Communist China.

General Collins: As I understand it, we are not going to give on the question of physically transporting the prisoners outside of Korea.

Mr. Robertson: That is correct.

Mr. MacArthur: I believe that Senator Knowland's idea of Indonesia was to some degree based on his idea that the prisoners could be transported to one of the Indonesian islands and that it would be practical to move them from there.

General Collins: Then if we are not going to physically transport them, the basis of Senator Knowland's idea doesn't seem to have much validity.

Colonel Matthews: We have apparently decided on two breaking points. The first is on the naming of the neutral and the second is on not moving the Chinese out of Korea. Under these circumstances I have a question as to what India could do if it had to maintain the custody of the POW's without moving them out of Korea. I don't see how they could forcibly turn them over to the Communists.

General Collins: This is really a political question which I think is purely up to State. If State doesn't want India as the neutral then I think we should just go along.

General Vandenberg: As I understand it now we are agreed that the message should go out with two changes. One, the omission of the part of the sentence which appears to instruct Clark to use lack of resources as an argument against India and two, the addition of a reference to the underlying Communist objective as it seems to come out of their statement at Panmunjom.[5]

General Collins: Then you will also look into the practical questions that would be involved in having two neutral states so that Clark can have your guidance.

[Here follows discussion of aid to France in Indochina.]

---

[5] According to Vandenberg, President Eisenhower at a meeting at the White House the afternoon of May 1 directed the dispatch of the first paragraph of the revised draft telegram prepared by State after the State–JCS meeting that morning. Johnson read the paragraph over the telephone to Carns, Deputy Secretary, JCS, who had it transmitted to CINCFE as JCS 938003, May 1, 1953. (Memorandum for record by Carns, May 1; JCS records, CCS 383.21 (3–19–45))

It read: "From JCS for CINCUNC. Reur C 62180 and CX 62150. Continue to insist on settlement of question neutral state prior to proceeding to other matters. Further guidance on additional questions raised by ref msgs will follow ASAP." (Dated Apr. 29 and 30, respectively; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795.00/5-153: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 1, 1953—7:48 p. m.

1081. Korean Briefing Meeting, May 1. Johnson reported developments plenary meetings April 29-30, May 1.

At April 28 meeting Communist representative simply reiterated previous statements. UNC repeated Communist proposals in present form unacceptable and asked whether Communists prepared nominate neutral state to take custody PWs.

At meeting April 29 Communist representative said although appropriate length of time for PWs remain neutral custody "entirely necessary" to eliminate their apprehensions, since UNC felt proposed 6-month period too long, "specific length of time can be a subject of discussion". He stated Communists prepared (1) nominate Asian neutral nation which geographical proximity made practical choice; and (2) would make specific nomination after principle sending non-repatriates to neutral agreed.

At April 30 meeting UNC stated until UNC knew Communist nominee, no reason for considering any country other than Switzerland whose neutrality was proverbial. Harrison pointed out geographic location irrelevant, and only neutrality should count. If Communists designate specific country, UNC could consider whether it is neutral and competent. He noted, however, that Asian state necessarily located close to countries dominated by Communists where might be subjected to Communist military, economic and political influence. He added that argument proximity of Asian state relevant advantage only if PWs actually moved from Korea, which UNC not considering. Communists were informed they had already shown UNC how to dispose of non-repatriate Korean PWs by their own actions illegally incorporating Korean PWs into Communist armies. UNC by this standard could appropriately release in Korea those Korean PWs who wanted to remain South Korea and urged Communists to propose such a measure in order facilitate solution of problem.

At May 1 meeting, Harrison again asked Communists nominate neutral. UNC would also consider Sweden true neutral highly competent for task. Moreover, UNC did not refuse consult with Communists on subject but without Communist nomination nothing about which to consult. Harrison also said UNC saw no good reason why geographical location should be deciding reason for acceptance or exclusion of neutral state; essentials required were neutrality and competence. Communist representative replied only Asian neutral "reasonable and practical" but repeated nomination could be discussed only after agreement on sending non-repatriates to territory of neutral.

---

[1] This telegram, drafted by Brown and cleared by Johnson, was a summary of a briefing meeting of the 15 nations with fighting troops in Korea, held May 1 in Washington. A more complete account can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Brown, May 1, 1953, not printed. (795.00/5-153) This telegram was sent to the same posts as circular telegram 1066; see footnote 1, p. 950.

Johnson also described liaison group meeting May 1 when UNC informed Communists their statement that they had completed exchange sick and wounded PWs under April 11 agreement disturbing and not in accordance with facts. UNC had "indisputable evidence" Communists still held 234 non-Korean PWs and 141 Korean PWs fit to travel, desiring repatriation, and eligible as sick and wounded. UNC pointed out repatriation sick and wounded continuing obligation and UNC even now screening PWs that might be included this category. UNC told Communists if failed to carry out April 11 agreement and Geneva Convention in good faith, UNC had no choice but to question Communist sincerity re reaching and carrying out agreements on broader questions confronting armistice delegations.

In answer question from Millet (France) re time UNC would acquiesce in such unproductive exchanges, Johnson stated that while obvious discussions not getting any place no specific time limit set.

DULLES

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 2, 1953—5:11 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 938041. From G-3 for CINCUNC. JCS have directed dispatch of the following:

Part I. Reur C 62180,[1] para 2 of CX 62150,[2] CX 62214[3] and CX 62221.[4]

1. As stated in JCS 938003[5] UNC should continue to insist on settlement of question of neutral state prior to proceeding to other questions.

2. In addition to Sweden and Switzerland, Pakistan would be acceptable as the neutral state. Any Asian state other than Pakistan would be acceptable only if associated with Switzerland or Sweden, the two states acting together to carry out the functions assigned the neutral

---

[1] In this telegram, dated Apr. 30, Clark requested from the JCS a list of acceptable and unacceptable nations for the role of neutral state. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] Dated Apr. 29, p. 952.

[3] In this telegram, dated May 2, Clark requested a modification of his basic instructions so that he could nominate, at the time of his choosing, India and/or Pakistan as the neutral state. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[4] In this telegram, dated May 2, Clark further requested permission to include Indonesia and/or Burma as potential UNC nominees for the neutral state. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[5] For text, see footnote 5, p. 960.

state. We would prefer Pakistan to combination of any other Asian state with Switzerland or Sweden.

3. In view of foregoing suggest at next meeting of delegations Communists be asked whether they are prepared to accept any one of the states named by them at the 2 May meeting, that is, are the Communists prepared to accept a nomination by the UNC of one of the four states named. If an affirmative answer can be elicited, you should immediately nominate Pakistan. If an affirmative answer cannot be elicited you should continue to insist that Communists make their nomination. If Communists nominate state other than Pakistan, UNC should propose prompt agreement upon the basis of acceptance by each side of the other's nomination, that is, association of state nominated by the Communists with Switzerland or Sweden, the two states acting together to carry out the functions assigned to the neutral state. In supporting association of the Asian state with Switzerland or Sweden you should carefully avoid impugning the integrity of any such state, basing any necessary argument primarily upon the reasonableness of the UNC position of agreeing to the Communist nominee as well as upon giving the Communists a choice between the two states nominated by the UNC. Question is not the ability or integrity of any Asian state to carry out function alone but simply that two states acting together are in a better position to assure that interests of all parties are fully protected.

Part II. Re para 7 of CX 62150.

4. No consideration should be given to physical movement of nonrepatriates to the neutral state, and you should continue to be guided by para 3*b* of JCS 937205 [6] in this regard. If agreement reached that some other state and Switzerland or Sweden should jointly exercise responsibilities of neutral state, physical movement of non-repatriates from Korea is clearly impracticable and question should be capable of ready resolution upon basis of custody being taken within Korea.

5. You are authorized if absolutely necessary and as a final position to agree to a period of access of four months and para 3*c* (1) of JCS 937205 is amended accordingly.

Part III.

6. Although Communist recognition that some of the POWs held by the UNC do not in fact desire repatriation is significant, we are concerned by Communist negotiating tactics thus far in negotiations. As indicated in JCS 937205 the US will not countenance prolonged and inconclusive negotiations. This fact should continue to be made clear to the Communists. If within the next few days the Communists do not indicate a more favorable negotiating attitude or if they reaffirm their

---

[6] Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.

stated objective set forth in paras 3 a, b, and c of ZX 36413,[7] we are prepared to consider your recommendations for bringing matters to a head.

---

[7] In this telegram, dated Apr. 29, Clark transmitted the record of the discussion at the Apr. 28 session at Panmunjom. In the paragraphs specifically cited, the Communist Delegate reiterated that both sides should repatriate all prisoners, and that the use of the neutral state was in effect a two-stage repatriation process. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795B.00/5-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PUSAN, May 3, 1953—8 p. m.

1292. Department pass Tokyo; repeated information Tokyo 367, Tokyo pass to Ambassador Murphy for General Clark.

First thoughts on President Rhee's letter April 30 to General Clark[1] (transmitted Clark's CX 62220 to JCS) are as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding unacceptable aspects of Rhee's detailed proposal, letter represents perceptible advance over his previous unequivocal insistence on withdrawal Chinese troops from NK as condition his acceptance of armistice. At least Rhee now appears willing discuss terms and alternatives.

(2) There is nothing inherently repugnant in idea of bilateral security pact since US came to Korea's defense without one in 1950 and we are far more committed to Korea today than three years ago.

(3) Specific terms proposed by Rhee are largely unsatisfactory since they would commit US to variety of dangerous gambits while leaving Rhee free to take whatever action he might see fit in NK under shelter of US defense guarantee. Rhee is evidently thinking in terms of ROK occupation of all Korea and when he speaks of US commitment to help "defend Korea" in event further attack he obviously has in mind everything up to Manchurian border. It also apparent that while he talks of "simultaneous withdrawal" of US–UN and Chinese Commie troops, what he really envisages is only partial withdrawal US military support, involving continued US participation in air and sea defense and in training and equipping ROK forces.

What Rhee's letter appears suggest, in other words, is that if Chinese Commies could be induced withdraw beyond Yalu (and buffer zone) ROK troops would then move into NK and that if either Chinese or Soviets intervened, US, on basis previously concluded defense pact, would immediately come rushing back to pull Rhee's chestnuts out of fire.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 955.

(4) One of principal questions raised by Rhee's letter is that of our own attitude toward simultaneous withdrawal UN and Chinese troops from Korea. It seems to me we should be careful avoid being placed in position of advocating such simultaneous withdrawal until we are certain in our own minds as to optimum timing of withdrawal our own forces. Withdrawal US forces from Korea, together with controls while [*which*?] their presence enables US to exercise, might be particularly serious step in [*if*?] US bound, through formal pact or otherwise, to come to aid of ROK in case of trouble.

(5) 8 points presumably represent his maximum position on basis of which he plans enter into new bargaining phase. Fact that word "armistice" does not appear once in entire letter suggests Rhee may be preparing shift attention to post-armistice political settlement. This seems all to the good.

BRIGGS

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953"

Paper Submitted by the Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army (Taylor) [1]

TOP SECRET SEOUL, 4 May 1953.

Subject: Outline Plan EVERREADY

Map: AMS L552,—Korea, 1:250,000 [2]

1. *Mission:* Eighth Army takes prompt action to safeguard UNC forces and supplies in Korea and to insure that the UN position with regard to the Armistice Agreement is maintained, in the event that operational control of Republic of Korea forces is weakened or lost prior to or after the conclusion of an armistice.

2. *Assumptions:*

a. That an armistice is being negotiated or has been concluded and that UN forces are disposed along the present line of contact or along Line Wyoming Extended.

b. That the government and people of the Republic of Korea may be reluctant to accept the terms of the armistice, and that this reluctance, depending upon its intensity, may produce any one of the following conditions:

(1) ROK troops, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UN directives.

(2) ROK Government and military units proceed along an independent course of action.

---

[1] This plan was subsequently discussed at the State-JCS meeting of May 29, 1953; for a memorandum of that discussion, see p. 1114.

[2] Not printed.

(3) ROK Government, military units or people are overtly hostile to UN troops.

c. That relationships between UN forces and the ROK Army may decline gradually or suddenly and the conditions described in the preceding paragraph may develop in sequence, or any one of the conditions, may be precipitated on short notice.

d. That Communist forces may attack at any time.

3. *Intelligence:* Annex 1, Intelligence[3]

4. *Concept of Operation:*

a. Tasks to be accomplished:

Condition One: See Para 2b (1) [Not Responsive][4]

(1) Intensify CIC coverage of all ROK Government and ROK Army activities.

(2) Division "A", Army Reserve, alerts Task Force #1 for the mission of securing the Seoul area and the Seoul-Taejon Railway.

(3) Division "C", Army Reserve:

> (a) Prepare for movement to Southeast Korea to secure the Pusan and Taegu areas under the command of CG, KCOMZ.
>
> (b) Prepare to pass control of Divison Artillery to X US Corps.

(4) I US Corps—Prepare to secure the Uijongbu area.

(5) IX US Corps—Prepare to secure the Chunchon area.

(6) X US Corps—Prepare to secure the Wonju area.

(7) Alert Navy and Air Force Commanders as appropriate.

(8) Initiate action to reduce the level of supply in forward areas.

(9) In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.

Condition Two: See Para 2b (2) [Independent]

(1) Accomplish tasks of Condition One as necessary.

(2) Move ROK units in the vicinity of vital installations to less sensitive areas.

(3) Commanders having area defense responsibility concentrate installations and units, close out non-essential installations, relieve and disarm ROK Security units, and establish strong security of vital installations utilizing resident UN forces to the maximum.

(4) UN forces secure areas as follows:

> (a) Army Reserve—Seoul, Seoul-Taejon Railway.
>
> (b) I US Corps—Uijongbu.
>
> (c) IX US Corps—Chunchon.
>
> (d) X US Corps—Wonju.

(5) Division "C" (—)—Move to Southeast Korea, on order.

(6) Supply loyal ROK units from US supply points and depots, if necessary.

(7) Turn in non-essential supplies for outshipment.

---

[3] Annex 1 was not attached to the source text and is not printed.

[4] All brackets in this document are in the source text.

(8) Restrict movement of civil population as necessary.

(9) In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.

Condition Three: See Para 2b (3) [Hostile]

(1) Accomplish tasks of Conditions One and Two as necessary.

(2) UN and dependable ROK forces regroup and prepare to conduct, on order, a phased withdrawal to appropriate defensive positions.

(3) In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.

b. Possible measures which may be taken as appropriate:

(1) Send for Chief of Staff, ROKA, and instruct him to secure enforcement of orders.

(2) Confer with commanders of disaffected units.

(3) Relieve disloyal or recalcitrant leaders and replace them by commanders personally loyal to CG, Eighth Army.

(4) Dispatch teams of loyal ROK officers to present the UN cause orally to ROK units.

(5) Notify recalcitrant units that continuation of logistical support is conditioned on full compliance with UN policy.

(6) Discontinue supply of fuel and munitions to the disaffected units and move arms and munitions from ROK supply channels to US installations.

(7) Request CINCUNC to make a demand for compliance on the President of Korea.

(8) Recommend to CINCUNC a declaration of UN policy and reasons therefore to be given the Korean people and Army via:

(a) US radio facilities.
(b) Vehicle and airborne loudspeakers.
(c) Preempted Korean radio facilities.
(d) Placards, handbills, and leaflets.

(9) Withdraw supporting artillery and air support, including the grounding of the ROK Air Force by arrangement with CG, Fifth Air Force.

(10) Demand return of US supplies and equipment in hands of ROKA.

(11) Cut off all communications between disaffected units of ROKA, their headquarters, and the ROK Government.

(12) Secure control, within Army area, of Korean civil and military communications, to include telephone, telegraph, radio, bus, railroad, and water transportation.

(13) Seize, divert, and secure in US installations all supplies in hands of dissident elements.

(14) Proclaim and establish martial law in the name of the UN.

(15) Secure custody of the dissident military and civil leaders.

(16) Proclaim military government in the name of the UN.

c. Location of Forces: Annex 2, Overlay.[5]

---

[5] Annex 2 was not attached to the source text and is not printed.

5. *Forces Available to Execute This Plan:*

a. I US Corps—1 UN and 1 US division.

b. IX US Corps—2 US divisions.

c. X US Corps—1 US division.

d. Army Reserve—3 US divisions.

(*Note:* All ROK forces still responsive to UN direction will be used.)

6. *Logistics:* Annex 3, Logistics. (Omitted)

TAYLOR
Lt Gen

795.00/5-453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1953.

Subject: Greater Sanctions Statement

Participants: Mr. Tomlinson, British Embassy
Mr. Johnson, FE
Mr. Henkin, UNP

Mr. Tomlinson called on instructions from the Foreign Office and left with me the attached "bout de papier".[2] I checked with Mr. Tomlinson my understanding that the UK was in effect withdrawing its agreement to the Greater Sanctions statement and asserting that whether a statement should be made and what it should contain should be decided following an armistice in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. Mr. Tomlinson confirmed that this understanding was correct. Mr. Tomlinson said that as he understands his Government's position it is that as fifteen months have passed since agreement to issue the statement was made it ought to be looked at again in the light of new circumstances. That does not mean necessarily that there should be no statement, but that question should be left open until the armistice is signed or at least until shortly before then, and examined anew. Asked for the reason for this change in the UK position, Mr. Tomlinson stated that the Foreign Office had offered no explanation. His personal estimate was that in the context of the Soviet Peace Offensive, it was felt that a warning statement following an armistice would strike a jarring note and, particularly in contrast with Soviet peace talk, would provide ammunition for the Soviet line that the allies were belligerent and "war-mongering".

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henkin and initialed by Johnson.

[2] In the "bout de papier", which was attached to the source text, the British Government stated that much could happen before an armistice was achieved and the conditions and atmosphere under which it would be signed could well be different from expectations held when the warning statement was originally prepared. In these circumstances, it was Churchill's view that the right time to decide whether a warning statement should be issued and on what terms was immediately after an armistice was signed.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that this communication from his Government was seriously disturbing. I reminded him that we had made a concession on the airfields question solely in reliance on the Greater Sanctions Statement. I recalled that we had reached agreement on the text and on the mechanics for the prompt issuance of the statement after much effort. I said that I was extremely reluctant to have to go to our military authorities to inform them that there is doubt whether the Greater Sanctions Statement could be issued. They will undoubtedly take the position, I said, that we would have to take a new look at the airfields issue if there is to be any shakiness about our ability to issue the statement promptly following an armistice.

I pointed out to Mr. Tomlinson that in view of the leaks that had occurred in regard to this statement the Communists were probably expecting it by now and that failure to issue it might be considered by them quite significant and a sign of weakness inviting new aggression. Also, if the statement were issued promptly upon an armistice the adverse propaganda effect which Mr. Churchill apparently feared would be dissipated in the public elation over an armistice. To issue a warning statement sometime later might in fact have an undesirable effect. Mr. Tomlinson ventured a suggestion that the statement might be made privately, but we did not explore this suggestion.

I emphasized again to Mr. Tomlinson the gravity with which we viewed the change in the UK position. I told him that so far as we were concerned we considered that a firm agreement had been reached by the 16 Powers and that this agreement remained in effect until superseded by some new agreement. Mr. Tomlinson stated that as he understood his Foreign Office message Mr. Churchill had in fact decided unilaterally to withdraw from the agreement. Mr. Tomlinson said that he would of course convey our reactions and views to his Foreign Office.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 4, 1953—3:22 p. m.

JCS 938085. From JCS to CINCUNC.

Circumstances surrounding UNC nomination Pakistan as indicated in para 2 ur ZX 36456 [1] appear to be somewhat at variance with instruc-

---

[1] In this telegram, dated May 4, Clark transmitted to the JCS and Briggs the record of the May 4 plenary session at Panmunjom, in which Harrison officially nominated Pakistan as the neutral state and stated that, as Pakistan was one of the four Asian countries originally suggested by the Communists, acceptance should be forthcoming. Nam Il,

Continued

tions contained in para 3 of DA 938041.[2] Since Congressional leaders were consulted in preparation those instructions and since they were approved by PresUS, it is anticipated that JCS may be queried as to exact circumstances and considerations involved in nomination without having first elicited from Commies statement that they were prepared to accept nomination by UNC of any one of 4 Asian States named by Commies. Request ur comments ASAP.

Harrison's Communist counterpart, refused to agree to a neutral state until the question of physically moving prisoners of war out of Korea to a neutral state was resolved. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] Dated May 2, p. 962.

795.00/5-453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 4, 1953—4:43 p. m.

2586. No distribution. Personal for Murphy. Department greatly concerned over failure Harrison at May 4 meeting obtain commitment from Communists they were prepared to accept one of four Asiatic states named prior to nominating Pakistan in accordance with instructions from JCS to CINCUNC. Clark being queried by separate message from JCS[2] but would appreciate any additional background you may be able furnish.

Appears here dangerous possibility is Communists will now nominate India and that the difference between the basis upon which we are willing to accept India and Pakistan will be exposed to the detriment of our relations with India and ability to maintain position that India is acceptable only if associated with Switzerland or Sweden. The only way we perceive these difficulties can be minimized is if Communists nominate India that [*then*?] UNC delegation in accordance with latter part para 3 JCS instructions May 2 to Clark point out that it has made three nominations, one which was from among countries mentioned by Communists but in spirit of compromise and desire for quick resolution of this problem UNC proposes that each side accept the other's primary nomination, that is, association of India with Switzerland or Sweden.

DULLES

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared by Robertson.

[2] Reference is to JCS 938085, *supra*.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET — TOKYO, May 5, 1953—10:50 a. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62247. Refs: A. JCS 938041.[1] B. JCS 937205.[2] C. CX 52284 (21 July 52).[3]

1. I do not share the optimistic view expressed in para 4, ref A: "If the agreement reached that some other state and Switzerland or Sweden should jointly exercise responsibilities of neutral state, phys mvmt of non-repatriates from Korea is clearly impracticable and ques should be capable of ready resolution upon basis of custody being taken within Korea."

2. However in order to maintain the psn promulgated in para 4 of ref A, and para 3*b* of ref B, believe we must obtain maximum support possible. I recm, if it has not already been done, that consideration be given to acquainting potentially eligible neutral states with the many disagreeable problems that 50,000 unwilling non-repatriates, and the fanatical Communist orientation pers (ref C) would represent if acpt within neutral state territory. By stressing these unpleasant aspects of the task, in addition to other known difficulties, it may be possible to encourage all reasonably sat neutrals to qualify their acceptance of the neutral state role by insisting that the non-repatriates must remain in Korea as a prerequisite to their assuming custody. If such efforts succeed our negotiatory psn would be greatly strengthened, and public support at home and abroad for our psn might be assured.

---

[1] Dated May 2, p. 962.
[2] Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.
[3] *Ante*, p. 415.

Matthews files, lot 55 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET — TOKYO, May 5, 1953—2:55 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62251. Refs: A. JCS 938085.[1] B. JCS 938041.[2] C. JCS 937205.[3]

1. My comments rqst in ref A fol.

2. In order to give Harrison as much time as possible to prepare for the 4 May session the guidance contained in ref B was passed immedi-

---

[1] Dated May 4, p. 969.
[2] Dated May 2, p. 962.
[3] Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.

ately. Early on 4 May Harrison informed us of his contemplated action at the 1100 conf and strongly recm that the first step suggested in part 1, para 3 of ref B be eliminated and that he be permitted to seize the initiative by obtaining the floor first and immediately nominating Pakistan.

3. This recommendation was examined and discussed by Murphy and myself and we both fully agreed that it was the most aprop action under the circumstances. Since you had stated that Pakistan would be most acceptable as the neutral state, and the only Asiatic state you considered qualified to handle the POWs alone, and in addition, as rept by Murphy to State, the Pakistan Ambassador in Tokyo had stated that his government would be willing to acpt the responsibility of the neutral state, we felt it was most desirable for us to seize the initiative by making the specific proposal regarding Pakistan. Furthermore, we considered it was unrealistic to assume that the Communists would give an affirmative ans to the ques as to whether they were prep to acpt a nomination by the UNC of any one of the states named by them. Inasmuch as they were falsely accusing us of our unwillingness to acpt an Asian nation as the neutral, the nomination of Pakistan appeared most aprop. If, by rare chance, the Communists did not give an affirmative ans we would then be in the identical psn we now find ourselves. If, on the other hand, they had responded in the negative our psn would not have changed from that which existed when the recess was called on 2 May.

4. As we see it here the action taken in the 4 May session has given us the initiative and has placed the Communists in the embarrassing psn of not accepting the Asian neutral state which they had previously indicated as acceptable to them.

5. I feel that the judgment of our negotiator on the spot should be supported wherever possible and consider my action to be fully in accordance with the guidance provided me in ref C which accorded me broad negotiating latitude and in ref B which you gave as suggested and not a directed action.

6. In our assumption that this was a suggested action, we were not acquainted with the fact that it had been discussed with Congressional leaders and approved by the President. It would be helpful if such info could be included in future guidance.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Harrison) [1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, May 5, 1953—7:20 p. m.

CX 62257. Ref: ZX 36463 (HNU 5-6).[2] Sgd Clark.

1. From the records of today's meeting covered in ref msg it is possible that the Communists are attempting to entangle us in the mass of details of custodial arrangements in order to prolong the negotiations or to place the UNC in the psn of having acpt their proposal as a basis of discussion. However, it appears to me that the Communists are showing interest and I believe that they are entitled broad ans to their ques.

2. In the conduct of the next meeting I desire that you prov, in a very gen manner, ans to the Communist ques along the fol lines without being drawn into discussion of details.

a. That it is our concept that the neutral state will have full control of the scty and admin of all PW placed in their hands.

b. That it is impossible to go into greater details on these ques until a neutral state has been agreed upon and we become acquainted with both their capabilities and their desires in these matters. These details must be worked out in terms of ref on which both sides will agree and which will be submitted to the neutral state for its consideration.

c. That the assumption of control of the PW in Korea will not place an excessive burden on the neutral state because we propose that the Korean non-repatriate PW be released to a civ status immediately upon the signing of an armistice, and will then be free to return to the location of their choice under the prov of Article 59 of the draft armistice agreement.

3. If aprop suggest you close out the meeting with a remark along the fol lines: I assume from your remarks yesterday that you agree with us that Pakistan is a sat neutral state to take cust of the non-repatriated PW. If that is correct, I am prep to discuss the other matters with you, if not, I propose we adjourn.

---

[1] This telegram was repeated to the JCS for their information.

[2] Not printed (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

795.00/5-553: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1953—7:17 p. m.

1087. Korean Briefing Meeting May 5. Hickerson reviewed developments plenary meetings May 2, 4-5 and liaison group meeting May 2.

---

[1] This telegram, drafted by Brown and cleared by Hickerson, was a summary of a briefing meeting of the 15 nations with fighting troops in Korea held on May 5. A more *Continued*

At first, Communists continued insist first step was agreement upon principle of sending non-repatriates to neutral state, after which they would nominate neutral. However, Communists mentioned India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia as suitable Asian neutrals. UNC maintained essential decide first upon neutral custodian, emphasized suitability Switzerland, Sweden as competent neutrals, and repeated UNC would not transport PWs outside Korea. On May 3 [*4*] UNC nominated Pakistan as custodial neutral. Communists refused comment on nominee and continued maintain prerequisite to agreement on nomination was decision send non-repatriate to neutral, arguing only in this way could military control of detaining power be thoroughly removed. However, at May 5 meeting, Communists without accepting Pakistan said UNC action nominating Pakistan "worth welcoming" and noted issue was whether non-repatriates should be sent to neutral nation or be taken into neutral custody in Korea. In this connection Communists inquired what UNC had in mind re machinery neutral custody in Korea: what steps would be taken to remove military control detaining side to free PWs from its influence; how would neutral effectively take charge of PWs in Korea; how would UNC maintain order in PW camps; whether UNC intended invite neutral send armed forces to Korea to take PWs into custody. UNC noted questions but said no need discuss details prior agreement on neutral.

Hickerson suggested Communist questions re neutral custody in Korea slightly hopeful sign, although he cautioned Communists had not yet abandoned position that non-repatriates must be transported outside Korea. He informed group confidentially that while it remained US view agreement on neutral should be reached before other questions taken up, General Harrison instructed to meet Communists half way and tell them in general terms what UNC has in mind, specifically, that UNC prepared have neutral take full control security and administration all PWs, though naturally details must be worked out and agreed neutral consulted.

At liaison group meeting, UNC repeated request that Communists fulfill obligations under Geneva Convention and April 11 agreement by repatriating additional sick and wounded PWs, of whose continued custody UNC had indisputable evidence. Communist representative insisted all qualified sick and injured PWs fit to travel had been repatriated, emphasizing Communists had repatriated 684, rather than original 600 estimate. He claimed UNC disregarding facts and using "unreliable and unfounded information" for asserting sick and injured PWs remained in Communist custody. UNC repeated UNC had "irrefutable evidence"

---

complete account can be found in a memorandum of conversation by Brown, May 5, 1953, not printed. (795.00/5–553) This telegram was sent to the same posts as circular telegram 1066; see footnote 1, p. 950.

that Communists still held many PWs eligible for repatriation and UNC insisted these PWs must be repatriated.

DULLES

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 6, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 143rd meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "The Large Ship Reactor and Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Programs" and item 2. "The Situation in Indochina and Thailand".]

3. *The Situation in Korea*

4. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC 147; [2] NSC Actions Nos. 759 and 777–*e*; [3] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea", dated March 30, 1953 [4])

General Bradley briefed the Council first on the military situation in Korea and subsequently on developments in the armistice negotiations, concluding with a summary of General Harrison's latest report to the effect that the Communists had begun to propagandize in favor of settling the prisoner-of-war problem and the armistice by means of a political conference. General Bradley pointed out the very great danger of a political conference prior to the conclusion of an armistice. This would permit the Communists to build up their forces while stringing out the political conference, thus placing the UN forces in a trap.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on May 7.

[2] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

[3] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892. NSC Action No. 777–*e*, taken Apr. 28, read as follows: "Agreed that the Department of Defense should study and report on steps which might be taken during the Korean armistice negotiations either to build up forces in Korea or to give the impression that such a build-up was taking place." (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 838.

With this judgment Secretary Smith expressed complete agreement, the more so, he added, since if we agreed to a political conference it would be quite likely his misfortune to be the chief U.S. representative at it.

Mr. Cutler then reminded the Council that at its last meeting it had requested the Department of Defense to appraise the desirability of an actual or simulated build-up of our forces in Korea.[5] He then asked Secretary Wilson or General Bradley to speak to this point.

General Bradley replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that we would not succeed in fooling the Communists by any kind of fake build-up of strength in Korea. The Chiefs were very skeptical of invoking psychological pressures if we were not actually prepared to resume the offensive if and when the armistice negotiations broke down. General Bradley outlined what forces and matériel would be available to commence such a build-up in Korea if the Council did decide to authorize such a build-up. But General Bradley also warned that the sending of additional men and matériel to Korea would seriously affect our commitments in other vital areas and would require more funds and higher force levels. In summary, said General Bradley, it was the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we should not only not move any new units to Korea, but not even alert such units for movement unless and until we had made a prior decision to step up the pace of our operations in the event that the armistice negotiations collapsed.

Mr. Cutler interposed to explain that the NSC staff had attempted to present in tabular form the six possible alternative courses of action open to the United States in Korea in this contingency.[6] While, said Mr. Cutler, it was not his intention to propose a discussion of these alternatives by the Council until we knew the probable outcome of the armistice negotiations, he hoped that this chart of the alternatives would prove helpful later.

The President expressed appreciation of this latest effort to set forth in convenient form the Korean alternatives, and then asked the Council whether it believed it would be profitable to have the military brief them on the several choices of action in Korea which were open to us, the briefing to be done in simple operational and descriptive terms. The briefing, the President thought, should also include a clear statement by the Chiefs of Staff as to which of the several possible courses would be most desirable for the United States in terms of total cost to the nation in both human and material resources. The President emphasized that he wished the briefing to avoid technical phraseology and to be accompanied by charts and maps.

---

[5] See the memorandum of discussion at the 141st meeting of the NSC, Apr. 28, p. 945. The reference to the "last meeting" was incorrect; the real or simulated build-up was discussed at the 141st NSC meeting, not the 142d.

[6] See the table in the NSC Staff Study of Apr. 2, pp. 854–856.

General Bradley informed the Council that the Joint Chiefs, in their recent paper setting forth several alternative courses of action in Korea,[7] had deliberately and by design avoided making any choice among these alternatives. They believed that it was inappropriate for them to fix on any military course of action until the Council itself had decided on what our national objective was. The Joint Chiefs, said General Bradley, are all too frequently accused of interference in the political decisions of the Government.

Secretary Smith first, and then other members of the Council, expressed warm approval of the President's proposal for a military briefing. Secretary Smith stated that most of the possible military courses of action in Korea involved difficulties from the point of view of foreign policy. As set forth in NSC 147, these foreign policy difficulties became increasingly more severe as the military courses of action became more drastic. Nevertheless, said Secretary Smith, he thought it quite possible that if we were to adopt the sixth and most drastic of these military courses of action and were able thereby to secure a victory in a short time, our allies might welcome our choice. If, on the other hand, victory eluded us and the struggle was protracted, we must anticipate grave difficulties.

In view of Secretary Smith's remarks, the President suggested that it would be very useful for General Bradley to plan his briefing in conjunction with the State Department in order that the military courses of action could be accompanied by a clear statement of their foreign policy implications.

The President then reverted to a statement made by General Bradley in the course of his briefing on the military situation in Korea. General Bradley had pointed out that the Communists seemed to be attempting to put planes in back on four airfields in North Korea, and the Air Force had been making these fields targets for recent attacks. With regard to this, the President inquired whether these airfields might not prove a target which would test the effectiveness of an atomic bomb. At any rate, said the President, he had reached the point of being convinced that we have got to consider the atomic bomb as simply another weapon in our arsenal.

General Bradley expressed some doubts as to the usefulness of any of these fields as a target for an atomic bomb.

---

[7] Presumably this reference was to the JCS estimate, which was attached to NSC 147, but is not printed.

There ensued, in conclusion, a discussion of the time when the military and the State Department should present their briefings on the alternatives open to the United States in Korea. It was first thought that the briefing should be scheduled in two weeks time. Secretary Smith, however, said it was quite possible that the armistice negotiations would break down during that interval, and the President therefore directed that the Council meet a half an hour earlier next week and the briefings be scheduled for that meeting.

Action on Item 3:

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in Korea and on developments in the Korean armistice negotiations.

Action on Item 4:

The National Security Council: [8]

a. Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to NSC Action No. 777–*e*, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Consider that the Communists are not likely to be fooled by deceptive or psychological warfare measures not related to an actual build-up in Korea.

(2) That such measures, to be effective, must be predicated on a prior decision and preparations to assume the offensive in Korea in the event armistice negotiations break down.

(3) Could make available certain additional forces to carry out such a decision, but this would reduce our offensive capabilities elsewhere and would require additional funds and personnel.

b. Noted a request by the President that Mr. Cutler circulate to the Council a letter from Ambassador Lodge relative to reimbursement by our allies for logistical support furnished to their troops in Korea by the United States. [9]

c. Agreed that the following briefings on the subject should be presented at next week's Council meeting:

(1) A briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on feasible military courses of action in Korea, together with their choice of the most advantageous course for the United States to adopt.

(2) A briefing by the Department of State on the probable effects of such courses of action on other nations, particularly our allies.

Note: The actions in *c*–(1) and (2) above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, respectively, for implementation.

---

[8] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 782; a record copy can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

[9] The text of subparagraph *b* has been corrected in accordance with the text of the record copy cited in footnote 8 above.

[Here follows item 6. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOKYO, May 7, 1953—1:36 p. m.

ZX 36484. HNU 5-10. CINCUNC transmits CINCUNC (Adv) msg HNU 5-10.

1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. Communists: "I have an important statement to make.

a. "In the concrete proposal for implementation which our side put forward on April 26, the disposition of the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated is based upon the prerequisite of sending them to a neutral nation. But discussion in the armistice negotiations of the past 10 days have proved that your side has been trying to obscure this prerequisite of our side by the settlement first of the question of the nomination of the neutral nation, thereby attempting to realize the other prerequisite which your side has put forward, namely, the prerequisite of keeping in Korea the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated with the neutral nation coming to Korea to take them into custody. We consider that the 2 prerequisites mentioned above are entirely different. Under different prerequisites, there should be different proposals for disposition. The proposal of our side provides that the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be sent to a neutral nation, released from the original control of your side and received and taken into custody by that neutral nation; that thereafter, through the explanations made to them by the personnel sent to that neutral nation by our side, they be freed from their apprehensions so that it will be possible for them to express their will; and that thereafter, the authorities of the neutral nation concerned ensure that all those prisoners of war who request repatriation be repatriated to their fatherlands. However, the proposal of your side provides that the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated still be kept in the area controlled by the detaining side. This would obviously make it impossible for such prisoners of war to be completely freed from the control of the detaining side. Moreover, the neutral nation would meet great difficulties in the area controlled by the detaining side in receiving and taking into custody the prisoners of war, who according to the assertion of your side are in great numbers. At the same time, such a situation would not afford due freedom and facilities to the side concerned for its explanation work. Between these 2 proposals, the proposal of our side best embodies the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and international practice, and can thus settle the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war justly and reasonably.

---

[1] This telegram was also addressed to Briggs in Pusan.

b. "But in the discussions of the past 10 days, your side has obstinately insisted upon the prerequisite of your side that the remaining prisoners of war not directly repatriated should still be kept in Korea, and that a neutral nation should come to Korea to receive them and take them into custody. Such an obstinate action of your side will again hinder the realization of an armistice in Korea because of a question of steps and procedure. As a result, the ardent desire for an armistice in Korea of the people of both sides whose sons are fighting in Korea and of the peace-loving people of the whole world, will again receive a blow. In view of this fact, I now declare that we will continue to reserve the proposal put forward by our side on April 26. But on condition that your side accepts the following new proposal which our side puts forward now, we are prepared to try to adopt the prerequisite of your side that the remaining prisoners of war not directly repatriated be kept in their original places of detention and be handed over to a neutral nation which shall arrange for their repatriation. I must point out that the proposal put forward on April 26 by our side is more reasonable as compared to the new one which is based upon the prerequisite of your side.

c. "The contents of our new proposal are as follows:

"(1) Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation to the side to which the prisoners of war belong, in accordance with the related provisions of paragraph 51, Article 3 of the armistice agreement and in conformity with the final names lists exchanged and checked by both sides.

"(2) In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, both sides agree that a neutral nations repatriation commission shall be established, to be composed of an equal number of representatives appointed respectively by 5 nations, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, the 4 nations provided for in paragraph 37, Article 2 of the armistice agreement, and India as agreed upon by both sides.

"(3) All prisoners of war of both sides, with the exception of those prisoners of war who shall be directly repatriated as provided for in paragraph 1 of this proposal, shall be released from the military control and custody of the detaining side at the original places of detention and be handed over to the neutral nations repatriation commission, provided for in paragraph 2 of this proposal, which shall receive them and take them into custody. The neutral nations repatriation commission shall have the authority to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction. In order to ensure the effective execution of this authority, the member nations of the neutral nations repatriation commission shall each provide an equal number of armed forces.

"(4) The neutral nations repatriation commission, after having received and taken into custody those prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within the time limit of 4 months after the neutral nations repatriation commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send personnel to the original places of detention of these prisoners of war to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations so as to eliminate their apprehensions and to inform them of all matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full right to return home to lead a peaceful life.

"(5) Within 4 months after the neutral nations repatriation commission receives and takes into custody the prisoners of war, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the neutral nations repatriation commission, and the detaining side shall not offer any obstruction. The administrative details for the repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be settled through consultation between the neutral nations repatriation commission and the sides.

"(6) If, at the expiration of the time limit of 4 months as provided in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral nations repatriation commission, their disposition shall be submitted for settlement through consultation to the political conference as provided in paragraph 60, Article 4 of the armistice agreement.

"(7) All the expenditures of the prisoner of war during the period in the custody of the neutral nations repatriation commission, including their travelling expenses in returning to their fatherlands, shall be borne by the nations to which they belong.

"(8) The terms of this proposal and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all prisoners of war."

3. UNC: "We have noted your proposal. We suggest a recess until 11 o'clock 9 May."

4. Communists: "We agree."

5. Meeting recessed at 1126 hours.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 7, 1953—9:41 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 938429. From CSUSA for CINCUNC. JCS have directed dispatch of the following:

1. At a meeting with the President today, 7 May, at which were present the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and General Hull representing the JCS, the latest Communist proposal outlined in your ZX 36484[1] was discussed. It was consensus of opinion that new Communist proposal appears to represent a significant shift in their position and appears to offer a basis for negotiation of an acceptable agreement. It has strong resemblance to the Indian General Assembly Resolution with some advantages and disadvantages over that proposal. It has the advantage of not requiring the transport of prisoners to the demilitarized zone. It has the disadvantage of not providing a definite time limitation for the political conference to reach agreement on the final disposition of prisoners not electing repatriation and in not making provision for such disposition in the event the political conference is unable to reach a decision thereon. It has the further disadvantage of stationing of troops, some of whom would be Communist controlled, in areas in the rear of United Nations forces. In our discussion it appeared that the stationing of troops of "the member nations of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" on an island such as Koje-Do and Cheju-Do might be acceptable if they were limited to military police type arms. There are other points in the Communist proposal which would need clarification, such as the reaching of a decision in event there were disagreement between the representatives of the member nations on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Also there is the question of what restrictions would apply under that part of the proposal which contemplates that the nations to which the prisoners belong shall have freedom and facilities to send personnel to the places of detention of the prisoners of war.

2. There is very complex problem here in connection with our agreeing to the fifth member of commission. For this reason it is thought that we could agree on the other four as originally proposed (Indian Resolution) and that they, in turn, should agree on the fifth member of the commission. If this turned out to be India, we would acquiesce.

3. UNC delegation should meet with Communists as presently scheduled and General Harrison, without indicating either acceptance or rejection of the Communist proposal, should ask for clarification of para 6 of Communist proposal (para 2*c* (6) of ZX 36484), particularly the question of ultimate disposition of prisoners who refuse repatriation in event agreement thereon is not reached at the political conference. This should be designed to explore whether Communists would accept a solution comparable to that contained in the last paragraph of the Indian Resolution.

---

[1] *Supra.*

4. Meanwhile send your comments ASAP on the Communist proposal and on our preliminary views indicated in paras 1 and 2, above.[2]

---

[2] See telegrams CX 62301 and CX 62316, both dated May 8, pp. 987 and 993, respectively.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 8, 1953—11 a. m.

Korean Negotiations

Mr. Robertson: The line of thinking which seems to have prevailed till now on how to deal with the Chinese Communists' 8-point proposal is that we should accept the four countries—Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and leave it to the four to choose the fifth. If they should then choose India, we should be prepared to accept India at that time. To our own minds we think there are serious disadvantages in this line of action. In the first place we would offend the Indians by not accepting them initially and in the second place we would probably end up with the Indians in any case, but after we had rebuffed them. We would have worries that with the Indians on the commission it might make possible a 3 to 2 vote against us, since the Indian position on the POWs has to some degree been close to the Communist position. We ourselves also see grave difficulties in having Communist troops in custody of the POWs. Clark has made what seems to me a very strong case against having Communist troops in our rear or in custody of the POWs.

General Bradley: Part of the difficulty might be overcome if the Commie troops were completely limited to an island.

Mr. Johnson: Would it help if all the POWs were put on Cheju-do rather than leaving some of them on Koje. It would mean, I should think, a greater possibility of isolating them, although it would probably require construction of facilities.

Mr. Matthews: Clark has actually suggested that. (At this point Mr. Matthews read a portion of Clark's message which stated that he thought it would be preferable to concentrate all POWs on Cheju-do and pointed out that there were some housing facilities there which presently were being used for ROK training purposes.[2])

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." On the JCS side, Generals Bradley and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended as well as Vice Chief General Hull. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Cabell represented the CIA, Gleason and General Gerhard the NSC, and Admiral Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 20 persons attended. Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

[2] Reference was to telegram CX 62301, May 8, 1953, paragraph 6*a*(4), *infra.*

Mr. Johnson: Another possibility that we have been considering is that we might propose that we have just Indian troops and no Czech or Polish armed forces.

Mr. Nitze: Personally I think it would be better to have the Indians act as a single neutral rather than to accept the 5-Power proposal at all.

General Bradley: Would the Commies accept that?

Mr. Nitze: I don't know why not.

General Vandenberg: The President has said that it was politically impossible for him to accept India alone.

Mr. Nitze: I agree that we would have real initial difficulties with the Hill, but the eventual difficulties that we would run into from having Communists on the Commission or particularly from having Communist troops would be considerably greater.

General Hull: Have the Swiss and Swedes said they would provide forces?

Mr. Matthews: The Swedes have reserved their position and the Swiss are very much worried about their ability to provide forces of the magnitude required.

General Hull: It certainly would be better to have all the troops come from just one country.

General Bradley: I think it would be better to accept the Indians if we are going to end up with the Indians anyway. There is the further point of having some sort of time limit after which the prisoners will be released. Under the Communist proposal the prisoners would probably have to stay in the jug forever. On the question of Communist troops—if this were a question of their being back of our lines in Europe it might be that we would gain something from it. The Communist troops would have a chance to see Western European standards of life, and in terms of psychological warfare that might be a net asset to us. The Communist troops in Korea would bring us no asset in the psychological warfare field and might constitute a real nuisance. I think they would have to be on an island.

Mr. Johnson: Can communications be by sea alone?

General Hull: Personnel and supplies could be shipped in LSTs from Inchon.

Mr. Nitze: I have been concerned about our use of the phrase "countries to which the prisoners belong". It seems to me that referring to these Chinese POWs as belonging to Communist China is a mistake and that the heart of our psychological position on these POWs is that they "don't belong" to Communist China if they don't want to.

Mr. Johnson: The difficulty is this is the precise language used at the Geneva Convention so it's hard to make an issue of it at this time.

Mr. Robertson: If we have Communist troops guarding the POWs we won't have any problem to worry about in handling those who will decide not to go back. After the treatment we can expect them to get from the Communist troops, they will probably all go back.

General Bradley: There are no safeguards on this thing at all—no provision for the ICRC to check on conditions and no provision for newspaper men or other news media to have access. On the other hand I think we are in something of a spot if we don't accept the Communists' proposal in general.

Mr. Robertson: Would you accept including Communist troops?

General Bradley: I think it would be much better to have Indian troops alone. Is anybody working on a draft telegram to Clark?

Mr. Robertson: We thought it would be useful to sort out our ideas with you before we undertook to get further instructions.

General Hull: Clark does need specific instructions right away which would give him clarification on his authority to talk about more than the 6th point of the Communist proposal. We have a draft telegram here.[3] (At this point General Hull distributed attached draft telegram.)

Mr. Johnson: I think that in the second paragraph you might revise it to read "As this point constitutes a principal issue it should receive primary attention" rather than the present wording which says "This point constitutes principal issue". With that change I think this telegram could go out. On the question of further instructions for Clark we have given our Secretary a memorandum which in sum makes three points—first that we should accept the Indians right away as a member of the commission, second that we should propose that all forces be provided by the Indians alone, and third that we should stand on having a terminal date after which POWs would be released.

General Hull: I think that we just have to face up to the fact that if there are Communist troops guarding the POWs, some POWs are going to get badly hurt and extreme pressure will be exerted on them.

Mr. Matthews: I think Brad's suggestion of making sure that there are rights for the press is a sensible one.

Mr. Robertson: I think we should stand firm on no Communist troops.

Mr. Matthews: Even if the troops were all Indians it still would be useful to have the press have the right to watch and report what was going on.

General Bradley: I would like to sum up the points we want to make in our instructions. First that we accept the Indians from the start. Second, only Indian troops, and third, no Iron Curtain and freedom for reporting. Fourth, some positive disposition of the POWs provided for.

Mr. Johnson: On the last point there are three alternative possibilities. The first that we should adopt the formula of the old Indian resolution which would be to refer decision on the POWs to the UN if it were not agreed to by the political conference. Second, to provide specifically for release of the prisoners in the armistice terms and third, to leave the disposition to the discretion of the neutral. With a 5-Power commission which includes two Communist countries and India, the third alternative would obviously be hopeless. The second the Communists might have difficulty with. The first one might eventually prove to be most practicable.

---

[3] The reference was to a draft of telegram JCS 938446 to Clark, May 8, 1953, not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 993.

General Bradley: It might really be useful to get the Indians out in the open on this thing. If they do follow purely the Communist line on the POWs, it might give us a good reason to wonder why we should spend $90 million on helping the Indians.

Mr. Nitze: There is some distinction, I think, between the Indian position and the Communist position. The Indians, I am pretty sure, are against sending the POWs by force back to Communist China, but I think they are also against sending any of them to Formosa.

Mr. Robertson: It seems to me that we should try to get into the armistice terms the point that the prisoners will be free to choose where they want to go after a given period of time. Even if this isn't an issue we can break on, we can still at least try to get it. After all, the Communists always ask for what they want and I don't see why we shouldn't try to get what we want.

Mr. Matthews: Clark in his message thought that the best position for him to be in would be to have a full counter proposal to make.

General Bradley: Could we have a recess of negotiations so that we can get squared away with a full counter proposal?

Mr. Johnson: Our Secretary, I believe, is pretty strong against our asking for a recess.

Mr. Matthews: I think we should try and get up a draft as soon as possible.

General Bradley: Let's work up a draft as soon as we can. We don't have to actually send it until we get Clark's report tomorrow on his meeting with the Communists.

Mr. Johnson: I think we need to get decisions made here and get out a message as rapidly as possible. We might be able to have a draft message this afternoon.

General Bradley: Let us try to get one up.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, May 8, 1953—11:27 a. m.

CX 62301. Refs: A. ZX 36484 (HNU 5-10).[2] B. CX 52284 (21 July 52).[3] C. CX 62296.[4] D. C 61968.[5] This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1.

1. The Communists' action today represents the first concession of any importance made by them in the curr negotiations and it can not help but give rise to the hope in the minds of many that they sincerely desire an early armistice. However, I consider it essential that the Communist proposal be examined with great care and in great detail at all levels for it contains provisions that can work to the detriment of the UNC and involve US in extreme difficulty with ROK Government. The many problems that will arise in drafting the terms of ref to place these provisions in effect will prov the Communists with all the obstacles they require if they elect to employ delaying tactics. It is apparent that the Communists are attempting to devise another system designed to insure the eventual return of all their POWs or conform them with the alternate of continued and indefinite detention.

2. The Communists' eight-point proposal is similar in many respects to the Indian resolution which the United States supported in the United Nation Gen Assembly's Political and Security Committee. The Communist proposal appears to differ from the Indian resolution in the following pertinent respects:

a. Five-state com in lieu of four with an umpire.

b. Four months custodial pd in lieu of three.

c. No cutoff date for consideration by political conf of disposition of POWs, i.e. no final solution of the problem.

d. Contains provisions for support of non-repatriates while in cust of NNRC by the "nations to which they belong."

3. My detailed comments on indiv points of the Communist proposal fol in Part 2.

Part 2.

4. Pnt 1. The Communists meaning of the term "final name lists" is subject to ques. Should they still be referring to the lists exchanged on 18 Dec 1951, this pnt would then be unacceptable. Should they mean

---

[1] A note on the source text indicated that Under Secretary Smith saw this telegram.

[2] Dated May 7, p. 979.

[3] *Ante*, p. 415.

[4] This telegram, dated May 7, contained a draft of a preliminary UNC proposal for settlement of the POW issue; it is not printed.

[5] Not printed.

that new final lists containing only names of those who desire to be repatriated be exchanged and that repatriation be effected on the basis of the new lists, this would also have some objectionable features. Based on experience in the recent sick and injured opn, it would be highly desirable from our point of view to prepare daily shipping lists only which would be turned over at time of dlvr. This would not affect exchange of round figures of repatriates during negotiations. I consider the foregoing item should be clarified and reworded to remove possible doubt prior to acceptance.

5. Pnt 2.

a. This provision parallels proposal 1 of the Indian resolution but by nominating India to be the fifth power of the com circumvents proposals 13 and 14 which provided means for determining the umpire. Considering the proposed composition of the com, India in effect becomes the umpire based on what is now only an assumption that decisions of the com will be by majority vote. I am not familiar with essential facts which I believe must be evaluated at governmental level to determine the desirability of allowing India to be the ultimate umpire.

b. Note that the Communist proposal reads: "Representatives appointed respectively by 5 nations." If representatives appointed by India are pro-Communists, our principle of non-forcible repatriation might be compromised. If India is to cast the deciding vote on the manner in which terms of ref will be implemented, then that portion of terms of ref, ref C, pertaining to verification must be given very close attn.

c. As indicated above, a vital point to be clarified in this provision is the manner in which the com will reach a decision; will it be by majority vote, or will the power of veto be aval to members of the com?

d. I consider that guidance is required on acceptability of representatives from Poland and Czechoslovakia as members of the repatriation com. In view of the psn India would hold in the com, and considering the proposed composition of the com, I consider that guidance as to the acceptability of India is also required. My initial thoughts are that I would prefer the provisions of proposals 13 and 14 of the Indian resolution to the direct approval of India to be the umpire. If veto is to be utilized in resolving pnts of issue within the com, this pnt of the proposal would obviously be unacceptable.

6. Pnt 3.

a. This pnt has omitted several items which I consider essential and contains several stipulations which are objectionable. These are:

(1) Fails to establish a specific time in relation to the effective date of the armistice by which the NNRC would assume cust of the non-repatriates.

(2) Does not prohibit further transfer or mvmt while in the cust of the NNRC of those non-repatriates who fail to rqst repatriation.

(3) Specifies that pers to be provided by the members of the NNRC shall be of the armed forces; there is apparently no provision for any civ participation.

(4) Stipulates that non-repatriates be released from the mil control and cust of the detaining side at the original place of detention. If the strict interpretation of this is required by the Communists, we would then turn over cust of non-repatriates at POW installations on the mainland of Korea. It should be noted that a portion of the custodial pers will be from armed forces of two Communist satellite nations. Considering the nationalities involved, there is no doubt that the ROK will violently oppose having mil forces of Communist satellite countries in Korea and probably even on the off-lying islands. In fact, they have already made public statements which, if the threats contained therein were consummated, might make it almost impossible without creating serious disturbances to implement the Communist proposal were we to acpt it. I believe we must realize that we and the ROKs would be faced with aprxly 2500 carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated Communist mil thugs, not to mention such others as may be introduced to "explain" to the non-repatriates their rights, at mainland or island installations, all free to engage in espionage and disorder. I have previously set forth in ref B my opinion as to the probable results based on my experience in Austria. With ROK opposition to having mil pers of Communist satellites in their rear areas, my prev experience might be mild in comparison to the sit which could develop. The foregoing sit would be difficult enough if a liberal interpretation were placed on the phrase "at the original place of detention." As you know, I visualize a neutral state or states assuming cust of the non-repatriates primarily on off-lying coastal islands, ref D. In my tentative plans I realize that considerable difficulty may be encountered in effecting the mvmt of these non-repatriates to off-lying islands during the interval of the effective date of the armistice and the time the NNRC would assume cust. I consider it very undesirable to attempt any mvmt prior to the time that hard-core Communists have been removed from the islands and prior to the time the non-repatriates could be informed of the purpose of this move. I consider it absolutely essential that the detaining power be the auth which determines the place in Korea at which the NNRC receives cust of the non-repatriated POWs. I am considering making arrangements with the ROKs for the use of Cheju-Do as the place to which all non-repatriates would be concentrated. This has many advantages other than its isolated location as the ROK replacement tng camp could be partially phased out and its many fac utilized. Considering their announced opposition to Communist satellite nations having mil pers in their rear areas, I ques whether I will even be able to accomplish this. Our problems would be materially lessened and ROK opposition to Communist pers in rear areas might be reduced if we could in some way achieve Communist agreement to release of Korean non-repatriates as civilians upon the armistice becoming effective.

b. My comments pertaining to probable results if these 2500 Communist armed forces are allowed access to mainland POW installations should be considered in developing guidance on pnt 2, para 5*d* above.

7. Point 4. I consider this point to be sat only if point 3 is modified to set a specific time limit in relation to the eff date of the armistice in which the NNRC will have assumed cust of the non-repatriates and prov the term "original place of detention" is resolved along the lines indicated in para 6*a* (4) above.

8. Point 5. There is no particular objection to the proposal as stated, nor is any hidden intent apparent. There is a negotiating factor we can develop in an effort to reach agreement on a shorter period. We can start initially on 2 months and compromise on 3, if possible. In implementing this prov, the neutral nation com would be free to call on either detaining power for trans of "persuaded" pris from the detention site to the exchange point with escorts furnd from neutral state armed forces. "Consultation" with the two sides I interpret to mean mainly coord of dlvr scd.

9. Point 6.

a. This is probably one of the most desirable goals from the Communist point of view and reinforces our belief that they intend to do everything in their power to insure the rtn of the great bulk of non-repatriates. Since this involves submitting the ques of disposition of non-repatriates remaining after period of access to the political conf, an element of the Indian resolution, but minus the limitation as to the period of time, disposition can be considered by the conf and the prov for care and maint at the termination of period of discussion by political conf, I am not in a psn to judge the political implications our govt must consider before acptg or rejecting it. However, from the UNC view, there are outstanding disadvantages:

(1) It offers little concrete hope for the future to non-repatriates who successfully resist Communist pressure during the period of "explanations".

(2) Indefinite cust of Koreans becomes more of an issue to the ROK as times goes on. Trans of cust from the UNC to neutrals, and then final disposition by a political conf will serve only to irritate the ROK.

(3) The four-month period (see para 8 above) applies only to the time allowed for "explanations". Depending on the life span of the political conf, it is entirely probable that the exercise of cust by the neutrals may extend over many months, if not years.

b. It would be to our great advantage to insist on release of all non-repatriates still in cust of the neutrals at the end of the four-month period.

10. Point 7. The phrase "shall be borne by the nations to which they belong" requires clarification and the proposal may be fraught with various possibilities that would work to our disadvantage. It would seem more logical, from purely admin and log points of view, that each detaining power cont its responsibilities for the non-repatriated pers in its respective territories until such time as their disposition is decided.

Equally it would appear logical that each detaining power assume support responsibilities for the elements of the neutral states operating within its respective area. As I see it now, this should be our psn in discussing details with the Communists, and should be included in our terms of ref for the neutral state. However, I would appreciate further guidance in this matter.

11. Point 8. Publication of the exact procedure to be fold as agreed to by both sides and the manner in which the neutral com will operate should be of minor interest to repatriates but of maj interest to non-repatriates. As pointed out in prev comms, the eventual fate of non-repatriates, as we explain it to them will have decisive effects on their courage to resist rtn to Communist control. Whatever the final terms are, we will plan on conducting a concentrated orientation program prior to the date the neutrals actually take over.

Part 3.

12. There can be no question but that the Communists' proposal contains a firm basis for further discussions, but I do not consider it advisable that we enter into any detailed discussions prior to having developed the firm psns that the UNC will take on every maj item that must be resolved in conf.

13. As pointed out in detail in part 2 above, I have grave misgivings concerning:

a. The manner in which decision will be made in the neutral nations repatriation com, especially if India exercises the controlling voice.

b. The reception which the ROKs will accord the assorted group of Nationals composing the NNRC, especially when it will probably contain as a min 2500 carefully selected and indoctrinated Communist armed pers. I will discuss this matter with Pres Rhee within next few days and obtain his views which in all probability will not be favorable.

c. The effect on our bargaining psn caused by our govt's apvl of the Indian resolution in the UNGA.

d. Our ability to have written into the specific terms of ref the many safeguards essential to protect our vital principles. This will not be an easy matter to resolve and may well result in long drawn-out discussions which the public will find difficult to understand.

14. In view of the above and present guidance, I will require further guidance on the folg items:

a. The acceptability or the nonacceptability of Poland, Czechoslovakia and India as a member of the NNRC.

b. The consideration I must accord to the fact that the United States has apvd in principle the former Indian resolution.

c. The psn the UNC must take in considering point six of the Communists' proposal.

d. In all probability the provisions contained in point seven can be clarified during the discussion of specific terms of ref. However I would appreciate advice on the legal aspects and such additional guidance as you consider nec.

e. If the decision is to acpt the Communists satellite nations as members of the NNRC should a firm psn then be taken in the negotiations to effect the relief of Korean non-repatriates to a civ status upon the armistice becoming eff.

15. There are 2 courses of action that I can foresee in the immediate future:

a. At the conclusion of the present 48-hour recess rqst another short recess in order to permit the receipt of additional guidance rqstd above and on which I can develop a firm psn.

b.

(1) To meet at the termination of the present recess pd devote 2 or 3 days to exploring the Communist proposal without revealing our psn or giving any indication of an acptance of the principles involved in the eight point proposal.

(2) Upon the receipt of the guidance rqstd, to develop and present as a single unit a firm concrete counter-proposal which will include in detail the complete terms of ref along the lines of ref *c*, modified to reflect the Communist eight point proposal and your guidance and which will include all the safeguards essential to protect our vital principles.

16. I prefer the latter course of action, para 15*b* above, as it will be difficult to retain public support if we rqst additional delays.

795.00/5-853

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1953.

Subject: Korea

At the White House luncheon today of General Bedell Smith and myself with the President the situation was thoroughly discussed and the following general decision reached by the President:

1. We should adhere to the provisions of the Indian Resolution with reference to the neutral commission and with reference to the ultimate disposition of prisoners of war not willing to be repatriated. We would accept as a practical deviation—and one which we in fact ourselves feel necessary—the communist proposal which will allow custody of prisoners to be taken *in situ* rather than the provision contemplating their transportation to the deneutralized [*demilitarized*] zone which would in fact be quite impractical, given the large number of prisoners.

---

[1] This memorandum was also addressed to Johnson and it was initialed by Dulles.

2. The President did not seem to feel that the presence of Polish and Czech troops would necessarily be unacceptable under proper safeguards and particularly if they were only on the two islands where the prisoners were.

J. F. D.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, May 8, 1953—6:11 p. m.

CX 62316. [A.] DA 938429,[2] [B.] CX 62301,[3] [C.] CX 62296.[4]

1. My comments on Communists proposal contained in ref B were dispatched prior to rec of ref A. Ref B appears to comply with your rqst for my comments except possibly for:

a. Custodial trps be limited to mil police type Armys. I consider this rqmt to be essential and to be entirely within reason, and one to which the custodial nations could not object. This proviso can be written into the terms of ref for the custodial nation.

b. The ques of what instructions would apply to that part of the proposal which contemplates that nations to which the pris belong shall have freedom and fac to send pers to the places of detention of the PWs. Again, this must be covered by provisions within the terms of ref or [*of*?] Armistice Agreement. In addition to the limitation on the nr of these pers, as shown in ref C, I consider that the agreed upon "Freedom and fac" should include such items as:

(1) Specific routes over which mvmt to PW installations will be accomplished.

(2) Time of day, and possibly week, during which this mvmt will be effected.

(3) That mvmt to and from PW installations of such pers will be under the control of, and escorted by pers of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken.

2. Harrison has been instructed to meet Sat [5] as scheduled and carry out the action indicated in para 15*b*, ref B. We do not interpret para 3, ref A as restricting Harrison to ques on pnt 6 only. To restrict his questioning to that single pnt may cause the Communists to believe that we are in general agreement on the other pnts or indicate undue interest at this time in that single pnt.[6] All ques will be couched in general terms

---

[1] A note on the source text indicated that Under Secretary Smith saw this telegram.

[2] Dated May 7, p. 981.

[3] Dated May 8, p. 987.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *ibid.*

[5] May 9.

[6] In telegram JCS 938446 to Clark, May 8, 1953, the JCS informed Clark that paragraph 3 of telegram DA 938429 was not intended to restrict the UNC to questions on

Continued

designed to indicate that we are seeking further info on their proposal and so designed as to neither indicate acceptance nor rejection or to give any indication as to what question might be.

---

point 6 only; however, they did believe this point constituted the principal issue and therefore should receive primary attention. Subject to that clarification, the JCS advised Clark that the action outlined in paragraph 15*b* of his telegram CX 62301, p. 992, was approved. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795.00/5–853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1953.

Subject: Communist Proposal on POW Question

Although we can probably somewhat mitigate the effects on India by pointing out we are only adopting the formula embodied in the Indian Resolution, a refusal by the U.S. to accept the Communist proposal for India as the fifth member of the commission will undoubtedly offend India and be exploited to the maximum by Communist and other unfriendly propaganda within and without India. Agreeing to a formula which makes the appointment of India virtually inevitable would not appear to do much to mitigate the domestic aspects of the acceptance of India. Thus we will end up with most of the international disadvantages of having refused India as well as the domestic disadvantages of having accepted India. India will enter on its duties on the commission more or less offended by us and probably less subject to our influence than if we had accepted India. Thus if we are willing to accept or acquiesce in India being a member of the commission, FE most strongly recommends that we simply accept the Communist proposal in this regard. In view of the previous consultations with Congressional leaders we recommend that they be informed prior to such action becoming public.

In so far as eventual disposition of prisoners are concerned there are only three basic possibilities: (1) specifically provide in the armistice agreement that prisoners are to be released by the commission on the expiration of the period of custody or failure of political conference to agree upon their disposition within a specified time limit, to proceed to an available destination of their choice; (2) leave the decision of the disposition of the remaining prisoners to the commission; (3) provide for a UN decision for their disposition.

It will be extremely difficult to obtain agreement on the first formula. Under the proposed Communist composition of the commission, the second formula would present serious dangers that at the least the prisoners would be indefinitely held. The third formula was embodied in the Indian Resolution. While not ideal, it may be the best obtainable.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson. A marginal note by O'Connor on the source text indicated that the Secretary saw it on May 8.

FE seriously questions the workability of a plan providing for custody of the prisoners being held by the combined armed forces of five such dissimilar states as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and India. The plan might be much more workable if the required armed forces were furnished by India alone, acting under the supervision of five members of the commission.

As General Clark states in his message today (CX 62301)[2] "I believe we must realize that we and the ROKs would be faced with approximately 2500 carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated Communist military thugs, not to mention such others as may be introduced to 'explain' to the non-repatriates their rights, at mainland or island installations, all free to engage in espionage and disorder". As Clark also points out the ROK will violently oppose having military forces of Communist satellite countries in Korea and probably even on the off-lying islands.

---

[2] Dated May 8, p. 987.

795.00/5-953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 9, 1953.

Subject: Reply to Points Raised by British Government Concerning Issuance of Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea.

Discussion:

The British Government, in a memorandum dated May 4, 1953, appears to have reversed its support for decision to issue the Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea immediately following the conclusion of an armistice. The British Government now suggests that no decision on the issuance of the Statement should be made until after an armistice is concluded. The British Embassy today requested the views of the Department as soon as possible. A copy of the British Memorandum, together with a Memorandum of Conversation with the Counselor of the British Embassy, is attached as Tab A.[2]

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Emmons and Young and cleared with Matthews, Merchant, Bonbright, and Henkin.

[2] Tab A was not attached to the source text; for a text of the memorandum of conversation by Johnson with Tomlinson, dated May 4, see p. 968; the British memorandum is not printed, but is summarized in footnote 2, *ibid.*

The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs considers that the reservations expressed in the British Memorandum concerning the issuance of the Statement are most serious. They could affect our whole position with respect to the armistice, with particular reference to the question of the construction or rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea during the post-hostilities period.

I believe that an oral reply should be made at the earliest possible time to the British Embassy along the lines set forth in Tab B.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve the comments in Tab B and that I deliver them orally to the British Embassy.[3]

[Tab B]

COMMENTS ON POINTS RAISED IN BRITISH MEMORANDUM OF MAY 4, 1953, CONCERNING GREATER SANCTIONS STATEMENT ON KOREA [4]

The Department of State has carefully considered the points raised in the memorandum of the British Embassy dated May 4, 1953, concerning the Greater Sanctions Statement on Korea, and has the following comments to make:

1. Despite the reservations concerning the Greater Sanctions Statement expressed by the British Government in its memorandum of December 12, 1951, in the light of subsequent discussions between officials of the British and American Governments it has been the understanding of the United States that all United Nations Member States participating in the military action in Korea have engaged in a firm agreement to participate fully in the issuance of the Greater Sanctions Statement immediately following the signature of an armistice in Korea.

2. We can not accept the thesis that a decision on the issuance of the statement now should be deferred until after the armistice is signed, since we consider the Greater Sanctions Statement to be, in effect, an important integral part of the armistice arrangements. It was solely as a result of the agreement by all the participating governments to join in the Greater Sanctions Statement that the United Nations Command delegation at Panmunjom made certain important concessions in early 1952 to the Communist side regarding the construction and rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea. It is perfectly clear that the

---

[3] Acting Secretary Smith approved the comments and called the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, to express extreme concern that if the British insisted on reworking the Greater Sanctions Statement, "a crisis of serious proportions" would arise between the two nations. (Memorandum by Gilman of S/S to Johnson, May 9, 1953, 795.00/5-953)

[4] These comments were drafted by Emmons and Young. According to a covering memorandum of conversation, Johnson saw Tomlinson on the afternoon of May 9 and read to him this paper stating that it represented the considered views of the Department of State on the subject. Johnson then provided Tomlinson with a copy of these comments.

construction and rehabilitation of military airfields in North Korea will have a great effect on the security of the United States and other forces in Korea. If the Greater Sanctions Statement is to be weakened by withdrawal of any one of the participating governments or if the decision on its issuance is now to be reviewed and possibly deferred, the United States Government would immediately have to reconsider its position on acceptable terms of an armistice, with particular reference to this grave question of military airfields in North Korea. It is obvious that to reopen a discussion of this phase of the armistice agreement would result in a serious delay and might even render impossible the achievement of an armistice under present conditions.

3. Since we consider the Statement as closely related to the armistice agreement, we consider it essential that it be made at the time that the armistice is signed. We can not imagine that the circumstances prevailing at that time would be different in any material respect from those anticipated when agreement to issue the statement was reached. Indeed, if the issuance of the statement is delayed after the armistice it might appear gratuitous. If issued at the time of the armistice, it cannot be considered provocative since it will appear as associated with the armistice agreements.

4. Accordingly, the United States Government firmly believes that such a statement should be issued immediately by all participating governments on conclusion of an armistice in order to demonstrate our collective determination to the Communists to meet any new aggression in Korea promptly and effectively.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1953—7:42 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 938571. From CSUSA for CINCUNC. JCS have directed the dispatch of the following reur CX 62296,[1] CX 62316,[2] and CX 62301.[3]

1. If modified and clarified so as to contain the following elements, we consider the Communist proposal of 7 May an acceptable basis upon which to negotiate an agreement on POWs.

a. Five-nation commission will operate on the basis of unanimity except with respect to procedural matters. On procedural matters decision would be by majority vote.

---

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 987.
[2] Dated May 8, p. 993.
[3] Dated May 8, p. 987.

b. If the political conference is unable to reach a decision on the disposition of the prisoners within 30 days after the question has been submitted to it, prisoners shall be automatically released from custody and assume civilian status.

c. The commission to take custody of all non-repatriates at a location(s) designated by the detaining power. (For UNC purposes this should be an island location such as Cheju-do, as suggested in para 6 *a* (4) of CX 62301.)

d. The armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall also be chairman and executive agent of the commission. This should not preclude India from requesting any assistance it may require from the UNC.

2. With respect to the voting procedure set forth in para 1 *a*, the purpose is to assure that the presence of Switzerland and Sweden on the commission, together with a requirement for unanimous vote, will give maximum assurance that decisions incompatible with the principle of non-forcible repatriation are not taken by the commission. As you are well aware, this voting procedure is one that has been consistently maintained by the Soviet bloc in international organizations and therefore should be difficult for them to refuse in this case.

3. Re para 14 of CX 62301.

a. As indicated above, Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, Switzerland, and Sweden are acceptable as members of the commission under conditions set forth in this message.

b. Although the U.S. voted for the Indian Resolution, we consider that as the Communists rejected the terms of that resolution when proffered and their present proposal also varies therefrom, we are not bound by the exact terms thereof. While we are under a certain compulsion to adhere to the spirit of that resolution, we do not consider that this prevents us from seeking to obtain more advantageous terms.

c. As indicated above, point 6 of the Communist proposal is not acceptable. UNC will take the position set forth in para 1 *b*, above.

d. View here is that it is important that UNC not relinquish ultimate claim to and responsibility for POWs, while in custody of commission. Pending legal opinion, believe Article 12 of Geneva Convention can be used to justify this position. You will be advised ASAP re legal aspects this question. With respect to cost of transportation of those requesting repatriation, Article 116 [*118*] of Geneva Convention should be applied.

e. Believe that as present proposal provides custody to be taken in Korea and as India should have physical ability to provide necessary custodial personnel, not considered necessary to provide for release of Korean non-repatriates to civilian status upon armistice coming into effect. Accordingly Korean non-repatriates should be handled in same manner as Chinese non-repatriates in this regard.

4. Believe question of period within which non-repatriates are to be transferred to custody of commission primarily involves time India will require to have force in position to assume custody. Would appear here

that sixty days would be realistic. Period during which North Koreans and Chinese Communists to have access to POWs should preferably be 60 days but you are authorized to agree up to 90 days. Para 5 of DA 938041[4] is amended accordingly. This period should start from date upon which transfer of custody to the commission is completed. Upon termination of this latter period, the thirty day period for consideration by political conference of disposition remaining non-repatriates will begin. If political conference has not reached any decision by end this latter thirty day period, prisoners will be released to civilian status, the commission ceasing its functions and being dissolved.

5. Recognize that representatives on commission of four countries other than India will require some staff assistants. A limitation should be placed on the number of such staff assistants which recognizes the necessity of limiting the number of Poles and Czechs to be present in the area while at the same time permitting the Swedes and Swiss a sufficient number to permit effective observation.

6. Communist terminology of "Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" carries a connotation of responsibility by the commission for "repatriating" all POWs, which the Communist may be expected to attempt to exploit. Also would prefer to avoid word "neutral" as applied to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, you should propose and insist on some simple designaton such as "POW Commission".

7. Re CX 62296 terms of reference set forth therein are approved except insofar as modifications are required by the instructions contained in this message and by acceptable provisions of Communist proposal. For reasons set forth in para 3 *d.* above terms of reference should avoid use of term "former detaining power".

8. At as early a date as you consider practical you should present a counter-proposal as set forth in para 15 *b* (2) CX 62301.

---

[4] Dated May 2, p. 962.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 11, 1953—5:40 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 62354. Ref DA 938571.[1] This msg in 5 parts.

Part 1.

1. I plan to present the UNC counter proposal, contained in part 3 of this msg, the Communists at the opening of the 12 May session. At this time I intend to take and maintain the initiative. On presentation of our

---

[1] *Supra.*

counter proposal we will ask for continuous morning and afternoon sessions in order to reach an agreement on this agenda item as rapidly as possible.

2. Past experience has indicated that the Communists do not understand an agreement on broad principles and considerable delay is always encountered in working out the details of those broad principles. Therefore our counter proposal will be very detailed and contain the body of the terms of ref itself. This has the added advantage of forcing initial consideration of these important details in plenary sessions rather than in sub-delegations meetings which prolong the negotiating procedures.

3. Inasmuch as I do not have the auth, nor do I consider it advisable at this time, to present the counter proposal in the form of a "take it or leave it" ultimatum, I consider it more aprop to enter discussions with an initial psn which will prov some bargaining latitude. However, if strong opposition is encountered in our initial psn we do not intend to waste time in prolonged arguments but will be prep to move quickly to our final psn which is covered in part 4 of this msg.

4. The maj differences between the initial psn, part 3, and the final psn, part 4, are:

a. No ref to the political conf in the initial psn.

b. No direct access to the POWs for explanations by each side in the initial psn.

c. Pd for explanations is 60 days in the initial psn and 90 days in the final psn.

Part 2. The UNC's counter proposal will be introduced with a statement designed to point out similarities and differences between the Communist 8-point proposal and our proposal. We will also include a statement that the UNC reserves the right to revert to our original proposal that one neutral state be agreed for the assumption of the responsibility of the disposition of the POWs not desiring repatriation.

Part 3. Counter proposal.

I. Gen.

1. Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes eff, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those PWs in its cust who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of Article III of the draft armistice agreement. In order to expedite the processing of such pers, each side will, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total nrs, by nationalities, of pers to be repatriated direct. Each group dlvrd to the other side will be accompanied by rosters, present nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or mil serial nr.

2. In order to insure that all POWs have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated folg an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be rqst by both sides to appoint a member to a POW Custodial Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those POWs who, while in the cust of the detaining powers, have elected not to avail themselves of their right to be repatriated. The POW Custodial Committee shall establish its Hq within the demilitarized zone in the vic of Panmunjom.

3. The armed forces and any other operating pers required to assist the Custodial Com in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be prov exclusively by India, whose representative shall also be chairman and exec agent of the com. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal nr not to exceed 50 each. The arms of all pers provided for in this para shall be limited to mil police type small arms.

4. No force or threat of force shall be used against the POWs specified in para 2 above to prevent or effect their repatriation and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see para 8 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the POW Custodial Com and each of its representatives. POWs shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific prov of the Geneva Convention, and with the gen spirit of that convention. The criminal code and system of courts to which the POWs will be subject while in cust of the POW Custodial Com will be as determined by the Custodial Com.

II. Custody of POWs.

5. All POWs who do not avail themselves of the right of repatriation fol the eff date of the armistice agreement shall be released from the mil control and from the cust of the detaining side as soon as practicable and in all cases within 60 days subsequent to the eff date of the armistice agreement to the Custodial Com allocations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

6. The locations specified in the preceding para shall be demilitarized by the withdrawal of the mil forces of the detaining side to a distance of at least two (2) kilometers from the perimeter of the POW installation at the time the Custodial Com assumes control thereof.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of para 6 above, the Indian representative is entitled to call upon the detaining side in the area under whose mil control POW installations are physically located, to provide such administrative and security forces as may be needed to augment the forces provided by India. Forces so provided shall be under the operational control of the senior off of the Indian Security Forces.

8. Notwithstanding the provision of para 4 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the auth of the Custo-

dial Com to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.

III. Verification.

9. The Custodial Com shall be responsible for explaining to the POWs in its cust their rights and inform them on any matters relating to their return to their homelands and, particularly, their full freedom to return. To this end it shall make aval to the prisoners such explanations as may be provided for this purpose by the side to which prisoners formerly belonged, provided such explanations are not inconsistent with the ltr and spirit of para 4 above. All explanations shall be observed by a representative of each member nation of the POW Custodial Com.

10. POWs in its cust shall have freedom and fac to make representations and comm to the Custodial Com and to representatives and agencies of the Custodial Com and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Custodial Com.

IV. Disposition of POWs.

11. Any POW who, while in the cust of the Custodial Com decides to avail himself of the right of repatriation, shall so certify to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Custodial Com. Upon execution of such certificate he shall, while still in the cust of the Custodial Com, be dlvr forthwith to the POW exchange pnt at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the armistice agreement.

12. 60 days after transfer of cust of the POWs to the Custodial Com is completed, POWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be released to civ status, and be free to proceed to an aval destination of their choice, the com ceasing its functions and being dissolved.

V. Red Cross visitation.

13. Essential Red Cross svc for POWs in cust of the Custodial Com shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Custodial Com. (*Note:* Change from CX 62296 [2] designed to elim the presence of troublesome Communist political workers in Red Cross uniforms.)

VI. Press coverage.

14. The Custodial Com shall insure freedom of the press by:

a. Providing for observance of the entire opn in South Korea by representatives of the press accredited to the UNC.

b. Providing for observance of the entire opn in North Korea by representatives of the press accredited to the KPA or the CPV.[3]

---

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 987.

[3] Korean People's Army (KPA) and Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV).

VII. Logistical support for POWs.

15. Each side shall provide logistical support for the POWs in the area under its mil control, dlvrg required support to the Custodial Com at an agreed dlvr pnt in the vic of each POW installation.

16. The cost of repatriating POWs from the exchange pnt at Panmunjom shall be borne by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance with Article 116 [*118*] of the Geneva Convention.

17. The Custodial Com is entitled to call upon the detaining side to provide specified unarmed pers for the opn of fac or the provision of services within the POW installations within the area under its mil control.

18. The Custodial Com shall provide medical support for the POWs as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide tactical support as practicable upon the rqst of the Custodial Com and specifically for those cases requiring extensive trmt or hospitalization. The Custodial Com shall maintain cust of POWs during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such cust. Upon completion of trmt, POWs shall be returned to a POW installation as specified in para 5 above.

19. The Custodial Com is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks.

VIII. Logistical support for the Custodial Com.

20. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the pers of the Custodial Com stationed in the area under its mil control and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the demilitarized zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determinations between the Custodial Com and the detaining side in each case.

21. The UNC shall reimburse Sweden and Switzerland, and the KPA and CPV shall reimburse Czechoslovakia and Poland for costs incurred by them incident to their participation on the Custodial Com and each side shall reimburse India for one-half (½) the costs incurred by them incident to their participation in the Custodial Com. (*Note:* Change from CX 62296 designed to avoid a shakedown of the United States by Poland and Czechoslovakia and to pnt up the identification of these countries with the Communist side.)

IX. Publication.

22. The terms of this agreement shall be made known to all POWs who, while in the cust of the detaining power, have failed to avail themselves of their right of repatriation.

X. Mvmt.

23. The mvmt of the Custodial Com, its pers, and repatriated POWs will be over lines of comm as determined by the comd(s) of the opposing side and the Custodial Com. A map showing these lines of comm will be furnished the comd of the opposing side and the Custodial Com. Mvmt of such pers except in the demilitarized areas established in para

6 above around locations as designated in para 7 above will be under the control of, and escorted by, pers of the side whose area the tvl is being undertaken. (This is a new para not included in CX 62296.)

XI. Procedural matters.

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Custodial Com. The Custodial Com, and any/or subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Custodial Com, shall operate on the basis of unanimity, except with respect to procedural matters, on procedural matters decision shall be by majority vote.

25. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become eff upon the date the armistice becomes eff.

Part 4.

1. Final psn is the same as init proposal except:

a. Change para 4 to: "No force or threat of force shall be used against the POWs specified in para 2 to prevent or effect their repatriation and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever (but see para 8 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the POW Custodial Com and each of its representatives. Both sides shall have representatives with aprop representatives of the POW Custodial Com to determine that any pers who rqst return to the other side have not been coerced into making this decision. POWs shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the gen spirit of that convention."

b. Change para 9 to: "Each side shall be afforded an opportunity to verify or ascertain the attitude towards repatriation of its captured pers while they are in the cust of the Custodial Com. To this end its representatives shall be afforded access to its captured pers to explain to them their rights and to inform them on any matters relating to their return to their homelands under the folg provisions:

> "(a) The nr of such verifying representatives shall not exceed 1 per 1000 POWs held in cust by the Custodial Com, but the min shall not be less than 5.
>
> "(b) The hours during which the verifying representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be determined by the Custodial Com and accord generally with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the trmt of POWs.
>
> "(c) All verifications and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Custodial Com.
>
> "(d) Additional provisions governing verification shall be prescribed by the Custodial Com and will be designed to employ the principles outlined in para 4 above."

c. Change para 12 to: "90 days after the transfer of cust of POWs to the Custodial Com is completed the ques of the disposition of the POWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to the political conf as provided in para 60, draft armistice agreement."

d. Add new para 13: "If the political conf is unable to reach a decision on the disposition of the prisoners within 30 days after the ques has been submitted to it, the prisoners shall be automatically released from cust and resume civ status and be free to proceed to an aval destination of their choice, the Custodial Com ceasing its functions and being dissolved."

e. Renumber paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.

f. Add new para 22. "Each of the detaining sides will be responsible for protecting the verifying representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of comm as set forth in para 26 for the POW Custodial Com within its area to a place of residence, and while in residence, in the vic of but not within each POW installation. The Custodial Com will be responsible for the scty of such representatives within the actual limits of POW installations."

g. Add new para 23. "Each of the detaining sides will provide trans, housing, comm, and other agreed logistical support to the verifying representatives to the other side while they are in the area under its mil control. Such svcs will be provided on a reimbursable basis."

h. Renumber subsequent paras.

Part 5.

1. The precaution covered in para 3*d* of ref msg, on which you indicated legal advice would fol, has not been specifically included in the counter proposal. Inasmuch as any mvmt of UNC formerly held prisoners by the Custodial Com will be over routes controlled by the UNC, the prospect of our phys loss of ultimate claim or responsibility for the POWs during the life of the Custodial Com is not considered great. Folg the dissolution of the Custodial Com those formerly UNC-held POWs who automatically revert to civ status will, of necessity, again become wards of the UNC until such time as their ultimate disposition can be effected. Therefore it is not considered nec to provide any specific provision in the terms of ref to insure the retention of this ultimate responsibility.

2. I appreciate that the POW Custodial Com will be an autonomous orgn. However you will note that there is no provision for an auth to which this com renders repts. It would be helpful if we could incorporate into the terms of ref a provision for progress repts by this com. A rqmt for periodic, perhaps semi-monthly, progress repts to either the senior mil comd of each side, the mil armistice com, or to the United Nations is considered feasible. I feel that such a rept to the senior mil comd of each side to be the most practical, but would appreciate your views on this matter.

3. You will note that I intend to present this counter proposal tomorrow, 12 May. Harrison has indic now that he cannot use another day profitably in furth questioning. However if you desire more time to examine this counter proposal I will upon receipt of instructions from you direct Harrison to continue with exploratory questions and delay the presentation until 13 May.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 11, 1953—5:20 p. m.
PRIORITY

JCS 938626. From JCS for CINCUNC reur CX 62354.[1]

1. Plan of action and proposals contained in ur 62354 are approved subj to comments which follow. If changes dictated by these comments require addnal time on part UNC prior to presentation to Commies, you are authorized such time.

2. While we appreciate ur desire for bargaining latitude, we believe it preferable to include in ur initial proposal right of access to POWs. Thought here is that Harrison's ltr to Commies of 17 Apr[2] in which agreement to principle of access was clearly indicated will logically lead Commies to conclusion that UNC will in end agree to right of access. Thus, it is doubtful that any appreciable negotiating advantages will accrue from omitting this element from initial posn. Another factor is desire here to limit substantive changes in Commie proposal to those considered essential, to stand firm on these essential changes, and thereby improve our overall posture. However, this does not mean that UNC proposal shld be presented, at least initially, on "take it or leave it" basis. We believe that there are other elements in proposal which will provide sufficient negotiating latitude. UNC agreement to right of access shld be used as argument to obtain Commie agreement to essential elements our posn.

3. Fol specific changes shld be made in counter-proposal contained in Part 3 of ur CX 62354:

a. Re para 2. Add addnal sentence to effect: "Subordinate bodies of same composition as POW Custodial Commsn shall be stationed at those locations at which Commsn assumes custody those POWs who have not availed themselves of right repatriation." For completeness and clarity.

b. Substitute para 1 *a* of Part 4 for para 4 of Part 3.

c. Substitute para 1 *b* of Part 4 for para 9 of Part 3.

d. In para 12 delete clause "and be free to proceed to available destination of their choice." Believe it may be difficult for Commies to agree to this provision. At same time, since non-repatriates will have assumed civilian status and will have reverted to custody of UNC, there will be no bar to their proceeding to available destination of their choice. Civilian status, in itself, implies this right. Accordingly, consider that inclusion of clause in question would raise unnecessary point of contention. Exclusion of clause would in no way imply that non-repatriates were not free to proceed to available destination of their choice. Make same deletion in para 1 *d* of Part 4.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] For text of this letter, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.

e. Re para 13. Believe point made is desirable, however, as final posn UNC may accept jt RC teams with limitation on numbers involved.

f. Re para 16. Change "Article 116" to read "Article 118." DA 938571[3] was in error in this regard.

g. Delete para 21 and renumber succeeding paras accordingly. Believe para 20 sufficient for purposes this agreement. While ur reasons for inserting para 21 are appreciated, we are confronted with fact that Switzerland, and possibly Sweden, would wish to avoid implied identification as "UNC neutral." In case of India, provision for logistical support as indicated in para 20 leaves only transportation and pay of psnl as major expenses. It is hoped these two items can be handled without raising question of reimbursement. If it shld turn out that reimbursement is nec, believe this can be handled later.

h. Add paras 1 *f* and *g* of Part 4 to proposal in Part 3.

4. Re para 1 of Part 5. Concur that no specific provision is required. Principal concern is that no provision be included which could be construed as undercutting ultimate responsibility. Firm legal opinion will be forwarded ASAP.

5. Re para 2 of Part 5. Concur in desirability of progress reports by Commsn. Agree that submission to senior mil cdrs appears most practical; however, we have no objection to reports being presented to Mil Armis Commsn. Considered undesirable to submit reports to UN.

---

[3] Dated May 9, p. 997.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 12, 1953—1:20 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62369. 1. I have just heard from Harrison who tells me the ROK member of the delegation, Maj Gen Choi, has requested in the name of his government a postponement of today's meeting because his government will not concur in either the eight-point Commie proposal or our counter proposal which envisages the location of custodial troops and personnel on ROK soil without its permission. Choi, being a member of the delegation and having sat in on the preliminary discussions in preparation for today's meeting, presumably learned its contents and telephoned them to Rhee.

2. To the best of my knowledge since the armistice negotiations commenced the UNC has never been required to obtain, nor have we solicited, the approval of the ROK Government in advance of taking any of our negotiatory positions or in our negotiating tactics.

3. In view of State msg 2489 to Murphy [1] I assume that you are keeping the ROK Ambassador in Washington informed of current developments. At every opportunity I keep Rhee informed of current developments during my informal conversations with him.

4. I am flying to Korea today. I already had made an appointment with Rhee to see him at 1500 hours. Will discuss this subject with him, and report later today the results of my conference with him.

---

[1] Dated Apr. 22, p. 926.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET [MUNSAN-NI,] May 12, 1953—6:35 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

HNC 1678. 1. This afternoon I had a frank discussion with Rhee with reference the critical situation which has developed in connection with the ROK attitude toward the UNC counter-proposal pertaining to the presence of Communist custodial troops in Korean rear areas. In this connection attention is invited to my rad C 62369.[1]

2. Rhee is adamant that no foreign Communist custodial forces be permitted on Korean soil and equally adamant that no Korean non-repatriates be turned over to a neutral state. It is my considered opinion that Rhee may have been and may still be bluffing about other matters, but he is in dead earnest about the release of Korean non-repatriates to any other state or group of states, particularly if any are Communist-controlled. In fact Rhee feels very strongly that India is not neutral and is opposed to having its armed forces, as well as Communist troops, on his sovereign soil, even on Cheju-Do. I feel, however, based on his question pertaining to numbers and other details, that he may go along with the idea of the custodial commission taking custody of the Chinese in Korea if the non-repatriated Koreans are released to return to civil life on effective date of the armistice. In any event, I feel that I can handle any developments based on this solution.

3. I am sympathetic with Rhee's position not because of any compulsion to comply with his personal desires, but because his position reflects a realism in the situation which we cannot ignore without jeopardizing the vital interests of our government and the UNC in connection with the armistice negotiations.

I feel that the only realistic and workable solution is to release the Korean non-repatriates on the effective date of the armistice. I also feel that the ROK position in this matter and the dangers and gravity of the situation have not been fully appreciated in Washington, as reflected in instructions contained in para 3 of urad DA 938571.[2]

---

[1] *Supra.*

4. Anticipating the ROK attitude and the difficulties in connection with retaining Korean non-repatriates, I have consistently recommended their release. I now feel more strongly than ever that this is the only solution. With the Chinese it is different, but Koreans belong in Korea, and their early release in Korea is, clearly, the most humane as well as the most practical solution. We, of course, previously suggested that in case Korean non-repatriates were retained, they be placed on off-shore islands to minimize the problems involved, but this suggestion was based on assumption of control by an acceptable neutral, and further, on the fact that only technical control would be assumed by the neutral. Now that the presence of representatives of Communist-dominated states is anticipated, the situation is materially altered even though we obtain agreement on India's dominant role in custodial operations.

5. I believe that the release of Koreans will be supported by Asiatic peoples, for it will not involve their prolonged retention as prisoners of war, and will avoid the necessity of using force, which undoubtedly will be necessary in turning them over to the control of other states or even temporarily relocating them for this purpose. Our strong-arm methods, taking place at a number of camps in full view of our South Korean allies, will have a most damaging effect upon the US position in Korea, the fact that the majority of our security forces in POW camps are from ROKA should also be considered. In fact, Rhee queried me this afternoon as to the possibility of his security troops releasing Koreans without involving me. While I forcibly reminded him that these troops are in my command, this does emphasize the seriousness of the ROK attitude.

6. I feel, if properly presented, that the release of non-repatriate Koreans will not be opposed by our allies. In this connection, Murphy and I discussed the general situation with Ambassador Dening yesterday. During the discussion Dening volunteered the suggestion that in view of the situation, this is the only practicable solution. He states that he has so reported to his government and that he believes that his government will see the logic of this solution.

7. As to the probable Communist reaction to the release of Korean non-repatriates, I feel that if they really want an armistice they will accept an adamant position of the United Nations Command on this question. The matter of release of Chinese non-repatriates would be different from theirs as well as from the ROK point of view. The Communists have indicated, however, during previous negotiations that they are primarily concerned with repatriation of Chinese and we of course

---

[2] Dated May 9, p. 997.

can remind them, as we have done in the past, that they have established the precedent on release of Koreans.

8. Regardless of whether the Communists accept our position on release of Korean non-repatriates, however, I strongly recommend that I be authorized to include this solution in our counter-proposal, as an initial and final position. Unless I am given this authority,[3] I will be committed to a situation fraught with grave danger and faced with implementation of other threats from the ROK which we have carefully striven to avoid.

9. A careful examination of our counter-proposal, contained in ourad CX 62354[4] as modified by urad JCS 938626,[5] indicates that in order to introduce the proposal with reference to release of non-repatriate Koreans, no other amendments will be necessary, except to reduce the maximum number of representatives of neutral states in view of the fact that the custodial commission would assume custody of non-Korean non-repatriates only.

10. I strongly recommend that I be authorized to introduce, as a part of our counter-proposal, the proposal that non-repatriate Korean prisoners of war be released on date armistice is effective. I am dictating this at Munsan-Ni, and the delegation can submit this revised proposal to the Communists on 13 May or as soon thereafter as your approval is received. I feel that this matter is of such transcending importance that I have instructed the delegation to delay the submission of our presently approved counter-proposal until we receive your reply. If your reply is not received by 0900 hours 13 May our time, the delegation will ask for recess for administrative reasons since current probing questions have reached limit of usefulness.

11. I have thoroughly discussed this matter with Murphy, Briggs, Harrison and Taylor, and they are all in complete agreement with my views.

---

[3] In telegram JCS 938704 to Clark, May 12, Clark was authorized by the JCS to introduce, as part of the UNC counterproposal, a proposal that nonrepatriate Korean POWs be released on the date the armistice was effective. This constituted an initial position pending further consideration of the problem. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[4] Dated May 11, p. 999.

[5] Dated May 11, p. 1006.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET PRIORITY TOKYO, May 13, 1953—6 p. m.

CX 62406. 1. As I have already reported in my HNC 1678,[1] I met with Rhee yesterday afternoon and had a thoroughly frank discussion of the problems which confront us. Those relating to the armistice were discussed in msg cited above.

---

[1] *Supra.*

2. In my conference with Rhee I also raised the question of his ltr to me of 30 Apr[2] dealing with various ROK problems. I indicated to him that I had not replied because the principal issue involved—that of a Korean-American mutual defense pact—is a problem to be resolved by my govt, which realizes its importance and is giving it sympathetic study. I told him the other points he had made in his ltr hinged upon the principal issue of a defense pact and are ones which obviously would be included in subjects to be considered by the political conference folg a military armistice. I made it clear to Rhee that the armistice probably would not contain a provision which requires the simultaneous withdrawal of UN and Chinese Communist trps from Korea, and that this subj too will probably be discussed by the political conference. I pointed out to him that I infer from his ltr of 30 Apr that he is not willing to risk the withdrawal of UN trps upon the signing of an armistice.

3. Rhee also brought up the question of an increase in ROK Forces. I emphasized my support of a ROK ground establishment of 20 divs and Rhee spoke earnestly regarding need of ROK Naval establishment if future security is to be maintained. It is clear that ROK economy will be in no psn to support such substantial military forces. I feel that there is much in ROK attitude which calls for our sympathetic consideration.

4. Rhee made it clear to me that what he strongly desires is a mutual security pact. He does not understand how we can make security agreements with Japan or with New Zealand and Australia and at the same time cannot make a similar agreement with Korea which is doing most of the fighting and is our principal ally in battle. If a mutual security pact cannot be arranged, I feel that as a minimum Rhee will insist upon an assurance from the US Govt that it would come to his immediate assistance should the terms of the armistice be violated. Although I made no commitments to Rhee on this point, I personally see no reason why such a guarantee should not be given as soon as possible. I feel that if this were done, many of the problems which confront us now would probably fall into line. In this connection, if such assurances are to be made they should be associated with the statements I have requested in para 2 of my msg C 62351.[3]

5. I have told Rhee repeatedly and did so again yesterday that my mission is to negotiate an armistice under honorable conditions as set forth by my govt and that I would pursue that course of action relentlessly. I told him again I hoped he would not confront us with unilater-

---

[2] *Ante*, p. 955.

[3] In this telegram, May 11, 1953, Clark suggested immediate announcement of the joint policy declaration by those UN members with troops in Korea after an armistice was signed. (Department of Defense files)

al decisions such as relief of trps from UN Comd, failure to obey the terms of the armistice, or outright provocative, hostile actions by ROK trps after the armistice; that to do so would produce a critical situation which would give aid and comfort to the enemy, seriously injure the fine US–ROK relations, and probably result in disaster to the ROK. Whereas he gave me no assurance he might not ultimately take one of these actions we fear, I again received the distinct impression that he considers them only as last resorts and that he felt he might be forced into such actions only if my govt should fail completely to take into consideration the various views of the ROK Govt.

6. I feel Rhee realizes that, in spite of some of his stated objections, we will go ahead and obtain an armistice if we can get one that does not sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation. He is bargaining now to get a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he is having a voice in the armistice negotiations. He realizes there may be an armistice, and I feel that if it provides for the simultaneous release of the Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war, we will be able to handle the Chinese non-repatriates at Cheju-Do or another island and the minimum custodial personnel which will be required.

7. Rhee had already asked me the day before (11 May) for my permission to increase the Korean participation in the armistice negotiations. I told him the number of delegates on both sides is fixed by agreement and could not be increased. I told him, however, that if it would help him I would be willing to give Gen Choi one or two administrative assistants similar to the other UN administrative assistants who go to make up the delegation. He told me this would be very helpful for it would improve his psn with the Korean people if he could tell them that the ROKs participation is being increased.

8. Murphy is sending a related msg to the Dept supporting the views expressed above.[4]

---

[4] The reference was to telegram 3594 from Tokyo, May 14, 1953, not printed. In telegram 1331 from Pusan, May 14, 1953, Briggs stated that Clark's talk with Rhee confirmed his view that unless Korea received a bilateral security pact, Rhee would make trouble in connection with the armistice and the subsequent political conference. (795.00/5–1453)

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 144th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 13, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 144th meeting of the National Security Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on May 14.

President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); General John E. Hull, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Adm. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Major General J. S. Bradley, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the chief points taken at the meeting.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. "Eligibility of Representatives of Foreign Governments To Receive Classified U.S. Security Information" and 2. "Negotiations with Spain".]

3. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC 147;[2] NSC Actions Nos. 703,[3] 759,[4] 765[5] and 782;[6] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea", dated March 30, 1953[7])

At the outset of the discussion of this item, Mr. Cutler noted that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, had questioned the accuracy of the course figures for the several alternative courses of action in Korea. Mr. Cutler said he merely wanted to state that these figures were not intended to be precise, but rather to provide a general idea of the costs which these several courses of action would entail.

Mr. Cutler also briefly informed the Council as to the nature of Project Solarium and the proposed study of general alternatives open to the

---

[2] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

[3] NSC Action No. 703, Feb. 4, 1953, read as follows:

"Noted that the President, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, approved a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to permit immediate activation of two infantry divisions in addition to the present twelve in the Republic of Korea Army, with a consequent increase in the personnel ceiling from 415,120 to 460,000." (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

[4] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

[5] In NSC Action No. 765, Apr. 22, 1953, the Council noted the President's approval of a JCS recommendation that two more infantry divisions be activated and added to the ROK Army, consequently raising the personnel ceiling from 460,000 to 525,000. The Council also agreed with the Department of Defense recommendation that an increase to a total of 20 ROK divisions should be authorized, subject to activation of additional divisions above 16 on the approval of the President. These actions were subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

[6] For NSC Action No. 782, see the memorandum of discussion at the 143d meeting of the NSC, May 6, p. 975.

[7] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 838.

Administration with respect to the basic decisions confronting it in view of the Communist menace and the world situation.[8]

Thereafter, General Slayton [*Sladen*] Bradley briefed the Council on the military implications of the six possible alternative courses of action in Korea. In the course of his briefing, General Slayton Bradley stated that none of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea could really be effectively carried out without the use of atomic weapons.

. . . In the event that atomic weapons were used, General Hull also warned the Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they must be used in considerable numbers in order to be truly effective. . . . While there were no good strategic targets within the confines of Korea itself, the military were most anxious to make use of atomic weapons in any of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea. Their use would be highly advantageous from the strictly military point of view.

The President seemed not wholly satisfied with the argument that atomic weapons could not be used effectively in dislodging the Chinese from their present positions in Korea. He inquired as to whether or not a test had been made at Bikini as to the effectiveness of a penetration type of atomic weapon. Could not such weapons be used with effect on tactical targets of the Chinese Communists?

General Hull said that the test of a penetration bomb at Bikini had been abandoned, but that tests of such weapons had been made at the Nevada Proving Grounds. The effect had been as of an earthquake, but there was some doubt as to whether use of such weapons could really be justified in terms of the large-scale destruction of enemy personnel and matériel.

The President nevertheless thought it might be cheaper, dollar-wise, to use atomic weapons in Korea than to continue to use conventional weapons against the dugouts which honeycombed the hills along which the enemy forces were presently deployed. This, the President felt, was particularly true if one took into account the logistic costs of getting conventional ammunition from this country to the front lines.

. . . .

There ensued an extended discussion of Course C as set forth in NSC 147 and described by General Slayton Bradley, which the latter described as the Van Fleet concept.

The trouble with it was, according to the President, that if our commanders succeeded in destroying a very great number of the enemy in a military operation which moved up to the waist of Korea, it would not be long before the enemy would bring up replacements and we should find ourselves in the same posture and in the same stalemate that we were now in, excepting only that we should have advanced to the waist of Korea. This seemed a doubtful gain to the President, whose view of the matter was confirmed by General Hull.

---

[8] For documentation on Project Solarium, a 1953 study of national security policy by a three-panel task group, see volume II.

Secretary Smith then briefed the Council on the political results and implications to be anticipated from the six courses of military action which had been outlined.[9] He dismissed Course A as having no significant implications, since it was a continuation of the *status quo*. Allied reaction to Courses B and C, thought Secretary Smith, would be determined in large part by whether the United States took the initiative in embracing these courses, or whether the decision to enter into them were forced on us by the enemy. The reaction of our allies and the effect on the neutrals would also depend on the achievement of success in a short period of time. Much would be forgiven us if we were quickly successful and ended the war. In summary, Secretary Smith stated that he was personally not very much worried about the reactions of our allies and of the neutral powers to these courses of action, which did not involve the lifting of current restrictions or expanding the war outside of Korea.

On the other hand, said Secretary Smith, Courses D, E and F were all fraught with danger for us from the point of view of the reaction of our allies. If we chose any one of these three courses on our own initiative, our allies might well refuse to go along with us in them and indeed might actually withdraw their contingents from the UN Command. Again, however, Secretary Smith estimated that if we achieved a rapid success with any of these three courses, and especially with the most drastic of them, Course F, many of our friends who had fallen away at the outset would climb back on the victorious bandwagon. The criterion again would be quick success. We should not, however, underestimate the severe Chinese Communist reaction to any of these three courses. We must count on a probable Soviet intervention and on the real possibility of general war. While it was not, strictly speaking, germane to the present discussion, said Secretary Smith, he could not but recall Dr. Sonntag's remarks apropos of Chinese Communist success in the present operations. History, Dr. Sonntag had predicted, would probably record this success as the turning point in the long history of relations between the East and the West. For the first time in a thousand years the East has successfully stood up to the West and secured a stalemate. For this reason, concluded Secretary Smith, the boldest line of action is probably the one which will leave us in the best position.

---

[9] The paper on which this briefing was based was a memorandum by Robertson to Smith, May 12, 1953, not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series) The six courses of action are those set forth in NSC 147, Apr. 2, p. 838.

The President inquired as to the effect of pursuing such a bold line of action on our NATO defenses and all of our arrangements in Europe.

Secretary Smith replied that in all probability NATO and our European system of alliances would all fall to pieces temporarily. If, however, we were successful in our bold line of action, and if global war were avoided, our system of alliances could be rebuilt.

The President replied that the simple truth of the matter was that many people in the European countries believe that global war is much worse to contemplate than surrender to Communist imperialism. To many of them there was simply nothing worse than global war, for the reason that it would amount to the obliteration of European civilization. We desperately need, continued the President, to maintain these outposts of our national defense, and we do not wish our allies to desert us. We were already in considerable difficulties with these allies and, it seemed to the President, our relations with Great Britain had become worse in the last few weeks than at any time since the end of the war.

To this, Secretary Smith replied that one must confess that our relations with Great Britain were now "not good."

The Vice President again reverted to the view he had expressed at last week's Council meeting, that the decision which the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the event of a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiative in the area of foreign policy.

The President agreed with the views of the Vice President, and explained that Project Solarium was being initiated with this precise problem in mind. He outlined briefly the alternatives which Project Solarium would present to the Council, and noted that the Council would sit in judgment on these alternatives much as would judges in a case in a law court.

Secretary Smith agreed with the Vice President's exposition of the long-term problems which were confronting the Administration, but also noted that if, as seemed very likely, we obtained an armistice in Korea, the Administration would also face a serious short-term problem. The first reaction of the American Congress and people to an armistice in Korea would be relief and rejoicing at the end of the bloodshed. Presently, however, Congress and the people would begin to tot up the net results of two years of savage fighting, and there would be bitter criticism of the small result which could be attributable to this long and costly effort.

The President showed some impatience with this prospective criticism of our efforts in Korea. If people raised hell when they contemplated these results, the thing to do would be to ask them to volunteer for front-line action in a continued Korean war.

The National Security Council: [10]

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on feasible military courses of action in Korea by General John E. Hull and Major General J. S. Bradley, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the probable effects of such courses of action on other nations, particularly our allies, by the Acting Secretary of State.

c. Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should present to the Council at its next meeting their choice of the most advantageous course for the United States to adopt.

d. Noted that the President, in accordance with NSC Action No. 765-*b*, authorizes the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to activate additional Republic of Korea divisions, over and above the 16 already activated, to a total of 20.

e. Noted a report by the Secretary of Defense that, within existing authorization, he has approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for the following personnel increases in Republic of Korea forces:

(1) Marine Corps—19,880 to 23,500
(2) Navy—9,402 to 10,000
(3) Air Force—7,034 to 9,000

Note: The action in *d* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 4. "Possibilities for Psychological Operations Based in Thailand", 5. "Position of the United States With Respect to Switzerland", and 6. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

---

[10] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 787; a record copy can be found in S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.

795.00/5-1353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: Mr. Hume Wrong—Ambassador of Canada
Mr. Peter Campbell—First Secretary, Embassy of Canada
G—Mr. Matthews
FE—U. Alexis Johnson

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson.

Ambassador Wrong, at his request, called today on Mr. Matthews. He stated that he had received the attached views by Mr. Pearson concerning the Communist May 7 proposal prior to being informed of instructions which had gone to General Clark on the subject. He had subsequently heard from Mr. Pearson following receipt of information with regard to instructions being sent to General Clark and wanted to add that Pearson was disturbed by the fact that the UNC counter proposal contained ideas that had not previously been considered such as a requirement for unanimous agreement of the commission. He did not agree that the counter proposal "had gone a long way" towards meeting the Communist May 7 proposal and regretted that at least the Ambassadors of the countries concerned in Washington had not been consulted, much less the governments, prior to issuance of instructions to General Clark. The Ambassador commented that he personally thought that the question of whether the "hard core" would become more manageable than in the prevailing atmosphere of the present discussion was debatable. It could work both ways.

The Ambassador also expressed himself as personally being much concerned over our position on the unanimity requirement for decisions of the commission.

Mr. Johnson explained our view in this regard, pointing out that it avoided adding to the already great burden that India would be bearing in our proposal. He pointed out that the substantive decisions being taken by the commission would involve whether any individuals or group of individuals should be repatriated and that we are confident that Switzerland and Sweden would apply the unanimity rule in a fair and equitable manner. If the commission did not reach a decision that any individual or group of individuals should be repatriated, it simply meant that those individuals would remain where they are.

Mr. Matthews mentioned our position with regard to release of the Korean non-repatriates and the attitude of President Rhee and the ROKs on this subject as well as upon the stationing of Communist troops in ROK territory. The Ambassador stated that our position with regard to release of the Koreans did not bother him nor did he think that it would bother the Canadian Government. The Ambassador was also informed that we had informed the Indian Government of our proposals and that while Nehru had not committed himself nor had we asked him to do so, he had not indicated India would refuse to participate as envisaged in the UNC counter proposal. Nehru had also appreciated the problem of the armed forces of five nations taking custody of the prisoners as envisaged in the Communist proposal.

HFM

[Attachment]

[OTTAWA,] May 12, 1953.

Mr. Pearson's Views Regarding Communist Proposals for Korean Armistice

I believe the 8-point proposal advanced by the Communist side goes a long way to meet the objections to their previous proposals which have been put forward by the United Nations Command. Indeed, I think there is only one difference of substance between the new Communist proposal and the Indian Resolution adopted by the Assembly last December. Both proposals provide for a reference of the problem of the prisoners who do not wish to return home to the Political Conference to be called under Paragraph 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement. However, the Communist proposal does not provide for further reference of this problem back to the United Nations, if the Political Conference is unable to settle it.

This, in my judgment, is the only significant difference between the two proposals. I am not too disturbed by the idea of Czechoslovakia and Poland providing guard troops in Korea, although the detailed arrangements for this will need working out. I understand the United States is prepared to accept these two countries for membership in the proposed Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Indeed, it would be difficult to adopt any other position as both countries have already been agreed to as members of similar bodies, under the terms of both the Draft Armistice Agreement and the General Assembly's Resolution of December 1952.

The Communists have made an important concession in no longer insisting that the prisoners who do not wish to be returned home should be physically removed from Korea to a "neutral state".

In view of the above, I think the way is now open for the conclusion of an armistice, if the United States Administration is seriously determined to obtain one, as I believe it is. Moreover, I am not too surprised that the counter-proposal of the Communist Chinese and North Koreans does not include any mention of reference back to the United Nations, for the simple reason that neither government is a member of that body. In my view, it may be necessary for the United Nations Command to be prepared to consider a compromise on this point in the interest of obtaining an early armistice.

I also believe that the main thing at present is not so much to concern ourselves with future points of method and procedure—though the Communists as we know can exploit these—as to recognize that there is already adequate agreement by both sides on the principles which should govern a solution of the prisoners-of-war question, to provide a reasonable basis for the armistice. The problem of disposing of the remaining prisoners-of-war will remain a problem, no matter what methods and procedures are devised. However, once the exchange of prisoners has actually started, the problem of the "hardcore" prisoners should become more manageable and less acute than it is in the prevailing atmosphere of the present discussions. It should also be noted that there is now agreement by both sides on:

(a) The setting up of a Repatriation Commission composed of neutral states; and

(b) As a second resort, the reference of this problem to the Political Conference to be called following the armistice. This area of agreement is, in my judgment, sufficient for our immediate purposes of obtaining an armistice.

Editorial Note

At 11 a.m. Korean time, May 13, 1953, the UNC made its counterproposal at Panmunjom. The record of the session and the text of the proposal can be found in telegrams ZX 36559 and C 62385, both from Clark to JCS, both dated May 13, 1953, neither printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) A text of the UNC counterproposal is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin,* May 25, 1953, pages 755–757.

At the next session, held May 14, the Communist Delegate stated that the UNC proposal was "absolutely unacceptable" and "resolutely" rejected it. A record of this session can be found in telegram ZX 36570, from Clark to JCS, May 14, 1953. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, May 14, 1953—1:11 p. m.

CX 62413. Refs: A DA [*JCS*] 938626.[2] B. CX 62354.[3]

1. Further study of possible results, should the ques of disposition of non-repatriates be submitted to the political conf, causes me concern as to the working of subparas *c* and *d*, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, as approved by ref A. My concern is based on the folg:

a. Para 60 of Draft Armistice Agreement reads in part, (underlining my own[4]) "—The mil Comds of both sides hereby *recm* to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides that *within 3 months* after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes eff, a political conf of a higher level of both sides be held—". This is a recm but there is no obligation on the part of the Governments that it be held in 90 days or ever as far as that is concerned. This recm was intentionally worded innocuously to avoid any commitment of the UN or US to enter into political discussions of the Far Eastern sit.

---

[1] This telegram was sent to CINCUNC (Adv) Korea, for information.

[2] Dated May 11, p. 1006.

[3] Dated May 11, p. 999.

[4] Printed here as italics.

b. Subpara *c*, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, now provs for submission of the disposition of POWs to the political conf. The ques could not be submitted to the conf if it had not convened. Subpara *d*, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, now provs for release to civ status of any remaining non-repatriates 30 days after the ques has been submitted to the political conf prov it has been unable to reach a decision on the disposition of the pris.

c. The wording of our counter proposal at this time assumes that a political conf *will* be held within 90 days after the armistice becomes eff. Should few non-repatriates be influenced by the Communists to return to their homelands by the end of the 90 days period of access, I consider it entirely within Communist tactics to intentionally delay the convening of the political conf. Thus the ques as to disposition of any remaining non-repatriates could not be submitted to the conf. This delay would result in keeping the non-repatriates in cust an indefinite length of time.

2. In view of the foregoing possibility I recm that subpara *c* and *d*, para 1, Part 4 of ref B, be combined and reworded as fols:

a. C. Change para 12 to: "90 days after the trf [transfer] of cust of POWs to the Custodial Com is completed the ques of the disposition of the PWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to the political conf recm to be convened in para 60, Draft Armistice Agreement prov it has in fact convened. In any event the access of representatives to captured pers as prov for in para 9 above shall terminate 90 days after the Custodial Com had assumed cust of POWs. Further, any POWs who have not availed themselves of the right to be repatriated or whose disposition has not otherwise been determined within the period of 120 days after the com has assumed their cust shall be released to civ status, the com ceasing its functions and being dissolved".

3. The foregoing wording is based on the assumption that my Government and other UN Governments involved intend to make every effort to convene the political conf within the 90 day period as recm in the Armistice Agreement. I realize that the Communists will immediately assume that we intend to delay the convening of the political conf and probably so charge us. However, if we are forced to our final psn on this issue I believe the effect of such charges can be minimized if in presenting this proposal we show clearly that any other solution could result in indefinite imprisonment of the non-repatriates and that their proposal would, if any "Government of the countries concerned" elected to delay the convening of the political conf, result in the problem remaining unsolved indefinitely.

4. As stated in para 1*c* the Communists might intentionally delay the convening of the political conf. However, the possibility exists that Communist insistence on turning ultimate disposition of non-repatriates

over to the political conf is based in part on their desire *to insure* that a political conf is convened. It may be advisable to give some assurance to the Communists by means of public statements made at Governmental level to the effect that the UN countries involved consider themselves obligated to convene such a political conf within 3 months after an armistice becomes eff. Such assurance, besides assisting the UNC in refuting possible Commie charges set forth in para 3 above, might be utilized by the delegation to secure Communist agreement to our final psn on disposition of non-repatriates.

5. The recm referred to in para 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement would be made by CINCUNC to the United States as exec agent for the UN. No info is aval here that indicates the possible composition of the UN delegation at political conf.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 14, 1953—4:25 p. m.
PRIORITY

C 62419. Ref: A. CX 61160.[1] B. C 61283.[2] C. CX 62372.[3] D. CX 55523.[4] This msg in 4 parts.

Part 1. Although present indications favor the assumption that we may obtain an armistice, common prudence dictates that we must anticipate the possibility of another indefinite recess in negots. In that I am faced with the problem of increasing pressures on the enemy which may induce him to agree to an honorable armistice, the accomplishment of which I consider of paramount importance.

Part 2. a. If another prolonged recess is directed I propose to cont to exert max mil pressure within my capabilities. I am not auth by JCS directives to launch a maj ground offensive, nor do I see that I should at this time, with curr inadequate forces, because of the likelihood of incurring casualties incommensurate with possible tactical and strat gains. Therefore, I intend to conduct a strong def on the ground (with exception of a proposed limited objective atk noted in subpara *b* below) imm increase guerrilla opns, cont and expand present naval opns, and expand air opns as much as possible. Specifically, immed upon recess I plan to cont air atks on such critical tgts as Suiho, Tme Yangsi, and

---

[1] Dated Feb. 7, p. 742.

[2] Dated Feb. 19, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 800.

[3] In this telegram, exclusive for Collins, May 12, Clark strongly recommended that he be authorized to implement immediately the 20-division balanced program for the ROK Army, at least on paper, in anticipation of a possible cutback of the ROKA as part of the armistice agreement. (Department of Defense files)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 742.

Pyongyang complexes and other sensitive tgts, observing presently imposed restrictions. Another tgt complex which has not been atkd to date, and which I plan to do under the above eventually, is the numerous North Korean dams, other than on the Yalu, impounding water for irrigation purposes. The breaching of these aprx 20 dams will inundate about 422,000 acres of land, causing damage or destruction of an est one quarter million tons of rice, thereby curtailing the enemy's ability to live off the land and aggravating a reptd Chinese rice shortage and log problem. Further, for the reason set forth in ref A, I rqst auth to take Kaesong under heavy air atk 24 hours after advising the Communists that their use thereof violates the spirit of the 22 Oct 1951 Scty Agreement (*d*). Complete text of ltr which I would submit to the Communists was set forth in ref B. In view of great importance of timing, rqst I be given auth now to submit this ltr to the Communists as soon as I am directed to again indefinitely recess the negots.

b. In the event of a prolonged recess I consider it desirable that Eighth Army conduct a limited objective atk from the vic of Kumsong late this fall when armor can be used to the max over the frozen rice paddies, northeast to the east coast, supported by an amph close-in envelopment, with the objective of destroying that part of the NK Army in the area, to shorten the front line, and prov a better base for executing that portion of plan 8–52 which envisions opns across the waist of the peninsula. Such an atk would consider the max use of ROK Ground Forces in its execution. It has distinct advantages in that it would be an addl means of providing pressure for an armistice, would destroy the NK Army elms dir in the line, shorten the line and would exploit the capabilities of the ROKA in its expansion and increasing combat effectiveness.

c. Addl pressure which I strongly advocate in the event of another recess is the unilateral release of some 35,000 North Korean non-repatriate POWs. My reasons and recms for their release were presented verbally to JCS on 6 March by a member of my staff who also left a written statement of my views, dtd 4 March 1953, with the Chairman JCS.[5] Although realizing difficulties of not releasing Chinese non-repatriates at same time as North Korean non-repatriates first logical step is release of Koreans. Release of Chinese non-repatriates would be held up pending further instructions to me, but pub announcement concerning release of non-repatriate POWs would be worded so that it does not indicate plans for disp of Chinese not believed entirely essential that disp of Chinese be settled at same time as Koreans. Again, based on the timing of these pressures, recm that I be given auth to implement this release program immed after another recess is directed. Implementation would be along the lines set forth in para 4 of my statement of 4 March 1953, referred to above.

---

[5] See the memorandum of discussion of State–JCS meeting, Mar. 6, p. 806.

Part 3. Under present directives, the actions set forth in Part 2 are the only ones within my capabilities which give promise of applying pressures on the Communists. The only addl pressure which I feel I can exercise with curr forces would entail a change of policy with respect to air opns against tgts in Manchuria and North China. I fully realize the political and mil implications in such a change of policy and make no recms at this time. I merely desire to point out pressures within my mil capabilities.

Part 4. A longer term pressure which can be brought to bear is an all out offensive which might create mil conditions nec to obtain an honorable armistice. My plan 8–52 is under constant revision with respect to concept and force rqmts. Unquestionably force rqmts for an offensive in 1954 would be greater than those contemplated in this plan. To offset this, at least in part, would be the availability of newly created ROK divs. However, an addl related pressure which could be exercised concurrent with another recess would be the announcement of the activation of 4 addl ROK divs, bringing them to the total of 20 divs, provided, of course, prior auth has not been granted for such action. As outlined in ref *c* such authorization would be helpful under curr conditions and if granted now would under the conditions assumed in this msg, place the Eighth Army in a more fav psn, not only to deter or repel renewed aggression by the Communists, but to launch an offensive.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 15, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korea

General Bradley: I understand you want to take up this draft telegram[2] to Briggs and Murphy about what they might say to Rhee. I have not yet had the chance to read it.

Mr. Matthews: We realize that you have had no time to go over this and it is being brought up on short notice, but we thought it might be useful to have a general discussion on it and see what points there were that might need further work.

Admiral Fechteler: That is a pretty far-reaching statement where the President says that if the Koreans are attacked again the U.S. will again respond to the best of its ability.

Mr. Matthews: It is probably a key sentence of the whole draft. I should point out, however, that this is a preliminary draft.

Mr. Johnson: This is not an instruction but is a draft on which comments are asked.

General Bradley: Isn't paragraph 8, where we talked about taking measures necessary to preserve the security of our forces, pretty blunt?

Mr. Matthews: Our feeling was that maybe we ought to be pretty blunt with Rhee.

Mr. Johnson: He certainly has been pretty blunt with us.

General Bradley: In paragraph 5 it seems to me that the phrase "preside at the liquidation of the ROK Government" might be changed to "the U.S. will not agree to or permit the liquidation of the ROK Government".

Mr. Matthews: We have had some doubts as to whether this was really enough to persuade Rhee to cooperate with us and we thought we should be thinking as to whether there was anything more beyond this that we might do.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chief General Twining. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent, Wisner represented the CIA, Gleason the NSC, and General Ruffner the Department of Defense. In all, 24 persons attended. In addition to Korea, Indochina, and the Five-Power Conference, proposed by Churchill before the House of Commons earlier in May, were topics of discussion at this meeting.

[2] Reference was to a draft of the message sent in telegram 713 to Pusan, May 15, p. 1029.

General Bradley: You did intend to clear this with the Secretary of State and Defense and the President before it was decided on, didn't you?

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

General Eddleman: We think a new Part 4 should be added along the lines that the proposed message might help persuade Rhee to go along with treating the North Korean POW non-repatriates the same way as the Chinese and asking Clark for his views on the suitability of that as a final position.

Mr. Johnson: I agree that we are in a bad position on the question of the Korean POWs. The Commies have been hammering us on our weakest point and in the last analysis our position just isn't logical. I agree in principle that this message should be used to try and get Rhee to go along with treatment for the Koreans identical to that for the Chinese.

General Bradley: I think we agree in principle to the content of the message but we should have a chance to get specific comments. Why don't we turn over the redrafting of the message to our joint team and then we can clear it with both our Secretaries. Since it is a State message I should think General Smith is the one to take it up with the President.

Admiral Fechteler: I again raise the point that the statement that the U.S. would again come to the defense of Korea is a pretty broad commitment, and a commitment that is beyond the purview of the JCS. I am not necessarily opposing it, but I don't see how we can concur in something that is outside our purview.

General Bradley: I think some language changes should be made of the message to make this a State message and have the State Department recommend to the President that the President make this statement. Can we have the team revise the draft and then circulate it to us.

Request for 3-day recess

General Bradley: There is a message just in from Clark[3] which says that unless he receives orders to the contrary, Harrison is at the next meeting going to call for a 3 day recess. Clark feels that the Commies will just use the next few meetings to beat their propaganda drums and that a recess would quiet this down and would at the same time present a chance for consideration of recommendations which Clark says he is making in a following message for bringing negotiations to a head.

Mr. Matthews: What reason would be given for recess?

General Bradley: Clark says Harrison would merely say it was for administrative reasons.

---

[3] The reference was to telegram C 62442, May 15, p. 1028.

Mr. Johnson: We are in somewhat a weak position for a recess. The Communists have focused on our stand on the Korean prisoners and we have not yet successfully focused on the central question of some prospect for release of the prisoners. However, a recess would give us a chance to get our position squared away.

General Bradley: I take it then that we should let Clark go ahead with the recess.

. . . .

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1953—12:25 p. m.

JCS 938989. From JCS for CINCUNC reur CX 62413.[1]

1. Although probable Commies will desire polit conf in event armistice achieved, we concur possibility Commies might intentionally delay convening conf in attempt to block ultimate disposition any remaining non-repatriates. In light of this possibility we approve recm in para 2, ur CX 62413, but desire that text cited in subpara 2 *a* read as fols:

> "90 days after the trf of cust of POWs to custodial comsn is completed access of reptvs [representatives] to captured pers as prov for in para 9 above shall terminate, and ques of disposition of POWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to polit conf recm to be convened in para 60, Draft Armis Agreement. Any POWs who have not availed themselves of right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to within 120 days after comsn has assumed their cust shall be released to civ status, the comsn ceasing its functions and being dissolved."

2. Consider that wording cited above provides just [justifiable] basis for release of remaining non-repatriates at end 120 day period whether or not polit conf meets and resolved ques their disposition, at same [time] avoids implication that conf may not convene. Since latter implication is eliminated, believe it unnec in absence of other compelling reasons to reiterate United States obligation to agree to convening polit conf since such obligation can be implied from UNC accession to para 60 of Draft Armis Agreement.

---

[1] Dated May 14, p. 1020.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, May 15, 1953—9:03 p. m.

C 62442. Ref ZX 36583.[1]

1. Harrison has been instrd to meet tomorrow, 16 May, with a view to further clarifying the basic issues of difference.

2. In view of the curr tactics employed by the Communists it is questionable whether it will be advantageous to meet on the folg 2 or 3 days. The records today, contained in ref msg, give evidence that the Communists have abandoned any attempt to negotiate, for the present, in favor of a propaganda campaign apparently designed to force US to make concessions. It outlines the propaganda themes which they will exploit to the fullest as long as we permit them to use the Pan Mun Jom sounding board for that purpose.

3. In order to circumvent these tactics, I am authorizing Harrison, at the end of the 16th May session, to rqst a 2 or 3 day recess. If the Communists do not agree to such a recess, I have directed him to agree to meet the next day, and then at an aprop time to inform the Communists that for administrative reasons he is unable to meet as scheduled, and that he will inform them later when he will be prepared to resume meetings.

4. Such a recess curtails the Communists propaganda and provides time for my recommended course of action designed to bring matters to a head to reach you and obtain your approval. This recommendation should be in your hands tomorrow.

---

[1] Not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795.00/5-1553: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, May 15, 1953—8 p. m.

4143. I called on Pillai again today at his request re Korea. He said Nehru had asked him to let me know that India was making representations in Peking expressing hope that armistice negotiations would not be broken off and he wished to express same very earnest hope to us. Pillai said Nehru also wanted to repeat again as emphatically as he could his conviction that chances of success in negotiations were in direct ratio to nearness of proposals to UNGA December resolution.

I asked Pillai what deviations from UNGA resolution in your proposals caused greatest difficulty in his opinion. He said three came immediately to mind. First was immediate release of Korean POW's who did not wish to return. Second was provision for unanimity. Third was proposal to release remaining non-repatriated prisoners at the end of sixty days without reference to political Conference. He thought Peking might consider other deviations equally important. Pillai mentioned that change of name from Repatriation Commission to Custodial Commission might not seem important but offered one more opportunity for prolonging debate.

As regards unanimity I pointed out that we had suggested this feature in belief it would facilitate India's role. He said Nehru understood and appreciated this factor but that nevertheless it was striking deviation from UNGA resolution.

Comment: It seems probable that since GOI has had opportunity to think our proposals over, they regard our insistence on unanimity as being based not so much on effort to make India's job easier as on lack of confidence in India's impartiality. This view has doubtless been strengthened by press reports of General Harrison's statement that Communists "may aspire to be able to use enough pressure to control a majority". Despite Harrison's expression of sympathy for India's position, his remarks made unfavorable impression on Indians.

Embassy is inclined to think Nehru's repeated pleas for return to UNGA resolution may be based on some understanding he had with Peking last November that Indian resolution was acceptable to Peking. Closer our proposals are in accord with GA resolution better position India will be in to urge Peking to accept.

ALLEN

795.00/5-1453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 15, 1953—11 p. m.
PRIORITY

713. Tokyo for Ambassador Murphy and CINCUNC. Tokyo's 3547 [2] and 3594; [3] CX 62406,[4] HNC 1678 [5] and preceding telegrams this subject.

---

[1] This cable, which was drafted by Young and cleared by Johnson, was also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2694.

[2] In this telegram, dated May 10, Briggs (who was in Tokyo conferring with Murphy and Clark) endorsed the idea of a public statement by President Eisenhower supporting the Republic of Korea with a view to eliminating Rhee's opposition to the armistice. In Briggs' opinion, however, it was questionable whether Rhee would accept such a statement in place of a mutual security pact. (795.00/5-1053)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1012.

[4] Dated May 13, p. 1010.

[5] Dated May 12, p. 1008.

Prior to discussing matter with President State and Defense request your comments on following proposed instruction to Briggs and CINCUNC and draft Presidential statement contained therein.

Part I. The President seriously concerned over deliberate campaign being developed by President Rhee against armistice. Korean *Aide-Mémoire* (Deptel 673[6]) particularly disturbing. Persistence present ROK attitude could seriously jeopardize US/UN interests Korea.

President appreciates Rhee's actions stem in part from feeling of apprehension in ROK regarding its future security. On other hand, US Government cannot overlook fact Rhee's actions also stem from his desire maximize his bargaining position with US at this time. President considers it essential every effort be made bring about cessation ROK agitation and opposition to armistice agreement and appropriate attempt should be made insofar as possible to allay ROK fears regarding future security. Accordingly US Government has under urgent consideration joint approach by Ambassador Briggs and CINCUNC to Rhee outlined Part II this message and issuance Presidential statement contained Part III below. Such statement would be considered formal expression personal message Deptel 653.[7]

Part II. It is envisaged that in joint approach to Rhee, you should strongly emphasize following points while showing him draft Presidential statement:

1. US fully aware ROK feeling of insecurity regarding future status and defense against aggression. US will do utmost to allay these fears as it has in past through years of fighting side by side with ROK for its defense against aggression and in helping build up economic position and international status ROK.

2. US not prepared engage mutual security treaty with ROK under present circumstances. However despite our inability give favorable consideration such treaty at this time US prepared begin informal discussions with ROK looking toward conclusion comprehensive agreement on military assistance and related matters. These would presumably include an administrative agreement covering disposition US/UN forces Korea; strengthening, training and maintenance ROK armed forces; and usual administrative questions regarding criminal jurisdiction, leasing arrangements and other rights and privileges, etc. Such agreement would represent further affirmation US determination provide continuing assistance ROKs in future defense Korea; agreement, however, could not be formally concluded until present hostilities terminated by armistice.

---

[6] This telegram, which is not printed, transmitted not only the text of the *aide-mémoire* of the Republic of Korea, but the gist of the Yang–Robertson discussion of Apr. 24. For a report on that discussion, see the memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 933, to which is attached a text of the Korean *aide-mémoire*.

[7] Dated Apr. 15, p. 912.

3. US fully sympathizes with ROK desire for total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces Korea. US endeavoring conclude armistice with view that such withdrawal should be accomplished through political conference.

4. While US intends fully cooperate with ROK strengthening it against future aggression, effectiveness such assistance will however inevitably depend upon ROK willingness and ability cooperate with US efforts and ensure such assistance has maximum effectiveness. In this regard we consider proposed Presidential declaration together with Greater Sanctions Statement (which we intend issue immediately following armistice) will serve as fundamental policy basis. Corresponding public declaration by President Rhee of determination his government fully cooperate with US/UN will serve greatly strengthen our mutual position against renewal Communist aggression.

5. US will not permit dissolution ROK in any political conference with Communists and we firmly believe integrity ROK should be preserved. US Government intends proceed promptly and vigorously in political conference attempting bring about political unification Korea under ROK and rapid withdrawal Chinese Communist forces and we will insist on continued recognition integrity and sovereignty ROK Government. You may indicate US intends consult with ROK both before and during such conference and we will never acquiesce any formal political agreement which leaves Korea permanently divided.

6. We prepared assist development and maintenance ROK ground forces to level of 20 divisions (plus one Marine Brigade) so long as necessary for ROK defense provided assurances given by ROK of cooperation in armistice agreement and any future efforts UN achieve unification peaceful means. We not prepared however make commitments for expansion ROK forces beyond present level if agitation against armistice and non-cooperative attitude ROK persists, since such US assistance would be rendered useless under such conditions. Rhee should bear in mind heavy US defense commitments throughout world and increasingly heavy burden these responsibilities upon American people.

7. Before President would make any declaration and before we would open discussions concerning mutual assistance agreement and strengthening ROK forces, it is essential US receive from President Rhee his firm assurance that ROK will cooperate fully with US/UN Korea. Such cooperation must include: (a) ROK will henceforth refrain from opposition and agitation against armistice negotiations and will use its influence restrain all segments Korean population from so doing; (b) ROK will cooperate fully in putting armistice agreement into effect; and (c) ROK armed forces will remain under operational control CINCUNC until governments of US and ROK mutually agree such arrangement no longer necessary.

8. If satisfactory assurance not received during this joint approach, President Rhee should be clearly told US will be compelled take all necessary measures insure security of US and other UN forces in unfortunate event before or after armistice he orders ROK forces take unilateral military action and withdraws them from UNC.

Part III. There follows text draft statement by President:

> "Under the Charter of UN and resolutions of the Security Council, the US and the other members of the UN are fighting in Korea to assist the ROK in resisting unprovoked aggression. Our common action has demonstrated the principle that the integrity of a peaceful nation which resists aggression cannot be attacked with impunity. The free nations of the world can never relax their vigilance in supporting this principle. This is vital for the attainment of true and lasting peace.
>
> The people of Korea can rest assured that we will never forget their valiant fight for freedom. The present struggle has shown our firm determination that aggression will not go unchallenged. If the present efforts to stop the fighting are successful, the Korean people can be confident that should they again be threatened, the US will again as a loyal member of the UN respond to the best of its ability. The welfare, security and independence of the Korean people will always be of concern to the American people.
>
> If the present efforts to stop the fighting are successful, there will remain the essential task of repairing the ravages of war to alleviate the terrible suffering of the Korean people and to reconstruct their stricken economy. The UN is no less dedicated to the work of rebuilding for peace than to the defense of freedom against aggression. The people of Korea can rest assured that the US will continue to do its part.
>
> In all these great tasks to bring peace and security to Korea we have had the splendid cooperation of the people of Korea. I feel certain that this cooperation will continue. I know that the authorities of our two governments will strive together in mutual understanding to help bring about a peaceful, prosperous, and united Korea."

Part IV. The foregoing proposed course of action is designed to meet, insofar as practicable, what appear to be Rhee's basic fears with respect to an armistice. As such it might be more effective in causing him to cease his present opposition to an armistice than adoption of final position re Korean non-repatriates recommended in HNC 1678. It would also be a more preferable solution to the problem from our viewpoint. Accordingly, in considering the foregoing course of action request your specific comments as to informing Rhee during above approach that in view of assurances given him UNC must be in position consider proposal for immediate release of Korean non-repatriates since free world opinion strongly in opposition and position is not logical in view of fact Koreans will in any event be released in ROK.

SMITH

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 16, 1953—2:53 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 62456. Refs: A. CX 62354.[1] B. JCS 938704.[2] C. JCS 938626.[3] D. JCS 937205.[4] E. JCS 938989.[5] This msg in 3 parts.

Part I.

1. We have now met with the Communist armistice delegation for almost a month in a sincere effort to achieve a solution to the ques of the disposition of the PWs. The Communists have given little indication of acptg our present psn. In fact they summarily rejected our counter proposal with little or no study. They have repeatedly confirmed their objective of obtaining total repatriation of all PWs and have left no impression that they will assume a more fav negotiating attitude. Based on my instructions that the US will not countenance prolonged and inconclusive negots, with which principle I am in full agreement, I feel that the time has come to take positive steps either to:

a. Secure Communists agreement or

b. Force them to dmst [demonstrate] to the world that they are acting in bad faith in seeking an armistice only on their own terms by exacting forcible repatriation of POWs.

2. If the curr Communists delaying tactics are primarily for the purpose of obtaining better terms, an armistice agreement can be expedited by presenting a final psn on as close to a take it or leave it basis as possible. From past experience we have learned that to give in inch by inch simply provs them encouragement to cont delaying tactics. It is essential that our next psn have a definite air of finality to it. By this method we believe we can place the Comm in a psn of having to acpt one of our varied proposals or force them to demonstrate to the world that they do not desire an armistice except under conditions which would amount to forced repatriation or indefinite detention.

3. This proposal modifies the final psn outlined in part 4, ref A, in some respect; the most important of which is that it elims the five (5) nation com concept and substitutes therefor two (2) neutral nations, which in this respect is a reversion back to our original concept. This proposal would be offered in a final spirit of compromise and be based on the folg:

---

[1] Dated May 11, p. 999.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1010.
[3] Dated May 11, p. 1006.
[4] Dated Apr. 22, p. 923.
[5] Dated May 15, p. 1027.

a. Revert to our original psn of Switzerland or Sweden assuming cust of non-repatriates, at the same time indicating UNC willingness to agree to an additional neutral from among the 4 nations which the Communists prevly stated they considered to be neutral, i.e., Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Burma. (*Note:* This represents a combination which I believe is capable of implementation under the present ROK sit. I assume that I would be authorized to acpt any of the 4 Asian neutrals listed herein though I anticipate that India will be the nation nominated by the Communists. In view of Nehru's latest statement it appears that India is neither objective nor completely neutral, but we appear to be committed to acpt her. There is a possibility that the Communists might agree in principle to this concept and then nominate either Czechoslovakia or Poland. In view of the ROK opposition prevly reptd, such a combination would be completely unacceptable and I would reject such a nomination on the basis that neither of these nations can qualify as a neutral under the concept outlined below.)

b. Agree that the neutral nation or nations selected in para 3*a* above would take cust of all non-repatriated POWs under the folg procedures:

(1) The UNC nominated neutral to take cust of all Korean POWs in Korea. (*Note:* This obviates the need of further guidance indicated in ref B.)

(2) The Communist nominated neutral, limited to 1 of the 4 Asian nations listed above, to assume cust of all non-Korean POWs either in Korea or, if desired by the Communists, within the border of the neutral state. (*Note:* In this connection your attn is invited to the danger inherent in such a transfer. It might jeopardize the UNCs most important principle as it creates a sit where the neutral might have final responsibility in determining the eventual disposition of these POWs. In such a transfer it would be difficult to insure that the UNC retains ultimate responsibility for these POWs as pntd out in para 4 of ref C.)

c. To agree that the pd of time dur which each side would be afforded an opportunity to verify or ascertain the attitude toward repatriation of its captured pers while in the cust of the neutral nation would be 90 days.

d. To agree that, quoting from ref E: "Ninety (90) days after the transfer of cust of POWs to custodial com is completed access of representatives to captured pers as provided for in para 9 above shall terminate, and ques of disposition of POWs who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to political conf recommended to be convened in para 60, draft armistice agreement. Any POWs who have not availed themselves of right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to within 120 days after com has assumed their cust shall be released to civ status, the com ceasing its functions and being dissolved."

e. The UNC psn on all other items to be the same as outlined in the amended terms of ref to cover the final psn indicated in ref A as amended by ref C. (If non-Korean POWs were transported to the neutral state, the Asian neutral state would aid remaining non-repatriates in proceeding to a designation of their choice and terms of ref would be modified as to location of cust, press coverage and log support.)

Part II.

4. In presenting the foregoing, Gen Harrison would make it crystal clear to the Communists that this proposal contains maj concessions. He would then recess, unilaterally if nec, for a pd of a week for the announced purpose of allowing the Communists an opportunity to arrive at a decision and to allow ample time for our action and ltr discussed in folg para to have effect.

5. Dur this week I will have a ltr[6] dlvrd to Communist comds through the liaison offs in which I propose to summarize briefly UNC efforts to obtain agreement, and the UNC concessions made to that end. I will include a warning to the effect that the final UNC offer is for urgent consideration and that early resolution of the POW problem will be nec to prevent the UNC from taking unilateral action. I will conclude this ltr by urging the Communists to reconsider their psn on the basic pnts of disagreement, and pnt out the practical and equitable considerations which prevent the UNC from making any further concessions. The context of this ltr will be submitted to you prior to dlvr.

6. If upon resumption of negots the Communists show no chg in attitude, Gen Harrison would announce that the UNC has been extremely patient but begins to believe that the Chou En-lai proposal is misleading and only contemplates another form of forced repatriation, and plans the folg actions:

a. The UNC proposes to recess negots unilaterally pending rec from the Communists in writing of:

(1) Acceptance of one of the UNC alternative solutions offered on 28 Sep 1952 (CX 55856, 26 Sep 52[7]).

(2) Acceptance of the UNC proposal of 13 May 1953.

(3) Acceptance of the UNC proposal of (as contained in this msg) May 1953.

(4) Rec of a new Communist proposal, spelled out in suf detail, to enable the UNC to judge whether or not it could be a valid basis for further negots.

b. The unilateral release of NK POWs to commence within 30 days.[8] (*Note:* Under this provision I would release all UNC-held Korean POWs to a civ status within Korea.)

7. At an approp time I would then initiate the action outlined in my C 62419.[9]

---

[6] A draft text of this letter can be found in telegram C 62582, Clark to JCS, May 23, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[7] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 539.

[8] In telegram CX 62463 to the JCS, May 16, Clark changed this sentence to read as follows: "The unilateral release of those North Korean PW who do not desire to be repatriated to be commenced within 30 days." (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[9] Dated May 14, p. 1022.

Part III.

8. I cannot emphasize too strongly that after what will have amounted to more than a month of patient negotiating we must not only present at this time a firm and final psn to the Communists but also have a firm and authoritative understanding from our government as to what the next step will be. It seems to me essential not to take the action outlined in part I above, unless and until we have a firm decision as to action outlined in part II.

9. Rqst auth to adopt the negotiatory tactics set forth here in the immed future and at a time of my choice.

10. I fully realize that we may be subjected to criticism in giving up the 5-nation custodial com concept to which we have agreed in principle. However, when we submitted the counter proposal on 13 May we reserved the right at that time, as did the Communists, to return to our prev psn. If the modifications indicated in paras 3*a* and *b* above are unacceptable to you, I strongly recommend that we maintain the same schedule and procedure outlined above, amended only so far as is necessary to include all the provisions of our final psn outlined in part 4, ref A. In this event the guidance indicated in ref B, pertaining to Korean non-repatriated PWs is nec.

795.00/5–1753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY SEOUL, May 17, 1953.[1]

Unnumbered. Repeated information CINCUNC Tokyo, Pusan unnumbered. Personal for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy. "I am preparing this message in Seoul." Re Deptel 713, repeated Tokyo 2694.[2]

Following are my comments on proposals contained reftel, which I have not as yet had opportunity discuss with Ambassador Murphy and General Clark:

1. I agree as to importance coordinated representations at level envisaged reftel designed induce President Rhee to abandon anti-armistice campaign and to support our present course of action looking toward conclusion armistice and settlement outstanding political problems in subsequent conference.

2. Re Part II paragraph 2. Our unwillingness negotiate Mutual Security Pact at this time might well be regarded by Rhee as decisive feature of proposals contained reftel. Effect of such unwillingness would not in my opinion be significantly ameliorated by counteroffer to initiate informal discussions on series of other agreements, negotiation of

---

[1] There was no time of dispatch on the source text; the telegram was received at the Department of State at 8:27 a.m., May 17.

[2] Dated May 15, p. 1029.

most of which Rhee might well regard as at least as much in interest of US as of ROK.

3. Re question release Korean non-repatriate POWs, to which Rhee also appears attach considerable importance. Position set forth reftel is equally negative (Part IV). On this point, I question wisdom, from tactical point of view, of giving in to Communists on proposal which we put forward as considered position as recently as May 13. As to reasons advanced for this change, I am convinced on basis information available here that "free world opinion strongly in opposition" to immediate release Korean non-repatriates. Rhee may be even less convinced. Regarding "logic" of release, this proposal may appear to Korean eyes at least as logical as any advanced heretofore and probably a good deal more so. In any event, I fail to see why proposals contained Parts II and III of reftel need be considered as alternative to proposal for immediate release Korean non-repatriates.

4. Re Part II paragraph 3. While Rhee would undoubtedly welcome assurances re withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea, what he has previously had in mind has been accomplishment of such withdrawal as part of armistice terms rather than through political conference which might be indefinitely protracted. While Rhee recently appears to have weakened somewhat on this (Murphy's 3594, May 14)[3] that was on assumption of obtaining Security Pact.

5. Re Part II paragraph 5. Rhee would likewise be gratified by commitment to preserve integrity and sovereignty ROK in political conference. Our expressed intention consult with ROK "before and during" political conference might, however, scarcely impress Rhee, who has probably been thinking in terms full ROK participation in such conference.

6. Threat contained Part II paragraph 8 is ambiguous, though perhaps necessarily so. I believe that to extent feasible we should determine in advance just how far we would be prepared to go in opposing or at least withholding support from independent ROK military action, and so inform Rhee. I should defer to Clark's judgment on this point.

7. Re Part III. Proposed draft statement by President, while helpful, would not in my opinion be regarded by Rhee as effective substitute for Security Pact. Most tangible commitment contained in that statement might be regarded by Rhee as deprived of much of its value by qualifying phrase "as loyal member of UN". Remainder of text appears largely restatement of what has already been said to Rhee on previous occasions, including President Eisenhower's personal message contained Deptel 653.[4]

---

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1012.

[4] Dated Apr. 15, p. 912.

8. At such time as we are able to give Rhee sufficient satisfaction on his major requirements, I agree it would be important obtain satisfactory assurances from him re support our policy and actions as suggested in Part II paragraph 4.

While I had hoped be able concert with Ambassador Murphy and General Clark concerning our views on proposal contained reftel, difficulties imposed by geographic separation make it advisable transmit this in advance such consultation.

BRIGGS

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1953—12:15 p. m.

Korean Negotiations

Mr. Johnson: We have been working with your people over the week end on the draft message to Clark and have had discussions with General Smith on the general question of our present posture in the Korean negotiations. We have the feeling that we just can't stand on our present position that the Korean POWs should be released to civilian status upon the conclusion of an armistice. The Commies have been exploiting this as the weakest point in our position, one which our Allies give us no support on and one which is really so illogical that it tends to weaken our whole position. We fully recognize the problems that Clark and Briggs will have with Rhee on shifting from this position, but we believe the problem that we have to meet is that of how we handle Rhee when we change our position. We also feel that a provision for referring the question of the non-repatriates to the U.N. would make our position closer to that of the Indian Resolution and would assist in retrieving Allied support. On the question of unanimity in the voting of the custodial commission, we realize that the President faces a real domestic political problem if that position should be changed. The position was originally adopted by our Secretary after consultations with members of the Congress.[2] A shift to decision by a majority might, therefore, raise problems for the President with the Congress.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Collins as well as Vice Chiefs General Twining and Admiral Duncan attended. Bowie headed the Department of State contingent; General Ruffner and Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense. General Cabell attended for the CIA and Gleason for the NSC. In all, 24 persons were present. The entire meeting was devoted to Korea.

[2] A record of these consultations can be found in a memorandum for the files by Morton, dated May 11, 1953, on a meeting with Congressional leaders, May 9, 1953, not printed. (611.95A241/5-1153) A second report of this meeting can be found in a memorandum by Dulles, May 9, 1953, not printed. (795.00/5-953)

General Collins: I don't see how we can really stick to the unanimity principle. I don't see how the commission could do anything if it operated under it.

Mr. Robertson: It really is a question of form, not substance, if the terms of reference are clear. There already is in our position a provision for majority vote on questions of procedure. We don't really get anything by sticking on unanimity. What is important is getting clear terms of reference.

Mr. Johnson: We also have the feeling that in the presentation of the final position we should, to the degree possible, avoid appearing to be handing out an ultimatum.

General Eddleman: I would like to raise the question about your provision for executive sessions.

Mr. Johnson: We feel strongly that our negotiators should go into executive sessions. In setting forth our final position we can't completely avoid giving it some of the aspects of an ultimatum, but putting it out in public session would make it even more difficult to avoid the ultimatum aspect of our proposal. We also think that in our presentation we should attempt to bring it out that we are accepting a large part of the Communists' position. We should present our position, we believe, in the form of general acceptance of their position rather than in the form of a counter proposal. General Smith, when we discussed this draft telegram with him, felt that it wasn't clear enough for Clark and that it was too complicated to use in informing the President of the decisions that he had to make, so we should try and get something up by this afternoon from which General Smith can talk to the President. We have also been discussing the question of how best we can make use of Bohlen in Moscow. There has been the tentative suggestion that we might have Chip present our position to the Russians and then leave it up to the Commies as to whether they propose it and have us accept, or vice versa. There is the alternative suggestion that we might present it to the Russians through Chip simultaneously with our presentation of our position in the negotiations. We have also been discussing the desirability of getting our Allies in and getting them on the line to support our position publicly.

Mr. Robertson: What the Communists are doing is capitalizing on the difference between us and our Allies. If our Allies would only stand firm we might have less of a problem bringing the Communists around to our position, but our Allies won't. I would also like to point out that I believe it is important that we stick by the detailed agreements of the terms of reference which protect the prisoners who don't want to go back from pressure or beating up. We have a lot of North Koreans, to speak only of them, who in spite of the fact that they have not been given any indication of what was going to happen to them eventually are still unwilling to go back to North Korea. If we should put them in a position now where they were beaten up or pressured to go back to North Korea, it would undermine our whole political position against the Communists.

Mr. Johnson: I agree that it is important for us to hold to the detailed terms of reference, but I think we should realize that we will be under very heavy pressure if the Communists agree to general principles and we go on doing what our Allies will undoubtedly describe as "haggling over details".

General Bradley: Already our own papers are leaning towards the position of blaming the JCS for blocking an armistice by haggling over details.

Mr. Robertson: I think the difficulty is that they evidently don't read Harrison's statements carefully and they don't use those statements. Actually it seems to me that Harrison has done a very good job if the newspapers would only make fuller use of what he says.

Mr. Johnson: It seems to me that we should discuss our substantive position on the question of the Korean prisoners, on unanimity, and on reference of the POWs to the U.N.

General Bradley: I don't think we will get an armistice if we don't change our position on the Korean POWs.

General Collins: It seems to me that essentially that is a political decision and not a military question.

Admiral Duncan: The real question is what Rhee will agree to and I should think the first thing to do is find out what he is willing to agree on and what he wants.

Mr. Johnson: We know all too well already what Rhee wants. He wants to get to the Yalu with our help and if he can't get that he wants a security pact.

General Collins: Is the State position firmed up on what recommendations you would make to the President on a security pact?

Mr. Robertson: This would be a decision the President himself would have to make. We think it would be useful with Rhee to propose a security pact but our own Secretary has been against it on the grounds that it would detract from the U.S. aspects of the Korean effort and that we could put ourselves in a position of guaranteeing Rhee's control over North Korea when he doesn't control it.

General Collins: The question of the security pact does have military aspects. If we give the Koreans a guarantee and if we were going to implement that guarantee, we would have to have military forces near enough to support the guarantee. They would have to be either in Korea or in Japan. The Japanese will eventually want to have us out of Japan and I don't know how we can then support a guarantee to Korea. If we would leave forces in Korea, we would be leaving forces in a place where in the event of global war we might not want to fight, so from a military point of view there are real disadvantages to a security pact with the Koreans.

Mr. Robertson: The question of what we can give Rhee to make him go along with our position in the armistice negotiation is precisely what should be put to the President.

Mr. Johnson: Briggs' reaction to the draft statement which we asked for his comments on was that it didn't really serve the purpose.[4]

General Bradley: I have some worries about the question of referring the POW matter to the U.N. We were unhappy about that before. Could we accept it now? Of course I realize that we probably really couldn't break on something that we had previously accepted.

Mr. Johnson: The President has publicly supported the U.N. Resolution and Ambassador Lodge has characterized it as a standard to which all honest men could repair. Under these circumstances we couldn't possibly object to it if the Commies should propose it and from the point of view of our relations with our Allies we probably couldn't break off the negotiations without having made it clear that we were prepared to accept it. It is, of course, possible that the Communists themselves might not want to refer the thing to the U.N.

General Eddleman: What Johnson is proposing is really a complete re-do of the message to Clark. I would like to discuss an interim message to Clark which would give him authority to call for a further recess. (At this point General Eddleman circulated a draft telegram.[5])

Admiral Duncan: It seems to me that the part of the message which says that we think he should talk to Rhee before making the new proposal needs clarification. What is important is the terms in which he is going to talk to Rhee.

Mr. Robertson: One of the questions General Smith is going to see the President about this afternoon is just how far we can go in talking with Rhee.

General Collins: If the President is going to talk to the Congress and State to the Ambassadors, and Clark and Briggs are going to talk to Rhee and then we are going to have to act on what Rhee proposes, I think that instead of a two or three day recess we will need at least a week.

General Bradley: We can't leave the question of the position up to Rhee. We will have to tell him what our final position is and say what we can or cannot do about a security pact. Then if he won't go along, we will have to take action against him.

---

[4] See unnumbered telegram from Seoul, *supra*, May 17, 1953, which commented on the proposals contained in telegram 713 to Pusan, May 15, p. 1029.

[5] This draft was transmitted to Clark in final form as DA 939211, May 18, 1953. In it Clark was informed that "action designed to bring matters to a head" at Panmunjom would require prior approval "at highest level of US Government as well as close coordination with our allies." These actions could not be accomplished in time to allow presentation of new proposals to the Communists on May 20. Consequently, Clark was asked to extend the current recess 5 days. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

General Collins: But Rhee is bound to come back with some sort of reaction and we will have to consult on that here in Washington.

Colonel Matthews: If you consult with Rhee on our final position, then we will actually be carrying on a firming up of our final position in the public press. If we don't want to discuss our final position in the newspapers, we will have to tell Rhee about it not more than two or three hours before the meeting and then go ahead and act on our final position.

General Bradley: I think you have a point there.

General Eddleman: You might have a clear idea as to how much time we will need after we talk with the President this afternoon. Why don't we draft up the message but leave the number of days blank. Then Johnson can let us know later after the session with the President.

General Bradley: I think what we need to do is get up a memorandum for the President[6] which would include the points that we think we can't stand on our position on the Korean POWs, that we can't stand on the unanimity principle, and that although we would prefer to turn the POWs loose we think that probably we will have to make it clear that we will accept reference to the U.N.

Mr. Johnson: Having already accepted the idea once, we can't stand against referral to the U.N. if the Communists should offer it.

Mr. Robertson: But the Communists have not been asking for U.N. consideration and apparently none of our Allies have objected to the release of the POWs after a fixed time limit.

Mr. Bowie: It is my understanding that the Indians have pointed out that our present position differs from the General Assembly resolution in not allowing for referral to the U.N.

Mr. Johnson: Our Allies are not pressing us hard on it right now but I would agree we can't stand against it if the Communists should bring it up.

Admiral Duncan: This is a point I can't agree on. We were unhappy about the Indian Resolution before and I don't see why we have to accept it now.

General Bradley: I think we do. We have committed ourselves to it before and we would be in an inconsistent position if we now said we were opposed to it. I had another question. Do we stand on the position of no Commie forces?

Mr. Robertson: Yes, we should. It will be perfectly understandable to our Allies that we are unwilling to let Communist armed forces come into our rear or have responsibility for POWs.

---

[6] For a copy of this memorandum in its final form, see p. 1046.

General Bradley: On the point of what we do if the Communists reject our final position, I think it raises two questions, both of which are primarily political. What will be the effect on the Allies of breaking and what will be the effect on the Commies? When will you discuss this with our Allies? Shouldn't we get our Allies to go along with us now on a decision to break off negotiations if the Communists don't accept our final proposal?

General Eddleman: If the Commies give a flat rejection, can't Harrison break off immediately?

Mr. Matthews: I don't think the Communists will be so helpful as to give us a clear, flat rejection, but in any case the decision for breaking off the talks should not be left to Harrison. It must be made here in Washington.

General Bradley: Are you going to ask our Allies now as to whether or not they will support us in breaking off the negotiations?

Mr. Matthews: I would be inclined to tell our Allies now that this is our final position and get their agreement that this is a reasonable final position, then at the time when the Communists don't meet the position, we could tell our Allies that we have made it clear to them that this was a final position, that there was no use in talking any more since the Communists have rejected it and that we were terminating the talks.

General Bradley: I have a real question on the section of the talks about repudiating all former agreements and withdrawing all U.N. proposals.

Admiral Fechteler: I think we would look tougher if we would break off clean and make it clear that all bets were off, that any new negotiations would start from scratch.

General Collins: I don't see any use in withdrawing everything, including the part of the armistice that has already been agreed upon. If we want to repudiate the agreements that have been made up to now, we could do that at any time that the situation changes. Unless we are really ready to go all out in Korea, it seems to me we might well want to preserve the tentative agreements that have been made so far, but it seems to me this is largely a political question.

Mr. Bowie: We will have to get the President's approval on a message authorizing a final break anyway. Perhaps it will be best to postpone a decision on that until that time.

Admiral Fechteler: I didn't quite understand what the question was of using Chip Bohlen in these negotiations.

Mr. Johnson: It was our thought that we would present our proposals through Chip to the Russians and have him tell them how seriously we took them simultaneously with Harrison's giving them to the Communists in Panmunjom.

Admiral Fechteler: I thought there was some question of presenting them first in Moscow and waiting for the Communists' reaction. I think the idea of putting them forward simultaneously is a good one but I have real question about leaving it up to the Russians as to how a proposal should be handled.

Mr. Johnson: That was a tentative suggestion but by and large I think we are thinking primarily of transmitting them simultaneously.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1953—3 p. m.

Korean Negotiations

(The State Department and JCS Representative read a draft memorandum for the President [2] which had been prepared after the morning session.)

General Bradley: On page 2, paragraph 5, does the UNC delegation state right off the bat that we would be willing to accept the Indian General Assembly Resolution providing for reference to the question of the U.N.

Mr. Johnson: That was our thought in drafting this, but I should explain that we thought it would be best to bring out clearly the questions which the President should decide and so we put in definite terms positions which were left somewhat vague and undecided in our discussion this morning.

Mr. Bowie: What is the advantage of having a statement made orally?

Mr. Johnson: Merely that we don't really like the idea of referring to the U.N. and although we want to be able to say for the record that we have made the offer, it seemed a little less conspicuous to make it orally rather than to include it in writing.

Mr. Bowie: It is no less harmful to us with the Commies if we make it orally and it is less beneficial with our Allies. I should think if we were going to make the offer that we should include it in writing as an alternative.

Admiral Fechteler: I have a question on language which says that the prisoners will be released to civilian status after 30 days discussion by the political conference. It might just be that the political conference might never meet. I think it should read that the prisoners will be released within 120 days.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants." Of the JCS, General Bradley and Admiral Fechteler attended as did Vice Chief Twining. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. General Ruffner and Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense and General Cabell the CIA. In all, 18 persons were at the meeting. Korea was the sole topic of discussion.

[2] For the memorandum in final form, see *infra.*

Mr. Matthews: Clark has raised the point that the Commies might stall on disposition of the prisoners by refusing to convene the political conference.[3] I think that Fechteler's language is clearer.

Admiral Fechteler: I don't understand the next point on the Indian Resolution at all.

General Bradley: The point is that we have already agreed to the Indian Resolution and so we couldn't break if the Communists proposed it and we probably couldn't break without having proposed it ourselves.

Mr. Johnson: The judgment on the acceptability to us of the Indian Resolution depends largely on what we can do in the U.N. if the question is actually referred there. If we can get our Allies committed in advance to support us we would be in a much better position to handle any U.N. action and therefore the Indian Resolution would be easier to live with.

Mr. Matthews: What is the advantage in having all previous agreements voided and all outstanding proposals withdrawn if the Communists don't accept our position.

General Eddleman: We might want to be in a position of having called off all bets in a new situation. Starting from scratch we might be in a better position on such things, for example, as ruling out construction of airfields.

General Bradley: Would we tell our Allies now that we were going to void all previous agreements.

Mr. Johnson: Personally I should think not.

General Bradley: I think the really important thing is to terminate the negotiations and to rule out the sanctuary agreements for Kaesong and Panmunjom. I think there would still be a question as to whether or not we wanted to keep the liaison road open.

Admiral Fechteler: If you are thinking of referring the thing to the U.N., how about setting some time limit for U.N. action.

Mr. Johnson: We would not be able to commit the U.N. to a time limit. The real question is one of how much political power we can wield in the U.N.

General Bradley: Couldn't we say that if our Allies insist on the Indian Resolution or if the Communists insist on it we would be prepared to go along with referring the question to the U.N.

Mr. Matthews: The difficulty is that what we want to do is give Clark a firm, final position. If we leave Clark something still to be negotiated or conceded on, we will lose out on the value of having a firm, final position.

---

[3] See telegram CX 62413, Clark to JCS, May 14, p. 1020.

Mr. Robertson: I still don't see why we should propose it ourselves.

Mr. Matthews: Without it we wouldn't really have a final position.

General Bradley: If we are going to present this as a final position, I personally think we will have to include the reference to the U.N. part of the Indian Resolution.

Mr. Johnson: If we do include it, it will be important to get our friends on the line to support any action, even before we make the proposal.

General Bradley: I don't think though that it should be done orally. Can't we just strike "orally" and insert an "also". The next question is on the last part of the next sentence. I would like to include a specific reference to terminate all agreements on the neutralization and immunity of Munsan, Panmunjom, and Kaesong.

General Collins: I personally don't think we want to void the other agreements.

Mr. Matthews: We could decide that if and when we begin the next set of negotiations.

Admiral Fechteler: I think we should just call all bets off.

Mr. Bowie: But we can call all bets off equally well when we begin further negotiations.

Colonel Matthews: If you consider the new situation that we might face under changed conditions, I don't think we would want the albatross of the present draft armistice agreement hanging around our neck particularly if we had inflicted serious defeats on the Communists.

Mr. Matthews: I think we could remove the albatross just as well later as now.

Mr. Johnson: There is one other point that we left out and that is our willingness to go ahead with unilateral release of the POWs if the Communists should not accept our proposal. I think we should add that and make it clear to the President what we have in mind.

795.00/5–1953

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

The Korean negotiations are at a crisis. Our position vis-à-vis our Allies is deteriorating daily. We particularly lack support for our position on the immediate release of Korean non-repatriate POWs at the time the armistice comes into effect and for our position that the custodial commission act on the basis of unanimity in substantive matters. There is also a general feeling among our Allies that the UNC position should be as close as possible to the Indian General Assembly resolution.

---

[1] According to a note attached to the source text, Smith did not sign this memorandum, but instead took it over to the White House to discuss it with President Eisenhower on May 19. It was drafted by Johnson.

No record of the Smith–Eisenhower discussion has been found, but see telegram 249 to Dhahran, May 18, p. 1050.

On the other hand, President Rhee is strongly opposed and is fomenting public opposition in Korea to any armistice along present lines. In particular, Rhee has also taken an apparently adamant position that Koreans resisting repatriation be released immediately upon an armistice coming into effect rather than turned over to the custodial commission for processing in the same manner as the Chinese. If unable to prevent an armistice along present lines, Rhee is trying to obtain a U.S. commitment to a security pact.

Subject to your approval and after consultation with our Allies, we propose to instruct Clark to present our final position at the next meeting with the Communists and to hold this meeting in executive session.

We recommend that this position be:

1. Maintaining our present position on accepting a five-nation custodial commission, subject to the condition that all armed forces and operating personnel be supplied exclusively by India.
2. Changing our present position on the immediate release of Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of an armistice and agreeing that Korean non-repatriates will be turned over to the custody of the commission in the same manner as Chinese.
3. Changing our present position that the commission will act on the basis of unanimity on substantive matters, and agreeing that the commission will reach decision on all matters by majority vote.
4. Maintaining all elements in our present position on detailed terms of reference for the operation of the custodial commission which are necessary to assure that the right of Chinese Communist and North Korean access to the prisoners is subject to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against the non-repatriates.
5. Maintaining our previously planned final position that we agree to submission to the political conference of the question of disposition of the remaining non-repatriates with the provision that failing determination of their disposition within a total of 120 days of their being handed over to the POW commission they would be released. In presenting this position to the Communists, the UNC Delegation would also indicate our willingness to accept the alternative formulation contained in the Indian General Assembly resolution providing for prompt referral of the question to the United Nations.

The foregoing would be presented as the final position of the UNC and if not accepted by the Communists within a period of one week negotiations would be terminated rather than recessed and all previous agreements voided as to the immunity and neutralization of the Munsan–Panmunjom–Kaesong area and access thereto. Also, all Korean and Chinese POWs opposed to repatriation would promptly be released, the Koreans to remain in South Korea and the Chinese to go to Formosa.

At the time of presentation of our final position we would have Bohlen make a simultaneous confidential approach to Molotov at Moscow and seek to elicit public statements of support from our Allies. The decision to drop the present position on unanimous action by the commission would involve relationships with the Congress since this position was adopted in consultation with Congressional leaders.

The decision to drop the present position on the immediate release of Korean POWs involves further decisions on possible alternative concessions that might be made to Rhee and action that we must be prepared to take if Rhee openly breaks with the UNC.

The politically most effective concession that we could make to Rhee would be to inform him of our willingness to negotiate a bilateral security pact. Such a security pact has very real political and military disadvantages which would have to be weighed against the need for securing Rhee's cooperation with an armistice.

We have just received views of Clark, Briggs and Murphy on the efficacy of a unilateral statement by you in lieu of a commitment to negotiate a security pact. Because of constitutional and political considerations such a declaration would necessarily be couched in very vague and general terms. Clark, Briggs and Murphy seriously doubt efficacy of such a statement and urge we express to Rhee a willingness to negotiate a mutual security pact.

Any approach to Rhee can include an explanation of the safeguards against renewal of the attack inherent in the armistice agreement and the "Greater Sanctions" statement to be issued by the 16 countries fighting in Korea immediately upon conclusion of an armistice.

795.00/5-1853: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 18, 1953—8 p. m.

3620. Department pass Pusan. Repeated information Pusan 246. From Murphy. Your 2694.[1]

While Clark and I have had no opportunity to consult with Briggs, we have seen his May 17 from Seoul.

We feel that Department telegram 2694 should be tied in with CX 62456[2] which transmitted our ideas regarding future tactics to be pursued at Panmunjom and outlined suggested final position. We believe that when action of the character proposed in Department telegram 2694 is taken, we should be in position to inform Rhee plan outlined in CX 62456.

---

[1] Telegram 2694 to Tokyo is printed as telegram 713 to Pusan, May 15, p. 1029.

[2] Dated May 16, p. 1033.

Clark is agreeable to making joint approach with Briggs and Rhee, but we believe action would be strengthened if ROK Ambassador in Washington were called to the Department first and given a strong statement incorporating reference to part 2, paragraph 6, your telegram 2694 by the Acting Secretary or the Secretary if he has by then returned to Washington.[3] We also believe that the text draft statement by the President is weak and frankly would leave Rhee unimpressed. It would be far better in our opinion if Presidential statement could be reserved until he is in position to send stronger message and if situation becomes more acute. After Acting Secretary has delivered strongest possible message to Ambassador Yang, Briggs and Clark would then call upon Rhee and do their best to impress upon him the seriousness with which United States Government views his government's attitude.

We are still mystified over reasons why United States is not prepared to engage mutual security treaty with ROK under present circumstances. When informing Rhee of this fact, if we could indicate reasons it is believed our statement would be strengthened. Information that United States is prepared to begin informal discussions with ROK looking to conclusion of agreement on military assistance and related matters is valuable and we believe may be helpful in rectifying to some extent ROK attitude as there would be included an administrative agreement covering the disposition of United States–United Nations forces in Korea and the other features regarding the strengthening, training and maintenance of ROK armed forces, et cetera. This, we find, most important feature of Department's present proposal.

Department, of course, will fully understand ROK cynicism regarding statement that United States is endeavoring to conclude an armistice with view that total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea should be accomplished through political conference. We fear that Rhee will classify this strictly under heading of wishful thinking in view of our continued inability to settle through political conference withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Germany and eastern Austria after many years of futile effort. Specious talk about achieving unification of Korea through peaceful effort at the conference, it is believed, is likewise destined to fall on barren ground in light of our past experience in Central Europe subsequent to the Potsdam agreement which provided for politically and economically unified Germany.

We believe that Acting Secretary's statement incorporating reference to greater sanctions which would be issued immediately following an armistice will be most helpful. This should be linked to a request for a corresponding public declaration by President Rhee regarding a termination of ROK to fully cooperate with United States–United Nations.

---

[3] From May 9 to 29 Dulles was on a series of goodwill visits to eight Middle East countries, as well as India, Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, and Libya.

As stated, Rhee has little faith in the ability of political conference to settle the question of unification of Korea and while statement that United States will not permit dissolution of ROK in such conference would of course be helpful, in face of Rhee's conviction that only effective solution is to drive Chinese Communist forces from the soil of Korea, effect on him of this general statement will be weak. Are we to assume also that suggestion that United States intends to consult with ROK both before and during political conference that ROK will be a participant at such conference?

We had hoped the information that United States prepared assist development and maintenance ROK ground forces to level 20 divisions, plus one marine brigade might be an effective bargaining counter at this stage. Unfortunately, this information has been publicly released by spokesman of Pentagon, according to press sources. It is understood that Rhee already has this information via press. However, we concur that whatever commitment is made should be conditioned on cessation of ROK agitation and serve as *quid pro quo* for cooperative attitude.

We agree that it is essential United States receive from Rhee full assurance that ROK will cooperate with United States–United Nations Korea [*Command*] before discussions regarding mutual assistance agreement would be opened. Also agree that Rhee should be told United States will be compelled to take necessary measures to assure security of United States–United Nations forces in unfortunate event Rhee orders ROK forces take unilateral military action, et cetera.

Clark concurs.

[MURPHY]

795.00/5–1853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1953—8:34 p. m.
NIACT

249. For the Secretary eyes only. Position with our allies on Korean negotiations rapidly deteriorating. We particularly lack support for position on immediate release Korean non-repatriate POWs at time armistice comes into effect and for unanimous decisions by Custodial Commission on substantive matters. There is general feeling among allies that UNC position should be close as possible to Indian GA Resolution.

President Rhee continues strongly opposed to armistice and the fomenting of public demonstrations in Korea. Rhee has also taken apparently adamant position that Koreans resisting repatriation be released immediately upon armistice coming into effect rather than turned over to Custodial Commission in same manner as Chinese. If unable to prevent armistice, Rhee trying obtain US commitment to security pact.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson.

Clark and Murphy have recommended determination and presentation our final position to Communists and if not accepted by Communists within one week, unilateral recess of negotiations.

Have today discussed matter with JCS and President and will discuss tomorrow with Ambassadors principal allies along following lines:

Clark to present final position at next meeting with Communists to be held May 25. UNC to request meeting be held in executive session. Position to be presented to be:

1. Maintenance present position accepting five-nation Custodial Commission subject to condition that all armed forces and operating personnel be supplied exclusively by India.
2. Changing of present position on immediate release Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of armistice and agreeing Korean non-repatriates will be turned over to custody of Commission in same manner as Chinese.
3. Changing present position on unanimous decisions by Commission on substantive matters to agreement that Commission will reach decision on substantive matters by majority of four. (Compromise suggested by President.)
4. Maintaining all elements our present position on detailed terms of reference for operation of Custodial Commission which are necessary to assure that right of Chinese Communists and North Korean access to prisoners is subject to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against non-repatriates.
5. Maintaining previously planned final position that we agree to submission to political conference the question of disposition of remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination their disposition within a total of 120 days their being handed over to Commission they would be released. We would also indicate our willingness to accept as an alternative formulation that contained in Indian GA Resolution providing for referral of question to UN.

Foregoing would be presented as final position and if not accepted by Communists within period of one week negotiations would be terminated rather than recessed and agreements relating to immunity and neutralization of Munsan–Panmunjom area voided. Also if not accepted by Communists, all Korean and Chinese POWs opposed to repatriation would be released. However, presentation would attempt to all possible avoid ultimatum connotations. Considering having Bohlen make approach to Molotov simultaneous with presentation final position at Panmunjom. We would also seek to elicit public statements of support from allies.

Rhee would be told while security pact cannot be considered, US would stand by greater sanctions statement.

Final decisions on position to be presented will be taken after consultation with allies and any further consultations with Congress which may appear necessary in light thereof.

SMITH

795.00/5–1953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: Sir Christopher Steel, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Arthur Tange, Australian Embassy
Mr. J. L. Allen, Australian Embassy
Mr. Sidney D. Pierce, Minister, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Peter Campbell, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. B. J. Jarvie, Counselor, South African Embassy
Ambassador Munro, New Zealand Embassy
Gen. W. B. Smith, Under Secretary
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE

General Smith invited the foregoing foreign representatives to a meeting in his office at 11:45 a.m. today to discuss the Korean armistice negotiations. General Smith opened the meeting by pointing out that progress was not being made at Panmunjom. He stated that the last proposal that the UNC had made did not represent a final position as it was necessary to have a few points on which the UNC could give in order to reach agreement and obtain the essential safeguards necessary in any agreement. With the permission of Mr. Steel, he then read a pertinent portion of a recent note from the U.K. Foreign Office[2] stating that in the opinion of the U.K. there were two points in the Communist May 7 proposal on which it was important to obtain improvement. These were the question of stationing of Czech and Polish troops in South Korea and a clear future for POWs who did not return. General Smith stated he agreed with these points and that there was a third point which involved U.S. domestic political considerations.

General Smith went on to state that the UNC position on release of Korean POWs at the time the armistice went into effect was introduced at the earnest recommendation of Clark, Murphy and Briggs following a conversation with President Rhee. They felt that Rhee meant business with regard to this point and that the position should be taken. However, General Smith felt that it was a mistake and both he and the President agreed that it could not be maintained. Yet Rhee has a capacity for causing trouble and we will have to do something for him if this point is dropped.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Johnson and approved by Smith.

[2] This note can be found attached to a letter from Makins to Smith, May 17, 1953, not printed. (795.00/5–1753)

The question of unanimous decisions by the commission on substantive matters was taken in deference to very strong feelings in Congress that India should not be the controlling vote on the commission. It was the feeling of several influential Congressional leaders that with India having the controlling vote the commission's votes would be consistently three to two against UNC interests. Nehru's recent statements have done nothing to help this situation. This whole question is coming up just at the time Congress is considering military and economic aid programs for the next fiscal year and there have been open threats by influential members of Congress not to vote the funds for aid being requested by the Administration.

We are therefore in a position of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. We cannot go on haggling over the armistice negotiations in Korea. When the negotiations were reopened we announced that we would not permit them to be dragged out. The question now is where can we go, as Allies standing together to get an armistice, or, if we fail, we fail honorably and standing together. We have tried to arrive at a final position which would be presented to the Communists shortly. However, we will carefully avoid baldly stating to the Communists that it is a final position and otherwise avoid any ultimatum aspects. We want to make it as easy as possible for them to accept. We will have to make clear to them that it is as far as we can go. The question is that if the negotiations are terminated how this can be done most to our advantage. Harrison's handling of the negotiations has been excellent but the ill reporting by the press has been a great disservice to all of us.

On May 13 Harrison told the Communists that the major portion of their proposal was acceptable but there were some provisions which required amendment and modification. The principal points of difference between the proposal put forward by Harrison and the Communist position were:

1. Armed forces and operating personnel for the commission to be supplied exclusively by India instead of equally by the five member nations of the commission. In this connection General Smith commented that Indian soldiers and officers fought along side the Allies during the war and have much the same ideas of decency as we do. They are trained in the tradition of the British army and we would not be worried at having professional Indian officers and troops. Our position in this regard is eminently reasonable and could only be opposed by the

Communists on the grounds of sheer intransigence. We cannot accept Czech and Polish goon squads and under no circumstances would Rhee agree. Rhee has not even agreed to the presence of Indian forces. In reply to General Smith's query as to whether there was any dissent from this view, Mr. Tange stated that the solution we were proposing was obviously much to be preferred. However, Australia wondered whether it would be practicable to locate prisoners in a restricted area, that is, an isolated island, and under these conditions it would be possible to concede admission of a controlled number of Czechs and Poles. In reply General Smith stated that there were no island areas from which it would be practicable to take off the civilians. We are probably very prone to overlook the question of ROK sovereignty involved in these questions. It would probably be difficult to induce Rhee to agree even to Indian troops. Our Congress would consider the presence of Czech and Polish troops as a catastrophic surrender to the Communists. It is a great error that the Korean POWs at least were not long since released.

General Smith went on with the other points of differences between Harrison's proposal and the Communist position.

2. The second was the question of release of Koreans upon the coming into effect of the armistice. As he had previously stated, we were prepared to recede on this point. We agree with the U.K. that there must be a clear future for the POWs. Even if this is worked out we must recognize that we may have to use force to turn Korean non-repatriates over to the commission. It is probable that many of them will strongly resist and we may be faced with a very ugly situation. Some of the Allied governments concerned are not sufficiently alive to the problem we will face in turning these men over. In the case of the Chinese, for example, there are at least 1900 staunch Roman Catholics among the Chinese non-repatriates.

3. The next point of difference was unanimity of decisions by the commission on substantive matters. We had discussed this with the President and it was quite clear that our Congress would never accept a solution involving decisions by the commission upon a simple majority basis. The President has suggested that the commission operate on a basis of a majority of four. Mr. Pierce and Mr. Steel stated that on the basis of either unanimous or a majority of four decision the Communist members of the commission would be in a position to veto action by the commission. General Smith stated that we well recognized that it may work out to our disadvantage and we would be grateful for the views of those present on this question.

4. General Smith then pointed out the next difference between General Harrison's proposal and the Communist position, that is, on the question of detailed terms of reference for the operation of the commission. In this regard he felt it necessary to assure Chinese Communist

and North Korean access to the prisoners would be subject to conditions which would prevent the use of coercion and force against the non-repatriates. This was very important. For example, unless there were provision to the contrary it could be expected that the Communists would insist on sending large numbers of their people to the camps and upon interviewing prisoners in private. This was something that could not be permitted.

5. The next question was that of a cut-off period for custody of the prisoners by the commission. General Smith expressed doubt that we should take the Indian formulation in this regard. He pointed out that the question was how long should the prisoners be held and at what point did it become entirely unreasonable to hold them any longer. Mr. Steel expressed the view that it would tactically be an excellent thing to put forward the formula in the Indian resolution. However, he thought the Communists would turn it down. Mr. Pierce stated that Canada would favor putting forward the Indian resolution formula. In general, Canada felt that the UNC should keep as close as possible to the Indian resolution. Ambassador Munro also expressed the view that the Indian resolution should be followed. There was some general discussion of whether the question would go to the Security Council or the General Assembly. It was generally agreed that the General Assembly was the proper forum. General Smith raised the question as to what would happen if it went to the General Assembly and a two-thirds majority on a resolution could not be obtained. Would we then be agreeable to holding the prisoners in captivity for an indefinite period. Mr. Steel stated that the success of any plan would largely be dependent upon whether a "good Indian" was representing India on the commission. Mr. Pierce stated that we did not have a situation in which we had a clear-cut victory, in fact there was no victory by either side and therefore we cannot get all we might want. General Smith stated that if we propose the alternative of agreement to defer the question to the UN in accordance with the Indian resolution we would expect the Allied governments to sponsor and support immediate consideration of the problem by the General Assembly with a resolution providing for the prompt release of the prisoners to proceed to any available destination of their choice. All of the representatives present agreed that there was no question in their minds that their governments would support such a resolution with a brief debate thereon of at the outside not more than two weeks. General Smith indicated that our position on this would be to agree to submit to a political conference the question of the disposition of the remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination of their disposition within a total of 120 days (90 days for access by Chinese and North Koreans and 30 days consideration of the question by the political conference) of their being handed over to the POW commission, they would be released. We would indicate our

willingness to accept the alternative formula contained in the Indian GA resolution providing for deferral of the question to the UN following 30 days consideration by the political conference.

General Smith stated that Rhee very much desires to obtain a bilateral security treaty with the U.S. but the U.S. view is that the question of Korean defense must be kept within the UN. In the post-armistice period the security of Korea centers around the "greater sanctions statement" to which we attach much importance. However, the harsh fact is that Rhee does not have confidence in the UN or anyone but the U.S.

Mr. Pierce asked whether this conversation should be considered as informing the governments concerned or were we consulting with them. General Smith replied that the U.S. was asking the advice of the governments concerned and hoped the representatives there would obtain it as urgently as possible. The meetings of the delegations were scheduled to resume on May 25 and it was important that we decide upon our final position and transmit it to General Clark as quickly as possible. The representatives indicated their understanding and except for South Africa stated that they thought they could have the views of their governments by Thursday.[3]

General Smith pointed out that the question was, how long could we go on with the negotiations. When decisions have been reached on the position which we were discussing, the UNC would have reached the end of its bargaining position and in the absence of clear indications from the Communists that agreement could be reached upon the basis of these positions within a reasonable period there would be no purpose in carrying on negotiations any further. General Smith pointed out that if it should come to a break-off in negotiations it cannot be expected that military operations can just sit where they are. The people of the U.S. would not stand for such a situation and it must be expected that the military operations will have to be intensified.

In closing, General Smith re-emphasized the completely confidential character of these consultations and the unfortunate effects among some of our other Allies if it became known that this consultation had taken place. As those present realized, the security considerations prevented widening the consultations at this time.

---

[3] May 21.

695.0024/5-1953: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

SECRET TOKYO, May 19, 1953—1 p. m.

3626. From Murphy to Alexis Johnson. No distribution. Proposal UNC advanced 13 May includes proposition for outright release 35,000 North Korean POW's in South Korea and also does not include acceptance in principle of eventual disposition all remaining POW non-repatriates by Political Conference with 30-day cutoff.

I want you to know that I have not been happy about these two items and it was in part due to my insistence that CX 62456[1] outlining proposed final position contains provision under which European neutral state would be responsible for custody of North Korean POW's in Korea. While I understand Clark's preoccupation with ROK opposition to anything but release of these North Korean POW's in South Korea and apprehension that there may be violence and disorder in South Korea if they are not released, UN technically does not have a foot of ground to stand on.

If we insist on outright release North Korean POW's I doubt that an armistice can be obtained. I have advised Clark that if there is a choice between an armistice and difficulties with ROK we must face the latter philosophically as the lesser of two evils.

I just want you to know that personally I find it incomprehensible that we put up a twelfth hour stand for the outright release of North Koreans merely because of apprehension over violent ROK reaction which is at best speculative. The POW issue has been built into enough of a Frankenstein without this added and unnecessary complication.

I also urged Clark several times to offer acceptance of the principle of the Political Conference with 30-day cutoff promptly, as originally contemplated in our 13 May position, but he and staff strongly felt they should be reserved as part of our final offer.

I hope that during this five day recess these two features especially can be thoroughly reviewed by Department and would appreciate your comment.

[MURPHY]

---

[1] Dated May 16, p. 1033.

795.00/5–1953: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 19, 1953—6:52 p.m.

2707. No distribution. For Murphy from Johnson. For your personal background only we are urgently considering recommendations Clark's CX 62456.[2] Position with our Allies on negotiations has rapidly deteriorated. Particularly lack support for position on immediate release Korean non-repatriates and for unanimous decisions by custodial commission on substantive matters. There is general feeling among Allies that UNC position should be close as possible Indian GA resolution. On other hand much influential Congressional opinion is strongly opposed any procedure which gives India deciding vote on commission. We thoroughly appreciate problems we face with Rhee regarding release Koreans but consider our present position on this insupportable. Communists are using it to becloud fundamental issue which is their failure agree on acceptable ultimate disposition remaining prisoners. If Rhee's purpose is to sabotage and forestall an armistice we cannot tolerate. If purpose is to improve his bargaining position for security pact and increased economic aid doubt there would be any basic improvement in situation even in unlikely event armistice obtained upon basis immediate release Koreans. No likelihood we can agree to security pact. Considered here that proposal in Clark's CX 62456 on custody of Koreans and Chinese is such a reversion from our previously agreed position on five-nation commission it could not be maintained as final position and concession of shipment of Chinese from Korea would only be seized upon by Communists to insist upon same treatment for Koreans. It would introduce new complicating element in negotiations giving Communists opportunity focus attention away from principal problems.

After consultation with JCS and President have today discussed with UK, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African representatives final position along following lines: (1) maintenance present position on accepting five-nation custodial commission with all armed forces and operating personnel supplied only by India, (2) agreeing turn over custody Korean non-repatriates to commission in same manner as Chinese, (3) proposing commission reach decision on substantive matters by majority of four, (4) maintaining all elements our present position on detailed terms of reference for operations custodial commission which are necessary to assure right of Communist access is subject to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against non-repatriates, (5) maintaining previously planned final position on submission question disposition non-repatriates to political conference with 30 day time limit together with indication willingness accept alternative contained last sentence Indian GA resolution.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson.

[2] Dated May 16, p. 1033.

Final decisions awaiting reactions governments consulted and results any necessary Congressional consultations.

Present planning is for Bohlen make approximately simultaneous approach in Moscow at time position presented Panmunjom and eliciting appropriate public statements Allied support and solidarity.

Thinking here is that presentation final position and any subsequent meetings should be in executive session doing all possible avoid ultimatum connotations, couched to maximum in terms acceptance Communist position, that is, do all possible facilitate Communist acceptance while making clear firmness our position.

Would appreciate your personal comments on how requirement for unanimous or majority of four decision on substantive matters in commission would work in practice.

Also working on instructions for Clark and Briggs discussion with Rhee at time he informed our decisions regarding Koreans centering on assurances contained in Greater Sanctions statement and willingness discuss military assistance agreement light comments Clark, Briggs and your Deptel 2694.[3] Constitutional and political problems prevent consideration any stronger unilateral statement by President than that contained 2694.

SMITH

---

[3] This telegram is printed as 713 to Pusan, May 15, p. 1029.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 19 May 1953.

Subject: Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea (Analysis)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that you are familiar with the various possible courses of action with respect to Korea, outlined in NSC 147 [1] as follows:

Course A: Continue for the foreseeable future military pressure on the enemy at substantially the present level, while building up ROK forces with a view to possible limited redeployment of U.S. forces from Korea.

Course B: Increase military pressure on the enemy by stepping up ground operations while continuing aggressive air and naval action, with a view to making hostilities more costly to the enemy in the hope that he might agree to an armistice acceptable to the United States.

---

[1] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

Course C: Continue aggressive air and naval action in Korea while launching a series of coordinated ground operations along the present line, followed by a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea, with a view to inflicting maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea and to achieving a favorable settlement on the Korean War.

Course D: Extend and intensify military pressures on the enemy by states, including air attack and naval blockade directly against Manchuria and Communist China, and if required, increase ground operations in Korea, with a view to making hostilities so costly to the enemy that a favorable settlement of the Korean War might be achieved.

Course E: Undertake a coordinated offensive to the waist of Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist, and to achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean War.

Course F: Undertake a coordinated large-scale offensive in Korea, and a naval blockade and air and naval attacks directly against Manchuria and Communist China, with a view to the defeat and destruction of the bulk of the Communist forces in Korea and settlement of the Korean War on the basis of a unified, non-Communist Korea.

2. Course of action A, which is in accord with the national objectives outlined in NSC 118/2,[2] has been followed since the armistice negotiations began.

3. You have directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on NSC 147, and to make their recommendations as to which course of action should be pursued in the event that current truce negotiations break down. Before concluding this statement with our recommendations, there are several considerations that should be brought to your attention. Fundamentally, the course of military action recommended will depend on the broader political objectives involving Korea. If it is decided to extend the war in an effort to gain a military decision, after all the risks are considered, then the course of action, as rewritten and stated in paragraph 8 would be the best one, from a military viewpoint, to attain the political objectives. The steps that the JCS believe should be taken to implement this course of action are outlined in the Appendix.

4. *Comments on courses of action:*

a. Course "C" and Course "E" both contain a limiting military factor of "a major offensive to establish a line at the waist of Korea", and in Course "E", "inflicting maximum possible destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea consistent with establishing a line at the waist" with the larger objective of achieving a favorable settlement of the Korean War. It should be pointed out that the military action of establishing a line at the waist does not preclude, under these courses of action, the pursuit and destruction of enemy forces beyond the waist of Korea if the offensive is successful. It should also be pointed out that in any mission given the UN Commander that the "waist of Korea" be clearly stated as a desirable end result, but that the main objective of either course of action is the "maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea" in order to achieve a favorable settlement. Limiting his ground action to the waist in Korea might exclude his being able to inflict maximum destruction of enemy forces and matériel in Korea.

---

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations,* 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.

b. If Course "C" were undertaken, it would very likely require extending the war into Manchuria in order to counter enemy air forces which would have our troops within striking range as they advance.

c. Paragraph 21 of NSC 147 states "Each of the suggested Courses of Action (except Course "A") permits but does not require employment of atomic weapons. In each case (except Course "A"), the use or non-use of such weapons is left open for future determination". The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this particular aspect of possible Courses of Action in Korea, and they now are of the opinion that all of the Courses of Action, except "A" and possibly "B", would require the employment of atomic weapons in sufficient numbers to insure, insofar as is possible, a successful military conclusion of the Korean War. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that from the Military standpoint no Course of Action beyond "A" or "B" should be undertaken without a concurrent decision to employ atomic weapons on a sufficiently large scale to insure success. A piecemeal or limited employment, with the attendant risk of failure, or at best limited success, is not recommended.

5. *Risks involved.* NSC 147 does not clearly emphasize the risks involved in carrying out the various courses of action. Therefore, the JCS believe that you should point out that if it is decided to enlarge the Korean War for the purpose of gaining a decision in Korea, that the following risks are involved:

a. We may become involved with a larger, long-term, costly war with Communist China.

b. We may also become involved in a war with the Soviet Union in Asia.

c. We may also be risking the outbreak of global war. (Any one or all of these conditions may result from the circumstances pointed out in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, and 18, concerning the Relations of Korea to Over-all Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives. From a military viewpoint, if a course of action is selected which risks any or all of the above, then preparations must be made to continue the operations to a decisive end, no matter how involved we become.)

d. We may lose some of our allies in Korea.

e. Our enlarging the war in Korea may have a detrimental effect on our relations with our allies in other areas, including the North Atlantic Treaty area.

f. Most of these offensive actions will cost many casualties.

g. All of these courses of action except "A" will call for a greater industrial and military mobilization, and will necessarily enlarge the military budget, not only for current operations, but for the larger forces needed in view of the larger risks we are taking in the Far East.

6. The very sound and constructive comments contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 147, as a basis for our firm attitude on the prisoner-of-war issue which may be the cause of the breakdown of current truce negotiations, thus leading to an enlargement of the Korean War, should be forcefully and completely explained to the American public.

7. Pursuant to your instructions, and based on the assumption that it is decided to extend the war in an attempt to obtain a decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to submit the view in the next paragraph to the National Security Council on 20 May 1953 as to the military courses of action which should be adopted in the event that current armistice negotiations fail.

8. In view of all the factors, it would appear that a combination of actions under Courses D, E, and F would be the most effective and the most economical in the long run for the United States to pursue in Korea. Such actions offer the most promise of success. Therefore, the course of action which should be adopted by the United States is restated as follows:

Extend and intensify military action against the enemy, to include air and naval operations directly against China and Manchuria, a coordinated offensive to seize a position generally at the waist of Korea and be prepared for further operations as required in order to:

a. Destroy effective Communist military power in Korea.

b. Reduce the enemy's capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East.

c. Increase possibility of enemy acceptance of an armistice on U.S.–U.N. terms.

d. Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for operations in Korea.

9. In the event the above course is adopted, the major implementing actions set forth in the Appendix hereto will be required.

10. If the course of action in paragraph 8 (above) is adopted, the *timing* of the various operations and the implementing steps outlined in the Appendix hereto is an important consideration. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the necessary air, naval, and ground operatons, including extensive strategical and tactical use of atomic bombs, be undertaken so as to obtain maximum surprise and maximum impact on the enemy, both militarily and psychologically. If undertaken piecemeal—for example, starting with a naval blockade, followed by gradually increasing air operations, and finally followed later by ground op-

erations—we would minimize the chance of success of the course of action outlined.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

MAJOR IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS

Initiation of the recommended course of action will require a broadening of national objectives and accomplishment of the actions listed below:

a. Obtain from the President authority to employ atomic weapons.

b. Obtain concurrence of as many of the United Nations participants in Korea as possible in a decision to employ offensive military measures.

c. Secure governmental approval of necessary increase in funds to support the recommended operations.

d. Defer critical items of equipment and ammunition from NATO and other MDA programs as necessary.

e. Increase U.S. military personnel ceilings and accelerate production rates for certain types of ammunition and critical items of equipment.

f. Augment U.S. and ROK forces as required.

g. Increase the military preparedness of Japan.

h. Initiate the necessary psychological, political, economic and unconventional warfare measures in support of the military campaign.

i. Intensify guerrilla operations against Communist China.

j. Prepare plans and make preparations for the use of atomic weapons.

k. Extend the area for pursuit and air-to-air action to include Manchuria and North China.

l. Undertake air reconnaissance of essential target systems in China and Manchuria.

m. Launch an air offensive to the extent of capabilities against the Communist air complexes and other targets north of the Yalu River to destroy the Chinese Communist Air Force and, as capabilities increase, intensify air and naval attacks against Communist LOCs in North Korea, China and Manchuria at times to be determined by CINCFE.

n. Be prepared to establish a naval blockade and conduct a mining campaign (including aerial mining) against Communist China, supplemented by air attacks against air base complexes and LOCs in China and Manchuria, at a time to be determined.

o. Institute deceptive measures, including amphibious and airborne feints and raids as feasible, with strong naval and air support, in order to draw the enemy off balance, to keep him confused as to U.N. intentions, and to insure maximum effect from massed air attacks in the battle area.

p. Launch an aggressive land campaign, in conjunction with strong amphibious attacks and supported by airborne envelopments to exploit enemy weaknesses, aimed at encirclement and destruction or neutralization of major enemy forces and leading to seizure and consolidation of Hungnam–Sinanju objectives. Following with pursuit and mopup operations as necessary in North Korea.

q. Prepare plans for support of operations by Chinese Nationalists, as feasible, to create diversions from Korea.

r. Maintain the security of Japan, the Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyus, consistent with the need to provide for the over-all security of U.S. forces.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 20, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 145th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the United States Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, USA (Ret.) (for item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for item 3); the Chief of Naval Operations (for item 3); General Twining for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for item 3); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA (for item 2); Lt. Col. Edward Black, USA (for item 2); Col. Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" and 2. "A Volunteer Freedom Corps".]

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on May 23.

3. *Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea* (NSC 147;[2] NSC Actions Nos. 759,[3] 782[4] and 787;[5] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea", dated March 30, 1953)[6]

General Bradley briefed the Council with respect to the choice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most desirable course of action in Korea, among those set forth in NSC 147, from the point of view of all considerations, military and otherwise.

(The record of General Bradley's statement which he read to the Council is filed with the Minutes of this meeting.[7])

General Bradley's statement indicated the necessity of expanding the war beyond Korea. General Bradley indicated that if a national decision were made to expand the effort in Korea, it would be necessary to conduct military operations outside Korea to achieve success.

General Collins took over from General Bradley and briefed the Council on the several phases of the course of action which General Bradley had outlined.

. . . .

The President then inquired of General Twining about the means of protecting our own units from low-flying Chinese Communist planes after the action had been begun.

It was to obviate this danger, replied General Twining, that the plan chosen by the Joint Chiefs contemplated initially the complete destruction of the Communist air force.

After further discussion of various military aspects of the problem, the President summed up the views presented by the Joint Chiefs as indicating their belief that if we went over to more positive action against the enemy in Korea, it would be necessary to expand the war outside of Korea and that it would be necessary to use the atomic bomb. His one great anxiety, said the President, with respect to this proposal was the possibility of attacks by the Soviet Air Force on the almost defenseless population centers of Japan. This, said the President, was always in the back of his mind.

General Collins replied that there was no clear answer to the President's anxiety, and added that for that matter, our own position in such places as Pusan and Inchon offered a very favorable target to the Soviets if they intervened with their Air Force.

---

[2] Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

[3] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

[4] For NSC Action No. 782, see the memorandum of discussion at the 143d meeting of the NSC, May 6, p. 975.

[5] For NSC Action No. 787, see the memorandum of discussion at the 144th meeting of the NSC, May 13, p. 1012.

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 838.

[7] The record was not attached to the source text, but see General Bradley's memorandum, *supra*.

The President next inquired the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to when we should have to begin to take the actions which would be required if the United States were to be ready to mount this operation, say, in May of 1954.

General Bradley said that we would have to begin at once to bring the ROK forces up to 20 divisions. We would also have at once to take steps to assure additional supplies of ammunition. This would involve cutbacks of ammunition programmed now for NATO.

General Collins said that the Marine division whose use was contemplated was ready to go. So also was the regimental combat team which would have to be made up from the 82nd Airborne Division. In a matter of three months from the time of decision to mount this operation, we should have to begin the selection and the movement of the American forces which would have to go to augment our strength in Korea.

The President observed that the quicker the operation was mounted, the less the danger of Soviet intervention. Everything, he believed, should be in readiness before the blow actually fell. He stressed his anxiety lest the United States become involved in global war commencing in Manchuria.

General Bradley confirmed that the Joint Chiefs were themselves convinced of the necessity of carrying out the proposed operation with great speed if it were to be done successfully.

There ensued a discussion of the disinclination of our allies to go along with any such proposal as this. It was the President's view that we ought at once to begin to infiltrate these ideas into the minds of our allies. If the ground were prepared and the seeds planted in a quiet and informal way, there was much better chance of acceptance than if we suddenly confronted the allied governments with a full-fledged plan to end the war in Korea by military decision.

There was general agreement with the President's point, and Secretary Smith said that in a sense he had already begun to plant these seeds. He has just called in the British and Dominion Ambassadors and made clear to them that the United States could not contemplate an indefinite continuation of the present stalemate if the armistice negotiations were broken off.[8] He also re-emphasized his views expressed to the Council earlier, that a quick victory would go far to sell our allies on even the most drastic course of action in Korea.

The President inquired whether, if he had conversations in the near future with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Mayer, he should not take the occasion to discuss this plan with them in an informal and exploratory way.

---

[8] See the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 19, p. 1052.

The trouble with this, replied Secretary Smith, was the prospect that Malenkov might very well issue an invitation to a conference before the President could.

In that case, the President queried whether he should not be the first to invite them all.

In response to this interchange, Ambassador Lodge warned the President that unless he did something quickly he was going to lose the initiative which he had gained in his great speech of April 16.

Speaking of the rumors of Prime Minister Churchill's maneuvers to secure a meeting of the four powers, and his recent speech in the Commons, the President wondered whether Sir Winston's faculties and judgment were not deteriorating.

Secretary Smith informed the Council that he would prepare a report to the Council setting forth the foreign policy implications of the military course of action which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected.

The President then indicated his anxiety lest the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff go any further than those who were in the room, and stated his desire that a record should be made of those who had heard the military briefing. It was agreed, however, that the substance of the Joint Chiefs' views, together with the State Department's political annex, should be made available to those who were to participate in Project Solarium.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the President stated that if the members of the Council agreed, he wished the record to show that if circumstances arose which would force the United States to an expanded effort in Korea, the plan selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was most likely to achieve the objective we sought. His only real worry, said the President, was over the possibility of intervention by the Soviets. He feared the Chinese much less, since the blow would fall so swiftly and with such force as to eliminate Chinese Communist intervention.

The National Security Council:[9]

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their choice of the most advantageous course of action for the United States to adopt in Korea in the event that current truce negotiations break down and it is decided to extend the war in an effort to gain a military decision.

b. Noted that the Department of State would prepare a political annex setting forth the foreign policy implications of the course of action selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that it was the sense of the National Security Council that, if conditions arise requiring more positive action in Korea, the course of action recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be adopted as a general guide.

---

[9] The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 794.

d. Deferred further consideration of the subject pending completion of related studies now under way.

Note: The action in *b* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 4. "Negotiations with Spain" and 5. "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

611.80/5-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

[Extract [2]]

SECRET NEW DELHI, 21 May 1953—11:30 a. m.

India, ST D-8

Participants: Prime Minister Nehru
Secretary Dulles

Subject: India

. . . .

8. We discussed the Korean armistice. I stated that our latest proposal contemplated the exclusive use of Indian troops to take custody of prisoners not desiring to be repatriated and that I hoped that India would accept this responsibility. Mr. Nehru indicated acquiescence. Mr. Nehru urged the importance of concluding an armistice, stating that he feared otherwise the fighting would extend. I agreed with his estimate, stating that if the armistice negotiations collapsed, the United States would probably make a stronger rather than a lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of conflict. (*Note:* I assumed this would be relayed.) I said that we were, however, sincerely trying to get an armistice and that only crazy people could think that the

---

[1] Secretary of State Dulles and his accompanying party arrived in India on May 20 as part of a 12-nation tour of the Near East and South Asia. For more information on this trip, see volume IX and the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1953, p. 707, and *ibid.*, June 15, 1953, pp. 831–835. This meeting took place in Nehru's office.

There has been considerable speculation that at this meeting Dulles passed a warning to the Chinese through the Indian Government that unless an armistice was agreed upon, the United States would expand the war. The best summary of the evidence supporting this view prior to the publication of this volume can be found in Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, pp. 416–420.

[2] Nehru and Dulles also discussed the following topics: Indian internal unity and economic development; India's relations with the Soviet Union; Chinese expansionism and the inevitability of a Sino-Soviet split; Indochinese border strategy; the convergence of Indian and Chinese influences in Indochina; the need for a high-level conference of world leaders to ease tensions; and disarmament. For a complete text of this memorandum of conversation, see volume IX.

United States wanted to prolong the struggle, which had already cost us about 150,000 casualties and 10 to 15 billion dollars of expenditures. Mr. Nehru said that he completely accepted the proposition that we wanted an armistice and not to prolong the war. I said that the problem of dealing with the Republic of Korea was one which apparently most people overlooked. It could not be overlooked because the ROK had a moral interest and also a material position which could not be ignored. If in disgust their troops stopped fighting, that could presage not an armistice but a great military disaster for the United States forces there. Also if they decided to go on fighting, there could be no armistice. That is why we had introduced the proposal for an immediate freeing of the North Koreans who did not want to be repatriated. This was strongly desired by President Rhee, and would make the armistice more acceptable. In fact the North Koreans had already acted in this same way as regards South Korean POWs. We were, however, still striving to find an acceptable armistice formula. We could not, however, abandon the concept of political asylum. That was something in which President Eisenhower and the American people believed strongly. Perhaps in this matter we were idealistic, but the one thing for which Americans had been willing to fight and die was their ideals. We did not apologize for this.

9. It was agreed to meet again the next day to complete the discussion of other items.

795.00/5-2153: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TOKYO, May 21, 1953—2 p.m.

3645. No distribution. For Alexis Johnson from Murphy. Your telegram 2707.[1]

Background information extremely helpful. Replying your request comment on how requirement unanimous or majority of four decison on substantive matters in commission would work in practice. As you know, while paragraph 24 UNC 13 May proposal was drafted in Tokyo, idea originated in Washington. It provides that custodial commission and subordinate bodies shall operate on basis of unanimity except in procedural matters; on latter by majority vote. I should add for your information that staff officers who drafted paragraph 24 are imbued with profound distrust India. These officers are persuaded that India, Poland, and Czechoslovakia will vote as bloc and that if rule of simple majority were adopted as proposed by Communists operation commission would effectively result in forced repatriation.

---

[1] Dated May 19, p. 1058.

In preparation UNC proposal obvious arguments were advanced that invariably Communists insist on rule of unanimity in international dealing except in rare instance such as present where it would work to their advantage as they hope control majority. However, apart from difficulty that five-power commission would be more cumbersome in its operation than a one-power or two-power body, I believe that military objection to majority could not be sustained if majority of four rule were adopted.

In my discussions with competent officers here I gather that requirement for unanimous decision would be most important on substantive decisions by commission relating to regulations insuring that no force or threat of force shall be used against POW's and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity (paragraph 3 UNC proposal); in exercise commission's delicate responsibility provide each side opportunity to verify or ascertain attitude towards repatriation of its captured personnel, and manner in which representatives are afforded access to captured personnel, and way in which explanation regarding return to homelands is given (paragraph 8 UNC proposal). If commission approves rules which substantively give Communists open sesame to high pressure brain washing POW's, latter will no doubt in time demonstrate that most are eager for repatriation with same zest defendants confess at Moscow trials. If that happens, UNC would later be accused of fraud and misrepresenting desires POW's these many months.

It was assumption in drafting UNC proposal that Swiss and Swedish votes under unanimous rule would prevent railroading POW's who honestly do not desire repatriation and that Communists would be in most awkward situation in view long record insistence on that principle internationally. I am surprised especially that Commonwealth should object on that score as Tokyo Commonwealth representatives did not seem to find unanimous rule objectionable whereas their views on political conference and North Koreans did not harmonize with 13 May UNC proposal.

On balance, I believe that if we are to obtain an armistice it would be better to adhere as closely as possible to Indian GA resolution but I urge Department be as firm as it can on cut-off date if principle of political conference is accepted as I think it should be. The thought outlined in your item 5 that we might accept open-ended alternative contained last sentence Indian resolution is open to attack on ground it abandons resistance to nonforcible repatriation.

[Murphy]

611.80/5-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Extract [1]]

SECRET NEW DELHI, 22 May 1953—1 p. m.[2]

India, ST D-8/2

Subject: India

Participants: Prime Minister Nehru
Secretary Dulles

. . . .

2. Mr. Nehru brought up the subject of the Korean armistice, referring particularly to my statement of the preceding day, that if there was no armistice hostilities might become more intense. He said that if this happened it would be difficult to know what the end might be. He urged withdrawal of our armistice proposals inconsistent with the Indian resolutions, notably the provision regarding Korean POWs and unanimity. He agreed that there should be some provision for ultimate freeing of the POWs not desiring to be repatriated, stating that it would be an "impossible situation," for them to rot away with no end to their incarceration. I said that our formula was designed to meet that situation plus the likelihood that the communists would not accept the Indian resolution that future of POWs be referred finally to UN Assembly. Nehru agreed that this would probably be unacceptable because of communist China's absence from the UN. He made no alternate proposal. He brought up again my reference to intensified operations, but I made no comment and allowed the topic to drop.

. . . .

---

[1] Nehru and Dulles also discussed the following topics: the Egyptian situation; Africa, anticolonialism, and Laos; Kashmir; Indian concern over Pakistan as a member of MEDO; and the conflict between the British and Saudi Arabia over British protectorates, particularly Buraimi. The full text of this memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in volume IX.

[2] This meeting took place at Nehru's residence. Later in the day, Dulles flew on to Pakistan.

795.00/5-2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1953.

Subject: Korean Armistice Negotiations

Participants: Mr. F. S. Tomlinson—British Embassy
FE—U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Tomlinson called at 8:30 this morning with the UK reply to General Smith's conversation with representatives of the UK and the Dominions on Tuesday, May 19.[1]

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the message from the Prime Minister stated that he well recognized the difficulties with Rhee and the Congress and that he was obliged to the Administration "for having gone so far to meet our point of view". The message stated that it was right that the revised proposal should not be put forward as an ultimatum. "Our object is to get the most advantageous terms by the process of negotiations". The Prime Minister stated that as he saw it the questions at issue are of three kinds. First, the point of honor to safeguard the principle of no forcible repatriation; then, points of substance (introduction of Czech and Polish troops and the time limit) and finally, those of procedure (rules for access to prisoners and voting in the commission).

On this basis the Prime Minister expressed the view that "we should stand firm on the question of the use only of Indian troops at this stage. But we should not go so far as to let Syngman Rhee's attitude be decisive. A possible alternative would be a commission of one neutral power—India—providing the troops. Alternatively it would be better in the last resort to agree to send all prisoners to a neutral state outside of Korea rather than have no armistice."

The message went on to state that the Prime Minister said that the position on turning over the Koreans to the commission was correct and that he agreed.

With respect to the 4 to 1 voting formula the Prime Minister stated that he agreed we should try the revised formula. He went on to state that while he understood the US difficulties he was "sure the Administration did not contemplate making this a breaking point if all other questions were resolved".

With respect to the terms of reference for safeguarding the prisoners against coercion and force he stated that we should "try for the best terms available" but that "these are procedural matters and should not be a breaking point".

With respect to the question of the referral of the disposition of the remaining prisoners to the political conference and, alternatively, failing agreement in the political conference, to the UN, the Prime Minister stated he agreed.

I told Mr. Tomlinson that I was naturally disappointed in the reply but that I would at once inform General Smith of its content. I asked that he immediately telephone London and obtain clarification as to whether the UK was committing itself to support a prompt resolution in the UNGA for the release of the prisoners to proceed to any available destination of their choice in the event the Communists accepted this alternative. He promised to do so and inform me later in the morning.[2]

---

[1] See the memorandum of conversation, by Johnson, May 19, p. 1052.

---

[2] According to a memorandum of conversation by Henkin, May 22, Tomlinson called the Department of State at 10:50 a.m. to say that he had telephoned London and received clarification on the question of disposition of the prisoners of war. The British Government would certainly sponsor and support a General Assembly resolution for referral of the prisoners to the United Nations following 30 days of unsuccessful consideration by the political conference. (795.00/5–2253)

795.00/5–2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1953.

Subject: Final UNC Proposal In Korean Truce Negotiations

Participants:
Mr. Ignatieff, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Campbell, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. Henkin, UNP

At 9:25 AM, Mr. Ignatieff called Mr. Johnson's office and left the following message: Mr. Pearson is prepared to accept the alternative proposal and agree to a private understanding that Canada would sponsor and support immediate consideration by the General Assembly of the problem of the non-repatriates through a resolution providing for the prompt release of the prisoners. This agreement by Canada was on condition that the U.S. would not insist on the other alternative i.e., automatic release of the prisoners if their disposition is not settled by the political conference. The message said that the Canadians insist that this new counter proposal should not be regarded as the breaking point.

In the afternoon, at 4:45 PM, Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell called and said that in view of our courtesy in consulting fully with their government, they felt that the Department should have a fuller explanation of the Canadian point of view than could be given in a telephone message. Mr. Ignatieff then stated the Embassy position as follows: Mr. Pearson has authorized the Embassy to agree to cosponsor and support immediate consideration of the problem of the non-repatriates by the GA through a resolution providing for their prompt release. This agreement however was made on the condition that having obtained this agreement, the UNC will put forward a proposal along the lines of the final paragraph of the Indian resolution and will not insist on automatic release of the non-repatriates.

---

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Henkin and initialed by Hickerson.

I explained to Mr. Ignatieff that what we had in mind would appear to satisfy this condition since we would put forward both alternatives simultaneously. We would tell the Communists that we believe the nonrepatriates should be released outright. At the same time, we would indicate that if the Communists preferred a reference of the problem of the disposition of these persons to the UN it would be acceptable to us. Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell seemed to agree that this met Mr. Pearson's condition.

Mr. Ignatieff then stated that Mr. Pearson made the following additional points:

(1) the Canadian agreement to cosponsor a resolution of the kind indicated must be considered as a private agreement and no publicity should be given to it.

(2) Mr. Pearson continues to believe that the Communists should be given advance assurance that they would be allowed to participate in the consideration by the GA of the disposition of the non-repatriates, since if this were done there would be no reason for Communists opposition to this plan, and that argument could be made to them.

On this point I told Mr. Ignatieff that we do not share Mr. Pearson's belief on this subject and we will therefore not give the Communists any such assurance. This question we believe should arise if at all in the GA, and not at Panmunjom; in the GA, I added, judging by our position in the past, I was confident that we would continue to oppose any form of participation by the Communists. In reply to Mr. Campbell's question whether, if the Communists accept the entire plan on condition that they be allowed to participate in UN discussion of the disposition of non-repatriates, we would continue to oppose such participation, I stated that that was a hypothetical question on which I was not prepared to comment at this time. We would have to consider it if that contingency developed.

(3) Mr. Pearson also stated that it should be made clear that Canada has not altered its fundamental position on the counter proposal as a whole. Mr. Pearson said "we continue to regard them [the new UNC proposals][2] as a satisfactory basis for negotiating the next step, but we cannot accept being pinned down to agreeing to them as a final position nor to support any move to break off the negotiations if the proposals are not accepted." Canada, he said, could not agree to be identified with any statement that these proposals represent a final position.

I told Mr. Ignatieff that the proposals we are discussing represent all the concessions that we feel can be made. Indeed, we are not sure that we can get public support even for these concessions. Further consultations with Congressional leaders, I said, have indicated very strong feelings on this subject on the part of certain members of Congress. I asked Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Campbell what further "give" there could be in our position and what Mr. Pearson had in mind in refusing to agree to this as a final position. Mr. Campbell stated that there was of course the disagreement on the voting procedure in the proposed custodial commission. However, if he understood his Government's position, it was Mr. Pearson's feeling that it is premature to talk about any final position until the Communist reaction is obtained to the UNC proposals. Mr. Ignatieff added that this government perhaps feels that the Indian attitude would be important, and that present discussions between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Nehru might be pertinent in any firm decision as to what the final position ought to be.

---

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Asked where matters now stood I told the Canadian representatives that I really did not know. We had been hoping to be able to say that our key allies have agreed to accept this as a final position if the U.S. made the concessions indicated. Since that is not in fact the case so far as Canada is concerned, I did not really know where we stood so far as making the proposals in question. In reply to Mr. Ignatieff I stated that while I had not seen the UK response the replies of the other Commonwealth countries[3] consulted went along with our position, and Canada alone resisted agreement that our proposal should be final.

JDH

---

[3] The replies of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa are reported in the following documents: memorandum of conversation, by Robertson with Spender, May 22; memorandum of conversation, by Robertson with Munro, May 21; and memorandum of conversation, by Johnson with Jarvie, May 21, none printed. (795.00/5-2253, 795.00/5-2153, and 795.00/5-2153, respectively)

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting[1]

[Extract[2]]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1953—11 a. m.

. . . .

Korean Armistice Negotiations

(At this point Messrs. Robertson and Johnson joined the conference.)

Mr. Matthews: Robertson and Johnson have just spent three hours with a group of representative Congressmen on our Korean armistice proposal.[3] Perhaps they might like to report the gist of the meeting.

Mr. Johnson: The meeting was concerned with the question of our instructions to Clark on armistice terms. The general sense of the meeting, very briefly, was that we should go to a position of accepting a majority vote for decisions of the Custodial Commission provided that our Allies agree to stand with us on detailed terms of reference for protecting the prisoners.

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."

Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason and General Gerhard represented the NSC, General Cabell the CIA, and Nash and Admiral Page Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 21 persons were present.

[2] In addition to Korea, Indochina, Yugoslavia, and Latin America were topics of discussion at this meeting.

[3] For the list of congressional leaders at this meeting, see footnote 2, *infra*.

Mr. Robertson: In general they were ready to go along on treating the Korean POW's the same as the Chinese, on the question of referring the problem of the POW's to the U.N. for eventual disposition, and on the 3 to 2 vote, but all providing that the Allies would stand with us on the terms of reference for the Custodial Commission. Originally there was some support among them for standing on a 4 to 1 system of voting, but when it came to the question of whether or not we should break off the negotiations if we could not get a 4 to 1 position, the majority of them agreed that we could not break on it.

Mr. Johnson: It had already been made clear that the English and Canadians would not support us on a position of a 4 to 1 vote.[4]

Admiral Fechteler: From my personal point of view it seems to me that the U.S. is going to maintain its principle of non-forcible repatriation but that if it goes along with concessions like this it will in practice let a situation develop in which all prisoners will eventually go back.

Admiral Libby: It seems to me that by giving way on all points of issue we are merely postponing the final decision. Agreement to a 3 to 2 vote is just putting off the evil day. We can't really negotiate our terms of reference which will protect the POWs. The Commies will wrangle around to terms of reference that will lead to a situation where the prisoners will not be protected.

Mr. Robertson: Three of the Senators felt like you do. The other Senators agreed that the important thing was to secure clear terms of reference. One primary difficulty is that of negotiating out our position with our Allies. Without their support we can't break on a 4 to 1 vote position.

Mr. Bowie: Aren't there really only two essential points in the points of reference, one of them being that all the members of the Custodial Commission should sit in on any dealings of the Communists with the prisoners and the other one that there should be a procedure for the prisoners saying that they don't want to go back. If the Swiss and Swedes are present they can always yell if they think duress is being applied.

Mr. Robertson: But if the Swiss and Swedes think that POWs shouldn't go back and the Commission is operating under a 3 to 2 vote, then the POWs might be sent back anyway. (At this point the discussion proceeded on a draft telegram from the JCS to Clark, which is attached.[5])

---

[4] For the British view, see the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 22, p. 1071; for the Canadian view, see the memorandum of conversation by Hickerson, *supra*.

General Bradley: On the first page of the telegram shouldn't we clarify the language to make it clear that we are referring to the General Assembly Resolution as it was adopted and not the Indian Resolution. The Indian Resolution was amended before it was passed as the General Assembly Resolution.

Mr. Matthews: Why don't we change the language to read General Assembly Resolution of December 1952 and then put in in parenthesis "The modified Indian Resolution".

General Bradley: My other question is that supposing the Communists agree to the general principles but don't buy our terms of reference. Are we going to permit them to drag out negotiations?

Mr. Robertson: Our feeling was that the terms of reference were just as important as the general principles.

General Collins: The language of this draft doesn't make it clear as to what terms of reference are essential. I should think we would have to spell out the terms of reference and that the last sentence of paragraph 3d should be omitted.

Mr. Robertson: We should also add the point which was brought out in the discussion with the Senators this morning that a certificate to the effect that a POW wanted to return must be approved by a majority vote of the Custodial Commission before he is actually sent back.

Mr. Johnson: Should we go through the terms of reference and pick out those that are essential?

General Collins: I think we should tell Clark just what he must put forward.

Mr. Bowie: I agree. He should be told from here what terms of reference we believe to be essential.

General Collins: The mere fact that we are debating here now as to what is and what is not essential indicates that we shouldn't make Clark responsible for that decision.

General Bradley: Have we gone over the terms of reference in detail with our Allies?

Mr. Johnson: They know them in general but we have not gone over them in detail. Maybe we had better go through the terms of reference now. (At this point Mr. Johnson read the terms of reference as they were spelled out in Clark's previous instruction.)

General Bradley: On the question of the number of staff assistants, it seems to me that we should say that what was essential would be that there be a limited number of staff assistants but that we would leave the determination of the exact number to Clark.

---

[5] The draft was not attached to the source text; it was transmitted in final form as telegram JCS 939673 to Clark, May 22, p. 1082.

Admiral Fechteler: Can't we leave the determination of all the essential elements to Clark?

General Collins: In fairness to Clark I think we should tell him what we think are essential.

General Bradley: On the point of having a UNC observer it seems to me that the Communists would balk on this. Is there any substitute that we could propose or assist [*insist*?] on?

General Collins: I think we ought to insist on having an observer.

General Bradley: If we do insist on it, it should be spelled out to Clark clearly that we consider this essential.

Mr. Bowie: I am not so clear myself on why a UNC observer is essential. What could they do? All they could do would be to yell if they saw anything going on that they didn't like. If the Swiss and Swedes are there they can also yell.

General Bradley: It might be that we should insist on either having the UNC or on having freedom of access for the press.

General Collins: I would agree to that.

Mr. Johnson: (Reading further from previous instructions to Clark.) The provisions that the Indians could secure assistance in the form of military personnel from the UNC if they desire it does not seem to me to be essential.

General Collins: Actually there might even be some question as to the legality of putting U.S. troops under foreign control.

Mr. Bowie: Just how would this thing work if there is a riot. Who would actually call out troops?

Mr. Johnson: We suppose it would be the Indian Commander. (Reading further.) It seems to me that the point of limiting the number of interviewers might be necessary but that the exact number should be left to Clark's discretion. Then there is the question of the hours of access to the POWs which the interviewers would have.

General Collins: The hours of access don't seem to me to be essential.

Admiral Libby: On the point of leaving the observation of the proceedings of the Custodial Commission to the press as an alternative to UNC observers, I think it should be pointed out that after all the press has no obligation to observe the activities of the Commission and I don't see how we could guarantee that the newspaper men would cooperate.

General Collins: All this discussion only convinces me that this is not really the province of the JCS. These are 90 per cent political problems. Right now a lot of people are saying that the JCS are responsible for holding up the Armistice and we will take the rap for it. But these questions are really not military questions, they are political questions.

General Bradley: To get back to the question of the UNC observer, I think we should put that as an essential position.

Mr. Johnson: OK, we will include that. Then we have already discussed the question that any certificate of a POW indicating that he wants to go back should be validated by a majority vote.

Admiral Fechteler: Paragraph f in the present draft is not clear to me. I think it will need redrafting.

Mr. Johnson: We will redraft that paragraph.

Admiral Libby: I have another question on the point of the admission of the press. How can we insist that it should just be press accredited to the UNC?

Mr. Bowie: I can't see that that would be a tenable position.

Mr. Matthews: I agree that we would be hard put to defend admission of the press on the grounds of freedom of the press and then attempt to keep out the Communist Press.

Mr. Robertson: Why don't we just make it that the press should have access.

Mr. Johnson: The points that deal with logistics, hospital services, protection of verifying officials, communications, etc., don't seem to me to be essential in terms of protecting the POWs.

General Collins: I have a question on paragraph 5 of the present draft which says that Clark should take measures to enlist maximum press cooperation in support of the executive session. It seems to me that that is ambiguous.

Admiral Libby: We have had no trouble with the press on previous executive sessions.

General Collins: Then why don't we just cut out that paragraph.

Admiral Fechteler: On page 5 Clark is instructed that if the Communists reject the UNC proposal to propose a recess until the following day. Will we be ready to have Harrison go back the following day?

Mr. Matthews: We will have to do some talking with our Allies as well as make decisions within this Government. I think the time period should be three days.

General Bradley: Can we have a drafting team get up a revised message and then maybe we can clear that by telephone.

695.0029/5-2253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1953—10:49 p. m.
NIACT

1663. Personal for the Secretary (eyes only) from Smith. Code clerk: When you decode this message carry it by hand to the Secretary of

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Smith and cleared by Johnson.

State personally, or in his absence, to the Ambassador or Mr. MacArthur.

After entire morning conference with Congressional group which met with you day of your departure,[2] with addition of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Judd, general understanding of our position and surprisingly general opinion on procedure was attained. This evening President dispatched following message to Prime Minister Churchill[3] and instructions to Clark which are summarized immediately thereafter.

Begin message from President to Prime Minister Churchill:

> "I have carefully considered your message[4] in reply to discussions which Bedell Smith had with representatives of H. M. Embassy on the Korean armistice negotiations. I feel that the position Bedell set forth was eminently reasonable especially in view of the fact that we are the parties who are resisting an unprovoked aggression. I had hoped his proposals could have provided the basis upon which we all could have taken a final stand. It is essential that a firm unified stand be taken if the Communists are to be convinced that the United Nations will never forsake the principle of non-forcible repatriation either in statement or in fact. Upon this there can be no possibility of misunderstanding. The matter has been thoroughly discussed and considered by members of my administration and with Congressional leaders in the light of your message. Although we have grave doubts concerning the conviction of some of the allies that we can depend upon a simple majority vote, we are prepared also to agree to such a voting formula for the commission provided that the terms of reference for the commission are such as to insure beyond any reasonable doubt that coercion and force will not be used against the prisoners. This is not a question of detail of procedure but involves the integrity of the basic principle for which we have so long fought and stoutly defended.
>
> The terms of reference and basic procedures which will be set forth by the UNC at Panmunjom on May 25 will be clear, simple and essential for the maintenance of the principle upon which we are all agreed. If an armistice is to be obtained upon any acceptable basis it will be essential that the Communists clearly understand that there can be no deviation from the essential elements of the position to be taken by the UNC. Any sign of weakening in our unity of resolve would again be exploited by them to the disadvantage of all of us. I am sure that you will appreciate that any failure on the part of our principal allies fully to support a position so clearly reasonable and fair and going so far to meet the views of those allies, would have most adverse effects upon American public and Congressional opinion at this critical time.
>
> With respect to Syngman Rhee's attitude I quite agree that we cannot allow him to dictate policy to our two countries. Yet I beg of you not to forget that Korea is the one place where we have an inspired resistance by the peoples themselves to the Communist enemy.

---

[2] This group included Senators Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper (Iowa), Knowland (California), George (Georgia), and Sparkman (Alabama) and Representatives Chiperfield (Illinois) and Richards (South Carolina).

[3] In telegram 7547 to London, May 22, not printed (695.0029/5–2253).

[4] See the memorandum of conversation by Johnson, May 22, p. 1071.

The Koreans are valiantly resisting in numbers that far exceed the combined contributions of all of us. The inspiration for that struggle largely comes from President Rhee.

I believe that a prompt public and unequivocal statement that the UK was fully consulted and fully supports the position which the UNC is taking in the forthcoming executive sessions would assure an armistice promptly, if in fact the Communists want one on the basis acceptable to us."

Essential elements instructions of President to Clark:

"Clark is to present in executive session on May 25 Korean time a final UNC position on POWs incorporating following points:

1. Maintenance present position on accepting five-nation custodial commission subject to all armed forces and operating personnel being provided exclusively by India.

2. Agree Korean non-repatriates will be turned over to commission in same manner as Chinese.

3. Agree that commission will act on all matters by majority vote.

4. Maintenance essential elements in terms of reference for commission to assure coercion and force will not be used against non-repatriates:

(*a*) Limitation on number staff assistants allowed Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland, exact number being left Clark's discretion.

(*b*) UNC observers present at operation of custodial commission and subordinate bodies.

(*c*) Limitation on number North Koreans and Chinese permitted access to POWs, exact number left to Clark's discretion.

(*d*) All verifications and interviews in presence of representatives of each member nation of commission. Requests by prisoners for repatriation be validated by majority vote of commission.

(*e*) Press be permitted access to all operations.

(*f*) Logistical support for prisoners to be provided by UNC.

5. Period of access to prisoners by North Koreans and Chinese to be ninety days.

6. Agree to submission to political conference question of remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination their disposition within 120 days (90 days access by Communists and 30 days for consideration by political conference) they will be released with alternative that if political conference does not reach a decision, question disposition will be referred to UN General Assembly. We will accept Communist choice these alternatives.

Presentation will do all possible minimize ultimatum aspects.

Following presentation negotiations will be recessed for one week. During this week Clark will transmit letter to opposing commanders reinforcing Harrison's presentation. Letter will be submitted to Washington for approval.

If on resumption negotiations following one week recess Communists reject UNC proposals, make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles UNC proposal or give no other evidence willingness reach agreement on acceptable basis, Harrison and Clark would submit their recommendations to Washington and if Washington concurred negotiations would be entirely terminated rather than recessed.

If Clark authorized to terminate negotiations this message authorizes him to:

1. Void agreements on neutralization and immunity Munsan–Kaesong–Panmunjom area.
2. Bomb Kaesong, step up air and naval action.
3. Release Chinese and Korean non-repatriates (instructions with regard to Chinese will be sent later to Clark but it is anticipated most if not all will go to Formosa)."

Also Briggs and Clark are being instructed to make a joint approach to Rhee to ask his cooperation and to assure him of the President's desire to do everything feasible to allay Korean fears.

SMITH

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1953—7:58 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 939673. From JCS for CINCUNC reur CX 62456[1] and C 62419.[2]

Part I.

1. Concur time has come take positive steps to bring negots to head and best method to attain this objective is to present our minimum posns on basic issues with air of finality.

2. As stated in para 3 *b* of DA 938571,[3] we did not consider ourselves bound by exact terms of UNGA resolution of 3 Dec 52 (Indian resolution); moreover, we did not consider this resolution forestalled our attempting to obtain better terms. However, it must be recognized that our vote in the UNGA in favor of this resolution leads Commies to conclusion that we are prepared accept principles of resolution and probably will not break on anything short of it. The tactics in the negots appear to bear this out. Moreover, we are under intensive pressure from our Allies to adhere closely to principles of the UNGA resolution. Under circumstances, believe any further attempt obtain agreement on markedly more favorable terms not only futile but also undesirable. Therefore, we now consider that minimum posn which we next propose shld be in general consonance with UNGA resolution. At same time under these conditions we consider it essential that terms of reference of custodial commission sustain the principle of no forced repatriation and insure that coercion and force not be used against non-repatri-

---

[1] Dated May 16, p. 1033.

[2] Dated May 14, p. 1022.

[3] Dated May 9, p. 997.

ates. If the Commies accept, we will have tolerable arrangement. On other hand, if they reject we will be in strongest possible posn to terminate negots.

3. Accordingly, PresUS has directed UNC set forth a final posn which incorporates folg essential elements:

a. Maintenance of our present posn on accepting a five-nation custodial comsn, subj to condition that all armed forces and operating psnl be provided exclusively by India.

b. Revise our present posn on immediate release Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of armistice so as to agree that Korean non-repatriates be turned over to comsn in same manner as Chinese.

c. Revise our present posn that comsn will act on basis of unanimity on substantive matters, so as to agree that all decisions of comsn shall be by majority vote.

d. Maintenance of all elements of present posn re terms of reference for operation of custodial comsn, which are nec to assure that right of Chi Commies and North Korean access to POWs is subj to conditions which will prevent use of coercion and force against non-repatriates. We consider folg elements essential:

(1) That provision be made that no force or threat of force shall be used against POWs to prevent or affect their repatriation.

(2) That there be limitation on number of staff assistants allowed to reptvs of 4 nations on comsn other than India. Exact number left to ur discretion.

(3) That UNC observers are present to observe operations of custodial comsn and subordinate bodies to include verifications and interviews as indicated in (5) below.

(4) That there be limitation on number of verifying reptvs permitted access to POWs. Exact number left ur discretion.

(5) That all verifications and interviews be conducted in presence of reptvs of each member nation of comsn.

(6) That there be provision along lines indicated in para 10 C 62385[4] amended to include provision that certificates submitted by POWs indicating desire be repatriated must be validated by majority vote of custodial comsn or subordinate body.

(7) That custodial comsn permit access of press to entire opn. Not considered essential press admitted to POW installations UNC area be restricted to reptvs accredited UNC. Present proposal in para 13 of C 62385 shld be amended accordingly.

(8) Para 14 of C 62385 providing for logistical support of POWs.

(9) Para 15 of C 62385 providing for cost of repatriating POWs be borne by detaining power in accordance with Art 118 of Geneva Conv.

(10) Para 22 of C 62385 providing that terms of agreement be made known to all non-repatriate POWs.

e. Maintenance our previously planned final posn that period of access by each side to non-repatriates will be 90 days.

f. To our previously planned final posn that we agree to submission to polit conf of question of disposition of remaining non-repatriates with provision that failing determination their disposition within total of 120 days of their being handed over to custodial comsn they would be released (i.e. para 3 *d* CX 62456) add the alternative that question of disposition of remaining non-repatriates, after same 120 days, would be promptly referred to UNGA with custodial comsn retaining custody of non-repatriates until decision reached by UNGA. We would accept Communist choice of either alternative.

---

[4] Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1020.

4. If we are to maximize possibilities of Commie acceptance, manner of presentation and public info handling most important. While it must be made clear to Commies that these are, in fact, our final posns, UNC shld avoid insofar as possible, the aspects of an ultimatum which would render Commie acceptance more difficult. We believe that this can best be accomplished by presenting our proposals in exec session, whereby UNC would be better enabled make clear that UNC posn is final while avoiding adverse effects of public ultimatum which would be inherent in presentation of final posn in open session. We further believe UNC presentation shld be from standpoint of using proposal of 7 May as basis along lines of UNC 13 May presentation. UNC shld avoid connotation that UNC proposal is counter proposal and shld avoid use of specific terms such as "final" "take it or leave it", etc. In proposing exec sessions the UNC shld make clear that purpose of such sessions is not to bargain as has sometimes in past been the case when one side has requested exec sessions, but rather to reinforce the solemn, non-propaganda character of the proceedings. If Commies reject exec sessions, UNC shld proceed with presentation final posn, but bearing in mind desirability of avoiding ultimatum aspects.

5. If on resumption negots folg one week recess (referred to in para 4 of CX 62456) Commies reject UNC proposals, make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles of UNC proposals, or otherwise provide no basis for further useful negots, we consider that negots shld be terminated rather than recessed, and agreements affecting the Kaesong–Panmunjom–Munsan area shld be voided. While we might at some future time be prepared to renew negots on basis of current draft armistice agreement and currently outstanding UNC proposals re POWs, we consider it undesirable for you to indicate that such might be the case. We do not wish place burden of decision to terminate either upon you or Gen Harrison, feeling that such responsibility properly rests in Washington. It is to be expected that Commie reply will be neither a flat rejection nor acceptance of UNC proposals and will require careful assessment before decision to terminate actually can be made.

Part II.

6. In accordance with foregoing you are directed:

a. At mtg scheduled 25 May propose exec sessions and submit proposal incorporating final posns set forth in para 3 above. If Commies do not agree to exec session proceed to submit proposal in open session.

b. Having submitted proposal, UNC will recess, unilaterally if nec, for one week to allow Commies time for consideration.

c. During period of recess you will submit ltr[5] to Commies as envisaged in para 5 of CX 62456, designed to reflect and reinforce approach indicated in para 4 this msg. Desire you submit text of ltr for approval prior to delivery.

d. If on resumption of negots folg one week recess Commies reject UNC proposals and make no proposal of their own incorporating basic principles UNC proposal, Harrison shld merely note Commie action and indicate such action poses a most serious situation which he feels compelled report to higher auth, and propose recess of 72 hours. You shld then submit promptly ur assessment of Commie reply along with ur recommended action. We will be prepared to act expeditiously.

e. On other hand if on resumption of negots folg one week recess Commies accept principles of UNC proposal or give other evidence of willingness reach agreement on acceptable basis, you are authorized continue negots within framework of Part I this msg.

Part III.

7. When and if decision is made to terminate negots you then authorized to:

a. Inform Commies, by means of ur own choosing and at earliest possible time, that agreements affecting Munsan–Panmunjom–Kaesong area are voided.

b. Undertake mil action indicated in Part 2 *a* of C 62419.

c. Effect prompt release of all non-repatriate POWs. Instructions will subsequently be transmitted you re procedures for release and disposition of Chi non-repatriates.

Part IV.

8. Re para 3 *b* above. We fully appreciate sit UNC faces with Rhee on issue release of Korean non-repatriates. However, immediate release of Korean non-repatriates upon coming into effect of an armistice, is not an essential element of our posn on no forced repatriation and has failed to comd any support outside Korea. It is not an issue on which we can permit negots to break down. By separate msg[6] through State channels you are being directed to undertake joint approach to Rhee with Briggs. Desire that on morning of 25 May prior to reconvening of negots you inform Rhee of action UNC taking in negots and undertake with Briggs approach outlined in State msg mentioned above. For security reasons we believe it undesirable inform Rhee that we intend terminate negots if Commies reject UNC proposals, although you might indicate that Commie rejection would leave little grounds for further negots. However, this matter is left to ur discretion.

---

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 1035.

[6] *Infra.*

9. Ref para 3 *c* above. You shld bear in mind that our willingness to agree to simple majority vote for all decisions by the cmsn is subj to Commie agreement on the essential elements in terms of reference for cmsn as set forth in para 3 *d*. Method of handling this in negots left to ur discretion.

10. Re para 3 *f* above. Assurances being sought from other UN Govts having forces in Korea that they will support immediate consideration of a resolution in UN calling for prompt release of non-repatriates to proceed to any available destination of their choice.

795.00/5-1853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1953—10:49 p. m.

723. Tokyo for Ambassador Murphy and CINCUNC. Deptel 713 to Pusan, 2694 to Tokyo,[2] Pusan's [*Seoul's*] unnumbered May 17[3] and Tokyo's 3620.[4] Joint State–Defense message.

Part 1. The President seriously concerned over deliberate agitation being developed by President Rhee against armistice. Korean *Aide-Mémoire* (Deptel 673[5]) represents particularly unsatisfactory situation which could seriously jeopardize US interests Korea unless modified.

While Rhee may be motivated in part from anxiety ROK future security, US Government cannot overlook fact Rhee's requests also stem his belief he can bargain with US at this time to gain his maximum conditions. The President considers it necessary President Rhee clearly understand there are limits on what US can agree to or tolerate. President also believes appropriate attempt should be made so far as practicable allay ROK fears regarding future security in effort bring about cessation ROK agitation and opposition to armistice agreement.

However, President cannot consider Rhee's repeated requests for mutual security treaty at this time for reasons outlined below. President is willing consider steps below if Rhee provides sufficient assurances.

Accordingly, President on advice State and Defense desires Ambassador Briggs and CINCUNC make joint approach to Rhee, as outlined Part II below, same day as next meeting armistice delegations at Panmunjom when UNC delegation will present its final position. President further desires Rhee be informed of final UNC position being despatched by separate message.

---

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Young, Emmons, and Johnson and cleared with the Department of Defense and the following offices, G, S/P, P, and L in the Department of State, was also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2740.

[2] Dated May 15, p. 1029.

[3] *Ante,* p. 1036.

[4] Dated May 18, p. 1048.

[5] This telegram transmitted to the Embassy in Korea the text of the *aide-mémoire,* which is printed as an attachment to a memorandum of conversation by Robertson, Apr. 24, p. 935.

Part 2. In joint approach to Rhee, President desires you strongly emphasize following points, making clear to Rhee they represent President's views. As broad suggestions for your general guidance in meeting the general purpose of this joint approach is outlined above. The use, order and manner of presentation of these suggestions is left entirely to your discretion.

(1) US fully aware ROK feeling of insecurity regarding future status and defense against aggression. US will do utmost allay these fears as in past, through years fighting side by side with ROK for its defense against aggression and helping build up military strength, economic position, and international status ROK. US fully sympathizes and agrees ROK desire for total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces Korea. US endeavoring conclude armistice agreement achieve such withdrawal through political means after an armistice.

Rhee should also understand that, in view long-term interests US in security Western Pacific, US will take strong stand against any developments from any quarter that affect political stability, economic progress and military security of free countries that area, including Korea. As Rhee aware, US intends maintain armed forces in Western Pacific on long-term basis, viz. Okinawa. Just as proximity of American forces to Korea at time original North Korean aggression was major factor stopping that aggression, in future whether or not large numbers US troops actually in Korea, proximity to Korea of American forces will clearly be deterrent to renewed aggression as well as major factor in US attitude towards and reaction to any such aggression. You can also assure Rhee USUN forces will remain Korea long as circumstances permit. US people are not prepared see their three long years sacrifice in Korea dissipated.

(2) President convinced that pending political settlement and establishment any wider system of security in Pacific area, armistice agreement itself taken in conjunction "greater sanctions statement" Deptel 619,[6] represents strongest possible guarantee security for ROK. It should be pointed out to Rhee that under Article 62 armistice agreement remains in effect until expressly superseded by amendments acceptable to UNC or by specific provision of political settlement. It should also be pointed out to Rhee that "greater sanctions statement" remains in effect for duration of armistice. "Greater sanctions statement" is, under present circumstances, clearly preferable from standpoint ROK security to bilateral defense treaty with US. Statement aimed directly at Korea's nearest potential aggressors for it plainly indi-

---

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 61.

cates hostilities will not be necessarily confined Korea. It has more tangible meaning than would bilateral security treaty with US for it is unprecedented international undertaking by UN members which will have profound effect discouraging future aggression Korea. Rhee can be assured "greater sanctions statement" will be issued by US and other signatories immediately upon conclusion armistice agreement. Statement will remain in effect as long as armistice and the President wants Rhee to know that we will not go back on it as long as it is in force.

(3) In addition to substantial undertaking for Korea's future security in "greater sanctions statement" US prepared begin discussion with ROK looking towards conclusion comprehensive agreement on military assistance and related matters. These would presumably include disposition USUN forces Korea; strengthening, training, and maintenance ROK armed forces; and usual administrative questions. Such agreement would represent further affirmative US determination provide continuing assistance ROKs in future defense Korea; agreement, however, could not be formally concluded until present hostilities terminated by armistice.

(4) US Government intends proceed promptly and vigorously in political conference attempting achieve unified, democratic and independent Korea and rapid withdrawal Chinese Communist forces. We will insist on continued recognition integrity and sovereignty ROK Government and will oppose any dissolution ROK. US intends consult with ROK both before and during such conference and confidently expects full ROK participation in it. You may assure Rhee we will not acquiesce any formal political agreement which leaves Korea permanently divided.

(5) We prepared assist development and maintenance ROK ground forces to level of in the order of more or less 20 divisions (plus one Marine Brigade) so long as necessary for ROK defense provided ROK assurances received of cooperation in armistice agreement and in future UN efforts achieve unification peaceful means. We are not prepared however make commitments expansion ROK forces beyond present level if agitation against armistice and non-cooperative attitude ROK persists, since such US assistance would be useless under such conditions. Rhee should bear in mind heavy US defense commitments throughout world and increasingly heavy burden these responsibilities upon American people.

(6) While US intends fully cooperate with ROK in strengthening it against future aggression, effectiveness such assistance will inevitably depend upon ROK willingness and ability cooperate with US efforts and ensure assistance has maximum effectiveness. Public declaration by Rhee of determination his government fully cooperate with USUN will greatly strengthen mutual position against renewal aggression.

(7) Before the President approves US opening discussions concerning political conference, mutual assistance agreement and strengthening ROK forces outlined paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) above, he desires receive from Rhee firm assurance that ROK will cooperate fully with USUN Korea. Such cooperation must include: (a) ROK will henceforth refrain from opposition and agitation against armistice and use its influence restrain all segments Korean population from so doing; (b) ROK will cooperate fully in armistice implementation; and (c) ROK armed forces will remain under operational control CINCUNC until US and ROK Governments mutually agree such arrangements no longer necessary.

(8) If satisfactory assurances not received Rhee should be clearly told US will be compelled take all necessary measures ensure security US and other UN forces in unfortunate event before or after armistice he orders ROK forces take unilateral military action and withdraws them from UNC.

(9) US has most carefully considered Rhee's April 30 letter to General Clark.[7] However under present circumstances the President cannot consider conclusion mutual defense treaty with ROK now. This does not in any way imply lack of concern over ROK security. It is simply that the following real practical difficulties stand in the way of such treaty at this time:

(a) If entered into under present circumstances, bilateral treaty would detract from UN aspects action Korea. It might lead some governments to desire reduce their present military participation in Korea, and to reconsider joining in issuing greater sanctions statement. Any weakening of effectiveness of this statement would be intolerable in view its great importance. Support of free world for Korea is support that must be most carefully preserved. From standpoint both of US and ROK it is vital UN remain seized with problem of Communist aggression in Korea until there is appropriate UN determination aggression ended. In view longstanding US dedication principle of collective security, it is important that no impression be created that US and ROK, through bilateral defense treaty, now consider UN as ineffective instrument against actual aggesssion in Korea.

(b) Formal agreement requiring Congressional approval would of necessity not apply to territory in North Korea not under ROK control, as Secretary fully explained to Yang April 8. It most undesirable from both ROK and US standpoints lead Communists believe US not interested in unification all Korea under free government, or acknowledge and give legal effect Communist control over any part Korea. Thus treaty not appropriate at least until results our mutual efforts at achieving political settlement Korea clarified.

(c) In view recent ill-considered ROK official statements re armistice and threat remove ROK forces from UNC, it now particularly difficult explain US people and Congress such far-reaching undertaking as represented by treaty. Such statements and continued agitation against armistice are undermining ROK position in free world opinion and cutting ground from under US efforts build up international support Korean security and economic future.

---

[7] *Ante*, p. 955.

When above difficulties no longer insurmountable, US will be in better position consider appropriate formal defense arrangements with ROK, provided assurances contained paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) Part II above have developed satisfactory basis for such consideration.

(10) If Rhee asks whether President, in view our position on treaty, would issue public statement similar his personal message April 15 (Deptel 653)[8] you may inform him that the President is willing consider appropriate way meet his request.

Part 3. The President personally requests that you convey the following personal message from him to President Rhee: "In view of extremely heavy load on free world in struggle against communism with which it is now engaged, we cannot be too arbitrary in our demands on the Communists and expect at the same time to retain the support of free people. I personally request that you accept my assurances in my continued interest in the economy and defense of Korea. For this reason I do not see how we can object to North Korean prisoners of war, who were taken with arms in their hands fighting against ROK and UN forces, from receiving the same treatment as other prisoners of war opposing repatriation. This seems to me particularly true since we intend to make certain that the Korean prisoners of war will not be subjected to any coercion of force and will in any event be released within Korea within a definite time period if they so desire."

SMITH

---

[8] *Ante*, p. 912.

Matthews files, lot 55 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, May 23, 1953—9:59 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

C 62592. Ref: JCS 939673.[1] This msg in 2 parts.

Part I. Part II of this msg contains the new proposal, consisting essentially of the terms of ref for the custodial commission developed in accordance with instructions contained in ref. To insure max scty of new proposal and to avoid possibility that ROK representatives at Munsan-Ni might gain knowledge of and acquaint Rhee with proposal prior to my seeing him on 25 May, Gen Harrison is hand-carrying to Korea copies of his msg.

---

[1] Dated May 22, p. 1082.

Part II.

a. Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes eff, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its cust who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of Article III of the draft armistice agreement. In order to expedite the processing of such pers, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total nrs, by nationalities, of pers to be repatriated dir. Each group delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepd by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or mil serial nr.

b. Terms of ref for pris of war custodial commission.

I. General.

1. In order to insure that all pris of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated folg an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be rqstd by both sides to apt a member to a pris of war custodial com which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those pris of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have elected not to avail themselves of their right to be repatriated. The pris of war custodial com shall establish its hq within the demilitarized zone in the vic of Panmunjom. Subor bodies of the same composition as the pris of war custodial com shall be stationed at those locations at which the custodial com assumes custody of pris of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the opns of the custodial com and its subor bodies to include verification and interviews.

2. The armed forces and any other operating pers required to assist the custodial com in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall also be chairman and exec agent of the custodial com. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal nr not to exceed fifty each. The arms of all pers provided for in this para shall be limited to mil police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the pris of war specified in para 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see para 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the pris of war custodial com and each of its representatives. Both sides shall have representatives with aprop representatives of the pris of war custodial com to determine that any pers who rqst return to the other side have not been coerced into making this decision. Pris of war shall at all times be

treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the gen spirit of that convention.

II. Custody of pris of war.

4. All pris of war who do not avail themselves of the right of repatriation folg the eff date of the armistice agreement shall be released from the mil control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within 60 days subsequent to the eff date of the armistice agreement to the custodial com at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. The locations specified in the preceding para shall be demilitarized by the withdrawal of the mil forces of the detaining side to a dis of at least 2 kilometers from the perimeter of the pris of war installation at the time the custodial com assumes control thereof.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of para 5 above, the custodial com is entitled to call upon the detaining side in the area under whose mil control pris of war installations are phys located, to prov such admin and scty forces as may be needed to augment the forces provided by India. Forces so provided shall be under the operational control of the senior off of the Indian scty forces.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of para 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the auth of the custodial com to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the pris under its temp jurisdiction.

III. Verification.

8. Each side shall be afforded an opportunity to verify or ascertain the attitude towards repatriation of its captured pers while they are in the custody of the custodial com. To this end, its representatives shall be afforded access to its captured pers to explain to them their rights, and to inform them on any matters relating to their return to their homelands, under the folg provisions:

a. The nr of such verifying representatives shall not exceed one per thousand[2] pris of war held in custody by the custodial com, but the min shall not be less than a total of 5;

b. The hours during which the verifying representatives shall have access to the pris shall be as determined by the custodial com, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of pris of war;

c. All verifications and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the custodial com and a representative from the detaining power;

---

[2] When the UNC handed the Communists this proposal at Panmunjom on May 25, there was one change: "one per thousand" was altered to "three (3) per thousand (1000)" (telegram CX 62621, Clark to JCS, May 25, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

d. Additional provisions governing verification shall be prescribed by the custodial com, and will be designed to employ the principles outlined in para 3 above.

9. Pris of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the custodial com and to representatives and agencies of the custodial com and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the custodial com.

IV. Disposition of pris of war.

10. Any pris of war who, while in the cust of the custodial com, decides to avail himself of the right of repatriation, shall so certify to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the custodial com. Upon execution of such cert, which is validated by majority vote of the custodial com or one of its subor orgns, he shall, while still in the cust of the custodial com, be delivered forthwith to the pris of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the armistice agreement.

11. 90 days after the transfer of cust of the pris of war to the custodial com is completed, access of representatives to captured pers as provided for in para 8 above, shall terminate, and ques of disp of the pris of war who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated shall be submitted for settlement to the political conf recommended to be convened in para 60, draft armistice agreement. Any pris of war who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disp has been agreed to within 120 days after the custodial com has assumed their cust shall be released to civ status, the custodial com ceasing its functions and being dissolved; (or, as an alternate solution: "Any pris of war who have not availed themselves of their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disp has been agreed to within 120 days after the custodial com has assumed their cust shall be promptly referred to the United Nations Gen Assy. The custodial com shall retain cust of these pris of war until decision is reached on their disp by the United Nations Gen Assy").

V. Red Cross visitation.

12. Essential Red Cross svc for pris of war in cust of the custodial com shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the custodial com.

VI. Press coverage.

13. The custodial com shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire opn as outlined herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the custodial com.

VII. Log support for pris of war.

14. Each side shall prov log support for the pris of war in the area under its mil control, delivering required support to the custodial com at an agreed delivery point in the vic of each pris of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating pris of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining power and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said pris depend in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The custodial com is entitled to call upon the detaining side to prov specified unarmed pers for the opn of facilities or the provision of services within the pris of war installations within the area under its mil control.

17. The custodial com shall prov medical support for the pris of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall prov medical support as practicable upon the rqst of the custodial com and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The custodial com shall maintain cust of pris of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such cust. Upon completion of treatment, pris of war shall be returned to a pris of war installation as specified in para 4 above.

18. The custodial com is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks.

VIII. Logistical support for the custodial com.

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing log support for the pers of the custodial com stationed in the area under its mil control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the demilitarized zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the custodial com and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the verifying representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of comm within its area, as set forth in para 23 for the pris of war custodial com, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vic of but not within each pris of war installation. The custodial com shall be responsible for the scty of such representatives within the actual limits of pris of war installations.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall prov trans, housing, comm, and other agreed log support to the verifying representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its mil control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX. Publication.

22. The terms of this agreement shall be made known to all pris of war who, while in the cust of the detaining power, have failed to avail themselves of their right of repatriation.

X. Movement.

23. The mvmt of the custodial com, its pers, and repatriated pris of war shall be over lines of comm as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the custodial com. A map showing these lines of comm shall be furn the comd of the opposing side and the custodial com. Mvmt of such pers, except in the demilitarized areas established in para 5 above, around locations as designated in para 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, pers of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken.

XI. Procedural matters.

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the custodial com. The custodial com, and/or any subor bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the custodial com, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The custodial com shall submit a weekly rept to the opposing commanders on the status of pris of war in its cust, indicating the nrs repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the 5 powers named herein, it shall become eff upon the date the armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at (   ) hours on the (   ) day of (   ) 1953, in English, Korean, Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Sgd William K. Harrison, Jr. Lt. Gen, United States Army Senior Del, United Nations Comd Delegation and Nam Il Gen, Korean Peoples Army Senior Del, Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

795.00/5-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET Moscow, May 24, 1953—1 p.m.

NIACT

1625. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Since time factor would preclude any possibility of a visit to Molotov having any influence on initial Communist reaction to new proposals, believe we should await initial Communist reaction at Panmunjom before definitely deciding when to see Molotov. Nature of representation would, of course, depend a good deal on Communist reception new proposals. If initial Communist reaction is not total rejection and week's recess is accepted, believe I should see Molotov as soon thereafter as possible Wednesday or at latest Thursday.[1]

In order to ensure that Molotov receives clear unslanted version of latest UN proposals, would suggest I be authorized to leave with him on plain sheet of paper the six points as summarized in Deptel 855 [2] which will be presented Panmunjom May 25. I would not, of course, include any reference to our contemplated action in event of refusal or other material contained in Department's telegram.

While I will make every effort here to keep visit to Molotov secret, there could be no guarantee on that score. It will therefore be necessary to work out what would be said to press in event visit becomes known and would suggest that, if necessary, I merely state that it was follow-up on my previous visit on protection cases (British Ambassador called twice on Molotov before receiving any reply to his representations on similar subject). Would also appreciate being informed to what extent proposed call on Molotov has been discussed or will be known to principal allies. Of diplomatic colleagues only British and French Ambassadors would present problem in view of tradition of confidential interchange of information with those missions.

In event Department authorizes visit in circumstances suggested above, I believe I should emphasize to Molotov the extreme importance and seriousness of latest proposals, pointing out especially the lengths to which the UNC has gone to bridge the existing gap and making it quite clear that these represent the extreme limit to which we can go. I would avoid all indication of threat but it might not be harmful to point out to Molotov that a rejection by North Koreans and Chinese of these proposals and consequent failure to reach agreement in armistice talks would create a situation which the US Government is seeking most earnestly to avoid.

I will, of course, make no request for interview with Molotov until specifically instructed to do so.

BOHLEN

---

[1] May 27–28.

[2] In this telegram, May 23, the Department informed Bohlen that instructions had been sent Clark on the final UNC POW proposal, which incorporated six essential elements. These elements were summarized in language identical to that used in telegram 1663 to Karachi, May 22, p. 1079.

Editorial Note

On May 25, Harrison asked that the resumed discussions at Panmunjom go into executive session and the Communists agreed. After a preface stressing that the United Nations Command continued to adhere to the principle of no forced repatriation and summarizing the major concessions the United Nations Command was about to make, Harrison made the proposal as contained in telegram C 62592, May 23, page 1090. After a recess of one and a half hours, Nam Il and his negotiating team commented on the proposal by asserting that the alternatives of release of non-repatriates after 120 days or submission of them to the United Nations, itself a belligerent in the conflict, were tantamount to handing them "to the control of your side." Nam stated that the other provisions required further study, and the two sides agreed to meet again on June 1. A record of the discussion at these sessions can be found in telegrams C 62608, CX 62621, and CX 62622, all May 25, 1953, none printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) See also Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 429–430.

795.00/5-2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, May 25, 1953—2:39 p.m.

250539Z. (Army message) From CGArmy Eight (General Clark) to Department Army Washington D.C. (for JCS), information AmEmbassy Pusan CGArmy Eight, CINCUNC and Secretary of State.

We met with President Rhee this morning from 10 a.m. to 1210, with Foreign Minister Pyun (Acting Prime Minister) likewise present. Rhee's response to our presentation was completely uncooperative. Instructions carried out to letter. We divided Department telegram 723 (2740 to Tokyo)[2] on basis contents respective paragraphs, this presentation being preceded by description by Clark of new UN armistice proposals. Clark also emphasized important security aspects re latter.

Armistice proposals apparently profound shock to President Rhee who declared them unacceptable to ROK. Attitude equally negative toward balance of exposition and proposals. Rhee reiterated disappointment at action being taken by US Government both on armistice proposals and position in security pact, although he stated he was glad President Eisenhower's intentions and attitude in present situation now clearly understood.

Although declaring repeatedly that armistice proposals unacceptable and that he could accordingly give none of assurances referred to in numbered paragraphs 6 (public declaration by Rhee) and 7 (three-point Korean assurances to US), Rhee requested this part of US statement be given him in writing, together with text of President's message, which was conveyed orally, on receipt of which he would make known officially ROK views. Inference was that pending receipt of foregoing in writing Rhee will take no precipitate step; this may, however, be wishful thinking, in which connection Department reminded that yesterday Pyun issued still another statement reiterating ROK will "never accept armistice leaving Korea divided and letting Chinese Communists remain in Korea".

---

[1] This message was transmitted from Seoul via Army communications channels.

[2] Dated May 22, p. 1086.

Rhee informed us after lengthy discussion of US position and Korean opposition thereto that he would now have to consider making separate ROK proposal containing following:

1. Immediate cease-fire.
2. Simultaneous withdrawal of all Chinese Communist and UN Forces from Korea.
3. North Korean POW's would accordingly be "no problem" presumably Rhee would order the release of non-repatriates.
4. Chinese would be turned over to UN Command for disposal as latter sees fit.

We believe Rhee entitled to written statement based on Department telegram 723, part II and will shortly transmit for Washington consideration text *aide-mémoire* [3] based thereon.

With reference to President's statement, request authorization give copy to President Rhee with one minor change in first sentence; namely substitution of "we cannot be too arbitrary in our demands on the Communists" by "we can not appear to be too arbitrary in our demand et cetera". Signed Briggs and Clark.

---

[3] The text of this *aide-mémoire* from Briggs was transmitted by Clark to the JCS in telegram C 62630, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) The JCS considered this a Department of State matter and the Department of State instructed Briggs to give Rhee the *aide-mémoire* after suggested minor changes were made. (Telegram JCS 939869 to Clark, May 26, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413 and telegram 730 to Pusan, May 26, 1953; 795.00/5–2653)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET SEOUL, May 25, 1953—3:10 p. m.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

250610Z. Refs: A. DA 939673.[1] B. HNC 1678.[2]

In par 8, part IV ref A, you indicated you fully appreciate the situation I face with ROK on issue of turning over non-repatriates to the five nation custodial commission. Separate joint msg from Briggs and me [3] gives details of our conference with Rhee today. In view of Rhee's completely uncooperative attitude, there is now more than a remote possibility he may, either covertly or overtly, initiate action to cause the release of all Korean non-repatriates. He has the capability, and should he attempt this action, there are few effective steps that I can take to counter it. Accordingly, I am bringing this matter to your attention, for such an eventuality would be most damaging to the UNC cause. It would be practically impossible to avoid charges of UNC duplicity, not only from the Communists but from our Allies as well.

---

[1] Dated May 22, p. 1082.

[2] Dated May 12, p. 1008.

[3] *Supra.*

2. At the present time, each of the nine separate locations on the mainland holding Korean non-repatriates has a US Commander with a small staff of US administrative and technical personnel. ROKA security battalions provide the overwhelming majority of actual guard forces. While there would be a better chance of maintaining control of the situation if these ROKA units were replaced with US troops, I feel any action to that end now would only irritate an already sensitive situation. In addition, it would be particularly unfortunate if US troops were employed in forceful action against Koreans whose only motive is to resist return to Communist control.

3. Yesterday, in discussing the overall POW situation with Taylor, Herren and McGarr (POW Commander), I pointed out the many possibilities that might materialize, including the action Rhee might take discussed in par 1 above. In order to alert key commanders concerned and to take steps to circumvent sudden action among the non-repatriates, I issued the following instructions:

a. McGarr will meet with each of his mainland camp commanders in Pusan today. After emphasizing that the information to be discussed will be held in strictest confidence, he will alert them to the several possibilities confronting US. Specifically he will tell them:

> (1) To make maximum use of every available source of intelligence within respective camps to keep close touch on the temper of the non-repatriates and to determine if any action is planned by the prisoners, with or without the assistance of local ROKA forces for [*or*] civilians.
>
> (2) Develop plans immediately to counter any possible action by POWs.
>
> (3) In the event it becomes necessary to use force in order to maintain control, normal riot control measures, including the use of non-toxic gases, may be used. Small arms will not be used directly against prisoners, and every precaution will be taken to insure that there is no loss of life. In my opinion this prohibition is fully justified, even if some non-repatriates do escape. I do not feel it is possible to use maximum force against processed anti-Communists without endangering the principle of no-forced repatriation or without causing strong unfavorable public reaction.

b. In addition, the normal orientation program in each Korean non-repatriate camp will include and emphasize the overall objectives of the UNC in the POW question. The following points will be emphasized to Korean non-repatriates:

(1) The UNC is continuing its efforts to effect a just and honorable armistice, but nothing in any agreement that might be reached with the Communists will change our repeated assertion that POWs will not be forced against their will to return to Communist control.

(2) Non-repatriates are assured that neither force nor coercion will be used against them and the UNC will protect their decision on repatriation, whatever it may be.

(3) After an armistice, non-repatriates may be confident they will be released in South Korea within a reasonable period, certainly within a few months, provided they do not, of their own free will, decide to return to Communist control.

4. I shall continue to follow developments closely and keep you informed.

795.00/5-2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, May 25, 1953—9:30 p. m.

251230Z. (Army message) Sent Department rptd info Pusan, CINCUNC Tokyo for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy. From Ambassador Briggs.

To assist State Department in understanding current ROK position, following comments supplement joint message today from General Clark and me summarizing meeting with President Rhee this morning.[1] This message relates exclusively Rhee's reception of exposition contained Deptel 723 (2740 to Tokyo)[2] since Clark may make separate comment on President's attitude toward UN armistice proposals. In this connection, however, it is my opinion that Rhee was so shocked by those proposals that this affected his attitude toward all subjects subsequently discussed. Rhee was personally courteous throughout session even though at times he spoke under much emotional strain. Meeting accordingly tense throughout, and various comments offered by Pyun generally unhelpful and sometimes provocative.

Taking section 2 Deptel 723 seriatim, Rhee's first comments were concerning "greater sanctions statement" which he proceeded to belittle, especially as allegedly far below bilateral pact in value to Korea. Comment included long attack on effectiveness of collective security via UN. President at one point declared "ROK made mistake believing democratic nations would keep faith". Notwithstanding efforts point out unique value and tangible meaning of greater sanctions statement, Rhee continued deny proposal has more than marginal utility.

---

[1] Reference was to telegram 250539Z, May 25, p. 1097.

[2] Dated May 22, p. 1086.

Concerning agreement on military assistance and related matters (paragraph 3) Rhee declared agreement this character has been discussed by us "since 1947 or 1948" and nothing effective has yet been done in that direction.

Concerning political conference (paragraph 4), Rhee indicated interest in and satisfaction with statement concerning US opposition to "any dissolution ROK", but with reference to "any formal political agreement which leaves Korea permanently divided" he charged US partly responsible for present situation by having agreed with Soviets on 38th Parallel division.

Paragraphs 5 through 8 initially evoked statement mentioned previous telegram that Rhee was glad President Eisenhower's intentions and attitude in present situation now clearly understood. He declared it would be impossible give assurances suggested and on contrary, he is now forced consider making public statement expressing disappointment at situation exposed this morning together with declaration of ROK intention to fight on, alone if necessary. "Withdraw UN forces and terminate economic aid—do that tomorrow if you must" declared Rhee "but even so we shall go forward alone".

With reference mutual defense treaty (paragraph 9) President did not attempt to argue against points mentioned but declared with reference last paragraph that assurances desired now out of question.

I then conveyed orally text of President Eisenhower's message. Rhee expressed appreciation of message but said he could not agree with final sentence concerning Korean POWs especially in light of long period during which they would be exposed to "Communist persuaders". Pyun at that point not only denounced lengthy period of additional detention facing Korean non-repatriates but also declared impossible protect them, within new armistice terms of reference, from coercion.

While Rhee's attitude was altogether negative with respect purposes visit, he conveyed throughout impression of burning sincerity and unshakeable conviction. He defended, at times with very considerable eloquence, his belief that by proposing armistice terms which fail meet "Korea's minimum requirement of withdrawal Chinese Communists" free world is failing solve Korean problem, by playing into Communist hands, and is bringing appreciably closer World War III. As to withdrawal Chinese Communists as *sine qua non,* Rhee in my opinion believes this passionately and steadfastly. He declared repeatedly that on no basis short of withdrawal Chinese Communists could ROK national aspiration be met.

Although *aide-mémoire* suggested in separate message should be submitted soonest in order that Rhee may have clear and unmistakable record of US position, I do not believe that this will significantly alter Rhee's attitude already adopted, described herein and in previous telegrams.

In fact, it now seems probable that at early date Rhee may issue public statement, perhaps along line indicated previous telegram, denouncing today's armistice proposal and reiteration ROK determination fight on alone.

795.00/5-2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL, May 26, 1953—7:55 a. m.
NIACT

252255Z. (Army message) Repeated information Pusan, CINCUNC exclusive for General Clark from Ambassador Briggs.

Following President Rhee's dinner last night (at which no business discussed) acting Prime Minister Pyun returned to house with me and for half-hour recapitulated Korean objections to UN armistice proposals. He described them as "new Asiatic Munich, except that Korea is not Czechoslovakia" and declared Korea will never accept them.

Provisions to which Rhee and Pyun take greatest exception are those having to do with Korean anti-Communist prisoners, including initial 60-day period while custodial commission is being organized, followed by 90 days of access by "Communist persuaders", followed by 30 days in custody of political conference, followed by indeterminate period in hands UNGA. Pyun declared this prospect when prisoners informed thereof would be so discouraging to them as to constitute powerful incentive for "large numbers loyal Koreans" to switch in order avoid more than half year additional imprisonment during at least three months of which they would be exposed to professional Communist intimidators and brain washers. He termed "proposal so bad it is really disguised forced repatriation". Pyun also resentful over what he described as "another *fait accompli*"; he in effect accused American Government of deliberately delaying informing President Rhee of latest proposals "until almost exact moment they were being made in Panmunjom".

Korea, concluded Pyun, is now like man faced with choice of two deaths. One is slow death of strangulation and starvation based on new armistice proposal and interminable political conference which will leave Korea "just like Austria" and the other, he said, may be of our own choosing, but quicker and more honorable.

It is evident from foregoing together with session with President Rhee yesterday morning that no US proposals of nature set forth in Deptel 723 [1] could possibly have prospered in conjunction with new armistice proposals. In fact, Rhee was so upset by latter that it may be doubted whether he took in full scope of related suggestions. In this connection Pyun again asked last evening for written statement summarizing US position.

---

[1] Dated May 22, p. 1086.

Granted that Pyun's exposition of Korean point of view was purposely set forth in extreme terms, it is, nevertheless, my impression from that conversation as well as discussion with President Rhee yesterday morning that:

1. Korea between now and June 1 may publicly denounce US/UN armistice proposals, declaring ROK will not be bound by them, and may offer alternate solution based on simultaneous withdrawal Chinese Communists and UN forces "leaving Koreans to settle Korean problems".
2. With reference North Korean POWs, I believe there is real danger of Rhee's taking some unilateral action with reference non-repatriate prisoners. During last night's conversation, Pyun came close to hinting some such action under consideration.

795.00/5-2653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1953—10:21 a. m.

860. Eyes only for Ambassador. Embtel 1625.[2] You are instructed to seek appointment with Molotov on Wednesday or at latest Thursday in which you should emphasize extreme importance and seriousness of latest UNC proposals, pointing out lengths to which UNC has gone to bridge existing gap and making it clear these represent the limit to which we can go. While avoiding indication of threat, point out to Molotov that rejection these proposals and consequent failure reach agreement in armistice talks would create a situation which U.S. Government seeking most earnestly to avoid.

You are authorized leave with Molotov six points summarized Deptel 855,[3] omitting subpoints (a) through (f) of numbered point 4. If Molotov raises question concerning elements considered essential in terms of reference for Commission, you should orally cite sub-points. You should make clear to Molotov that we attach major importance to inclusion these points in terms of reference and that we consider them essential to provide adequate safeguards against use of coercion or force against non-repatriates. For your information we consider maintenance of these points in terms of reference essential in view of concession of voting procedure for Commission. End for your information. You should make clear to Molotov that points left with him are merely brief summary principal positions taken by Harrison and do not attempt spell out details position put forward by Harrison.

---

[1] This telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared with Barbour, Matthews, and Smith.

[2] Dated May 24, p. 1095.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1096.

For your information, at meeting May 25 Korean time, following Harrison's presentation, Communist delegation confined remarks to attack upon provision for referring disposition of remaining prisoners to UNGA and apparently any procedure which will result in "release to civilian status captured personnel in the area under UNC military control" which "is to release them to the military control of your side and is thus to effect forcible retention by your side". Communists went on to state that to submit question to UN organization "which is a belligerent itself" is inconceivable and that the purpose of such a proposal would be to effect forcible retention. Apparent purport of Communist statement is that they will never agree to any procedure which results in ultimate release in territory under control of UNC of prisoners who continue to oppose repatriation. Communists stated they would comment later on other points UNC proposal. In reply to UNC suggestion for one week recess Communists suggested recess until May 29 and stated "we consider that three days will be enough for a study of your proposal" but agreed to recess until morning June 1. End for your information. Within your discretion you are authorized to make reference with Molotov to position taken by Communist negotiators and to state that as the U.S., its principal allies and the UN have made abundantly clear, if this remains Communist position, there is no hope of armistice. We have no desire retain any POW and will not do so. However, we will never agree to forcible repatriation in any form nor to what amounts to virtually same thing, the prisoners being held in permanent captivity with no alternative but return to the other side.

Only UK will have knowledge foregoing approach to Molotov. Therefore should not be discussed with French Ambassador.

Agree it will probably not be possible keep visit Molotov secret and event visit becomes known concur in your stating it was follow-up on previous visit on protection cases.

SMITH

795.00/5-2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, May 26, 1953—7 p. m.

4295. Repeated information London 212, Tokyo 47 from Mills. I saw Prime Minister at 11:30 May 26 (Deptel 2934, May 23 [1]). He said he had studied Embassy's May 24 *aide-mémoire* [2] upon his return New Delhi May 25. It would be difficult, he added, for him form final judgment on new proposal without seeing complete text. I replied I had asked for complete text and hoped receive it shortly. I added, however, I believed *aide-mémoire* outlined UNC position on principal point at issue.

---

[1] In this telegram, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to brief Nehru on the UNC proposal and provide him with a summary of the essential UNC concessions while emphasizing that this proposal was as far as the UNC was prepared to go. The Department of State did not wish the terms of the proposal to be made public, but Nehru

Nehru said he had instructed Indian Ambassador in Peiping to keep close touch with Chinese. Without quite stating so clearly, he indicated India might bring "gentle pressure." He said from studying *aide-mémoire* he judged there remained only one important point of difference which he considered procedural, namely what is done with those unwilling be repatriated following 60-day period of custodial commission. I pointed out new proposals provided for 30 days for political conference attempt deal with problem, following which we offered alternatives, either release or referral to UN.

Prime Minister talked at some length about differences in Chinese and UNC approaches to repatriation. He stated that legally under Geneva Convention prisoners of war should be repatriated but he could see problem went good deal further. I expressed personal view many Americans were greatly troubled by repatriations to Russia following World War I [*II*?] and moral aspect of problem certainly was big factor in US.

I recalled that in conversation with Ambassador Allen, Prime Minister had stated India did not want to get into middle of dispute but its role might be that of catalyst. I asked whether it possible and useful for India to serve as catalyst now. He did not reply directly. Trying another approach I recalled that in his May 15 statement to Parliament he welcomed Communist proposals as useful since they followed closely Indian resolution. I asked whether it possible and helpful for him make similar statement now regarding UNC proposals of May 25. Prime Minister referred again to fact he did not have full text these proposals. He then said in three days will be in London conferring with Commonwealth Ministers (he departs New Delhi 1240, May 28 by air).

Prime Minister did not bring up any of "difficulties" which apparently troubling R.K. Nehru (Embtel 4282, May 25 [3]). He asked, however,

---

might wish to announce that he had been consulted and fully supported the proposal or, alternatively, he might wish to make a private approach to Peking to the same effect. Either course of action would, in the Department of State's view, destroy any Communist hope "that division in the free world will lead to further concessions cutting into the principle of non-forcible repatriation." (795.00/5–2553)

[2] On May 24, Chargé Sheldon T. Mills saw Indian Foreign Secretary R.K. Nehru and gave him an *aide-mémoire* embodying the substance of telegram 2934. (Telegram 4263 from New Delhi, May 24, 1953; 795.00/5–2453)

[3] As reported in this telegram, R.K. Nehru raised the following points: China might not accept the change in name from repatriation commission to custodial commission; the Chinese might be unwilling to agree that India alone should provide troops to guard POWs; and Chinese leaders might find it difficult to accept either UNC alternative on disposition of POWs not repatriated. (795.00/5–2553)

why name of Commission was changed from repatriation to Custodial Commission. I replied I did not know but could not believe hidden motive of any kind involved.

Prime Minister most friendly but cautious and somewhat elusive. He appeared pleased that UNC had modified May 13 proposals. He talked at some length about Syngman Rhee saying latter and Chiang Kai-shek two persons ready bring on world war to gain their ends. I replied that Rhee naturally wished unite Korea. Nehru asked if there had been any decisions about composition and tasks of proposed political conference. I replied I did not know but assumed this would have to be considered when armistice concluded, that we must consider matters one at a time and big problem now is to achieve armistice.

I have impression that if he feels he can usefully take action vis-à-vis Communists, he will do so but not before he reaches London. I told him his Parliamentary statement May 15 without doubt had influenced our side and similar statement now might influence other side. He did not comment. He said he had learned Churchill would endorse new proposals and asked if this done. I told him I did not know. Later UK High Commissioner informed me he did not know why public endorsement by Churchill had been delayed.

ALLEN

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, May 26, 1953—7:08 p. m.

261008Z. References: A. Dept State 723 to Pusan (2740 Tokyo).[2] B. DTG 250539Z.[3] C. C 62630.[4]

Supplementing reference B. I made random notes of statements made by President Rhee and Pyun during our joint session in Seoul yesterday. Am passing these on as they will give you an insight as to the depth of Rhee's emotional reaction to our joint presentation. The notes are tabulated below in the order taken. Quotations attributed to Rhee are as I recorded them and are substantially what he said.

1. After I finished informing Rhee of our final UNC position his first comment was "I am deeply disappointed." He said the US Government

---

[1] This telegram was sent to Briggs for his information.

[2] Dated May 22, p. 1086.

[3] Dated May 25, p. 1097.

[4] This telegram, May 26, contained a text of the proposed *aide-mémoire* summarizing the exposition which Clark and Briggs presented Rhee on May 25, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

changes its position often and that we had paid no attention to the views of the ROK Government.

2. When reference was made to the "greater sanctions statement," Rhee commented that it meant little to him or his government. What he wanted was a security pact such as America has made with Japan, that the Korean people *so far* have been a loyal ally.

3. For Min Pyun commented that to permit the Communists to have 6 months access in Korea to the North Korean non-repatriates was tantamount to forceful repatriation. He added the observation that many of these prisoners would commit suicide.

4. Rhee said in effect, "please inform Pres Eisenhower that I am not agitating against an armistice, that it is the popular will of the people. The people will not accept these new terms even if the government tells them to do so."

5. Rhee stated, "please tell President Eisenhower Indian troops cannot come into our rear areas."

6. Rhee indicated, "we are at a point where we cannot drag along any longer. If the US wants to save democracy for the world, better do it now. Please do not let President Eisenhower disappoint the anti-Communists and democratic people all over the world." He continued, "the world requires leadership now. The Kremlin will think twice before starting World War III. Please do not disappoint the whole world."

7. Rhee continued he thought our approach was a weak one, that President Eisenhower must know his (Rhee's) point of view for the sake of the United States. "Now is the time, do not turn back and be weak. Democracy is going backwards. Some day the United States will fight alone. Do not wait for that day."

8. Rhee indicated he did not wish to disagree with our position, but that his country could not wait 6 months and then years for a political conference to be effected.

9. Rhee indicated this is not threat or blackmail. "We will die, we will go alone, one way or the other."

10. While we were talking in Rhee's office Pyun interrupted by asking if the new position is actually being presented to the Communists at Panmunjom at this moment while we are in conference. (He knew this to be the case.) He stated this was a threat. The terms would result in forced repatriation of Korean POWs. He said "we cannot accept. It is entirely contrary to views of our government."

11. When I told Rhee of the willingness of the United States to begin to discuss a comprehensive agreement of military assistance, he indicated he had heard this before back in 1947. If such an agreement is to be convincing to the Communists, it must be concluded now before cessation of hostilities.

12. Rhee said, "Please say to President Eisenhower, please let the Koreans fight on alone. It is the only way they can survive. This is my solemn request to President Eisenhower."

13. When Briggs indicated it was the intention of the United States to proceed promptly and vigorously in a political conference, etc., Rhee stated, "That's all right, but what would you think if Korea made its own proposal for settlement of the fighting by demanding the withdrawal simultaneously of Chinese Communists and UN Forces from Korea. (This has already been reported in reference B.)

14. When I communicated to Rhee the substance of paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 (reference A) he was deeply depressed, stating, "This is a great disappointment to me. President Eisenhower has now clearly defined his position. I cannot promise the President my military cooperation without unification of Korea." It was at this time that Rhee requested in writing the substance of our conversation with him, which has been communicated to you in the suggested *aide-mémoire*, reference C.

15. After Briggs read the message from President Eisenhower, as contained in part 3, reference A, Rhee made the following comments:

a. "One thing we want is the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists."

b. "It is up to the United States to decide the strength of the ROK Army. You can increase it or decrease it or take it away. These threats have no effect upon us. We want to live, we want to survive. Leaving the Chinese Communists in our country is impossible."

c. "You can withdraw all UN Forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us. We made our mistake perhaps in the beginning in relying upon democracy to assist us."

d. "Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstances."

795.00/5-2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

MOSCOW, May 28, 1953—1 p. m.

1646. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. I am seeing Molotov at 4 p.m. Moscow time today. In carrying out Department's instruction (Deptel 860)[1] I shall endeavor to avoid even oral discussion of sub-points paragraph four but if Molotov inquires about essential elements referred to, will state to him that they are administrative arrangements which we consider essential to insure the vital principle that no coercion, force or intimidation are to be used against non-repatriates and avoid if possible entering into details. I feel that attempt to go deeper into these points even orally with Molotov might lead to unnecessary misunderstanding since, for example, exact extent of General Clark's discretion is not entirely clear.

---

[1] Dated May 26, p. 1103.

In conformity with discretion given me, I consider it extremely important to make reference to initial Communist reaction on May 25 concerning ultimate release of prisoners continuing to oppose repatriation after operation of proposed process since this is probably most fundamental point at issue and Communist position certainly not taken with Soviet approval.

I will naturally take advantage of occasion to inquire of Molotov when I might expect an answer to the cases raised with him on May 12. I intend to tell Molotov that we will make every effort to keep visit and particularly subject discussed confidential and even if fact of visit should become known we intend merely to say that it was follow-up on questions raised with him during my previous call. I believe it desirable to have this on the record in event there should be any disposition on part of Soviet Government to publicize discussion in distorted form as was done in Smith–Molotov conversation in 1948. It does of course place upon us a special responsibility to avoid any leak concerning main purpose of visit. I shall make every effort to keep fact of meeting secret from press here and hope Department will do likewise.

BOHLEN

795.00/5-2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

MOSCOW, May 28, 1953—7 p. m.

1650. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary. I was with Molotov for half an hour this afternoon devoted entirely to Korean armistice talks (Embtel 1646).[1] Molotov was correct throughout and did not make any attempt to challenge or even question exposition of the latest UN proposals. He was however quite noncommittal as to the Soviet official attitude thereto and merely said he would inform his government of my remarks.

I began by stating that I had been requested by my government to draw his attention to the main points of the latest UN proposals submitted May 25 at Panmunjom and in order that my subsequent remarks would be clear to him I was authorized to give him an unofficial memorandum setting forth the six main points. The interpreter then translated the six points (Deptel 855 as amended by Deptel 860).[2] Molotov listened with great attention, occasionally interrupting for points of clarity and on point 4 regarding essential elements for commission merely inquired to what this related. I answered that they were certain indispensable arrangements for the operation of the commission and the administration of the camps during this period designed to insure that no coercion, intimidation or force would be used against the prisoners refusing repatriation in order to compel them to change their minds. On point 6 he expressed particular interest in the reference to the political conference and inquired whether or not the composition of this conference had been decided saying he could not remember offhand whether this was still an open question. I told him that likewise I did not have in my head the exact composition of the proposed political conference but I understood it was not a point of difference in the armistice discussions.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Telegram 855 to Moscow is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1096; for telegram 860 to Moscow, dated May 26, see p. 1103.

I then told Molotov as instructed that this was a most serious and important proposal. I said as he was aware the fundamental principle on which the UN had been operating was that no force either direct or indirect should be used in order to compel the prisoners refusing repatriation to change their minds; that the present proposals go to the extreme limit of possible concessions and it would not be possible to go beyond these limits without direct violation of this principle, which the UN was not prepared to do in any circumstances. I then went through point by point the nature of these concessions pointing out how far they went to meet the point of views of the other side. I strongly emphasized the absolute necessity of providing as outlined in latest UN proposal some means of ultimate liberation of these prisoners who after the established period and procedures continued to adhere to their original opposition to repatriation.

He did not dispute my statement that if at the end of three months the North Koreans and Chinese had been unable to persuade these prisoners by explanation and assurances to change their minds it was clear that only some form of force would ever bring about their repatriation. I stated and Molotov did not disagree, that to offer merely the choice of either permanent imprisonment in camps or repatriation was in effect the use of force no matter how disguised against these prisoners. I told him that I was drawing his attention especially to this point since the initial reaction of the North Koreans and Chinese negotiators to these proposals had been to object to any reference to the UN or indeed to any other method which would involve release from captivity of these men.

In conclusion I told him that rejection by the North Koreans and Chinese of these extremely liberal proposals and an insistence on the position that the POWs still refusing repatriation could not be released from captivity would extinguish hopes for an armistice and a failure of the present armistice talks would lead to the creation of a situation which the US Government was most sincerely and earnestly attempting to avoid.

Molotov inquired whether my government expected a reply to this memorandum to which I replied that it was not an official communication requiring a reply but for the purpose of directing the attention of the Soviet Government to the importance and seriousness of the UN proposals made on May 25. In this connection I made reference to that part of his statement published April 2 [3] to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in the achievement of the armistice in Korea and to my remarks to Voroshilov on importance of Korean armistice (Embtel 1504).[4] Molotov said he would inform his government of my remarks and he wished to assure me that the Soviet Government was indeed interested in the establishment of peace in the Far East. At the end he again reverted to the question of the political conference which would follow an armistice and said he would have to refresh his memory as to whether the exact composition had been agreed. He likewise inquired whether the negotiators at Panmunjom were meeting at present time and when I told him they were recessed until first of June he appeared to be doing some mental calculation as he remarked that today was the 28th.

He nodded agreement when I told him we planned to make no announcement of today's visit but that should the fact leak out we would merely say it was a follow up on the concrete questions I had raised at my last visit. I inquired at this point when I might receive an answer to these concrete questions and he said Foreign Office was still studying these cases and he had nothing to tell me today.

As usual with Molotov I have no grounds for even attempting to forecast what Soviet Government may or may not do in regard to these proposals. I can only report that he listened with great attention and seriousness and refrained from any form of propaganda statement or question or even any attempt to defend or support the Communist position. His reference twice to the composition of the political conference may be some indication of where the present Soviet interest lies.

BOHLEN

---

[3] Presumably this was a reference to Molotov's radio broadcast of Apr. 1, 1953; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1953, pp. 528–529.

[4] In this telegram, dated Apr. 20, Bohlen reported on the conversation he had with Voroshilov after presenting his credentials. In this discussion, Bohlen made it clear that success or failure of the truce talks at Panmunjom would be the real test of whether, as Voroshilov suggested, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could improve. (795.00/4–2053)

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET Tokyo, May 29, 1953—7:38 p. m.[1]
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 62727. Refs: A. CX 62406.[2] B. HNC 1678.[3] C. C 62143.[4] D. C 62592.[5] E. 8A 250539Z.[6] F. 8A 250610Z.[7]

1. In refs A, B and C, I pntd out the firm and positive stand Rhee probably would take if the armistice agreement should fail to take into consideration the views of the ROK Govt on such matters as

(1) Handling of North Korean non-repatriate POWs,
(2) A bilateral security pact, and
(3) Provisions for withdrawal of Chinese Communist trps from Korea.

2. Ref D contained my recms for a UNC final position which had been prepared specifically with a view to including the provisions I believed should be acpt to our allies, would in no way sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation, would not incur serious ROK resistance and passive disaffection, and would, if presented to the Commies in a sufficiently forceful manner, stand a reasonable chance of being acpt by them.

3. Rhee reaction 25 May and since to the UNC new proposal was not unexpected (ref E). It conformed closely to predictions contained in prev ref msgs. However, I am reasonably certain Rhee will take no action that will seriously affect the UNC capability of waging war against the Communists as long as the fighting continues. On the other hand, he has the capability of taking many other less drastic actions that can interfere with the UNC effort or at least prove extremely embarrassing to US.

4. Among such possibilities are the fol:

a. During the conduct of curr negotiations and any time before an armistice Rhee can:

(1) Take unilateral action to release the Korean non-repatriate POWs presently held by the UNC in South Korea.
(*Comment:* This immediate possibility is covered in ref F.)
(2) Offer a separate ROK proposal to the Communists, either at the conf table or by some other means: Such a proposal may include:

---

[1] Due to the time difference between Washington and Tokyo, this message was received in Washington the morning of May 29.

[2] Dated May 13, p. 1010.

[3] Dated May 12, p. 1008.

[4] Dated Apr. 28, p. 947.

[5] Dated May 23, p. 1090.

[6] Dated May 25, p. 1097.

[7] Dated May 25, p. 1098.

(*a*) An immediate ceasefire.

(*b*) Withdrawal of all foreign trps.

(*c*) All non-Korean POWs to be handled under the curr proposals.

(*d*) All remaining problems to be settled between the Koreans.

(*Comment:* Such a move could be made without our consent or prior knowledge.)

(3) Withdraw the ROK del and announce ROK unwillingness to comply with any provisions of the armistice if signed.

(4) Withdraw ROK forces from comd of the UNC.

(*Comment:* I believe such a sit can be controlled. If Rhee directs his forces to continue fighting, I can probably make a logical div of the front. Under these circumstances, I believe I can obtain reasonable ROK cooperation, including assurance that the UNC flank will not be exposed.)

(5) Initiate ROK inspired riots and demonstrations.

(*Comment:* I do not believe these will be directed against UNC forces or installations.)

b. On the signing of an armistice or any time subsequent thereto Rhee can:

(1) Withdraw ROK forces from comd of the UNC.

(*Comment:* With a cessation of hostilities and UNC and ROK no longer engaged in unified mil action, ROK units will undoubtedly look to their govt for guidance and direction.)

(2) There are several courses of action which the ROK may take in connection with the withdrawal of ROK units from comd of the UNC, among the most important of which are as fol:

(*a*) ROK refusal to withdraw from the DZ.

(*Comment:* The UNC can take no feasible action to force withdrawal.)

(*b*) Launch a ground atk with ROK trps.

(*Comment:* Such an atk would of necessity be limited in nature and for relatively short duration because of our control of the flow of ammo and supplies. However, it would be a violation of the armistice which could result in serious repercussions.)

(*c*) Use ROK AF and Naval units to atk enemy tgts, either in conjunction with ground atks or separately.

(*Comment:* Same as under (2) (*b*) above.)

(*d*) Conduct raids and guerrilla fighting.

(*Comment:* Concurrent with either (*a*), (*b*) or (*c*) above, sporadic raids and extended program of guerrilla fighting, using elements of 1 or all of the 3 ROK svcs, can be conducted for an indefinite prd. Even though limited, such action could eff interfere with our ability to carry out the terms of the armistice agreement.)

(3) Refuse or hinder admittance into Korea of the many foreign pers, particularly Communists, involved in the implementation of an armistice.

(*Comment:* This is a capability that will be most difficult to counter. ROK not only has a well organized police force that can be used to delay and interfere with the mvmts of representatives of the PW Custodial Com and Communist elms, but it can also launch propaganda atks and incite civil dmsts and riots that could be extremely embarrassing. This sit is obviously worsened in light of the guarantee the UNC must make for the protection of foreign elms while in South Korea.)

5. Either before or after an armistice, and acting separately or in conjunction with courses of action indicated in para 4 above, ROK can employ labor strikes as a wpn [weapon] to slow down UNC mil oprs. Almost all UNC elms in Korea use indigenous labor to varying degrees. Wide strike mvts through organized labor unions can seriously interrupt our log oprs and lines of comm, particularly ports of entry to Eighth A rear, in which areas the bulk of such labor is employed. There is a further possibility that ROK could withdraw or cause serious disaffection among KSC forces. By the use of mil pers, I can, on an emerg basis and strictly limited scale, offset the loss of indigenous labor support, but as you must realize, it would greatly reduce the UNC combat potential, especially if strikes were to cont for a long pd. We have plans to meet this eventuality insofar as practicable.

6. In submitting this summary of the possibilities which the UNC must be prep to meet, I must emphasize it is not done with the attitude of either an alarmist or a defeatist. I will handle any sit that develops to the best of my ability and with whatever force I believe is called for. My sole purpose in submitting these possibilities is to insure that my government is fully aware of them. Those of us who are in contact with key personalities in the ROK Government and have kept close watch on the devs of this increasingly explosive sit are convinced that the ROK fully appreciates its potential. Rhee's age, his strong feeling that time is running out, and his deep conviction that the contributions he can make and the actions he initiates in the near future will determine the fate and future of Korea are compelling motives which must be fully considered in analyzing the ROK potential.

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 29, 1953—11 a. m.

[Here follow brief and inconclusive discussions on the Greek offer of an increase of its forces in Korea and a French request for loan of a light aircraft carrier.]

---

[1] A note on the title page read: "Draft. Not cleared with any of participants."
Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Shepherd attended as well as Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Duncan. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC, General Cabell the CIA, and Nash the Department of Defense. In all 19 persons attended.

Possible Emergency Actions in South Korea

General Collins: There is one particular point I would like to raise before we get into Clark's general plans and that has to do with the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, General Paek, who is here now. Clark has prepared as an extreme emergency measure to take Rhee into custody.[2] My understanding is that Clark has the feeling that Paek has tacitly indicated that he would be prepared to back us if anything should happen which involves a split with Rhee. I have raised the question informally with the Chiefs and have sent a telegram to Clark asking Clark what he thought as to the desirability of having Paek return to Korea immediately so that he would be on hand if things came to a head with Rhee. Clark has replied saying that Paek has already had some difficulties with Rhee which, however, seem to have been cleared up but that to send him back before he was due to arrive would naturally arouse Rhee's suspicions. Although Clark feels it would be advantageous to have him on hand if trouble really comes, he thinks that on balance the disadvantages of sending him back early outweigh those of having him come back on schedule. I have now found out that Paek's plans have been changed so that he at present is not due to leave till June 23. I think there are two questions. I think it might be useful to send Clark another message telling him of the change of plans and seeing whether he thinks we should try and abide by Paek's original schedule and the other question is whether it wouldn't be useful for Paek to see the President. If he does see the President, I think there is a question as to whether it should be an open meeting or a secret meeting.

Mr. Matthews: We would have to fit it in to the President's dates. He is going to be away a couple of times in June and of course there are the tentative dates for the Bermuda Conference.

Mr. Johnson: On the question of seeing the President secretly it might be very difficult to keep a call on the President secret and if it did come out after an attempt was made to keep it secret, it would probably arouse more suspicion than if there had been a meeting openly arranged.

Mr. Matthews: There are two points of information I would like to raise. The first is as to whether the Acting Chief of Staff is reliable from our point of view. The second is whether or not we know anything about the content of the conversations that Rhee has been having with his Cabinet and the Defense Ministers having with the ROK Commanders.

General Eddleman: According to our information the Acting Chief of Staff would be more likely to go along with Rhee in a bustup than he would with the U.N. Also, Rhee is trying to set up a Provost Marshal separately so that he and the military police will not be under the Eighth Army.

---

[2] See the paper submitted by Taylor, Outline Plan EVERREADY, May 4, p. 965.

General Cabell: I don't think we have any specific reports on what Rhee and his Defense Ministers have been saying to their own people.

General Collins: (At this point Collins read a message telegram from Clark [3] in which he said that he thought Rhee's reaction to the U.S. message to him was not unexpected. Clark was reasonably sure that Rhee would take no action which would interfere with U.N. capabilities while fighting was going on. He could, however, follow a number of courses of action of varying degrees of embarrassment or danger. He could release the North Korean POWs; he could offer a separate armistice; he could withdraw ROK delegates from armistice negotiations; he could withdraw ROK forces from the U.N. Command; and he could stimulate riots or attacks on the foreign personnel agreed to under the armistice terms. Clark thought that if Rhee were to order the ROK forces to take independent action it might be feasible to divide up the front between ROK and U.N. forces and secure some agreement that would prevent the ROKs from uncovering the U.S. flank. If after an armistice the ROK forces refused to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, there appeared to be no feasible action which the U.N. Command could take. If the ROK were to independently launch a ground attack, they would probably run out of supplies within about three days. The ROKs might use their air force and navy force for harassment of Communists independently either before an armistice or after an armistice. This would be difficult to stop. The ROKs also have the capability of making guerrilla raids against the Communists, hindering admission of any foreign personnel to South Korea, of causing disaffection in Korean Service Corps on which the UNC was highly dependent, and of calling labor strikes which would interfere with the UNC operations.)

I don't think it is necessary to go into the details of Clark's plans,[4] but perhaps Eddleman could give them to you in broad outline.

General Eddleman: Clark takes as his mission the safeguarding of U.N. forces and his assumption that an armistice is concluded and that U.N. forces stay where they are. He deals with three possible conditions. First, that the ROK troops might not be responsive to UNC orders—second, that the ROK forces might undertake independent action against the Communists and third, that the ROKs might undertake action overtly hostile to UNC Command. Clark lays out a series of courses of action which he might take to meet the varying contingencies. The most serious ones would be to take Rhee into custody, to proclaim martial law, to have ROK Army authorities enforce martial law, to place dissident civil and military commanders under custody of those who are loyal to the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, and as a possible final measure to establish military government under the U.N.

---

[3] The reference was to telegram CX 62727, *supra*.

[4] The reference was to Outline Plan EVERREADY, see footnote 2 above.

Mr. Robertson: Under what authority would we take over the Korean Government? Wouldn't we really be putting ourselves in a position of being the aggressors? I would like to raise the question as to whether from a purely military point of view it would be possible for us to consider a course of action of just pulling our troops out of Korea. We might then talk to Rhee in terms of his holding up any action for at least long enough for us to get our forces out of there.

General Collins: It would be very difficult for us to get out if the Commies should decide to launch an attack while we were withdrawing. The authority for taking action against Rhee and the Korean Government would have to be purely that of military necessity. In taking such action we would have to consider whether Rhee was actually speaking for the Korean Government and Korean people and also we would have to take into consideration the reaction that we would meet if we decided to pull all our forces out of Korea. The real nub of Clark's plan, it seems to me, which we should discuss, is whether Clark should have authority to proclaim martial law, take dissidents, which would probably include Rhee, into custody, and proclaim a military government. Another question, it seems to me, we should look into, is whether or not it would be useful to give Rhee the promise of a security pact in order to forestall the actions that he might otherwise take.

Mr. Johnson: It would be most important if we did take action against Rhee that it should be done by South Koreans and that any military law or military government should be set up under the cover of South Koreans.

General Collins: In the last analysis it seems to me that we have three alternative courses to choose between. The first is the question of proposing a security pact, second is a question of authority for taking over the South Korean Government, and third is the question of pulling our forces out of Korea.

Admiral Duncan: The problem of getting our forces out of Korea is not just a military problem.

Mr. Matthews: That is perfectly true. There would be serious political implications if we gave up South Korea after having fought three years to protect it, but if this course of action were not militarily feasible, then we couldn't even consider it.

General Collins: We could quite possibly pull back into the old perimeter and then evacuate from there. The number of casualties we would suffer would depend almost completely on what action the Communists took.

Mr. Robertson: It seems to me that we must at least make it very clear to Rhee that his actions would involve him in going completely on his own.

General Collins: Personally I think we should be prepared to take Rhee into protective custody rather than try to sweeten him up with a security pact.

Mr. Robertson: It would be a question as to what we were taking him into protective custody for—whether it was protective custody while you took over the Korean Government or protective custody while we prepared to get our forces out of Korea.

Mr. Matthews: Would Clark call the military government, Military Government or would he call it a Provisional Korean Government?

General Collins: I think that Clark will try to do as much as possible through the Koreans. The main thing, however, is to get a message to Clark giving him authority to take what actions we think he should have authority to take.

Mr. Matthews: It would be highly important that any military government should be under ROK cover and whatever authority we give Clark we should emphasize that point strongly.

General Collins: I think we should frame an additional paragraph pointing out the necessity of doing as much as possible through the Koreans.

Mr. Matthews: Does your present draft of the message include authority to propose a security pact?

General Collins: No it doesn't, but I think we should discuss that.

Admiral Duncan: It seems to me that if Rhee is not brought into line we will be faced with the possibility of a disastrous military defeat. If the final issue between Rhee and ourselves appears to be whether or not we would give him a security pact it might well be worth giving Rhee such a pact in order to keep him in line. I have proposed to the Chiefs that the Embassy and CINCFE should be authorized to negotiate a bilateral pact if in their view it was essential to prevent a break with Rhee.

Mr. Robertson: When we talked to the President last week we talked about this very point.[5] At that time he decided that we would not offer Rhee a security pact. Of course he may change his mind.

Mr. Johnson: I am not sure that the President has been in the position hitherto to fully appreciate the capabilities of the ROK for causing trouble as Clark has laid them out in his message.

General Collins: I think we should have a brief paper for the President which would lay out the three alternative courses of action and then let it be up to him for decision. I personally don't like the idea of a bilateral pact. It seems to me that this would be an open admission on our part that Rhee has the whip hand.

---

[5] For a report on this discussion with the President, see telegram 723, to Pusan, May 22, p. 1086.

Mr. Matthews: However, the President should be enabled to decide whether he thinks it is worth it to prevent a break with Rhee and to secure his agreement to an armistice.

Mr. Johnson: It actually could be and really would have to be only a promise to negotiate a pact rather than the actual conclusion of a pact. We would have some time before a pact could possibly be concluded and could continue to use this as a pressure point with Rhee.

General Collins: I think we should get up a paper and present it to the President not later than tomorrow.[6]

Mr. Johnson: We will work on it with your people right away.

---

[6] For a report on why that paper was not submitted to the President, see memorandum for the record, by Eddleman, June 1, p. 1126.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953"

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 29, 1953—10:57 p. m.
EMERGENCY

DA 940238. From CSUSA for CINCUNC exclusive for General Clark. JCS have authorized me to dispatch the following:

1. Reference your plan "EVERREADY" [1] which was reviewed today, we are deeply concerned over current difficulties with ROK government, due to their dissatisfaction with armistice terms, and the possibility of withdrawal of all or part of ROK forces from UNC. This problem is receiving consideration at the highest levels of government.

2. Pending final action here, you are authorized to take such preliminary measures as you deem necessary to insure the security of your command in the event an emergency is created by any action of ROK government. Moreover, if a grave emergency should arise due to such action by ROK government you, as the commander in the field, are authorized to act as necessary to insure the integrity of your forces.

3. The Secretary of State, who returned today from the Middle East, and the Secretary of Defense will confer with the President tomorrow, 30 May, re the offer to ROK government of a bilateral security pact, and you will be informed earliest of President's decision. However, prior to receipt of this information, if it becomes advisable to avert a grave emergency, and if in your judgment you can effectively avoid it by doing so, you are authorized to give Rhee oral assurances that the

---

[1] For text of Outline Plan EVERREADY, see p. 965.

Secretary of State is strongly recommending to the President that we agree to negotiate a bilateral security pact with ROK government.

4. Your comments requested on urgent basis as to whether offer to negotiate a security pact with ROK government at this time would reconcile Rhee to an armistice according to most recent UNC proposals.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953"

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

TOKYO, May 30, 1953—9:02 p. m.

CX 62747. Reurad DA 940238.[2]

1. I note the authority you have given me in Para 2, reference message and I will govern myself accordingly.

2. With reference to the authority given to me in Para 3:

a. This authority might be helpful and I will use it if the gravity of the situation requires. However, it would obviously be better, if I have to use this authority, to make the firm statement that the President is ready to negotiate such a pact.

b. As to timing, I do not believe Rhee will take the more serious unilateral actions we fear without prior warning; he will threaten before he acts. Since we have delivered to him the *aide-mémoire*[3] covering Briggs and my conversation with him, he will, in my opinion, give careful consideration to the cold facts and circumstances fully and clearly stated therein. Certainly we should wait until Rhee's intentions are indicated, which I feel will not be before the Armistice meeting on Monday.[4] By that time Rhee will not only have an indication of whether we have changed our position but will also have an indication of Communist reactions. After Rhee's intentions become known, I will be in a better position to evaluate and analyze them and can determine whether and to what extent he is bluffing.

3. Reference your Para 4, to answer your question as to whether to offer to negotiate a security pact with the ROK Government at this time would reconcile Rhee to an Armistice according to most recent UNC proposals, I have the following comments:

a. If Rhee could be told at the appropriate time that the President is now willing to enter into such negotiations, he may feel that such action is coming late. Nevertheless, I believe it would improve our relations with Rhee and the ROK Government materially and diminish active opposition to the new UNC armistice proposal.

b. I doubt very much that this offer alone would overcome all ROK objections but it is certainly worth trying.

---

[1] This telegram was sent to Briggs and Taylor for their exclusive information.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to telegram 250539Z, p. 1098.

[4] June 1.

c. As you realize, Rhee and his government feel strongly that the Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war should be released on the effective date of an armistice; they should not be turned over to a custodial group composed in part of Communist representatives, and neither should they be guarded by Indian armed forces. Rhee is likewise adamant about hundreds of Communist "indoctrinators" having access to these POWs for a long period of time.

d. I believe we could overcome Rhee's objections to the access of Communist indoctrinators, provided the safeguards we have already insisted upon are agreed to by the Communists. I am not at all optimistic, however, as to his willingness to accept Pole and Czech administrative representatives on the Custodial Commission or to permit Indian troops in South Korea. These will be bitter pills for him to swallow.

e. As you know, I have continuously felt that Rhee's primary goal is a security pact signed, sealed and delivered before an armistice becomes effective. Such a pact, in my opinion, would not reconcile Rhee to the new UNC proposal but would at least diminish his active opposition. In presenting such offer to him, naturally it would be contingent upon guarantees that he will fall into line on the UNC armistice proposal and on such other matters as retention by UNC of complete control of ROK forces.

Murphy concurs. As Briggs is in Seoul and in view of the urgency, I have had no opportunity for prior consultation with him.

795B.5/5-3053: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT SEOUL, May 30, 1953.[1]

GX 5478. (Army message) Sent CINCUNC for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy, State Department Washington DC from Briggs. Re Deptel 744 (to Pusan) repeated Tokyo 2804.[2]

Whether President Rhee would be reconciled to armistice by last-minute offer to negotiate bilateral security pact can only be answered by Rhee himself, who would be weighing disadvantages (to him) of armistice based on May 25 UN proposal against advantages of US-ROK security pact, on which he has placed such importance in past. If pact had been offered to him earlier, in conjunction with assurances re economic and military aid and satisfactory consultation on armistice and political negotiation, I would have had reasonable confidence in his willingness and ability to accept an armistice, on somewhat modified basis. In light of events of past two weeks however, and in particular presentation May 25 proposal without any prior consultation with ROK, I doubt whether Rhee would now accept armistice without significant changes especially concerning non-repatriated North Korean prisoners. Obviously our willingness to negotiate mutual security pact (notwithstanding statements to contrary contained in *aide-mémoire* handed Rhee May 27) would be major step in direction acceptance Rhee's basic objectives for Korea, but situation—whole situation—was greatly changed by May 25 proposal.

---

[1] There was no indication on the source text when this message was sent; it was received at the Department of State at 2:51 p.m., May 30.

[2] In this telegram, May 29, Briggs was urgently requested to inform the Department whether in his judgment an offer to negotiate a bilateral security pact would reconcile Rhee to the armistice. (795B.5/5-2953)

Furthermore, question arises whether Rhee might regard this as bargaining, piecemeal approach, encouraging him to renewed insistence on modifying armistice proposal.

We recognize that last sentence of General Choe's May 28 letter to General Harrison (CINCUNC's CX 62717 to DeptAr [3]) leaves opening for Rhee to change his position. Conceivably offer to negotiate bilateral security pact coupled with other inducements contained May 27 *aide-mémoire* might sway him (especially if fortified by firm statement of amount of economic aid to be made available), but my judgment at moment is that May 25 UN armistice proposal remains decisive point in Rhee's thinking, and that some modification of that proposal would be essential element in any settlement with him.

I favor awaiting Communist reply June 1 before deciding whether to reopen question with Rhee. If Communists do not accept UN proposal, we should be prepared to move fast in capitalizing on that fact.

---

[3] In this letter to Harrison, ROK Delegate Major General Choi Duk Shin explained by means of a long policy statement opposing the UNC proposal of May 25 why he had abstained from attending the May 15 session at Panmunjom. The last sentence of the letter read: "In conclusion I wish to make clear the opinions expressed in this letter are from my personal point of view." Telegram CX 62717 is in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953"

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)[1]

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1953—3:16 p. m.

DA 940241. From CSUSA for CINCUNC exclusive for General Clark. Pass to US Ambassador, Pusan exclusive for Amb Briggs. The following are joint State–Defense instructions:

1. The President has authorized you and Briggs to inform Rhee that US is prepared immediately to undertake negotiations for a mutual defense treaty with the ROK along lines of Philippine and ANZUS treaties which insofar as the ROK is concerned would cover the area now or hereafter under the administrative control of the ROK. Other as-

---

[1] For the events leading to the drafting of this and subsequent telegram DA 940242, see memorandum for the record by Eddleman, June 1, p. 1126.

pects of the treaty would require amplification as the negotiations progress. We are agreeable to negotiate either in Korea or in Washington.

2. Our willingness to negotiate and enter into such a treaty is subject to receiving the following assurances from Rhee:

a. The Korean Govt will refrain from opposition to and agitation against an armistice along the lines presently proposed by the UNC and use its influence to restrain the Korean population from engaging in such agitation and opposition.

b. The ROK will cooperate in the implementation of an armistice agreement.

c. The armed forces of the ROK will remain under operational control of CINCUNC until US and ROK mutually agree such arrangements no longer necessary.

3. Upon receipt of such firm assurances the US will be prepared immediately to undertake formal negotiations.

4. The ROK must understand that conclusion of such a treaty is subject to US constitutional processes requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. ROK cooperation with the UNC will undoubtedly be a major factor in the attitude of the Senate toward ratification of any such treaty.

5. Insofar as the armistice is concerned you can assure Rhee that there will be no departure from the principles set forth by the UNC Delegation at the 25 May meeting.

6. In presenting this matter to Rhee you should state that US continues to consider the "Greater Sanctions Statement" by 16 members of the UN, including the US, meets the actual security needs of the ROK. If, however, Rhee feels that a mutual defense treaty has greater dignity and assures ROK status in future developing Pacific security system, US is agreeable to enter into such an arrangement in addition to issuance of the "Greater Sanctions Statement."

7. Timing of approach to Rhee is left to your discretion.

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953"

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
EMERGENCY

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1953—3:31 p. m.

DA 940242. From CSUSA for CINCUNC exclusive for Gen Clark ref our DA 940238 [1] and your CX 62747. [2] JCS have authorized me to transmit following:

---

[1] Dated May 29, p. 1119.

[2] Dated May 30, p. 1120.

1. Consideration has just been given to current difficulties with ROK Government and your plan "EVERREADY".

2. We cannot concur with any action on your part which would establish a UNC military government in ROK. However in event of internal ROK political or military disaffection against present ROK Government, you as the responsible military commander will take whatever other steps you deem appropriate to safeguard the integrity and security of your forces.

3. Instructions re the offer to Rhee of a bilateral security pact are contained in separate radio [3] dispatched simultaneously.

---

[3] Telegram DA 940241, *supra.*

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower [1]

TOP SECRET — SEOUL, May 30, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have recently had the honor of receiving several messages from Your Excellency, some oral and some written, through General Clark and Ambassador Briggs, and, as a result, come to be fully cognizant of your intention to settle the war in Korea by means of an armistice. I have given them full study and attention. I earnestly wish I could see my way clear to make a public statement, as requested, pledging to accept any armistice you may deem necessary. But we are fearfully aware, on the other hand, that to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, in terms of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence without protest. It is a hard thing for a nation to do. Furthermore, even if I personally agree to such an arrangement, it will not help the matter very much, as subsequent developments, I fear, will show.

It seems at once appropriate and opportune for us, therefore, to make a proposal now for the consideration of the United Nations and the Communist negotiators. Communists made their proposals; so did the United Nations. The Government of the Republic of Korea, however, has been patiently waiting all this while for them to discuss the matter fully among themselves. None of these proposals from other sides has proved to be acceptable to all and consequently there has come about a stalemate in negotiation, in addition to this stalemated war. Whatever academic arguments there may be against it, we cannot but feel that rough and rudimental justice calls for Korea making one first and last proposal on its own part.

From our own point of view, the Korean problem which the United Nations started to settle by military means when they sent their armed forces to Korea to fight the Communists and kept on fighting for three years should be settled by punishing the aggressors, unifying Korea and thus firmly establishing the collective security of all free nations. This would be honorable and just for all concerned and alone would force the war makers to abandon their ambition to conquer the world. However, we have found, to our great disappointment, the new United Nations proposal to be of such an appeasing nature that it cannot avoid the appearance of surrender and that that, in turn, will lead to a great disaster to all. We are forced, therefore, to propose something which may not be fraught with such a danger.

---

[1] The text of this letter was initially sent to Washington in telegram 1382 from Pusan, June 2, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–253)

Meanwhile, I am sure you have been fully informed of it, for I mentioned it to General Clark and Ambassador Briggs the other day, asking them to present my view of the matter to you. I told them further that I would not publicly announce it until I heard from them. I take it for granted, however, that you would not mind, if I released it now. I am going to write down here what I orally said to them by way of confirming it. There are, of course, certain detail matters to be worked out satisfactorily in order to safeguard the fruit of our common efforts so far made from dissipation. I submit the following as a rough outline of what we propose as something to be preferred to any arrangement leaving Korea divided and letting the Chinese Communists stay on in Korea.

We propose a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Communist and United Nations forces from Korea, on the condition that a mutual defense pact between our two governments precede it. The Communist puppet regime in north Korea has a military pact, I understand, with Red China, while the latter has another with Soviet Union. Korea has nothing to counteract the formidable impact of this series of Communist military copulations. We sincerely believe that once when both parties agree to see this primary need and the danger from the absence of its satisfaction, the difficulties, mostly academic in our view, that seem to discourage such a pact will vanish or, at least, can be brushed aside with much reason and wisdom.

The Mutual Defense Pact will, we earnestly hope, cover the following points, among others to be agreed upon by both sides.

The United States will agree to come to our military aid and assistance immediately without any consultation or conference with any nation or nations, if and when an enemy nation or nations resume aggressive activities against the Korean Peninsula.

The Security Pact should include the United States help in the increase of the ROK armed forces. If we come to agree with the Soviets to refrain from building up the defense forces on both sides, our hands will be tied while the Soviet continue to do it anyway.

Adequate supplies of arms, ammunition and general logistic materials will be given Korea with a view to making it strong enough to defend itself without needing American soldiers to fight in Korea again.

The United States air and naval forces will remain where they are now so as to deter the enemy from attempting another aggression.

In case the idea of simultaneous withdrawal is found unacceptable to either or both of the negotiating parties, I beg you to allow the Koreans to continue the fighting, for this is the universal preference of the Korean people to any divisive armistice or peace. Our first choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have our allies by our side to actively help us fight out our common issue. But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather wish to have the right of self-determination to decide the issue ourselves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it is beyond question that we cannot any longer survive a stalemate of division.

Let me assure Your Excellency that the defense of the United States is as dear to us as is that of our own, for the ultimate safety or security of the whole free world hangs upon that of the United States. For this reason, we even resent the so-called unity of the free nations, some of whom do urge the United States to join in their appeasement policy. These nations do not realize where they stand in this global struggle between Democracy and Communism.

Due to the lack of a firm and steady policy on the part of the free world, we have lost already too many nations to the Soviets. The longer this policy continues, the more free nations will be forced to join with the enemy of Democracy. To disappoint the Koreans is to disappoint most of the anti-Communist elements everywhere. The United States will in the end find itself a democratic oasis in a Communist desert. I trust that the people of America will never sell out their freedom and democratic institutions at the price of peace.

Action, not words, will deter the world aggressor.

Our prayers are unwaveringly behind every effort of yours to pull through an effective action against the enemy, in spite of the difficulties that surround you.

Most sincerely yours, SYNGMAN RHEE

JCS files

Memorandum for the Record, Prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army (Eddleman)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 1, 1953.

Subject: Conference on the Current Difficulties with the ROK Government due to Their Dissatisfaction with Armistice Terms

1. At a State–JCS meeting on 29 May 1953,[1] convened primarily for the purpose of discussing the current difficulties with President Rhee

---

[1] See the memorandum of discussion, May 29, p. 1114.

and his ROK Government, due to their dissatisfaction with the latest UNC proposals for an armistice with the Communists, and to consider Plan "EVERREADY" submitted by General Clark,[2] a joint decision was reached to prepare a memorandum for the President setting forth the situation and the steps which General Clark proposed to take to meet any emergencies arising therefrom. In addition to the normal State–JCS attendance, Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was among others present. The memorandum for the President, with a covering memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, is attached as Inclosure "A".[3]

2. The above-mentioned memorandum was presented separately to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in the late afternoon of 29 May and neither of them concurred in it as written. As an interim measure it was agreed between State and Defense to dispatch a cable to General Clark informing him in essence that: The seriousness of the situation was appreciated and would be presented to the President on 30 May; he was authorized to take preliminary measures to meet any threatened emergency resulting from difficulties with the ROK Government; in event of a grave emergency he was authorized to take such action as he deemed necessary to insure the integrity of his forces. He was authorized to inform Rhee that the Secretary of State would strongly recommend to the President that the U.S. agree to negotiate a bilateral security pact with the ROK Government. This latter authority was to be used at his discretion if it appeared that, by so informing Rhee, he could avoid a dangerous and provocative situation. In addition, General Clark was asked to comment on whether the offer to negotiate such a pact at this time would reconcile Rhee to an armistice according to most recent UNC proposals. This radio (DA 940238[4]) was dispatched to General Clark near midnight of 29 May.

3. The reply (DA IN 272275) to the above-mentioned radio was received from General Clark early on 30 May.[5] In it he commented on the merits of informing Rhee of our willingness to enter into a bilateral security pact with the ROK Government and Rhee's possible reaction thereto. He also commented on the feeling of Rhee and his government toward giving Communists access to Korean non-repatriate POWs.

4. A meeting for the purpose of discussing the subject of the bilateral security agreement was convened in the office of the Secretary of State at 1100, 30 May, and was attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, representing the JCS, the Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far

---

[2] Printed as a paper submitted by Taylor, May 4, p. 965.

[3] Not found attached.

[4] Dated May 29, p. 1119.

[5] Printed as CINCFE telegram CX 62747, May 30, p. 1120.

Eastern Affairs, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, U.S. Army, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State, and Mr. C. A. Sullivan, OSD. At this conference it was agreed that General Clark should be notified that the U.S. could not concur in that part of his plan which would establish a UNC military government. It was also agreed to recommend to the President that the U.S. authorize the offering to the ROK Government of a mutual defense treaty, along the lines of our current Philippine and ANZUS treaties, and conditioned upon the ROK Government agreeing to acceptance of an armistice along the lines most recently proposed by UNC, to cooperating in implementation of an armistice agreement, and to leaving its armed forces under operational control of CINCUNC until mutually agreed between the U.S. and the ROK that such arrangements were no longer necessary.

5. All of the conferees listed in paragraph 4 above, except the Under Secretary of State, then proceeded to the White House and met with the President in his office. The Secretary of State presented the gist of the recommendation concerning the offer of a bilateral U.S.–ROK security pact to Mr. Rhee, and the President promptly approved this recommendation. The conferees departed from the White House at about 1155. In the immediately ensuing discussion of this same subject, Mr. Dulles indicated to General Collins that, in his opinion, the message to General Clark, which was to inform him of our disapproval of the establishment of a UNC military government, should be a brief message without going too much into detail. In event of internal ROK political or miltary disaffection against the present ROK Government, he should be authorized to take whatever other measures he as the military commander might deem appropriate to safeguard the integrity and security of his forces. Also it was agreed that General Collins, Mr. Johnson, and General Eddleman should prepare promptly the necessary messages to General Clark and submit them to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense for approval prior to transmission.

6. Shortly after the conference with the President, General Eddleman and Mr. Johnson met with General Collins in his office and agreed as to the format and contents of the messages to be transmitted to General Clark. It was decided to send the message pertaining to the bilateral agreement separate from the one pertaining to instructions for General Clark in the event of an emergency arising from difficulties within the ROK Government. The drafts of these messages were completed about 1330 and were concurred in by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Nash, and Mr. Sullivan from OSD. In addition, Mr. Nash concurred for the Secretary of Defense in both messages to General Clark. Mr. Johnson departed for Mr. Dulles' home about 1400 to clear both messages with him. General Eddleman apprised Admiral Libby of the Navy and General Harris of the Air Force

of the nature and scope of these messages and offered them the opportunity to read them and comment thereon, should they so desire.

7. Mr. Johnson returned to General Eddleman's office at 1500 and informed him of the changes Mr. Dulles wished to make in the messages. The changes were non-substantive in character and General Eddleman incorporated them into the messages, informing General Collins by telephone that he had done so.

8. The two messages were dispatched to General Clark in the late afternoon of 30 May with emergency precedence. The one pertaining to the bilateral treaty was numbered DA 940241;[6] the other, pertaining to the security of his forces, was numbered DA 940242.[7]

C. D. EDDLEMAN
Major General, GS

---

[6] Dated May 30, p. 1122.
[7] Dated May 30, p. 1123.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 1, 1953.

Subject: Additional United Nations Forces for Korea

References:
A. NSC 118/2 (Paragraphs 2–*a*(3) and 2–*b*(7))[1]
B. NSC 147 (Paragraphs 168–180)[2]
C. NSC Action No. 759–*b*[3]

At the direction of the President the attached letter from Ambassador Lodge is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Council at an early meeting.

The current policy of the United States on the subject is as follows (NSC 118/2):

> *a.* In the event an armistice is achieved: "Exert vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN members of forces to the UN command in Korea so long as UN forces are required in Korea."
>
> *b.* In the event that armistice negotiations clearly fail: "Exert vigorous efforts to obtain increased military forces from those countries already participating as well as to obtain contributions from UN countries which have not yet contributed military forces".

On April 8, 1953, the Council considered changing current practice with respect to seeking reimbursement from nations maintaining forces in Korea for the costs of logistical support furnished them by the United States. The Council agreed that "current practice regarding reimbursement by the United States for logistic support of other UN forces in Korea should be continued for the time being" (NSC Action No. 759-*b*).

---

[1] For text of NSC 118/2, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, Part 1, p. 1382.
[2] Dated Apr. 2; for text of paragraphs 168–171 and 173–180, see pp. 850–857.
[3] For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.

The arguments for reconsideration of the Council's decision on April 8, and for undertaking now a renewed effort to secure additional forces from UN members for service in Korea are set forth in Ambassador Lodge's letter.

The Council's attention is invited to the importance of the question of the timing of the proposed effort.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Attachment]

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President

SECRET NEW YORK, May 19, 1953.

DEAR GENERAL: The purpose of this letter is to propose that the United States start a renewed and vigorous campaign to get more troops from other members of the United Nations for service in Korea.

The reasons are as follows:

1. We would thereby reduce our own part in the load of combat.
2. Respect in this country for our allies and other members of the United Nations would be increased.
3. Respect for the United Nations as an effective instrument against aggression would be increased because the unjust criticism of the United Nations for not having supplied enough allies—and which was not the fault of the United Nations—would be lessened.
4. A larger number of countries would become committed by deeds to the United Nations principle of collective resistance to aggression, which would be of great value in case of any future aggression.
5. Additional troops would thus become available for occupation duties in Korea.
6. Thus larger numbers than otherwise of our own troops could be returned home and made available for service elsewhere.
7. It would also facilitate carrying out our military program within the limits of prospective economies.
8. There are real reasons for believing that more troops *could* be obtained so that this effort would, therefore, be a success. For example, I received a wholly unsolicited hint from Colombia to this effect.
9. Such a policy would be pleasing to countries which can send troops, but cannot send dollars or matériel.
10. The country expects leadership to secure additional effective allies and to lessen the drain on American manpower in Korea.
11. Assuming a successful outcome of the current armistice negotiations, this would be a good time to approach other governments since

their troops sent to Korea would presumably not run the usual risks of active military operations.

The steps to be undertaken are as follows:

1. The Defense and State Departments should revise policy decisions taken on this matter under the previous Administration which made unrealistic requirements concerning the providing by foreign governments of financial and logistic support. As I have already pointed out to you, these requirements in effect eliminated foreign troops which might otherwise have become available. In one policy statement the Defense Department justified this decision on the ground that there was no longer urgency about the war in Korea—a position which, I think, was not supported by the electorate last November.
2. The Defense Department should also determine what would be the smallest unit that would be militarily *bearable* rather than *desirable.* In negotiations with other governments we might initially ask for more, but should be prepared to take less (down to the bearable unit) if forced to do so.
3. The State Department should undertake a bilateral approach to all members of the United Nations who have not contributed forces and even to many of those who have, but could contribute more. A resolution in the United Nations General Assembly should not be introduced initially as it could be used by the Communists to cause friction among free nations.
4. I should help vigorously in my relations with other delegations here and, if my contemplated trip to Korea and Indochina in July takes place, might take it up with the governments of the countries which I visit.
5. General Van Fleet might be sent on a trip to selected capitals around the world to help out.

The timing of the matter can be judged by an event which occurred recently when I received more than eighty members of Congress and their families at the United Nations for breakfast sightseeing, and a session at which I agreed to answer all questions. The question which made by far the greatest impression was that of Representative Widnall of New Jersey who said that: "The greatest disappointment of the American people seems to be in the minor participation of other countries in the Korean war", and who asked whether any steps were currently being taken to try to secure a greater participation on the part of other nations both with respect to personnel and matériel.

This was not only the outstanding question of the session, but it was also the question which the press stressed above all others.

Senator McCarthy has just announced that he will sponsor an amendment to the Bill making appropriations for the United Nations, reducing the United States contribution in inverse ratio to the amount of troops contributed. While this is a thoroughly fallacious proposal, it does reflect a strong public feeling that our allies are not doing enough—a feeling which will surely be raised in Congress.

Public announcement can be made when the issue arises in Congress that the Administration is actively working to develop more troops. Later it should be possible to make press releases on actual troop increases. A public appeal by the President should be carefully studied.

For all the reasons stated above, I recommend that you move promptly to take the lead.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

P.S. I am sending an information copy of this letter to Foster Dulles, with whom I have discussed the subject generally in the past, to Bobby Cutler and to Jerry Persons.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TOKYO, June 2, 1953—6:16 p. m.

CX 62781. 1. Rhee's msg[2] is milder in tone and restraint than was expected and he has omitted any ref to the Korean POWs or to the 5-nation custodial comm. It seems to us that the obvious care with which it was drafted is indicative of decision on his part to avoid plunging into reckless adventure. The 4 maj conditions to which he limits himself are:

a. Mutual Def Pact.
b. Mil and economic support.
c. Retention of US air and naval forces. (*Note:* In view of his fourth point we interpret this to mean in the immediate area but outside Korea.)
d. Simultaneous withdrawal of UN and Chinese and Communist forces from Korea.

2. On the basis of our present instr, we apparently are prepared to give satisfaction on 3 of them. The fourth—the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and UN forces—is worthy of careful examination. Our immediate reaction (we only recd the text of Rhee's msg in Tokyo 2 June at 1200) is that depending on Communist reply to UN 25 May proposal, Rhee's fourth condition re withdrawal of forces might be met by offering at an aprop time in plenary sessions a proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and UN forces. If this order is made, it should be understood, and this should be frankly explained to Rhee and our allies, that this issue will not be permitted to become a breaking point in negotiations. If this offer is not acptd by the Communists and there is little hope the Communists would acpt, we would an-

---

[1] This telegram was also sent to Briggs for his exclusive information.

[2] The reference was to Rhee's letter to President Eisenhower, May 30, p. 1124.

nounce in plenary session our determination to support such a proposition ASAP at the polit conf where a peaceful settlement of the Korean ques is to be sought. We are confident that Rhee has no faith whatever in the ability of a polit conf to settle this or other maj issues involved in the Korean ques.

3. We remain convinced that offer to negotiate scty pact with Rhee should be deferred until after Panmunjom meeting scd 4 June. If Communists reject UN 25 May proposal, it would then be nec to review entire sit and our difficulties with ROK would no doubt be absorbed in whatever decision we then take. If on the other hand, it appears we are close to an agreement on PW issue, Briggs and I agree that we should meet with Rhee on 5 June and give him aprop assurances on scty pact, mil and economic aid, and retention outside Korea of US air and naval forces in *status quo.*

4. In summary, while Rhee shows determination to gain his objectives, and manifests unconcealed disdain for what he chooses to term appeasement, modulation of tone of his msg and circumspection with which he personally had acted alleviate some of apprehension as to emotional and reckless acts. Rhee's msg although premised falsely on proposition that UN started to settle the Korean problem by mil means is relatively more favorable than we had feared.

5. It is our opinion that Rhee should refrain at this stage from public announcement his psn just as we are refraining on our side during period of exec session. In this connection, I concur in steps taken by Briggs to avoid publicity.

6. Murphy concurs in this msg.

795.00/6-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT Moscow, June 3, 1953—4 p. m.

1668. Eyes only for Secretary. Molotov asked me to call at 1 p.m., today and made the following oral statement to me (I listened to it in Russian and then checked it carefully as given in English by the interpreter and following is virtually verbatim):

> "The Soviet Government has taken note of the information you gave to me on May 28, concerning the armistice talks at Panmunjom; as you know the outcome of these talks does not depend on us, but it has been noted with satisfaction that the path to the successful conclusion of these armistice talks has been mapped out."

---

[1] Bohlen reproduced the gist of this message and gave the immediate background to the approach in his *Witness to History, 1929–1969*, pp. 349–351.

Molotov has made this statement with great care and had obviously learned it by heart but showed no disposition at all to elaborate and I did not consider it wise to question since presumably we will have the answer as to its full significance in the actual negotiations at Panmunjom. I merely expressed appreciation for his statement and told him I would report it immediately to my government and that if it meant an armistice in Korea it was good news to which observation he made no comment.

Would appreciate being kept currently informed by special message of Communist position at Panmunjom.

BOHLEN

795.00/6-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PUSAN, June 3, 1953—6 p. m.

1390. Department pass Tokyo; repeated information priority Tokyo 413 (for Ambassador Murphy and General Clark).

President Rhee's May 30 letter[1] does not give me confidence that offer of mutual security pact will reconcile him to armistice based on United Nations proposal or gain us other assurances we would require from him in return for such a pact (paragraph 2, Department Army cable 940241, May 30[2]). Although I agree with Clark that we are now technically authorized to meet three out of Rhee's four demands, and consideration can be given to possibility supporting his fourth and most important requirement—withdrawal of Chinese Communists—if Communists do not accept May 25 proposal, Rhee at moment appears to be speaking in entirely different context from ourselves. His requirements are for certain agreements from us prior to a cease-fire based on withdrawal Chinese Communist and United Nations forces, not on basis armistice along lines May 25 proposal and assurances to be obtained in accordance DA 940241. This is wide gap to be bridged. Rhee's proposal implies Koreans would be left to themselves in solving thorny armistice problems such as POW repatriation (presumably non-repatriated North Koreans would be immediately released by ROK) and in dealing with problem of unification of Korea. I doubt whether he anticipates US would commit itself to security pact, support of 20 divisions ROK Army and provision of naval and air support without limitations or conditions on ROK freedom of action, but that is position from which he now appears to be negotiating.

It is my impression Rhee expects Communist acceptance of UN proposal at June 4 Panmunjom meeting and is readying his proposal for this eventuality. As indicated in Rhee's letter his proposal may be made public at time he considers most advantageous to him. Chances of negotiating compromise along lines authorized DA 940241 would be correspondingly diminished by publication ROK proposal.

---

[1] *Ante*, p. 1124.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1122.

I therefore believe Clark and I should not defer further approach to Rhee beyond June 5 and, subject to outcome June 4 Panmunjom meeting, would present position authorized DA 940241 as our final position (which I assume it to be since he will be informed there can be no change in May 25 proposal). In event Communist rejection UN proposal I agree with Clark we should immediately review entire situation and consider action vis-à-vis Rhee in this context.

One subject which has not been discussed (except in general terms and with specific reference to 20 ROK divisions) is economic aid that might be forthcoming from US for Korean reconstruction and assistance. Although President Rhee must recognize that such aid may well be largely withheld or at any rate considerably curtailed in measure in which Rhee fails to cooperate in immediate future I suggest it would be useful in order for Rhee to have full understanding of direction his opposition to armistice is leading for subject to be broached at next meeting that General Clark and I have with him.

BRIGGS

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953"

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 3, 1953—8:45 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DA 940543. From CSUSA for CINCUNC exclusive for General Clark. Pass to US Ambassador, Pusan exclusive for Amb Briggs. Refs CX 62781,[1] Pusan's 1390[2] repeated Tokyo as Pusan's 413. The following are joint State–Defense instructions:

1. Concur that if following 4 June Panmunjom meeting your assessment situation is that we are close to agreement on PW issue Briggs and you should meet with Rhee on 5 June. It is left to your discretion after consultation with Briggs as to whether Rhee's attitude at that meeting is such that it would serve useful purpose to make offer of Mutual Defense Treaty as authorized by DA 940241.[3] In any case, you can renew assurances on military and economic aid and maintenance US forces in Western Pacific on long-term basis in accordance with instructions contained State tel 2740 Tokyo (repeated Pusan as 723[4])

---

[1] Dated June 2, p. 1132.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated May 30, p. 1122.

[4] Dated May 22, p. 1086.

and approved text subsequent *aide-mémoire*. If on other hand, it does not appear we are close to agreement on POW issue, 5 June meeting with Rhee would be unnecessary.

2. As we analyze Rhee's proposal in 30 May letter for simultaneous withdrawal UN and Chinese forces it appears he is now seeking an armistice agreement which would provide for such simultaneous withdrawal leaving the now superior ROK forces to deal with North Korean forces, and a Mutual Defense Treaty with the US which would assure him of US intervention if Chinese Communists or the Soviets again came to aid of North Koreans. If this is in fact Rhee's intent, it is of course not in accord with the conditions set forth in DA 940241 which must be met prior to offering him a mutual defense treaty. Apart from foregoing consideration view here is that now to introduce into armistice negotiations concept of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces would jeopardize maintenance our present position in negotiations.

3. In connection with Rhee's proposal in this regard following points should be made as appropriate:

a. US and UNC have consistently taken position question withdrawal forces political in character and beyond competence of commanders on spot to discuss or reach binding agreements. Forces are ordered into Korea by decisions of governments and not commanders. Proposal for withdrawal foreign forces has been consistently advanced by Communists and resolutely opposed by UNC in armistice negotiations as well as by US in discussions at UN.

b. In order assure security of ROK, US and UNC have consistently taken position that there should be no commitment to withdraw all UN forces until ROK and UNC satisfied regarding security of ROK.

c. Actual presence of UNC forces in Korea is additional deterrent against renewal of attack.

d. If all UNC forces withdrawn would mean dissolution of UNC and complete loss of UN character present military action.

e. Continued presence of UNC forces during political conference will improve bargaining position of ROK and UN delegations at conference.

f. Under Article 60 the Armistice Agreement, both sides are committed to discussion question withdrawal foreign forces and it is intent US to do all possible in such conference to bring about withdrawal Communist Chinese forces under conditions which will present minimum hazard to ROK and UNC. Political conference will, of course, also give ROK opportunity to participate in discussions of and decisions on this difficult question.

g. Dissolution of UNC as responsible UN agent for armistice would vitiate international character armistice agreement as presently envisaged and leave to ROK burden its administration.

h. Dissolution UNC and disbandment its constituent forces would undermine basis for proposed greater sanctions statement which is not only important to ROK but also to US and US ability enter in mutual security treaty with ROK.

i. Withdrawal of UN forces would mean the disbandment of the vast supply organization and facilities now provided by 8th Army and KCOMZ to back up ROK units. Without the support of these installations and their technicians the ROK Divisions would be stranded.

4. In connection with continued economic aid to ROK if you and Briggs consider it helpful you are authorized in your discretion to point out that failure to reach understanding with him and his Government on armistice would jeopardize the foundation upon which US Government now examining economic aid requirements for ROK. Unilateral continuation of hostilities by ROK would make it impossible for US and other UN governments continue economc aid to ROK.

5. Strictly for info you and Briggs, President does not intend immediately to reply to Rhee's 30 May letter.

Editorial Note

Because the Communist Delegation requested and received a 3-day postponement for administrative reasons, the plenary sessions at Panmunjom did not reconvene until June 4. At the meeting on that date, the Communist Delegation submitted a counterproposal which accepted most of the provisions of the UNC proposal of May 25. The Communists continued to insist on ten explainers per thousand POWs; but perhaps more important was their revised language vis-à-vis prisoners who did not choose repatriation, which read as follows:

> "The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the release from prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the political conference within 120 days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who elect to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Red Cross Society of India."

A record of this session can be found in telegram CX 62808 (HNC 1715), Clark to JCS, June 4, 1953, not printed. In telegram CX 62821, June 4, 1953, to the JCS, not printed, Clark commented on the points of the counterproposal and stated that he was going to Korea the next day to confer with Ambassador Briggs regarding the meeting with President Rhee scheduled for the afternoon of June 5. (Both in Matthews files, lot 53 D 413) See also Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* pages 430–431 and Vatcher, *Panmunjom,* page 193.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1953.

Subject: Communist Proposal

In connection with our telephone conversation this afternoon,[2] the following are Murphy's comments on the June 4 Communist proposal.

"1. Initial examination of Communist proposal indicates substantial acceptance of UN May 25 proposal. In some respects example formula for release non-repatriates to civilian status far exceeds our most optimistic expectation.

"2. Barring unforeseen developments, it appears that PW issue has been solved.

"3. Results June 4 meeting will be relayed by Clark to Rhee June 5, 1500. If circumstances justify, Rhee would then be given our assurances on security treaty.

"4. Murphy has recommended that at close of Executive Session a joint UN-Communist communiqué on PW agreement be issued to avoid conflict of interpretation. Murphy has recommended to Clark, who agrees, that US personnel now supervising PW camps be augmented by mixture of other UN personnel. Thus if ROK resistance encountered US will not be pin-pointed and will share whatever burdens may develop with our Allies. Clark and Murphy suspect at some point ROK's may seek engineer irregular release of some North Korean non-repatriated PW's.

"5. Clark expects some days may be absorbed in discussion demarkation line due ebb and flow of battle during past weeks.

"6. Clark and Murphy foresee little hindrance to consummation agreement shortly."

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

---

[1] A copy of this memorandum, located in file 795.00/6–453, indicated that Dulles himself drafted this communication for the President.

[2] Murphy's comments, which are summarized in this memorandum, were contained in telegram 3798 from Tokyo, June 4, 1953, not printed. (795.00/6–453) No record was found of this telephone conversation.

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Political Annex to NSC 147 Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1953.

1. NSC Action 794[2] calls for an evaluation by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications of the recommended course of action. This involves a brief analysis of the probable attitudes and reactions of—

a. Allies of the United States, especially the NATO members;
b. The Soviet bloc;
c. The neutral states, especially India.

General Basis for Evaluation

2. For the purpose of this evaluation, it is assumed that the United States would adhere to the proposed course of action despite the possible reactions of allied and other nations.

3. The attitudes and reactions of the various nations may be much affected by the timing and extent of their knowledge about the proposed course of action. As outlined, the plan calls for maximum secrecy in order to capitalize on surprise. Certain factors, however, will work strongly against effective secrecy:

a. During period of build-up, estimated by JCS at nine months to a year, it would be more and more difficult to conceal the extent and nature of the expansion in military forces and supplies, and its probable purpose, especially in view of the necessity of obtaining additional funds from the Congress. (JCS Appendix,[3] paras (*c*) and (*e*))

b. The plan proposes to notify our Allies of the general course of action and to seek their concurrence. If for no other reason, this would be necessary to explain diversion of equipment from NATO. Since this could not be postponed beyond the time when the military build-up became a matter of public knowledge in the United States, they would have such notice several months or more before the time fixed for action. (JCS Appendix, paras (*b*) and (*d*))

Accordingly, while it should be possible to conceal the precise date fixed for action or its exact scope and nature, it seems realistic to assume, for the purpose of this analysis, that the American public, our Allies, and the Soviet bloc would be aware for several months of a substantial build-up and of its probable purpose.

---

[1] In a covering note by Bowie to Smith, dated June 5, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff noted that this annex had been approved by Matthews, Merchant, Barbour, Johnson, and MacArthur. After approval by Dulles and Smith—an initialed marginal notation in Smith's handwriting read "Noted & approved"—it was to be sent to the NSC. A note in an unidentified hand on this covering note by Bowie indicated that the annex was sent to the NSC.

[2] For NSC Action No. 794, see the memorandum of discussion at 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.

[3] Reference was to the Appendix to a JCS memorandum of May 19, p. 1063.

Reaction of Free European and Commonwealth Countries

4. The reaction of each country in Europe would be directly related to:

a. Its estimate of its own exposure in the event of a Soviet attack in Europe;
b. Treaty obligations linking it to the United States; and
c. The present state of national morale which, in turn, to a large extent is a product of the first two factors.

5. The first response almost certainly would be—

a. Fear that the risk of Soviet reaction in the form of a military offensive against Western Europe would markedly increase; and
b. A loss of confidence in American leadership as impetuous and disregardful of the consequences of its actions to them.

6. To the extent that shipments of end-items and particularly ammunition were reduced below expectations, their sense of exposure would correspondingly increase. If American air, ground, or naval forces should be withdrawn for redeployment in the Far East, that would critically affect their will to fight.

7. In attempting to distinguish in degree the effect, country by country, a vital factor is the present extent of neutralist sentiment particularly where rooted in defeat in World War II and subsequent occupation. The paramount fear of the population in countries which were occupied during or after World War II is the fear of another occupation. There is the gravest doubt that many countries in Europe would fight if they were convinced in advance that initial defeat was probable and that it could only look forward to a future liberation.

8. Knowing of the proposed action in advance, our NATO allies and Germany would certainly attempt to exert the strongest pressure on the United States not to take such action, both by diplomatic means and public statements. In the end their positions would probably become so firmly and publicly fixed that the United States would be faced with choosing directly between Allied and neutral support and the pursuit of the proposed course of action. In view of this fact, taking the action would have a profound impact on our Allies and on many sections of American opinion. It would be construed as a decision to follow our own policy at the expense of the coalition in case a choice were necessary.

9. Within the NATO alliance the reactions are likely to be as follows:

a. The U.K. could be expected to use all of its influence to modify our course. Failing success, she would in all probability cast in her lot with ours with reluctance and bitterness. Canada would surely follow Great Britain in that case, and might align itself with us even if Great Britain refused.
b. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Norway would be of doubtful reliability, but would all be importantly influenced by the British reaction.

c. Turkey could be expected to remain staunch, as Greece probably would.

d. Iceland would weaken in its willingness to afford us base rights but might hold if the U.K. and Canada stood firm.

e. Denmark is the weakest member in morale and would probably withdraw from NATO *de facto* if not *de jure*.

f. Portugal would be largely influenced by the position of Spain and the U.K.

10. a. Germany, unarmed and with a weakened NATO, would likely seek strenuously to modify our course; its final position would be difficult to predict since so much would depend on how the Soviets exploited the situation.

b. Yugoslavia might recede from its developing ties with the West and move toward a more neutral position.

c. Spain would raise its price but would probably stand with the U.S. if promised protection and substantial and prompt shipments of end-items.

11. Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland would remain neutral, but might well tend toward more benevolence toward the Soviet Union.

12. Australia might oppose the action less than the other dominions. New Zealand would probably follow the British lead. The Union of South Africa would be highly doubtful.

13. In summary, it would appear probable at best that NATO would suffer losses on its northern flank, neutralist sentiment everywhere on the Continent would be gravely increased thereby weakening public support for such governments as decided to stand with the U.S., and in the key country, Great Britain, the Labor Party could be expected to gain heavily, with Bevan's chances for gaining its leadership notably enhanced.

Reaction of Other Allied and Associated Nations

14. The use of Japanese bases for air attacks, particularly atomic attacks, will raise in Japan considerable concern over their being subject to retaliatory attacks. While the present Yoshida government would probably desire to support whatever policy the U.S. adopted, the government has a very slender and shaky working majority and it is difficult to predict what the ultimate political results in Japan would be.

15. The Philippines could be expected loyally to support the U.S. action.

16. No significant opposition need be expected from Latin America.

17. The ultimate effect on the Free World is difficult to predict. If the action did not provoke large-scale Soviet reaction and the United States obtained a quick victory, there would be much greater likelihood that the sharp cleavages among the Allies could be patched up. However, the factors stated in paragraph 8 would be likely to leave perma-

nent scars. The Allies and neutrals who felt that our action showed that we were prepared to create serious risks for their security in going our own way would doubtless be more chary of our leadership in the future. Of course, if our judgment was sustained by success, the effect would be somewhat mitigated by showing that the risk or danger was not as great as they had anticipated. Even so, the experience would probably make the Allies much less willing to rely on us to take account of the interest of the coalition as a whole as contrasted with our own views. In other words, the bitterness and doubt created by the dispute would not be wholly dissipated even under the best outcome. And, of course, if the action was protracted or the Soviet reaction violent, especially in a different area, the consequences on the coalition would be even more marked.

Soviet Reaction

18. During the preparatory period, the Soviets would exploit to the maximum, psychologically and diplomatically, any and all emerging signs of divergence between the Free World Allies. They could be expected to carry such exploitation to the point of serious risk of precipitating general conflict in an effort to frighten those Free World elements susceptible thereof and to weaken the alliance against them to the point of disintegration.

19. The Soviet reaction to the action itself would no doubt be importantly affected by their appraisal of Western intentions. As already indicated, it would not be possible to conceal from them the necessary build-up, but they might well be uncertain as to the scope and purpose of the action. If the Soviet Union knew that the purpose of the action was limited, it may be presumed that its reaction would be commensurately tempered. On the other hand, the combined effect of the feints and diversionary actions, the weapons, and the surprise in so far as achieved might mislead them as to our intentions. For example, they might consider the move as an opening step toward the liberation of the whole of China. Such an evaluation might greatly magnify the scale of the Soviet reaction.

20. Factors which would induce the Soviets to react strongly to such an action include:

a. The proximity of the operations to Soviet frontiers and Vladivostok;
b. The special compulsion on the new Soviet leaders not to be less forceful in defendng the Soviet Empire than Stalin;
c. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance which provides for the Soviets to go to the assistance of China in the event of attack on the latter by a power allied with Japan; and
d. Soviet special interest in Manchuria.

21. Soviet reaction might take several forms and would not necessarily be confined to the Far Eastern theater.

22. It is believed the Soviets would not consciously decide to embark on general war. However, their reaction would undoubtedly be sufficiently vigorous to create a major risk of initiating a spiral of action and reaction which could result in world-wide conflict.

23. In the Far East, the Soviets might well react by direct Soviet military intervention; probably, initially at least, air and naval (submarines). As a minimum they might make airfields inside the Soviet Union available to the "Chinese". If considered desirable to preserve further the fiction of Soviet government non-involvement Soviet air "volunteers" might be openly engaged and be utilized throughout the whole range of operations.

24. In Europe, Soviet thinking accords primacy to Germany. The Soviets would be aware that direct Soviet military action there would involve conflict with U.S. forces and would thus involve maximum risk of precipitating general war. They might estimate, however, that increased involvement of the U.S. militarily in the Far East plus the weakened situation of the Western European alliance arising from the stresses and strains incident to this development created conditions suitable for the exertion by them of serious new pressures against the Western position in Germany, particularly in Berlin.

25. The situation in Iran and the isolation and weakness of Afghanistan also suggest possible fields for Soviet diversionist reactions.

26. On the other hand, there is a possibility that knowledge of the build-up, whether accompanied by notification or not, could induce the Soviets to agree to terminate Korean hostilities.

Reaction of Communist China

27. It is just possible that knowledge of the build-up for the action might lead the Chinese Communists to attempt to conclude an armistice along the lines of the present draft armistice. Allied pressures to agree to such an armistice at that time would be very strong and the U.S. would therefore be faced with the decision as to whether at that point it would still be willing to agree to such an armistice.

28. Once the action has begun the Chinese Communists would recognize that the action, if successful, would involve at the minimum a severe deflation of their political and military prestige both at home and abroad. They would, therefore, react to the maximum of their capabilities and increase their demands upon the Soviets for aid. Particularly if the hostilities develop adversely from their viewpoint, they would attempt to invoke the Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1950.

29. If within their military capabilities, the Chinese might attempt offensive counteraction such as against Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, as well as against Hong Kong.

30. The action would greatly intensify the strain upon China's slender military industry and transportation potential. This would exacerbate the economic difficulties faced by the regime. It is impossible to predict the effects this might have in terms of the ability of the regime to continue to exercise effective control over their country. However, the regime could be expected to exploit to the maximum the xenophobia of the Chinese people to maintain its control.

Reaction of Asian Neutrals

31. If it appeared to them that enlargement of the scope and scale of hostilities was entirely at the initiative of the United States, Asian neutral reaction would probably be strongly adverse. U.S. relations in particular with Indonesia, Burma and India as well as with other countries of the "Arab-Asian bloc" would be very strained until the action was successfully completed. In particular they would react severely to offensive use of Chinese Nationalist forces and to any indications that the intent of the U.S. was to restore the Chinese Nationalists to the mainland and bring about a renewal of the Chinese civil conflict with the objective of overthrowing the Chinese Communist regime.

32. However, if the action were quickly successful, Chinese Communist prestige in the area would be greatly diminished and fear of Chinese Communist military aggression reduced. U.S. prestige would correspondingly be increased and, with careful handling, U.S. influence in the area enhanced.

795.00/6–553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET SEOUL,[1] June 5, 1953—5:50 p. m.
NIACT

DTG 050850Z. (Army Message) Repeated information CINCUNC for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy AmEmbassy Pusan from General Clark and Briggs.

We met with President Rhee for approximately one hour this afternoon, acting Foreign Minister Pyun present. Rhee's position is that within next day or two he will issue ROK statement along lines his May 30 letter,[2] but will not make precipitate move against armistice, or take unilateral action with ROK troops at least at this time.

Clark began by summarizing armistice position, describing meeting yesterday as virtual Communist acceptance May 25 UNC proposal.

---

[1] During the summer of 1953, the South Korean Government continued to transfer its operations from Pusan to Seoul. With President Rhee and his ministers in Seoul, Ambassador Briggs found it expedient to move himself and part of the Embassy to Seoul. Telegrams from Briggs and his staff were therefore sent through Army channels directly to Washington.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1124.

This was followed by a statement by Briggs that we had returned to Rhee as friends of Korea to invite him once more to join with other countries associated with ROK during past three years in establishing honorable armistice, conclusion of which declared now imminent. Armistice is designed constitute first step toward peace and unification of Korea, giving Korea in meantime opportunity bind wounds and begin hard task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In this connection US Government prepared to pledge close and vigorous collaboration in forthcoming political conference as set forth May 25 conversation[3] and confirmed by May 27 *aide-mémoire.*[4] We also authorized to reiterate assurance of military and economic aid, and maintenance of American Forces in Western Pacific on long-time basis, provided assurance received of Korean cooperation likewise as set forth in *aide-mémoire.*

Rhee replied by lengthy statement along now familiar lines declaring armistice proposals represent appeasement, Communist victory, first step toward World War III, et cetera, including outline of views as set forth his May 30 letter. Rhee's major emphasis in this exposition was on simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese Communist and UN forces without which he said no peace or unification possible and toward which he refused recognize proposed political conference can make progress.

He said he preferred not consider reasons US Government might have against withdrawal but he was left in no doubt as to Washington views that withdrawal is out of question as part of armistice terms, even though we of course agreed with Rhee that withdrawal together with unification constitute ultimate US objectives. Rhee then said that since Communists have made proposals and US/UNC has made proposals he believes it only fair for ROK to have opportunity make public its proposal, thereby placing ROK views before world, and that it is now his intention to do so. When in connection with discussion of views set forth in May 30 letter, Rhee mentioned mutual defense treaty, we asked whether assuming it might be possible at appropriate time to negotiate such agreement, ROK support of armistice terms on that basis could be anticipated. Although this question was put to Rhee several times, he declined to answer it, continuing to declare instead that he wished to place ROK views before world through statement, as next ROK move.

Since implication of what Rhee said was clearly that nothing short of withdrawal would satisfy him, Clark and Briggs agreed during brief recess in discussion that it would not be desirable at this juncture to propose mutual defense treaty as authorized in DA 940241 May 30 and DA 940543 June 3.[5]

---

[3] This conversation was reported in telegram 250539Z from Seoul, May 25, p. 1097.
[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3 to telegram 250539Z, p. 1098.
[5] *Ante,* pp. 1122 and 1135, respectively.

We informed Rhee that while we did not contest his right to make public statement should he be determined to do so, statement in question would be widely interpreted as split in united front hitherto maintained in Korea against Communists and as such would give them much satisfaction (a point promptly contradicted by Pyun). Beyond that, we anticipated statement would have certain other effects and requested indication President's views as to steps that might follow. Rhee again declined to be drawn into any discussion of ROK steps contemplated after issue of statement, and conversation ended on that note, except for additional remarks by Pyun, who spoke of question attacking UNC armistice proposals. When we pointed out this was altogether different matter from what Rhee had stated earlier, President did not back up Pyun but limited himself to speaking again of making public ROK proposal.

Our conclusion from meeting is that although Rhee is absolutely determined to "speak his piece", he is proceeding cautiously and carefully and has probably not yet decided on steps to be taken after making public ROK views. Although he is permitting, perhaps even encouraging, Pyun to make inflammatory statements, we believe Rhee himself may be more circumspect and that possibility exists that having had his say, he may be prepared to go along with armistice as *fait accompli,* or at least not to attack it or to take unilateral action. On the other hand, early in our discussion, Rhee did refer to his opposition to entry of Indian troops "with 1,000, 10,000 or only 10", or to the entry of Communists into the rear areas of Korea.

Rhee clearly understands that issue is drawn and also that, unless he collaborates, he cannot expect to receive US support—military, economic or otherwise—which if he collaborated, American people would be glad to extend. On the other hand, it is perhaps encouraging that Rhee gave his personal assurance that no unilateral ROK step that might jeopardize the security of UNC forces will be taken without prior consultation.

We shall watch for suitable opportunity to offer mutual security treaty in return for required assurances of ROK armistice support, if situation develops in direction rendering this feasible.

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1953—3:50 p. m.

DA 940728. From CSUSA for CINCUNC. Pass to US Ambassador, Pusan, for Amb Briggs. This is joint State-Defense message.

1. Reference your 050850Z June.[1] We concur in your proposal to withhold offer of Mutual Defense Treaty until in your judgment it will be most effective in securing from Rhee assurances of ROK armistice support. However, the President is preparing a letter, which will be sent through you, to Rhee in reply to Rhee's letter of 30 May, in which the President will mention that you and Briggs, as his representatives on the ground, are prepared to discuss conditions under which we could arrange a Mutual Defense Treaty with ROK.

2. Ref CX 62821 [2] and DA 940674.[3] We are prepared to agree that Communist proposal, subject to clarification of para 8a and 8e, is acceptable basis for armistice. While it may be desirable to clarify certain other points as indicated in your CX 62821, we feel primary substantive points are those raised in paras 8a and 8e. Further study here of para 11 of Communist proposal confirms our belief that Communists should be informed that we accept this para literally as intended to be a forthright proposal and that it means what it says. Feeling here is that the procedure outlined in this para offers Chinese a face-saving device to cover the actual acceptance of no forcible repatriation.[4]

3. Rhee's proposed 6 June statement may produce some serious repercussions not only in ROK but in US. It is highly desirable that this be counteracted as promptly as possible. This can best be done by publication of agreed armistice terms. You should therefore proceed with armistice negotiations without delay as planned.

---

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1137.

[3] In this message dated June 4, Clark's superiors, commenting on the revised language of the Communist proposal concerning nonrepatriates, advised him to assume that the text meant what it said and that the UNC should not seek clarification; see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front,* p. 431.

[4] Reference was to a portion of paragraph 11, telegram CX 62808, June 4, quoted in the editorial note, p. 1137.

795.00/6-553

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1953.

Subject: U.K. Adherence to Greater Sanctions Statement

Participants: Mr. F.S. Tomlinson—British Embassy
FE— U. Alexis Johnson

With reference to our previous discussions concerning British adherence to the Greater Sanctions Statement, Mr. Tomlinson today brought me the attached text of a telegram to the Embassy from the Foreign Office:

---

[1] A note by O'Connor on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on June 8.

[Here follows the text of a United Kingdom Foreign Office telegram in which the British Government expressed its willingness to stand by the original arrangements for the Greater Sanctions Statement made in January 1952. The British Government did hope, however, that the timing and method of release of the statement would reflect the changed circumstances prevailing at the time of the signature of the armistice.]

I told Mr. Tomlinson that I presumed that the British willingess to stand by the "original arrangement" provided for public adherence to the statement within 24 hours of the signing of the armistice in accordance with procedures originally agreed to. I said that we did not consider that a "confidential" notification was satisfactory and that unless I heard otherwise from them I would assume that they were prepared to sign and issue the statement as originally agreed.

UAJ

Editorial Note

The Republic of Korea's Delegate to the armistice talks at Panmunjom, Major General Choi Duk Shin, who had been boycotting the plenary sessions since May 15, 1953, was recalled by his government on June 7, 1953. Choi and his entire staff left Munsan-ni; no Koreans remained in the United Nations Command base camp. (Telegram C 62874, CINCUNC to JCS, June 7, 1953; Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

795.00/6–753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

SEOUL, June 7, 1953—5 p. m.

Unnumbered, DTG 070800Z. Repeated information CINCUNC (for General Clark and Ambassador Murphy). General Clark and I delivered President's letter [1] to President Rhee as scheduled this afternoon.

Prior delivering letter, we called attention offer relating mutual defense treaty, pointing out willingness begin discussion thereof as soon as armistice signed and accepted. We also informed Rhee that President intended make public his communication in Washington, and that Rhee accordingly free to do so here if he so desired. It was not, however, intended release in Washington text of Rhee's May 30 letter.

---

[1] The reference was to the letter of June 6; it contained an offer of a mutual defense treaty in return for South Korean acceptance of an armistice. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 377–380.

Rhee accepted letter stating that in view of source and importance he would prefer to defer reading it until alone, especially since he did not wish to make any comment at this time. We thereupon departed.

Our meeting took place shortly after Clark-Rhee meeting which will be reported separately by General on return to Tokyo this evening.[2] In meantime, he asks me to say that no progress was made and Rhee appeared as inflexible as ever with respect to opposition to armistice. During this meeting, Rhee in emotional state and spoke of leading people north to suicide if necessary. In contrast, Rhee subdued and calm during our presentation of President's letter.

BRIGGS

---

[2] See telegram CX 62890, *infra.*

FE files, lot 55 D 338, "Korean Political Conference, June 1953"

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET TOKYO, June 7, 1953—9:51 p. m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 62890. AmEmb Pusan exclusive for Briggs. CGArmyEight exclusive for Taylor. CINCUNC (Adv) exclusive for Harrison. CGAFFE (Main) exclusive for Kendall. CGKCOMZ exclusive for Herren.

1. I am dictating this supplementary message flying back to Tokyo. As I have previously reported in the short message sent from Seoul,[1] I made absolutely no progress in my effort to persuade Rhee to take a reasonable approach to the armistice terms. I have never seen him more distracted, wrought up, and emotional. He told me he was not feeling well, was tired and that he had not slept all night.

2. I told Rhee I had requested to see him alone in an attempt to reach an understanding on the problems which confront us. I impressed upon him that my government is determined to go ahead and conclude an armistice on our May 25 terms, that agreement on the POW question is imminent and that there are only a few remaining questions to be settled. I told him that the President of the United States is dispatching to him a letter[2] which Briggs and I would deliver later in the afternoon. I reiterated the steps the US is willing to take to support the ROK, short of continuing the fighting to secure the unification of Korea.

---

[1] The reference was to telegram GX 5715, Clark to JCS, June 7, 1953, in which Clark reported that he had met with Rhee, who was in lower spirits than ever before, and that he had made no progress. Clark discussed the offer of a mutual defense treaty, but Rhee expressed no interest and stated that he was prepared to take action as he saw fit if the United States signed an armistice. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra.*

3. I told Rhee that, inasmuch as an armistice probably would be consummated according to the terms which he has so often indicated would be unacceptable to him, I wanted to discuss with him the question of non-repatriate POWs particularly the Koreans, in an effort to secure his cooperation in their being taken over by the custodial commission. I explained that if he would cooperate in helping us explain to these POWs that my government would never be a party to their forceful repatriation, and with a little patience, those POWs who are determined not to return to Communism would be released to civilian status, the Koreans, if they so choose, in South Korea.

4. I explained that it would be better to concentrate these POWs on an island where the activities of the custodial personnel would be confined to a small area which would avoid any possible disturbances between them and the South Korean populace. Rhee interrupted and made crystal clear the following points:

a. That the US is making a great mistake in adopting these tactics of appeasement;
b. That the ROK government would never accept the present terms of the armistice.
c. That the ROKs would fight on, even if it meant suicide, and he would lead them.
d. That from any time hereafter he would feel free to take such steps as he deems appropriate.

I asked him to elaborate, but he was too emotional to do so. He did make one point with comparative composure in connection with possibility of consolidating Korean POWs. He said it would be much better to leave them where they are; not move them from present camps.

5. I asked Rhee if his statements meant withdrawing his troops from UN Command. He said not today or tomorrow, but he would feel free to take any action from now on. I told him how futile it would be for him to attempt to attack alone, for he would be unsuccessful and does not have the necessary logistical support, that it would result in destruction of himself and his country, and urged that he show the strong leadership he has displayed in the past and the kind his country expects of him now in such an emergency. He indicated that Korea would become another China; it is inevitable and he and his people may as well die now as later.

6. I indicated that Ambassador Briggs and I later would discuss a mutual defense treaty, as explained in the President's letter. He showed no interest, said it is too late, that Korea could not survive as long as we leave the Chinese Communists on Korean soil.

7. As Briggs has reported to you, we delivered the letter. Briggs again raised the offer of the mutual defense treaty, and again Rhee indicated no interest.

8. I am not yet ready to believe that Rhee will continue the catastrophic course down which he is now heading, but it must be clear to you, as it is to me, that he has the capability of violating the armistice terms to the great embarrassment of the UN. As I have previously reported, he can do this by any one of a number of methods, with limited preventative action we can take. In this connection, Rhee told me today that he could not permit Indian troops in his country. He stated that he would be willing to give protection to the non-Communist members of the custodial commission and that if we had turned the custodial task over to a real neutral like Switzerland at least one of our difficulties would not have arisen. Rhee also said that the POWs will not submit to indoctrination by the Communists persuaders.

9. To summarize, Rhee was utterly unreasonable and gave no ground whatsoever. He himself is the only one who knows how far he will go but undoubtedly he will bluff right up to the last.

10. I see no solution at this time, other than to await developments.

Editorial Note

On June 8, 1953, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison and General Nam Il signed the agreement which established the "Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" culminating 18 months of negotiations over Item 4 of the armistice agenda. For text of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 22, 1953, pages 866–868.

Index for Parts 1 and 2
Appears at End of
Part 2.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1984 O - 204-259